Chapter XXVIII (3)

Lord Canning ventures to believe that he is well able to figure to himself the feelings with which your Majesty will have welcomed the termination of the Mutiny and Rebellion in India, and of the chief miseries which these have brought in their train. He hopes that your Majesty will not have thought that there has been remissness in not marking this happy event by an earlier public acknowledgment and thanksgiving in India, as has already been done in England.[55] The truth is, that although this termination has long been steadily and surely approaching, it is but just now that it can be said to be complete in the eyes of those who are near to the scene of action. It is only within the last three weeks that the exertions of our Troops on the Oudh and Nepaulese frontier, and in some other parts, have been remitted, and almost every Gazette has recounted engagements with the rebels, which, although they have invariably had the same issue, would scarcely have consisted with a declaration that peace and tranquillity were restored. Now, however, military operations have fairly ceased, and the rains and the climate, which would make a continuance of those operations much to be regretted, will do their work amongst the rebels who are still in arms in the Nepaul jungles more terribly than any human avengers.

Lord Canning has used every exertion and device to bring these wretched men to submission; but many--it is difficult to say how many, but certainly some few thousands--still hold out. With some of them the reason no doubt is that they belong to the most guilty Regiments, and to those which murdered their officers; but this cannot apply to all; and it is to be feared that the prevailing cause is the bad influence of their leaders--the Nana, Bala Rao, and the Begum;[56] or rather the Begum's infamous advisers. It is certain that all of these, believing their own position to be desperate, have spared no pains to persuade their followers that the Government is seeking to entrap them, and that, if they submit, their lives will be taken....

[Footnote 55: There had been a Public Thanksgiving in England
on the 1st of May.]

[Footnote 56: Bala Rao was a brother of Nana Sahib, chief
instigator of the Sepoy Mutiny. See _ante_, 4th July, 1857,
note 24.]

[Pageheading: A MILITARY ENQUIRY]

_Queen Victoria to Viscount Palmerston._

BUCKINGHAM PALACE, _5th July 1859_.

The Queen is much shocked to see that the Government last night moved for a Committee of the House of Commons to enquire into the Military Departments, without having previously communicated with the Queen on the subject. She is the more surprised at this, as Lord Palmerston told her, when she saw him on the formation of the present Government, and she expressed her anxiety on the subject, that there would be no more trouble about it, and he thought it would drop. The Queen expects that the names of those who it is proposed should compose the Committee, and the wording of it, will be submitted to her.

[Pageheading: CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION]

_Viscount Palmerston to Queen Victoria._

PICCADILLY, _5th July 1859_.

Viscount Palmerston presents his humble duty to your Majesty, and begs to state that the re-appointment of the Committee on the Organisation of the Military Departments was unavoidable. That Committee had been affirmed by the House of Commons and consented to by the late Government, and had begun its sittings; but when a Dissolution of Parliament was announced, it suspended its further sittings, with the understanding that it should be revived in the new Parliament; and to have departed from that understanding would have been impossible. That which Viscount Palmerston intended to convey in what he said to your Majesty on the subject was, that the evidence given by Lord Panmure might be deemed as having fully set aside the objection urged against the present organisation by persons unacquainted with the bearing upon it of the fundamental principles of the Constitution, namely, that the Crown acts in regard to Military matters without having any official adviser responsible for its acts. Such a condition of things, if it could exist, would be at variance with the fundamental principles of the British Constitution, and would be fraught with danger to the Crown, because then the Sovereign would be held personally answerable for administrative acts, and would be brought personally in conflict in possible cases with public opinion, a most dangerous condition for a Sovereign to be placed in.

The maxim of the British Constitution is that the Sovereign can do no wrong, but that does not mean that no wrong can be done by Royal authority; it means that if wrong be done, the public servant who advised the act, and not the Sovereign, must be held answerable for the wrongdoing.

But the Ministers of the Crown for the time being are the persons who are constitutionally held answerable for all administrative acts in the last resort, and that was the pith and substance of the evidence given by Lord Panmure. Those persons who want to make great changes in the existing arrangements were much vexed and disappointed by that evidence, and the attempt made yesterday to put off the Committee till next year on the ground that the evidence now to be taken would be one-sided only, and would tend to create erroneous impressions, was founded upon those feelings of disappointment.

Viscount Palmerston submits names of the persons whom Mr Sidney Herbert proposes to appoint on the Committee, and they seem to be well chosen.

_Lord John Russell to Queen Victoria._

PEMBROKE LODGE, _10th July 1859_. (7 P.M.)

Lord John Russell presents his humble duty to your Majesty. He has just received from Lord Palmerston, who is here, the paper, a copy of which is enclosed.[57]

Lord John Russell has to add that Lord Palmerston and he are humbly of opinion that your Majesty should give to the Emperor of the French the moral support which is asked. It is clearly understood that if the Emperor of Austria declines to accept the propositions, Great Britain will still maintain her neutral position.

But it is probable that her moral support will put an end to the war, and your Majesty's advisers cannot venture to make themselves responsible for its continuance by refusing to counsel your Majesty to accept the proposal of France.

