Chapter XXII: Part 22

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A review of this book has appeared already in _The Open Court_, No. 231, in which we called attention to the great merits of a work which has become a household book, not only for the scientist, but for every educated reader who is interested in man and the origin of man. Our knowledge in Anthropogeny, certainly, will influence not only our general world-conception, but through our general world-conception it will extend its influence not only over every branch of science but also into the broader fields of man’s daily life and his practical morality.

Professor Haeckel is the most popular naturalist of to-day and there is no one, perhaps, who has made a more effective propaganda for the monistic world-conception than he. So it is almost a matter of course that his definition of monism is generally accepted as the standard. We have formulated our view of monism in a way which in principle and general outlines concurs with the commonly accepted usage of the term, yet it deviates from it in some important points which are perhaps not merely matters of detail. It will be difficult to say how far we agree and how far we disagree with Professor Haeckel’s monism because those subjects in which we disagree, have never been elaborated by him, and we are inclined to believe that he would modify some of his expressions, if he devoted a quiet hour’s thought to the objections we have to make to his definitions.

Professor Haeckel’s monism being mechanicalism savors strongly of materialism. He says in the latest edition of his “Anthropogenie” which is now before us, Vol. II, p. 851:

“There can be no doubt that a thorough consideration and unprejudiced deliberation of these facts will lead to a decisive victory of that philosophical conception which with one word we call monistic or mechanical in opposition to the dualistic and teleological. Upon the latter are based most of the philosophical systems of antiquity, of the mediæval times, and also of the present time. The mechanical or monistic philosophy declares that certain and immutable laws obtain everywhere in the phenomena of human life as much as in nature generally, that a necessary causal connexus obtains everywhere in phenomena and, accordingly, that the knowable world forms throughout a unitary whole, a monon. Monism moreover maintains that all phenomena are produced alone through mechanical causes (_causæ efficientes_) not through premeditated purposive causes (_causæ finales_).”

And in the first lecture “The History of Evolution and Philosophy,” (p. 15) he says:

“We shall clearly recognise in the following investigations how
the most wonderful enigmas of human and animal organisations,
heretofore considered as inaccessible, have become accessible
to a natural solution through Darwin’s reform in the doctrine
of evolution by a mechanical explanation of purposeless
efficient causes.”

In agreement with these views, Professor Haeckel regards the terms necessity and mechanicalism as equivalent terms. He rejects any kind of teleology, any kind of final causes, and also the freedom of the will. He opposes the so-called moral world-order as contradictory to the idea that the world is regulated by mechanical law and he adopts the latter to the exclusion of the former. All these points come out very strongly and clearly in Professor Haeckel’s letter to the editor of _The Open Court_, where his view of monism is graphically presented in a concise tabular form.

We here reproduce this table from No. 212 of _The Open Court_, for the convenience of our readers:

Now we agree with Professor Haeckel in one main point, viz. “that certain and immutable laws obtain everywhere in the phenomena of human life as much as in nature generally, and that the knowable world forms throughout a unitary whole, a monon.” But we cannot agree to his proposition that “the wonderful enigmas of organised life are accessible to a natural solution by a mechanical explanation of purposeless efficient causes.” We grant willingly that mechanical explanations will serve for all motions that take place in the world; even the motions of the brain take place in strict obedience to the laws of molar and molecular mechanics. But a mechanical explanation is not applicable to that which is not motion. If it were applicable it would not be desirable, for it would be of no avail. Mechanical explanations are to be limited to mechanical phenomena. Feeling however is not a mechanical phenomenon, and an idea, being a special and a very complex kind of a feeling, or rather and more accurately expressed, being the special meaning of a very complex feeling, is not a mechanical phenomenon either. It is true that when a feeling takes place and when an idea is thought in the brain of an organised being, that a certain nervous action takes place. The nervous action is a motion and this motion represents a definite amount of energy. There is no theoretical difficulty, although there are almost insurmountable practical difficulties, in measuring the definite amount of potential energy that is changed into kinetic energy when a man thinks. Yet the brain-motion is not the idea and by a mechanical explanation of the brain-motion we have not even touched the problem of what the nature of the idea is, why ideas originate and how they act.

We know that Professor Haeckel when he so vigorously insists on mechanicalism, opposes those philosophers who believe that there are motions which cannot be explained by mechanical laws. We side with Professor Haeckel against any one who maintains that some motions are mechanical (molar or molecular) and others are exceptions to the laws of mechanics, representing a kind of hypermechanics. But we cannot admit the explanation by mechanical laws of non-mechanical phenomena.

Professor Haeckel speaks of purposeless efficient causes—_zwecklos thätige Ursachen_. He speaks of efficient causes, as excluding final causes. He is right in his objection to final causes as the term is commonly used. But while there are causes that are _zwecklos_, there are no causes that are _ziellos_. Every process of causation takes a definite course, it has a certain and definable direction. The end of this direction need not be a conscious aim, but it is an aim whatever it be, it is a _Ziel_. In this sense every efficient cause is at the same time a final cause. The gravitating stone has no purpose, yet it has an aim. So the evolution of organised life is a natural process having a very definite aim. And this aim of the evolution of organised life is determined by factors of a very complex nature. One of these factors is almost imperceptible at the beginning, but it is of a constantly and rapidly growing importance; and this factor is the psychical element that appears with organised life. This factor is nothing supra-natural, nothing extra-natural, and yet it is not something material or mechanical. It is this factor which in its highest efflorescence changes aims into purposes, and with this change it creates again a new factor of evolution which is the purposive aspiration to conform to the world-order and thus to advance the further progress of mankind. This aspiration is in one word called morality.

