Chapter VI

THE GERMAN RETIREMENT
_March to July 1917_

The excitement caused by the news of the enemy’s retirement may well be imagined. The very idea of marching into his trenches without being fired at seemed almost too good to be true, and the possibilities opened up by the thought of marching for miles behind them appeared incalculable. One was very apt to forget during those first few days that the retirement was being carried out “according to plan,” which meant that we could not pursue bald-headed the moment that we received news.

REPRODUCTION OF A FRENCH POSTCARD OF PÉRONNE AFTER GERMAN EVACUATION
IN MARCH 1917. (WITH CRUDE TRANSLATION!)
]

It was not, in fact, until March 20 that we received orders to move to billets at Péronne, which town had been entered by the 143rd Infantry Brigade on the previous day. The march through “No Man’s Land,” Biaches, and over the pontoon bridge, just finished by the Royal Engineers at Bazincourt, was one of exceptional interest. The area had been completely cleared of all stores by the enemy before his departure, and the most that one saw, in the way of material left behind, was a few coils of barbed wire. Péronne presented the most awful of pictures, being completely wrecked and a large portion of it still burning. An earthquake could not have produced a more appalling effect or a scene of greater chaos. House fronts in many cases had been blown completely out and had fallen right across the street, so that one looked from the street straight into the rooms of the houses. These rooms were bare of all furniture, every stick of which had been either carried away by the enemy or sent to Berlin as souvenirs. Everywhere lay huge masses of rubble and paper, and the work of tidying up appeared to be well-nigh hopeless. The only two buildings which remained more or less intact were the Town Hall and the Castle, and these we guessed must be mined. Battalion Headquarters were, however, billeted in the Castle for that night, and the remainder of the Battalion in cellars on the north-west side of the square. These cellars were selected, not from any idea of possible bombardment, but because they provided the only shelter left, and there was less fear of a wall falling on one there than above ground.

At 6.30 a.m. on March 21, B, C and D Companies moved off to relieve the 1/8th Battalion Royal Warwickshire Regiment in the outpost line, which then lay some three miles east of the town and embraced Doingt, Doingt Woods and Courcelles Wood, from a point about 500 yards south of Bussu to the Cologne River. In the afternoon, Battalion Headquarters and A Company moved up from Péronne, the former taking up quarters in Doingt.

In the evening, a flying column, known as “Ward’s Column,” and composed, roughly speaking, of one Infantry Brigade, drawn from elements of all Brigades in the Division, moved forward through the outpost line to Cartigny.

The line, which we took over on the 21st, remained the Divisional line of resistance until the 26th, though places well forward were occupied and held by us during this period. With the exception of a few Uhlans who were at times visible in the distance, no enemy was seen, and we were given a great opportunity of practising, in real earnest and yet without molestation, open warfare, which was a complete novelty to us. Mounted officers were enabled to visit their outposts on horseback, and the free and open life, after trench warfare, was thoroughly appreciated. On the evening of March 26 we moved forward to Tincourt, taking over billets there from the 1/4th Battalion Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry. This village had not been completely demolished like the others, chiefly because it had been used by the enemy as a dumping ground for civilians, who had been collected there from all farms and villages in the neighbourhood. Our excitement at finding them was great, as they were the first we had seen.

The following day, March 27, the Battalion took over the outpost line, which now ran from Roisel (captured by 1/4th Battalion Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry) to Villers-Faucon (exclusive), Battalion Headquarters being at Hamel. At 5.30 in the afternoon, the 5th Cavalry Division attacked and captured Villers-Faucon. At 7 p.m. that part of the line covering Roisel was handed over to the 2/4th Battalion Lincolnshire Regiment (59th Division), and B Company were dispatched to Villers-Faucon to assist the cavalry, who, in taking this village, had met with considerable opposition from the enemy rearguards, and suffered a number of casualties from their machine guns.

The following day the enemy shelled the village pretty heavily with 77 mm’s, and 5·9’s, and after dark the cavalry were withdrawn, being relieved by C Company. There can have been few darker or wetter nights than this one. Telephone lines were cut, and communication forward entirely broke down, owing to the difficulty of finding Company Headquarters in the dense darkness. Strong patrols were sent forward at dawn to ascertain whether the enemy were still holding St. Emilie, and they were found to be there in considerable numbers.

