Chapter XIV: Section II: Adam Ferguson

Adam Ferguson is the author of a work on moral and political philosophy, and also of some historical books, which will be noticed elsewhere.¹ He was appointed to the chair of moral philosophy in the University of Edinburgh in 1764, an office which he held, with some intervals of absence, till the year 1785. In 1766, he published an outline of his lectures for the use of his class, and from these heads and notes he explained his system orally to the students, always keeping his mind open for the reception of whatever new light might dawn upon it. After his retirement from the professorship, he rearranged his lectures into a systematic form, and published them in 1792, under the title of _Principles of Moral and Political Science_. In his preface he says:――“Many, no doubt, may be conscious, that in a continued pursuit of the same subject for so long a time, they themselves could have done better; but in this, it is to be regretted, that they have not done so: For in this field there is room for many labourers; and the subject, though never new, is always interesting. It is so in the specimen of every particular life; in the history of every particular age or nation, and even in the lucubrations of every faithful transcriber of what nature suggests.

¹ He was a son of the minister of Logierait, and was born in
1723. Having passed through the arts classes at St. Andrews,
he came to Edinburgh to study for the Church in 1742.
Thus he became one of the literary coterie consisting of
Robertson, Blair, Home, Carlyle, Hume, and others, who were
then students in the University, or living in Edinburgh. In
1745, he was offered a chaplaincy to the 42nd Regiment――“The
Black Watch,” and though only twenty-two years of age, and
having only completed two sessions of the divinity course,
he obtained ordination from the General Assembly on account
of his high testimonials. He accompanied this regiment to
the battle of Fontenoy, and was with difficulty prevented
from rushing into action with a broadsword. He remained
with his regiment till 1754, and obtained much influence
over the Highland soldiers; he took a keen interest in
military matters, and gained a knowledge of them which was
afterwards of use to him as a historian. He gave up the
idea of becoming a minister, as he felt that he had not the
requisite qualities for a popular preacher.

Having returned to Edinburgh, he was appointed to succeed
Hume as Librarian of the Advocates’ Library in 1757; but
after a few years, he resigned this post, and became tutor
to the sons of Lord Bute. In July, 1759, he was appointed
to the chair of natural philosophy in the University of
Edinburgh, and by the month of October he was ready to meet
his class, which drew from Hume the remark, that “Ferguson
had more genius than any of them, as he had made himself
so much master of a difficult science――viz., natural
philosophy――which he had never studied but when at college,
in three months as to be able to teach it.” He occupied
this chair for five years, and it is recorded that he gave
universal satisfaction, by rendering his subject attractive
and popular. He published a short summary of his course
for the use of his class.――Sir A. Grant’s _Story of the
University of Edinburgh_, Volume II., pages 349, 350.

A contemporary and friend of Ferguson’s says of him:――“He
was the son of a Highland clergyman, and had the pride and
spirit of his countrymen.... He had the manners of a man
of the world, and the demeanour of a high-bred gentleman,
insomuch that his company was much sought after; for though
he conversed with ease, it was with a dignified reserve....
He had another talent, unknown to any but his intimates,
which was a boundless vein of humour, which he indulged when
there was none others present, and which flowed from his pen
in every familiar letter he wrote.”――_Autobiography of the
Rev. Dr. Alexander Carlyle_, pages 281‒283. 1860.

“Although, therefore, an author may have been preceded by men of distinguished ability in former or in present times, it implies no degree of arrogance to follow even such reapers, in gleaning materials from this inexhaustible field of reflection, on which mankind have been employed from the beginning, and on which they will continue to be employed to the end of time.”

This work consists of two parts. The first treats of the most general phenomena in the nature and state of man, and extends to three chapters, which consecutively explain Man’s place in the scale of Being; Mind, or the characteristics of Intelligence; and Man’s Progressive Nature. Each of these chapters is divided into a number of sections, in which many important questions and interesting subjects are examined and discussed with rare candour and ability. The third chapter is especially attractive, as it explains the gradual progress and organisation of human society, the influence of habit, the progress of political and commercial arts, the pursuits and attainments of science, the fine arts, and the progress of moral apprehension.

The second part contains six chapters, which, under the following headings of a moral and political character, expound the Specific Good incident to Human Nature; the Fundamental Law of Morality, and its immediate Application and Sanctions; Jurisprudence, or Compulsory Law; Touching the Defences of Men; Moral Action, and the characteristics of a virtuous and happy Life; and, finally, Politics. Of these chapters, the first, the second, and the fourth are the most interesting, and present a body of well-digested information and reflection.

Ferguson was a well-informed man, and fairly equipped with a knowledge of the science of his time, as his method and conceptions clearly manifest. His moral ideas were distinct and comprehensive; his conception of human progress was accurate; and he approached nearer to the modern idea of a gradual development of human society and political institutions than any of his predecessors. Although, in some points, he was a follower of Hutcheson and Reid, in others he rose above them, especially in his admission of the idea of perfection in morality, and generally in his grasp of reality and of principles.

