Chapter XII: The Defence of Rivas (11)

On the morning of the 2d of December the general-in-chief went aboard of the lake steamer, with a view of visiting Granada. Just before the anchor was hove, a courier from San Juan del Sur announced the arrival of the Orizaba with eighty men for Nicaragua. The steamer was getting under weigh when a small canoe, with three men in it, approached the vessel from the direction of Omotepe. The men from the canoe were taken aboard the steamer, and they reported that the Americans on the island had been attacked the night previously by a large body of Indians. The tale of these three persons was indistinct, but as they had been out during the night and were shivering from exposure to the damp, chilly air, it was more charitable to impute the confusion of their story to cold than to fear. The steamer was forthwith ordered to the island, and the general-in-chief took the most intelligent of the three fugitives to the cabin and dosing him with a half-tumblerful of whiskey, tried to get out of him the true state of affairs at Omotepe. All he could get out of the man was that every soul on the island, sick and wounded, women and children, had probably been murdered. The cowardly fellow was not ashamed to live and tell the tale.

As the steamer approached the island one of the large iron launches used by the Transit Company for loading freight and passengers was seen drifting in the lake, without sail or rudder, and filled with a crowd of men, women, and children, in all varieties of dress and humor. It was some comfort to see that everybody on the island was not killed; though the forlorn condition of the launch’s passengers was well fitted to excite pity and compassion. Among them, two or three ladies who had been delicately brought up, bore their trials and sufferings with more patience than the stoutest men; while some of the women, viragos in appearance, as soon as they were safely aboard the steamer, loosened their tongues and gave free play to their long-restrained feelings. Soon the steamer anchored off the village where Fry was quartered; and he immediately reported that the Indians had attacked the Americans merely to get a chance of rifling their trunks, and that they had disappeared not long after daylight. Some of the men capable of bearing arms, and even some officers, had disgraced themselves by deserting women and children, as well as the sick and wounded, at the first alarm. Two or three of these men, as they might by courtesy be called, escaped to the main land before the passengers by the Orizaba left Virgin Bay; and thus the report was sent to the United States that all the people of Omotepe had been massacred by the Indians.

Leaving the island and going to Granada, Walker remained there only long enough to see that Henningsen had reached the huts half way between the Guadalupe and the lake; then, returning to Virgin Bay, he proceeded to organize the new men who had arrived from California on the Orizaba. The spirits of Jaquess’ men had been revived by the arrival of these fresh recruits; and in a short time the main portion of the troops at Virgin Bay were ready for a march to San Jorge. On the afternoon of the 3d December, the Americans occupied San Jorge, without any opposition from Cañas, then at Rivas with some seven or eight hundred men. The sick at Virgin Bay, as well as the army stores and government property collected there, were carried to San Jorge on the lake steamers; and the fine air of that village, together with the improved quarters and rations, diminished the sick list and increased materially the effective force of the several companies.

When nearly the whole American strength in the Meridional Department had been concentrated at San Jorge, the hospital at Omotepe, together with the women and children there, were removed to the main land. Many of the native women and families had followed the army in its retreat from Granada, and many of these were supplied with quarters and rations by the proper officers of the Nicaraguan forces. The trunks and chests of most had suffered from the foray the Indians made on the island; but the delightful air of the isthmian December rendered the loss less severe than might be imagined.

In the meanwhile the steamer from New-Orleans arrived at San Juan del Norte with nearly two hundred and fifty passengers for Nicaragua. On the afternoon of the 6th these persons reached Virgin Bay; and on the morning of the 7th they arrived at San Jorge. They were mostly under the direction of Lockridge, who had gone to the United States during the previous summer to encourage emigration to Central America. A small company of these men, commanded by Captain G. W. Crawford, was assigned to the Rangers; while the remainder were organized into a new corps, called the Second Rifles, (the old Second Rifles being dissolved,) and placed under the command of Major W. P. Lewis. Crawford’s company were, for the most part, supplied with saddles and revolvers they had brought from the United States; and the rifle, commonly called Mississippi, was issued to them. Major Lewis’ men were armed with Minié muskets.

Lockridge had brought to San Jorge about 235 men; and these, together with the men from California, raised the number of recruits to more than 300. The men from California were, for the most part, distributed into two companies, commanded respectively by Capt. Farrell and Capt. Wilson. Farrell was ordered to report to Waters for duty with the Rangers; while Wilson was attached to the new command of Lewis. These fresh men were in good spirits, and all anxious to see some fighting. Nor had they long to wait for active service. Sanders was ordered to take Higley’s company, the strongest of Lewis’s command, and proceed to Granada with a view of ascertaining Henningsen’s position. It was supposed that Henningsen had probably been able to reach the lake; and if such were the case, Higley’s company would suffice to aid his embarkation. But Sanders returned and reported that Henningsen appeared not to have advanced further than the position he held between Guadalupe and the beach on the 2d; and it was certain that he was altogether unable to communicate with the lake shore. Rumors also came by the way of Nandaime, through native channels, to the effect that the Americans were suffering from disease and famine in the church of Guadalupe.

