Chapter XXXII: Part 32

If a maxim of conduct is fit to enter as a principle into a possible enactment of universal laws, it will be found in harmony with the cosmical laws; if not, it must come in conflict with the order of things in the universe. It then cannot stand, and will, if persistently adhered to, lead (perhaps slowly but inevitably) to certain ruin.

Concerning the proposition that happiness may be regarded as the purpose of life Kant in his review of Herder’s “Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit” (Ed. H. IV, p. 190), speaks of the relativity of happiness and its insufficiency as a final aim of life:

... “First of all the happiness of an animal, then that of a
child and of a youth, and lastly that of man! In all epochs
of human history, as well as among all classes and conditions
of the same epoch, that happiness has obtained which was in
exact conformity with the individual’s ideas and the degree
of his habituation to the conditions amid which he was
born and raised. Indeed, it is not even possible to form a
comparison of the degree of happiness nor to give precedence
to one class of men or to one generation over another....
If this shadow-picture of happiness ... were the actual aim
of Providence, every man would have the measure of his own
happiness within him.... Does the author (Herder) think perhaps
that, if the happy inhabitants of Otaheite had never been
visited by more civilized peoples and were ordained to live
in peaceful indolence for thousands of years to come—that we
could give a satisfactory answer to the question why they
should exist at all and whether it would not have been just as
well that this island should be occupied by happy sheep and
cattle as that it should be inhabited by men who are happy only
through pure enjoyment?”

Concerning the mission or purpose of humanity and its ultimate realization, Kant interprets Herder’s views as follows:

“It involves no contradiction to say that no individual
member of all the offspring of the human race, but that
only the species, fully attains its mission (Bestimmung).
The mathematician may explain the matter in his way. The
philosopher would say: the mission of the human race as a whole
is _unceasing progress_, and the perfection (Vollendung) of
this mission is a mere idea (although in every aspect a quite
useful one) of the aim towards which, in conformity with the
design of providence, we are to direct our endeavors.”

We learn from the passages quoted from Kant that his idea of good will is neither mystical and supernatural, nor is it vague. It is a conception as logically and definitely defined as any mathematical definition. Good will in the sense in which Kant defines it, is only possible in a reasonable being by the power of its reason. The good will is the intention of conforming to universal principles and thus of being in harmony with the All. This good will is the corner-stone of Kant’s ethics; it appears as the categoric imperative of duty, so to act that the maxim of one’s conduct may be fit to become a universal law. It is formulated in another passage: “Act so as if the maxim of thy conduct by thy volition were to become a natural law.”

It is easily seen that, in Kant’s conception, the _ought_ of morals (viz. of the categoric imperative) does not stand in contradiction to the _must_ of natural laws. Kant’s conception is monistic, not dualistic. Kant says:

“The moral _ought_ is man’s _inner_, _necessary_ volition as
being a member of an intelligible world and is _conceived_ by
him as an ought only in so far as he considers himself also as
a member of the sensory world.”[98]

Our way of explaining it would be: Man _feels_ in his activity the categoric imperative as an ought. So the snow crystal, if it were possessed of sensation, would _feel_ its formation as an “ought.” But both are, and to an outside observer will appear, as a “must.”

* * * * *

In the Spencerian system of ethics, which is utilitarianism, the moral maxim or the idea of duty is not distinguished from the feeling of pleasure or pain that accompanies ethical thoughts and acts, and their consequences. This lack of distinction induces Mr. Spencer to consider man’s pursuit of happiness as the basis of ethics. Accordingly the aim of ethics, he maintains, is not the performance of duty, not the realization of the good; to the utilitarian this is only the means. The end of ethics is the greatest happiness of the greatest number.

It is strange that Mr. Spencer’s essay contains a passage which, although intended as a point of objection to Kant, is a corroboration of Kant’s ethics, and a refutation of Mr. Spencer’s own views. While denying the statement that “a cultivated reason, if applied with deliberate purpose to the enjoyment of life and happiness, will fail to produce true satisfaction,” Mr. Spencer says:

“I assert that it is untrue on the strength of personal
experiences. In the course of my life there have occurred
many intervals, averaging a month each, in which the pursuit
of happiness was the sole object, and in which happiness was
successfully pursued. How successfully may be judged from the
fact that I would gladly live over again each of those periods
without change, an assertion which I certainly cannot make of
any portions of my life spent in the daily discharge of duties.”

This statement, if it proves anything, proves that happiness is one thing and duty is another; it proves that Kant’s theory of ethics, which is based on the discharge of duty and not on the pursuit of happiness, is correct, and that Mr. Spencer’s theory which identifies duty with the pursuit of happiness, is wrong.

However, we must in this place express our opinion that Mr. Spencer’s statement _cannot_ be quite correct. The discharge of duty, unpleasant though the drudgery part of it may have been, was undoubtedly accompanied and followed by a certain satisfaction, which perhaps was less in quantity, but certainly higher in quality than the pleasure derived from the mere pursuit of happiness. And in the valuation of the intrinsic and of the moral worth of pleasures, the quality alone should be taken into consideration, not the quantity. In this sense only can an ethical hedonism or utilitarianism be acceptable. The man whose pleasures and pains are of a higher kind, of a nobler form, and of a better quality, is morally and generally the more evolved man. And then, the basis of ethics would be, not so much pleasure or happiness as the quality of pleasure or happiness; it would be an aspiration to evolve toward a higher plane of life, to shape our lives in nobler forms, and to enjoy nobler, greater, and more spiritual pleasures, or, as Kant says, “unceasing progress.”