In pouring rain on the 29th March, the Battalion marched back to Cartigny at dusk, on relief by the 4th Battalion Gloucestershire Regiment. Here we became part of what had been called “Ward’s Column,” but was now known as “Dobbin’s Column.” After four happy days with this column the Battalion was moved to Longavesnes, relieving the 1/4th Battalion Gloucestershire Regiment in Brigade reserve. This village, which had been attacked and captured by the 143rd Infantry Brigade on the 26th, was absolutely devoid of any accommodation or shelter, so completely had it been wrecked by the enemy and our shells.

On April 5, at 2 a.m., we marched to the railway cutting between Villers-Faucon and St. Emilie, acting as reserve to the remainder of the Brigade, who were to capture the villages of Lempire, Ronssoy and Basse-Boulogne (Map No. 2), attacking as follows:

1/4th Battalion Royal Berkshire Regiment, south and south-east of
Ronssoy and Basse-Boulogne;

1/4th Battalion Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry, south-west end of
Ronssoy;

1/5th Battalion Gloucestershire Regiment, the work-house, Lempire and
Basse-Boulogne.

Each of these battalions carried out the attack with three companies, keeping one in battalion reserve. Zero was at 4.45 a.m. The operation was completely successful, all objectives being taken, together with over thirty prisoners and six machine guns. The German dead numbered over 200. The prisoners, who belonged to the 237th Infantry Regiment, stated that one platoon from each of their companies had been holding the villages, but owing to our active patrolling the alarm had been given at 11 o’clock that night and the support platoons had been brought into the picquet line. They had received no orders to withdraw in case of a heavy attack, and had been told to hold the position to the last. All had the greatest confidence in the impregnability of the Hindenburg Line, and, though they were obviously tired of the war, their _moral_ was not bad. They said that the Hindenburg Line near Bony had been occupied since the 28th of last month, and that their next outpost line ran in front of Tombois Farm and Malakoff Farm.

The Battalion moved back into Villers-Faucon for the remainder of the day, officers being sent up to reconnoitre the new line, with a view to relieving the 5th Battalion Gloucestershire Regiment that evening. The outpost line was held by A and B Companies, the 1/4th Battalion Royal Berkshire Regiment being on the right, and 1/6th Battalion Royal Warwickshire Regiment on the left. C Company were in support in cellars in Basse-Boulogne, and D Company in reserve with Battalion Headquarters in the railway cutting, just south of the Lempire-Epehy Road. The transport and quartermaster’s stores had at this time been moved to the neighbourhood of Villers-Faucon.

No counter-attack developed on that night or the two succeeding ones, during which the Battalion held that line, and companies were occupied in consolidating the whole position, which it was decided should be the future Divisional line of resistance.

On the evening of April 7 we were relieved by the 1/7th Battalion Worcestershire Regiment, and marched back to cellar accommodation in Marquaix. Work was here concentrated on roads which the enemy had done everything in his power to make impassable. Additional parties were sent up to the outpost line on most nights, to help the forward battalions in the work of wiring and digging of new trenches.

PÉRONNE CHURCH.
]

RONSSOY SUGAR FACTORY.
]

On April 15 the Battalion took over the line again, receiving orders at the same time that we were to attack Tombois Farm on the following night. (See Appendix I A.)

This farm lay on the southern side of the Lempire-Vendhuille Road (Map No. 2), midway between the two villages, and about 1,000 yards from our nearest sentry post. At dusk on April 16, A Company (Captain N. S. Reid, D.S.O., M.C.) took over the whole of the Battalion outpost line, relieving B and C Companies for the attack. On our right, the 1/4th Battalion Royal Berkshire Regiment were to capture Gillemont Farm, and on our left, the 1/5th Battalion Royal Warwickshire Regiment were to attack Catelet Copse and Le Petit Priel Farm.

C Company (Captain J. B. Hales) had orders to form up just west of Sart Farm, and to direct their attack south and south-east of Tombois.

B Company (Lieutenant M. Bowen) were to form up on the northern side of the Lempire-Vendhuille Road, clear of Lempire, and to deliver their attack on the west and north of the farm; D Company (Captain R. Gregson-Ellis) to proceed in echelon behind C Company, occupying the trench in front of the farm, until satisfied that the leading companies had attained their objectives, when they were to go through and capture a small ridge lying some 200 yards beyond the farm.

Zero was fixed for 11.30 p.m., April 16.

The weather conditions could not conceivably have been more unfavourable for a night attack, over open country, with few landmarks. It was pitch-dark, with pouring rain, and a gale blowing in the direction of the enemy. That the attacking companies were able to find their forming-up position in such darkness was a creditable performance; that they should have kept direction and struck Tombois speaks very highly for their leaders.

