Chapter XXIII: The New Academy (8)

[585] Cic. Tusc. iv. 7, 15: Sed quæ judicia quasque opiniones perturbationum esse dixi, non in eis perturbationes solum positas esse dicunt, verum illa etiam, quæ efficiuntur perturbationibus, ut ægritudo quasi morsum quendam doloris efficiat: metus recessum quendam animi et fugam: lætitia profusam hilaritatem; libido effrenatam appetentiam. Galen. Hipp. et Plat. iv. 3, p. 377: (Ζήνωνι καὶ πολλοῖς ἄλλοις τῶν Στωϊκῶν) οἳ οὐ τὰς κρίσεις αὐτὰς τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ [should perhaps be struck out], τὰς ἐπὶ ταύταις ἀλόγους συστολὰς καὶ ταπεινώσεις καὶ δείξεις [both for δείξεις, and for λήξεις in the passage about to be quoted from Plutarch, Thurot, Etudes sur Aristote, p. 249, suggests δέσεις· δήξεις is more probable, confirmed too by Cicero’s morsus doloris] ἐπάρσεις τε καὶ διαχύσεις ὑπολαμβάνουσιν εἶναι τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς πάθη. Plut. Virt. Mor. 10, p. 449: τὰς ἐπιτάσεις τῶν παθῶν καὶ τὰς σφοδρότητας οὔ φασι γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὴν κρίσιν, ἐν ᾗ τὸ ἁμαρτητικὸν, ἀλλὰ τὰς λήξεις [δήξεις] καὶ τὰς συστολὰς καὶ τὸ ἧττον τῷ ἀλόγῳ δεχομένας. The same results are involved in the definitions of emotion already given, p. 244, 2. In reference to this pathological action of representations, one kind of emotions was defined (Stob. ii. 170; Cic. Tusc. iv. 7, 14) as δόξα πρόσφατος, or opinio recens boni (or mali) præsentis, πρόσφατον being κινητικὸν συστολῆς ἀλόγου ἢ ὑπάρσεως.

[586] De Hipp. et Plat. v. 1, p. 429): Χρύσιππος μὲν οὖν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ παθῶν ἀποδεικνύναι πειρᾶται, κρίσεις κινὰς εἶναι τοῦ λογιστικοῦ τὰ πάθη, Ζήνων δ’ οὐ τὰς κρίσεις αὐτὰς, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἐπιγιγνομένας αὐταῖς συστολὰς καὶ λύσεις, ἐπάρσεις τε καὶ τὰς πτώσεις τῆς ψυχῆς ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι τὰ πάθη. Conf. iv. 2, p. 367, and 3, p. 377.

[587] Diog. 111 (see above, p. 245, 3, and the definition quoted on p. 245, 5) confirms the view that, in the passage referred to by Galenus, Chrysippus explained the emotions to be κρίσεις. Elsewhere Galenus asserts (iv. 2, p. 367) that he called λύπη a μείωσις ἐπὶ φευκτῷ δοκοῦντι; ἡδονὴ, an ἔπαρσις ἐφ’ αἱρετῷ δοκοῦντι ὑπάρχειν; and charges him (iv. 6, p. 403), quoting passages in support of the charge, with deducing emotions from ἀτονία and ἀσθένεια ψυχῆς. That Chrysippus agreed with Zeno in his definition of emotion, has already been stated (p. 244, 2). No doubt, too, with an eye to Chrysippus, Stobæus also (ii. 166) defines emotion as πτοία (violent mental motion), the words used being πᾶσαν πτοίαν πάθος εἶναι καὶ πάλιν πάθος πτοίαν· and, in Galenus (iv. 5, p. 392), Chrysippus says: οἰκείως δὲ τῷ τῶν παθῶν γένει ἀποδίδοται καὶ ἡ πτοία κατὰ τὸ ἐνσεσοβημένον τοῦτο καὶ φερόμενον εἰκῆ. Chrysippus even repeatedly insists on the difference between emotion and error—error being due to deficient knowledge, emotion to opposition to the claims of reason, to a disturbance of the natural relation of the impulses (τὴν φυσικὴν τῶν ὁρμῶν συμμετρίαν ὑπερβαίνειν). He shows that both Zeno’s definitions come to this (Galen. iv. 2, p. 368, and iv. 4, p. 385; Stob. ii. 170), and elsewhere explains (Plut. Vir. Mor. 10, p. 450) how emotion takes away consideration, and impels to irrational conduct. The quotations on p. 246, 1 from Cicero and Stobæus are an explanation of positions of Chrysippus, of which Chrysippus is himself the source. And were he not directly the source, Galenus (iv. 4, p. 390) observes that the view of Chrysippus on the emotions was generally held in the Stoic School after his time. In designating the emotions κρίσεις, Chrysippus cannot therefore have intended thereby to exclude the emotions of impulse and feeling. All that he meant was, that emotions, as they arise in the individual soul (we should say as conditions of consciousness), are called forth by imagination. This is clear from the fact that the modes in which the pathological character of emotions displays itself are appealed to as evidence. See his words in Galen. iv. 6, p. 409. τῷ [l. τό] τε γὰρ θυμῷ φέρεσθαι καὶ ἐξεστηκέναι καὶ οὐ παρ’ ἑαυτοῖς οὐδ’ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς εἶναι καὶ πάνθ’ ὅσα τοιαῦτα φανερῶς μαρτυρεῖ τῷ κρίσεις εἶναι τὰ πάθη κἂν τῇ λογικῇ δυνάμει τῆς ψυχῆς συνίστασθαι καθάπερ καὶ τὰ οὕτως ἔχοντα. On the other hand, Zeno never denied the influence of imagination on emotion, as is perfectly clear from the expression of Galenus, quoted pp. 246, 2; 246, 1.

[588] Stob. Ecl. ii. 190 (Floril. 46, 50): The wise man, according to the Stoic teaching, exercises no indulgence; for indulgence would suppose τὸν ἡμαρτηκότα μὴ παρ’ αὑτὸν ἡμαρτηκέναι πάντων ἁμαρτανόντων παρὰ τὴν ἰδίαν κακίαν.

[589] Epictet. Diss. i. 18, 1–7; 28, 1–10; ii. 26; M. Aurel. ii. 1; iv. 3; viii. 14; xi. 18; xii. 12.

[590] This motive can be best gathered from the passages in Cicero already quoted, p. 244, 3, and from Sen. De Ira, ii. 2, 1: Anger can do nothing by itself, but only animo adprobante ... nam si invitis nobis nascitur, nunquam rationi succumbet. Omnes enim motus qui non voluntate nostra fiunt invicti et inevitabiles sunt, &c.

[591] See p. 179, 3, 4.

[592] See p. 88, 1.

[593] Cic. Acad. i. 10, 39: Perturbationes voluntarias esse. Tusc. iv. 7, 14: Emotions proceed from judgment; itaque eas definiunt pressius, ut intelligatur non modo quam vitiosæ, sed etiam quam in nostra sunt potestate, upon which follow the definitions quoted, p. 246, 1.

[594] Cic. Tusc. iv. 9, 22: Omnium autem affectionum fontem esse dicunt intemperantiam (ἀκράτεια), quæ est a tota mente et a recta ratione defectio sic aversa a præscriptione rationis ut nullo modo adpetitiones anima nec regi nec contineri queant.

[595] Stob. Ecl. ii. 170, probably from Chrysippus, of whom similar remarks were quoted, p. 246, 3: πᾶν γὰρ πάθος βιαστικόν ἐστιν, ὡς καὶ πολλάκις ὁρῶντας τοὺς ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντας ὅτι συμφέρει τόδε οὐ ποιεῖν ὑπὸ τῆς σφοδρότητος ἐκφερομένους ... ἀνάγεσθαι πρὸς τὸ ποιεῖν αὐτὸ ... πάντες δ’ οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες ἀποστρέφονται τὸν λόγον, οὐ παραπλησίως δὲ τοῖς ἐξηπατημένοις ἐν ὁτωοῦν, ἀλλ’ ἰδιαζόντως. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἠπατημένοι ... διδαχθέντες ... ἀφίστανται τῆς κρίσεως· οἱ δ’ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες, κἂν μάθωσι κἂν μεταδιδαχθῶσιν, ὅτι οὐ δεῖ λυπεῖσθαι ἢ φοβεῖσθαι ἢ ὅλως ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅμως οὐκ ἀφίστανται τούτων ἀλλ’ ἄγονται ὑπὸ τῶν παθῶν εἰς τὸ ὑπὸ τούτων κρατεῖσθαι τυραννίδος. A different view is taken by Epictet. Diss. i. 28, 8, who à propos of Medea remarks: ἐξηπάτηται· δεῖξον αὐτῇ ἐναργῶς, ὅτι ἐξηπάτηται, καὶ οὐ ποιήσει.

[596] See p. 242, 2. The same idea is expressed in applying the terms αἱρετὸν and φευκτὸν to good and evil (Stob. ii. 126 and 142; see p. 229, 1, and 232, 3).

[597] Stob. ii. 166; Cic. Tusc. iii. 11; iv. 7, 14; 15, 43; Fin. iii. 10, 35.

[598] According to Diog. 110, this distinction was found in the treatise περὶ παθῶν.

[599] In Clem. Strom. ii. 407, A, the words being πρὸς ὅλον τὸ τετράχορδον, ἡδονὴν, λύπην, φόβον, ἐπιθυμίαν, πολλῆς δεῖ τῆς ἀσκήσεως καὶ μάχης.