Mr. Spencer’s assertion, if taken in the sense in which it stands, is a contradiction of his ethical theory. But even if Mr. Spencer had declared that the discharge of duty affords a kind of happiness or satisfaction, as it truly does, there would still remain a deep gap between his and Kant’s ethics. Mr. Spencer reduces ethics to mere worldly prudence; he says that we must do the good in order to be happy, and for the sake of its utility, and Kant says we must act so as to be in agreement with universal law. Mr. Spencer says:

“But now, supposing we accept Kant’s statement in full, what
is its implication? That happiness is the thing to be desired,
and, in one way or another, the thing to be achieved.” ...

“An illustration will best show how the matter stands. To
a tyro in archery the instructor says: ‘Sir, you must not
point your arrow directly at the target; if you do, you will
inevitably miss it; you must aim high above the target, and you
may then possibly pierce the bull’s-eye.’ What now is implied
by the warning and the advice? Clearly that the purpose is
to hit the target. Otherwise there is no sense in the remark
that it will be missed if directly aimed at; and no sense in
the remark that to be hit, something higher must be aimed at.
Similarly with happiness. There is no sense in the remark that
happiness will not be found if it is directly sought, unless
happiness is a thing to be somehow or other obtained.” ...

“So that in this professed repudiation of happiness as an end,
there lies the inavoidable implication that it _is_ the end.”

The pursuit of happiness is by no means repudiated by Kant as wrong or immoral; it is only maintained to be insufficient as a foundation of ethics. Kant’s remark that happiness will not be found if it is directly sought has no reference to his own ethics. Kant, speaking from the standpoint of one who takes the view of utilitarianism, says that if a cultivated reason applies itself to the sole purpose of enjoying life and happiness, it will meet with a failure.[99]

Any other explanation of the moral _ought_ than that from the Good Will, Kant declares to be _heteronomy_. Will would no longer be itself, and the principle of action would lie in something foreign to the will. Kant says:

“Will in such a case would not be a law to itself; but the
object by its relation to the will would impose the law upon
the will.... This would admit of hypothetical imperatives
only: ‘I ought to do a certain thing, because I want something
else.’ The moral and therefore categorical imperative, on the
contrary, says: ‘I ought to act so or so, even if I had nothing
else in view.’ For instance: the hypothetical imperative
of heteronomy says: ‘I ought not to lie, if I ever wish to
preserve my honor.’ The categorical imperative says: ‘I ought
not to lie even if it would not in the least bring me to
shame.’”

Mr. Spencer quotes the following passage from Kant:

“I omit here all actions which are already recognized as
inconsistent with duty, although they may be useful for this
or that purpose, for with these the question whether they are
done _from duty_ can not arise at all, since they even conflict
with it. I also set aside those actions which really conform
to duty, but to which men have _no_ direct _inclination_,
performing them because they are impelled thereto by some
other inclination. For in this case we can readily distinguish
whether the action which agrees with duty is done _from
duty_, or from a selfish view. It is much harder to make this
distinction when the action accords with duty, and the subject
has besides a _direct_ inclination to it. For example, it is
always a matter of duty that a dealer should not overcharge an
inexperienced purchaser, and wherever there is much commerce
the prudent tradesman does not overcharge, but keeps a fixed
price for every one, so that a child buys of him as well as any
other. Men are thus _honestly_ served; but this is not enough
to make us believe that the tradesman has so acted from duty
and from principles of honesty: his own advantage required it;
it is out of the question in this case to suppose that he might
besides have a direct inclination in favor of the buyers, so
that, as it were, from love he should give no advantage to one
over another[!]. Accordingly the action was done neither from
duty nor from direct inclination, but merely with a selfish
view.

“On the other hand, it is a duty to maintain one’s life, and,
in addition, every one has also a direct inclination to do
so. But on this account the often anxious care which most men
take for it has no intrinsic worth, and their maxim has no
moral import. They preserve their life _as duty requires_, no
doubt, but not _because duty requires_. On the other hand,
if adversity and hopeless sorrow have completely taken away
the relish for life; if the unfortunate one, strong in mind,
indignant at his fate rather than desponding or dejected,
wishes for death, and yet preserves his life without loving
it—not from inclination or fear, but from duty—then his maxim
has a moral worth.

“To be beneficent when we can is a duty; and besides this,
there are many minds so sympathetically constituted that
without any other motive of vanity or self-interest, they find
a pleasure in spreading joy around them, and can take delight
in the satisfaction of others so far as it is their own work.
But I maintain that in such a case an action of this kind,
however proper, however amiable it may be, has nevertheless no
true moral worth, but is on a level with other inclinations.”
(pp. 17-19)

Kant’s metaphysics of ethics is to practical ethics what pure mathematics is to applied mathematics, or what logic is to grammar. Kant’s method of reasoning _in abstracto_ everywhere shows the mathematical bent of his mind. In a foot-note (Editio Hartenstein, IV), p. 258, he says:

“As pure mathematics is distinguished from applied mathematics
and pure logic from applied logic, so may the pure philosophy
(the metaphysics) of ethics be distinguished from the applied
philosophy of ethics, that is, as applied to human nature.
By this distinction of terms it at once appears that ethical
principles are not based upon the peculiarities of human
nature but that they must be existent by themselves _a
priori_,—whence, for human nature, just as well as for _any_
rational nature, practical rules can be derived.”

