Chapter XXIII: The New Academy (4)

[217] Sext. Math. viii. 89; Diog. 73: ἀντικείμενα are ὧν τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου ἐστὶν ἀποφατικὸν or (according to the outward treatment of these determinations) ἀποφάσει πλεονάζει—as, It is day, and It is not day. Aristotle called such a contradictory ἀντίφασις, a contrary ἐναντιότης, putting both under the class conception of ἀντικείμενα. The Stoics reserved ἀντικείμενα for contradictories (Simpl. Cat. 102, δ and 102, ζ, a Stoic discussion intended to show that the conception of ἐνάντιον is not applicable to negative sentences and conceptions), which is after all only a difference in terminology. Ἐναντίον they also call μαχόμενον (Apollon. Synt. 484, Bekk.). Otherwise, following Aristotle, they distinguished between ἐναντίον and ἐναντίως ἔχον· ἐναντία are conceptions which are in plain and immediate contrast, such as φρόνησις and ἀφρόνησις· ἐναντίως ἔχοντα are those which are only contrasted by means of the ἐναντία, such as φρόνιμος and ἄφρων (Simpl. Categ. 98, γ). The former, therefore, apply to abstract, the latter to concrete notions. That every negative judgment has an affirmative judgment opposed to it is elaborately proved by a series of quotations from poets, each one of which is four times repeated in the fragment περὶ ἀποφατικῶν first edited by Letronne (Fragments inédits, Paris, 1838), and subsequently emended, explained, and with a great degree of probability referred to Chrysippus by Bergk (De Chrysippi libro περὶ ἀποφατικῶν, Cassel, 1841, Gymn. progr.). In explaining the fragment Prantl, Gesch. d. Log. I. 451 appears to have hit the truth in one point, where Bergk is not satisfied.

[218] Simpl. Categ. 103, β; Cic. De Fato, 16, 37; N. D. i. 25, 70. Further particulars above p. 83, 2; 110, 3.

[219] Viz. that the members of a disjunction, as well as their contradictory opposites, must also be contraries (adversa or pugnantia), and that from the truth of the one the falsehood of the other follows. A disjunction which does not satisfy one or the other of these conditions is false (παραδιεζευγμένον). Gell. N. A. xvi. 8, 12; Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 191; Alex. Anal. Pr. 7, b.

[220] Diog. 71; Sext. Math. 109; Galen, De Simpl. Medicamen. ii. 16, vol. xi. 499; Ps. Galen, Εἰσαγ. διαλ. p. 15. The Stoics distinguish most unnecessarily, but quite in harmony with their ordinary formal punctiliousness, the case in which the leading clause is identical with the inferential clause (εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστὶν, ἡμέρα ἔστιν) and the case in which it is different (εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστὶν, φῶς ἔστιν). Conditional sentences of the first kind are called διφορούμενα συνημμένα. Sext. viii. 281; 294; and 466; Pyrrh. ii. 112; conf. viii. 95; Diog. 68. That in all these passages διφορούμενον must be read, and not διαφορούμενον, appears according to Prantl’s (p. 445, 122) very true observation from the remarks of Alex. Top. 7, a; Anal. Pr. 7, b, on διφορούμενοι συλλογισμοί.

[221] Sext. Math. viii. 112; κοινῶς μὲν γάρ φασιν ἅπαντες οἱ Διαλεκτικοὶ ὑγιὲς εἶναι συνημμένον, ὅταν ἀκολουθῇ τῷ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡγουμένῳ τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ λῆγον. περὶ δὲ τοῦ πότε ἀκολουθεῖ καὶ πῶς, στασιάζουσι πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ μαχόμενα τῆς ἀκολουθίας ἐκτίθενται κριτήρια. Cic. Acad. ii. 47, 143: In hoc ipso, quod in elementis dialectici docent, quomodo judicare oporteat, rerum falsumne sit, si quid ita connexum est, ut hoc: Si dies est, lucet; quanta contentio est! aliter Diodoro aliter Philoni, Chrysippo aliter placet. (The further remarks on the points of difference between Chrysippus and Cleanthes have no reference to hypothetical judgments.) The Philo here alluded to—the same Philo against whom Chrysippus wrote his treatises (Diog. vii. 191 and 194)—is the well-known dialectician and pupil of Diodorus, who declared all conditional sentences to be right in which a false inferential clause is not drawn from a true leading clause. According to this view, conditional sentences would be right, with both clauses true, or both false, or with a false leading clause and true inferential clause (Sext. l.c. viii. 245 and 449; Pyrrh. ii. 110). According to Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 104, the view of Philo appears to have gained acceptance among the Stoics, perhaps through Zeno, for whose connection with Philo see Diog. vii. 16. But, in any case, the meaning appears to have been (Diog. vii. 81), that, in the cases mentioned, conditional sentences may be right, not that they must be right.

Others more appropriately judged of the correctness of conditional sentences by the connection of the clauses, and either required, for a conditional sentence to be right, that the contradictory opposite (ἀντικείμενον) of the inferential clause should be irreconcileable with the leading clause, or that the inferential clause should be potentially (δυνάμει) contained in the leading clause (Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 111). The first of these requirements, which is mentioned by Diog. 73 as the only criterion of the Stoic School, was due to Chrysippus, who accordingly refused to allow sentences in which this was not the case to be expressed hypothetically (Cic. De Fato, 6, 12; 8, 15): it was not right to say, Si quis natus est oriente canicula, is in mari non morietur; but, Non et natus est quis oriente canicula et is in mari morietur.

It may be observed, in connection with the enquiry into the accuracy of conditional sentences, that a true conditional sentence may become false in time. The sentence, If Dion is alive now, he will continue to live, is true at the present moment; but in the last moment of Dion’s life it will cease to be true. Such sentences were called ἀπεριγράφως μεταπίπτοντα, because the time could not be previously fixed when they would become false (Simpl. Phys. 305, a). Chrysippus also wrote on the μεταπίπτοντα, according to Dionys. Comp. Verb. p. 72 Schäfer. Diog. vii. 105, mentions two treatises of his on the subject, but characterises them as spurious.

[222] According to Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 100, Math. viii. 143 and 156, the Stoics distinguished between σημεῖα ὑπομνηστικὰ and σημεῖα ἐνδεικτικά. The definition of the latter was ἐνδεικτικὸν ἀξίωμα ἐν ὑγιεῖ συνημμένῳ καθηγούμενον (or προκαθηγούμενον) ἐκκαλυπτικὸν τοῦ λήγοντος· the ὑγιὲς συνημμένον was a sentence with both the leading and inferential clauses true. Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 101; 106; 115; Math. viii. 249.

[223] Diodorus had said that Only what is, or what will be, is possible. The Stoics, and in particular Chrysippus, define δυνατὸν as what is capable of being true (τὸ ἐπιδεκτικὸν τοῦ ἀληθὲς εἶναι), if circumstances do not prevent; ἀδύνατον as ὃ μή ἐστιν ἐπιδεκτικὸν τοῦ ἀληθὲς εἶναι. From the δυνατὸν they distinguish the οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, which is defined as ὃ καὶ ἀληθές ἐστι καὶ ψεῦδος οἷόν τε εἶναι τῶν ἐκτὸς μηδὲν ἐναντιουμένων (Plut. Sto. Rep. 46, p. 1055; Diog. 76; Boëth. De Interp. 374, Bas. The same thing is also stated in Alex. Aphr. De Fato, c. 10, p. 30. δυνατὸν εἶναι γενέσθαι τοῦτο δ’ ὑπ’ οὐδενὸς κωλύετα γενέσθαι κἂν μὴ γένηται.) On the other hand, ἀναγκαῖον is, what is both true and incapable of being false, either in itself or owing to other circumstances. Diog. and Boëth. There was probably another definition of οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, as ὃ ψεῦδος οἷόν τε εἶναι τῶν ἐκτὸς μὴ ἐναντιουμένων· so that it might be said (Boëth. 429) that the οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον was partly possible and partly impossible, without contradicting (as Boëth. and Prantl, p. 463, believe) their other statement, that the δυνατὸν was partly necessary and partly not necessary. The conceptions of the Possible and the Not-necessary are thus made to overlap, the former including the Necessary and Not-necessary, the latter the Possible and the Not-possible.

To defend his definition of the Possible against the κυριεύων of Diodorus, Chrysippus denied the statement, δυνατῷ ἀδύνατον μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν, without exposing the confusion contained in it between sequence in time and causal relation (Alex. Anal. Pr. 57, b; Philop. Anal. Pr. xlii. b; Schol. in Arist. 163, a; Cic. De Fato, 7, 13; Ep. ad Div. ix. 4). Cleanthes, Antipater, and Panthoides preferred to attack another leading clause of Diodorus, the clause that Every past occurrence must necessarily be true (Epictet. Diss. ii. 19, 2 and 5). The Aristotelian position in reference to a disjunction, that When the disjunction refers to something future, the disjunction itself is true, without either clause being necessarily true, was not accepted by the Stoics (Simpl. Cat. 103, β).