[600] The definition of λύπη or ἄση (Cicero ægritudo) as δόξα πρόσφατος κακοῦ παρουσίας is explicitly referred to Chrysippus (more at length in Cic. Tusc. iv. 7, 14: Opinio recens mali præsentis, in quo demitti contrahique animo rectum esse videatur), as also the definition of φιλαργυρία = ὑπόληψις τοῦ τὸ ἀργύριον καλὸν εἶναι. See p. 254, 4, 5. In like manner μέθη, ἀκολασία, and the other passions, were, according to Diog. 110, defined. To Chrysippus also belong the definitions—quoted Tusc. iv. 7, 14; iii. 11, 25—of ἡδονὴ (lætitia, voluptas gestiens) = opinio recens boni præsentis, in quo efferri rectum videatur; of fear = opinio impendentis mali quod intolerabile esse videatur, agreeing with the προσδοκία κακοῦ of Diog. 112; of desire (cupiditas, libido, ἐπιθυμία) = opinio venturi boni, quod sit ex usu jam præsens esse atque adesse. It is, however, more common to hear λύπη (Diog. 111; Stob. 172; Cic. Tusc. iii. 11) described as συστολὴ ψυχῆς ἀπειθὴς λόγῳ, more briefly συστολὴ ἄλογος, fear as ἔκκλισις ἀπειθὴς λόγῳ, ἡδονὴ even according to Alex. Aphr. top. 96, as ἄλογος ἔπαρσις ἐφ’ αἱρέτῳ δοκοῦντι ὑπάρχειν, two different translations of which are given by Cic. l.c. and Fin. ii. 4, 13, ἐπιθυμία as ὄρεξις ἀπειθὴς λόγῳ, or immoderata appetitio opinati magni boni. The latter definitions appear to belong to Zeno. They were probably appropriated by Chrysippus, and the additions made which are found in Stobæus.

[601] Further particulars may be gathered from Diog. vii. 111; Stob. ii 174. Both include under λύπη subdivisions as ἔλεος, φθόνος, ζῆλος, ζηλοτυπία, ἄχθος, ἀνία, ὀδύνη. Diogenes adds ἐνόχλησις and σύγχυσις; Stobæus πένθος, ἄχος, ἄση. Both include under φόβος, δεῖμα, ὄκνος, αἰσχύνη, ἔκπληξις, θόρυβος, ἀγωνία; Stobæus adds δέος and δεισιδαιμονία. Under ἡδονὴ, Diogenes includes κήλησις, ἐπιχαιρεκακία, τέρψις, διάχυσις; Stobæus, ἐπιχαιρεκακίαι, ἀσμενισμοὶ, γοητεῖαι καὶ τὰ ὅμοια. Under ἐπιθυμία, Diogenes places σπάνις, μῖσος, φιλονεικία, ὀργὴ, ἔρως, μῆνις, θυμός; Stobæus, ὀργὴ καὶ τὰ εἴδη αὐτῆς (θυμὸς, χόλος, μῆνις, κότος, πικρία, κ.τ.λ.), ἔρωτες σφοδροὶ, πόθοι, ἵμεροι, φιληδονίαι, φιλοπλουτίαι, φιλοδοξίαι. Definitions for all these terms—which, without doubt, belong to Chrysippus—may be found in the writers named. Greek lexicographers may obtain many useful hints from Stoic definitions.

[602] Plut. Vir. Mor. 10, p. 449: πᾶν μὲν γὰρ πάθος ἁμαρτία κατ’ αὐτούς ἐστιν καὶ πᾶς ὁ λυπούμενος ἢ φοβούμενος ἢ ἐπιθυμῶν ἁμαρτάνει. The Stoics are therefore anxious to make a marked distinction in the expressions for emotions and the permitted mental affections, between pleasure and joy, see p. 236, 2, fear and precaution (εὐλαβεία), desire and will (βούλησις, Diog. 116; cupere et velle, Sen. Ep. 116, 1), αἰσχύνη and αἰδὼς (Plut. Vit. Pud. c. 2, p. 529).

[603] On this favourite proposition of the Stoics, consult Diog. 115; Stob. ii. 182; Cic. Tusc. iv. 10; whose remarkable agreement with Stobæus seems to point to a common source of information directly or indirectly drawn upon by both; iii. 10, 23; Galen. Hipp. et Plat. v. 2; Sen. Ep. 75, 11. According to these passages, the Stoics distinguish between simple emotions and diseases of the soul. Emotions, in the language of Seneca, are motus animi improbabiles soluti et concitati. If they are frequently repeated and neglected, then inveterata vitia et dura, or diseases, ensue. Disease of the soul is therefore defined as δόξα ἐπιθυμίας ἐῤῥυηκυῖα εἰς ἕξιν καὶ ἐνεσκιῤῥωμένη καθ’ ἣν ὑπολαμβάνουσι τὰ μὴ αἱρετὰ σφόδρα αἱρετὰ εἶναι (Stob. translations of the definition in Cicero and Seneca). The opposite of such a δόξα, or a confusion arising from false fear, is an opinio vehemens inhærens atque insita de re non fugienda tanquam fugienda—such as hatred of womankind, hatred of mankind, &c. If the fault is caused by some weakness which prevent our acting up to our better knowledge, the diseased states of the soul are called ἀῤῥωστήματα, ægrotationes (Diog.; Stob.; Cic. Tusc. iv. 13, 29); but this distinction is, of course, very uncertain. The same fault is at one time classed among νόσοι, at another among ἀῤῥωστήματα; and Cicero (11, 24; 13, 29) repeatedly observes that the two can only be distinguished in thought. Moreover, just as there are certain predispositions (ἐνεμπτωσίαι) for bodily diseases, so within the sphere of mind there are εὐκαταφορίαι εἰς πάθος. Diog., Stob., Cic. 12. The distinction between vitia and morbi (Cic. 13) naturally coincides with the distinction between emotions and diseases. The former are caused by conduct at variance with principles, by inconstantia et repugnantia, likewise vitiositas in a habitus in tota vita inconstans; the latter consist in corruptio opinionum. It is not consistent with this view to call κακίαι, διαθέσεις; and νόσοι, as well as ἀῤῥωστήματα and εὐκαταφορίαι, ἕξεις (Stob. ii. 100, on the difference between ἕξις and διάθεσις, see 102, 1); and, accordingly, Heine suggests (De Font. Tuscul. Dis.: Weimar, 1863, p. 18) that, on this point, Cicero may have given inaccurate information. The unwise who are near wisdom are free from disease of the soul, but not from emotions (Sen., Cic.). The points of comparison between diseases of the body and those of the soul were investigated by Chrysippus with excessive care. Posidonius contradicted him, however, in part (Galen, l.c., Cic. 10, 23; 12, 27); but their differences are not of interest to us.

[604] Cic. Acad. i. 10, 38: Cumque perturbationem animi illi [superiores] ex homine non tollerent ... sed eam contraherent in angustumque deducerent: hic omnibus his quasi morbis voluit carere sapientem. Ibid. ii. 43, 135. We shall find subsequently that the mental affections, which cause emotions, are allowed to be unavoidable.

[605] Cic. Tusc. iv. 17, 37.

[606] Cic. Tusc. iii. 10, 22: Omne enim malum, etiam mediocre, magnum est. Nos autem id agimus, ut id in sapiente nullum sit omnino. Ibid. iv. 17, 39: Modum tu adhibes vitio? An vitium nullum est non parere rationi? Ibid. 18, 42: Nihil interest, utrum moderatas perturbationes approbent, an moderatam injustitiam, &c. Qui enim vitiis modum apponit, is partem suscipit vitiorum. Sen. Ep. 85, 5, says that moderation of emotions is equivalent to modice insaniendum, modice ægrotandum. Ep. 116, 1: Ego non video, quomodo salubris esse aut utilis possit ulla mediocritas morbi.

[607] Sen. De Ira, i. 9, 2; particularly with reference to anger, conf. Ep. 85, 10.

[608] Full details are given by Cic. Tusc. iv. 19–26; Off. i. 25, 88; Sen. De Ira, i. 5, 21; ii. 12; particularly with regard to the use of anger.

[609] In the same spirit Sen. De Ira, i. 9, 1; 10, 2, meets the assertion that valour cannot dispense with anger by saying: Nunquam virtus vitio adjuvanda est, se contenta ... absit hoc a virtute malum, ut unquam ratio ad vitia confugiat.

[610] Diog. vii. 117: φασὶ δὲ καὶ ἀπαθῆ εἶναι τὸν σοφὸν, διὰ τὸ ἀνέμπτωτον (faultless) εἶναι. From the apathy of the wise man, absence of feeling and severity, which are faults, must be distinguished.

[611] Chrysippus (in Stob. Floril. vii. 21): ἀλγεῖν μὲν τὸν σοφὸν μὴ βασανίζεσθαι δέ· μὴ γὰρ ἐνδιδόναι τῇ ψυχῇ. Sen. De Prov. 6, 6; Ep. 85, 29; Cic. Tusc. ii. 12, 29; 25, 61; iii. 11, 25.

[612] Plut. Sto. Rep. 20, 12; Musonius (in Stob. Floril. 19, 16); Sen. De Const. 2; 3; 5; 7; 12. The second title of this treatise is: nec injuriam nec contumeliam accipere sapientem.