When we speak of a moral world-order we mean that such moral behests as were formulated in prescripts by Confucius, by Buddha, by Moses, by Jesus, and other moral teachers of mankind have an objective and immutable foundation in the nature of things. The mechanical law in the province of motions, the logical law in the realm of thought, geometrical proportions in mathematics, the regularity of natural laws, etc., form in our world-conception a part of this moral world-order. The laws of social life are not opposed to them but correlative.

The purpose of a man’s action reveals his character, and the character of the man is his innermost nature. In an analogous way the aim of evolution and especially the aim of the evolution of organised beings reveals the character, the innermost nature of the universe. Psychic life is absent so far as we can see in the primordial world substance as it appears in the form of a nebula; it is absent still in the primordial state of planets. It appears with the subjective states of awareness that rise into existence in organised life. The subjectivity of unorganised matter is, in comparison with man’s subjectivity, to be considered as a blank; i. e., if there is in it a state of awareness, which we have reasons to doubt, it is apparently without meaning; it does not symbolise external objects; it is no mind; it is, as it were, blind. Yet the aim of evolution being the development of psychical life, shows that the subjectivity of unorganised matter is spiritual in its innermost nature. And the aim of psychical life being the development of moral ideals, we are very well justified in speaking of the world-order as moral. When speaking of the world-order as moral we mean that the moral prescripts of the great ethical teachers of mankind are founded in and derived from the world-order of nature.

There is one objection to calling the world-order moral, and we therefore dislike to use the phrase. It is this: Morality means conformity to a certain standard. The standard is not moral, but those who do or do not conform to it are moral or immoral. Therefore if there is any truth in the idea of God it is this that there is a standard for human conduct to conform to, there is an authority which has to be obeyed and this authority is God. To speak of God as moral or immoral is anthropomorphism. If “God” means anything, it means that power of the world-order obedience to which is called morality. If we say God is moral, God ceases to be God, the moral authority above him to which he has to conform would be the really true God. Thus logically the personal conception of God leads to a superpersonal conception of God.

These are in brief our objections to Professor Haeckel’s definition of monism as being identical with mechanicalism and perhaps also with materialism. My opinion that Professor Haeckel may after all accede to our view of monism is based upon an interesting and friendly conversation which I enjoyed with him several years ago in Jena. Professor Haeckel is not the one-sided naturalist that he is often represented to be by orthodox clergymen. He does not see the workings of the natural laws only, he sees also the moral aspect to which a consideration of the natural laws leads. That his books emphasise the former without entering into the problems of the latter is natural for a scientist, but he personally is certainly even broader than are his books, and I should say that his very opposition to certain errors which have been foisted by an antiquated dogmatism upon our religious institutions, show the deeply religious spirit of his character.

P. C.

FOOTNOTES:

[65] _Anthropogenie oder Entwickelungsgeschichte des Menschen._ Keimes-und Stammesgeschichte. By Ernst Haeckel. Mit 20 Tafeln, 440 Holzschnitten und 25 genetischen Tabellen. Vierte, umgearbeitete und vermehrte Auflage. Leipzig: Engelmann.

MR. CHARLES S. PEIRCE ON NECESSITY.

Mr. Charles S. Peirce is one of those thinkers who in the investigation of a subject go right down to the bottom of the problem. This appears to me the more conspicuously so, as the result to which his investigations lead stand in a strong contrast to my own views. Yet I cannot help admiring the boldness of his trenchant critique which finds the difficulties at the point where really the main difficulty of all philosophical inquiry lies buried. It lies buried, i. e. it does not appear on the surface of things. If it lay on the surface, our most superficial thinkers would naturally light on it; but most of them walk their way in peace, unmolested by the question, Is there any truth in the idea of necessity. An editorial treatment of this problem may be expected in a forthcoming number of _The Monist_.

P. C.

BOOK REVIEWS.

EINLEITUNG IN DAS ALTE TESTAMENT. By _C. H. Cornill_, Professor at the University at Königsberg.

When Darwin and his followers first gave to the world the astonishing results of their studies, few were those who at once recognised the importance of the new theories and still fewer those who readily accepted them. But within the last thirty years, gradually but steadily the number of those who have adopted as virtually true the hypotheses of the new school, has been increasing until to-day those are in the minority who teach a view different from Darwin on the origin and evolution of the universe. The history and fate of the new studies in Biblical criticism bear a striking analogy to the reception accorded to Darwinian researches. At first they were met with well nigh universal opposition. They were declared to be subversive of the holiest interests of religion. They were held to rob the Bible of its glory. But by slow degrees the first passion yielded to wiser counsel. Curiosity led to the examination of the new positions; and in consequence in ever widening circles the conviction gained ground that far from taking away from the dignity of the old Hebrew literature, these new investigations and the method upon which they footed, lent new lustre to the collection of ancient writings. And to-day the battle has been won by the school of Wellhausen and Kuenen. Few are those who to-day urge the old views on the authorship date and historical succession of the several parts composing what is called the O. T. or even on the canonisation of the whole collection.