[224] Plut. Sto. Rep. 46, p. 1055, justly insists on this point.

[225] Prantl, pp. 467–496.

[226] Diog. 45; Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 194, see above p. 65.

[227] Both were included by the Peripatetics under the term hypothetical. In the same way the Stoics include both among the five ἀναπόδεικτοι. See below p. 119, 2.

[228] Chain-argument seems to have been also treated of in the categorical form. See p. 120, 3.

[229] As shown by Prantl, 468, 171; on Diog. 76; Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 135; Apul. Dogm. Plat. iii. 279, Oud. The latter rightly refers to the fact, that Chrysippus discussed the main forms of hypothetical inference at the very beginning of his doctrine of inference, Sext. Math. viii. 223.

[230] Anal. Pr. 87, b: δι’ ὑποθέσεως δὲ ἄλλης, ὡς εἶπεν (Arist. Anal. Pr. i. 23, 41, a, 37) εἶεν ἂν καὶ οὓς οἱ νεώτεροι συλλογισμοὺς μόνους βούλονται λέγειν· οὗτοι δ’ εἰσὶν οἱ διὰ τροπικοῦ, ὡς φασὶ, καὶ τῆς προλήψεως γινόμενοι, τοῦ τροπικοῦ ἢ συνημμένου (conditional) ὄντος ἢ διεζευγμένου (disjunctive) ἢ συμπεπλεγμένου (a copulative judgment suggesting partly hypothetical judgments like the συμπεπλεγμένον in Sext. Math. viii. 235, partly negative categorical judgments which have the force of hypothetical judgments, such as: it is not at the same time A and B. Conf. Diog. 80. Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 158; Matt. viii. 226. Cic. De Fato, vi. 12). By the νεώτεροι, the Stoics must be meant, for the terminology is theirs; and the Peripatetics, to whom it might otherwise apply, always considered the categorical to be the original form of judgment. See Prantl, 468, 172.

[231] Such an inference was called λόγος· when it was expressed in definite terms, for instance, If it is day, it is light. The arrangement of the clauses (which were designated by numbers, and not by letters, as the Peripatetics had done), was called τρόπος· for instance, εἰ τὸ πρῶτον, τὸ δεύτερον. A conclusion composed of both forms of expression was a λογότροπος· for instance, εἰ ζῇ Πλάτων, ἀναπνεῖ Πλάτων· ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ πρῶτον· τὸ ἄρα δεύτερον. The premisses were called λήμματα (in contrast to ἀξίωμα which expresses a judgment independently of its position in a syllogism); or, more correctly, the major premiss was λῆμμα, the minor πρόσληψις (hence the particles δὲ γε were προσληπτικὸς σύνδεσμος, Apollon. Synt. p. 518, Bekk.). The conclusion was ἐπιφορά, also ἐπιφορικοὶ συνδεσμοί. Ibid. 519. The major premiss in a hypothetical syllogism was called τροπικόν, its two clauses being called, respectively, ἡγούμενον (as by the Peripatetics) and λῆγον (by the Peripatetics ἑπόμενον). Diog. 76; Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 135; Math. viii. 301, 227; Alex. l.c. and p. 88, a; 109, a; 7, b; Philop. Anal. Pr. lx. a; Schol. in Arist. 170, a, 2; Ammon. on Anal. Pr. 24, b, 19; Arist. Orig. ed. Waitz, i. 45; Apul. Dog. Plat. iii. 279, Oud.; Ps. Galen, Εἰσαγ. διαλ. p. 19.

[232] Alex. Anal. Pr. 116, b, after mentioning ἀμεθόδως περαίνοντες συλλογισμοὶ, or inferences incomplete in point of form, such as: A = B, B = C, ∴ A = C, which is said to want as its major premiss: Two things which are equal to a third are equal to one another. On these ἀμεθόδως περαίνοντες of the Stoics see l.c. 8, a; 22, b; Alex. Top. 10, Ps. Galen, Εἰς. διαλ. 59. He then continues: οὓς ὅτι μὲν μὴ λέγουσι συλλογιστικῶς συνάγειν, ὑγιῶς λέγουσι [οἱ νεώτεροι] ... ὅτι δὲ ἡγοῦνται ὁμοίους αὐτοὺς εἶναι τοῖς κατηγορικοῖς συλλογισμοῖς ... τοῦ παντὸς διαμαρτάνουσιν.

[233] συνακτικοὶ or περαντικοὶ, and ἀσυνακτικοὶ or ἀπέραντοι, or ἀσυλλόγιστοι. Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 137; Math. viii. 303 and 428; Diog. 77.

[234] Syllogisms which are conclusive in point of fact, but wanting in precision of form, were called περαντικοί in the narrower sense; those complete also in form, συλλογιστικοί. Diog. 78; Ps. Galen, Εἰσαγ. διαλ. 58.

[235] An inference is true (ἀληθὴς) when not only the illation is correct (ὑγιὴς), but when the individual propositions, the premisses as well as the conclusion, are materially true. The λόγοι συνακτικοὶ may therefore be divided into true and false. Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 138; Math. viii. 310 and 412; Diog. 79.

[236] Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 140 and 135; Math. viii. 305; 313; and 411: True forms of inference are divided into ἀποδεικτικοὶ and οὐκ ἀποδεικτικοὶ. ἀποδεικτικοὶ = οἱ διὰ προδήλων ἄδηλόν τι συνάγοντες· οὐκ ἀποδεικτικοὶ when this is not the case, as in the inference: If it is day, it is light—It is day, ∴ It is light; for the conclusion, It is light, is known as well as it is known that It is day. The ἀποδεικτικοὶ may proceed either ἐφοδευτικῶς from the premisses to the conclusions, or ἐφοδευτικῶς ἅμα καὶ ἐκκαλυπτικῶς· ἐφοδευτικῶς when the premisses rest upon belief (πίστις and μνήμη); ἐκκαλυπτικῶς when they are based on a scientific necessity.

[237] According to Diog. 79, Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 157, others added other forms of ἀναπόδεικτοι. Cic., in adding a sixth and seventh (Top. 14, 57), must have been following these authorities.

[238] Consult, on these five ἀναπόδεικτοι of Chrysippus (which need not be given here more at length, and are absolutely identical with those of Theophrastus) Diog. 79–81 (on p. 79 we must read συλλογιστικῶν for συλλογισμὼν. See p. 118, 2); Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 156–159; 201; Math. viii. 223–227; Cic. Top. 13; Simpl. Phys. 123, b; Ps. Galen, Εἰσαγ. διαλ. 17; Prantl, 473, 182; on the πέμπτος ἀναπόδεικτος διὰ πλειόνων Sext. Pyrrh. i. 69; Cleomed. Meteora, pp. 41 and 47; Prantl, p. 475.

[239] Two such cases are distinguished, one in which all three clauses, the other in which the conclusion and minor premiss are identical. The first class are called διφορούμενοι· If it is day, it is day; It is day, ∴ It is day. The second class, ἀδιαφόρως περαίνοντες· It is either day or night; It is day, ∴ It is day. The latter term is, however, applied to both kinds. See Alex. Anal. Pr. 7, a; 53, b; Top. 7; Schol. in Arist. 294, b, 25; Cic. Acad. ii. 30, 96; Prantl, 476, 185.

[240] Cic. Top. 15, 57: ex his modis conclusiones innumerabiles nascuntur. Sext. Math. viii. 228, in which passage it is striking that ἀναπόδεικτοι should be divided into ἁπλοῖ and οὐχ ἁπλοῖ. It has been suggested that ἀποδεικτικῶν should be substituted for ἀναποδείκτων, but it is also possible that the latter word may be used in a narrow as well as in a wider sense.

[241] Diog. 78: συλλογιστικοὶ [λόγοι] μὲν οὖν εἰσιν οἱ ἤτοι ἀναπόδεικτοι ὄντες ἢ ἀναγόμενοι ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀναποδείκτους κατά τι τῶν θεμάτων ἢ τινά. According to Galen, Hipp. et Plat. ii. 3, p. 224, Chrysippus had taken great pains in resolving the composite forms of inference (Diog. 190 and 194). Antipater suggested still simpler modes.

[242] Sext. 229–243, borrowing the example used by Ænesidemus, but no doubt following the Stoic treatment. Prantl, 479. Such a composite inference is that mentioned by Sextus l.c. 281.

