Chapter XI

RAIDS
_July to October 1918_
_Reference Map No. 4_

Very shortly after the Austrian attack the Division was relieved in the line by the 7th Division.

The 145th Brigade remained in the mountains for a week longer than the other two Brigades, acting as an additional reserve to the 7th Division in case the Austrians should venture to renew their attempt. But the situation soon became perfectly normal, and on June 30, at 12.30 in the morning, the Battalion marched to the Centrale district in the plains.

Two days later we moved again to billets at Grumo and Cereda. Here an intensely hot fortnight was passed, the heat during the day frequently reaching over 90° in the shade, and we were by no means displeased when we received orders to return to the mountains, and to relieve the 23rd Division in the right sector of the British front.

On July 19 the Battalion reached Granezza. This tour in the line proved to be one of exceptional activity, and ended with the astounding collapse of the Austro-Hungarian army.

Artillery action was considerable and constant on both sides. The Austrians, whatever their other failings may have been, were by no means to be despised as gunners, their shooting being extremely accurate.

Raids on the enemy’s lines were of an almost nightly occurrence along the British and French fronts, the raiding parties usually consisting of one or more battalions. They met with a large amount of success on nearly every occasion, chiefly owing to the fact that the more often we raided, the more men did the enemy put into his front line, so increasing his casualties from our barrage and providing more prisoners for us to round up.

On August 8 and 9 raids were carried out on the enemy’s trenches along practically the whole British and French fronts. These proved entirely successful and several hundreds of prisoners were taken, while but few casualties were incurred by the raiding troops.

Preparations and plans for these raids were organised with the very greatest care, and worked out to the smallest detail. This was in all cases the secret of success.

On the night August 26/27, the Battalion, in conjunction with the 1/4th Battalion Royal Berkshire Regiment, carried out one of these raids, for which the full orders are given in Appendix Ic, with a view to showing the amount of detail to be dealt with. The object of the raid was to kill or capture the garrison of the Austrian trenches in the neighbourhood of Sec and Ave (Map No. 5). Owing to the absence of Lieutenant-Colonel L. L. C. Reynolds, D.S.O., on leave, the general plan of the raid was worked out by Major P. A. Hall, M.C., though the former returned in time to arrange the details.

The boundary between the 1/4th Royal Berkshire Regiment and the Bucks Battalion was the road running through the Austrian line midway between Sec and Ave, our Battalion’s right boundary being the Clama-S. M. Maddalena road. We had the assistance of four 18-pounder batteries, 4·5 and 6-inch howitzers; and French ·77’s also engaged selected targets.

MAP Nº. 5.

AREA RAIDED ON NIGHT 26/27 AUG. 1918.
]

At zero (10.40 p.m., August 26) the 18-pounders put down a barrage on the enemy front line for five minutes. At zero plus five minutes the two right batteries lifted on to the sunken road for nine minutes, while the two left batteries first lifted for four minutes on to the group of dugouts north-east of Lone Tree House, and then on to the dugouts about S. M. Maddalena for five minutes, lifting again at zero plus 14 to form a protective barrage beyond.

The two right batteries at zero plus 14 lifted on to the portion of enemy front line facing south-east (between Sec and the Clama road) for eight minutes, when they, too, finally lifted off the area to form a protective barrage beyond.

The Battalion formed up behind the Midway House ridge. The point of entry for the whole Battalion was the trenches between Lone Tree House road and Sec, the enemy’s front trenches to the right facing south-east being taken in reverse in the last phase.

Three platoons of A Company (Captain J. E. Firminger) were responsible for the front line between Sec and Lone Tree House, and the fourth platoon for the dugouts north-east of Lone Tree House.

Closely following the barrage D Company (Captain B. C. Rigden, M.C.) passed through A Company, two platoons dealing with the remainder of the dugouts north-east of Lone Tree House, the other two platoons those dugouts round S. M. Maddalena.

B Company (Lieutenant A. L. Brightman) and C Company (2/Lieutenant P. T. Herbert) had a more difficult task. C Company and two platoons of B Company passed through A Company, and moved along the west side of a communicator running north from Sec. Along this they formed up in two lines facing east. The first line took the dugouts in the sunken road, while the second line passed through the first, taking the front-line trench between Sec and the Clama road from behind. The other two platoons of B Company remained outside the front line until the barrage had lifted clear, when they entered the front line just left and right of the sunken road.

The whole attack went according to programme. The 18-pounder barrages were perfect on all lines. The timing of “lifts” could not have been better. The wire in front of the front-line trench proved a serious obstacle, and the leading company had a good many casualties in getting through it.

The front line was strongly held, the garrison putting up a good fight with rifle and machine-gun fire. When our leading platoons, however, closed with the bayonet, the enemy mostly surrendered.

At Sec, a machine gun was captured and the crew shot. A deep dugout, found about fifteen yards west of the sunken road, refused to divulge its occupants. A smoke bomb changed their ideas and no fewer than thirty eventually swarmed out, but as they brought their arms with them, the majority got killed.

The platoons that went to S. M. Maddalena found but few of the enemy there.

The attack on the sunken road and front line facing south-east went without a hitch. The former was found to be full of dugouts, and a large number of Austrians were killed or taken prisoner.