The startling assumptions of Wellhausen, Graf, and their Dutch colleagues had their forerunners, as had Darwin and Wallace. But when George and Vatke in the fourth decade of our century and Reuss, in his first academic lectures, virtually anticipated the lines of research of their later successors, the world was too busy with other matters to give their labors much attention. (Cfr. this work, p. 8.) For all this, primitive orthodoxy had only few representatives in this domain, at least in Germany. While Hävernick and Keil and Hengstenberg, are ranged on the extreme right of the line defending with all the resources of a vast erudition the traditional views, the middle ground is occupied by such men as Ewald, and Hitzig, and the teacher of these De-Wette, a school of critics that to-day yet counts among its protagonists such men as Dillmann and Schrader and Kittel. With Graf, a new era may be said to have begun for Biblical criticism. Notwithstanding the violent opposition encountered, the school has won the day. Its greatest triumph was perhaps the acquiescence in its positions shortly before his death by that master of Biblical science, Professor Delitzsch of Leipzig. What the cardinal point of contention is between the warring camps, is well known. It is the relative age and position of what is technically designated as the Priestly code, in the Hexateuch. According to the new school this portion is the capping stone of the edifice, as it were. For Dillmann it is pre-exilic; for Wellhausen post-exilic.

The book before us places itself without equivocation on the standpoint of this latest criticism. It is thus another leaf in the laurel wreath crowning the men of the new dispensation. For the name of the author is guarantee of the scholarly character of the work; and views which have the endorsement of a man of the renown and the scholarship of Professor Cornill carry the presumption of having truth on their side. Professor Cornill is however, a new-comer in this special field. His life work, as he himself says, lies in another province of the vast realm of Biblical critical studies. His fame is associated with his critical edition of the text of Ezekiel, a work which will forever stand as the best guide for all who would venture on the dangerous ground of conjectural textual emendations. For Cornill was the first to lay down the method which above all must be followed in so venturesome a task and his new version is the classic illustration of the correctness of his method of proceeding. That a man who has established for himself the reputation of being methodic and painstaking almost to a fault, a man who is dowered with critical acumen of the highest order, should after going anew over the whole ground cast the weight of his scholarly authority in favor of the views of the new critical school is a fact the significance of which cannot be blinked. We are indeed glad that the publishers entrusted this number of their intended series of manuals for theological students, to a scholar who had hitherto not written _ex cathedra_ on this particular subject. Thus was ensured a new and impartial examination of all the points involved.

The ends which this series of manuals is to serve, decided of course the style and scope of this work. Of introductions (_Einleitungen_) to the O. T. there was no scarcity; but (see preface) they were either too bulky and too full and thus did not answer the requirements of the student, not yet a scholar; or they were too brief, mere “ponies” as we here in America would say, intended to be learnt by heart for the purpose of passing a good examination. The difficulty thus consisted in combining thoroughness with the necessary brevity without sacrificing lucidity. No mere results on the other hand were to be stated. The student was to be initiated into the course of the investigations, the reasons for the conclusions and thus his interest was to be awakened and the way prepared for independent research on his own part. That the author has succeeded in carrying out this his programme, every section of the book confirms. His fear that the full analysis in paragraph 12, of the priestly code will be found to be out of place in an “outline of this kind” is groundless. We do not hesitate that this very section is the gem of the whole work full as it is of numerous passages which cannot but stir to profitable reflection the student. None can lay this book aside without confessing that he has gained a “Gesammtanschauung,” an insight into the unity and coherence of the new views, apt to convince all earnest and unbiased minds of the truth that in this science (_Wissenschaft_) criticism is standing on firm ground. In the selection of the books named at the head of each chapter, or in the course of the discussion, the Professor has displayed most consummate skill. There is scarce one important work which with profit may be consulted but is mentioned; and what is more in the right connection. This feature is not the least valuable in the whole work; the student thus has at ready command a bibliography which excludes the chaff and stores the wheat.