[243] Sext.; Prantl, p. 478.

[244] Alex. on Anal. Pr. i. 25, 42, b, 5, after speaking of the Sorites, continues (p. 94, b): ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ τῶν προτάσεων συνεχείᾳ τό τε συνθετικόν ἐστι θεώρημα ... καὶ οἱ καλούμενοι ὑπὸ τῶν νεωτέρων ἐπιβάλλοντές τε καὶ ἐπιβαλλόμενοι. The συνθετικὸν θεώρημα (or chain-argument), the meaning of which is next investigated, must be a Peripatetic expression. The same meaning must attach to ἐπιβάλλοντές τε καὶ ἐπιβαλλόμενοι, which are to be found ἐν ταῖς συνεχῶς λαμβανομέναις προτάσεσι χωρὶς τῶν συμπερασμάτων· for instance, A is a property of B, B of C, C of D; ∴ A is a property of D. ἐπιβαλλόμενος means the inference, the conclusion of which is omitted; ἐπιβάλλων, the one with the omitted premiss. These inferences may be in either of the three Aristotelian figures κατὰ τὸ παραδεδομένον συνθετικὸν θεώρημα. ὃ οἱ μὲν περὶ Ἀριστοτέλην τῇ χρείᾳ παραμετρήσαντες παρέδοσαν, ἐφ’ ὅσον αὐτὴ ἀπῇτει, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ [στοᾶς] παρ’ ἐκείνων λαβόντες καὶ διελόντες ἐποίησαν ἐξ αὐτοῦ τὸ καλούμενον παρ’ αὐτοῖς δεύτερον καὶ τρίτον θέμα καὶ τέταρτον, ἀμελήσαντες μὲν τοῦ χρησίμου, πᾶν δὲ τὸ ὁπωσοῦν δυνάμενον λέγεσθαι ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ θεωρίᾳ κἂν ἄχρηστος ᾖ, ἐπεξελθόντες τε καὶ ζηλώσαντες. Reference is made to the same thing in Simpl. De Cœlo; Schol. in Arist. 483, b, 26: ἡ δὲ τοιαύτη ἀνάλυσις τοῦ λόγου, ἡ τὸ συμπέρασμα λαμβάνουσα καὶ προσλαμβάνουσα ἄλλην πρότασιν, κατὰ τὸ τρίτον λεγόμενον παρὰ τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς θέμα περαίνεται, the rule of which is, that when a third proposition can be drawn from the conclusion of an inference and a second proposition, that third proposition can be drawn also from the premisses of the inference and the second proposition. Both these passages appear to have escaped the notice of Prantl in his summing up, otherwise so accurate. Or else the πρῶτον, δεύτερον, τρίτον and τέταρτον θέμα mentioned by Galen, Hipp. et Plat. ii. 3, vol. v. 224; Alex. Anal. Pr. 53, b, would hardly suggest to him the various forms of the ἀναπόδεικτοι instead of the formulæ for the resolution of composite conclusions. The expressions διὰ δύο τροπικῶν, διὰ τριῶν τροπικῶν, and the title of a treatise of Chrysippus περὶ τοῦ διὰ τριῶν (sc. τροπικῶν or λημμάτων conf. p. 117, 3) in Diog. vii. 191; (Galen, l.c.; Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 2), appear to refer to such composite inferences.

[245] Called μονολήμματοι συλλογισμοί. Such were ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν· and ἀναπνεῖς, ζῇς ἄρα. See Alex. Top. 6, 274; Anal. Pr. 7, a, 8, a: Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 167; Math. viii. 443; Apul. Dogm. Plat. iii. 272, Oud.; Prantl, 477, 186.

[246] Compare the remarks of Prantl, 481, on Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 2; Alex. Anal. Pr. 53, b; Galen, l.c.; Ps. Galen, Εἰσαγ. διαλ. 57. If Posidonius, according to the latter passage, calls analogical conclusions συνακτικοὺς κατὰ δύναμιν ἀξιώματος, and the Stoics also, according to Schol. in Hermog. Rhet. Gr. ed. Walz, vii. 6, 764, spoke of a κατὰ δύναμιν τροπικὸν, we have already met with the same thing, p. 119, 1, where an analogical conclusion was included in the ἀμεθόδως περαίνοντες, which, by the addition of an ἀξίωμα, can be changed into regular conclusions. In the doctrine of proof the τόπος παράδοξος was also treated of, according to Procl. in Euclid, 103, being probably suggested by the ethical paradoxes of the Stoics.

[247] Conf. Alex. Anal. Pr. 95, a; Galen. See above p. 120, 3. According to Ps. Galen, l.c. p. 58, Chrysippus wrote these treatises on Συλλογιστικαὶ ἄχρηστοι.

[248] Diog. 186, mentions fallacies due to Chrysippus, which can only have been raised for the purpose of being refuted.

[249] The list of his writings contains a number of treatises on fallacies, among them no less than five on the ψευδόμενος.

[250] Cic. Acad. ii. 29, 93: Placet enim Chrysippo, cum gradatim interrogetur, verbi causa, tria pauca sint, anne multa, aliquanto prius, quam ad multa perveniat, quiescere, id est, quod ab iis dicitur ἡσυχάζειν. The same remark is made by Sext. Math. vii. 416; Pyrrh. ii. 253. The same argument was employed against other fallacies (Simpl. Cat. 6, γ). With this λόγος ἡσυχάζων (Diog. 198), Prantl, p. 489, connects ἀργὸς λόγος (Cic. De Fato, 12, 28), regarding the one as the practical application of the other, but apparently without reason. The ἀργὸς λόγος, by means of which the Stoic fatalism was reduced ad absurdum, could not of course commend itself to Chrysippus, nor is it attributed to him.

[251] Prantl, pp. 485–496.

[252] Sext. Math. viii. 367: ἀλλ’ οὐ δεῖ, φασὶ, πάντων ἀπόδειξιν αἰτεῖν, τινὰ δὲ καὶ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως λαμβάνειν, ἐπεὶ οὐ δυνήσεται προβαίνειν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος, ἐὰν μὴ δοθῇ τι πιστὸν ἐξ αὑτοῦ τυγχάνειν. Ibid. 375: ἀλλ’ εἰώθασιν ὑποτυγχάνοντες λέγειν ὅτι πίστις ἐστὶ τοῦ ἐρρῶσθαι τὴν ὑπόθεσιν τὸ ἀληθὲς εὑρίσκεσθαι ἐκεῖνο τὸ τοῖς ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ληφθεῖσιν ἐπιφερόμενον· εἰ γὰρ τὸ τούτοις ἀκολουθοῦν ἐστιν ὑγιὲς, κἀκεῖνα οἷς ἀκολουθεῖ ἀληθῆ καὶ ἀναμφίλεκτα καθέστηκεν.

[253] Natural Science was divided by the Stoics themselves (Diog. 132): (1) εἰδικῶς into τόποι περὶ σωμάτων καὶ περὶ ἀρχῶν καὶ στοιχείων καὶ θεῶν καὶ περάτων καὶ τόπου καὶ κενοῦ· (2) γενικῶς into three divisions, περὶ κόσμον, περὶ στοιχείων, and the αἰτιολογικός. The first of these divisions covers ground which is partly peculiar to natural science and is partly shared by the mathematician (astronomy. Posidonius in Simpl. Phys. 64, b, discusses at length the difference between astronomy and natural science); and the third, ground which is shared by both the physician and the mathematician. The precise allotment of the subject into these divisions is not known. At best, it would be a very uncomfortable division.

[254] Soph. 247, D.