Accordingly on the 11th, Higley’s and Wilson’s companies were ordered to report to Waters; and these, together with Leslie’s, Farrell’s, and Crawford’s companies of Rangers, formed a body of 160 men. Waters soon had his men embarked on the steamer La Virgen; and the general-in-chief accompanied the command. Besides the Rangers and the two companies of Rifles, several volunteers requested leave to act under Waters. Lockridge appeared anxious for action; and although no definite rank was assigned him, he was, for the occasion, placed next in command to the chief of the Rangers. Early on the morning of the 12th, the steamer was anchored off Granada, out of range of the enemy’s shot; and the officers were instructed to keep the men carefully concealed in the lower part of the vessel. During the day, the positions of the enemy were as far as possible observed; and the anxiety of the Allies to prevent a landing, was proved by their parading soldiers in numbers along the beach. These soldiers would march and counter-march; and the effort was manifest to arrange them in such a manner as to make them appear more numerous than they really were.

Between eight and nine o’clock in the evening, the steamer quietly and with all her lights covered, moved up the lake to the same point where the Democrats landed on the night of the 12th of October, 1855. This point was more than a league from the fort and wharf of Granada; and the depth of water was such as to allow the steamer to approach near the shore. The disembarkation was immediately begun; and when the first boat reached the beach, a picket of the enemy fired a single volley and fled. In about two hours the whole force was ashore; and Waters received orders to proceed to the relief of Henningsen, keeping as close as possible to the beach, in order not to lose his power of communicating with the general-in-chief who remained aboard the steamer. Then the La Virgen withdrew, and resumed as nearly as possible the anchorage she held during the day.

Not long after the steamer anchored off the wharf, and near midnight of the 12th, the long lines of fire from small arms followed by the reports of heavy volleys of musketry and answered by quick and angry retorts from the rifles announced that the conflict of Waters with the enemy had begun. Then the flashes and the reports ceased; but in a short time the fires again appeared and the sounds yet louder and more distinct told that the bold chief of the Rangers was driving the enemy before him. For several minutes the flashes and the reports were even fiercer and heavier than before; but they soon ceased, and their sudden cessation again told the tale of the yet advancing Americans. Soon after the last firing was heard, a noise from the water, crying as if for help, announced a messenger with news. A small boat was let down, and in a few moments a dusky form was seen scrambling over the rail of the steamer. At first Walker was apprehensive the news might be from Waters, and, it being dark and the messenger not a white man, the general-in-chief commenced his questions in Spanish. But the answer was English, and spoken in the thick broken accents of a Kanaka boy who had come to Central America on the Vesta in 1855. Kanaka John had been for several hours in the water, and bore, in a sealed bottle, a note from Henningsen, giving information of the state of his force and indicating certain signals to be made in case a landing was attempted. The signals were made as soon as the note was read; but they were not seen by those for whom they were intended.

After landing Waters proceeded along a narrow strip of land with the lake on his left and a lagoon on his right. As he approached a point where the lagoon reaches within thirty or forty yards of the lake, he was fired on by the enemy, who were stationed behind a barricade they had built from one body of water to the other. The heaviness of the volleys showed that the Allies were in force; and the Americans for a moment wavered. Waters had ordered Leslie to assault the barricades with his company; but his men hesitated, and some confusion arising, Leslie took the first who offered and leading them up to the barricades drove the enemy from their position. The march toward Granada was resumed; but when Waters reached a place called the “coal pits” he was again arrested by a large body of the Allies. The numbers of the enemy were greater than at the first barricade; the position, however, was not so good and they were soon driven from it by the vigorous charge of Higley and his company.

Waters, as he approached the town, turned to the right in order to gain the Tipitapa road which passes over higher ground than that nearer the lake. About daybreak he had gained the suburbs and was approaching some small cane huts when he again received the fire of the Allies. The enemy were behind strong barricades; but Capt. Crawford, passing with his company to some rising ground on the right, was enabled to turn the left flank of the Allied lines. A prisoner taken at this point gave Waters such information as decided him to proceed at once to the Guadalupe. He was encumbered with thirty wounded and it became an object to join Henningsen without further loss. Leslie was, therefore, sent in advance to advise Henningsen of Waters’ approach; and thus early in the morning of the 13th the Americans in the Guadalupe were strengthened by the entrance of the force landed the night previously.

It was well for Henningsen that Waters arrived; for the commissary stores of the former were nearly exhausted, and, as fearful a plague as cholera, desertion, had begun to thin his enfeebled ranks. Even after Waters’ arrival, the difficulties of Henningsen’s position were not slight. But the vigorous fighting of the Americans during the night had impressed the Allies with an exaggerated idea of their strength; and Belloso was discouraged by the fierceness with which his barricades had been assailed. He began to think that wood and earth were no safe protection from the soldiers who had carried three well-defended positions in the course of almost as many hours; and the movements of his force soon showed his weakness and irresolution. The fort was abandoned, and the sheds built on it were set afire. Of course, as soon as Henningsen discovered the fort was given up by the enemy he took possession of it; and thus, without further difficulty, communication with the steamer was established.