Schleiermacher says:

“A good is any agreement (“unity”) of definite sides [certain
aspects] of reason and nature.... The end of ethical praxis
is the highest good, _i. e._, the sum of all unions of nature
and reason.... The moral law may be compared to the algebraic
formula which (in analytical geometry) determines the course
[path] of a curve; the highest good may be compared to the
curve itself, and virtue, or moral power, to an instrument
arranged for the purpose of constructing the curve according to
the formula.” (Quoted from a translation of Ueberweg.)

Kant declares in other passages that in examples taken from practical life, it will be difficult to separate clearly and unmistakably the sense of duty as the real moral motive from other motives, inclinations, habits, etc. But such a distinction must be made, if the moral value of motives is to be considered _in abstracto_. This is necessary for a clear conception of the essential features of morality. Mr. Spencer has on other occasions highly praised the power of generalization, which indeed is fundamentally the same faculty, as thinking _in abstracto_; here, however, he does not follow Kant’s argument, but declares “that the assumed distinction between sense of duty and inclination is untenable.” He says:

“The very expression _sense_ of duty implies that the mental
state signified is a feeling; and if a feeling it must,
like other feelings, be gratified by acts of one kind and
offended by acts of an opposite kind. If we take the name
conscience, which is equivalent to sense of duty, we see the
same thing. The common expressions ‘a tender conscience,’ ‘a
seared conscience,’ indicate the perception that conscience
is a feeling—a feeling which has its satisfactions and
dissatisfactions, and which _inclines_ a man to acts which
yield the one and avoid the other—produces an _inclination_,”
(p. 476).

It is quite true that every state of consciousness is a feeling, but we can and must discriminate between consciousness or feeling and the idea or thought which becomes conscious, in which the feeling appears, and which is, so to speak, the special form of a certain feeling. The consciousness and its special form, the feeling and the mental object of feeling, are in reality one and the same. Yet they are different and must _in abstracto_ be well distinguished. Mr. Spencer’s method is that of generalization, but generalizing can lead to no satisfactory results, if it is not constantly accompanied by discrimination. We must generalize and discriminate.

If a certain group of states of consciousness takes the form of a logical syllogism, it must not be expected that logic will find its explanation in feeling, although it cannot be denied that all the states of consciousness are feelings. Not the feeling in this case is to be explained, but logic. In our generalizations we must discriminate _in abstracto_ between the feeling and the idea which feels. We must positively abstract from feeling and cannot consider whether the feeling of logical arguments is pleasant or unpleasant. Mr. Spencer’s method of explaining ethics, if applied to logic, would be as follows: “Man’s logical sense is a very complex feeling and has developed from simple percepts such as can be observed in the lowest animals; percepts are a higher evolved form of reactions against irritations such as take place in protoplasm. The old method of explaining logic is that of deduction, modern logic will be inductive. Formerly pure logic was considered as a science _a priori_; but the evolution-philosophy shows that logic is developed by steps, it appears _a priori_ to the individual now, but it is in reality a consolidated product of multitudinous experiences received mainly by ancestors and added to by self. Logical sense accordingly finds its explanation in most simple feelings. Our conceptions of logically incorrect feelings will be more and more avoided because they will ultimately be found to be unpleasant; logical correctness is striven for because of the feeling of satisfaction that accompanies the conception of a logically correct conclusion.”

Sense is feeling, there can be no doubt. Logical sense and mathematical sense are feelings and if a person thinks a mathematical axiom or a logical syllogism or an ethical maxim, he has a feeling. Logical sense of reason is the product of evolution, and it cannot be denied either that one man has a more logical or mathematical or moral sense than another. But it does not follow that an explanation of mathematics, or logic, or ethics, must be derived from feeling pleasure and pain, or happiness. On the contrary we must abstract from feeling altogether and concern ourselves with the object of feeling only, which is the idea or the special form in which and as which feeling appears. States of consciousness (never mind whether they are painful or pleasurable) must be considered as moral if their mental object, _i. e._, the idea, the thought, the motive, the form in which feeling becomes manifest, is in harmony with the universal order of things.

* * * * *

Mr. Spencer declares that the world would be intolerable “if Kant’s conception of moral worth were displayed universally in men’s acts.” And it must be acknowledged that Kant’s ethics in their logical and irrefutable rigidity not only impressed the literary world of his time with the grandeur and sublimity of ethics; Kant’s ethics also astounded, and overwhelmed his readers with awe. Virtue no longer appeared to be the fervid enthusiasm of sentiments; it congealed into the cold idea of duty which can be fixed in abstract rules and will operate like the correctly calculated gear of a machine. Objections have been raised by some of Kant’s own disciples; but it must be known that the Kantian view of ethics does not suppress feelings, emotions and inclinations, it excludes them only from an estimation of the moral worth of actions. Kant gave the _coup de grace_ to all sentimentality which had taken the lead in ethical questions too long. Mr. Spencer says:

“If those acts only have moral worth which are done from a
sense of duty ... we must say that a man’s moral worth is
greater in proportion as the strength of his sense of duty
is such that he does the right thing not only apart from
inclination but against inclination. According to Kant,
then, the most moral man is the man ... who says of another
that which is true though he would like to injure him by a
falsehood; who lends money to his brother though he would
prefer to see him in distress.”