[Footnote 57: At the seat of war, a series of decisive French
victories had culminated in the battle of Solferino, on
Midsummer Day (see _ante_, Introductory Note to Chapter XXVIII).
But the French Emperor was beginning to think these successes
too dearly purchased, at the expense of so many French lives,
and, actuated either by this, or some similar motive, he
attempted, on the 6th of July, to negotiate through the British
Government with Austria. The attempt was a failure, but an
armistice was signed on the 8th, and again the Emperor sought
the moral support of England. The paper which Lord John
Russell submitted was a rough memorandum of M. de Persigny's,
proposing as a basis of negotiation the cession of Lombardy to
Piedmont, the independence of Venetia, and the erection of an
Italian Confederation.]

[Pageheading: FRANCE AND AUSTRIA]

_Queen Victoria to Lord John Russell._

PAVILION, ALDERSHOT, _10th July 1859_.

The Queen has just received Lord John Russell's letter with the enclosure which she returns, and hastens to say in reply, that she does not consider the Emperor of the French or his Ambassador justified in asking the support of England to proposals he means to make to his antagonist to-morrow. He made war on Austria in order to wrest her two Italian kingdoms from her, which were assured to her by the treaties of 1815, to which England is a party; England declared her neutrality in the war. The Emperor succeeded in driving the Austrians out of one of these kingdoms after several bloody battles. He means to drive her out of the second by diplomacy, and neutral England is to join him with her moral support in this endeavour.

The Queen having declared her neutrality, to which her Parliament and people have given their unanimous assent, feels bound to adhere to it. She conceives Lord John Russell and Lord Palmerston ought not to ask her to give her "moral support" to one of the belligerents. As for herself, she sees no distinction between moral and general support; the moral support of England _is_ her support, and she ought to be prepared to follow it up.

The Queen wishes this letter to be communicated to the Cabinet.[58]

[Footnote 58: The Queen not having been informed whether this
instruction had been complied with, a correspondence took
place on the subject between the Prince and Lord Granville.
See the _Life of Lord Granville_, vol. i. chap. xiii.]

[Pageheading: END OF THE WAR]

_Queen Victoria to Lord John Russell._

OSBORNE, _12th July 1859_.

The Queen has to acknowledge the receipt of Lord John Russell's letter reporting to her the result of the deliberations of the Cabinet, which has very much relieved her mind. Lord John does not say whether her letter was read to the Cabinet, but from his former letter she concludes it was. She is most anxious that there should exist no misapprehension on their part as to the Queen's views. Our position must be consistent and precisely defined. A negotiation to stop the effusion of blood, and to attain "a peace which would be for the interests of all belligerents," is a very vague term. Who is to judge of those interests? Is M. de Persigny or the Emperor Napoleon's opinion to be the guide, as they just now proposed to us? Austria must be considered the exponent of her own interests. Prussia has explained to us the interests of Germany in the maintenance of the line of the fortresses on the Mincio, and was answered; her views were entirely erroneous, and her apprehensions exaggerated. It will require the greatest caution on our part not to lose our neutral position, nor to be made the advocate of one side. Are the wishes of the Lombards, Tuscans, etc., really ascertainable, while their countries are occupied by French and Sardinian armies? The Queen encloses an extract of a letter from the first Napoleon to his son, Prince Eugene,[59] showing how the expression of a wish for annexation has already of old been used as a means for conquest.

[Footnote 59: Eugene de Beauharnais, Duke of Leuchtenberg, son
of the Empress Josephine by her first marriage, and adopted
son of Napoleon I.]

[Pageheading: ASCENDANCY OF FRANCE]

_Queen Victoria to Lord John Russell._

OSBORNE, _13th July 1859_.

The Queen has received the news of a concluded peace,[60] which Lord John Russell has sent to her yesterday, with as much surprise as it must have caused Lord John. It was a joyous intelligence, as far as the stopping of the further effusion of innocent blood and the security against further diplomatic complications is concerned, but it gives cause for serious reflection. The Emperor Napoleon, by his military successes, and great apparent moderation or prudence immediately after them, has created for himself a most formidable position of strength in Europe. It is remarkable that he has acted towards Austria now just as he did towards Russia after the fall of Sebastopol; and if it was our lot then to be left alone to act the part of the extortioner whilst he acted that of the generous victor, the Queen is doubly glad that we should not now have fallen into the trap, to ask Austria (as friends and neutrals) concessions which he was ready to waive. He will now probably omit no occasion to cajole Austria as he has done to Russia, and turn her spirit of revenge upon Prussia and Germany--the Emperor's probable next victims. Should he thus have rendered himself the master of the entire Continent, the time may come for us either to obey or to fight him with terrible odds against us. This has been the Queen's view from the beginning of this complication, and events have hitherto wonderfully supported them. How Italy is to prosper under the Pope's presidency, whose misgovernment of his own small portion of it was the ostensible cause of the war, the Queen is at a loss to conceive. But the Emperor will be able to do just as he pleases, being in military command of the country, and having Sardinia, the Pope, and Austria as his debtors.

The Queen would like this letter to be communicated to the Cabinet.

[Footnote 60: The armistice had arranged that the Emperors
should meet at Villafranca, where peace was concluded. See
_ante_, Introductory Note to Chapter XXVIII. The Italian
Confederation was to be under the presidency of the Pope.]

_Lord John Russell to Queen Victoria._

FOREIGN OFFICE, _13th July 1859_.

Lord John Russell presents his humble duty to your Majesty; he will read your Majesty's letter to the Cabinet to-morrow.

The Emperor Napoleon is left no doubt in a position of great power. That position has been made for him by allowing him to be the only champion of the cause of the people of Italy.

But that is no reason why we should seek a quarrel with France, and there is some reason to doubt whether the speeches made in the House of Lords, while they display our weakness and our alarm, are really patriotic in their purpose and tendency.