But let us dwell a little more specifically on the plan and execution and the contents of this book. Two plans may suggest themselves to the writer of an “introduction” of this kind. He may attempt to give a picture of the rise of literature among the ancient Hebrews and treat of the different writings which have come down to us, often the fragments of larger works, in the order of their composition and at the same time connect with this discussion the reasons for departing from the traditional views as to their dates and so forth and for assigning them to a new age. This would be virtually writing a history of the literature. It is this plan which Reuss adopted. But according to our Professor, investigation has not proceeded far enough to make such a history possible. He even doubts whether it ever will (p. 2). Perhaps his verdict is justified. At all events he is right when he urges that in such a sequence much which belongs to the branch which he is to teach, will scarcely find its proper or organic place. And therefore it was a wise conclusion of his to adhere to the second plan, the traditional, for such _Einleitungen_ which treats of the different books in the order of the Hebrew canon and finally takes up the discussion of such questions as the collection of the canon, the condition of the text, the different ancient versions and their value for the reconstruction, if possible, of the true original. But what is an _Einleitung_? It is that theological “discipline” which concerns itself about holy scripture as a book. It is its business to fix the time when and the manner how the several writings were composed, which now collectively form the holy scriptures, again it is one of its main objects to understand at what period and under what conditions the several writings were collected and also the manner of the tradition of this collection down to us. The method of this inquiry can be none other but the historic critical. To this definition of the character of this discipline, to retain this German name, none will take exception. It is both succinct and complete. The second paragraph gives a full survey of the history of the studies in this field. It covers within the brief space of ten pages the results of scholarly labors extending over a period of over fourteen hundred years. It is not a dry enumeration of names and book titles. Under each scholar, the salient element of his contribution is emphasised. The living principle of these studies is thus illustrated in its growth and successive development. Take for instance this description of Wellhausen’s method, and in a similar manner that of all other predecessors or co-laborers is brought out: “At the hand of the history of the cultus and that of tradition, he shows how these two lines of development run parallel to each other, how the religious process of evolution at every halt and turn finds its expression and at the same time its corroboration in the productions of literature: Israel and Judaism are two concepts radically different from each other; it is the canon that differentiates Judaism from old Israel.” Paragraph three states the author’s reasons for treating the single books first before taking up the discussion of their collection into a canon, and also why the apocrypha are excluded. These not being in the canon, are foreign to the purposes of an introduction into the canon books. None will deny that the Professor’s arguments on these points are irrefutable. His inquiry into the age of the art of writing among the Hebrews concludes this general preliminary. He is of the opinion that as far back as the memory of the Hebrews goes, they were acquainted with this art as nowhere there is a sign that among them there was a dim recollection of an analphabetic period. Recent finds have made it plain that during the reign of the Pharaoh of the exodus a lively correspondence was kept up between Palestine and Egypt, while for the reign of David the names of his court officials is documentary proof that there were writers at his court. The use of the pen must have been pretty general among the people as is shown by Judges viii, a chapter which belongs to the oldest layer of historical compositions.