The signal to withdraw was given at 12.30 a.m. The withdrawal was carried out according to programme, and as far as could be then ascertained all our casualties had been brought in.

The enemy barrage was at no time very heavy, and the Austrian infantryman showed but little inclination to fight.

Prisoners taken amounted to about 165, while the number killed was estimated to be at least 150, and even more if one was to judge from the number of men who returned with bloody bayonets.

Our casualties were:

_Officers._—Wounded. Capt. J. E. Firminger.
Lieut. A. L. Brightman.
2/Lieut. L. W. G. Lorns.
2/Lieut. F. W. Blackmore.
2/Lieut. F. J. Wilcox.
2/Lieut. F. P. Bates.

_Other ranks._—Killed—4.
Wounded—75.
Wounded and prisoner—1.
Missing—4 (afterwards presumed killed).

The raid carried out by the 1/4th Royal Berks on our right was equally successful.

The Commander-in-Chief sent the following message:

“Please convey my hearty congratulations to men of Bucks Battalion and 1/4th Royal Berks, and to Brigadier-General Watt and staff, on their gallant, well-planned and successful raid. The results are of the greatest importance in ascertaining the enemy’s intentions.”

Several decorations were awarded to the Battalion for this operation, the Commander-in-Chief himself presenting the medal ribbons at Granezza.

During the next six weeks trench life, combined with a few days’ periodical rest at Granezza, continued uninterruptedly.

On August 27, Brigadier-General D. M. Watt, D.S.O., handed over command of the 145th Brigade to Brigadier-General W. W. Pitt-Taylor, C.M.G., D.S.O., but the latter was shortly afterwards appointed B.G.G.S. of the XIVth Corps and Brigadier-General G. W. Howard, C.M.G., D.S.O., then assumed command of the Brigade.

About this time all brigades throughout the British Force in Italy were reduced to three battalions. The 1/5th Battalion Gloucestershire Regiment was consequently taken from the 145th Infantry Brigade and dispatched to France.

On October 3, Major P. A. Hall, M.C., was appointed to command the 1/7th Battalion Royal Warwickshire Regiment. He had, except for short intervals, been with the Battalion ever since mobilisation, and had rendered it invaluable service.

Captain P. L. Wright, M.C., was now promoted to fill his place as 2nd-in-command.

In connection with these changes on the Battalion Headquarters staff, it is worthy of record that no little success had been attained by the officers who originally embarked with the Battalion, or joined it very shortly afterwards. The original senior company commander, then Captain Reynolds, had assumed command of the Battalion early in 1916, and had commanded continuously ever since. Promotions to 2nd-in-command had invariably been made from officers within the Battalion. In addition, three of our officers had been appointed to command other battalions, and two others appointed as 2nds-in-command of other units, whilst four others had received staff appointments.

The 48th Division was now the only British Division holding the line, as the 23rd Division had shortly before been relieved on our left by troops of the 12th Italian Corps. It had been intended to send the 23rd and 7th Divisions to France, but the situation changed, and finally all three divisions remained in Italy.

RESERVE BATTALION H.Q., KABERLABA N.
]

THE C.-IN-C. PRESENTING MEDALS TO THE BATTALION AT GRANEZZA, AUGUST
1918.
]

At the beginning of October, the British Commander-in-Chief accepted the command of a mixed Italian-British Army, with a view to undertaking offensive operations on the Piave. The 7th and 23rd Divisions, being at this time in reserve, were to form part of this new Army, while the 48th Division, in order to make as little apparent change as possible, were to remain on the Asiago plateau, passing temporarily under the command of General Pennella, commanding XIIth Italian Corps.

When raids were not taking place, the sector, and more especially our headquarters at Kaberlaba North, was peaceful enough, but raids on the enemy lines now became more and more frequent, the French on our right being particularly successful.

The following figures show the number of prisoners captured during October by means of these raids:

October 3:
6th Battalion R. Warwickshire Regiment 149
October 10:
7th Battalion Worcestershire Regiment 35
French Battalion 300
Italians 10
October 23:
1/4th Battalion Gloucestershire Regiment 210
3 Battalions French 700

On the night October 28/29, the Bucks Battalion raided the area Sec—S. M. Maddalena—Cassordar, full of hope, and anxious to beat all records in prisoners. The result was a disappointment. The whole area was found to have been completely evacuated by the enemy, who had that very night at dusk withdrawn to a line 3,000 yards in rear. This line was sited at the foot of the mountains which rose from the northern edge of the plateau. The enemy had been working on it for the past three months, and we had learned from prisoners that it was to be their position for the coming winter and was called the “Winter Stellung.” One wretched Austrian had been left behind in the old line to loose off Verey lights, and he formed our only capture.

The discovery of the retirement was, however, most important. The following day, patrols sent out by the battalion holding the front line gained touch with the enemy at the Winter Stellung, the town of Asiago being occupied by the British.

The enemy’s retirement, coupled with his diminishing _moral_ and the fact that our attack had opened successfully on the Piave, made it clear that the time was now ripe for dealing him a decisive blow.

For this we now waited expectantly.