Preparations were immediately made for embarking the whole command on the La Virgen. The number of sick and wounded made the movement slow; and the men for duty were exhausted, some by their long fatigues and exposures, and others by the march and actions of the previous night. Of the 419 under Henningsen when Granada was surprised, 120 died of cholera and typhus, 110 were killed or wounded, nearly 40 deserted, and 2 were made prisoners. Of Waters’ force, 14 were killed and 30 wounded. Leslie was unfortunately shot in the head after he reached the Guadalupe, and his death was a loss not easily repaired, for his services as a scout were inestimable. Lieut. Tayloe, who was absent, by leave, from his post at San Carlos, had obtained permission to march with Waters, and he fell at one of the barricades outside the town.

It was near two o’clock on the morning of the 14th before everything was aboard the steamer. At leaving, Gen. Henningsen stuck up on a lance the words “_Aqui fué Granada_”—“Here was Granada”; and these were well calculated to re-kindle the passions of party, not yet extinct among the old Legitimists and Democrats. While the voice of one party was that of wailing and woe, at the loss of its cherished city, the other party could not suppress its feelings of triumph and exultation. Nor has the destruction of Granada failed to call forth censure elsewhere than in Central America. It has been denounced as an act of vandalism, useless in its consequences to the authority which ordered it. As to the justice of the act, few can question it; for its inhabitants owed life and property to the Americans in the service of Nicaragua, and yet they joined the enemies who strove to drive their protectors from Central America. They served the enemies of Nicaragua in the most criminal manner; for they acted as spies on the Americans, who had defended their interests, and sent notice of all their movements to the Allies. By the laws of war, the town had forfeited its existence; and the policy of destroying it was as manifest as the justice of the measure. It encouraged the Leonese friends of the Americans, while it gave a blow to the Legitimists from which they have never recovered. The attachment of the old Chamorristas to Granada was strong and peculiar. They had for their chief city a love like that of woman; and even after years have passed tears come to their eyes when they speak of the loss of their beloved Granada. And well did it become them to have such affection for the town; because it furnished them with the resources which enabled them to maintain power, and to keep under the excitable passions, as they called them, of the Leonese Democrats. The destruction of Granada was, therefore, a long step toward the destruction of the Legitimist party; and thus the Americans of Nicaragua were able to cripple their most bitter and consistent foe.

As the steamer left her anchorage a strong north-easter rose, and the vessel was obliged to seek the shelter of Omotepe, and to lie for several hours under the lee of the beautiful volcano which springs, as it were, from the waters of the lake. When the wind fell the La Virgen ran across to San Jorge, and everything was soon got ashore. The enemy at Rivas, hearing of the relief of Henningsen, and fearful of the artillery now at the disposal of the Americans, stealthily abandoned the place, and marched hastily to join Belloso at Masaya. On the morning of the 16th the Americans were again in possession of Rivas.

Chapter Eleventh.

OPERATIONS ON THE SAN JUAN.

In the retreat from Granada much of the type and printing materials, as well as the paper belonging to the office of the _Nicaraguense_, had been destroyed or lost. Hence, a few days after the headquarters of the army were moved to Rivas, the sub-secretary of Hacienda, Rogers, went to San Juan del Norte for the purpose of purchasing the materials necessary for the publication of the suspended newspaper. A number of officers, on leave of absence, went down the river on the same steamer with Rogers. Lockridge also, who had shown himself active in procuring emigration to Nicaragua, was aboard the steamer on his way to New-Orleans. He seemed anxious to serve the cause of the Americans in Nicaragua, and as there was no place in the army he could suitably fill, he was sent to the United States with the hope that he might be useful there. Emile Thomas, too, and his brother Carlos, repaired to San Juan del Norte at the same time.

As these passengers for the mouth of the San Juan steamed down the river they saw some suspicious looking rafts floating out of the San Carlos, and Emile Thomas, a watchful and discreet man, familiar with the country and its people, advised a scrutiny into the meaning of the singular appearance. Some have sought to place on Rogers the whole blame of the neglect to follow the advice of Thomas, and there were not wanting persons who attributed the negligence to design. But whatever may have been the previous faults of Rogers, it must be admitted that he served the cause of Nicaragua with a singleness of purpose and honesty of action which might have shamed the conduct of those who spoke evil of him. And on this occasion there were aboard the steamer officers whose duty it was to ascertain the meaning of the rafts, whereas such was no part of the duty specially pertaining to Rogers’ office or orders. The responsibility of neglecting the rafts must rest on other shoulders than those of the sub-secretary of Hacienda.

It was not long after the steamer passed the mouth of the San Carlos before the meaning of the rafts became apparent. On the 23d of December, while the company stationed at the mouth of the Serapaqui were at dinner, they were surprised by a body of Costa Ricans about 120 strong, led on by a man named Spencer. When Thompson, who commanded at the Serapaqui, was attacked by Spencer, he had no sentries posted, and the arms of the men were at some little distance from the place where they were dining. Spencer had got to the rear of the American camp, and by placing a soldier in the top of a tree he was able to know accurately the state of Thompson’s camp. The surprise was complete, and most of the Americans were either killed or wounded. Thompson was made prisoner; his conduct and courage were praised by the Costa Ricans, and he himself was liberated soon after being taken to San Juan del Norte. Well might the Costa Ricans afford to laud Thompson, for it was his criminal neglect of duty which enabled them to get possession of the point at the mouth of the Serapaqui, and thereby secured the success of their subsequent operations.