Our space is too limited to abstract every chapter of this remarkable book. Much as we should like to do this, and especially as in this manner alone we can hope to do justice to its merits, we must confine ourselves, now that we come to the “special introduction” to a few selections taken from the discussion of the main points in reference to books which have been the centre of critical study. The Pentateuch as is natural receives the lion’s share of the author’s attention. We have no hesitancy in saying that his is the best exposition of the modern views which has yet come under our notice. The Pentateuch cannot be the work of Moses; internal evidence, as already pointed out by Aben Esra, Hobbes, Peyrerius, and Spinoza, render the traditional assumption of Mosaic authorship untenable. But the Pentateuch cannot be the work of one author. The critical labors of one and a half century, sketched most skillfully, has made it plain that the Pentateuch has been “worked together” from four independent original writings, (_Quellenschriften_) a yahwistic work, J. an elohistic, E. a Deuteronomistic D. and a priestly which after Kuenen is denoted as P. On this general division the scholars are agreed, the relative age of the separate parts alone is yet under controversy. In paragraph seven an analysis is given of the first four books as assigned to the three sources. Deuteronomy occupies a position of its own. It is characteristically different in language and thought from the others; it is something essentially new and is in itself homogeneous. In the main Deuteronomy is the book of the covenant mentioned in II. Kings xxiii; this original D. is now incorporated in chapters xii, xiii, xiv-xvii, where however certain verses and even parts of verses must be eliminated. Perhaps xxviii, or as Professor Cornill argues, something more succinct but of the same general nature, a curse, may have belonged to the original D. This must have been the book published under such extraordinary circumstances in 621. Who is its author? It presents itself as the work of Moses. But this is characteristic of the tendency of the age to take a great man as the father of a new literary production, a tendency which was perfectly well understood and was far above the level of a literary deception. Its early manifestation in D. is merely proof that even then Moses was among the people the law-giver _par excellence_. The author of D. must be looked for in the circle of the pious who in consequence of Manasse’s retrogression were bound all the more closely unto each other. In other words among the men of the prophetic party, who must have had influence also over certain priestly orders, for D. is a compromise and an alliance between the prophets and the priests. Besides these components of original D. the book contains in its present form additions and duplicates which partly are historical and hence are denoted by D.h, partly parenetic, hence D.p; but again in these are many later interpolations. For the particulars in this regard, we must refer to the work of Cornill itself. His analysis displays a keen eye and will on the whole be sure to be accepted as final. The date of D. being 621, what is the time of the other great sources of the present Pentateuch. It is clear that D. is acquainted with the “book of the covenant” Ex. xx, 23.-xxiii, 33. and with both Decalogues (?). Thus it was acquainted with JE. P. on the other hand is totally unknown. The historical portions of D. confirm this deduction from the legislative pieces. JE is clearly known to D. while of a knowledge of P. there is not the least trace. How far back of 621 may we go to fix the date of both J. and E.? The period of the first kings seem to be the limit, or more particularly the reign of David. But which of the two is the elder, J. or E.? There can be no question that J. is. For he is more naïve as appears from a comparison among others of chapters Gen. xx, 1-17, xxi 22-32 which belong to E., with chapter Gen. xxvi. 1-33 which is J.’s. E. appears to be a theological recasting of J. E. is the work of the Northern kingdom. Joseph always appears as the leader of his brothers and other features confirm this impression. The year 722, when in the Northern realm national consciousness was at its high water mark may then be supposed to be the _terminus ad quem_. But is E. as we have it a literary unit? Kuenen has proven that it is not. A century after its original composition a second edition so to speak must have been made with a view to meet the requirements and prejudices of the Judaic population of the South. Ex. chapters 32-33, are of great decisive importance in this connection. They are a rebuke for the golden calf worship at Dan and Bethel. Thus E. is divided again into two E.1 and E.2, to which come yet other later amplifications f. i. Num. xxi, 32-35. E.1 then belongs to the reign of Jeroboam II (750); and E.2 is the work of a later author living in Judah and under the influence of prophetic ideas. The locality of J. is a point of controversy. Cornill sides with those who maintain that his home is the Southern kingdom of Judah. The incidents in the Patriarchal biographies which seem to weaken such an assumption are explained as original traits of tradition which J. had no interest to change. J. again is not a literary unit; it compromises J.1, J.2, and even J.3. The reasons for these subdivisions are clearly given in the book. J. must have been composed in its different parts between 850-625. The priestly code occupies a whole paragraph, the signal merit of which we have noticed above. This is indeed the master-piece of a great critical master. The many points which are involved in the discussion of this mooted problem are treated with a clearness and a calmness which carry conviction to the most sceptical. P. presents a spiritual unity but not a literary. P. is the offspring of P.1 an old priestly record and P.2 a narrative and legislative composition which is as it were the substance and skeleton of P. around which younger accretions have gathered at different times for which Cornill in order to simplify his symbols proposes the designation of P.x. J. S. Vater as early as 1805 has proven that in the so-called Mosaism, of the influence in literary and legislative respect of our P. there is no evidence before the captivity. Wellhausen and Kayser and Kuenen have demonstrated what for Vatke was a dim suspicion. Dillmann, Kittel, and Delitzsch as little as Baudissin have succeeded in saving the pre-exilic character of P. Certain it is that before Esra 458 (444), this code had no official recognition. From Nehemiah we have the proof that our P. corresponds to the “Book of the Law of Moses” which was read at the great assembly in October 444. On the other hand the book of Chronicles is based on P. as it details history, as it would have been, if P. had been the law regulating life and liturgy and temple service. Had P. been known before D. what reason should the priest have had who promulgated it to substitute for it another code less advantageous for his own order? P. is clearly a development of D. D. presents itself as something new in all of its demands, in its insistence on centralisation, in one sanctuary and in one priestly order on the legitimacy of the tribe of Levi exclusively. Of the tabernacle there is not one syllable in the whole of the pre-exile literature. It is a clear projection into antiquity of the Deuteronomic Central sanctuary. The relations of P. to Ezekiel make this still plainer. This prophet is the link of transition between D. and P. The omissions in the festal cycle of E. can only be explained that this prophet-priest was unacquainted with P. The captivity is thus the time for the composition of P. in the main. Its emphasis on circumcision as the sign of the covenant which decides the connection with the chosen seed and nation, is proof of this. And the chronology finally corroborates all previous inferences as the chronology of Genesis which is so important a part of P. is unmistakably a reconstruction after certain principles of the Babylonian history of the beginnings. (Oppert.) P. was written during the century from Ezekiel to Esra (570-458). It was not merely P.2 that Esra read before the assembled people. P.1 and P.2 seem thus to have been united even at this time. But it is not to be assumed that under Esra P. was already a part of the other portions of our Pentateuch. P. itself contains parts which are later than Esra. P.x is undoubtedly later and these additions are easily explained on the very assumption of the official introduction of P. P. is not the work of an individual; it is that of a whole school, a school which naturally formed in the captivity. Besides these “source-writings,” the Pentateuch contains smaller pieces of great antiquity mostly of a poetic character which had for a long time an independent existence. Such is Gen. xlix, Exodus xv, and others. Exodus xxi-xxiii, the so-called book of the covenant, requires also a treatment by itself. It is characteristic of this book that it ignores totally the Decalogue. Kuenen has solved the difficulties in which this collection of judicial precedents is involved by pointing out that it is the predecessor of D. D. is merely the substitute for this. As it is older than E. and is the precipitate of the unwritten law of the earlier kingly period, we place its date in the ninth century. Lev. xvii-xxvi while betraying in many regards affinity with P. is still distinct from it. It stands between Ezekiel and P.; it is one of the many priestly Thoroth which undoubtedly were current among the class whom they concerned. How now did these component parts finally combine? This is elucidated in paragraph fourteen. First J. and E. were put together, by an editor of Jehovistic leanings, whom Wellhausen has styled Rj. (R. standing for German Redacteur, Editor). This Rj. worked over, and that often decidedly, his materials in keeping with his own convictions. This Rj. probably lived about 650. His position is pre-deuteronomic. A second editor combined the work of Rj. with D. He is designated as Rd. His was the placing of the old book of the covenant near Sinai in order to gain room for Deuteronomy. He thus became the cause of much confusion. He lived during the second half of the Babylonian captivity. JED. was finally combined with P. by a third editor (Rp.) who is characterised by considerable reverence for the old documents. He omitted much to guard against repetition but at the same time where the relations differed he preserved them most faithfully and endeavored to place them into their proper position and connection. Rp. was thus virtually the author of our Pentateuch. But living after Esra even with him the Pentateuch was not yet closed. Many younger hands had a share in its final shaping. Glosses were added or crept into the text, as is shown by comparison with the lxx. The book of Joshuah is a necessary continuation and complement of the Pentateuch.

