Chapter II

HÉBUTERNE
_June 1915 to June 1916_

There followed a series of three night marches, via Vieux-Berquin, Merville, Busnettes, to Allouagne, which lies five miles west of Béthune. The night’s march of June 26/27, from Vieux-Berquin to Busnettes, was a particularly unpleasant one, for we moved as a Division, and those who have taken part in a divisional march, on a dark night, will know that the constant but inevitable checking is apt to become very tiring. In addition, we arrived at Busnettes to find that a Brigade which should have left those billets that evening had decided not to move, with the result that we were forced to bivouac in a very damp orchard for the remainder of the night. We were far too weary to grouse, however, and were quite compensated the following morning on finding ourselves surrounded by cherry trees, the fruit on which was quite ripe. Colossal deals were at once done with the natives, and there were but few cherries left in the neighbourhood when we marched off.

The billets at Allouagne were the best we had yet seen, and quite a happy fortnight was spent here. Training was strenuous and carried out mostly in a neighbouring wood, called the Bois de Maraquet. This wood was said to resemble closely one with which we were to have more serious dealings, and many sinister rumours got about in regard to it.

On the morning of July 8, 1915, the Brigade rose early and lined a portion of the Lillers-Chocques road, down which Lord Kitchener was to pass together with Field Marshal Lord French and the Prince of Wales. Four cars passed hurriedly by. These well-known officers were probably inside them.

On the 12th, the Battalion was moved in to bivouacs close to Nœux-les-Mines, every man available during the two succeeding days being put on to digging a new rear line. It was quite thought that the Division was to take over new trenches in these parts, but not a bit of it: on July 16 we suddenly got orders to move, and marched the whole of that night, in a deluge of rain, to billets in Lières, passing again within a stone’s throw of Allouagne. Everyone was wet through after the first twenty minutes, and, as the whole march occupied six hours and the rain was continuous, our entry into Lières may well be pictured. Night marches had previously been carried out more or less in silence, but at the end of some two hours of this march, word was passed down the line that the men could sing. Instead of having a really good grouse, and declaring that they were of course allowed to sing when the conditions were such as to make any lightheartedness impossible, they saw only the humour of the situation and sang lustily for several hours.

Our probable destination entirely baffled us, and there appeared good grounds for believing any, or all, the following rumours which were at this time prevalent: (1) The Dardanelles, (2) Dunkirk, (3) Ypres, (4) attachment to the French at Arras. The fourth appeared the least probable, as we were marching so very hard in the opposite direction. However, on the 18th this situation became a trifle less obscure, as we were put into a train at Berguette, in which we slowly proceeded to Doullens. A two hours’ march from here took us to some woods at Marieux, where we arrived at 4 a.m. to bivouac.

On July 20, the Division started to relieve the French in the line in front of the village of Hébuterne, the Battalion being in reserve, with two companies at Sailly-au-Bois and two companies at Bayencourt. Both these villages were then a mass of flies, owing to the general filth everywhere, and, as the weather was extremely hot, life in these billets was none too pleasant.

The trenches, which the Battalion took over on July 24, lay some 100 to 300 yards east of Hébuterne, and were at this time good and quiet. Unlike the front line at Ploegsteert, where the trenches consisted of sand-bagged barricades, these trenches were dug down about 6 feet deep all along. The parapets were low, and consequently little visible to the enemy. What there was of them had no pretence of being bullet-proof, though this was apparently a matter of small importance, bullets being so rare owing to our line being anything from 300 to 1,000 yards distant from the Boche trenches.

Our dugouts had the outward appearance of real luxury, owing to a large portion of the furniture of Hébuterne having been imported into them. Four-poster beds existed in quite a number, but owing to the quantities of small vermin and mice which had made their homes in them, they proved to be most undesirable, and were almost all scrapped before we had been a week in the line.

For the first fortnight the Division was supported by French guns, with apparently no shortage of ammunition. Their gunners were most obliging, and took endless trouble to do everything in their power for our front-line infantry. If asked to retaliate when our front trenches were being heavily shelled, they would throw at least three times as many shells back—and then ring up to know if we were entirely satisfied with their work. Satisfied indeed—we revelled, for the first time in our lives, in the sight of the Boche receiving far more in return than what he had hurled at us.