[613] See 253, 2 and 3 and Cic. Tusc. iii. 9, 19.

[614] Cic. Tusc. iii. 9, 20; Sen. De Clem. ii. 5; Diog. vii. 123.

[615] Stob. Ecl. ii. 190; Floril. 46, 60; Sen. l.c. 5, 2; 7; Diog. l.c.; Gell. N. A. xiv. 4, 4.

[616] Ps. Plut. Hom. 134: οἱ μὲν οὖν Στωϊκοὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν τίθενται ἐν τῇ ἀπαθείᾳ.

[617] See p. 193. Alex. Aphr. De An. 156, b. Virtue consists in ἐκλογὴ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν. Diog. vii. 89 (conf. Plut. Aud. Po. c. 6, p. 24): τήν τ’ ἀρετὴν διάθεσιν εἶναι ὁμολογουμένην.

[618] Cic. Acad. i. 10, 38: Cumque superiores (Aristotle and others) non omnem virtutem in ratione esse dicerent, sed quasdam virtutes natura aut more perfectas: hic [Zeno] omnes in ratione ponebat.

[619] Cic. Tusc. iv. 15, 34: Ipsa virtus brevissime recta ratio dici potest. Conf. Sen. Ep. 113, 2: Virtus autem nihil aliud est quam animus quodammodo se habens, and the remarks, p. 128, 1; 129, 3.

[620] The proof of this will be found subsequently in the Stoic definitions of various virtues and vices. Compare preliminarily 254, 6 and Diog. vii. 93: εἶναι δ’ ἀγνοίας τὰς κακίας, ὧν αἱ ἀρεταὶ ἐπιστῆμαι. Stob. Ecl ii. 108: ταύτας μὲν οὖν τὰς ῥηθείσας ἀρετὰς τελείας εἶναι λέγουσι περὶ τὸν βίον καὶ συνεστηκέναι ἐκ θεωρημάτων. It is not opposed to these statements for Stob. ii. 92 and 110, to distinguish other virtues besides those which are τέχναι and ἐπιστῆμαι; nor for Hecato (in Diog. vii. 90) to divide virtues into ἐπιστημονικαὶ καὶ θεωρητικαὶ (σύστασιν ἔχουσαι τῶν θεωρημάτων) and ἀθεώρητοι; for by the latter must be understood not the virtuous actions themselves, but only the states resulting from them—health of soul, strength of will, and the like. On the health of the soul, in its relation to virtue, see Cic. Tusc. iv. 13, 30.

[621] Diog. vii. 91 (following Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and others); Ps. Plut. V. Hom. 144.

[622] See p. 260, 3.

[623] Plut. Sto. Rep. 7; Diog. vii. 161; Galen, vii. 2, p. 595.

[624] See p. 56.

[625] See p. 58, 2. Diog. vii. 165, conf. 37: Ἥριλλος δὲ ὁ Καρχηδόνιος τέλος εἶπε τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ὅπερ ἐστὶ ζῇν ἀεὶ πάντα ἀναφέροντα πρὸς τὸ μετ’ ἐπιστήμης ζῇν καὶ μὴ τῇ ἀγνοίᾳ διαβεβλημένον. εἶναι δὲ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἕξιν ἐν φαντασιῶν προσδέξει ἀμετάπτωτον ὑπὸ λόγου. On the definition, see p. 82, 1.

[626] Cleanthes (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 7): When τόνος, on which see p. 128, 2, is found in the soul in a proper decree, ἰσχὺς καλεῖται καὶ κράτος· ἡ δ’ ἰσχὺς αὕτη καὶ τὸ κράτος ὅταν μὲν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐπιφανέσιν ἐμμενετέοις ἐγγένηται ἐγκράτειά ἐστι, κ.τ.λ. In the same way, Chrysippus (according to Galen, Hipp. et Plat. iv. 6, p. 403) deduced what is good in our conduct from εὐτονία and ἰσχύς; what is bad, from ἀτονία καὶ ἀσθένεια τῆς ψυχῆς; and (ibid. vii. 1, p. 590) he referred the differences of individual virtues to changes in quality within the soul. By Aristo, p. 220, 1, virtue is defined as health; by Stob. ii. 104, as διάθεσις ψυχῆς σύμφωνος αὐτῇ; by Diog. 89, as διάθεσις ὁμολογουμένη.

[627] Sen. De Otio, i. (28) 4: Stoici nostri dicunt; usque ad ultimum vitæ finem in actu erimus, non desinemus communi bono operam dare, &c. Nos sumus, apud quos usque eo nihil ante mortem otiosum est, ut, si res patitur, non sit ipsa mors otiosa.

[628] This will appear from the definitions of virtue about to follow.

[629] See pp. 59, 1; 56, 2.

[630] See p. 254, 7. Sen. Ep. 65, 6, after describing a great and noble soul, adds: Talis animus virtus est.

[631] Plut. Vir. Mor. 2: Ἀρίστων δὲ ὁ Χῖος τῇ μὲν οὐσίᾳ μίαν καὶ αὐτὸς ἀρετὴν ἐποίει καὶ ὑγίειαν ὠνόμαζε, κ.τ.λ. Id. on Zeno, see p. 260, 3, and Cleanthes, p. 236, 3. According to Galenus, Aristo defined the one virtue to be the knowledge of good and evil (Hipp. et Plat. v. 5, p. 468): κάλλιον οὖν Ἀρίστων ὁ Χῖος, οὔτε πολλὰς εἶναι τὰς ἀρετὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἀποφηνάμενος, ἀλλὰ μίαν, ἣν ἐπιστήμην ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ κακῶν εἶναί φησιν. vii. 2, p. 595. νομίσας γοῦν ὁ Ἀρίστων, μίαν εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς δύναμιν, ᾗ λογιζόμεθα, καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἔθετο μίαν, ἐπιστήμην ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν. The statement that Aristo made health of soul consist in a right view of good and evil agrees with the language of Plutarch. Perhaps Zeno had already defined φρόνησις as ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν.

[632] Conf. p. 255. 1. Cic. De Off. i. 43, 153: Princepsque omnium virtutum est illa sapientia, quam σοφίαν Græci vocant: prudentiam enim, quam Græci φρόνησιν dicunt, aliam quandam intelligimus: quæ est rerum expetendarum fugiendarumque scientia. Illa autem scientia, quam principem dixi, rerum est divinarum atque humanarum scientia. A similar definition of wisdom, amplified by the words, nosse divina et humana et horum causas, is found Ibid. ii. 2, 5. Sen. Ep. 85, 5; Plut. Plac. Proœm. 2; Strabo, i. 1, 1. It may probably be referred to Chrysippus; and it was no doubt Chrysippus who settled the distinction between σοφία and φρόνησις, in the Stoic school, although Aristo had preceded him in distinguishing them. Explaining particular virtues as springing from the essence of virtue, with the addition of a differential quality, he needed separate terms to express generic and specific virtue. In Zeno’s definition too, as later writers would have it (Plut. Vir. Mat. 2), to φρόνησις was given the meaning of ἐπιστήμη.

[633] ἀρεταὶ πρῶται. Diog. 92; Stob. ii. 104. In stating that Posidonius counted four—Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and Antipater more than four—virtues, Diogenes can only mean that the latter enumerated the subdivisions, whereas Posidonius confined himself to the four main heads of the four cardinal virtues. Besides this division of virtues, another, threefold, division is also met with, see p. 56, 2; 57, 1, that into logical, physical, and ethical virtues. In other words, the whole of philosophy and likewise its parts are brought under the notion of virtue; but it is not stated how this threefold division is to harmonise with the previous fourfold one. A twofold division, made by Panætius and referred to by Seneca (Ep. 94, 45)—that into theoretical and practical virtues—is an approximation to the ethics of the Peripatetics.

[634] The scheme was in vogue before Zeno’s time. See Plut. Sto. Rep. 7, 1, and the quotations, p. 260, 3.

[635] ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων, or ἑκάστων ὧν ποιητέον καὶ οὐ ποιητέον καὶ οὐδετέρων. Stob. 102. Stobæus adds, that the definition needs to be completed by the words, occurring in the definition of every virtue, φύσει πολιτικοῦ ζῴου. But this is superfluous, for only in the case of such a being can the terms good and evil apply. Diog. 92; Sext. Math. xi. 170 and 246; Cic. l.c.

[636] ἐπιστήμη δεινῶν καὶ οὐ δεινῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων (Stob. 104); ἐπιστήμη ὧν αἱρετέον καὶ ὧν εὐλαβητέον καὶ οὐδετέρων (Diog.); ἐπιστήμη ὧν χρὴ θαῤῥεῖν ἢ μὴ θαῤῥεῖν (Galen. Hipp. et Plat. vii. 2, 597). Cic. Tusc. iv. 24, 53, conf. v. 14, 41: (Chrysippus) fortitudo est, inquit, scientia perferendarum rerum, vel affectio animi in patiendo ac perferendo, summæ legi parens sine timore. The last-named characteristic appears still more strongly in the definition attributed to the Stoics by Cic. Off. i. 19, 62: Virtus propugnans pro æquitate.

[637] ἐπιστήμη αἱρετῶν καὶ φευκτῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων. Stob. 102. The definition of φρόνησις in Cicero is the same, word for word. See p. 258, 1; that of valour in Diogenes is not very different. Since all duties refer to ποιητέα and οὐ ποιητέα, the definitions of the remaining virtues must necessarily agree with those of φρόνησις.