But here we must stop quoting in detail. Much as we should desire to reproduce Cornill’s own words relating to other Biblical books, want of space precludes even the attempt. Suffice it to say that as in his treatment of the Pentateuch, so every question bearing on Biblical criticism is handled with the skill of the master. At whatever turn we ask information of this book we receive it most abundantly. This is indeed a students book. It stimulates while it instructs. It leads while it describes the road passed over. In the discussion of the critical problems on the Psalms, the prophets Isaiah and Zechariah, on the final collection of the canon, the translation of the Bible and the relation of the different recensions to each other, the historical books as distinct from Chronicles, and Esra, and so forth, every point is treated with a lucidity of style and a fulness of material which is the rare gift of a man who is saturated with his science and loves it for its own sake. This book is destined to rank among the classics. Its earnest study and repeated consultation can therefore be recommended to all who wish to inform themselves about the method and the achievements of the critical schools. The kindred book by Driver, recently published will not make a translation into English of Cornill’s manual less desirable. We take leave from the author with a feeling of great gratitude for the pleasure and the profit we derived from his contribution to the literature of Biblical scholarship. The book is well printed and singularly free from typographical errors.

DR. E. G. HIRSCH.

THE PRESENT POSITION OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL SCIENCES. An Inaugural Lecture. By _Andrew Seth_, M. A. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons. 1891.

As stated by the author, this lecture deals, not with the circle of the philosophical sciences, but only with the subjects traditionally associated with a Chair of Logic and Metaphysics in Scotland. These subjects belong to the three-fold classification of logical, psychological, and metaphysical, or philosophical in the strict sense. They therefore embrace the study of the conditions to which valid reasoning must conform, the investigation, introspectively and otherwise, of the phenomena of consciousness, and the study of the two-fold question of knowing and being, which as epistemology and metaphysics are included under the designation of Philosophy. These three lines of learning are cognate, and the first two are in a measure introductory to the third, or at least, says Professor Seth, if we go beneath the surface they lead us into the very heart of philosophical difficulties. The lecturer refers in his sketch of the present outlook in these three departments of science to the marvellous activity displayed in the department of psychology. All the influences at work may be said to meet and come to fruition in Mr. Ward’s “masterly treatise” in the “Encyclopædia Britannica” and “the rich and stimulating volumes” of Professor James, of Harvard. Experimental psychology is now widely spread in Germany and has been enthusiastically taken up in America, “where every well-equipped college aims at the establishment of a psychological or psycho-physical laboratory.” Professor Seth thinks, however, that the experimental psychologists magnify their office overmuch. The field of experiment is necessarily limited to the facts of sensation, the phenomena of movement, and the time occupied by the simpler mental processes. The results are often so contradictory as to leave everything in doubt, and where definite results are obtainable, their value is often not apparent. Moreover, many of the results are of a purely physiological nature, and are only by courtesy included in psychological science. We would remark on this, that without the experiments the results would not have been obtained and that their value will become apparent when the methods of experiment are perfected. After referring to the critical function of philosophy as a doctrine of knowledge, Professor Seth states that as constructive it should lay special stress on a _teleological_ view of the universe. By this is meant, that philosophical teleology should concentrate itself upon the proof that there is an end of evolution, “that there is an organic unity or purpose binding the whole process into one and making it intelligible—in one word, that there _is_ evolution and not merely aimless change,” such as is supposed in a purely mechanical view of the universe. As to the nature of the end, although the lecturer accepts Hegel’s view that all things are relative to man as rational, he cannot accept “the abstraction of the race in place of the living children of men.”

Ω.

DER MENSCHLICHE WELTBEGRIFF. By Dr. _Richard Avenarius_, Ord. Professor der Philosophie an der Universität Zürich. Leipsic: O. R. Reisland. 1891.

This monograph is as it were a self-confession. The author endeavors to attain clearness in his own philosophical standpoint. He looked back upon the path he has traveled and feels that “the solution of the problem-attained is fundamentally a personal self-liberation” (Preface, ix). This book is most commendable reading to all idealists and agnostics. It is an interesting and instructive little work, tracing with a keen psychological criticism the vagaries of certain philosophical conceptions, through which not alone the author but the thinkers of mankind in general have strayed. The philosopher begins with what Avenarius calls the “natural world-conception.” But this natural world-conception leads to contradictions and the evil spirit of speculation leads us in a circle through the barren fields of idealism. Avenarius asks: “Is the world really of such a nature that it appears unitary and consistent only to the superficial thinker, while it leads every one astray who attempts to grasp it more precisely in its entirety—the more so the more consistently the thinker proceeds?” (p. xiii.)