Brigade and Battalion headquarters were both in the village, and for some time occupied quarters above ground, though they were compelled eventually, when the shelling of the village became more frequent, to take to cellars and dugouts.

Company cookers were housed in the village, and from them all food was carried up to the front line through communication trenches.

The Battalion in Brigade reserve occupied billets above ground in Hébuterne, and of this one company was detailed as garrison of a large portion of the village defences, in case of attack. This company had considerably the best of the billets, living in what was known as the “keep,” a really charming spot amongst orchards and trees; and all those who were then present with the Battalion and still live will cherish happy memories of it.

As will be gathered, it was a very quiet war that was waged round Hébuterne when we first arrived, there being a tacit agreement, between ourselves and the Germans opposite, that provided they would leave Hébuterne quiet, we would not entirely destroy Gommecourt, and again, if they decided to leave Sailly alone, we in our turn would keep our hands off Bucquoy and Puisieux. For all that, it was not pleasant to reflect on the fact that, should the enemy choose, he could perfectly well destroy our billets, and with them ourselves, in the short space of an hour. What actually occurred was a gradual warming up of artillery fire on the villages by both sides, and it became just as gradually evident that life above ground was not only unwise, but exceedingly foolish, with the result that, after several months’ work, dugouts had been constructed for the entire garrison of Hébuterne.

COY. H.Q. IN THE “KEEP” AT HÉBUTERNE.
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HÉBUTERNE CHURCH, 1915.
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During the first six weeks, reliefs of this sector of the front line, by the 5th Battalion Gloucestershire Regiment and ourselves, took place every eight days. These reliefs were really only notable on account of one particular incident, which created not a little feeling at the time, and has for ever since been the cause of constant good-natured banter between the two Battalions concerned.

When the 5th Gloucesters took over the front line from the French, the latter were generous enough to hand over to them, with the line, a good milking cow, which was duly passed on to us on our taking over the front line. It transpired afterwards that the Gloucesters surrendered the cow to us not because they regarded her as belonging to the Battalion which happened to be in Hébuterne (as we considered should be the case), but because they thought she would not appreciate the continual move to and from Sailly, where the rest billets lay. After some four weeks of this periodical change of ownership, instead of our being sent back to Sailly on relief, we were only sent as far as the western outskirts of Hébuterne, so that the field wherein the cow grazed lay just midway between the Gloucester headquarters and our own. Now came the trouble—the Gloucesters discovered the cow to be dry every morning at the usual milking hour. Accusations poured forth against our Adjutant, and he alone is able to say whether these were justified. In any case the cow was never again handed over to us, on taking over the line, and it is believed that she eventually died of excessive exercise taken between Sailly and Hébuterne, and from the overanxiety on the part of all ranks in the Gloucesters to extract their full share of milk. This at any rate was our explanation of her disappearance, though it is by no means certain that it will accurately coincide with the official account to be given by that Battalion.

Throughout the six months during which our Battalion held K sector, patrolling was most active; this was very necessary if we were to prevent the enemy establishing control of the extensive “No Man’s Land” which lay between us. With the exception of a Z-shaped hedge, known as the Z hedge, which lay out in front of the left company, “No Man’s Land” was very featureless. This hedge, however, provided no end of excitement, for it was most difficult at night for either side to locate and dislodge a party which had got out first and taken up a position in it. But the enemy were seldom, if ever, permitted to do this owing to our constant patrolling, and after some months they gave up all except periodical visits.

Having gained supremacy of the hedge at night, it proved of some value to us in pushing larger patrols along it towards the German lines. On one night Captain N. S. Reid, who had previously carried out some daring patrols, succeeded in reaching the enemy wire and crawling into it with his party. Four German sentries could be distinguished along a stretch of about 80 yards of trench. Gradually our patrol approached one of the sentries, who was occupying a sap-head which we knew as “Y” sap. The sentry challenged when our men were within a few yards of him. For answer Captain Reid fired his revolver, and the sentry was seen to fall across his parapet. An excited buzz of conversation rose from the trench, and while this was going on our patrol was able to retire into some dead ground before the enemy opened rapid fire. Eventually our men returned without a casualty, having ascertained accurately the position of at least four German sentry posts.