[638] ἐπιστήμη ἀπονεμητικὴ τῆς ἀξίας ἑκάστῳ, in Stob. Id. p. 104, further enumerates the points of difference between the four virtues: intelligence refers to καθήκοντα, self-control to impulses, valour to ὑπομοναὶ, justice to ἀπονεμήσεις. See also the distinctive peculiarities of the four virtues in Stob. 112. Below, p. 263.

[639] Diog. 93; Stob. 104. The πρῶται κακίαι are: ἀφροσύνη, δειλία, ἀκολασία, ἀδικία. The definition of ἀφροσύνη is ἄγνοια ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων. See p. 255, 1.

[640] This follows from the fact that the conception of ἐπιστήμη is the basis in all. See p. 258, 1.

[641] Of Zeno, Plut. Vir. Mor. 2, p. 441, says: ὁριζόμενος τὴν φρόνησιν ἐν μὲν ἀπονεμητέοις δικαιοσύνην· ἐν δ’ αἱρετέοις σωφροσύνην· ἐν δ’ ὑπομενετέοις ἀνδρίαν. The like in regard to justice in Sto. Rep. 7, 2. On the other hand valour is here termed φρόνησις ἐν ἐνεργητέοις. He also says, p. 440, that, according to Aristo, ἡ ἀρετὴ ποιητέα μὲν ἐπισκοποῦσα καὶ μὴ ποιητέα κέκληται φρόνησις· ἐπιθυμίαν δὲ κοσμοῦσα καὶ τὸ μέτρων καὶ τὸ εὔκαιρον ἐν ἡδοναῖς ὁρίζουσα, σωφροσύνη· κοινωνήμασι δὲ καὶ συμβολαίοις ὁμιλοῦσα τοῖς πρὸς ἑτέρους, δικαιοσύνη. Further particulars as to Aristo may be found in Galen. Hipp. et Plat. vii. 2, p. 595: Since the soul has only one power, the power of thought, it can only have one virtue, the ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν. ὅταν μὲν οὖν αἱρεῖσθαί τε δέῃ τἀγαθὰ καὶ φεύγειν τὰ κακὰ, τὴν ἐπιστήμην τήνδε λαλεῖ σωφροσύνην· ὅταν δὲ πράττειν μὲν τἀγαθὰ, μὴ πράττειν δὲ τὰ κακὰ, φρόνησιν· ἀνδρείαν δὲ ὅταν τὰ μὲν θαῤῥῇ, τὰ δὲ φεύγῃ· ὅταν δὲ τὸ κατ’ ἀξίαν ἑκάστῳ νέμῃ, δικαιοσύνην· ἑνὶ δὲ λόγῳ, γινώσκουσα μὲν ἡ ψυχὴ χωρὶς τοῦ πράττειν τἀγαθά τε καὶ κακὰ σοφία τ’ ἐστὶ καὶ ἐπιστήμη, πρὸς δὲ τὰς πράξεις ἀφικνουμένη τὰς κατὰ τὸν βίον ὀνόματα πλείω λαμβάνει τὰ προειρημένα. We know, from Plut. Sto. Rep. 7, 4, see p. 256, 3, that, according to Cleanthes, strength of mind, ὅταν μὲν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐπιφανέσιν ἐμμενετέοις ἐγγένηται, ἐγκράτειά ἐστιν· ὅταν δ’ ἐν τοῖς ὑπομενετέοις, ἀνδρεία· περὶ τὰς ἀξίας δὲ, δικαιοσύνη· περὶ τὰς αἱρέσεις καὶ ἐκκλίσεις, σωφροσύνη. With him, too, if Plutarch’s account is accurate, ἐγκράτεια, or perseverance, takes the place of φρόνησις. Cic. Tusc. iv. 24, 53, quotes no less than three definitions of bravery given by Sphærus. See p. 259, 3.

[642] Plut. Vir. Mor. 2, p. 441, charges him with creating a σμῆνος ἀρετῶν οὐ συνῆθες οὐδὲ γνώριμον, and forming a χαριεντότης, ἐσθλότης, μεγαλότης, καλότης, ἐπιδεξιότης, εὐαπαντησία, εὐτραπελία, after the analogy of πρᾳότης, ἀνδρεία, &c. In Stob. ii. 118, among the Stoic virtues, is found an ἐρωτικὴ as ἐπιστήμη νέων θήρας εὐφυῶν, &c., and a συμποτικὴ as ἐπιστήμη τοῦ πῶς δεῖ ἐξάγεσθαι τὰ συμπόσια καὶ τοῦ πῶς δεῖ συμπίνειν. An ἐρωτικὴ and συμποτικὴ ἀρετὴ are also mentioned by Philodem. De Mus. col. 15. According to Athen. 162, b (Vol. Herc. i.), Persæus, in his συμποτικοὶ διάλογοι, had discussed συμποτικὴ at length; and since, according to the Stoics (Sen. Ep. 123, 15: Stob. l.c.), none but the wise know how to live aright and how to drink aright, these arts belong to a complete treatment of wisdom.

[643] Stob. 106, includes under φρόνησις, εὐβουλία, εὐλογιστία, ἀγχίνοια, νουνέχεια, εὐμηχανία; under σωφροσύνη, εὐταξία, κοσμιότης, αἰδημοσύνη, ἐγκράτεια; under ἀνδρεία, καρτερία, θαῤῥαλεότης, μεγαλοψυχία, εὐψυχία, φιλοπονία; under δικαιοσύνη, εὐσέβεια (on which Diog. 119), χρηστότης, εὐκοινωνησία, εὐσυναλλαξία. Diog. 126, is slightly different. Stobæus gives the definitions of all these virtues, and Diogenes of some. By Stobæus, they are generally described as ἐπιστῆμαι; by Diogenes, as ἕξεις or διαθέσεις. Otherwise, the definitions are the same. A definition of εὐταξία is given by Cic. Off. i. 40, 142.

[644] Diog. 93; Stob. 104.

[645] Sto. Rep. 7.

[646] Plut. Vir. Mor. 2: Ἀρίστων δὲ ὁ Χῖος τῇ μὲν οὐσίᾳ μίαν καὶ αὐτὸς ἀρετὴν ἐποίει καὶ ὑγίειαν ὠνόμαζε· τῷ δὲ πρός τι διαφόρους καὶ πλείονας, ὡς εἴ τις ἐθέλοι τὴν ὅρασιν ἡμῶν λευκῶν μὲν ἀντιλαμβανομένην λευκοθέαν καλεῖν, μελάνων δὲ μελανθέαν ἤ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον. καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρετὴ, κ.τ.λ. See p. 260, 3. καθάπερ τὸ μαχαίριον ἓν μέν ἐστιν, ἄλλοτε δὲ ἄλλο διαιρεῖ· καὶ τὸ πῦρ ἐνεργεῖ περὶ ὕλας διαφόρους μιᾷ φύσει χρώμενον.

[647] Galen. Hipp. et Plat. vii. 1, p. 590: νομίζει γὰρ ὁ ἀνὴρ ἐκεῖνος, μίαν οὖσαν τὴν ἀρετὴν ὀνόμασι πλείοσιν ὀνομάζεσθαι κατὰ τὴν πρός τι σχέσιν. Conf. note 5 and Diog. vii. 161: ἀρετάς τ’ οὔτε πολλὰς εἰσῆγεν, ὡς ὁ Ζήνων, οὔτε μίαν πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι καλουμένην, ὡς οἱ Μεγαρικοὶ, ἀλλὰ καὶ [l. κατὰ] τὸ πρός τί πως ἔχειν (scil. πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι καλουμένην).

[648] See p. 260, 3.

[649] Their distinguishing features fall under the category of ποιὸν, to use Stoic terms, not under that of πρός τί πως ἔχον, as Aristo maintained.

[650] Galenus l.c. continues: ὁ τοίνυν Χρύσιππος δείκνυσιν, οὐκ ἐν τῇ πρός τι σχέσει γενόμενον τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἀρετῶν τε καὶ κακιῶν, ἀλλ’ ἐν ταῖς οἰκείαις οὐσίαις ὑπαλλαττομέναις κατὰ τὰς ποιότητος. Plut. Sto. Rep. 7, 3: Χρύσιππος, Ἀρίστωνι μὲν ἐγκαλῶν, ὅτι μιᾶς ἀρετῆς σχέσεις ἔλεγε τὰς ἄλλας εἶναι. Id. Vir. Mor. 2: Χρύσιππος δὲ κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν ἀρετὴν ἰδίᾳ ποιότητι συνίστασθαι νομίζων.

[651] Stob. ii. 110: πάσας δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς, ὅσαι ἐπιστῆμαί εἰσι καὶ τέχναι (compare on this additions p. 255, 1) κοινά τε θεωρήματα ἔχειν καὶ τέλος, ὡς εἴρηται (p. 108—the same is more fully set forth by Panætius, p. 112), τὸ αὐτὸ, διὸ καὶ ἀχωρίστους εἶναι· τὸν γὰρ μίαν ἔχοντα πάσας ἔχειν, καὶ τὸν κατὰ μίαν πράττοντα κατὰ πάσας πράττειν. Diog. 125: τὰς δ’ ἀρετὰς λέγουσιν ἀντακολουθεῖν ἀλλήλαις καὶ τὸν μίαν ἔχοντα πάσας ἔχειν· εἶναι γὰρ αὐτῶν τὰ θεωρήματα κοινὰ, as Chrysippus, Apollodorus, and Hecato assert. τὸν γὰρ ἐνάρετον θεωρητικόν τ’ εἶναι καὶ πρακτικὸν τῶν ποιητέων. τὰ δὲ ποιητέα καὶ αἱρετέα ἐστὶ καὶ ὑπομενητέα καὶ ἀπονεμητέα, knowledge and action including all the four principal instincts.

