Chapter IX: Part 9

‘Fourthly, The death of my said lord of Orleans was so sudden that no true Christian can say it was not damnable to those who committed the crime, as well as to those who had commanded it.

‘Fifthly, I shall demonstrate clearly, that our opponent did not cause the late duke of Orleans to be murdered for any good purpose, nor for the public welfare, but solely through ambition and covetousness, from a lust of power, and in order to make his dependants rich, and from the great hatred that had been long fostered at his heart.

‘Sixthly, That the death of the late duke of Orleans was not sufficient for our adversary, but that he has exerted himself to the utmost to blast and scandalize his memory by defamatory libels, and by supporting traitors and murderers. This regards the second part of my discourse.

‘In respect to my third point, I shall produce six arguments, in opposition to the six false accusations brought by our adversary against the late duke of Orleans, and which shall clearly prove the innocence of the defunct. Such will be my third division.

‘I have thus shown you my three divisions. The first regards justice,—the second declares the malice of our adversaries,—and the third exonerates the late duke of Orleans from the false charges brought against him. Before I proceed further, I must here solemnly declare, that I intend not to say any thing but the exact truth, or to advance more than has been enjoined me by my foresaid lady of Orleans, and my lords her children.

‘It is true, indeed, that the defender of our adversary has very unadvisedly called my late lord of Orleans criminal, although he has no way proven it; nevertheless I shall not use this expression in speaking of our adversary, though I repute all murderers criminal, and him in particular, not from any suspicion, but from the confession made by himself; and as wisdom conquers malice, according to the holy Scriptures, it will be sufficient for me to name the adverse party, the party of Burgundy; for it will be better that I first demonstrate the crimes, and then show the duke of Burgundy guilty of them, than to follow his example, and call him criminal without any proof or verification. I shall now, having divided my subject into three divisions, enter on my first point, which treats of the justice of the king, and quote the words of the prophet which say, ‘Justitia et judicium præparatio sedis tuæ.’ These words are in the lxxviiith Psalm, and declare to the king that his throne is founded on justice and judgment. I shall quote in regard to my second division, which relates to the malice of our adversary, the very words his defender made use of, namely, ‘Radix omnium malorum cupiditas, quam quidem appetentes erraverunt a fide.’ These words are taken from the first epistle of St Paul to Timothy, in the last chapter, and which mean, That covetousness is the root of all evil, and causes a defalcation from the faith.

‘In regard to my third division, respecting the innocence of the late duke of Orleans, I shall use the words of the Psalmist in the seventh Psalm, ‘Judica me secundum justitiam tuam et secundum innocentiam meam super me;’ that is to say, Do me right according to thy justice, and judge me according to my innocence.

‘I shall now return to my first point, and repeat the words of the Psalmist, ‘Justitia et judicium præparatio sedis tua.’ This expression I may address personally to the king our lord, in saying, ‘Justice and judgment are the foundations of thy royal throne;’ for royalty without justice is undeserving of the name, and should be called a robbery according to St Austin, in the 10th chapter of his 9th book, ‘De Civitate Dei:’ ‘Regna, inquit, remota a justitia, quid sint nisi magna latrocinia.’

‘It appears, therefore, that the king is bound to do justice to all his subjects, and to preserve to every one his right, and that for the six reasons touched upon at the beginning of my speech,—my first reason being founded on the regard due to the royal dignity, which dignity has been instituted principally in order to do justice, the king being truly, in respect to his subjects, what a shepherd is to his flock, as Aristotle says in his 8th chapter of ethics, or in the 5th of his politics, on the government of cities; and it is also declared, in his book on the ruling of princes, that they are bounden to preserve justice.

‘‘Justitia inquit regnantis utilior est subditis quam fertilitas ipsius;’ which means, That the justice of the governing powers is more advantageous to the subject than fertility or riches. The Psalmist, on this matter, says, ‘Honor inquit regis judicium diligit;’ that is, The honour of the king loves justice and judgment. The justice here spoken of is nothing else than to preserve to every one his right, which is also declared by the emperor Justinian, in the first book of his Constitutions.

‘‘Justitia est constans voluntas unicuique jus suum tribuens,’ meaning, That justice is firm and stable, giving to every one his due; and it should be considered that justice is not to be administered according to pleasure, but as the written laws prescribe. Weigh well, therefore, how much you are bounden to do justice.

‘To you, then, my lady of Orleans and her children address themselves, requiring from you justice, which is the brightest jewel in your crown. Recollect the numerous examples of kings, your predecessors, who so much loved justice, and particularly that bright instance of a king, who seeing that his son had deserved, by the laws of that time, to lose both his eyes, ordered one of his eyes to be put out, and had at the same time one of his own destroyed, that the law might not be violated nor infringed.

‘Valerius also mentions, in his 6th book, a king called Cambyses, who commanded a false judge to be flayed, and his skin to be placed on the judge’s seat, and then ordered the son of the late judge to sit on the skin of his father, telling him, ‘When thou judgest any cause, let what I have done to thy father be an example to thee; and let his skin, forming thy seat, always keep thee in remembrance.’

‘O, king of France! thou rememberest what David said, when king Saul unjustly persecuted him, ‘Dominus inquit retribuet unicuique secundum justitiam tuam;’ that is to say, The Lord God will repay every one according to his justice. These words are written in the second chapter of the first book of Kings.