Schiller, although an admirer of Kant, makes in his Xenions a similar objection to this corollary of the ethics of pure reason. He says:

“Willingly serve I my friends; but ’tis pity, I do it with pleasure.
And I am really vexed, that there’s no virtue in me!”

And he answers in a second distich:

“There is no other advice than that you try to despise friends,
And, with disgust, you will do what such a duty demands.”

The difficulty is removed under the following consideration: A man with good inclinations is less exposed to temptation than a man with bad inclinations. If both act morally under conditions otherwise the same, the latter has shown greater strength of moral purpose than the former. The former’s character (viz., his inherited inclinations and habits which represent the sum total of the moral energies of his ancestors,) is more moral than that of the latter. But the latter deserves more credit than the former for overcoming the temptation; he has in this special act shown more moral strength of will than his more fortunate and morally higher advanced fellow-man. To those who have accepted the Kantian view, Mr. Spencer’s and Schiller’s objection can serve as a warning, not to lose sight of emotions altogether. Man is not only a reasonable being, he is at the same time a feeling creature. The instinctive faculties of man, the so-called subconscious states, are the basis of his consciousness. They form the roots of his soul from which spring the clear conceptions of his reason. The more man’s habits and inclinations agree with morals, the more strength of purpose is left for further ethical advancement and moral progress.

Similar objections have also been made to Kant’s mechanical explanation of the origin of the planetary systems and milky ways. It seemed as if the divinity of nature were replaced by the rigid law of gravity. In his poem “The God’s of Greece,” Schiller complains:

“Fühllos selbst für ihres Künstlers Ehre,
Gleich dem todten Schlag der Pendeluhr,
Dient sie knechtisch dem Gesetz der Schwere,
Die entgötterte Natur.”

“Dead even to her Master’s praise,
Like lifeless pendulum’s vibration,
Lo, godless Nature now obeys,
Slave-like, the law of gravitation.”[100]

Such objections are always raised when a scientific explanation destroys the mystic view that a spirit or at least something unexplainable is the supposed cause of certain phenomena. Our sentiments are so closely connected and intimately interwoven with our errors that truth appears hostile to sentiment, and it becomes difficult to part with errors sanctified by emotion. Sentimentality always complains that clear thought is an enemy of romanticism, and romanticism is the only possible poetry to the taste of the sentimental.

Now it cannot be denied that a one-sided knowledge not only appears rigid, it truly _is_ so, and will be destructive of such emotions as reverence, awe, æsthetic taste, religion and art. Criticism is a most essential feature of science and philosophy, and how negative, how desolate and melancholy appear the results of criticism! But the pruning process of criticism is very wholesome, and true science will only profit by discarding the vagueness of indistinct conceptions. Alpine lakes that are really deep can only gain by lucidity. Thus the clearness of genuine science and broad philosophy will only show the depth of truth into which by all its lucidity our emotions can plunge without ever finding it shallow or fathoming it in all its profundity.

Kant’s doctrine of ethics is a truth that can stand the severest test.

Ethics, in the sense of the word as used by Kant, can be found in man only, in so far as he is a reasonable being. A truly reasonable being does not allow himself to be guided by impulses but is led by maxims. Inclinations and habits are remnants of instinct. Not he who in instinctive good-naturedness acts morally, is the ethical man, but he who deliberately and consciously considers himself a representative of the general order of things. The man, who adopts such maxims as can become universal principles, identifies his will with the laws of the universe. Man’s moral dignity must not be sought in vague feelings or in instinctive inspirations; it is based upon his reason and is developed in so far only as he makes use of his reason.

FOOTNOTES:

[87] Quotations from Mr. Spencer’s essay will be distinguished by quotation-marks, while those from Kant will appear in hanging indentations.

[88] Kant distinguishes two kinds of sublimity: 1) the mathematical, and 2) the dynamical. His definitions are: 1) sublime is that in comparison with which everything else is small; and 2) sublime is that the mere ability to conceive which shows a power of emotion (Gemüth), the latter transcending any measurement by the senses. [1) Erhaben ist, mit welchem im Vergleich alles andere klein ist. 2) Erhaben ist, was auch nur denken zu können ein Vermögen des Gemüths beweist, das jeden Maasstab der Sinne übertrifft. Editio Hartenstein, Vol. V, pp. 257, 258.]

[89] The stellar Universe, of course, has not been evolved; Mr. Spencer means that according to Kant’s mechanical explanation the planetary systems and milky ways of the stellar Universe are in a state of constant evolution.

[90] Translation by J. M. D. Meiklejohn, pp. 244, 249.

[91] Compare also Kant’s “Prol. zu jeder künftigen Metaphysik,” § 46.

[92] We call attention to Kant’s peculiar expression, in this passage, of _Auswickelung_ which has now yielded to the term _Entwickelung_.

[93] Die in der Natur eines organischen Körpers (Gewächses oder Thieres) liegenden Gründe einer bestimmten Auswickelung heissen, wenn diese Auswickelung besondere Theile betrifft, _Keime_; betrifft sie aber nur die Grösse oder das Verhältniss der Theile unter einander, so nenne ich sie _natürliche Anlagen_.