[652] Cic. Parad. 3, 1: Una virtus est, consentiens cum ratione et perpetua constantia. Nihil huic addi potent, quo magis virtus sit; nihil demi, ut virtus nomen relinquatur. Conf. Sen. Ep. 66, 9. See p. 267.

[653] Stob. 112 (conf. Diog. 126): διαφέρειν δ’ ἀλλήλων τοῖς κεφαλαίοις. φρονήσεως γὰρ εἶναι κεφάλαια τὸ μὲν θεωρεῖν καὶ πράττειν ὃ ποιητέον προηγουμένως, κατὰ δὲ τὸν δεύτερον λόγον τὸ θεωρεῖν καὶ ἃ δεῖ ἀπονέμειν, χάριν τοῦ ἀδιαπτώτως πράττειν ὃ ποιητέον· τῆς δὲ σωφροσύνης ἴδιον κεφάλαιόν ἐστι τὸ παρέχεσθαι τὰς ὁρμὰς εὐσταθεῖς καὶ θεωρεῖν αὐτὰς προηγουμένως, κατὰ δὲ τὸν δεύτερον λόγον τὰ ὑπὸ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς, ἕνεκα τοῦ ἀδιαπτώτως ἐν ταῖς ὁρμαῖς ἀναστρέφεσθαι. Similarly of bravery, which has for its basis πᾶν ὃ δεῖ ὑπομένειν; and of justice, which has τὸ κατ’ ἀξίαν ἑκάστῳ. Plut. Alex. Virt. 11: The Stoics teach that μία μὲν ἀρετὴ πρωταγωνιστεῖ πράξεως ἑκάστης, παρακαλεῖ δὲ τὰς ἄλλας καὶ συντείνει πρὸς τὸ τέλος.

[654] Stob. 116: φασὶ δὲ καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν τὸν σοφὸν κατὰ πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς· πᾶσαν γὰρ πρᾶξιν τελείαν αὐτοῦ εἶναι. Plut. Sto. Rep. 27, 1, conf. Alex. Virt. l.c.: τὰς ἀρετάς φησι [Χρύσιππος] ἀντακολουθεῖν ἀλλήλαις, οὐ μόνον τῷ τὸν μίαν ἔχοντα πάσας ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ τὸν κατὰ μίαν ὁτιοῦν ἐνεργοῦντα κατὰ πάσας ἐνεργεῖν· οὔτ’ ἄνδρα φησὶ τέλειον εἶναι τὸν μὴ πάσας ἔχοντα τὰς ἀρετὰς, οὔτε πρᾶξιν τελείαν, ἥτις οὐ κατὰ πάσας πράττεται τὰς ἀρετάς. If Chrysippus allowed, as Plutarch states, that the brave man does not always act bravely, nor the bad man always like a coward, it was a confession to which he was driven by experience, contrary to Stoic principles.

[655] Cic. Acad. i. 10, 38: Nec virtutis usum modo [Zeno dicebat] ut superiores (whom the Stoic evidently wrongs), sed ipsum habitum per se esse præclarum. Id. Parad. 3, 1: Nec enim peccata rerum eventu sed vitiis hominum metienda sunt. Sen. Benef. vi. 11, 3: Voluntas est, quæ apud nos ponit officium, which Cleanthes then proceeds to illustrate by a parable of two slaves, one of whom diligently seeks for the man whom he is sent to find but without success, whilst the other taking it easy accidentally comes across him. Ibid. i. 5, 2: A benefaction is only ipsa tribuentis voluntas. 6, 1: Non quid fiat aut quid detur refert, sed qua mente.

[656] Compare also the paradoxical statement—Qui libenter beneficium accepit, reddidit—which Sen. l.c. ii. 31, 1, justifies by saying: Cum omnia ad animum referamus, fecit quisque quantum voluit.

[657] Cleanthes, in Stob. Floril. 6, 19:

ὅστις ἐπιθυμῶν ἀνέχετ’ αἰσχροῦ πράγματος
οὗτος ποιήσει τοῦτ’ ἐὰν καιρὸν λάβῃ.

[658] On the notions of κατόρθωμα and ἁμάρτημα, see Plut. Sto. Rep. 11, 1: τὸ κατόρθωμά φασι νόμου προστάγμα εἶναι, τὸ δ’ ἁμάρτημα νόμου ἀπαγόρευμα. To a bad man, law only gives prohibitions, and not commands: οὐ γὰρ δύνανται κατορθοῦν. Chrysippus, Ibid. 15, 10: πᾶν κατόρθωμα καὶ εὐνόμημα καὶ δικαιοπράγημά ἐστι. Stob. ii. 192: ἔτι δὲ τῶν ἐνεργημάτων φασὶ τὰ μὲν εἶναι κατορθώματα, τὰ δ’ ἁμαρτήματα, τὰ δ’ οὐδέτερα (examples of the latter are speaking, giving, &c.) ... πάντα δὲ τὰ κατορθώματα δικαιοπραγήματα εἶναι καὶ εὐνοήματα καὶ εὐτακτήματα, κ.τ.λ. τὰ δὲ ἁμαρτήματα ἐκ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἀδικήματα καὶ ἀνομήματα καὶ ἀτακτήματα.

[659] It is to this view that the distinction between κατόρθωμα and καθῆκον refers from the one side. A καθῆκον (the conceptions of which will be subsequently more fully discussed) is, in general, any discharge of duty, or rational action; κατόρθωμα only refers to a perfect discharge of duty, or to a virtuous course of conduct. Conf. Stob. 158: τῶν δὲ καθηκόντων τὰ μὲν εἶναί φασι τέλεια, ἃ δὴ καὶ κατορθώματα λέγεσθαι. κατορθώματα δ’ εἶναι τὰ κατ’ ἀρετὴν ἐνεργήματα ... τὸ δὲ καθῆκον τελειωθὲν κατόρθωμα γίνεσθαι. Similarly, 184: A κατόρθωμα is a καθῆκον πάντας ἐπέχον τοὺς ἀριθμούς. Cic. Fin. iii. 18, 59: Quoniam enim videmus esse quiddam, quod recte factum appellemus, id autem est perfectum officium; erit autem etiam inchoatum; ut, si juste depositum reddere in recte factis sit, in officiis (καθήκοντα) ponatur depositum reddere. Off. i. 3, 8: Et medium quoddam officium dicitur et perfectum; the former is called κατόρθωμα, the latter καθῆκον. A virtuous action can only be done by one who has a virtuous intention, i.e. by a wise man. Cic. Fin. iv. 6, 15: If we understand by a life according to nature, what is rational, rectum est, quod κατόρθωμα dicebas, contingitque sapienti soli. Off. iii. 3, 14: Illud autem officium, quod rectum iidem [Stoici] appellant, perfectum atque absolutum est, et, ut iidem dicunt, omnes numeros habet, nec præter sapientem, cadere in quenquam potest. Off. iii. 4, 16: When the Decii and Scipios are called brave, Fabricius and Aristides just, Cato and Lælius wise, the wisdom and virtue of the wise man are not attributed to them in the strict sense of the term: sed ex mediorum officiorum frequentia similitudinem quandam gerebant speciemque sapientum.

[660] See p. 263, 2.

[661] In Simpl. Categ. 61, β (Schol. in Arist. 70, b, 28), the Stoics say: τὰς μὲν ἕξεις ἐπιτείνεσθαι δύνασθαι καὶ ἀνίεσθαι· τὰς δὲ διαθέσεις ἀνεπιτάτους εἶναι καὶ ἀνέτους. Thus straightness is, for instance, a διάθεσις, and no mere ἕξις. οὑτωσὶ δὲ καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς διαθέσεις εἶναι, οὐ κατὰ τὸ μόνιμον ἰδίωμα, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ ἀνεπίτατον καὶ ἀνεπίδεκτον τοῦ μᾶλλον· τὰς δὲ τέχνας, ἤτοι δυσκινήτους οὔσας ἢ μὴ (add οὐκ) εἶναι διαθέσεις. Conf. p. 103, 1. Ibid. 72, δ (Schol. 76, a, 12): τῶν Στωϊκῶν, οἵτινες διελόμενοι χωρὶς τὰς ἀρετὰς ἀπὸ τῶν μέσων τεχνῶν ταύτας οὔτε ἐπιτείνεσθαι λέγουσιν οὔτε ἀνίεσθαι, τὰς δὲ μέσας τέχνας καὶ ἐπίτασιν καὶ ἄνεσιν δέχεσθαι φασίν. Simpl. (73, α. Schol. 76, a, 24) replies: This would be true, if virtue consisted only in theoretical conviction: such a conviction must be either true or false, and does not admit of more or less truth (for the same line of argument, see p. 267, 1); but it is otherwise where it is a matter for exercise. It may be remarked, in passing, that a further distinction was made between ἀρετὴ and τέχνη—the one being preceded by an ἀξιόλογος προκοπὴ, the other by a simple ἐπιτηδειότης (Simpl. Categ. 62, β; Schol. 71, a, 38). There is also a definition of τέχνη attributed by Olympiodorus, in Gorg. 53 (Jahrb. für Philol. See Supplementb. xiv. 239), to Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus; to Zeno in Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 241; Math. vii. 109 and 373; more fully in Lucian, Paras. c. 4, Conf. Cic. Acad. ii. 7, 22.