OUR TRENCHES IN FOREGROUND. GOMMECOURT WOOD IN BACKGROUND, WITH Z
HEDGE IN FRONT OF IT.
]

REST BILLETS, COUIN.
]

About September, the 5th Gloucesters took over the trenches on our right, and from then onwards to December we were relieved by the 6th Battalion Gloucestershire Regiment (144th Infantry Brigade) every eight days. Each Battalion, on relief went back some four miles to the village of Couin. There was nothing particularly attractive about this village on the hill, but owing to the regularity of our visits to it and the duration of our stays there, we became almost part of the place, with the result that we became fond of it.

On the way back to these billets from the trenches during the evening of January 27, 1916, the Commanding Officer, Lieutenant-Colonel C. P. Doig, D.S.O., sustained severe injuries through a fall from his horse, and Major L. C. Hawkins assumed command.

Towards the middle of the month the Battalion had to bid good-bye to K sector. We had done so much work on it in the way of defence and comfort that the order came as a bitter blow, the more so as the trenches we were to take over were in the last state of decay and were rapidly falling in everywhere. They lay more to the S.E. of Hébuterne, in very much lower ground than K sector.

We were warned that a bad state of affairs existed in this, G sector, and were told that the Battalion had been singled out for bettering it. The result was that every man was out to do his utmost with the spade and show some substantial improvement, and it was not long before a very marked change had been effected, and life was made a little more possible. But it must be admitted that when frost gave way to heavy rains, it became impossible to keep every trench in the sector open, and on several occasions long lengths of even the front line became impassable. Our efforts to keep open the communication trenches Jena, Jean-Bart and Vercingétorix were positively heart-rending, and the results achieved, even in good weather, were in no way proportionate to the amount of work put on to them.

In addition, the enemy artillery became daily more active, and their shooting, which was most exceptionally good, accounted for quite a number of casualties, including amongst the killed Captain J. W. Backhouse and 2/Lieutenant R. B. Furley, the last-named having only joined us two weeks previously.

During the period that the Battalion held G sector, the enemy undertook several raids, though on no occasion did he succeed in entering the Battalion’s trenches. All these raids were preceded by extremely heavy bombardments, usually of about an hour’s duration. In one of these attacks, which the Germans delivered at 2 a.m. on March 19, they employed a great number of gas shells, but owing to the amount of practice the men had been given in adjusting their gas helmets quickly, these shells did us little harm; in fact, in one way they did us good, as the bombardment tended to increase our confidence in gas helmets for the future.

In this same bombardment, the use and importance of yet another protective appliance was brought out for the first time. This was the steel helmet, which had not as yet been made a general issue, but which had been sent to us in very small quantities to test and report on. Two men who were wearing these helmets had them struck by large fragments of shell. In one case the helmet was merely badly dinted, and in the other, although the steel was ripped open, the shell fragment lost its sting and failed to penetrate the man’s head.

In all these bombardments our trenches invariably suffered considerably, the more so when _Minenwerfers_ were employed in large numbers, as these shells made the most gigantic craters, which completely obliterated all traces of dugouts and trench.

At the beginning of April the Battalion was relieved in G sector, and took over trenches between G and K sectors. These were better but by no means good.

LT.-COL. F. O. WETHERED, C.M.G., V.D.
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LT.-COL. C. P. DOIG, D.S.O.
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LT.-COL. L. C. HAWKINS, T.D.
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Fighting patrols, with the coming of better weather, were now sent out more frequently, and brisk fighting in “No Man’s Land” resulted. The most successful of these were undertaken by B Company (Captain L. W. Crouch), and were carried out under the leadership of Captain H. V. Combs. The main road from Hébuterne to Puisieux ran through this company’s line across “No Man’s Land.” At some distance before it reached the German line a sunken road branched from it. This road also crossed the enemy trenches. In the sunken road, close to the junction and about 100 yards from the German front line, were sixteen poplar trees. Our reconnoitring patrols had heard the enemy digging here at night very regularly, and it was considered a good opportunity for a fighting patrol to take up a position before the enemy’s working party came out, and engage them with fire, while another party endeavoured to cut off their retreat.