The author proposes the question: “In what consists the inevitableness of the contradiction to which every general world-conception seems to have led? Or, if the world really be unitary what is the evil spirit that leads those astray who hunger and thirst after a true cognition of the world?”

The author has entirely abandoned the idealistic standpoint, an inclination to which he showed in his first publication, “Philosophie als Denken der Welt gemäss dem Princip des kleinsten Kraftmasses.” He says: “Doubt of the correctness of my way heretofore pursued was induced through the barrenness of theoretical idealism in the field of psychology; and yet cognition and experience should belong to this science as psychological ideas.”

The author in explaining the development of thought as it takes place in man proceeds in a personal way, so much so that every idealist ought to be satisfied. There are whole pages which teem with _ME_’s and _I_’s. The method of notation is what might be called American. Europeans often complain about our abbreviations, the Y. M. C. A., the S. A. S., the C. B. & Q. Ry., etc., which are great puzzles to the uninitiated new-comer. In a similar way Avenarius introduces such algebraic signs as _R_ and _E_, which means reality and the sensations which our fellow-men are supposed to have. _M_ is Man, _T_ is fellow-man. _T₁_ is the bodily appearance of _T_, it is _R_; while _T₂_ is the _E_ of _T_, i. e. his soul or spirit. _C_ is the nervous central organ, etc. Thus Avenarius says (p. 18):

“I can in a relative consideration assume _R_ to be the condition of changes in the _E_ values, supposed to exist in _M_, only if _M_ and in _M_ the system _C_ are parts of my supposition,” and in a note (p. 117) he adds:

“The skeleton in Goethe’s poem, ‘The Dead’s Dance,’ scents without an organ of smell, sees without eyes, thinks without a brain; it also moves without muscles. To consider such acts as true is now universally declared to be superstition. The time will come when the assumption of psychical phenomena without the coördination of the system _C_ will universally be considered in the same way.”

The first three chapters remind us very much of W. K. Clifford’s article “On the Nature of Things in Themselves.” But the article is nowhere mentioned and it is most probable that it is unknown to the author. If Avenarius had known Clifford’s view, he might have presented his ideas with more economy of space. But if he did not know Clifford’s article, the coincidences of procedure and to a great extent also of the result attained are the more remarkable. What Avenarius calls the _E_ values are termed by Clifford “ejects,” and the formation of ejects is called by Avenarius “introjection.”

On page 52 we read the following sentence on the three phases of the cognition of the data of experience:

“The first phase alone, that of ingenuous empiricism, cognises, i. e. explains the totality of these facts without the assistance of a non-sensible ... the second that of ingenuous realism conceives the non-sensible as supersensible, and the third, that of ingenuous criticism, as the pre-sensible. The epithet ingenuous has reference to the foundation, not to the doctrinary system built upon it. That which makes the said realism and criticism ingenuous is a survival of the ingenuous empiricism.”

The theory which conceives the external cause of an experience as an object, effecting _in_ the subject sensations, passes successively through the following views. The object is said to be (1) not within the range of experience, (2) not within the range of cognition, (3) not-existing. Thus it reaches _via_ agnosticism its climax in idealism and “pure experience becomes a something that is never truly experienced, it becomes the totality of mere or pure sensations” (p. 62).

The third part of the pamphlet is devoted to “the restitution of the natural world-idea.” Here the author comes, at least in some expressions, very close to the solution editorially upheld in _The Monist_. Avenarius says: “The task is ... to _describe_ the what of my experience so as to make a practical application of it in my dealings with my fellow-men” (p. 79).

Professor Avenarius sums up his conclusions in the term “empirio-critical principal-coördination” which he defines as the inseparability of the ego-experience from the surrounding experience. “The ego and the surrounding belong in the same sense to every experience. It is a co-ordination peculiar to all experience” (p. 83). If we understand Avenarius correctly he means to say, to express it in our terms, that there is no object but there is a subjective aspect of it, no subject but it appears objectively. Thus there is no subjectivity in itself and there is no objectivity in itself. This is exactly our position, which we call Monism.

The “introjection” was according to Avenarius the evil spirit that led speculation astray. To get rid of this evil spirit the proposition is made to discard “introjection” and replace it by the empirio-critical principal-coördination. But closely considered the latter is only an improved modification of the former, and this plan would better be characterised as discarding the error implied in that kind of introjection theory which assumes that sensations alone are given. The data of experience are not mere feelings, not mere subjectivity, as is maintained by the idealist; nor are they mere objectivity, as is maintained by the ingenuous realist; the data of experience are states of subject-objectness, they are feelings of a certain kind possessing objective significance, and the ideas subject as well as object are abstractions made in a late stage of mental development from this one inseparable whole of subject-objectness (see _The Monist_ I, No. 1, pp. 78-79).