To be well armed, and to be just to all our neighbours, appears to Lord John Russell to be the most simple, the most safe, and the most honest policy.

_Queen Victoria to Lord John Russell._

OSBORNE, _14th July 1859_.

The Queen acknowledges the receipt of Lord John Russell's communications of yesterday. She entirely agrees with him "that we have no reason to seek a quarrel with France," and that "the most simple and most safe and most honest" line of conduct for us will be "to be well armed, and to be just to all our neighbours."

She trusts that as the poor Duchess of Parma[61] appears to be overlooked in the Italian Peace merely because nobody thinks it his business to befriend her, we shall in the above spirit ask for justice and consideration for her.

The Queen concurs with Lord John that it will now be useless to communicate to France the advice given to the Porte.

[Footnote 61: Louise Marie de Bourbon, daughter of the Duc de
Berri, and widow of Charles III., Duke of Parma. She was at
this time Regent for her son Robert, a minor (born 1848), the
present Duke.]

[Pageheading: THE VIEWS OF THE POPE]

[Pageheading: THE POPE ON ENGLISH LIBERALISM]

[Pageheading: THE TEMPORAL POWER]

_Mr Odo Russell to Lord John Russell._ (_Submitted to the Queen._)

ROME, _17th July 1859_.

MY LORD,--Some days since a letter from the "Pontifical Antechamber," directed to "Signor Odoni Russell, Agente Officioso di Sua Maesta Britannica," informed me that His Holiness the Pope desired to see me.

In consequence I proceeded to the Vatican, and was ushered into the presence of His Holiness by Monsignore Talbot, the "Cameriere" in waiting, who immediately withdrew, and I remained alone with the Pope.

His Holiness welcomed me with his usual benevolence and good humour. He seemed very gay, and spoke with more than customary frankness, so much so indeed that I have felt some hesitation as to the propriety of submitting what passed between us to your Lordship. But after mature reflection, I think it best you should be in possession of an accurate and conscientious account of the sentiments of His Holiness in the present important juncture of affairs.

"Caro mio Russell," the Pope said, "you have been so long at Naples that I was already thinking of sending after you to bring you back; we do not like you to leave us, and the more so as I have heard you were attached to the Mission of Mr Elliot,[62] who is a son of Lord Minto; and if he entertains the same political views as his father, he is a dangerous man to the peace of Italy. Now I knew Lord Minto here, and although he may be a very good man, I do not think him a man of any capacity, and his doctrines were calculated to bring on the ruin of Italy."

I replied, "I cannot agree with your Holiness, for I consider Lord Minto to be a very clever man, whose honest, sound, and liberal views, had they been listened to, might have prevented the crisis which is now convulsing Italy."

The Pope said, "Well, of course you belong to his party, but, _Poveri noi!_ what is to become of us with your uncle and Lord Palmerston at the head of affairs in England? They have always sympathised with the turbulent spirits of Italy, and their accession to power will greatly increase the hopes of the Piedmontese Party. Indeed, I well know what the English Government want: they want to see the Pope deprived of his temporal power."

I replied, "Again I regret to find your Holiness so entirely mistaken with respect to the policy of England. We derive great happiness from our free institutions, and we would be glad to see our neighbours in Europe as happy and as prosperous as we are, but we have no wish to interfere with the internal concerns of other nations, or to give advice without being asked for it; least of all as a Protestant Power would _we_ think of interfering one way or the other with the Government of your Holiness."

The Pope said, "I do not doubt the good intentions of England, but unfortunately you do not understand this country, and your example is dangerous to the Italian minds, your speeches in Parliament excite them, and you fancy because constitutional liberties and institutions suit you, that they must suit all the world. Now the Italians are a dissatisfied, interfering, turbulent and intriguing race; they can never learn to govern themselves, it is impossible; only see how they follow Sardinia in all she tells them to do, simply because they love intrigue and revolution, whilst in reality they do not know what they want; a hot-headed people like the Italians require a firm and just government to guide and take care of them, and Italy might have continued tranquil and contented, had not the ambition of Sardinia led her to revolutionise the whole country. The Grand Duke of Tuscany, for instance, is an excellent and just man, and nevertheless, at the instigation of Piedmont, he was turned out of the country, and for no earthly purpose. I suppose you have read Monsieur About's book about Rome[63]? well, all he says is untrue, pure calumny, and it would be easy for me to have it all refuted; but he is really not worthy of such an honour. His book, I see, has been translated into English, and I have no doubt it will be much read and believed in England. Such books and our refugees mislead your countrymen, and I often wonder at the language your statesmen hold about us in the Houses of Parliament. I always read their speeches. Lord Palmerston, Lord John Russell, and Mr Gladstone do not know us; but when I think how kindly and hospitably Lord Granville was received at Rome last winter, and then read the extraordinary speech he made last February about us, I think the gout he suffered from here must have gone to his head when he reached England, and I wonder how Her Majesty the Queen could send for him to form a Government! Then again, Mr Gladstone, who allowed himself to be deceived about the Neapolitan prisoners--he does not know us and Italy--and Mr Cobden,--I knew him in 1847--he is always in favour of peace, and he must be very fond of animals, for when he came here from Spain he wanted me to write to that country and put a stop to bull-fights--a very good man, but I do not know his views about Italy. And Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, do you think he will be employed again? he seemed so anxious to get a place. Mr Disraeli was my friend; I regret him. But tell me, _caro mio Russell_, if you are a prophet, how all this war and fuss is to end?"