[255] Plut. Com. Not. 30, 2, p. 1073: ὄντα γὰρ μόνα τὰ σώματα καλοῦσιν, ἐπειδὴ ὄντος τὸ ποιεῖν τι καὶ πάσχειν. Plac. i. 11, 4: οἱ Στωϊκοὶ πάντα τὰ αἴτια σωματικά· πνεύματα γάρ. iv. 20: οἱ δὲ Στωϊκοὶ σῶμα τὴν φωνήν· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ δρώμενον ἢ καὶ ποιοῦν σῶμα· ἡ δὲ φωνὴ ποιεῖ καὶ δρᾷ ... ἔτι πᾶν τὸ κινοῦν καὶ ἐνοχλοῦν σῶμά ἐστιν ... ἔτι πᾶν τὸ κινούμενον σῶμά ἐστιν. Cic. Acad. i. 11, 39: [Zeno] nullo modo arbitrabatur quidquam effici posse ab ea [natura] quæ expers esset corporis ... nec vero aut quod efficeret aliquid aut quod efficeretur (more accurately: in quo efficeretur aliquid. Conf. Ritter, iii. 577) posse esse non corpus. Seneca, see below p. 128, 1; 129, 1; Stob. Ecl. i. 336 (see p. 95, 2) and 338: Χρύσιππος αἴτιον εἶναι λέγει δι’ ὅ. καὶ τὸ μὲν αἴτιον ὂν καὶ σῶμα, κ.τ.λ. Ποσειδώνιος δὲ οὕτως. αἴτιον δ’ ἐστί τινος δι’ ὃ ἐκεῖνο, ἢ τὸ ἀρχηγὸν ποιήσεως, καὶ τὸ μὲν αἴτιον ὂν καὶ σῶμα, οὗ δὲ αἴτιον οὔτε ὂν οὔτε σῶμα, ἀλλὰ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ κατηγόρημα. See p. 95, 1 and 2. Diog. vii. 56: According to Chrysippus, Diogenes (see Simpl. Phys. 97, a), and others, the voice is material, πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ποιοῦν σῶμά ἐστι. Ibid. 150: οὐσίαν δέ φασι τῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων τὴν πρώτην ὕλην, ὡς καὶ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ τῶν φυσικῶν καὶ Ζήνων· ὕλη δέ ἐστιν, ἐξ ἧς ὁτιδηποτοῦν γίνεται ... σῶμα δέ ἐστι κατ’ αὐτοὺς ἡ οὐσία. Hippolyt. Refut. Hær. i. 21: σώματα δὲ πάντα ὑπέθεντο, κ.τ.λ.

[256] As do Ritter, iii. 577, and Schleiermacher, Gesch. der Philos. 129.

[257] Diog. vii. 135: σῶμα δ’ ἐστὶ (φησὶν Ἀπολλόδωρος ἐν τῇ φυσικῇ) τὸ τριχῇ διαστατὸν, κ.τ.λ.

[258] See p. 98. The corporeal nature of deity and the soul will be subsequently discussed.

[259] See p. 105. Sen. Ep. 102, 7, remarks, in reference to the difference of ἡνωμένα· (see p. 103, 1): nullum bonum putamus esse, quod ex distantibus constat: uno enim spiritu unum bonum contineri ac regi debet, unum esse unius boni principale. Hence the objection raised in Plut. Com. Not. 50, 1, p. 1085: τὰς ποιότητας οὐσίας καὶ σώματα ποιοῦσιν, and Ibid. 44, 4, the statement discussed on p. 101, 2.

[260] Philo, Qu. De. S. Immut. p. 298, D (the same in the spurious treatise De Mundo, p. 1154, E): ἡ δὲ [ἕξις = ποιότης] ἐστὶ πνεῦμα ἀντιστρέφον ἐφ’ ἑαυτό. ἄρχεται μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν μέσων ἐπὶ τὰ πέρατα τείνεσθαι, ψαῦσαν δὲ ἄκρας ἐπιφανείας ἀνακάμπτει πάλιν, ἄχρις ἂν ἐπὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ἀφίκηται τόπον, ἀφ’ οὗ τὸ πρῶτον ὡρμίσθη. ἕξεως ὁ συνεχὴς οὗτος δίαυλος ἄφθαρτος, κ.τ.λ. Qu. Mund. S. Incorr. 960, D [De Mundo, 1169, A]: ἡ δ’ [ἕξις] ἐστὶ πνευματικὸς τόνος. There can be no doubt that Philo is describing the Stoic teaching in these passages.

The same idea is also used to explain the connection between the soul and the body. The unity of the universe is proved by the fact that the Divine Spirit pervades it. Further particulars hereafter. Conf. Alex. Aphr. De Mixt. 142, a: ἡνῶσθαι μὲν ὑποτίθεται [Χρύσιππος] τὴν σύμπασαν οὐσίαν πνεύματός τινος διὰ πάσης αὐτῆς διήκοντος, ὑφ’ οὗ συνάγεταί τε καὶ συμμένει καὶ σύμπαθές ἐστιν αὑτῷ τὸ πᾶν. (That must be the reading, the next sentence containing τῶν δὲ, κ.τ.λ. Conf. 143, b). Alex. 143, b, carefully denies the statement, that the all-penetrating Breath keeps things together.

[261] Plut. Com. Not. 45. See p. 129, 3. Sen. Ep. 117, 2: Placet nostris, quod bonum est, esse corpus, quia quod bonum est, facit: quidquid facit corpus est ... sapientiam bonum esse dicunt: sequitur, ut necesse sit illam corporalem quoque dicere. Conf. p. 129, 1.

[262] This is the conception of τόνος, upon which the strength of the soul depends, as well as the strength of the body. Cleanthes, in Plut. Sto. Rep. 7, 4, p. 1034: πληγὴ πυρὸς ὁ τόνος ἐστὶ κἂν ἱκανὸς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γένηται πρὸς τὸ ἐπιτελεῖν τὰ ἐπιβάλλοντα ἰσχὺς καλεῖται καὶ κράτος. Stob. Ecl. ii. 110: ὥσπερ ἰσχὺς τοῦ σώματος τόνος ἐστὶν ἱκανὸς ἐν νεύροις, οὕτω καὶ ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς ἰσχὺς τόνος ἐστὶν ἱκανὸς ἐν τῷ κρίνειν καὶ πράττειν καὶ μή. All properties may be classed under the same conception of tension. See p. 127, 5 and Plut. Com. Not. 49, 2, p. 1085: γῆν μὲν γὰρ ἴσασι καὶ ὕδωρ οὔτε αὑτὰ συνέχειν οὔτε ἕτερα, πνευματικῆς δὲ μετοχῇ, καὶ πυρώδους δυνάμεως τὴν ἑνότητα διαφυλάττειν· ἀέρα δὲ καὶ πῦρ αὑτῶν τ’ εἶναι δι’ εὐτονίαν ἐκτατικὰ καὶ τοῖς δυσὶν ἐκείνοις ἐγκεκραμένα τόνον παρέχειν καὶ τὸ μόνιμον καὶ οὐσιῶδες. Ps. Censorin. Fragm. c. 1, p. 75, Jahn: Initia rerum eadem elementa et principia dicuntur. Ea Stoici credunt tenorem atque materiam; tenorem, qui rarescente materia a medio tendat ad summum, eadem concrescente rursus a summo referatur ad medium. Here tenor or τόνος is made equivalent to πνεῦμα. Seneca, however, Nat. Qu. ii. 8, conf. vi. 21, endeavours to show that intentio belongs to spiritus more than to any other body.

[263] Sen. Ep. 106, 4: Bonum facit, prodest enim: quod facit corpus est: bonum agitat animum et quodammodo format et continet, quæ propria sunt corporis. Quæ corporis bona sunt, corpora sunt: ergo et quæ animi sunt. Nam et hoc corpus. Bonum hominis necesse est corpus sit, cum ipse sit corporalis.... Si adfectus corpora sunt et morbi animorum et avaritia, crudelitas, indurata vitia ... ergo et malitia et species ejus omnes ... ergo et bona. It is then specially remarked that the Good, i.e. virtue, works upon the body, governing it and representing itself therein. Conf. p. 128, 1.

[264] Sext. Math. vii. 38: τὴν δὲ ἀλήθειαν οἴονταί τινες, καὶ μάλιστα οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς, διαφέρειν τἀληθοῦς κατὰ τρεῖς τρόπους ... οὐσία μὲν παρ’ ὅσον ἡ μὲν ἀλήθεια σῶμά ἐστι τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς ἀσώματον ὑπῆρχε. καὶ εἰκότως, φασί. τουτὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀξίωμά ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ἀξίωμα λεκτὸν, τὸ δὲ λεκτὸν ἀσώματον· ἀνάπαλιν δὲ ἡ ἀλήθεια σῶμά ἐστιν παρ’ ὅσον ἐπιστήμη πάντων ἀληθῶν ἀποφαντικὴ δοκεῖ τυγχάνειν· πᾶσα δὲ ἐπιστήμη πὼς ἔχον ἐστὶν ἡγεμονικὸν ... τὸ δὲ ἡγεμονικὸν σῶμα κατὰ τούτους ὑπῆρχε. Similarly Pyrrh. ii. 81. See p. 92, 2.