[662] Diog. vii. 127: ἀρέσκει δὲ αὐτοῖς μηδὲν μέσον εἶναι ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας· τῶν Περιπατητικῶν μεταξὺ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας εἶναι λεγόντων τὴν προκοπήν· ὡς γὰρ δεῖν, φασιν, ἢ ὀρθὸν εἶναι ξύλον ἢ στρεβλὸν, οὕτως ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον· οὔτε δὲ δικαιότερον οὔτε ἀδικώτερον, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως. Similarly, Sen. Ep. 71, 18: Quod summum bonum est, supra se gradum non habet ... hoc nec remitti nec intendi posse, non magis, quam regulam, qua rectum probari solet, flectes. Quicquid ex illa mutaveris injuria est recti. Stob. ii. 116: ἀρετῆς δὲ καὶ κακίας οὐδὲν εἶναι μεταξύ.

[663] The much-discussed paradox (Cic. Parad. 3; Fin. iv. 27; Diog. 101 and 120; Stob. 218; Plut. Sto. Rep. 13, 1; Sext. Math. vii. 422; Sen. Ep. 66, 5) is this: ὅτι ἴσα τὰ ἁμαρτήματα καὶ τὰ κατορθώματα. It was, according to Diog., supported, on the one hand, by the proposition, πᾶν ἀγαθὸν ἐπ’ ἄκρον εἶναι αἱρετὸν καὶ μήτε ἄνεσιν μήτε ἐπίτασιν δέχεσθαι; on the other hand, by the remark, to which Sext. and Simpl. in Categ., Schol. in Arist. 76, a, 30, refer: If truth and falsehood admit of no difference of degree, the same must be true of the errors of our conduct. A man is not at the mark, no matter whether he is one or a hundred stadia away. Similarly, Stobæus: The Stoics declare all errors to be ἴσα, although not ὅμοια· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ψεῦδος ἐπίσης ψεῦδος συμβέβηκεν· (a statement quoted as Stoical by Alex. in Metaph. p. 258, 3 Bon. 667, a, 19 Brand) every ἁμαρτία is the result of a διάψευσις. It is, however, impossible for κατορθώματα not to be equal to one another, if vices are equal; πάντα γάρ ἐστι τέλεια, διόπερ οὔτ’ ἐλλείπειν οὔθ’ ὑπερέχειν δύναιτ’ ἂν ἀλλήλων. Cicero and Seneca devoted particular attention to this enquiry. The investigations of Cicero in the Paradoxa result in bringing him to the passage quoted p. 263, 2, from which it follows that nothing can be recto rectius, nor bono melius. The equality of faults is a corollary from the equality of virtues; it also follows from the consideration that whatever is forbidden at all is equally forbidden. De Fin.: It is said, all faults are equal, quia nec honesto quidquam honestius nec turpi turpius. Seneca (Ep. 66, 5) raises the question, How, notwithstanding the difference between goods (see p. 230, 3 end), can all be equal in value? and at once replies: Is virtue—or, what is the same thing, a rightly moulded soul—the only primary good? Virtue, indeed, admits of various forms, according to the activities imposed on it, but can neither be increased nor diminished; Decrescere enim summum bonum non potest, nec virtuti ire retro licet. It cannot increase, quando incrementum maximo non est: nihil invenies rectius recto, non magis quam verius vero, quam temperato temperatius. All virtue consists in modo, in certa mensura. Quid accedere perfecto potest? Nihil, aut perfectum non erat, cui accessit: ergo ne virtuti quidem, cui si quid adjici potest, defuit ... ergo virtutes inter se pares sunt et opera virtutis et omnes homines, quibus illæ contigere ... una inducitur humanis virtutibus regula. Una enim est ratio recta simplexque. Nihil est divino divinius, cœlesti cœlestius. Mortalia minuuntur ... crescunt, &c.; divinorum una natura est. Ratio autem nihil aliud est, quam in corpus humanum pars divini spiritus mersa ... nullum porro inter divina discrimen est: ergo nec inter bona. Ibid. 32: Omnes virtutes rationes sunt: rationes sunt rectæ: si rectæ sunt, et pares sunt. Qualis ratio est, tales et actiones sunt: ergo omnes pares sunt: ceterum magna habebunt discrimina variante materia, etc. On the same ground, Seneca, Ep. 71, defended the equality of all goods and of all good actions, in particular p. 18, where to the quotation given, p. 266, 3, the words are added: Si rectior ipsa [virtus] non potest fieri, nec quæ ab illa quidem fiunt, alia aliis rectiora sunt.

[664] Plut. C. Not. 10, 4: ναὶ, φασίν· ἀλλὰ ὥσπερ ὁ πῆχυν ἀπέχων ἐν θαλάττῃ τῆς ἐπιφανείας οὐδὲν ἧττον πνίγεται τοῦ καταδεδυκότος ὀργυίας πεντακοσίας, οὕτως οὐδὲ οἱ πελάζοντες ἀρετῇ τῶν μακρὰν ὄντων ἧττόν εἰσιν ἐν κακίᾳ καὶ καθάπερ οἱ τυφλοὶ τυφλοί εἰσι κἂν ὀλίγον ὕστερον ἀναβλέπειν μέλλωσιν, οὕτως οἱ προκόπτοντες ἄχρις οὗ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀναλάβωσιν ἀνόητοι καὶ μοχθηροὶ διαμένουσιν. Diog. 127 (see p. 266, 3). Stob. ii. 236: πάντων τε τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων ἴσων ὄντων καὶ τῶν κατορθωμάτων καὶ τοὺς ἄφρονας ἐπίσης πάντας ἄφρονας εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ ἴσην ἔχοντας διάθεσιν. Cic. Fin. iii. 14, 48: Consentaneum est his quæ dicta sunt, ratione illorum, qui illum bonorum finem quod appellamus extremum quod ultimum crescere putent posse, iisdem placere, esse alium alio etiam sapientiorem, itemque alium magis alio vel peccare vel recte facere. Quod nobis non licet dicere, qui crescere bonorum finem non putamus. Then follow the same comparisons as in Plutarch. Sen. Ep. 66, 10: As all virtues are equal, so are omnes homines quibus illæ contigere. Ep. 79, 8: What is perfect admits of no increase; quicunque fuerint sapientes pares erunt et æquales.

[665] Stob. ii. 198: ἀρέσκει γὰρ τῷ τε Ζήνωνι καὶ τοῖς ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ Στωϊκοῖς φιλοσόφοις, δύο γένη τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἶναι, τὸ μὲν τῶν σπουδαίων τὸ δὲ τῶν φαύλων· καὶ τὸ μὲν τῶν σπουδαίων διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου χρῆσθαι ταῖς ἀρεταῖς τὸ δὲ τῶν φαύλων ταῖς κακίαις.

[666] Plut. Aud. Poet. 7, p. 25: μήτε τι φαῦλον ἀρετῇ προσεῖναι μήτε κακίᾳ χρηστὸν ἀξιοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ πάντως μὲν ἐν πᾶσιν ἁμαρτωλὸν εἶναι τὸν ἀμαθῆ, περὶ πάντα δ’ αὖ κατορθοῦν τὸν ἀστεῖον.

[667] Stob. Ecl. ii. 116; 120; 196; 198; 220; 232; Diog. vii. 117; 125; Cic. Acad. i. 10, 38; ii. 20, 66; Plut. Sto. Rep. 11, 1; Sen. Benef. iv. 26; Sext. Math. vii. 434.

[668] Compare the collection of expressions respecting the wise and unwise in Baumhauer, Vet. Phil. Doct. De Mort. Volunt. p. 169.

[669] Diog. 121; 32; Cic. Acad. ii. 44. 136. Parad. 5: ὅτι μόνος ὁ σοφὸς ἐλεύθερος καὶ πᾶς ἄφρων δοῦλος.

[670] Plut. C. Not. 28, 1; Cic. Acad. l.c.: Sext. Math xi. 170.

[671] Cic. Parad. 6; Acad. l.c.; Cleanthes, in Stob. Floril. 94, 28; Sext. l.c.; Alex. Aphr. Top. 79.

[672] Sen. Benef. vii. 3, 2; 6, 3; 8, 1.

[673] Cic. Acad. l.c.; Diog. vii. 125.

[674] Cic. l.c.; Diog. vii. 122; Stob. ii. 206; Plut. Arat. 23. On all the points discussed, Plut. C. Not. 3, 2; De Adul. 16, p. 58; Tran. An. 12, p. 472; Ps. Plut. De Nobil. 17, 2; Cic. Fin. iii. 22, 75; Hor. Ep. i. 1, 106; Sat. i. 3, 124.

[675] Plut. Tran. An. 12; Cic. Divin. ii. 63, 129: Stob. ii. 122; conf. Ps. Plut. Vit. Hom. 143.

[676] Stob. ii. 122 and 216; Diog. 119; Sen. Provid. i. 5. Philodemus, περὶ θεῶν διαγωγῆς (Vol. Hercul. vi. 29), quotes a Stoic saying that the wise are the friends of heaven, and heaven of the wise.