I replied, "Your Holiness has better claims to being a prophet than I have, and I sincerely hope all this may end well for Italy; but as regards the present and the past, I must again say that I deeply regret to see your Holiness misconceive the honest views and sincere sympathies of the statesmen you have named, for the welfare of Italy; they would like to see Italy independent, prosperous, progressing and contented, and able to take care of herself without foreign troops. Your Holiness has done me the honour to speak freely and openly with me; permit me to do the same, and ask your Holiness what England must think when she sees the temporal power of your Holiness imposed upon three millions of people by the constant presence of French and Austrian bayonets, and when, after ten years of occupation, the Austrians withdraw suddenly, there is at once an insurrection throughout the country; and if the French were to leave Rome it is generally acknowledged that a revolution would compel your Holiness to seek refuge in some foreign country. At the same time, when the troops of your Holiness are employed as at Perugia,[64] the Government is too weak to control them; they pillage and murder, and, instead of investigating their conduct, the excesses committed by them are publicly rewarded."

The Pope smiled, paused, took a pinch of snuff, and then said good-humouredly: "Although I am not a prophet, I know one thing; this war will be followed by an European Congress, and a Congress about Italian Affairs is even worse for us than war. There will be changes in Italy, but mark my words, whatever these changes are, the Pope will ever be the Pope, whether he dwells in the Vatican or lives concealed in the Catacombs.

"Lastly, I will give you some advice. Prepare and take care of yourselves in England, for I am quite certain the French Emperor intends sooner or later to attack you."

The Pope then beckoned to me to approach, and making the sign of the Cross, he gave me his blessing in Latin, then with both his hands, he took one of mine, pressed it, and said with great warmth, "Be our friend in the hour of need." I have the honour to be, etc., etc.,

ODO RUSSELL.

[Footnote 62: Mr (afterwards Sir) Henry Elliot, P.C., G.C.B.,
was Plenipotentiary to Naples. He was subsequently Ambassador
at Vienna, and died in 1907.]

[Footnote 63: Edmond About, a French journalist (1828-1885),
had published _La Question Romaine,_ an attack on the Papacy.
See De la Gorce, _Histoire du Second Empire_, vol. ii. p.
365.]

[Footnote 64: An insurrection against the Pope at Perugia bad
been put down with great cruelty on the 20th of June.]

[Pageheading: DISAPPOINTMENT OF CAVOUR]

_Queen Victoria to Lord John Russell._

OSBORNE, _18th July 1859_.

The Queen returns these interesting letters to Lord John.[65]

The whole aspect of affairs gives cause for serious reflection and great anxiety for the future.

The conduct of France as regards Italy shows how little the Emperor Napoleon cared for, or thought of, its independence when he undertook this war, which (though in the last instance begun by Austria) _he_ brought on, for purposes of his own.

The manifesto of the Emperor of Austria shows how unfortunate for her own interests the policy of Prussia has been.[66] She had made herself answerable for the issue of the war by restraining the minor states, and stands now humiliated and isolated. Her position in Germany is at present very painful, and may be for the future very dangerous.

The Queen feels strongly that we are not without considerable responsibility in having from the first urged her to take no part in the war, which certainly had great influence on her actions--and she will very naturally look to us not to desert her when the evil hour for her may come.[67]

[Footnote 65: These were letters from Lord Cowley and Sir
James Hudson in reference to the Peace of Villafranca. The
former announced, as a result of his conversation with the
Empress and other persons, that among the causes which induced
the French Emperor to consent to peace were his horror at
any further sacrifice of life and time, disgust at what he
considered Italian apathy for the cause which the French
were upholding, and distrust of the intentions of the King
of Sardinia and Count Cavour. Sir James Hudson described the
unanimous feeling at Turin that the Nationalist cause had been
betrayed. Cavour, he wrote, could obtain no further response
to his remonstrances with Napoleon than "Il fait bien chaud:
il fait bien chaud." Moreover, Napoleon knew (continued Sir
James) "that Mazzini had dogged his footsteps to Milan, for,
the day before yesterday, sixty-six Orsini bombshells were
discovered there by the chief of the Sardinian police, who
arrested the man (a known follower of Mazzini) who had them.
The story is that he brought them from England for the purpose
of using them against the Austrians!!" Count Cavour, who
resigned in disgust and was succeeded by Rattazzi, remained
out of office till the following January.]

[Footnote 66: He stated that he believed he could obtain
better terms direct from the French Emperor than those to
which England, Russia, and Prussia were likely to give their
moral support as a basis of mediation.]

[Footnote 67: Lord Cowley wrote to Lord John Russell on the
20th of July:--

"... The two Emperors met in the most cordial manner, shaking
hands as if no difference had existed between them. As soon as
they were alone, the Emperor of Austria took the initiative,
and stated at once that he was ready to cede to the Emperor
of the French, for the sake of the restoration of peace, the
territory which the latter had conquered, but that he could
not do more, giving the reasons which I have mentioned to
your Lordship in former despatches. The Emperor of the French
replied that his own position in France, and the public
declarations which he had made, rendered something in addition
necessary: that the war had been undertaken for the freedom of
Italy, and that he could not justify to France a peace
which did not ensure this object. The Emperor Francis
Joseph rejoined that he had no objection to offer to the
Confederation which formed part of the Emperor Napoleon's
programme, and that he was ready to enter it with Venetia, and
when the Emperor Napoleon remarked that such a result would be
a derision, if the whole power and influence of Austria were
to be brought to bear upon the Confederation, the Emperor
Francis Joseph exclaimed against any such interpretation being
given to his words, his idea being that Venetia should be
placed on the same footing, in the Italian Confederation, as
Luxemburg holds in the Germanic Confederation....