Spencer had marched with his Costa Ricans from San José to a point on the San Carlos river, some miles above its mouth, and had thence floated his men on rafts down to the mouth of the Serapaqui. In addition to the force which attacked Thompson on the 23d, a large body of soldiers had been marched to the San Carlos, under the orders of General José Joaquin Mora, brother of the President, Juan Rafael Mora, and commander-in-chief of the Costa Rican army. The march was very difficult from the nature of the country through which it was made, the region between San José and the San Carlos being entirely uninhabited, and wholly destitute of subsistence. The road over which Mora marched was a mere trail, and his soldiers had at times to cut their way with machetes through the thick undergrowth. The results of the march depended wholly on the success of Spencer’s efforts to get possession of the river San Juan and of the boats plying on it, and Spencer, as we have seen, owed his first and most important success to the gross and criminal negligence of Thompson at the Serapaqui.

After the surprise of Thompson, Spencer again took to his rafts and floated to the harbor of San Juan del Norte. He reached there during the night of the 23d, and on the morning of the 24th he had possession of all the river steamers at Punta Arenas. The United States commercial agent at San Juan del Norte called on the commander of the English forces off that port to protect American interests from the soldiers of Costa Rica. To this request Capt. Erskine of the Orion replied that “he had taken steps, by landing a party of marines from one of Her Majesty’s ship, to protect the persons and private property of Capt. Joseph Scott, his family and all citizens of the United States of America;” but as regards the capture of the steamers he adds: “To prevent all misapprehension, I think it, however, right to state that the steamers and other property belonging to the Accessory Transit Company being at this moment the subject of a dispute between two different companies, the representatives of which are on the spot, and one of them authorizing the seizure, I do not feel justified in taking any steps which may affect the interests of either party. With respect to the participation of a force of Costa Ricans in the seizure and transfer of the steamers alluded to, I must observe that these steamers having been for some months past employed in embarking in this port and conveying to the parties with whom Costa Rica is now carrying on active hostilities, men and munitions of war, it appears that as a non-belligerent I am prohibited by the law of nations from preventing the execution of such operations by a belligerent party.” Of course it was a mere act of comity for a British officer to protect American property at Punta Arenas; but the subtlety of distinguishing between American property in dispute and that not in dispute, was a convenient invention for the occasion. If Capt. Erskine desired to protect American property his plain course was to maintain those in possession. As to the question of the right of Costa Rica to seize the steamers it will more properly come up when we inquire why the United States had, at this time, no naval force at San Juan del Norte.

When Spencer had secured the river boats in the harbor of San Juan he proceeded to the mouth of the San Carlos and communicated to General Mora—then at the embarcadero, some miles up the latter river—the success of the operations below. As the small steamer Spencer sent up the San Carlos approached a picket of Costa Ricans posted on a raft, the soldiers, frightened by the noise and appearance of such a boat as they had never before seen, plunged into the river and were drowned in their efforts to reach the shore. At the embarcadero Mora had, according to Costa Rican accounts, eight hundred men, with a rear guard of three hundred more expected each moment to arrive. To supply this force with subsistence six hundred men were employed in carrying provisions from the capital to the river. Much of the transportation between those points was done on the backs of men, as the trail is difficult for even mules.

Castillo was forthwith occupied by the Costa Ricans; and Spencer, taking the steamer which runs over the Toro Rapids, easily succeeded, by concealing his men, in getting possession of the lake steamer, La Virgen, then lying at the mouth of the Zavalos, awaiting the return of Rogers from San Juan del Norte. Then proceeding to Fort San Carlos he lured aboard the steamer Capt. Kruger, commanding that post. The first-lieutenant of Kruger had been sent to headquarters on business connected with the garrison at San Carlos; and his second lieutenant, Tayloe, had been killed at Granada, while marching as a volunteer under Waters to the relief of Henningsen. Hence, after Kruger’s capture by Spencer, the post was in charge of a sergeant, and Kruger so far forgot his duty as to permit Spencer, under a threat of death, to extort from him an order directing the sergeant to surrender the post to the enemy. The sergeant, taken by surprise, was less to blame for obeying the order than was the captain for signing it.

Thus the Costa Ricans were in possession of the San Juan river from Fort San Carlos to the sea, and they also held the smallest of the lake steamers, the La Virgen. On the latter steamer they had also taken some arms and ammunition intended for the service of Nicaragua. But the occupation of the river and the seizure of the La Virgen would have been comparatively useless to them and harmless to Walker without the capture of the steamer San Carlos. The loss of the river might have been easily repaired by the force then at Rivas, but the loss of the control over the lake was a much more serious event. Spencer well knew that he could not venture on the lake with the La Virgen as long as the larger and faster steamer remained in the hands of the Americans, and, therefore, he prevailed on Mora to keep his Costa Ricans quiet until the San Carlos got into the river with passengers from California for the Atlantic States.