[677] Sen. Ep. 81, 11; Stob. ii. 118.

[678] Sen. Benef. v. 12, 3; Plut. Sto. Rep. 12, 1: C. Not. 20, 1; and above, p. 230, 1.

[679] Stob. ii. 196; Plut. Stoic. Abs. Poët. Dic. 1, 4.

[680] Chrysippus, in Plut. Sto. Rep. 13, 2; Com. Not. 33, 2; Stob. ii. 198. Seneca, Prov. i. 5: Bonus ipse tempore tantum a Deo differt. Ibid. 6, 4: Jupiter says to the virtuous: Hoc est, quo Deum antecedatis: ille extra patientiam malorum est, vos supra patientiam. Ep. 73, 11; De Const. 8, 2; Cic. N. D. ii. 61, 153; Epictet. Diss. i. 12, 26; Man. 15; Horat. Ep. i. l. 106.

[681] See p. 239, 1; Sen. Ep. 53, 11: Non multo te Di antecedent ... diutius erunt. At mehercules magni artificis est clusisse totum in exiguo. Tantum sapienti sua, quantum Deo omnis ætas patet. 73, 13: Jupiter quo antecedit virum bonum? Diutius bonus est: sapiens nihilo se minoris æstimat, quod virtutes ejus spatio breviore cluduntur.

[682] πᾶς ἄφρων μαίνεται. Cic. Parad. 4; Tusc. iii. 5, 10; Diog. vii. 124; Stob. Ecl. ii. 124; Horat. Sat. ii. 3, 43.

[683] The Peripatetic Diogenianus raises the objection (in Eus. Præp. Ev. vi. 8, 10): πῶς οὖν οὐδένα φῂς ἄνθρωπον, ὃς οὐχὶ μαίνεσθαί σοι δοκεῖ κατ’ ἴσον Ὀρέστῃ καὶ Ἀλκμαίωνι, πλὴν τοῦ σοφοῦ; ἕνα δὲ ἢ δύο μόνους φῂς σοφοὺς γεγονέναι. Similarly Plut. Sto. Rep. 31, 5.

[684] Sext. Math. ix. 90 in the argument quoted, p. 146, 1: Man can be the most perfect being, οἷον εὐθέως, ὅτι διὰ κακίας πορεύεται τὸν πάντα χρόνον, εἰ δὲ μή γε, τὸν πλεῖστον· καὶ γὰρ εἴ ποτε περιγένοιτο ἀρετῆς, ὀψὲ καὶ πρὸς ταῖς τοῦ βίου δυσμαῖς περιγίνεται.

[685] This point will be again considered in the next chapter. Compare at present Sext. Math. ix. 133, who says: εἰσὶν ἄρα σοφοί· ὅπερ οὐκ ἤρεσκε τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς, μεχρὶ τοῦ νῦν ἀνευρέτου ὄντος κατ’ αὐτοὺς τοῦ σοφοῦ. Alex. Aphrod. De Fat. 28, p. 90: τῶν δὲ ἀνθρώπων οἱ πλεῖστοι κακοὶ, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀγαθὸς μὲν εἷς ἢ δεύτερος ὑπ’ αὐτῶν γεγονέναι μυθεύεται, ὥσπερ τι παράδοξον ζῷον καὶ παρὰ φύσιν, σπανιώτερον τοῦ Φοίνικος ... οἱ δὲ πάντες κακοὶ καὶ ἐπίσης ἀλλήλοις τοιοῦτοι, ὡς μηδὲν διαφέρειν ἄλλον ἄλλου, μαίνεσθαι δὲ ὁμοίως πάντας. Philodem. De Mus. (Vol. Herc. i.), col. 11, 18: The Stoic cannot take his stand upon the opinion of the majority (consensus gentium), since he has declared it to be profane and impious.

[686] Benef. i. 10, 1–3.

[687] De Ira, iii. 26, 4; Benef. v. 17, 3.

[688] De Clemen. i. 6, 3; De Ira, ii. 28, 1; iii. 27, 3.

[689] Ep. 41, 9; Vit. Be. i. 4.

[690] See the pathetic description, De Ira, ii. 8–10, amongst other passages the following: Ferarum iste conventus est: ... certatur ingenti quidem nequitiæ certamine: major quotidie peccandi cupiditas, minor verecundia est, &c.

[691] Diog. vii. 91: τεκμήριον δὲ τοῦ ὑπαρκτὴν εἶναι τὴν ἀρετήν φησιν ὁ Ποσειδώνιος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τοῦ ἠθικοῦ λόγῳ τὸ γενέσθαι ἐν προκοπῇ τοὺς περὶ Σωκράτην, Διογένην καὶ Ἀντισθένην. The limitation likewise contained herein will be presently discussed. Epictet. Man. 15, mentions Heraclitus as well as Diogenes as θεῖοι.

[692] See the immoderate language of praise of his admirer Sen. De Const. 7, 1: The wise man is no unreal ideal, although, like everything else that is great, he is seldom met with; ceteram hic ipse M. Cato vereor ne supra nostrum exemplar sit. Ibid. 2, 1: Catonem autem certius exemplar sapientis viri nobis Deos immortales dedisse quam Ulixen et Herculem prioribus sæculis.

[693] Plutarch, Prof. in Virt. 2, p. 76; Cic. Off. iii. 4, 16, p. 265, 2.

[694] Sen. Benef. iv. 27, 2: Itaque errant illi, qui interrogant Stoicos: quid ergo? Achilles timidus est? quid ergo? Aristides, cui justitia nomen dedit, injustus est? &c. Non hoc dicimus, sic omnia vitia esse in omnibus, quomodo in quibusdam singula eminent: sed malum ac stultum nullo vitio vacare ... omnia in omnibus vitia sunt, sed non omnia in singulis extant (i.e., all points are not equally prominent in each one). It hardly requires to be pointed out how nearly this view coincides with that of Augustine on the virtues of the heathen, how close a resemblance the Stoic doctrine of folly bears to the Christian doctrine of the unregenerate, and how the contrast between wisdom and folly corresponds to that between the faithful and unbelievers.

[695] Plut. C. N. 10, 1; Prof. in Virt. 12, p. 82; Sen. Ep. 75, 8.

[696] Plut. C. Not. 9; Stoic. Abs. Poët. Dic. 2. The Stoics are here ridiculed because, according to their view, a man may go to bed ugly, poor, vicious, miserable, and rise the next morning wise, virtuous, rich, happy, and a king. In Prof. in Virt. 1, p. 75, a saying of Zeno’s is given, that it is possible to tell by a dream whether we are advancing in virtue.

[697] See p. 266, 3; Plut. Prof. in Virt. 1; Com. Not. 10, 2; see p. 269, 1; Sen. Ep. 75, 8.

[698] Plut. C. Not. 9, 1: τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας παραγινομένης πολλάκις οὐδ’ αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸν κτησάμενον οἴονται διαλεληθέναι δ’ αὐτὸν ὅτι μικρῷ πρόσθεν ἀθλιώτατος ὢν καὶ ἀχρονέστατος νῦν ὁμοῦ φρόνιμος καὶ μακάριος γέγονεν. So Sto. Rep. 19, 3. In explanation of these words, Ritter, iii. 657, aptly refers to Stob. ii. 234 (γίγνεσθαι δὲ καὶ διαλεληθότα τινὰ σοφὸν νομίζουσι κατὰ τοὺς πρώτους χρόνους), and Philo, De Agric. p. 325: Those yet inexperienced in wisdom παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις διαλεληθότες εἶναι λέγονται σοφοί· τοὺς γὰρ ἄχρι σοφίας ἄκρας ἐληλακότας καὶ τῶν ὅρων αὐτῆς ἄρτι πρῶτον ἁψαμένους ἀμήχανον εἰδέναι, φασι, τὴν ἑαυτῶν τελείωσιν. μὴ γὰρ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον ἄμφω συνίστασθαι τήν τε πρὸς τὸ πέρας ἄφιξιν καὶ τὴν τῆς ἀφίξεως κατάληψιν, ἀλλ’ εἶναι μεθόριον ἄγνοιαν, κ.τ.λ. Sen. Ep. 75, 9, likewise investigates the same point, but ranges those who have not yet attained the consciousness of perfection among advancers, but not among the wise. Prantl’s conjecture (Gesch. d. Logik, i. 490, 210), that the σοφὸς διαλεληθὼς is connected with the fallacy known as διαλανθάνων, appears to be questionable.

[699] See p. 230, 3.

[700] Cic. Fin. iii. 5, 17. Gell. N. A. xii. 5, 7: The primary objects of natural self-love are the πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν; and self-love consists mainly in this: Ut omnibus corporis sui commodis gauderet [unusquisque], ab incommodis omnibus abhorreret. Stob. Ecl. ii. 142: Some things are according to nature, others contrary to nature, others neither one nor the other. Health, strength, and such like, are among things according to nature. Ibid. p. 148: τῶν δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἀδιαφόρων ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἐστι πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν τὰ δὲ κατὰ μετοχήν. πρῶτα μέν ἐστι κατὰ φύσιν κίνησις ἢ σχέσις κατὰ τοὺς σπερματικοὺς λόγους γινομένη, οἷον ὑγιεία καὶ αἴσθησις, λεγὼ δὲ τὴν κατάληψιν καὶ ἰσχύν. κατὰ μετοχὴν δὲ ... οἷον χεὶρ ἀρτία καὶ σῶμα ὑγιαῖνον καὶ αἰσθήσεις μὴ πεπηρωμέναι ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν παρὰ φύσιν κατ’ ἀνάλογον. Conf. Ibid. p. 60, where the enumeration of the πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν is also in the Stoic sense, and above, p. 225.