[265] Plut. Com. Not. 45, 2, p. 1084: ἄτοπον γὰρ εὖ μάλα, τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας, πρὸς δὲ ταύταις τὰς τέχνας καὶ τὰς μνήμας πάσας, ἔτι δὲ φαντασίας καὶ πάθη καὶ ὁρμὰς καὶ συγκαταθέσεις σώματα ποιουμένους ἐν μηδενὶ φάναι κεῖσθαι, κ.τ.λ. ... οἱ δ’ οὐ μόνον τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας ζῷα εἶναι λέγουσιν, οὐδὲ τὰ πάθη μόνον, ὀργὰς καὶ φθόνους καὶ λύπας καὶ ἐπιχαιρεκακίας, οὐδὲ καταλήψεις καὶ φαντασίας καὶ ἀγνοίας οὐδὲ τὰς τέχνας ζῷα, τὴν σκυτοτομικὴν, τὴν χαλκοτυπικήν· ἀλλὰ πρὸς τούτοις καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας σώματα καὶ ζῷα ποιοῦσι, τὸν περίπατον ζῷον, τὴν ὄρχησιν, τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, τὴν προσαγόρευσιν, τὴν λοιδορίαν. Plutarch is here speaking as an opponent. Seneca, however (Ep. 106, 5). observes: Non puto te dubitaturum, an adfectus corpora sint ... tanquam ira, amor, tristitia: si dubitas, vide an vultum nobis mutent:... Quid ergo? tam manifestas corpori notas credis imprimi, nisi a corpore? See p. 129, 1; Stob. Ecl. ii. 114: The Stoics consider virtues to be substantially identical (τὰς αὐτὰς καθ’ ὑπόστασιν) with the leading part of the soul (ἡγεμονικὸν), and consequently to be, like it, σώματα and ζῷα. Seneca, Ep. 113, 1, speaks still more plainly: Desideras tibi scribi a me, quid sentiam de hac quæstione jactata apud nostros: an justitia, an fortitudo, prudentia ceteræque virtutes animalia sint.... Me in alia sententia profiteor esse.... Quæ sint ergo quæ antiquos moverint, dicam. Animum constat animal esse.... Virtus autem nihil aliud est, quam animus quodammodo se habens: ergo animal est. Deinde: virtus agit aliquid: agi autem nihil sine impetu (ὁρμὴ) potest. If it is urged: Each individual will thus consist of an innumerable number of living beings, the reply is that these animalia are only parts of one animal, the soul; they are accordingly not many (multa), but one and the same viewed from different sides: idem est animus et justus et prudens et fortis ad singulas virtutes quodammodo se habens. From the same letter, 23, we gather that Cleanthes explained ambulatio as spiritus a principali usque in pedes permissus, Chrysippus as principale itself.

[266] See p. 92, 2, the extract from Sen. Ep. 117.

[267] Plut. Com. Not. 45, 5, p. 1084: Χρυσίππου μνημονεύοντες ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν φυσικῶν ζητημάτων οὕτω προσάγοντος· οὐχ ἡ μὲν νὺξ σῶμά ἐστιν, ἡ δ’ ἑσπέρα καὶ ὁ ὀρθὸς καὶ τὸ μέσον τῆς νυκτὸς σώματα οὐκ ἔστιν· οὐδὲ ἡ μὲν ἡμέρα σῶμά ἐστιν, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ ἡ νουμηνία σῶμα, καὶ ἡ δεκάτη, καὶ πεντεκαιδεκάτη καὶ ἡ τριακὰς καὶ ὁ μὴν σῶμά ἐστι καὶ τὸ θέρος καὶ τὸ φθινόπωρον καὶ ὁ ἐνιαυτός.

[268] Diog. 151: χειμῶνα μὲν εἶναί φασι τὸν ὑπὲρ γῆς ἄερα κατεψυγμένον διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἡλίου πρόσω ἄφοδον, ἔαρ δὲ τὴν εὐκρασίαν τοῦ ἀέρος κατὰ τὴν πρὸς ἡμᾶς πορείαν, θέρος δὲ τὸν ὑπὲρ γῆς ἀέρα καταθαλπόμενον, κ.τ.λ. Stob. Ecl. i. 260: Chrysippus defines ἔαρ ἔτους ὥραν κεκραμένην ἐκ χειμῶνας ἀπολήγοντος καὶ θέρους ἀρχομένου ... θέρος δὲ ὥραν τὴν μάλιστ’ ἀφ’ ἡλίου διακεκαυμένην· μετόπωρον δὲ ὥραν ἔτους τὴν μετὰ θέρος μὲν πρὸ χειμῶνος δὲ κεκραμένην· χειμῶνα δὲ ὥραν ἔτους τὴν μάλιστα κατεψυγμένην, ἢ τὴν τῷ περὶ γῆν ἀέρι κατεψυγμένην. Ibid.: According to Empedocles and the Stoics, the cause of winter is the preponderance of air, the cause of summer the preponderance of fire. Ibid. 556: μεὶς δ’ ἐστὶ, φησὶ [Χρύσιππος] τὸ φαινόμενον τῆς σελήνης πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ἢ σελήνη μέρος ἔχουσα φαινόμενον πρὸς ἡμᾶς. Cleomedes, Meteora, 112, distinguishes four meanings of μήν. In the two first it means something material; in the others, as a definition of time, something immaterial.

[269] Diog. vii. 140; Stob. Ecl. i. 392; Sext. Math. x. 218 and 237; viii. 11; vii. 38; Pyrrh. ii. 81; iii. 52. See p. 92, 2.

[270] See p. 94, 1.

[271] See p. 66, 1.

[272] See p. 93; 132, 1.

[273] See p. 84, 4.

[274] See p. 105, 3.

[275] Let a piece of red-hot iron be taken, every part of which is heavy, hard, hot, &c. Not one of these attributes can be confounded with another, or with the iron itself, but each one runs through the whole iron. Now, if each attribute is due to the presence of some material producing it, there is no avoiding the conclusion that there must exist in the iron, and in each part of it, as many various materials as there are attributes, without any one of them losing its own identity.

[276] Diog. vii. 151: καὶ τὰς κράσεις δὲ διόλου γίνεσθαι, καθά φησιν ὁ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῇ τρίτῃ τῶν φυσικῶν, καὶ μὴ κατὰ περιγραφὴν καὶ παράθεσιν· καὶ γὰρ εἰς πέλαγος ὀλίγος οἶνος βληθεὶς ἐπὶ πόσον ἀντιπαρεκταθήσεται εἶτα συμφθαρήσεται. According to Stob. Ecl. i. 374, the Stoics more accurately distinguish μῖξις, κρᾶσις, παράθεσις, σύγχυσις. Παράθεσις is σωμάτων συναφὴ κατὰ τὰς ἐπιφανείας; for instance, the combination of various kinds of grain. Μῖξις is δύο ἢ καὶ πλειόνων σωμάτων ἀντιπαρέκτασις δι’ ὅλων, ὑπομενουσῶν τῶν συμφυῶν περὶ αὐτὰ ποιοτήτων; for instance, the union of fire and iron, of soul and body. Such a union is called μῖξις in the case of solid bodies, κρᾶσις in the case of fluids. Σύγχυσις is δύο ἢ καὶ πλειόνων ποιοτήτων περὶ τὰ σώματα μεταβολὴ εἰς ἑτέρας διαφερούσης τούτων ποιότητος γένεσιν, as in the making up salves and medicines. Very much in the same way according to Alex. Aphr. De Mixt. 142, a, Chrysippus distinguished three kinds of μῖξις: παράθεσις, or union of substances, in which each retains its οἰκεία οὐσία or ποιότης κατὰ τὴν περιγραφήν; σύγχυσις, in which both substances, as well as attributes, are destroyed (φθείρεσθαι), giving rise to a third body; κρᾶσις = δύο ἢ καὶ πλειόνων τινων σωμάτων ὅλων δι’ ὅλων ἀντιπαρέκτασιν ἀλλήλοις οὕτως, ὥστε σώζειν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἐν τῇ μίξει τῇ τοιαύτῃ τήν τε οἰκείαν οὐσίαν καὶ τὰς ἐν αὐτῇ ποιότητας. Materials thus united can be again separated, but yet are they so united: ὡς μηδὲν μόριον ἐν αὐτοῖς εἶναι μὴ μετέχον πάντων τῶν ἐν τῷ μίγματι.