‘Thou oughtest, therefore, like a true follower of our lord, to do in like manner according to thy power, and aid and support such as have been unjustly wounded and persecuted. Thou canst not have forgotten, how Andronicus, a cruel murderer, was condemned to death on the spot where he had slain the high priest, as it is written in the book of Machabees.

‘O, king of France! take example from king Darius, who caused those that had falsely accused the prophet Daniel to be thrown into the lion’s den to be devoured. Recollect the justice that was executed on the two elders who, from false charges, had accused and condemned Susanna. These examples are written in the sixth and fourteenth chapters of the book of Daniel the prophet, and ought to stimulate thee to do justice as king and sovereign,—for it is in doing thus that thy subjects will be obedient to thee, and in such wise art thou bound to do them justice, and which will cause them to be highly criminal when disobedient to thee.

‘Some indeed have doubted whether the subject may not withdraw his allegiance from the sovereign on a refusal of justice and equity. May it please thee, therefore, sire, to consider this well, for thou wilt not have any thing to fear in doing justice, as I shall hereafter demonstrate; and in conclusion of this my first reason, I shall quote the words of the third chapter of Job: ‘Cum justitia indutus sum, et vestivi me vestimento et diademate in coronatione mea;’ that is to say, I am clothed with justice, and have invested myself with it, as the robe and diadem of my coronation.

‘Consequently, most noble prince, I say that fraternal love ought greatly to urge thee to do justice; for I do not believe that greater love ever existed between two brothers than what you both felt. Be then the true friend to thy brother in justice and judgment; for it will be the greatest disgrace to thee and to the crown of France, throughout the world, if justice and reparation be not made for the infamous and cruel murder of thy brother. It is now time for thee to show thy brotherly affection; and be not like to those friends spoken of by the wise man, in the 8th chapter of Ecclesiasticus, as follows: ‘Est amicus socius mensæ et non permanebit in die necessitatis.’ That is, There are friends who are companions at table, and in prosperity, but who are no longer such in the day of adversity.

‘At this moment, necessity and affection united call upon thee to prove thyself such a friend that the world may not call thee a faint hearted friend, of whom Aristotle speaks, in his 9th chapter of ethics: ‘Qui, inquit, fingit se esse amicum, et non est; pejor est eo qui facit falsam monetam.’ A faint friend is worse than a coiner of base money. Should some tell thee, that our opponent is of thy blood, and thy relation, thou oughtest, nevertheless, to abominate his crime, and do strict justice between two friends, according to what Aristotle says, in his second book of ethics: ‘Duobus existentibus amicis, sanctum est præhonorare virtutem.’—That is, It is praiseworthy to give the preference to virtue between two friends.

‘Thou rememberest the strong love that subsisted between thee and thy brother; not that I wish to obtain any favour by that remembrance, but solely to exhort thee to justice and truth. Alas! it would be of little value the being son or brother to a king, if such a cruel murder were passed over without any punishment inflicted on the guilty, nor any reparation made for it,—more especially as he who caused his death ought to have loved him as a brother; for in the holy Scriptures nephews and cousins-german are called brothers, as appears from the book of Genesis, where Abraham says to his nephew Lot, ‘Ne sit jurgium inter te et me, fratres enim sumus.’ Let there be no strife between thee and me, for we are brothers.

‘Saint James is also called the brother of our Lord, when they were only cousins-german. Thou mayest repeat to our adversary the words which God said to Cain, after he had murdered his brother, ‘Vox sanguinis fratris tui clamat ad me de terra.’ The voice of thy brother’s blood cries to me from the earth; and certainly in our case the earth and blood do cry.

‘There cannot be a man of common feelings who has not compassion for such a death as that of my late lord of Orleans; and it must not be wondered at if I compare our adversary to Cain, for in them I see many features of resemblance. Cain, moved by envy, slew his brother, because the Lord had accepted of his brother’s offerings, and had not received his sacrifice, because he was practising in his heart how he could kill his brother. In like manner, the duke of Burgundy, because my lord of Orleans was the more agreeable to the king, in his heart meditated his death, and in the end had him treacherously and infamously murdered, as shall be fully proven. As Cain, instigated by covetousness, committed his crime, so our adversary, urged on by similar passions, did the act we complain of, as shall be demonstrated from his conduct previous to and after the death of the late duke of Orleans. I find, likewise, that the word _Cain_, by interpretation, signifies, ‘acquired’ or ‘acquisition.’ By the same name our adverse party may be called, for vengeance is acquired by the king in body and goods; but let justice take its course, and events will happen according to the good pleasure of God. It therefore seems very reasonable that I compare the duke of Burgundy to Cain.

‘Sire, remember, I pray thee, the words addressed to Cain, namely, ‘Vox sanguinis:’ The voice of thy brother’s blood. It is the voice of the lady of Orleans, and of her children, crying to thee, and demanding justice. Alas! my lord king, to whom wouldst thou wish to do justice, if thou refusest to do it for the love of thy own brother? If thou be not a friend to thy blood, to whom wouldst thou be a friend, seeing we ask no more than justice? O, most noble prince, consider that thy brother has been torn from thee for ever! Thou wilt never again see him, for the duke of Burgundy has cruelly caused him to be put to death.