Early in the afternoon of the 2d of January, 1857, the Sierra Nevada arrived at San Juan del Sur from San Francisco. Her passengers were in a few hours aboard of the San Carlos ready to cross the lake. Some anxiety had been felt at Rivas on account of the long delay of the La Virgen in the river, but it was easy to imagine causes why she had not yet returned to Virgin Bay. Therefore the steamer San Carlos, with the passengers aboard, unsuspectingly approached Fort San Carlos and passed into the river without seeing any cause for alarm on shore. But when the steamer had passed the fort, Spencer, who was aboard a river boat with a force of Costa Ricans, hailed the San Carlos, demanding her surrender. There were a number of Nicaraguan officers on the San Carlos, going to the United States, but in the midst of the confusion, created by the surprise, Spencer got aboard of the lake steamer and soon had possession of her. The captain of the San Carlos, a cool, bold Dane, proposed to run the steamer back into the lake under the guns of the fort, and the movement might have been made without any great danger or loss of life. But Harris, jointly interested with his father-in-law, Morgan, in the transit contract across Nicaragua, happened to be aboard the steamer, and he refused to permit Capt. Ericsson to make the attempt. By the surrender of the San Carlos the Costa Ricans got control of the lake, and thus they were enabled to communicate rapidly and readily with the Allies at Masaya, while Walker was cut off from any direct communication with the Caribbean sea.

It is clear that the success of Mora’s movement to the San Juan river was due to the skill and daring of Spencer. The march to the San Carlos with all its expense and all its fatigues would have been useless without the aid of the bold hand which got possession of the river steamers. And the success of Spencer was the reward of a rashness which, in war, sometimes supplies the place of prudent design and wise combinations. The fortune which proverbially favors the brave certainly aided Spencer much in his operations. Mora afterward Attempted to depreciate the value of the services Spencer rendered him; and the brutality of the man toward the soldiers soon made it an object for the Costa Rican General to get rid of him. But it would be difficult to overestimate the advantages the Allies derived from the services of the base and murderous man who did not scruple for the sake of lucre to imbrue his hands in the blood of countrymen straggling to maintain the rights of their race against a cruel and vindictive foe.

Unfortunately for the honor of human nature, Spencer was not the only American who co-operated with the Costa Ricans for the purpose of robbing the naturalized Nicaraguans of the rights they had in Central America. As to Spencer’s immediate employers their conduct need not excite surprise; for gain is the god of their idolatry, and at Ephesus they would have persecuted the Apostle to the Gentiles for teaching a religion which destroyed their trade in shrines. From such as these he is but a fool who expects aught high in principle or unselfish in action. But we are entitled to expect loftier sentiment and nobler actions from the men who aspire to govern states and control policies. As Spencer’s operations closed the American transit across Nicaragua, it is not unimportant to ascertain if any public persons besides the Moras of Costa Rica and their Allies in Central America are directly or remotely responsible for the act. Especially is this becoming in view of the fact that no less a person than the President of the United States[5] has, in a grave annual message to the Houses of Congress, declared with most indecent inaccuracy that the Transit was closed in February, 1856, by the revocation of the charters of the Ship Canal and of the Accessory Transit Companies.

As early as the month of April, 1856, the American Secretary of State, Mr. Marcy, had been advised by the Costa Rican government that it meditated the seizure of the river and lake steamers and the consequent destruction of the Transit. At that time Mr. Marcy replied such an act would not be regarded with indifference by the United States. The language of the Secretary implied that the American government would deem it a duty to prevent such acts. And such a position was worthy of an American Minister. Undoubtedly Costa Rica, at war with Nicaragua, had a right not only to prevent the latter from using the property of neutrals for the purpose of transporting military persons and stores; and she might also take possession of such property and use it, as lawfully as Nicaragua, for the conveyance of her own troops and military equipments. But this did not involve the right of Costa Rica to confiscate the property of neutrals used by her enemy for purposes of transportation. Neutral ships at sea are liable to capture by a belligerent if they are found having aboard military stores or persons belonging to the enemy; for at sea, such an act on the part of a neutral is one of choice and not of compulsion. But on land, or within the territory of a country at war, where the property of neutrals is entirely under the control of the belligerent sovereign, the involuntary act of the neutral certainly cannot subject him to the loss of his property. Hence Mr. Marcy was right when he told Costa Rica, to all intents and purposes, that the use of American property by Nicaragua did not make it forfeit if taken by the enemy; and still less could it justify the destruction of a franchise, such as the Transit across the Isthmus, held by the owners of the lake and river steamers. When Walker saw the declaration Mr. Marcy made to the Costa Rican Minister, he felt assured the Allies would not attempt to interrupt the Transit and thus risk a rupture with the United States. Nor, in the face of this declaration, is it probable that Costa Rica would have attempted to break up the Transit without assurances of the act not provoking active hostilities from the American Republic.