For such a union to be possible, (1) it must be possible for one body to penetrate every part of another, without being fused into a homogeneous mass. Hence the expression σῶμα διὰ σώματος ἀντιπαρήκειν, σῶμα σώματος εἶναι τόπον καὶ σῶμα χωρεῖν διὰ σώματος κένον μηδετέρου περιέχοντος ἀλλὰ τοῦ πλήρους εἰς τὸ πλῆρες ἐνδυομένου (Plut. C. Not. 37, 2, p. 1077; Alex. 142, b; Themist. Phys. 37; Simpl. Phys. 123, b; Hippolyt. Refut. Hær. i. 21); (2) it must be possible for the smaller body to extend over the whole size of the greater. This is affirmed by Chrysippus: οὐδὲν ἀπέχειν φάμενος, οἴνου σταλαγμὸν ἕνα κεράσαι τὴν θάλατταν, or even εἰς ὅλον τὸν κόσμον διατενεῖν τῇ κράσει τὸν σταλαγμόν (Plut. 10; Alex. 142, b; Diog.). The greater body is said to help the smaller, by giving to it an extension of which it would not otherwise be capable. Nevertheless, the bodies so united need not necessarily occupy more space than was previously occupied by one of them (Alex. 142, b; Plotin. Enn. iv. 7, 8, p. 463, C. Fic. 860, 14, Cr.). The absurdities which this theory involves were already exposed by Arcesilaus (Plut. 7), and in detail by Alexander, Plutarch, Sextus, and Plotinus, by the latter in a whole treatise (Enn. ii. 7) περὶ τῆς δι’ ὅλων κράτεως.

[277] Πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ λέγεται περὶ κράσεως καὶ σχεδὸν ἀνήνυτοι περὶ τοῦ προκειμένου σκέμματός εἰσι παρὰ τοῖς Δογματικοῖς στάσεις. Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 56. See previous note.

[278] According to Alex. 142, a, the following arguments were used by Chrysippus:—(1) The argument from κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι—our notion of κρᾶσις is different from that of σύγχυσις or παράθεσις. (2) Many bodies are capable of extension, whilst retaining their own properties; frankincense, for instance, when burnt, and gold. (3) The soul penetrates every part of the body, without losing its properties. So φύσις does in plants, and ἕξις does in all which it connects. (4) The same holds good of fire in red-hot metal, of fire and air in water and earth, of poisons and perfumes in things with which they are mixed, and of light, which penetrates air.

The first of these arguments clearly does not embody the real reason in the mind of Chrysippus; it might, with equal justice, have been used to prove anything else. Just as little does the second; for the phenomena to which it refers would be equally well explained on the theory of simple intermingling (παράθεσις) or complete (σύγχυσις) mixing. Nor does the fourth argument, taken independently of the theory of the corporeal nature of properties, necessarily lead to the idea of κρᾶσις as distinct from παράθεσις and σύγχυσις. For heat, according to the Peripatetic view, might be regarded as a property of what is hot, light as a definite property of a transparent body (conf. Alex. 143, a), παράθεσις and σύγχυσις sufficing for other things. Even the fact, greatly insisted upon by the Stoics, that things so mixed can be again separated into their component materials (Alex. 143, a; Stob. i. 378), was not conclusive. As long as the knowledge of the actual composition depended on isolated cases and crude experiments, like the one named by Stobæus (into a mixture of wine and water, put an oiled sponge, it will absorb the water and not the wine), and as long as the substantial change of elements, advocated by the Stoics as well as by the Peripatetics, was clung to, it was no difficult matter for an opponent to reply. On the other hand, the relation of the soul to the body, of property to subject-matter, of φύσις to φυτὸν, of God to the world, can hardly be otherwise explained than it was by Chrysippus, if once material existence be assigned to the soul, to φύσις, to ἕξις, and to God. We have, therefore, here the real ground on which this theory of κρᾶσις was based; and Simplicius rightly deduces it herefrom (Phys. 123, b): τὸ δὲ σῶμα διὰ σώματος χωρεῖν οἱ μὲν ἀρχαῖοι ὡς ἐναργὲς ἄτοπον ἐλάμβανον, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ὕστερον προσήκαντο ὡς ἀκολουθοῦν ταῖς σφῶν αὐτῶν ὑποθέσεσιν ... σώματα γὰρ λέγειν πάντα δοκοῦντες, καὶ τὰς ποιότητας καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν, καὶ διὰ παντὸς ὁρῶντες τοῦ σώματος καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν χωροῦσαν καὶ τὰς ποιότητας ἐν ταῖς κράσεσι, συνεχώρουν σῶμα διὰ σώματος χωρεῖν.

[279] See p. 95, 2; 126, 1.

[280] On ἄποιος ὕλη, as the universal ὑποκείμενον or οὐσία κοινὴ, see p. 100. Sext. Math. x. 312: ἐξ ἀποίου μὲν οὖν καὶ ἑνὸς σώματος τὴν τῶν ὅλων ὑπεστήσαντο γένεσιν οἱ Στωϊκοί. ἀρχὴ γὰρ τῶν ὄντων κατ’ αὐτούς ἐστιν ἡ ἄποιος ὕλη καὶ δι’ ὅλων τρεπτὴ, μεταβαλλούσης τε ταύτης γίνεται τὰ τέσσαρα στοιχεῖα, πῦρ, κ.τ.λ. Plut. C. Not. 48, 2, p. 1085: ἡ ὕλη καθ’ αὑτὴν ἄλογος οὖσα καὶ ἄποιος. M. Aurel. xii. 30: μία οὐσία κοινὴ, κἂν διείργηται ἰδίως ποιοῖς σώματι μυρίοις. Diog. 137: τὰ δὴ τέτταρα στοιχεῖα εἶναι ὁμοῦ τὴν ἄποιον οὐσίαν τὴν ὕλην.

[281] See p. 141, 2.

[282] Plut. Sto. Rep. 43. See p. 105, 1.

[283] See p. 105, 1 and 2; 127, 5; 128, 2.

[284] Simpl. Cat. 67, ε (Schol. 74, a, 10): τὸ τοίνυν σχῆμα οἱ Στωϊκοὶ τὴν τάσιν παρέχεσθαι λέγουσιν, ὥσπερ τὴν μεταξὺ τῶν σημείων διάστασιν. διὸ καὶ εὐθεῖαν ὁρίζονται γραμμὴν τὴν εἰς ἄκρον τεταμένην.

[285] Simpl. Cat. 68, ε: οἱ δὲ Στωϊκοὶ δύναμιν, ἢ μᾶλλον κίνησιν τὴν μανωτικὴν καὶ πυκνωτικὴν τίθενται, τὴν μὲν ἐπὶ τὰ ἔσω, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔξω· καὶ τὴν μὲν τοῦ εἶναι, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ποιὸν εἶναι νομίζουσιν αἰτίαν. Nemes. Nat. Hom. c. 2, p. 29: εἰ δὲ λέγοιεν, καθάπερ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ, τονικήν τινα εἶναι κίνησιν περὶ τὰ σώματα, εἰς τὸ ἔσω ἅμα καὶ εἰς τὸ ἔξω κινουμένην, καὶ τὴν μὲν εἰς τὸ ἔξω μεγεθῶν καὶ ποιότητων ἀποτελεστικὴν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ εἰς τὸ ἔσω ἑνώσεως καὶ οὐσίας. This remark is confirmed by what is quoted, p. 128, 2 from Censorinus, and by the language of Plutarch (Def. Orac. c. 28. Schl. p. 425), in reference to Chrysippus: πολλάκις εἰρηκὼς, ὅτι ταῖς εἰς τὸ αὑτῆς μέσον ἡ οὐσία καὶ ταῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ αὑτῆς μέσου διοικεῖται καὶ συνέχεται κινήσεσι.

[286] Diog. vii. 134: δοκεῖ δ’ αὐτοῖς ἀρχὰς εἶναι τῶν ὅλων δύο, τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον. τὸ μὲν οὖν πάσχον εἶναι τὴν ἄποιον οὐσίαν τὴν ὕλην, τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ λόγον τὸν θεόν. τοῦτον γὰρ ὄντα ἀΐδιον διὰ πάσης αὐτῆς δημιουργεῖν ἕκαστα. Such is the teaching of Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Archedemus, and Posidonius. Sext. Math. ix. 11: οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς δύο λέγοντες ἀρχὰς, θεὸν καὶ ἄποιον ὕλην, τὸν μὲν θεὸν ποιεῖν ὑπειλήφασι, τὴν δὲ ὕλην πάσχειν τε καὶ τρέπεσθαι. Similarly Alex. Aph. De Mixt. 144; Achill. Tat. Isag. c. 3, 124, E; Plut. Pl. Phil. i. 3, 39; Stob. Ecl. i. 306; 322, according to the passage quoted, p. 101, 2, from Zeno respecting ὕλη: διὰ ταύτης δὲ διαθεῖν τὸν τοῦ παντὸς λόγον ὃν ἔνιοι εἱμαρμένην καλοῦσιν, οἷόνπερ ἐν τῇ γόνῃ τὸ σπέρμα. Sen. Ep. 65, 2: Dicunt, ut scis, Stoici nostri, duo esse in rerum natura, ex quibus omnia fiant: causam et materiam. Materia jacet iners, res ad omnia parata, cessatura si nemo moveat. Causa autem, i.e. ratio, materiam format et quocunque vult versat, ex illa varia opera producit. Esse ergo debet, unde fit aliquid, deinde a quo fiat. Hoc causa est, illud materia. Ibid. 23: Universa ex materia et ex Deo constant ... potentius autem est ac pretiosius quod facit, quod est Deus, quam materia patiens Dei.