Avenarius says in a note (p. 132), “The question should not be ‘Why do we believe in the reality of an external world?’ but ‘Why did we not believe that the external world is real?’” We should say that neither question is admissible. We should first ask: What do we mean by real? Reality is the sum total of our experiences, including the meaning of sensations and ideas, and finds its special application in their reliability. The question, Is the candle I see real? means, Does it react in special ways? Every name of a special object signifies a certain group of actions or reactions observable by the subject. This is what we _call_ real and the idealist would have to deny the existence of his own experience to deny the reality of objects in this sense.

Avenarius’s books are not easy reading to the English and American student, for his style is sometimes heavy and his constructions are involved. So are his thoughts. But his thoughts show the earnest thinker; the evolution of his views goes in the right direction and his works deserve the attention of his co-workers in the philosophical field.

κρς.

DIE BEDEUTUNG DER THEOLOGISCHEN VORSTELLUNGEN FÜR DIE ETHIK. By Dr. _Wilhelm Paszkowski_. Berlin: Mayer & Müller. 1891.

Religion originates everywhere, according to the author, in the self-consciousness of man who feels himself an acting and willing being limited by and dependent upon greater and higher powers. The religious relation consists in the regulation of his actions as well as his will with reference to the ordinances of these powers. Dr. Paszkowski lets all the best known religions pass in review before our eyes, tracing in all of them the connection between the properly religious elements and morality and singling out those religious factors which are most effective in determining man’s will in a moral way. In the second part of the little volume he endeavors to show in how far the ecclesiastical organisation of religion in dogma and cult have strengthened and in how far they have weakened this result.

Concerning the most important dogma, which is the belief in immortality, Paszkowski declares that it had its undoubted effects favorable and unfavorable upon the social and moral life of mankind. It has prevented some crimes while it has enhanced others. The question is, he says, whether an individual immortality such as the religions usually picture it, is tenable or not. Modern science and anthropology seem to have proved it an illusion. Yet, as Paulsen says, the belief in immortality is not a mere imagination. Every reality and so also man’s life is eternal. It is nonsensical to think of death as a finality. That which has been alive is a necessary, an eternal and inexpugnable part of reality and can never again be blotted out. Through death the continuance of a man’s life is cut off, but the contents of his life can never again be annihilated. The real is in its very nature eternal. Paszkowski adds to Paulsen’s remarks that man should find the norm of moral action in his relation to his fellow-men and posterity, so that morality need not depend upon any religious views. He will also have to act morally after he has resigned the belief in the reality of the beautiful immortality-dream as it is presented by enthusiastic religiosity.

It appears to us that if the usual conception of immortality is scientifically untenable it devolves upon the moral teacher to present an immortality conception that is tenable. The true immortality conception will never enhance crimes, it will always have a favorable effect upon the morality of mankind. Furthermore man’s relation to mankind and also to the universe is of a religious nature. The social order to which man has to conform is one part of those powers a recognition of which constitute religion. If these powers are conceived to be outside the world we have a supernatural deity, if they are the highest, best, and greatest of, and in the world itself, we have an immanent deity and ethics still remains intimately connected with and dependent upon religion.

This it appears must be after all the author’s meaning, for he says in prominent print, p. 89: “So long as there are men religion will not cease, for it is one of the constitutional elements of human nature.” “In the same measure as religion becomes spiritual, the moral conceptions also will be purified, the mere ceremonial and the cult-element will lose their importance in religion” (p. 92). “To divide the ethical factor from the religious, as a matter of principle, will be seen to be impossible. We can only conciliate the one with the other, both having originated out of the same source of emotions” (p. 90).

κρς.

DAS WAHRNEHMUNGSPROBLEM VOM STANDPUNKTE DES PHYSIKERS, DES PHYSIOLOGEN UND DES PHILOSOPHEN. Beiträge zur Erkenntnisstheorie und empirischen PSYCHOLOGIE. By Dr. _Hermann Schwarz_. Leipsic: Duncker & Humbolt 1892.

Dr. Hermann Schwarz treats the most fundamental problem of philosophy—viz. that of perception. He says in the preface: “There is a triple state of facts to which obvious yet strange as it appears to thought, the attention of the naturalist and the philosopher is drawn: the physical, the physiological, the psychical.” The physical is the empire of mechanical motion that can be observed with great accuracy to take place everywhere. The physiological is the fact that when certain impressions produce mechanical effects upon the nerves, the result consists in certain sense-data; nervous action is accompanied with sensation. The psychical state of things exhibits the fact that whether or not we want it to be so, colors, sounds, odors, tastes, and touches are always referred to external things, never to the own internal states of the mind. Every one of these facts is strange in itself, for every one represents the contrary of what might be expected _a priori_. Who would expect that the machine-like world of jostling atoms and the glorious world of colors and sounds should have anything in common? And the sense-organs appear to the physiologist as mere physical apparatuses modifying the ether-vibrations somehow. We do not see on the one hand how consciousness can acquire information concerning the external world and on the other hand, how motions can develop something so heterogeneous as is consciousness. If we were confronted with one set of facts only, everything would be plain, but this triple set of facts produces a problem, it makes an explanation necessary and to this explanation Dr. Schwarz has devoted a careful investigation of some four hundred and odd pages.

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The Monist, Vol. 2, 1891-1892Chapter XXII: Part 22

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