At 11.45 p.m. the enemy opened with machine-gun and rifle fire, and sent up a great number of lights from the farm and the trenches on either side of it. They also put down a moderate barrage well behind our attack, mostly on the outskirts of Lempire and on Sart Farm. All companies encountered a thick belt of wire in front of the enemy positions, which were strongly held, C and D Companies both being held up by this wire, which it was impossible to negotiate in face of the heavy enemy fire. All D Company’s officers had become casualties, and at 12.30 a.m. Captain Hales decided to withdraw both companies to Sart Farm, and reform them there for another attack.

Meanwhile B Company, on the left, had attracted rather less rifle and machine-gun fire than the other two companies, and had succeeded in getting through a thinner belt of wire and penetrating the enemy trenches at a point just north of where the trench crossed the road.

In consequence of the failure of the two right companies, and in view of the fact that at that time no news had been received at Battalion Headquarters of the success of B Company’s attack, three platoons of the support company (1/5th Battalion Gloucestershire Regiment) were ordered to advance on the farm, one platoon each side of the road and one in close support, in order to ascertain the situation as regards B Company and, if necessary, to attack. They arrived at the farm to find B Company in possession, but the enemy still holding out in the orchard south of the farm. Our men were finding considerable difficulty in clearing the orchard owing to the fire of the other two companies who had been held up.

MAP Nº. 2.

ATTACK ON TOMBOIS FARM
NIGHT 16/17 APRIL 1917.
]

By 3 a.m., however, both farm and orchard were clear, and a counter-attack, launched by the enemy down the road, was successfully broken up by B Company. C and D Companies, who had now reorganised, were at once sent up to help in the work of consolidation, and trenches were dug west of the road and north and east of the farm, Major A. B. Lloyd-Baker going forward to organise this work.

News was received that the 1/4th Battalion Royal Berkshire Regiment and 1/5th Battalion Royal Warwickshire Regiment had both failed to reach their objectives, on account of wire and heavy enemy fire.

At daylight on April 17, the Battalion was holding three or four hundred yards of trench on either side of the farm, with no sign of the enemy. Strong patrols were sent out to right and left, with orders to occupy every position possible, and by 7.30 a.m. one of these patrols, consisting of a platoon of Gloucesters, succeeded in entering Le Petit Priel Farm with little or no opposition. Another patrol from A Company (holding the old line), which had been sent forward to ascertain the left of our new line, found Catelet Copse unoccupied. This they reported to the nearest picquet of the Warwicks, who moved up and occupied it.

It would seem that at dawn the enemy, realising that he had lost Tombois, had decided to withdraw from the objectives which the battalion on our left had fought hard all that night to gain.

At least thirty dead Germans were found in and around the farm, and our captures were nine prisoners with one machine gun. Our casualties were:

_Officers._—Wounded. Capt. R. Gregson-Ellis
(died following day).
2/Lieut. J. Jack.
2/Lieut. N. S. Flint.
2/Lieut. B. C. C. Olivier.
2/Lieut. R. F. Chatham.

_Other ranks._—Killed—18.
Wounded—48.

The strengths of the attacking companies had been:

B Company—4 officers and 136 other ranks.
C Company—3 officers and 125 other ranks.
D Company—4 officers and 134 other ranks.

The following message was received from the Army Commander, General Sir H. Rawlinson:

“Please convey to 48th Division my admiration of their success last night. To have carried out a successful attack, on a wide front, in the midst of such a storm, reflects the highest credit on all ranks and especially on the leadership of subordinate commanders. My best congratulations and thanks to all troops engaged.”

Tombois Farm, and the road running from the farm to Lempire, were shelled throughout the day, making our occupation of the new position and communication with the rear most unpleasant; but relief, in the shape of the 1/5th Battalion Gloucestershire Regiment, arrived that evening, and we tramped back, very wet and weary, to a camp in the neighbourhood of St. Emilie, only to be moved again two days later to huts and billets in Villers-Faucon.

Numerous mines, laid by the enemy in his retreat, had recently exploded in this village, the 1/6th Battalion Gloucestershire Regiment being unfortunate enough to lose the whole of their Battalion Headquarters, including their Commanding Officer, 2nd in Command, Adjutant, Intelligence Officer, Medical Officer, and a Chaplain attached to them. The mine exploded underneath a large cellar where these officers were all sleeping together. The Commanding Officer and Adjutant were brothers who had come out with the Division in 1915, and had become well known and popular. The result of this mishap was an order, issued by Division, that no officers were to live in billets in the town, and huts were erected to house them.