Heretofore we have seen the decided opposition of the Secretary of State to the American movement in Nicaragua. But he was reluctantly compelled to give way to the President in reference to the reception of Father Vigil. Mr. Pierce was, in May, 1856, seeking the nomination of the democratic party for a re-election; hence he was able to resolve on a policy displeasing to his chief minister. After the Cincinnati Convention, it was easier for the Secretary to manage the President; and the departure of Father Vigil from Washington having been procured, Mr. Marcy was relieved from the presence of a Minister of Nicaragua. He immediately ordered Mr. Wheeler to demand the causes of the revocation of the Accessory Transit charter; but in August he was disappointed at a reply which entirely justified the act of the Rivas administration. If, however, Mr. Wheeler proved not pliant to the purposes of the Secretary, it was easy to secure British aid for getting the Americans out of Nicaragua. And if Mr. Marcy would silently permit British power to accomplish this object, he might hope for a strong interest in the city of New-York to aid his ambitious schemes.

It is difficult to imagine that an American Secretary of State would thus connive at a plan for driving his countrymen from the Isthmus; but pride of opinion and desire for office were Mr. Marcy’s leading passions, and one of these had been hurt by the reception of Father Vigil and the other was pleased at the hope of conciliating a strong influence in his own State. The evidences, too, of this connivance, are too palpable to escape the notice of the least observing. By the middle of September, 1856, the British had stationed off San Juan del Norte a strong fleet, of eight vessels, carrying several hundred guns, and evidently with a view of influencing the result of the war in Central America. No United States vessels were sent thither to watch the movements or ascertain the intentions of the British fleet. The objects of the fleet had been foreshadowed in the previous April by the attempt of the British vessel Eurydice to prevent the passengers of the Orizaba from going up the river. At that time the commodore of the American squadron in the Caribbean had been instructed to show the United States flag at San Juan del Norte; and if it was expedient for the American flag to be displayed when only a single British man-of-war was in the harbor, how much more pressing the necessity when several hundred British guns were pointed at the Isthmian transit.

Not only did the American Secretary of State quietly permit a strong British fleet to take its station off San Juan del Norte and there await a favorable opportunity to act against the naturalized Nicaraguans; but he was also advised by Costa Rica of her intention to close the transit if she had the requisite military force. On the first of November the President of Costa Rica published a decree, declaring in its second article: “The navigation of the river San Juan del Norte is prohibited to all kinds of vessels while hostilities against the invaders of the Central American soil continues.” And the fourth article of the same decree orders: “The officers and military forces of the Republic will carry out this decree, using for that purpose every means within their reach.” Here was a public and explicit declaration to Mr. Marcy notifying him that if he desired to keep the Transit from being closed during the hostilities between Nicaragua and Costa Rica, he must have United States vessels at San Juan del Norte to resist force with force. The United States had a consul in Costa Rica to advise it of the acts of the government there; and so well aware was her Britannic Majesty’s consul, Allan Wallis, of the movement against the Transit that with evident reference thereto he published, at San José, on the 26th Nov., the following notice: “All persons residing in this Republic, claiming to be British subjects, are requested to send into this office with as little delay as possible, and not later than the 20th prox., their names, professions or occupations and places of residence, with the names of the members of their family, if any.” Singular, too, as it may seem, the Secretary of State did not, after the order of Mora’s decree of the first of November was executed, take any steps to re-establish the Transit or protect those who were aiming to re-open it from the interference of the British naval forces. These facts, together with others to be hereafter related concerning the acts of American naval officers on the Pacific coast of Nicaragua, lead irresistibly to the conclusion that Mr. Marcy co-operated with the British government in its Central American policy.

An insight into the policy of the American Secretary of State is necessary to a due understanding of the events which followed Spencer’s operations on the San Juan river. The Costa Rican soldiers who accompanied the passengers from California to Punta Arenas were scarcely able to leave on their return up the river before the steamer Texas arrived in the port of San Juan del Norte with nearly two hundred men for the service of Nicaragua. But these men not having been received by the State could not act in the name of the government. Hence Mr. Harris, the agent of the owners of the lake and river steamers, selected Lockridge, who was at San Juan del Norte, as a proper person to regain possession of their property for the Transit contractors. As before stated, Lockridge had been ordered to New-Orleans on special duty; and had the task of re-opening the Transit been a strictly military enterprise, the duties of command would naturally have devolved on Lieut.-Colonel Rudler, the senior officer present at San Juan del Norte, and lately charged with the defence of the River frontier. Rudler had a leave of absence to visit the United States; but he had only to tear up his leave and resume his right to command on the river in order to have full authority over any expedition attempted in the name of Nicaragua. But merit is modest and unobtrusive, while pretension is forward and presumptuous; therefore, Lockridge was put in command of the men who were expected to clear the river of the Costa Ricans, and Rudler left for New-Orleans. In addition to the men by the Texas, General C. R. Wheat, and Colonel Anderson, with some forty others from New-York, arrived at Punta Arenas on the ninth of January by the James Adger. Arms and ammunition were not wanting for the whole of Lockridge’s command; and the supply of provisions was abundant.