[701] Cic. Fin. iii. 15, 50: Deinceps explicatur differentia rerum: quam si non ullam esse diceremus, confunderetur omnis vita, ut ab Aristone: nec ullum sapientis munus aut opus inveniretur, cum inter res eas, quæ ad vitam degendam pertinerent, nihil omnino interesset neque ullum delectum adhiberi oporteret. The same argument was used by the Stoa against the theoretical ἀδιαφορία of the Sceptics (see above, p. 37, 1), with which the practical ἀδιαφορία of Aristo is most closely connected. It differs only in name from the ἀταραξία of the sceptics, Aristo having a leaning towards Scepticism. See p. 61, 1.

[702] Cic. Fin. iii. 6, 21: Prima est enim conciliatio [οἰκείωσις] hominis ad ea quæ sunt secundum naturam, simul autem cepit intelligentiam vel notionem potius, quam appellant ἔννοιαν illi, viditque rerum agendarum ordinem et ut ita dicam concordiam, multo eam pluris æstimavit quam omnia ilia quæ primum dilexerat: atque ita cognitione et ratione collegit ut statueret in eo collocatum summum illud hominis per se laudandum et expetendum bonum ... cum igitur in eo sit id bonum, quo referenda sint omnia ... quamquam post oritur, tamen id solum vi sua et dignitate expetendum est, eorum autem quæ sunt prima naturæ propter se nihil expetendum, &c. Similarly Gell. l.c.

[703] Plut. Com. Not. 4; Cic. Fin. iv. 17; v. 24, 72; 29, 89.

[704] Cic. Fin. iii. 6, 22: Ut recte dici possit, omnia officia eo referri, ut adipiscamur principia naturæ: nec tamen ut hoc sit bonorum ultimum, propterea quod non inest in primis naturæ conciliationibus honesta actio. Consequens enim est et post oritur.

[705] Plut. C. Not. 26, 2: εἰ γὰρ αὐτὰ μὲν [τὰ] πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν ἀγαθὰ μή ἐστιν, ἡ δ’ εὐλόγιστος ἐκλογὴ καὶ λῆψις αὐτῶν καὶ τὸ πάντα τὰ παρ’ ἑαυτὸν ποιεῖν ἕκαστον ἕνεκα τοῦ τυγχάνειν τῶν πρώτων κατὰ φύσιν, κ.τ.λ. εἴπερ γὰρ οἴονται, μὴ στοχαζομένους μήδ’ ἐφιεμένους τοῦ τυχεῖν ἐκεῖνον τὸ τέλος ἔχειν, ἀλλ’ οὗ δεῖ ἐκεῖνα ἀναφέρεσθαι, τὴν τούτων ἐκλογὴν, καὶ μὴ ταῦτα. τέλος μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἐκλέγεσθαι καὶ λαμβάνειν ἐκεῖνα φρονίμως· ἐκεῖνα δ’ αὐτὰ καὶ τὸ τυγχάνειν αὐτῶν οὐ τέλος, ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ ὕλη τις ὑπόκειται τὸν ἐκλεκτικὴν ἀξίαν ἔχουσα. Cic. See p. 279, 3.

[706] Cic. l.c. 6, 20; Plut. l.c.; Stob. ii. 142: Diog. vii. 105.

[707] See p. 232. Stob. ii. 132: διαφέρειν δὲ λέγουσιν αἱρετὸν καὶ ληπτὸν ... καὶ καθόλου τὸ ἀγαθὸν τοῦ ἀξίαν ἔχοντος.

[708] Diog. vii. 165: Herillus taught διαφέρειν τέλος καὶ ὑποτελίδα· (On this expression compare Stob. ii. 60) τῆς μὲν γὰρ καὶ τοὺς μὴ σοφοὺς στοχάζεσθαι, τοῦ δὲ μόνον τὸν σοφόν. Hence Cic. Fin. iv. 15, 40, raises the objection, Facit enim ille duo sejuncta ultima bonorum, because he neither despises external things, nor connects them with the ultimate aim. Diog. l.c., however, says that he taught τὰ μεταξὺ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας ἀδιάφορα εἶναι; and Cic. Off. i. 2, 6, mentions him, together with Pyrrho and Aristo, as upholders of ἀδιαφορία. It would appear from these passages that Herillus was not far removed from true Stoicism. According to Cic. Fin. ii. 13, 43 (conf. Offic.), he had no followers after the time of Chrysippus.

[709] Cic. Legg. i. 21, 55: Si, ut Chius Aristo dixit, solum bonum esse diceret quod honestum esset malumque quod turpe, ceteras res omnes plane pares ac ne minimum quidem utrum adessent an abessent interesse. Ibid. 13, 38. Fin. iv. 17, 47: Ut Aristonis esset explosa sententia dicentis, nihil differre aliud ab alio nec esse res ullas præter virtutes et vitia intra quas quidquam omnino interesset. Ibid. ii. 13, 43; iii. 3, 11; 15, 50; iv. 16, 43; 25, 68; v. 25, 73; Acad. ii. 42, 130; Offic. Fragm. Hortens. (in Nonn. Præfract.); Diog. vii. 160; Sext. Math. xi. 64. Cic. usually places Aristo together with Pyrrho.

[710] Diog. l.c.: τέλος ἔφησεν εἶναι τὸ ἀδιαφόρως ἔχοντα ζῇν πρὸς τὰ μεταξὺ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας μηδὲ ἡντινοῦν ἐν αὐτοῖς παραλλαγὴν ἀπολείποντα ἀλλ’ ἐπίσης ἐπὶ πάντων ἔχοντα. Cic. Acad. l.c.: Huic summum bonum est in his rebus (the morally adiaphora) neutram in partem moveri; quæ ἀδιαφορία ab ipso dicitur. Chrysippus, in Plut. C. Not. 27, 2: Indifference to that which is neither good nor bad presupposes the idea of the good, and yet, according to Aristo, the good only consists in that state of indifference. Stob. i. 920; Clem. Strom. ii. 416, C. See Cic. Fin. iv. 25, 68, for Chrysippus’ attack on this ἀδιαφορία.

[711] Diog. vii. 105: τῶν ἀδιαφόρων τὰ μὲν λέγουσι προηγμένα τὰ δὲ ἀποπροηγμένα. προηγμένα μὲν τὰ ἔχοντα ἀξίαν· ἀποπροηγμένα δὲ τὰ ἀπαξίαν ἔχοντα. By ἀξία, the three meanings of which are discussed, they understand here μέσην τινὰ δύναμιν ἢ χρείαν συμβαλλομένην πρὸς τὸν κατὰ φύσιν βίον. 107: τῶν προηγμένων τὰ μὲν δι’ αὑτὰ προῆκται, τὰ δὲ δι’ ἕτερα, τὰ δὲ δι’ αὑτὰ καὶ δι’ ἕτερα.... δι’ αὑτὰ μὲν ὅτι κατὰ φύσιν ἐστί. δι’ ἕτερα δὲ ὅτι περιποιεῖ χρείας οὐκ ὀλίγας. ὁμοίως δὲ ἔχει καὶ ἀποπροηγμένον κατὰ τὸν ἐναντίον λόγον. Essentially the same account, only somewhat fuller, in Stob. Ecl. ii. 142. Conf. Cic. Acad. i. 10, 36; Fin. iii. 15, 50; iv. 26, 72; Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 191; Math. xi. 60; Alex. Aphr. De An. 157. Zeno (in Stob. 156; Cic. Fin. iii. 16, 52) explains the conception προηγμένον, and its distinction from ἀγαθόν: προηγμένον δ’ εἶναι λέγουσιν, ὃ ἀδιάφορον ὂν ἐκλεγόμεθα κατὰ προηγούμενον λόγον ... οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν εἶναι προηγμένον, διὰ τὸ τὴν μεγίστην ἀξίαν αὐτὰ ἔχειν. τὸ δὲ προηγμένον, τὴν δευτέραν χώραν καὶ ἀξίαν ἔχον, συνεγγίζειν πως τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φύσει οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐν αὐλῇ τὸν προηγούμενον εἶναι τὸν βασιλέα, ἀλλὰ τὸν μετ’ αὐτὸν τεταγμένον.

[712] Stob. ii. 142: ἀδιάφορα δ’ εἶναι λέγουσι τὰ μεταξὺ τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν κακῶν, διχῶς τὸ ἀδιάφορον νοεῖσθαι φάμενοι, καθ’ ἕνα μὲν τρόπον τὸ μήτε ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακὸν καὶ τὸ μήτε αἱρετὸν μήτε φευκτόν· καθ’ ἕτερον δὲ τὸ μήτε ὁρμῆς μήτε ἀφορμῆς κινητικόν—τὰ καθάπαξ ἀδιάφορα. Similarly Diog. vii. 104. Sext. M. vi. 60, distinguishes a third meaning. It is, however, only a subdivision of the second.

[713] Stob. ii. 144, 156; Sext. P. iii. 191; M. xi. 62.