Captain Combs with twenty-one N.C.O.’s and men reached the Sixteen Poplars soon after 7 p.m. on March 6. At 10 p.m. some Germans came up, entered the Poplars and started to work with shovels. No scouting had been carried out by them previously, which made it appear that some further enemy party had done this without being seen by our patrol. The latter was now split up, one party being sent to engage the workers with bombs, the other being sent down the road to intercept the enemy should they retire.

Everything worked according to plan, except that a larger number of the enemy existed in the Poplars than had been seen to enter them. Efforts were made to get them to surrender before bombing, but they preferred to fight. Our bombs played havoc in their midst, and caused those who remained to fly down the road towards their line. Our second party further diminished their numbers, L/Cpl. R. Colbrook, Ptes. J. Goldswain and H. Hazzard standing in the middle of the road to hold up the rush. Of the Germans who escaped the bullets and bayonets of these men the majority made off across country in a southerly direction. Large parties of the enemy now appeared from out of their wire, but our patrol were able to save themselves just in time from being overwhelmed. As a result of this encounter, at least twenty of the enemy were killed, while our casualties consisted of three slightly wounded.

Efforts were made to repeat this performance the following month, Captain H. V. Combs going out during the evening of April 1 with 2/Lieutenant R. Aitken and twenty-five other ranks. On this occasion the Germans were before us, and in much larger numbers. A great fight ensued and casualties occurred on both sides.

The following account of the action appeared in the VIII Corps summaries of April 3 and 4:

_April 3._—“A patrol of two officers and twenty-five other ranks advanced during the night of April 1/2 in the direction of the Sixteen Poplars, with the intention of intercepting or capturing an enemy patrol. The enemy, apparently becoming early aware of this patrol, sent out a strong party of fifty men to oppose them. Our patrol after putting up a good fight retired safely behind our wire. Our casualties were four killed and two wounded, all of whom were brought in. Casualties to the enemy are unknown, though several of the bombs and rifle grenades fired were seen to burst well amongst them.”

_April 4._—“With reference to the patrol report in yesterday’s summary, attention is drawn to the fact that the enemy were robbed of any possible identification by the calmness and resource shown by the patrol in getting back the killed and wounded to our trenches. The behaviour of all ranks was excellent. The withdrawal was slow and deliberate, and the men were well in hand.

THE 1ST BUCKS BATTALION CEMETERY, HÉBUTERNE.
]

“Although it is difficult to distinguish one man’s services from another, Sergt. W. J. Baldwin, L/Cpl. Goldswain, and L/Cpl. Jennings are deserving of special notice. Although Sergt. Baldwin was wounded, not only did he assist in carrying back one of the dead men, but came back again to help the covering party, when the enemy were almost on top of them. During the fight, several of the grenades which were thrown amongst the enemy caused considerable havoc, loud cries and groans being heard.”

Our killed included L/Cpl. R. Colbrook and Pte. H. Hazzard, both of whom had distinguished themselves in the previous fight.

In May 1916, the Battalion was withdrawn from the front area, and sent back to rest at Beauval, where a fortnight was spent before moving to Agenvillers for a week. The most strenuous training was undertaken at these two places, and all manner of attacks practised, with a view to the coming British offensive.

During the march from Beauval to Agenvillers on June 2, the Commanding Officer, Lieutenant-Colonel L. C. Hawkins, was unfortunate enough to meet with a similar accident to that which befell Lieutenant-Colonel Doig, being thrown from his horse and seriously damaging his shoulder. Major L. L. C. Reynolds then assumed command, Captain A. B. Lloyd-Baker being appointed second in command.

On June 9, we moved back to the line, and held the Hébuterne trenches during the preparations for the coming big offensive. But for these operations it had been decreed that the 48th Division was to be in VII. Corps reserve, with the result that zero day (July 1, 1916) found us no nearer to the line than Couin Woods.