Lockridge remained for some days at Punta Arenas, engaged with Joseph N. Scott in fitting up one of the old disused river steamers for purposes of transportation. But he was not allowed to work without interruption by the British naval officers. On the morning of the 16th of January, Capt. Cockburn, of H. B. M.’s ship Cossack, went ashore at Punta Arenas, and inquired for the commander of the armed men occupying the point. On meeting Lockridge, Capt. Cockburn informed him he had received orders from Capt. Erskine, of Her Majesty’s ship Orion, and “senior officer of Her Majesty’s ships and vessels employed on the coasts of Central America,” to offer protection to any British subjects who might be detained and compelled to bear arms against their will. In accordance with his instructions, Capt. Cockburn demanded a list of all the men at Punta Arenas, and required them to be paraded in his presence, that he might read to them the orders of Capt. Erskine. The men were accordingly drawn up on the beach, and Cockburn read to them the order of Erskine. The concluding sentences of the order were: “Should any of the party in question claim protection as British subjects, and their claims appear to you to be well founded, you will acquaint the officer commanding, that these men must be permitted to withdraw from their present position; and you will (in the event of his acquiescence) either give these men a passage to Greytown, or take them on board Her Majesty’s ship under your command, to await my decision as to their disposal, as they may desire. In the event of the aforesaid officer resisting such a course as I have pointed out, you will inform him that, in the first place, no person whatever under his command will be permitted to leave their present position, to proceed up the river or elsewhere, until my demands shall be complied with; and, secondly, that I will adopt such measures to enforce the rights of British subjects as I may think best adapted to the purpose.” Ten men claimed and received protection under the order of Erskine, and were taken from the point in Cockburn’s boat. The instructions of Her Majesty’s government must have been indeed stringent, when they induced honorable officers to degrade themselves to the work of inciting men to desert a cause they had voluntarily embraced; for Cockburn, not satisfied with reading Erskine’s orders, had also advised the whole of Lockridge’s command of the dangers they ran in attacking the large force the Costa Ricans had concentrated on the river.

Thus the demoralization of Lockridge’s men was commenced before they left Punta Arenas. The Americans—at least the good men among them—were, of course, indignant at the course the British pursued; but all the Europeans were more or less affected by this English interference. Nor is it in the nature of men long to respect those claiming authority over them, when they see such persons humbled by the actions of others. Hence it was all-important for Lockridge to get beyond the reach of British interference. Not only was he daily losing men by the policy the British practised; but the effectiveness of those remaining with him was constantly diminished. Finally the small steamer was got ready for going up the river, and Lockridge moved his whole force to a point several miles below the mouth of the Serapaqui.

On the morning of the 4th of February the Texas again arrived from New-Orleans at San Juan del Norte, having aboard H. T. Titus, known in Kansas as Col. Titus, in charge of about one hundred and eighty men. Many of the persons with Titus had been his companions in Kansas, and probably most of them were made of better stuff than their leader. But his swaggering air had imposed on many people; and the contest in which he was said to have been engaged, gave him a sort of newspaper notoriety, thus making his name familiar as the leader of the “border ruffians.” Lockridge organized Titus and his men in a separate body, and soon a jealousy rather than rivalry sprang up between the new-comers and those acting under Anderson. Attached to the command of the latter was Capt. Doubleday, formerly of the Nicaraguan service; and several others who were yet in the service, acted under Anderson’s orders. All of Titus’ men were entirely new to the country.

Soon after Titus arrived, Lockridge, by a sharp skirmish, got possession of Cody’s Point, a piece of high ground just opposite the mouth of the Serapaqui; and Wheat thence opened a cannonade on the defences the Costa Ricans had built on the opposite side of the San Juan river. But the fire of Wheat’s guns was not of such a character as to make a serious impression on the enemy; and it was only after Col. Anderson had crossed the river and succeeded in harassing the Costa Rican flank and rear with riflemen, that the Americans drove the enemy from the Serapaqui, and got possession of both sides of the river. The Costa Ricans left behind a number of killed and wounded, besides two guns, some small-arms and ammunition, and a supply of military clothing. A yet more important portion of the articles captured were certain letters from General Mora detailing the condition of his force on the San Juan, and urging the necessity for fresh troops, in order to hold his position on the river.

The Costa Ricans were driven from the mouth of the Serapaqui on the morning of the 13th of February; and the next day Titus, with some hundred and forty men, ascended the river on the little steamer Rescue with the view of attacking Castillo. Anderson was placed in charge of Hipp’s Point; and the contest between him and Titus, as to rank, had increased the disorganization and disorder already existing in Lockridge’s command. Desertions were frequent, and were, of course, encouraged by the protection and assistance the English gave to the deserters. The heavy rains made camp life disagreeable, and its duties arduous; and much labor was necessary in order to protect the men from the weather. Thus the movements were impeded; and much care was necessary to keep the ammunition in a state fit for use. Numbers were sick with fever; but considering the exposure and fatigues to which the men were subjected, their health was not bad.

On the other hand the difficulties of the Costa Ricans were not slight. After getting possession of the San Juan and of the lake, Mora had communicated with the Allies at Masaya; and movements were undertaken which will be more particularly described hereafter. Suffice it to say here, that these movements entailed heavy draughts on the force Mora held on the river; and in addition to this the Costa Ricans coming from the high lands about San José, suffered much with fever when they reached the low country on the San Juan. Thus by the necessities of the Allies for troops in the western part of Nicaragua, and by the effects of disease in the force occupying the river, the garrison at Castillo was reduced to a trifling figure; and when Titus appeared before the fort Cauty, an Englishman commanding at Castillo, had, according to some, twenty-five, and according to others, fifty men.