On the 24th and 25th April the 144th Infantry Brigade made further attempts to capture Gillemont Farm, and these eventually proved successful. With this exception, no further active operations were undertaken by the Division in this area, and at the end of the month the Division was relieved, the Battalion marching back via Hamel to billets at Mons-en-Chaussée. Here we had ten days’ strenuous training, though as usual this was partly interfered with by large working parties, which had to be provided about every other day for road-mending and filling up craters.

Those officers who were unable to ride—and there were at this time quite a number—will not have forgotten their first experiences on a horse in the fields behind this village. The Commanding Officer had been working up a “hate” for a considerable time against these unlucky individuals, and as he determined to be himself the riding master, the blow fell with full force. The result, however, was splendid, and a month later all officers in the Battalion were able to ride after a fashion.

Our ration strength at this time had fallen to 570 other ranks, and though we were hoping to receive reinforcements here, none arrived. Our officers numbered twenty-five, but many of them were always attending courses, of which a large number were held continuously.

On May 11 the Battalion started on the first of a series of daily marches up to a part of the line which we had not yet visited. These marches, which took us through Flamicourt (one night), Cléry, Maurepas (one night), Combles, Sailly-Saillisel, and Le Transloy (one night), were of exceptional interest, embracing as they did such a large part of the old Somme battle-fields. The roads had been entirely remade by the British Army and were excellent, but with this exception the whole country was one great stretch of shell-craters. Over all these acres and acres of ground there was hardly a yard into which a shell had not fallen. The sites of the villages through which we passed were marked only by heaps of rubble, with a few charred tree-trunks standing like weary sentinels over them. A smell of dead pervaded the whole atmosphere.

On the night of May 14 we relieved the 7th Battalion South Staffordshire Regiment, 33rd Infantry Brigade, 11th Division, in the line between Hermies and Demicourt, the 143rd Brigade taking over the line on our left and the 1/4th Royal Berkshire Regiment on our right.

The Division spent nearly two months in this sector, the 143rd Brigade and 144th Brigade relieving each other on the left, and the 145th Brigade carrying out its own reliefs on the right. As regards the latter, two battalions held the line, a third was in support round the village of Beaumetz, while the fourth battalion was in reserve in Vélu Wood. The line held by the Bucks Battalion ran for the most part just in front of the village of Hermies, and consisted of a series of disconnected strong posts, separated from the enemy trenches by fifty yards on the right and some 300 yards on the left. The Germans were occupying the Hindenburg Line, their front trenches running mostly along the eastern side of the Canal du Nord, just in front of the village of Havrincourt, while opposite our left their line ran forward so as to include a large spoil-heap. This mound formed a magnificent stronghold for them and was a source of continual annoyance to us, harbouring as it did several machine-gun nests with splendid observation over our lines.

Our right post, well known as R3, was situated on either side of the Hermies-Havrincourt road, behind an old prisoners’ cage which had been erected by the Germans before their retirement. Parties were at work nearly every night during the whole of our period in this area, digging trenches through and around this cage, to the intense displeasure of the platoon commander in charge of the post, who always had the most harrowing tales to tell in the evening of the hell which the garrison had endured in R3 during the day! The post certainly caught the bulk of the enemy trench-mortar and grenade fire, largely because of the close proximity of the two front trenches, which were practically separated only by the canal.

Artillery fire on points behind the lines was active on both sides, the chief targets for the enemy being the villages of Hermies, Demicourt and Beaumetz.

Aeroplane bombing, chiefly by night, was becoming increasingly popular with the enemy, and one bomb, which fell on the quarters of a field ambulance in Beaumetz, caused a number of casualties.

Our machine-gunners contracted a habit of pouring thousands of rounds of small-arms ammunition into enemy country each night, hoping no doubt to inconvenience the enemy infantry to an even greater extent than our own!