[94] Wir nehmen die Benennungen _Naturbeschreibung_ und _Naturgeschichte_ gemeiniglich in einerlei Sinne. Allein es ist klar, dass die Kenntniss der Naturdinge, wie sie _jetzt sind_, immer noch die Erkenntniss von demjenigen wünschen lasse, was sie ehedem _gewesen_ sind und durch welche Reihe von Veränderungen sie durchgegangen, um an jedem Ort in ihren gegenwärtigen Zustand zu gelangen. Die _Naturgeschichte_, woran es uns noch fast gänzlich fehlt, würde uns die Veränderung der Erdgestalt, imgleichen die der Erdgeschöpfe (Pflanzen und Thiere), die sie durch natürliche Wanderungen (sic! I take it as a misprint for _Wandelungen_) erlitten haben, und ihre daraus entsprungenen Abartungen von dem Urbilde der Stammgattung lehren. Sie würde vermuthlich eine grosse Menge scheinbar verschiedener Arten zu Racen ebenderselben Gattung zurückführen, und das jetzt so weitläuftigte Schulsystem der Naturbeschreibung in ein physisches System für den Verstand verwandeln.

[95] The original of the first sentence reads: “Es ist überall nichts in der Welt, ja überhaupt auch ausser derselben zu denken möglich, was ohne Einschränkung für gut könnte gehalten werden, als allein ein guter Wille.”

[96] _Italics are ours._

[97] The phrase “we take it for granted” (in the original “nehmen wir es als Grundsatz an)” reads in the translation quoted by Mr. Spencer: “we take it as a fundamental principle.” Mr. Spencer objects to the passage declaring that there _are_ many organs (such as rudimentary organs) in the construction of organized beings which serve _no_ purpose. This however does not stand in contradiction to Kant’s assumption that organs of organized beings serve a special purpose. The rudimentary organs have under other conditions served a purpose for which they then were fit and well adapted and are disappearing now because no longer used.

[98] Das moralische Sollen ist also ein eigenes nothwendiges Wollen als Gliedes einer intelligiblen Welt, und wird nur sofern von ihm als Sollen gedacht, als er sich zugleich wie ein Glied der Sinnenwelt betrachtet. Ed. Hartenstein vol. IV. p. 303.

[99] The passage referred to is quoted in full on page 16.

[100] Slightly altered from B. W. BALL’S translation in THE OPEN COURT, p. 83.

KANT ON EVOLUTION.

IN CRITICISM OF MR. HERBERT SPENCER’S PRESENTATION OF KANTISM.

It is very strange that Mr. Herbert Spencer will again and again attack the philosophy and ethics of Kant for views which Kant never held.[101] It is possible that there are disciples of Kant who deny the theory of evolution. Yet it is certain that Kant himself is not guilty of this mistake. Thinkers who reject the theory of evolution are in this respect as little entitled to call themselves disciples of Kant as, for instance, the Sadducees were to call themselves followers of Christ. Kantian philosophy was foremost in the recognition of the need of evolution, and that at a time when public interest was not as yet centered upon it.

Mr. Spencer’s merits in the propagation of the theory of evolution are undeniable, and he deserves our warmest respect and thanks for the indefatigable zeal he has shown in the performance of this great work, for the labors he has undergone, and the sacrifices he has made for it. Yet recognising all that Mr. Spencer has done, we should not be blind to the fact that Kant’s conception of evolution is even at the present day more in conformity with the facts of natural science than Mr. Spencer’s philosophy, although the latter commonly goes by the name of the philosophy of evolution.

It is painful to note that in many places where Mr. Spencer refers to Kant’s philosophy, he does it slightingly, as though Kant were one of the most irrational of thinkers. Kant’s reasoning is denounced as “abnormal” and “vicious.” I find such phrases as, “It is a vice of Kant’s philosophy ...,” “If Kant had known more of Man than he did ...,” etc. Mr. Spencer characterises Kant’s method as follows:

“Instead of setting out with a proposition of which the
negative is inconceivable, it sets out with a proposition of
which the affirmation is inconceivable, and proceeds to draw
conclusions therefrom.”

These attacks of Mr. Spencer on Kant are not justifiable. Kant is not guilty of the faults for which he is arraigned by Mr. Spencer.

* * * * *

It is, however, fair to state that these misunderstandings appear excusable if the difficulties are borne in mind with which the English student of Kant is confronted. First, Kant cannot be understood without taking into consideration the historical development of his philosophy, and, secondly, most translations of the fundamental terms, he employs, are so misleading that errors can scarcely be avoided.

Kant’s philosophy is by no means a perfected system; it rather represents (as perhaps necessarily all philosophies do) the development of a thinker’s mind. The “Critique of Pure Reason” especially shows traces of the state of Kant’s mind at different periods, and thus it is that we discover passages which closely considered will be found to be contradictory. When reading this remarkable work we feel like travelers walking over the petrified relics of a powerful eruption. There are strata of ideas of the oldest formation close to the thoughts of a recent date. There are also vestiges of intermediate phases. Here they stand in the petrification of printed words, peacefully side by side, as memorials of a great revolution in the development of human thought. It is this state of things which more than anything else makes of Kant’s writings such difficult reading. At the same time it is obvious that we cannot simply take the results of Kant’s philosophy; we must follow him in the paths by which he arrived at any given proposition.