"In the course of conversation between the two Imperial
Sovereigns, the Emperor of Austria remarked to the Emperor of
the French with many expressions of goodwill, and of a desire
to see the dynasty of the latter firmly established on
the throne of France, that His Majesty took an odd way to
accomplish his end. 'Believe me,' said the Emperor Francis
Joseph, 'dynasties are not established by having recourse to
such bad company as you have chosen; revolutionists overturn,
but do not construct.' The Emperor Napoleon appears to have
taken the remark in very good part, and even to have excused
himself to a certain degree, observing that it was a further
reason that the Emperor Francis Joseph should aid him in
putting an end to the war, and to the revolutionary spirit to
which the war had given rise.

"The Emperors having separated in the same cordial manner in
which they had met, the Emperor of the French himself drew up
the preliminaries and sent them in the evening to Verona
by his cousin, the Prince Napoleon. Being introduced to the
Emperor of Austria, who received His Imperial Highness
very courteously, His Majesty said, after reading the
preliminaries, that he must beg the Prince to excuse him for
a short time, as he had others to consult before signing them.
He then went into an adjoining room where, according to Prince
Napoleon's account, a loud and angry discussion ensued, in
which the Prince distinguished the Emperor's voice broken by
tears, as if His Majesty had been obliged to have recourse to
persuasion, to silence the opposition made to the conditions,
and it was not until some time had elapsed that His Majesty
returned and signed the paper containing them, or rather
I infer that he retained the paper signed by the Emperor
Napoleon, and returned one of similar purport signed by
himself; for among all the curious circumstances connected
with this transaction, not the least curious is the fact that
there does not exist any document recording the preliminaries
with the double signature of both Emperors."]

[Pageheading: INDIAN AFFAIRS]

_Queen Victoria to Sir Charles Wood._

OSBORNE, _23rd July 1859_.

The Queen's attention has been attracted by No. 86 (Foreign Department) of the printed abstracts of letters received from India, relating to the affairs of Bussahir.[68] She would ask Sir C. Wood to consider, with his Council, whether means could not be found for making acts of confiscation, sequestration, spoliation, transfer of Government, or whatever they may be called, dependent upon some formal and judicial proceeding which should secure the Queen from acts being done in her name--which might not be entirely justifiable morally, as well as legally--which should relieve the Government agents from the fearful responsibility of being sole advisers on steps implying judicial condemnation without trial on their mere personal opinion, and from which they derive themselves additional personal advancement in power, position, possibly emolument, etc., etc., and lastly, which would give the people of India security that the Government only acts after impartial judicial investigation and the sifting of evidence.

The Queen would wish a report to be made to her upon this important subject.

[Footnote 68: Bussahir was a State in the upper course of the
Sutlej. In January, the Punjab, including the Sutlej States,
had been made a distinct presidency, but Bussahir was not
finally included until 1862.]

[Pageheading: NON-INTERVENTION]

_Queen Victoria to Lord John Russell._[69]

OSBORNE, _21st August 1859_.

The Queen sends the enclosed draft to Lord John Russell; she is very sorry that she cannot give her approval to it. There are many points in it to which she cannot but feel the gravest objections. It is unnecessary, however, for her to go into these details, as it is against the principle of England volunteering at this moment the intrusion of a scheme of her own for the redistribution of the territories and Governments of Northern Italy, that she must above all protest. Moreover, a step of such importance, reversing the principle of non-intervention, which the Queen's Government has hitherto publicly declared and upheld, should, in the Queen's opinion, not be brought before her without having received the fullest deliberation and concurrence of the assembled Cabinet.

[Footnote 69: A month earlier, on his return from the war, the
Emperor had tried to enlist British support in his scheme for
a European congress. But the Cabinet decided (24th July),
with the Queen's full concurrence, that no answer should
be returned to this proposal, till a Treaty, embodying the
preliminaries of Villafranca, should have been signed.]

_Lord John Russell to Queen Victoria._

PEMBROKE LODGE, _23rd August 1859_.

Lord John Russell presents his humble duty to your Majesty; he begs to explain that with respect to reversing the principle of non-intervention, he has never proposed any such course. If intervention were to mean giving friendly advice, or even offering mediation, your Majesty's Government from January to May would have pursued a course of intervention, for they were all that time advising Austria, France, Sardinia, and Germany.

If by friendly and judicious advice we can prevent a bloody and causeless war in Italy we are bound to give such advice.

If we refrain from doing so, we may ultimately be obliged to have recourse to intervention; that is to say, we may have to interfere against the ruthless tyranny of Austria, or the unchained ambition of France. It is with a view to prevent the necessity of intervention that Lord John Russell advises friendly representations.

[Pageheading: NON-INTERVENTION]

_Queen Victoria to Lord John Russell._

ALDERSHOT, _23rd August 1859_.