Only one operation, and this a small one, was undertaken by the Battalion during its tenure of these trenches. It had become apparent at the beginning of June that the enemy had established a night post amongst a cluster of bushes on our bank of the canal. The sniping from this post caused us considerable annoyance and some casualties to our working parties. It was therefore decided to capture it, and to dig a trench along the bank of the canal with a communicator running back to our present post. Two platoons of B Company (Captain M. Bowen, M.C.) were detailed to make the attack, forming up on a line parallel to the canal bank, each platoon being in two lines at fifteen yards’ distance and on a frontage of fifty yards. Zero was fixed for midnight June 7/8, at which time a barrage from one section of field guns was placed on the enemy trenches. At zero plus five this barrage lifted, and the assaulting platoons charged with the bayonet. The enemy opened rifle fire before the assault, but was most effectually silenced by a Lewis gun posted on the right bank for the purpose of providing covering fire. This fact was confirmed by an _Unteroffizier_ taken prisoner, who declared that the Lewis-gun fire forced them to take shelter behind the bank, and that the next thing they knew was that the English were on top of them. After the assaulting platoons got in there ensued a bombing fight which lasted for a few minutes, but the enemy soon gave in. No attempt at a counter-attack was made, but rifle grenades were fired from the opposite bank at intervals throughout the remainder of the night.

The report of this operation was afterwards issued for circulation throughout the IVth Corps, with the following minute added:

“_To 20th Division, 48th Division, Corps Mounted Troops, Corps Schools._

“The Corps Commander considers this report should be circulated down to company and battery commanders, as it is a good example of the co-operation of all arms and of covering fire. The action of the Lewis guns in driving the enemy to take cover and thus letting our troops get in is especially good.”

Our casualties were two killed and nine wounded. Eleven prisoners were taken by us and several of the enemy killed. The prisoners belonged to the 41st Infantry Regiment and stated that the previous artillery activity had led the picquet to expect an attack, and they had been ordered to maintain the greatest vigilance. They believed that the post in question was to have been finally withdrawn the following day as being tactically unsound. The average _moral_ and physique of these men was second-rate, and they declared that the longing for peace in all classes was intense, the more so as it was firmly believed that the war would end in a draw. One of these prisoners was of special interest, as he had been on the Russian front in March, where he said there had been much fraternising between Germans and Russians, to such an extent indeed that whenever artillery shoots were planned each side warned the other of the danger zone to be avoided.

Another prisoner, who was a N.C.O., stated that the cage which has been mentioned above was called by them “Russenlager” (Russian Camp), because Russian prisoners used to be interned there within the danger zone, as an act of retaliation on the practice attributed to the English and French of requiring German prisoners to work within the range of German artillery.

On July 3 the Division was withdrawn from the line, the Battalion being relieved by the 4th Battalion Royal Fusiliers, 9th Brigade, 3rd Division. After a halt for one night at Vélu, we marched the two following days via Bihucourt, Achiet-le-Grand, Adinfer and Ransart to Bailleulval, where the most strenuous training was undertaken. Rumours of an offensive to be started by the British Army in the Ypres area had for some time been persistent, and it became increasingly evident during the first few days of our stay in this village that the Battalion was earmarked to take part in it.

Seconds in Command of battalions were detailed to attend a course at the XVIIIth Corps School, with a view to learning the general scheme of the operations and the rôles that the various Divisions in the Corps were to play in them. Points which required further training were brought out, but the special feature of the preparation was that every man should not only know his own job thoroughly but also be made acquainted with the jobs of all units near him, and not be “in the dark,” as had been largely the case on previous occasions. In other words, secrecy was to be to a great extent sacrificed with the hope of gaining greater efficiency.

Various changes were made in the headquarter staffs of battalions in the Brigade, and we had most regretfully to part with Major A. B. Lloyd-Baker, who was transferred to the 1/4th Battalion Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry as 2nd in Command, Captain P. A. Hall, M.C., being promoted to fill his place as our own 2nd in Command.

Two drafts were received on July 12 and 15, one of 196 other ranks and the other of 43 other ranks, which brought the Battalion ration strength up to about twenty-five officers and 920 other ranks. Two most instructive and interesting lectures were delivered by Major Hall, on his return from the Corps School, to all officers and N.C.O.’s, and in these he was able to state definitely the proposed objectives of the 48th Division.

The Second and Fifth Armies were to attack along the whole of their fronts. Our XVIIIth Corps was in the Fifth Army, and included the 11th, 39th, 48th, and 51st Divisions. So far as this Corps was concerned, the initial attack was to be made by the 39th Division on the right and the 51st Division on the left, with the 48th Division in reserve on the right and 11th Division in reserve on the left.

The Corps front ran roughly from Wieltje to the Ypres-Staden railway. The final objective on the first day was to include Pilkem Ridge on the left and St. Julien on the right, from which line the other two Divisions (11th and 48th) were to continue the attack, immediately guns could be got forward.

Every arrangement appeared to be so thoroughly thought out that it seemed impossible that the attack could be anything but a complete success, the results of which would eventually give us back the whole Belgian coast and, with any luck, finish the war.