‘Recollect he was thy brother, and thou wilt find how greatly he is to be compassioned. He, like thee, was equally fond of the queen and thy children, and, from his natural good sense, honoured all the royal blood of France; and few could be found more eloquent than he was when addressing nobles, clergy or laymen.

‘Our Lord had given him what king Solomon had demanded, prudence and wisdom; for every one knows, that he was adorned with an excellent understanding,—and of him may be said as of David, in the chapter of the Acts of the Apostles,—‘Sapiebat sicut angelus Domini.’ He was endowed with wisdom like to an angel of God.

‘Were I to speak of the beauty of his person, I could only say, that he was thy image and resemblance, with this good quality that he was perfectly courteous to all, and never caused any one to be beaten, or put to death, nor did he ever procure the death of any one. He possessed, however, the power of so doing, even to his enemies, who were notoriously defaming him, and attributing to him evils which he never thought of: he could, more especially, have had our adversary put to death several times, had he so pleased,—for no great power is requisite to have any one treacherously murdered.

‘But, in good truth, such thoughts were not in his heart; for the property of royal blood is to have such compassion and mercy that it cannot suffer any cruelty, murder or treason whatever; and of this blood my late lord of Orleans had a large share, for he was the son of a king and queen.

‘O, king Charles! if thou wert now alive, what wouldst thou say? What tears could appease thee? What would have hindered thee from doing justice for so base a murder? Alas! how hast thou loved, and to what honour hast thou diligently trained the tree that has brought forth the fruit which has put to death thy very dear son? Alas! king Charles, thou mayest now say with Jacob, ‘Fera pessima devoravit filium meum.’ The worst of beasts has devoured my son.

‘Our adversary has made a miserable return to thee, oh Charles! for all the great riches thou hast heaped on his father. This is the gratitude for the expedition to Flanders, wherein thou and thy kingdom were in such peril out of love to him. In truth, all the magnificent gifts thou madest the father are already forgotten. Sire, look down, and hear the lady of Orleans, crying in the words of the Psalmist, ‘Domine deduc me in justitia tua propter inimicos meos.’ Lord, lead me to thy judgment on account of mine enemies.

‘This concludes my second argument. My third is founded on pity, considering the desolate state of the supplicants, namely, the widowed lady of Orleans, in despair, with her innocent children, thy nephews, now become orphans, having no other father to look to but thee. It becomes thee, therefore, to incline thyself diligently to do them justice, as they have no other refuge but in thee, who art their lord and sovereign; and they are beside thy very near relations, as thou well knowest.

‘Let pity move thy breast; for as Saint James the apostle says, ‘Religio munda et immaculata est visitare pupillos et viduas in tribulatione eorum.’ To visit orphans and widows in their distress is the duty of a pure and undefiled religion. It is melancholy that so great a lady should suffer thus undeservedly; and she may be compared to her whom Valerius speaks of in the sixth book. A widow had a son who had been unjustly slain: she went to the emperor Octavian to demand justice, and said, ‘Sire, do me justice for the cruel death of my son.’ The emperor had already mounted his horse, to perform a long journey, but replied, ‘Woman, wait until I be returned, when I will do thee justice.’ The woman answered instantly, ‘Alas! my lord, thou knowest not if ever thou shalt return, and I wish not justice to be delayed.’ The emperor said, ‘Should I not return, my successor will see thee righted;’ but the widow replied, ‘Sire, thou knowest not if thy successor would wish to see me righted: he may, perhaps, have something to prevent it like to thee; and supposing that he should do me justice, what honour would it be to thee, or what merit canst thou claim for it from the gods? Thou art bound to do me justice: wherefore then seekest thou to throw the burden on others?’

‘The emperor, observing the firmness of the woman and the reasonableness of her arguments, dismounted, and, without more delay, did her ample justice. It was for this meritorious conduct, that when the emperor died, five years after, in the pagan faith, he was brought to life again by the prayers of St Gregory, then pope, and baptised, as the histories relate.

‘The example of this emperor, O king of France! thou oughtest to follow in regard to the disconsolate widow of the late duke of Orleans, who is now a supplicant to thee, and has formerly demanded, and now again demands justice, for the inhuman and barbarous murder of her lord and husband, who was thy brother. Delays, or reference to thy successors, will have no avail; for thou, as king, art singularly obliged to do this, considering the rank of the supplicants, the duchess of Orleans and her children.

‘This lady is like to the widow of whom St Jerome speaks, in his second book against Jovinian, wherein he relates, that the daughter of Cato, after the death of her husband, was in the deepest sorrow, uttering nothing but groans and lamentations. Her relations and neighbours asked her how long this grief was to last,—when she replied, that her life and her sorrow would end together. Such, without doubt, is the state of my lady the duchess,—for she can have no remedy for her loss but by means of the justice she is soliciting. In truth, she does not require any hostile measures,—for were that the case, she and her children, with their allies, are so much more powerful than the duke of Burgundy that they are well able to avenge themselves.

‘This act of justice thou canst not refuse, nor can the adverse party raise any objections to it, considering the persons who demand it. O, sovereign king! act in such wise that the words the Psalmist spoke of the Lord may be applied to thee: ‘Justus Dominus et justitias dilexit, æquitatem vidit vultus ejus.’ Our Lord is judgment, and loves justice: equity is the light of his countenance.—This concludes my third argument.

‘My fourth argument is founded partly on the act itself, which was so abominably cruel, the like was never seen; and all men of understanding must feel compassion for it. This, if duly considered, should incline thee the more to do justice, from the usages of the ancient kings, who, through compassion, bewailed even the death of an enemy: how much the more then does it become thee to bewail the death of thy brother, and to exert thy courage to punish the authors of it? Should it not be so, great disgrace will attach to thee and to many others.

‘We read, that Cæsar seeing the head of his enemy Pompey wept, and said, that such a man ought not to have died. He was also very much grieved at the death of Cato, though his enemy, and did all in his power to aid and console his children. O, most courteous king of France! thou oughtest likewise to give consolation for the death of thy brother, who was thy dear and loyal friend. Weigh well the manner of his death, which was piteously lamentable. Alas! my lord, could the spirit of thy brother speak, what would it not say? It would certainly address thee in words similar to these:

‘Oh, my lord and brother, see how through thee I have received my death,—for it was on account of the great affection that subsisted between us! Look at my wounds, five of which are mortal. See my body beat to the ground, and covered with mud! behold my arm cut off, and my brains scattered about! See if any pains were equal to my sufferings. It was not, alas! sufficient for mine enemy to take away my life so cruelly, and without cause; but he suddenly surprised me when coming from the residence of the queen to thee, which has put me in danger of damnation; and even after my death, he has attempted to blast my reputation by his false and defamatory libel.

‘My sovereign king, attend to these words as if thy brother had spoken them; for such they would have been, could he have addressed thee. Be then more active to do justice; and having heard the petition of my lady of Orleans, act so that thou mayest verify what is said in the second chapter of the first book of Kings: ‘Dominus retribuet unicuique secundum justitiam suam.’ Our Lord will render to all according to his justice. And this concludes my fourth argument.

‘My fifth is grounded on the great evils and mischiefs that might ensue if justice be not done on such crimes,—for every one will in future take the law into his own hand, and be judge and party. Treasons and murders will be the consequence, by which the kingdom may be ruined, as I shall demonstrate; for, according to the doctors, the surest way to preserve peace in a country is to do equal justice to all. St Cyprian declares this, in his book on the twelve errors, saying, ‘Justitia regis, pax populorum, tutamen pueris, munimentum gentis, terræ fœcunditas, solatium pauperum, hereditas filiorum, et sibimet spes futuræ beatitudinis.’ The justice of a king is peace to the people, the defender of orphans, the safety of the subject, the fertility of the earth, the comfort of the poor, the inheritance of sons, and to himself a hope of future happiness. It is an everlasting glory. And on this occasion the Psalmist says, ‘Justitia et pax osculatæ sunt.’ Righteousness and peace have kissed each other.

‘Should it be urged, that if due punishment be inflicted on this crime, greater evils might ensue from the reputed power of the duke of Burgundy. To this, which has more of appearance than reality, it may be answered, That the duke of Burgundy is as nothing compared with the power of the monarch; for what power or force can he have but what thou givest him or sufferest him to enjoy?

‘Justice and truth, however they may be delayed, always in the end, through Divine mercy, are the mistresses, and there is no security like working for them. Who are the knights or esquires that would dare to serve him against thee? or where are the strangers that would risk their lives in his traitorous quarrel? Certainly none.

‘O! ye knights of Burgundy and Flanders, clerks and laymen, and all ye vassals of our adversary, send hither men unbiassed by favour or hatred, to hear this cause pleaded, truth declared, and justice adjudged to the right, according as it shall be plainly shown.

‘O! most Christian king, ye dukes, counts and princes, have the goodness to give your aid that justice may be administered, for which end you have been principally constituted and ordained.

‘O, my lord king! consider how small a power, when compared with thine, thy ancestors enjoyed, and yet they punished criminals of yet superior rank to our opponent, as any one may see who shall read our history of former times. Beside, who are they that would dare to oppose their sovereign lord, who, doing an act of justice according to the evidence of truth, becomes a true and upright judge, as Tully showeth, in his second book of Offices: ‘Judicis est semper verum sequi.’ A good judge should give judgment according to truth.

‘The same author says, in one of his orations before he went into banishment,—‘Nemo tam facinorosus inventus est vita, ut non tamen judicum prius sententiis convinceretur, quam suppliciis applicaretur.’ No one has led so wicked a life but that a verdict has been passed upon his case before he was put to the torture.

‘Thou art bounden, most potent king, to do justice; and should any evil result from it, it will fall on the adverse party, on account of his crimes, as I shall show to you hereafter. The judgment of our LORD JESUS CHRIST will not certainly fail of having its effect: ‘Qui de gladio percutit, gladio peribit.’ Whoso kills with the sword shall die by the sword. And Ovid, in his Art of Love, says, ‘Neque lex est æquior ulla, quam necis artifices arte perire sua.’ No law is more just than that murderers should perish by their own arts.

‘O, my lord king! open the gates of justice, and listen to the very reasonable complaints which my lady of Orleans makes to thee, that thou mayest verify in thyself the words of the prophet, ‘Dilexisti justitiam et odisti iniquitatem propterea unxit te Deus tuus oleo leticiæ præ consortibus tuis;’ that is to say, Thou hast loved justice, and hast hated iniquity, wherefore the Lord thy God has anointed thee with the oil of gladness above thy fellows;—and this finishes my fifth argument.

‘My sixth and last argument, for the present, is founded on the conduct and demeanour of our opponent after this cruel and detestable crime.

‘There is nothing in this world a king should so much dread and check as the overbearing pride of any subject in regard to his government; and thou, O king! oughtest to follow, in thy governance, the example of the King of kings, of whom holy writ says, ‘Deus superbis resistit, humilibus autem dat gratiam.’ God humbles the proud, and raises up the weak-hearted. Thou art therefore bound to humble the pride of our opponent, which has increased to such a pitch as to make him resist thy power in the support of this his wicked deed.

‘Oh! king of France, and all ye my lords, weigh well then the rebellion and disobedience of our adversary, not only against the commands of the king, but contrary to the orders of the whole royal council. It is a well known fact, that the king of Sicily, my lord of Berry, and several others, went lately to Amiens, notwithstanding the great severity of the season, to attempt bringing about a reconciliation between the parties, for the general good of the king and kingdom; but these lords, in truth, could not effect this, though they signified to our opponent the king’s commands,—but he contended that he would not wait upon his sovereign until he should be sent for by the king himself.

‘When the aforesaid lords advised him to obey the king’s commands, they could scarcely obtain from him a promise not to come to the king with a great power of men at arms; and even then he delayed his coming for fifteen days. Consider, my lords, what sort of obedience this is, and what fatal consequences may ensue from it. After the conference at Amiens, what was his conduct? Why, he assembled so large a force of men at arms, that when he came to Paris, he seemed as if he would conquer the whole kingdom.

‘It is true, indeed, that the king and the princes of his blood, hearing of this, collected a sufficient power to provide a remedy. But when the king had commanded him, by especial messengers, not to enter Paris with more than two hundred men at arms, he came accompanied by more than six hundred, in direct opposition to the king’s orders.—On his arrival in Paris with so large a force, it seemed to him that the king, queen, and other princes ought to act according to his will; and for certain, such was the state of affairs that nothing was refused him, but the whole court behaved courteously toward him, to appease his anger.

‘O, government of France! if thou wilt suffer such things to pass with impunity, thou wilt soon have cause for lamentations. Our adversary next caused all the barricadoes and defences round the king’s palace to be taken away, that his wicked intentions, already begun, might be completed. Such deeds are strong proofs of subjects having evil designs against their king. It behoved him to have come to humble himself and seek for pardon; but, on the contrary, he came with his sword drawn, and accompanied by a numerous body of men at arms, the greater part of whom were foreigners.—During his residence in Paris, he frequently excited to rebellion the simple inhabitants, by spreading abroad his defamatory libels, and various false promises. The citizens, believing he was to do wonders, and to be the regent of the kingdom, have been so much deceived by him that they paid great honour to him and to his writings, even by cries of joy, and shoutings of the populace whenever he appeared; by which and other like means, his pride and cruelty are increased, and make him obstinately persist in his iniquities.

‘Alas! my lord king, is it not the very height of presumption to ride through Paris openly armed, after having committed such a crime, and to attend thy peaceful council with his battle-axes and lances? where thou oughtest not to have suffered any one to have entered more armed than thyself, lest the devil, who had instigated him to commit the base act he did, should unfortunately have urged him to commit a still greater, because the princes of the council did not approve of the wickedness he had done. Therefore thou shouldest never allow any one culpable like him, who takes the law into his own hands, to be in thy presence, more strongly armed than thou art thyself; for it is possible for such as him to beguile the people by the means before mentioned, and to lead them to thy own destruction as well as that of thy realm.

‘Be pleased, therefore, to humiliate our opponent, and shew thyself an upright and fearless judge in the cause of truth, that it may be said of thee as it is written in the 8th chapter of the 3d book of kings,—‘Judicabit servos suos, justificans quod justum est, attribuens eis secundum justitiam.’ He will judge his servants, justifying them that are upright, and giving to each according to his deserts. From this, as well as from the preceding arguments, it plainly appears, that thou art bounden to do the justice required by my lady of Orleans.

‘I shall now demonstrate the crime of our adversary, and how he perpetrated such an unpardonable deed, to which I shall add six arguments to prove the fealty and loyalty of my lord of Orleans, taking for my theme the words of the advocate of our opponent,—namely, ‘Radix omnium malorum cupiditas.’

‘It seems to me, that covetousness has been the original cause of this murder,—not covetousness of wealth alone, but likewise covetousness of honours and ambition.—Covetousness has then been the original cause, as shall more plainly be shown hereafter.

‘To prove the greatness and abomination of this crime, I shall use six arguments. The first is founded on our adversary having not the power or authority of a judge over the deceased.

‘Secondly, Supposing he may have had any authority over him, he proceeded in his own way, contrary to every maxim of law and of justice.

‘My third argument is grounded on the strict alliance that had been formed between my late lord of Orleans and our adversary.

‘Fourthly, That this is a damnable murder, and cannot any way be defended or explained.

‘Fifthly, That our opponent caused my lord of Orleans to be slain with a wicked intention.

‘Sixthly, That, not satisfied with having caused the duke of Orleans to be deprived of his life, he has exerted himself to disgrace his fame, by defamatory libels,—thus, as it were, slaying him a second time.

‘As to my first argument, it plainly appears, that the malice of our adversary is incorrigible, seeing that he had not any authority over the deceased; for, according to the laws and decrees, as well as to reason and the holy Scriptures, no one can put another to death without authority from the judge or judicial. Otherwise, any one may slay another at his pleasure, and tumults and confusion would reign without any chief or head, and every one would alternately, when strongest, make himself king.

‘So far was our adversary from having any power or authority over my lord of Orleans that he was bound to do him honour and reverence as son to a king, and to call him his lord, and respect him in his words and actions, for such are the privileges and prerogatives belonging to the sons of kings. This usurpation, therefore, of authority is apparent in our adversary, and consequently his wickedness has been unjustly perpetrated.

‘That authority is required as essential to enable any one to put another to death appears clearly in many parts of the holy Scriptures: and in fact, St Austin, when discussing the saying of our Lord, in the 26th chapter of the gospel of St Matthew,‘Omnis qui gladium acceperit, gladio peribit;’ that is, Whosoever useth the sword shall perish by the sword; adds, ‘All who shall, without lawful authority, make use of the sword, or shall arm himself against another, is bold in his wickedness.’ He afterwards asserts, that even a malefactor cannot be put to death without lawful authority; for in his Civitas Dei, ‘Qui, inquit, sine publica administratione maleficum interfecerit, velut homicida judicabitur.’ That is, Whoever shall slay a malefactor without the forms of public administration of justice shall be judged guilty of murder. This the law confirms, ‘Vigor, inquit, publicus tutela in medio constituta est, ne quis de aliquo, etiam sceleribus implicato sumere valeat ultionem:’—which is, That the public strength is as a defence constituted and ordained to prevent any one from taking vengeance, even upon him who is involved in great and abominable crimes.

‘In truth, the advocate for our adversary may say, that the laws should only take cognizance of such as act contrary to law; and that as a tyrant proceeds directly in opposition to them, he will affirm that this murder is no way contrary to the law. Alas! and does the advocate of our opponent know that my late lord of Orleans was a tyrant? Who is the judge that declares him such?

‘The fallacy of this assertion must be strictly examined, for on this deception is founded the supposition of my lord being a tyrant; and as our adversary groundlessly asserts, that the late duke of Orleans was a tyrant in the eye of reason, he concludes that it was lawful to put him to death. Let us, however, consider the properties of tyranny, and who should be accounted tyrants.

‘The philosopher says, in his 4th chapter on morals, ‘Tyrannus est, cum aliquis princeps, vi et violentia potestatis, sine titulo terram usurpat alienam, et de facto aliquam occupat civitatem vel patriam et qui incorrigibilis est, et nulli obediens.’ Now let us see whether my lord of Orleans had these properties. Certainly not; for he never took possession of another’s land: if any one know the contrary, let him say so.

‘Our opponent, therefore, ought not to have called the duke of Orleans a tyrant, for he never usurped any dominion, excepting over such places as were given him as appanages by the king, or what he had himself justly acquired. The duke of Burgundy, on the contrary, withholds three castles and their dependencies, without any just title, from the inheritance and domain of the king, namely, Lille, Douay and Orchies, notwithstanding his oaths on the holy sacrament to the king, that he would restore them to the crown, according to the conditions and agreements then made.

‘My lord of Orleans was never incorrigible; for I firmly believe that never did so great a prince pay more respect and honour to the laws.

‘Let our opponent say what acts or opposition the duke of Orleans ever committed or made against the laws. There are many noble persons now living, who can testify that no lord ever supported or maintained the dignity of justice more than the duke of Orleans during his whole life.

‘If we consider the properties of a tyrant according to the philosophers, they declare that a tyrant bends his whole mind to slay and destroy the prudent and wise: he seeks the ruin of churches and colleges of learning, and is solely occupied with destruction. He is much to be feared for his wickedness, whilst he studies to preserve his personal safety by strong guards. Such were not the qualities of my late lord, for his were the direct opposite.

‘In the first place, he never caused either wise men or fools to be put to death, but was particularly fond of the learned, and desirous of seeing any new improvements. In regard to churches, so far from destroying them, he repaired many, and founded some new ones, to which he gave large estates, as is well known. As for guarding his personal safety, he felt himself so innocent and pure toward all mankind, that he suspected no one of attempting to hurt him, and took no precautions, as you have seen, against his murderers. In fact, had he been of a suspicious temper, he would not have been thus treacherously slain.

‘It is therefore wonderfully astonishing how our adversary should have dared to have called the duke of Orleans a tyrant, by way of excusing his abominable act, when it is apparent that his qualities were directly the reverse to those of a tyrant. This I think a sufficient answer to the damnable proposition of our opponent.

‘But the advocate for our adversary says, That whatever he may have done contrary to the letter of the law was not, however, contrary to the intention of the maker of the law, nor contrary to its spirit, but through love of God. Who is he that has thus revealed to him the intention of the Maker of the law, and that it is the object of laws to cause men to be put to death without authority or sentence of the law? The consequence would be, that any prince may be made away with, under pretence that he was a tyrant; for every one would interpret the law according to his fancy, which would create the greatest misfortunes. ‘Cujus est leges condere ejus est interpretari.’ It is therefore clear, that our opponent could not establish laws binding on the duke of Orleans, who was not his subject, or interpret the law in respect to him. For although his advocate styles him dean of the peers, it does not follow that he had any authority over the defunct; for if so, he would have authority over the whole kingdom, and be equal to the king. What though he be a peer? he has no power but over his own lands; and in so much as he attributes to himself the power of another over the realm, he appropriates to himself kingly domination.

‘His advocate has indeed alledged twelve reasons to prove that his lord might lawfully put to death the duke of Orleans without orders from any one whatever. The three first are founded on the declarations of three doctors in theology, and three others on the writings of three moral philosophers,—three on the civil law, and the three last on examples drawn from the holy Scriptures.

‘With regard to the first, taken from the writings of St Thomas Aquinas, who says,—‘Quando aliquis aliquod dominium sibi per violentiam suscipit nolentibus subditis, vel sine consensu communitatis et non est recursus ad superiorem per quem de tali invasore judicium posset fieri, tunc qui ad liberationem patriæ talem tyrannum occidit laudatur et præmium accipit.’ To this I reply, that it is no way applicable to the case; for my lord of Orleans never intruded on any other’s domination by violence, nor did he attempt to usurp the power and authority of the king. I say, he never even thought of such a thing, as will more amply be shown in the third part of my defence of him.

‘I am therefore right in saying, that Saint Thomas speaks of him who may be proved a tyrant,—but my lord of Orleans was not one. On this subject St Austin proposes a question, whether it be lawful for a pilgrim to kill a robber, who is on the watch on the highway? and from his conclusion it is apparent, that he does not think it lawful for any man to put another to death without sentence of the law, as Henry de Gand afterward determined.

‘I shall add, that supposing my lord of Orleans was such a person as our opponent describes him, but which I deny, he had a safe resort to the king, when he was in good health and cheerful with the queen and the princes of his blood,—none of whom would have hesitated to have personally exposed himself in bringing to punishment the duke of Orleans, had he been proven guilty of usurping the king’s authority. Most certainly, my late lord had too good an understanding to imagine he could ever succeed to the crown, when so many obstacles were against him and the king assured of successors.

‘The second reason is founded on the authority of St Peter, who says, ‘Subditi, estote regi quasi præcellenti sive ducibus tanquam ab eo missis ad vindictam malefactorum, laudem vero bonorum quia hæc est voluntas Dei.’ These words appear to me of no weight in the present case; for it would seem that the Apostle would not that any duke should have dominion over a whole kingdom, but solely in his own country: otherwise it would follow that Brittany, Berry, and the other duchies within the realm, should obey the duke of Burgundy.—The advocate has, therefore, wrongfully perverted the holy Scripture to his purpose.

‘His third reason is drawn from what Sabellicus says, in the fifteenth chapter of his third book, ‘Tyranno licet adulari quem licet occidere.’ That is to say, It is lawful to flatter and deceive a tyrant who may legally be put to death; but Sabellicus here speaks of such as have been proven and known for tyrants.

‘The fourth reason is founded on what Aristotle says, in his book on the government of cities, That it is lawful, and even praiseworthy, to slay a tyrant. But Aristotle alludes to a public tyrant; and such was not my lord of Orleans, as I have before shown.

‘The fifth reason is grounded on the praise Tully, in his book ‘de Officiis,’ gives to those who killed Cæsar. To this I reply, that although Tully was a man of great ability, he here speaks as an ill-wisher to Cæsar; for he was always of the party, and supported the cause of Pompey the rival and adversary to Cæsar,—and Cæsar perpetrated many deeds which my lord of Orleans never thought of.

‘The sixth reason is grounded on what is said in the sixth chapter of the second book of the Misfortunes of great Men: ‘Res est valde meritoria occidere tyrannum.’ To this I answer, That it must apply only in cases where no other remedy can be had; and the conduct of our opponent has been illegal and wicked.

‘The seventh and two following reasons are founded on the civil laws, which declare there are three sorts of men who may lawfully be put to death,—namely, such as disgrace their knighthood, highway robbers, and housebreakers found during the night within any dwelling. Now my lord of Orleans cannot be included with any one of the above three classes. He was ever attended by a noble body of chivalry, and was fond of it beyond measure. And in regard to the two other cases, I maintain that the law does not command such to be slain except when the danger is most inevitable. They can in no wise be applicable to my lord of Orleans, who, thank God, was no waylayer on the high roads, nor a housebreaker; and there is no law in the world that can excuse our adversary.

‘The example of Moses, who slew an Egyptian without any authority, is produced to support the tenth reason. To this I say, according to the opinion of St Austin and many other doctors, that Moses sinned in killing the Egyptian; and although Moses and St Peter both acted contrary to the rules of justice, their cases are not similar,—for Moses was a Hebrew, and noticing an unbeliever moving towards his brother, to slay him, put him to death to prevent him from so doing.

‘The eleventh reason is grounded on the instance of Phineas, who slew Zambry without orders, and not only remained unpunished, but was remunerated for it. Thomas Aquinas says, in exculpation of this act, that he did it as a teacher of the law, for he was the son of the high priest, and, on this account, had power and public authority. This is also inapplicable to the question before us, as history will show.

‘The twelfth reason is founded on Saint Michael having slain Lucifer without the Divine command. For this he was rewarded with riches and power, as our opponent says. To this I reply, That St Michael did not slay Lucifer,—and the assertion that he did so is deserving only of derision; for the slaying of Lucifer is nothing more than the deprivation of the Divine grace, and of the sovereign glory of paradise, whence he was cast out by God for his inordinate pride. O, my lords! in what book has this advocate learned such theology? I am confounded at the boldness of his assertions, for there is not certainly any book in which it can be found. On the contrary, we see in the epistle of St Jude, that St Michael dared not to rail against Lucifer, although he had power over him, nor command him to do any thing; but he only said, ‘Our Lord commands thee;’ and thus it clearly appears, that the arguments which our adversary has produced are no way applicable to his case, nor can they serve to justify his disloyal and treacherous act.

‘I repeat, that such murders as the above, which our opponent has brought forward, are not of any consequence as examples; for many things have been suffered, that are mentioned in the Old Testament, which are now forbidden. As for instance, Samuel, as a churchman, put to death the king Amalech,—but at this day it is not lawful for a churchman to commit such crimes. To Moses was given the power of repudiation from the marriage-vow, which is now forbidden. The doctrine, therefore, which is here attempted, and the examples quoted to palliate and even justify this atrocious crime, cannot be supported; and truly princes would be in constant dread of death, if this deed go unpunished,—for should any evil report be spread abroad of them, some one of their subjects might take it into his head to punish them himself for it.

‘O, princes! consider well, that if such doctrines are supported, any man may say, ‘I also may kill him as such a one did.’ You will therefore be pleased to condemn this false doctrine as dangerous, seditious and abominable. Our adversary, and all those of his party, may then say with Jeremiah, in his twentieth chapter, ‘Confundantur vehementer qui non intellexerunt opprobrium sempiternum quod nunquam delebitur.’

‘The second argument is founded upon this consideration, that the cruel death of the duke of Orleans was not accomplished according to the way of justice; and supposing our adversary had the right to inflict it, he was, notwithstanding, bound to do so according to the forms of law, by information, and on the testimony of irreproachable witnesses. But he no way followed this course; for he first kills the duke of Orleans, and then seeks for reasons to exculpate himself for so doing. O, God! what a trial, and what a judge!! O, justice! do thy duty; and what thou owest to thyself, defend thy own cause against one who seeks to reduce thee to nothing. In truth, every law ordains that causes should be first tried, and sentences examined, before they are put into execution; and to this purpose Julius Cæsar, according to what Sallust relates, said, That when judges shall put men to death before they be condemned, the greatest evils may arise, and no man live in security. He brings, as an example, the Lacedemonians, who, after their victory over the Athenians, constituted thirty persons to govern the public state, who put to death numbers without any previous trial, which caused great misfortunes.

‘The like will befal us, if such crimes are suffered to go unpunished. Sallust tells us, that when Cataline and his associates were intending to burn the city of Rome and murder its senators, Tully was then consul; but although he was fully acquainted with the plot, he did not cause one of the conspirators to be put to death until he had fully proved their guilt. Now, my lords, as I have fully and clearly proved the heinousness of the crime with which I have charged the duke of Burgundy; and as it was done contrary to all law and justice, I trust it will not remain unpunished, according to the words of our Lord by the prophet Isaiah, in his 47th chap.: ‘Videbitur opprobrium tuum, ultionem capiam, et non resistet mihi homo.’

‘My third argument is grounded on our adversary’s having entered into the strongest possible alliance with the duke of Orleans, in the presence of many of their dependants; and a twelvemonth prior to the murder of the above duke this alliance was renewed before several prelates, nobles, clergymen and counsellors of each side, when the two dukes swore on the crucifix, with the holy evangelists in their hands, to the due and faithful observance of it, promising, on the salvation of their souls, and by their honour, that henceforward they would be to each other as brothers and companions in arms, engaging to reveal mutually any evil designs that might be plotted or meditated against their persons or interests. They then agreed to wear each other’s badge, which was done. And at the last feast at Compiègne, for the greater confirmation of the above, my lord of Orleans and our adversary made many of their knights and dependants alternately swear, that they would loyally and truly abide by and support the bonds of friendship entered into between them, through love and attachment to their persons,—and would make known to each party any thing that should be imagined against their persons or estate.

‘Moreover, my lord of Orleans and our adversary entered into other private engagements, promising and swearing on the true cross, that they would mutually defend and guard each other’s person and honour against all who should attack them. This agreement was signed with their own hands and seals.

‘What now, O duke of Burgundy! canst thou say to these things? Who now can put any confidence in thee? for thou canst not deny the above alliance, as there are many witnesses to it now living: thou hast been publicly seen by the whole city wearing the badge of the duke of Orleans.

‘How did my late lord act? Certainly in no way hurtful to our opponent; for from that time no reproachful or angry words passed between them, that could any how be ill interpreted. It is plain, therefore, that our adversary has wickedly and treacherously put to death him who had the fullest confidence in his honour.