[287] Sen. Ep. 65, 11: Nam si, quocumque remoto quid effici non potest, id causam judicant esse faciendi, &c. Sext. Math. ix. 228: εἰ αἴτιόν ἐστιν οὗ παρόντος γίνεται τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα. This appears to be the most general Stoic definition. That given by Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 14—τοῦτο, δι’ ὃ ἐνεργοῦν γίνεται τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα—and by him said to express the views of several schools, expresses a narrower conception—the conception of efficient cause, which, however, for a Stoic, is the only essential one.

[288] Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 15, distinguishes between συνεκτικὰ, συναίτια, and σύνεργα αἴτια, all of which are, however, subordinated to the δι’ ὃ, which he is there alone discussing. Seneca l.c. maintains that, according to the definition given above, time, place, and motion ought to be reckoned as causes, since nothing can be produced without these. He allows, however, that a distinction must be made between causa efficiens and causa superveniens. This agrees with what Cicero (De Fato, 18, 41) quotes from Chrysippus relative to causæ perfectæ et principales, and causæ adjuvantes et proximæ, and with the Platonic and Aristotelian distinction of αἴτιον δι’ ὃ and οὗ οὐκ ἄνευ. See Zeller’s Philosophie der Griechen. In the same way, Plut. Sto. Rep. 47, 4, p. 1056 distinguishes between αἴτια αὐτοτελὴς and προκαταρκτική. Alex. Aph. De Fato, 72, blames the Stoics: σμῆνος γὰρ αἰτίων καταλέγουσι, τὰ μὲν προκαταρκτικὰ, τὰ δὲ συναίτια, τὰ δὲ ἑκτικὰ, τὰ δὲ συνεκτικὰ, τὰ δὲ ἄλλο τι. Conf. Orelli ad locum.

[289] Seneca, l.c., after enumerating the four causes of Aristotle, to which the Platonic idea is added as a fifth, continues: This turba causarum embraces either too much or too little. Sed nos nunc primam et generalem quærimus causam. Hæc simplex esse debet, nam et materia simplex est. Quærimus quæ sit causa, ratio scilicet faciens, id est Deus. Ita enim, quæcumque retulistis, non sunt multæ et singulæ causæ, sed ex una pendent, ex ea, quæ faciet. Conf. Stob. Ecl. i. 336: αἴτιον δ’ ὁ Ζήνων φησὶν εἶναι δι’ ὃ ... Χρύσιππος αἴτιον εἶναι λέγει δ’ ὃ ... Ποσειδώνιος δὲ οὕτως· αἴτιον δ’ ἐστί τινος δι’ ὃ ἐκεῖνο, ἢ τὸ πρῶτον ποιοῦν ἢ τὸ ἀρχηγὸν ποιήσεως.

[290] Cic. N. D. ii. 7, 19, after speaking of the consentiens, conspirans, continuata cognatio rerum (συμπάθεια τῶν ὅλων), continues: Hæc ita fieri omnibus inter se concinentibus mundi partibus profecto non possent, nisi ea uno divino et continuato spiritu continerentur. See Sext. Math. ix. 78. The same view is further expanded in Sext. Math. ix. 78. Conf. the quotation on p. 127, 5, from Alexander.

[291] According to the remarks, p. 105 and 126, this requires no proof.

[292] Cic. N. D. ii. 9, 23 (conf. iii. 14, 35), gives it apparently as the view of Cleanthes, who alone is mentioned, 9, 24. All living things, plants, and animals, exist by heat: nam omne quod est calidum et igneum cietur et agitur motu suo. Digestion and circulation are the result of heat: ex quo intelligi debet, eam caloris naturam vim habere in se vitalem per omnem mundum pertinentem. Moreover: omnes partes mundi ... calore fultæ sustinentur. There must be fire in earth and stones, else it could not be extracted therefrom. Water, especially fresh spring water, is warm, more particularly in winter, and as motion warms us, so the roll of the waves does the sea. From water likewise as it evaporates, air derives its heat.... Jam vero reliqua quarta pars mundi, ea et ipsa tota natura fervida est, et cæteris naturis omnibus salutarem impertit et vitalem calorem. Ex quo concluditur, cum omnes mundi partes sustineantur calore, mundum etiam ipsum simili parique natura in tanta diuturnitate servari: eoque magis quod intelligi debet, calidum illum atque igneum ita in omni fusum esse natura, ut in eo insit procreandi vis, &c.

[293] On the argument, ex consensu gentium, consult Plut. Sto. Rep. 38. 3; Com. Not. 32, 1; Cic. N. D. ii. 2, 5; Seneca, Benef. iv. 4; Sext. Math. ix. 123 and 131, where different varieties of it are given, even a particular one from Zeno.

[294] Sext. Math. ix. 75.

[295] Cic. N. D. iii. 9, 22: Zeno enim ita concludit: quod ratione utitur, melius est, quam id, quod ratione non utitur. Nihil autem mundo melius. Ratione igitur mundus utitur. The same, ibid. ii. 8, 21, and 12, 34. Sext. Math. ix. 104: εἰ τὸ λογικὸν τοῦ μὴ λογικοῦ κρεῖττόν ἐστιν, οὐδὲν δέ γε κόσμου κρεῖττόν ἐστι, λογικὸν ἄρα ὁ κόσμος ... τὸ γὰρ νοερὸν τοῦ μὴ νοεροῦ καὶ ἔμψυχον τοῦ μὴ ἐμψύχου κρεῖττόν ἐστιν· οὐδὲν δέ γε κόσμου κρεῖττον· νοερὸς ἄρα καὶ ἔμψυχός ἐστιν ὁ κόσμος. Likewise Diog. 142, says that Chrysippus, Apollodorus, and Posidonius agree that the world is ζῷον καὶ λογικὸν καὶ ἔμψυχον καὶ νοερόν· τὸ γὰρ ζῷον τοῦ μὴ ζῷον κρεῖττον· οὐδὲν δὲ τοῦ κόσμου κρεῖττον· ζῷον ἄρα ὁ κόσμος.

[296] Cic. N. D. ii. 8, 22: Zeno affirms: Nullius sensu carentis pars aliqua potest esse sentiens. Mundi autem partes sentientes sunt. Non igitur caret sensu mundus.

[297] Diog. 143: ἔμψυχον δὲ [τὸν κόσμον], ὡς δῆλον ἐκ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς ἐκεῖθεν οὔσης ἀποσπάσματος. Sext. Math. ix. 101: Ζήνων δὲ ὁ Κιττιεὺς ἀπὸ Ξενοφῶντος τὴν ἀφορμὴν λαβὼν οὑτωσὶ συνερωτᾷ· τὸ προϊέμενον σπέρμα λογικοῦ καὶ αὐτὸ λογικόν ἐστιν· ὁ δὲ κόσμος προΐεται σπέρμα λογικοῦ, λογικὸν ἄρα ἐστὶν ὁ κόσμος. The same proof in Sext. Math. ix. 77 and 84; Cic. l.c. Conf. ibid. ii. 31, 79; 6, 18, where also the passage in Xenophon, Mem. i. 4, 8, quoted by Sext. ix. 94, is referred to.

[298] Cic. l.c. iii. 10, 25: Is [Chrysippus] igitur: si aliquid est, inquit, quod homo efficere non possit, qui id efficit melior est homine. Homo autem hæc, quæ in mundo sunt, efficere non potest. Qui potuit igitur, is præstat homini. Homini autem præstare quis possit, nisi Deus? Est igitur Deus. The same, only a little more fully, ibid. ii. 6, 16. To this argument, another favourite one of the Stoics, based on the fulfilment of prophecy, belongs.

[299] Cleanthes made use of arguments from final causes to prove the existence of God. Of this nature are all the four arguments which he employs in Cic. N. D. ii. 6, but particularly the fourth, based on the regular order and beauty of heaven. A building cannot exist without a builder; no more can the building of the world exist without a ruling spirit. Therewith Cicero connects the above-named argument of Chrysippus. The same writer, N. D. ii. 32–66, gives very fully the physical theological argument for the existence of providence, which is given in a shorter form by Cleomedes, Meteora, 1; Seneca, De Provid. i. 1, 2–4; Nat. Qu. i.; Sext. Math. ix. 111; conf. Ps. Censorin. Fragm. i. 2, p. 75, Jahn; Plut. Plac. i. 6, 8: belief in gods grows out of considering the world and its beauty, an argument also quoted by Sext. Math. ix. 26.