There is no philosopher that has been worse misinterpreted than Kant; and the English interpreters of Kant have succeeded in mutilating his best thoughts so that this hero of progress appears as a stronghold of antiquated views. Mistranslations or misconceptions of his terms are to a great extent the cause of this singular fate. As an instance we mention the errors that attach to Kant’s term _Anschauung_. _Anschauung_ is the present object of our senses; it is the impression a man has from looking at a thing and might have been translated by “perception” or perhaps “sensation.” It is usually translated by “intuition.” The _Anschauung_ of objects comprises the data of knowledge, and they are previous to our reflection upon them. An intuition in the sense of the English Intuitionalists is defined as “a presentation which can be given previously to all thought,” yet this presentation is supposed to be a kind of revelation, a knowledge that comes to us without our contemplation, a cognition the character of which is immediate as well as mysterious; in short something that is supernatural.

How different is Kant’s philosophy, for instance, if his position with reference to time and space is mistaken! “Time and Space are our _Anschauung_,” Kant says. But his English translators declare: “Kant maintained that space and time are intuitions.” What a difference it makes if intuition is interpreted in the sense applied to it by the English Intuitionalist School instead of its being taken in the original meaning of the word _Anschauung_.

* * * * *

Any one who knows Kant through Mr. Spencer’s representations only, must look upon him as having the most perverse mind that could possibly exist; and yet it is Kant from whom Spencer has indirectly derived the most characteristic feature of his philosophy. What is Mr. Spencer’s agnosticism but a popularisation of Kant’s view that things in themselves are unknowable?

We conclude from the animosity which Mr. Spencer shows toward Kant that he does not know how much in this respect he agrees with Kant, how much he has unconsciously imbibed from the _Zeitgeist_ which in part was formed under the influence of this huge error of the great philosopher.

I feel confident that any clear thinker who studies Kant and arrives along with him at the “thing in itself” will soon free himself from this error of Kantian thought. Kant himself suggests to us the method by which we are to find the way out of agnosticism. As a proof I quote the views of two independent thinkers; both influenced by Kant’s criticism but neither a blind follower. Professor Mach says:

“I have always felt it as a special good fortune, that early
in my life, at about the age of fifteen, I happened to find
in the library of my father Kant’s ‘Prolegomena to Any
Future Metaphysic.’ The book made at that time a powerful,
ineffaceable impression upon me that I never afterwards
experienced to the same degree in any of my philosophical
reading. Some two or three years later I suddenly discovered
the superfluous rôle that ‘the thing in itself’ plays.” _The
Monist_, Vol. I, No. 1, pp. 65 and 66.

And Schiller guided by similar considerations says in one of his Xenions:

“Since Metaphysics, of late, without heirs to her fathers was gathered:
Under the hammer are now ‘things in themselves’ to be sold.”

The latest attack of Mr. Spencer upon Kantism is in the article “Our Space-Consciousness,” in _Mind_, written in reply to Professor Watson. Mr. Spencer there repeats his misconception of Kantism, so that I feel urged to utter a few words of protest against his gross misrepresentation of Kant’s views. I shall confine myself mainly to quotations from Kant’s works—and the passages quoted will speak for themselves. Should there indeed be any disciples of Kant who are, as Mr. Spencer says, “profoundly averse to that evolutionary view which contemplates mind as having had a genesis conforming to laws like those conformed to by the genesis of the body,” these quotations will suffice to prove that they have misconstrued the views of their master. Philosophers hostile to the theory of evolution had better select another patron for their ideas. Kant is too radical a mind to protect those men who in the domains of thought give the signal for retreat.

Mr. Spencer adopted the evolution theory as it was presented by Von Baer, who explains “_Entwickelung_” as a progress from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous.

Baer’s “Developmental History of Animals” was published in 1828. Mr. Spencer adopted the theory in 1854. But the history of the theory of evolution is older than Von Baer’s book. Professor Baer concludes his work with a few corollaries among which near the end we find the following passage:

“If we survey the contents of the whole Scholia, there
follows from them a general result. We found that the effect
of generation continues to advance from a part to a whole
[Schol. 2.]; that in development, self-dependence increases
in correspondence with its environment [Schol. 2.], as well as
the determinateness of its structure [Schol. 1.]; that in the
internal development special parts shape themselves forth from
the more general, and their differentiation increases [Schol.
3.]; that the individual, as the possessor of a fixed organic
form, changes by degrees from more general forms into more
special [Schol. 5.].

“The general result of our inquiry and consideration can now
well be declared as follows:

“That the developmental history of the individual is the
history of increasing individuality in every relation; that
is, Individualisation.

“This general conclusion is, indeed, so plain, that it needs
no proof from observation, but seems evident _a priori_. But
we believe that this evidentness is merely the stamp of truth,
and therefore is its guarantee. Had the history of development
from the outset been perceived as just expressed, it could and
should have been inferred, that the individual of a determinate
animal type attains to this by changing from a general into
a special form. But experience teaches everywhere, that
deductions are always safer if their results are discovered
beforehand by observation. Mankind would have obtained a still
greater intellectual possession than it really has, had this
been otherwise.

“But if this general conclusion has truth and contents, it is
_one fundamental idea_ which runs through all forms and degrees
of animal development, and governs every single relation. It is
the same idea that collected in space the distributed particles
into spheres and united them in solar systems; which caused the
disintegrated dust on the surface of our metallic planet to
grow up into living forms; but this idea is nothing else than
life itself, and the words and syllables in which it expresses
itself, are the different forms of life.”