... With regard to Lord John's letter of to-day, the Queen wishes merely to say that from the outbreak of the war our negotiations have ceased, and that the war is not over till the peace is concluded. Our interference before that period may be prompted by a desire to prevent a future war; but our first duty is not to interfere with the closing of the present. The desire to guard Italy against "the ruthless tyranny of Austria, and the unchained ambition of France" may produce a state of things in Italy, forcing both to make common cause against her, and backed by the rest of Europe to isolate England, and making her responsible for the issue. It will be little satisfaction then to reflect upon the fact that our interference has been merely _advice_.

[Pageheading: FOREIGN POLICY]

_Viscount Palmerston to Queen Victoria._

94 PICCADILLY, _23rd August 1859_.

Viscount Palmerston presents his humble duty to your Majesty, and begs to state that Lord John Russell has shown him your Majesty's communication, in which your Majesty objects to a proposed despatch to Lord Cowley, on the ground that it would be a departure from the principle of non-intervention which has been publicly proclaimed as the rule for Great Britain in the late events between France and Austria. But Viscount Palmerston would beg humbly to submit to your Majesty that the intervention which all parties agreed that this country ought to abstain from, was active interference by force of arms in the war then going on, but that neither of the great political parties meant or asserted that this country should not interfere by its advice and opinions in regard to the matters to which the war related. Viscount Palmerston can assert that neither he nor any of those who were acting with him out of office ever contemplated giving such a meaning to the doctrine of non-intervention; and that such a meaning never was attached to it by the Conservative Leaders while they were in office, is proved from one end of their Blue Book to the other.[70] The whole course of the Derby Government, in regard to the matters on which the war turned, was one uninterrupted series of interventions by advice, by opinions, and by censure now addressed to one party and now to another. Whatever may be thought of the judgment which was shown by them, or of the bias by which they were guided, the principle on which they acted was undoubtedly right and proper.

England is one of the greatest powers of the world, no event or series of events bearing on the balance of power, or on probabilities of peace or war can be matters of indifference to her, and her right to have and to express opinions on matters thus bearing on her interests is unquestionable; and she is equally entitled to give upon such matters any advice which she may think useful, or to suggest any arrangements which she may deem conducive to the general good.

It is no doubt true that the Conservative Party, since they have ceased to be responsible for the conduct of affairs, have held a different doctrine, and in their anxiety lest the influence of England should be exerted for the benefit of Italy, and to the disadvantage of Austria, have contended that any participation by Great Britain in the negotiations for the settlement of Italy would be a departure from the principle of non-intervention; but their own practice while in office refutes their newly adopted doctrine in opposition; and if that doctrine were to be admitted, Great Britain would, by her own act, reduce herself to the rank of a third-class European State.

[Footnote 70: This was the Blue Book, the production of which
would, according to Lord Malmesbury, have saved the Derby
Ministry.]

[Pageheading: ITALIAN POLICY]

[Pageheading: THE QUEEN AND LORD JOHN RUSSELL]

_Queen Victoria to Lord John Russell._

OSBORNE, _24th August 1859_.

The Queen is really placed in a position of much difficulty, giving her deep pain. She has been obliged to object to so many drafts sent to her from the Foreign Office on the Italian Question, and yet, no sooner is one withdrawn or altered, than others are submitted exactly of the same purport or tendency, if even couched in new words. The Queen has so often expressed her views that she is almost reluctant to reiterate them. She wishes, however, Lord John to re-peruse the two drafts enclosed, which just came to her. If they have any meaning or object, it must be to show to France that it would be to her interest to break in the Treaty of Zurich the leading conditions to which she pledged herself to Austria at Villafranca. Those preliminaries contained but three provisions affecting Austria: (1) That Austria was to cede Lombardy; (2) That an Italian Confederation should be encouraged, of which Venetia was to form part; (3) That the Dukes of Tuscany and Modena were to return to their Duchies. The two latter clauses must be considered as compensations for the losses inflicted in the first. Both the latter are now to be recommended by England, a neutral in the war, to be broken.

Now, either it is expected that our advice will not be listened to, in which case it would not be useful and hardly dignified to give it, or it is expected that France will follow it. If, on finding herself cheated, Austria were to feel herself obliged to take up arms again, we should be directly answerable for this fresh war. What would then be our alternative? Either to leave France in the lurch, to re-fight her own battle, which would entail lasting danger and disgrace on this country, or to join her in the fresh war against Austria--a misfortune from which the Queen feels herself equally bound to protect her country.

As this is a question of principle on which she clearly understood her Cabinet to have been unanimous, she must ask her correspondence to be circulated amongst its members, with a view to ascertain whether they also would be parties to its reversal, and in order to prevent the necessity of these frequent discussions, which, as the Queen has already said, are very painful to her.

[Pageheading: MEDIATION OF LORD GRANVILLE]

_Earl Granville to the Prince Albert._

LONDON, _29th August 1859_.