[300] See the expansion of this thought by Cleanthes (in Sext. Math. ix. 88–91) and the Stoics (in Cic. N. D. ii. 12, 33). Cicero distinguishes four kinds of beings—Plants, Animals, Men, and that being which is altogether reasonable and perfect deity.

[301] See p. 143, 2; 144, 1–4; 145, 1 and 2.

[302] Sext. Math. ix. 102, expanding Zeno’s argument given, p. 145, 2: πάσης γὰρ φύσεως καὶ ψυχῆς ἡ καταρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως γίνεσθαι δοκεῖ ἀπὸ ἡγεμονικοῦ καὶ πᾶσαι αἱ ἐπὶ τὰ μέρη τοῦ ὅλου ἐξαποστελλόμεναι δυνάμεις ὡς ἀπό τινος πηγῆς τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ ἐξαποστέλλονται. Cic. N. D. ii. 29: according to Cleanthes, omnem enim naturam necesse est, quæ non solitaria sit, neque simplex, sed cum alio juncta atque connexa, habere aliquem in se principatum [= ἡγεμονικὸν] ut in homine mentem, &c.... Itaque necesse est illud etiam, in quo sit totius naturæ principatus, esse omnium optimum. See following note.

[303] Cic. Acad. ii. 41, 126: Zenoni et reliquis fere Stoicis æther videtur summus Deus, mente præditus, qua omnia regantur. N. D. i. 14, 36: (Zeno) æthera Deum dicit. 15, 39: ignem præterea et eum, quem antea dixi, æthera (Chrysippus Deum dicit esse). Diog. vii. 138: οὐρανὸς δέ ἐστιν ἡ ἐσχάτη περιφέρεια, ἐν ᾗ πᾶν ἵδρυται τὸ θεῖον. Ibid. 139: τὸν ὅλον κόσμον ζῷον ὄντα καὶ ἔμψυχον καὶ λογικὸν ἔχειν ἡγεμονικὸν μὲν τὸν αἰθέρα, καθά φησιν Ἀντίπατρος ... Χρύσιππος δ’ ... καὶ Ποσειδώνιος ... τὸν οὐρανόν φασι τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν τοῦ κόσμου. He continues: ὁ μέντοι Χρύσιππος διαφορώτερον πάλιν τὸ καθαρώτερον τοῦ αἰθέρος ἐν ταὐτῷ [= τῷ οὐρανῷ] ὃ καὶ πρῶτον θεὸν λέγουσιν, αἰσθητικῶς ὥσπερ κεχωρηκέναι διὰ τῶν ἐν ἀέρι καὶ διὰ τῶν ζῴων ἁπάντων καὶ φυτῶν, διὰ δὲ τῆς γῆς αὐτῆς καθ’ ἕξιν. Arius Didymus, in Eus. Præp. Ev. xv. 15, 4: Χρυσίππῳ δὲ [ἡγεμονικὸν τοῦ κόσμου εἶναι ἤρεσε] τὸν αἰθέρα τὸν καθαρώτατον καὶ εἰλικρινέστατον, ἅτε πάντων εὐκινητότατον ὄντα καὶ τὴν ὅλην περιάγοντα τοῦ κόσμου φύσιν. Ibid. xv. 20, 2: According to the Stoics, the air surrounding sea and earth is the soul of the world. Cornut. Nat. De. 8: Zeus dwells in heaven, ἐπεὶ ἐκεῖ ἐστι τὸ κυριώτατον μέρος τῆς τοῦ κόσμου ψυχῆς. Tertullian (Apol. 47; Ad Nat. ii. 2, 4) inaccurately attributes to the Stoics the belief in a God external to nature.

[304] Cic. Acad. l.c.: Cleanthes ... solem dominari et rerum potiri = κρατεῖν τῶν ὄντων putat. He speaks with less accuracy (Krische, Forsch. 428) in N. D. i. 14, 37: either he considers the original deity; for this does not exclude the other. No doubt he identified αἰθὴρ with calor (see p. 144, 1), believing that it emanated from the sun. Diog. 139: Κλεάνθης δὲ [τὸ ἡγεμονικόν φασι] τὸν ἥλιον. Ar. Didymus, l.c. ἡγεμονικὸν δὲ τοῦ κόσμου Κλεάνθει μὲν ἤρεσε τὸν ἥλιον εἶναι διὰ τὸ μέγιστον τῶν ἄστρων ὑπάρχειν καὶ πλεῖστα συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὅλων διοίκησιν, κ.τ.λ. Stob. Ecl. i. 452; Ps. Censorin. Fragm. i. 4. According to Epiphan. Exp. Fidei, 1090, C, he called the sun the δᾳδοῦχος to the universe.

[305] Stob. l.c.: Ἀρχίδαμος (leg. with Cod. A Ἀρχέδημος) τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν τοῦ κόσμου ἐν γῇ ὑπάρχειν ἀπεφήνατο: the same statement without mentioning the name in Ar. Didymus, l.c. This reminds one somewhat of the Pythagorean doctrine of a central fire, and the view of Speusippus. The resemblance to the Pythagoreans is greater, if Simpl. De Cœlo, Schol. in Ar. 505, a, 45, is correct in saying Archedemus denied with the Pythagoreans that the earth was in the centre of the world.

[306] See p. 141, 2; 143, 1. Aristocles, in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 14: στοιχεῖον εἶναί φασι [οἱ Στωϊκοὶ] τῶν ὄντων τὸ πῦρ, καθάπερ Ἡράκλειτος, τούτου δ’ ἀρχὰς ὕλην καὶ θεὸν, ὡς Πλάτων.

[307] Fuller particulars p. 144, 1; 146. Hippolytus, Refut. Hær. i. 21: Chrysippus and Zeno suppose ἀρχὴν μὲν θεὸν τῶν πάντων, σῶμα ὄντα τὸ καθαρώτατον (æther). Diog. 148: Antipater calls the οὐσία θεοῦ ἀεροειδής. Stob. Ecl. i. 60: Mnesarchus (a pupil of Panætius) defines God to be τὸν κόσμον τὴν πρώτην οὐσίαν ἔχοντα ἐπὶ πνεύματος. Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 218: Στωϊκοὶ δὲ [λέγουσι θεὸν] πνεῦμα διῆκον καὶ διὰ τῶν εἰδεχθῶν (the adverse). Alex. Aphr. on Metaph. 995, b, 31 (Schol. in Ar. 607, a, 19): τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ἔδοξεν ὁ θεὸς καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν αἴτιον ἐν τῇ ὕγῃ εἶναι. Ibid. De Mixt. 144, gives them credit: πνεύματι ὡς διὰ πάντων διήκοντι ἀνάπτειν τό τε εἶναι ἑκάστου καὶ τὸ σώζεσθαι καὶ συμμένειν. Compare the quotations p. 127, 5 and De An. 145: [τὸν νοῦν] καὶ ἐν τοῖς φαυλοτάτοις εἶναι θεῖον ὄντα, ὡς τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ἔδοξεν. Lucian, Hermot. 81: ἀκούομεν δὲ αὐτοῦ λέγοντος, ὡς καὶ ὁ θεὸς οὐκ ἐν οὐρανῷ ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ διὰ πάντων πεφοίτηκεν, οἷον ξύλων καὶ λίθων καὶ ζῴων, ἄχρι καὶ τῶν ἀτιμωτάτων. Tertullian, Ad Nation. ii. 4: Zeno makes God penetrate the materia mundialis, as honey does the honeycombs. See p. 105, 3.

Clemens, Strom. v. 591, A: φασὶ γὰρ σῶμα εἶναι τὸν θεὸν οἱ Στωϊκοὶ καὶ πνεῦμα κατ’ οὐσίαν, ὥσπερ ἀμέλει καὶ τὴν ψυχήν. Ibid. i. 295, C: (οἱ Στωϊκοὶ) σῶμα ὄντα τὸν θεὸν διὰ τῆς ἀτιμοτάτης ὕλης πεφοιτηκέναι λέγουσιν οὐ καλῶς. Protrept. 44, A: τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς, διὰ πάσης ὕλης, καὶ διὰ τῆς ἀτιμοτάτης, τὸ θεῖον διήκειν λέγοντας. Orig. c. Cels. vi. 71: τῶν Στωϊκῶν φασκόντων ὅτι ὁ θεὸς πνεῦμά ἐστι διὰ πάντων διεληλυθὸς καὶ πάντ’ ἐν ἑαυτῷ περιεχόν. Opponents like Origen, l.c. and i. 21, Alexander, De Mixt. l.c., and Plutarch, Com. Not. 48, naturally attack them for their materialistic views.