These corollaries were not inserted by Baer because he intended to proclaim a new truth, but simply to excite a popular interest in a strictly scientific work, in order to extend the circle of its readers. Baer says in the preface:

“So much about the first part. In order to procure for the
work readers and buyers, I have added a second part in which
I make some general remarks under the title of Scholia and
Corollaries. They are intended to be sketches of the confession
of my scientific faith concerning the development of animals,
as it was formed from the observation of the chick and by other
investigations.”

* * * * *

The “Encyclopædia Britannica” says of Baer that he “prepared the way for Mr. Spencer’s generalisation of the law of organic evolution as the law of all evolution.”[102]

Baer declares that individualisation is “the one fundamental idea that goes through _all_ the forms of cosmic and animal development.” The generality of the law of evolution is clearer in the language employed by Baer, in the full context of the Scholia than appears from the short statement of the “Encyclopædia Britannica.” Nevertheless it is clear enough in the quoted passage that Baer made a statement of universal application. How can such a universal statement be made more general?

We must add here that Mr. Spencer and his disciples overvalue the importance of generalisation. It is not the power of generalisation that makes the philosopher and the scientist but the power of discrimination. The habit of generalising whatever comes under our observation is very common among the uneducated and uncivilised, and almost nine tenths of human errors arise from unwarranted generalisations.

In Kant’s time the interest in the theory of evolution was confined to a few minds. It is well known that Goethe was one of its most enthusiastic supporters.[103] In the middle of the eighteenth century there were three views proposed to explain the origin and the development of organised beings: (1) Occasionalism, (2) the theory of Evolution, and (3) the theory of Epigenesis. Occasionalism maintained that God created on each new occasion a new animal. The word evolution was used in a different sense from that in which it is now understood: evolutionism, as maintained by Bonnet, Haller, and others, was the view that the sperma contained a very small specimen of the animal that was to grow from it. The hen’s egg was supposed to contain an excessively minute but complete chicken. The theory of epigenesis, however, propounded in 1759 by Caspar Friedrich Wolff in his “Theoria Generationis,” explained development by additional growth, and it is this theory of epigenesis which later on, after the total defeat of the old evolutionism, was called (but improperly) the evolution theory. The word “evolution” has thus again admitted the erroneous idea of an unfolding.

In Kant’s time the battle between the occasionalists, the evolutionists, and the adherents of the epigenesis theory was hot indeed; and Kant unquestionably gave preference to the epigenesis theory. The most important passage on the subject appears in his “Critique of Judgment.” It is as follows:

“If now the teleological principle of the generation of
organised beings be accepted, as it would be, we can account
for their internally adapted form either by _Occasionalism_
or by _Prestabilism_.[104] According to the first, the
supreme world-cause would, in agreement with its idea, on the
occasion of every coition directly give the proper organic
form to the material thereby blended; according to the second,
it would have implanted into the original products of its
designing wisdom merely the power by means of which an organic
being produces its like and the species itself is constantly
maintained and likewise the death of individuals is continually
replaced by their own nature, which is operating at the same
time for their destruction.

“If we assume occasionalism for the production of organised
beings, nature is thereby wholly discarded, and with it the use
of reasoning in determining the possibility of such kinds of
products; therefore, it cannot be supposed that this system is
accepted by any one who has had to do with philosophy.”

“As to _Prestabilism_, it can proceed in a two-fold manner,
namely, it considers every organic being produced by its like,
either as the _educt_ or as the _product_ of the first. The
system which considers generated beings as mere _educts_ is
called that of _individual preformation_, or also the _theory
of evolution_; that which makes generated beings _products_ is
named the system of _epigenesis_. The latter can also be called
a system of _generic preformation_, because the productive
power of those generating was virtually preformed to agree with
the internal adapted arrangements that fell to the lot of their
race. The opposing theory to this view should be named that
of individual preformation, or still better, the _theory of
evolution_.”

“The defenders of the theory of evolution, who exempt each
individual from the formative power of nature, in order to
derive the same directly from the hand of the Creator, would
not dare to permit this to happen in accordance with the
hypothesis of occasionalism, so that coition would be a mere
formality, a supreme national world-cause having decided to
form every particular fœtus by direct interference, and to
resign to the mother only its development and nourishment.
They declared themselves in favor of preformation, _as though
it were not the same to make the required forms arise in a
supernatural manner at the beginning of the world, as during
its progress_; and as if a great multitude of supernatural
arrangements would not rather be dispensed with through
occasional creation which were necessary in order that the
embryo formed at the beginning of the world should, throughout
the long period up to its development, not suffer from the
destructive forces of nature, but endure and maintain itself
intact; moreover, an immensely greater number of such preformed
beings would be made than ever would be developed, and with
them as many creations be thus rendered unnecessary and
purposeless. They still, however, resign at least something to
nature, in order not to fall in with complete hyperphysics,
which can dispense with explanation from nature. They still
held fast indeed, to their hyperphysics; even finding in
monsters (which it must be impossible to regard as designs
of nature) cases of adaptation which call for admiration,
although the only purpose of that adaptedness might be to make
an anatomist take offence at it as a purposeless adaptedness,
and have a sense of melancholy admiration. Yet they could
not well fit the generation of hybrids into the system of
preformation, but were obliged still further to endow the sperm
of male creatures with a designedly acting power, whereas they
had otherwise accorded it nothing except mechanical force to
serve as the first means of nourishment of the embryo; yet
this designedly acting force, in the case of the products of
generation between two creatures of the same kind, they would
grant to neither of them.