For instance, he says:――“Mind, we have reason to believe, predominates in nature; so that, in a comprehensive survey of all that exists, whatever is not mind, would be as nothing.... The essence of Almighty God we must conceive as most simple, being that which necessarily exists from eternity. Of His supreme intelligence, we have full evidence in the system of nature, and of His distinguishing the opposite conditions of moral good and evil, there is equally irresistible proof.”¹

¹ Volume I., pages 31, 129.

The following sentences will give an idea of his method:――“Most subjects in nature may be considered under two aspects――under that of their actual state, and under that of a specific excellence, or aspect, of which they are susceptible. Under the first, they are subjects of mere description, or statement of fact; under the second, they are objects of estimation or contempt, of praise or censure. In respect to what men have actually done or exhibited, human nature is a subject of history and physical science. Considered in respect to the different measures of good and evil, of which men are susceptible, the same nature is a subject of discipline and moral science. In treating of man, as a subject of history, we collect facts and endeavour to conceive his nature as it actually is, or has actually been, apart from any notion of ideal perfection or defect.

“In treating of him as a subject of moral science, we endeavour to understand what he ought to be; without being limited, in our conception, to the measure of attainment or failure, exhibited in the case of any particular person or society of men.

“To have an object or purpose, and to employ means for the attainment of it, is the distinctive condition of mind or intelligent being; the first implies will and choice; the second implies energy and power. For man, therefore, to know his province, and to be qualified for his station, requires equally that he should be acquainted with the foundation of both.”¹

¹ Volume I., Introduction, pages 1, 2.

Thus the method of investigation in the study of human nature, according to Ferguson, is in the first place to ascertain, on the most comprehensive and exhaustive scale, what man actually has been in the past and what he is now; and then, upon this knowledge, to frame a more reasonable conception of the improvable capacity of man, a juster idea of what he ought to be, and to devise more available and effective moral means for advancing the progress, the happiness, and the perfection of mankind. He insists much on this view, and often returns to it throughout his work.

In accordance with his progressive conception of man, Ferguson at once discarded Hobbes’ theory that the state of nature was a continual war. He argues that “a child may be considered apart from his parent, and the parent apart from his child; but the latter could not have existed without the former. And if we trace human society back to its simplest state, even there the society was real――resting upon the fundamental feelings of human nature; and if we trace human thought back to its simplest exertions, even there it was an exercise of understanding and some effort of invention or skill.” He also rejected the contract theory of the origin of government, and argued consistently for the historical view of the gradual growth and development of society.¹

¹ Volume I., pages 190‒197, _et seq._

Ferguson discussed the standard of morality at length, and also the supreme end. He admitted only a qualified and limited value to utility as a moral principle, and the same with regard to sympathy. Utility appeared to him to resolve the distinction of right and wrong into a mere difference of tendency or external effect in the actions of men. He avers that sympathy is also inadequate as the principle of moral approbation, and argues on some points conclusively against Smith’s theory; but he fully recognised that sympathy is an important factor in the social nature of man.¹

¹ Volume II., pages 57‒115, 117‒126.

His own view of the principle of moral approbation is announced thus: ――“It is the idea of perfection or excellence which the intelligent and associated being forms to himself, and to which he refers in every sentiment of esteem or contempt, and in every expression of commendation or censure.”

If it be said that mankind are not agreed on this point, his reply is:――“The idea of perfection no doubt may be associated with subjects divested of merit; but notwithstanding the effect of such association in warping the judgment, virtue is approved as the specific perfection or excellence of man’s nature; and as no one ever inquired why perfection should be esteemed, it is difficult to conceive why we should look for any other account of moral approbation than this.”¹

¹ Volume II., page 134.

In many parts of his work the ideal conception of a progress towards perfection is touched upon and illustrated. “Perfection is nowhere to be found short of the infinite mind; but progression is the gift of God to all His intelligent creatures, and is within the competence of the lowest of mankind.... Men of humble capacity may learn to think justly on these subjects; and as far as wisdom depends on a just conception of familiar objects, it is the nature of created mind in the course of experience and observation to improve its sagacity and to make a continual approach to the highest measure of intellectual ability of which it is susceptible.... But the virtue of goodness, whether operating in mere innocence or in beneficence, is surely improvable if not actually acquired by habit.”¹

¹ Volume II., page 403.

In reference to the fundamental laws of morality, Ferguson taught “that the first law of morality, relating to the mind and its affections, requires the love of mankind as the greatest good to which human nature is competent.” If it should appear, however, that mankind are not agreed as to the kinds of external actions that flow from this principle, nor in the choice of what to expect from the beneficent, it may be asked by what rule is the friend of mankind to conduct himself? His general reply to this question is to the effect that mankind in reality do not often mistake the pernicious for the useful, nor the destructive for that which tends to their own preservation; and so the beneficent man has little difficulty in determining what is in him, a natural effect of benevolence or of goodwill to his fellow-creatures.¹

¹ Ferguson died in 1816, having lived to the great age of
ninety-three years.