SIR,--In the middle of last week I received at Aldenham a letter from Mr Sidney Herbert,[71] in which he told me that he had just received a visit from Lord Palmerston, much perturbed and annoyed, saying that the Queen had objected to all Lord John's despatches, and appeared to think that it was objectionable for England to give any advice on the subject of Italian affairs. Mr Herbert gave some good advice to Lord Palmerston, but, from the tone of his letter, I gather that he thought the objections made at Osborne unreasonable. I answered that I entirely concurred with him in the interest of everybody, that no feelings of irritation should exist between the Sovereign and her leading Ministers; that it was possible that the Queen, forgetting how very sensitive Lord John was to criticism, had pulled him up more sharply than he liked, but that I was convinced the objections made were not exactly those mentioned by Lord Palmerston. I heard nothing more till I received on Saturday evening a telegram, summoning me to a Cabinet this day. I came to Town immediately, and saw Lord Palmerston yesterday. I enquired the reason of the sudden summons for a Cabinet. He told me that there had been a discussion between the Queen and Lord John; that the Queen had objected to his (Lord John's) proposal that the despatch of 25th July should be now communicated to the French Government. Lord John had informed him of the fact, and had requested him to communicate with the Queen on the subject. Lord Palmerston then read to me a well-written memorandum on the abstract question of giving advice, which he had sent to Her Majesty. He told me that he had been to Osborne; that the Queen had expressed a wish through Sir Charles Wood that he should not discuss the whole matter with her; that he had had a satisfactory conversation with your Royal Highness, of which he gave me an abstract, which, however, contained his own arguments at greater length than your Royal Highness's. He said that Lord John had made a mistake with respect to the end of the despatch, in which Lord Cowley is desired to withhold it till after the Peace of Zurich was concluded. Lord John gave a different interpretation to it from what appeared to be the case, as described by a previous letter of Lord John, in which he had said that the sentence was added at the suggestion of the Cabinet, and with his entire approval. Lord Palmerston states that the Queen did not feel herself authorised to sanction a departure from what had been decided by the Cabinet, without the concurrence of the Cabinet, and that she thought it desirable, if the Cabinet met, that they should agree on the future policy as regards Italy. Lord John also wished for a Cabinet.

I replied that there seemed to be a double question: first, a difference between the Queen and Lord John Russell and himself; and second, the whole question of our Italian Policy. On the first point I could not but remember the apprehension generally felt at the formation of his first Government; that the feeling between the Sovereign and himself might not be such as to give strength to the Government; that the result, however, was most satisfactory. I was not aware of either the Queen or himself having given way on any one point of principle, but the best understanding was kept up in the most honourable way to both, and that, at the end of his Ministry, I knew that the Queen had expressed to several persons how much she regretted to lose his services. That I most sincerely hoped that there was no chance of misunderstanding now arising; that would be most disadvantageous to the Sovereign, to the public service, to the Government, and, above all, to himself. He interrupted me by assuring me that there was not the slightest chance of this. He repeated to me flattering things said by the Queen at the close of his last Administration, and told me that it was impossible for the Queen to have been more kind and civil than at his visit last week at Osborne. I continued that in Italian matters I believed the Cabinet was agreed. Our language to Italian Governments ought to show sympathy with Italy, and let them know that we were anxious that they should be left free to act and decide for themselves; that it should inform them in the clearest manner that in no case were they to obtain active assistance from us, and it ought to avoid giving any advice as to their conduct, which might make us responsible for the evil or danger which might accrue from following such advice. That our language to France and Austria ought to press upon them in every _judicious_ manner the expediency of doing that which was likely to secure the permanent happiness of Italy, and to persuade them to abstain from forcing upon the Italians, persons and forms of Government to which they objected; nothing like a menace or a promise to be used....

I then saw Sidney Herbert, who told me that Charles Wood's report had entirely changed the aspect of things; that it was clear that the Queen had come to the assistance of the Cabinet, instead of opposing them; that reason had been entirely on her side, and that Johnny had reduced the question now to the single point, which was not of much importance, whether the 25th July despatch should now be communicated or not. He told me that Lord John was in a state of great irritation, and ready to kick over the traces. I dined at Lord Palmerston's, and met Sir Charles Wood and Mr Gladstone. I had some guarded conversation with the latter, who seemed very reasonable. Sir Charles Wood gave me all the information which I required. It appears to me that the really important point is that the whole Cabinet should know the real question between the Queen and her Ministers, and that, if Lord John can find plausible reasons for changing the date of the communication of the despatch, it may be better for the Queen to consent to this. Some of us will take care to have a decided opinion about the future course of our policy.

I presume Sir George Grey will be at the Cabinet, and will be able to report to your Royal Highness what has passed. If he is not there, I will write again. I have the honour to be, Sir, with great respect, your Royal Highness's obedient, humble, and faithful Servant,

GRANVILLE.

[Footnote 71: See Lord Fitzmaurice's _Life of Lord Granville_,
vol. i. chap. xiii.]

[Pageheading: THE QUEEN'S POSITION]

_Earl Granville to the Prince Albert._

PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE, _29th August 1859_.

SIR,--The Cabinet was very satisfactory. Lord John looked ill, and evidently ashamed of much of his case. Many of the Cabinet thought that the despatch of 25th July had not only been sent but communicated. Others attached a different meaning to the closing paragraph than what it appears to bear. Lord John produced a most objectionable draft of despatch in lieu of that of the 25th. It was universally condemned, and Lord Palmerston was empowered to tell the Queen that the Cabinet now thought that the despatch of the 25th might be communicated.

Lords Palmerston and John Russell asked for further powers during the Recess, and recommended that we should give an opinion in favour of annexation of duchies to Sardinia. This was decidedly objected to, and we all professed our readiness to meet again if necessary.[72]

The Cabinet thoroughly understood what had passed between the Queen and her two Ministers, although we could not get Lord John to show us all we required.

Gladstone took me aside after it was over to say that I must have thought him stupid yesterday evening, that now he knew the facts he thought Her Majesty had been put to most unnecessary annoyance. The Chancellor said something of the same sort. I never saw the Cabinet more united.

The Duke of Argyll, Lord Elgin, and Mr Cardwell were absent. I am, Sir, with great respect, your obedient, humble, and faithful Servant,

GRANVILLE.

[Footnote 72: "Pam. asked for fuller powers to act during the
recess, which was met by a general assurance of readiness
to come up by night trains." Lord Granville to the Duke of
Argyll. See the _Life of Lord Granville_, vol. i. p. 358.]

[Pageheading: SARDINIA AND CENTRAL ITALY]

_Queen Victoria to Lord John Russell._

Balmoral, _5th September 1859_.

Lord John Russell will not be surprised if the despatches of Lord Cowley and drafts by Lord John in answer to them, which the Queen returns to him, have given her much pain. Here we have the very interference with advice to which the Queen had objected when officially brought before her for her sanction, to which the Cabinet objected, and which Lord John Russell agreed to withdraw, carried on by direct communication of the Prime Minister through the French Ambassador with the Emperor; and we have the very effect produced which the Queen dreaded, viz. the French Minister insinuating that we called upon his master to do that which he would consider so dishonourable that he would rather resign than be a party to it! What is the use of the Queen's open and, she fears, sometimes wearisome correspondence, with her Ministers, what the use of long deliberations of the Cabinet, if the very policy can be carried out by indirect means which is set aside officially, and what protection has the Queen against this practice? Lord John Russell's distinction also between his own official and private opinion or advice given to a Foreign Minister is a most dangerous, and, the Queen thinks, untenable theory, open to the same objections, for what he states will have the weight of the official character of the Foreign Secretary, whether stated as his private or his public opinion. His advice to the Marquis d'Azeglio[73] is moreover quite open to the inference drawn by Count Walewski, that it is an encouragement to _Sardinia_, to Military intervention in and occupation of the Duchies, and Lord John Russell's answer hardly meets this point if left as it stands at present; for "the _name_ of the King of Sardinia,... _the chief of a well-disciplined army_," will have little influence unless he is prepared to use that army.

The Queen must ask Lord John to instruct Lord Cowley to state to Count Walewski that no opinions expressed on Foreign Policy are those of "Her Majesty's Government" but those which are given in the official and regular way, and that Her Majesty's Government never thought of advising the French Government to break the solemn engagements into which the Emperor Napoleon entered towards the Emperor of Austria at Villafranca.

The Queen asks Lord John to communicate this letter to Lord Palmerston.

[Footnote 73: Massimo d'Azeglio, Sardinian Commissioner in the
Romagna. He had been Prime Minister of Sardinia from 1849 till
1852, when Cavour, who had been in his ministry, succeeded
him.]

[Pageheading: ENGLAND INVOLVED]

_Queen Victoria to Lord John Russell._

BALMORAL, _6th September 1859_.

The Queen returns Lord Palmerston's letter, together with the other papers sent to her, to Lord John. She is glad to find that he thinks that no answer ought to be given to Count Persigny, but she thinks it important that it should be _stated to him that no answer can be given_. Unfortunately, here has been again the Prime Minister declaring that he _quite agrees_ with the French Ambassador, but that the proposal should come officially from France to be placed before the Cabinet. The inference must be that the Cabinet and the Queen will, as a matter of course, agree also, when it is so submitted. Now what is it that Lord Palmerston has approved? A plan for an alliance of England with France for the purpose of _overruling_ Austria, if the Duchies in which she is the heir, and to which the Archdukes were to return in accordance with the stipulations of Villafranca, were given to Sardinia and Austria should object. It is hoped indeed that this will not immediately lead to war with her, but France is to expect that she will not be left to fight single-handed for an object declared to be more English than French! Thus we are dragged step by step into the position of a party in the Italian strife. The Queen thinks it incumbent upon her not to leave Lord John Russell in ignorance of the fact that _she_ could not approve such a policy reversing our whole position since the commencement of the War.

The Queen must leave it to Lord John to consider how far it would be fair to his colleagues in the Cabinet to leave them unacquainted with the various private steps lately taken, which must seriously affect their free consideration of the important question upon which they have hitherto pledged themselves to a distinct principle.

_Queen Victoria to Viscount Palmerston._

BALMORAL, _6th September 1859_.

The Queen returns to Lord Palmerston his correspondence with M. de Persigny. Lord John Russell will have sent him her letter to him on this subject. She has nothing to add, but to repeat her conviction of the great danger and inconvenience arising out of such private communications, and the apprehension she must naturally feel that the attempt to convince the Emperor Napoleon that it would be for his interest to break his word to the Emperor of Austria should reflect upon the honour of the Queen's Government. She must insist upon this being distinctly guarded against.

[Pageheading: LORD JOHN RUSSELL'S CRITICISMS]

_Lord John Russell to Queen Victoria._

ABERGELDIE, _7th September 1859_.

Lord John Russell presents his humble duty to your Majesty; he cannot refrain from making some remarks on your Majesty's letter of yesterday.

Lord Palmerston appears to have answered M. de Persigny by saying that he personally agreed with him, but that the proposition he had sketched must come from the French Government; that it must come from them officially, and it would then have to be maturely considered by the Cabinet.

Lord John Russell sees nothing to object to in this language. It might be embarrassing to Lord Palmerston if such a proposition were to come from France, and were to be rejected by the Cabinet. But Lord Palmerston could easily explain the matter to M. de Persigny. Lord Palmerston does not appear to have committed your Majesty, or Lord John Russell, or the Cabinet in any way.