When Titus landed near the fort of Castillo Viejo, he found the houses of the village in flames, and the small steamer Machuca also rapidly burning. He succeeded, however, in cutting loose the steamer J. N. Scott, and although her machinery was somewhat damaged, it was easily repaired in the course of two or three days’ work. Soon after he appeared at Castillo, Titus sent to Cauty a demand to surrender the fort; and the reply was a proposal for an armistice of twenty-four hours, with a promise of surrender in case the garrison were not relieved by the expiration of that time. Strange to say the proposal of Cauty was accepted; and it was not difficult for him to send a courier to Fort San Carlos with news of his position. Of course, before the armistice expired, reinforcements for Cauty were landed a short distance above the fort; and on the appearance of the fresh Costa Ricans, Titus retreated in great disorder and confusion. The retreat was made before the number of the relieving party was even approximately ascertained; and the fact, that the Americans were able to escape without any protection to their rear, shows the enemy did not arrive with much force.

After the Americans withdrew, or rather fled, from Castillo, they halted at San Carlos Island, a few miles below the fort. On this island Lockridge threw up some works for defence from the enemy, and also built, with much labor, sheds for protection from the weather. The repulse at Castillo, shameful in its character, added to the demoralization of the whole command on the river, and desertions accordingly increased. Such, too, was the feeling against Titus that he gave up his command and left for San Juan del Norte, with the intention of going by Panama to Rivas. When he arrived at San Juan del Norte his insulting language to one of the British officers led to his arrest and detention for a few hours. At the same time Titus was arrested the steamer Rescue was detained; but she was soon released when the U. S. sloop of war Saratoga was seen coming into port. This single fact shows how different might have been the conduct of the British naval forces had there been a few United States vessels stationed off San Juan del Norte.

In the latter part of February Walker sent an aide, Major Baldwin, from Rivas by Panama, to Lockridge, confirming the latter in his command on the river, and also informing him of the importance of early communication either around or across the lake. The orders sent to Lockridge were, if he found it impossible to take Castillo and San Carlos without great sacrifice, to cut a road from the river either to Chontales or the southern shore of the lake, and march by land to Rivas. The cause of these orders will hereafter appear; and it is sufficient here to say, that one chief reason for Walker’s holding Rivas was, the apprehension that Lockridge, reaching the Meridional department, might be placed in an awkward position by finding the town in the possession of the Allies. Baldwin arrived at San Juan del Norte about the middle of March, and nearly at the same time with some hundred and thirty fresh men, principally from Mobile and Texas, and directed respectively by Major W. C. Capers and Captain Marcellus French.

With this reinforcement under Capers and French, Lockridge’s numbers had been so reduced by desertion and sickness, that his effective force scarcely reached four hundred. The men, however, were for the most part of excellent quality, and in other hands might have accomplished much. French’s command particularly was, by general consent, composed of fine materials. But these men arrived too late; and they met on the river bands which had been disorganized by bad conduct and ill fortune. Lockridge, however, determined to make another effort to get possession of Castillo Viejo; and with this purpose he prepared nearly his whole command for an attack on the fort.

Landing his force a short distance below Castillo and out of sight of the enemy, he led his men by a trail through the woods to a position near an elevation, known as Nelson’s Hill. This elevation commands the fort, and the Costa Ricans having entrenched it were occupying the summit. Along the sides of the hill they had cut some trees and formed a sort of chevaux-de-frise; and by clearing away the undergrowth for some distance around the summit, they had made the approach difficult and dangerous. After reconnoitring the position of the enemy, Lockridge deemed it imprudent to hazard an attack; and calling the principal officers together and asking their opinions, he received the concurrence of all as to the expediency of retiring without engaging the enemy. The resolution was wise, for defeat would almost inevitably have been the result of an attempt on the Costa Rican defences. The opportune moment for taking Castillo had been lost through the incapacity of Titus, and with a month to prepare for a second attack, the enemy had not been idle. Even if the Costa Ricans had been less strongly posted, the moral condition of Lockridge’s force was not such as to warrant ordering them on any hazardous service.

After Lockridge retired from Castillo the men began to discuss plans for the future, and all appear to have agreed on the propriety of abandoning the river. It was clear that the effort to re-open the Transit had entirely failed, and the leader of the enterprise drawing up the men informed them that he proposed to try to reach Rivas by the Isthmus of Panama, and called on all who wished to follow him to step from the ranks. Near a hundred persons agreed to take this course; and the remainder of the men were deprived of their arms and virtually discharged. Then the disarmed men sought means to reach the mouth of the river. Not waiting for the steamer they took the boats they could put their hands on, and some floated on logs to the harbor of San Juan del Norte. The panic-stricken crowd thought the Costa Ricans were hot in pursuit; and each over-anxious for his own safety added to the fright of his fellows.