“If on the contrary the great advantage was not at once
recognised which the theory of epigenesis possessed over the
former in view of the experimental foundation on which the
proof of it rested; yet reason would be especially favorably
predisposed from the outset for this mode, of explanation,
inasmuch as it regards nature—with reference to the things
which originally can be conceived as possible only in
accordance with the theory of causality and design, at least
so far as propagation is concerned—as self-producing and
not merely as developing, and thus with the least possible
employment of the supernatural, leaves all that comes
afterwards, from the very beginning on, to nature: without
concerning itself with the original beginning, with regard to
the explanation of which physics in general miscarries, try
with what chain of causes it may.”

Kant recognises neither the stability of species nor any fixed limits between them. And this one maxim alone suffices to prove that he was of the same opinion as the great biologist who wrote the “Origin of Species.” Kant says (Ed. Hart. III. p. 444):

“_Non datur vacuum formarum_, that is, there are not different
original and primitive species, which were, so to say, isolated
and separated by an empty space from one another, but all the
manifold species are only divisions of a single, chief, and
general species; and from this principle results again this
immediate inference: _datur continuum formarum_, that is, all
differences of species border on each other, and allow no
transition to one another by a leap, but only through very
small degrees of difference, by which we can arrive at one
from another; in one word, there are no species or sub-species
which, according to reason, would be _next_ each other in
affinity, but intermediate species are always possible, whose
difference from the first and second is less than their
difference from one another.”

In Kant’s “Critique of Judgment” (§. 80) we find the following passage:

“The agreement of so many species of animals, with reference
to a definite, common scheme, which appears not only to be
at the foundation of their bony structure, but also of the
arrangement of their other parts, in which, by abridgment of
one and prolongation of another, by envelopment of this and
unfolding of that, a wonderful simplicity of plan has been able
to produce so great a diversity of species—this agreement casts
a ray of hope, although a weak one, in the mind, that here,
indeed, something might be accomplished with the principle of
the mechanism of nature, without which in general there can be
no physical science.

“This analogy of forms, so far as they appear, notwithstanding
all their diversity, to be produced after the model of a common
prototype, strengthens the conjecture of a real relationship
between the same by generation from a common ancestral
source, through the gradual approach of one animal species to
another, from man, in whom the principle of design appears
to be best proved, to the polyp, from this to the moss and
lichen, and finally to the lowest stage of nature perceptible
to us, to crude matter, from which and its forces, according
to mechanical laws (like those which work in the production
of crystals), the whole technic of nature (which is so
incomprehensible to us in organised beings that we imagine
another principle is necessitated for their explanation)
appears to be derived.[105]

“The Archæologist of nature is now free to make that great
family of beings (for such we must conceive it, if the
uninterrupted relationship is to have a foundation) arise out
of the extant vestiges of the oldest revolutions, following
every mechanism known to him or which he can suppose.”

Kant adds in a foot-note:

“An hypothesis of such a kind can be named a daring venture of
reason, and there may be few of the most sagacious naturalists,
through whose minds it has not sometimes passed. For it is not
absurd, as the _generatio equivoca_, by which is understood
the production of an organised being through the mechanical
action of crude unorganised matter. But it would still be
_generatio univoca_ in the common understanding of the word,
in so far only as something organic was produced out of
another organic body, although specifically distinguished
from it; for instance, if certain aquatic animals by and by
formed into amphibia, and from these after some generations
into land animals. _A priori_ this does not contradict the
judgment of pure reason. Only experience shows no example
thereof; according to it, rather, all generation which we know
is _generatio homonyma_ (not mere _univoca_ in opposition to
production out of unorganised material), that is, the bringing
forth of a product homogeneous in organisation, with the
generator; and _generatio heteronyma_, so far as our actual
experience of nature goes is nowhere met with.”

The treatise “Presumable Origin of Humanity,” Kant sums up in the following sentence:

“From this representation of the earliest human history it
results, that the departure of man from what, as the first
abode of his kind, his judgment represented as Paradise, was
no other than the transition of mere animal creatures out of
barbarism into man, out of the leading-strings of instinct into
the guidance of reason, in a word, out of the guardianship of
nature into the state of freedom.”

In his work “Upon the Different Races of Mankind,” Kant discusses the origin of the species of man in a way which would do honor to a follower of Darwin. It is written in a spirit which recognises the difference of conditions as the causes that produce different species. We select a few passages from this work.

In a foot-note we read:

“Ordinarily we accept the terms natural science
(_Naturbeschreibung_) and natural history in one and the
same sense. But it is evident that the knowledge of natural
phenomena, as they _now are_, always leaves to be desired
the knowledge of that which they _have been_ before now, and
through what succession of modifications they have passed in
order to have arrived, in every respect, at their present
state. _Natural History_, which at present we almost entirely
lack, would teach us the changes that have effected the form
of the earth, likewise, the changes in the creatures of the
earth (plants and animals) that they have suffered by natural
transformations and, arising therefrom, the departures from the
prototype of the original species that they have experienced.
It would probably trace a great number of apparently different
varieties back to a species of one and the same kind, and would
convert the present so intricate school-system of Natural
Science into a natural system in conformity with reason.”

We adduce another passage, no less remarkable in clearness, which proves that Kant has a very definite idea, not only of the gradual evolution of man, but also of the survival of the fittest: