Chapter XXIV: A Naval Study for All Time (8)

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Footnote 78:

That is, the First Lord agreed with my statements, but objected to
inquiry because I moved for it!

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“Mr. Rose,” said his lordship in reply, “has expressed his persuasion
that the interests of the navy are best protected by being in the care
of the king’s proctor; that is,” continued his lordship, “under the
absolute control of one man, who, in addition to the management of his
majesty’s business in two courts, and the monopoly of libelling and
prosecuting to condemnation all the captures made by the navy,
possesses also the exclusive privilege of conducting the numerous and
intricate litigations which have arisen of late years out of the
seizure of neutrals; causes in which not only the property detained is
at stake, but all that a captor possesses is answerable for the costs
of suit and demurrage, which, if he is unable to pay, he may be thrown
into gaol, not for errors or misconduct of his own, but owing to
neglect arising from confusion in an office where there have formerly
been from 1800 to 2000 causes in progress at one and the same time; an
evil which, unfortunately for the country, is working its remedy in a
way highly prejudicial to its best interests. Let me ask, would the
right honourable gentlemen opposite exert themselves with zeal, if
every motion they made subjected them to risk of costs, damages, and
imprisonment? They would not sit on these soft cushions unless they
were amply paid, although it is easier to do so than to make captures
on the enemy’s coast. How would they like to be compelled, as the navy
is, to employ one attorney to conduct all their affairs, even if he
had not their opponent’s interests also to promote, as is the case
with the procurator-general? Will such management of their affairs
encourage the navy to impede suspicious commerce in neutral bottoms?
And if the condemnation of a boat costs as much as the condemnation of
a ship, is not the capture of the enemy’s coasting commerce virtually
discouraged?

“Nothing,” he continued, “can better demonstrate the effect which the
dread of fraud and neglect in the procurator’s office has on the
exertions of the navy, than an account before the House, by which it
appears, that the numbers of causes belonging to the whole navy
amounted only to ninety-two, including droits of the Admiralty and
Crown; while about three dozen privateers, possessing the inestimable
privilege of employing counsel of their own choice, had actually
110,—not injudicious captures, but such as had been sanctioned by the
decisions of the lower courts. The navy are told, by a public minute
in the procurator-general’s office, 6 that it is the king’s proctor’s
particular desire, in respect to his bills, first, that in all
successful cases they should be made out moderately; secondly, that in
unsuccessful cases they should contain those fees only which are
allowed on taxation.’ Permit me,” said Lord Cochrane, to ask what fees
he is entitled to that are disallowed on taxation; and permit me to
ask the treasurer, who is desirous to remove the misconception that
prevails in the navy, if he thinks that were the commanding officers
all compelled to employ one tailor, (the chancellor’s for instance,)
that it would be quite satisfactory to learn, whilst there was a
certainty of their cloth being damaged, that being cut and sewed by
old women it was made up cheaper, as might be ascertained by a minute
behind the shop-board; ‘that it was the master tailor’s particular
desire, in respect to his bills, first, that the old ladies should be
moderate in their cabbaging if the coat fitted; and secondly, if
spoilt, that they should take only what they could get,’ would not
persons thus restricted, and desirous of expedition or care, stimulate
the old ladies by a dram; and would not they quit one job and take up
another? Would the interests of all be best protected thus?”

Lord Cochrane instanced a case of capture, wherein the captor had a
balance of 11_l._ 14_s._ against him in the prize courts, after the
prizes were condemned. He stated a case wherein 63_l._ were deducted
from a bill upon taxation, and the same sum to a farthing charged for
taxing it; and he asked the attorney-general, whether he did, or did
not, receive twenty-two guineas out of the pockets of the navy for
every cause which came before the Court of Appeals, though he had
attended but once there since the court commenced sitting in November.
“Is this,” said he, “one of the law charges which the treasurer has no
occasion to disapprove of? And does he think it right that the
procurator, the boasted guardian of the interests of the navy, should
not only pay the attorney-general for staying away, but fee another
for coming to court, and performing his duty? I have passed nearly
twenty years in the navy. Having been constantly employed until
lately, I have had full opportunity to be acquainted with the feelings
of those with whom I have mixed, and I believe that, unless the laws
and regulations made to guide the Courts of Admiralty are reformed,
captures will soon cease to be made. Were that done, the enemy would
then suffer the loss of all the trade which is of such importance to
France and her dependent states. Two thirds of our present naval
establishment would be quite sufficient for the purposes of blockade,
and all others; nay, I am clearly of opinion, that if the courts were
reformed, it would be a benefit to our country if one third of our
ships were converted into fire-wood. I am sure that the First Lord of
the Admiralty would not vote against the production of papers and full
investigation, if he knew the extent of the evil. He has, however, no
means personally to become acquainted with the facts, and there are
but few who will venture to inform him.”

The motion was negatived without a division.

CHAP. XXXIII.
OPENING OF PARLIAMENT, 1812.

SIR FRANCIS BURDETT’S ADDRESS SECONDED BY ME.—EMPLOYMENT OF THE
NAVY.—NAVAL DEFENCES.—THE ADDRESS REJECTED.—CURIOUS LETTER FROM
CAPT. HALL.—PERVERSION OF NAVAL FORCE IN SICILY.—A NAUTICO-MILITARY
DIALECT.—USELESSNESS OF OUR EFFORTS UNDER A FALSE SYSTEM, WHICH
EXCLUDES UNITY OF PURPOSE.

The opening of the session of 1812 was in many ways remarkable. The speech of the Prince Regent, read by the Lords Commissioners, made everything _couleur de rose_, both as regarded our foreign wars and domestic policy. Notwithstanding that we were on the brink of war with America, both Houses were assured that the affair of the _Chesapeake_ had been “finally adjusted, though other, discussions were not yet brought to a close.” The finances were represented as being in a flourishing condition, and His Royal Highness had no doubt of the liberal disposition of Parliament “to sustain the country in the great contest in which it was engaged.”

The hollowness of these representations was met by Lord Grenville, who contrasted it with the “critical circumstances of the times, and the present alarming state of the country. The framers of the speech, said his Lordship, were the very men who by their obstinate blindness had brought the country to the brink of ruin, but who, in the midst of the distresses they had themselves occasioned, still held forth the same flattering and fallacious language. He would protest against a continuance of those measures which had brought such calamities upon the country. People might choose to close their eyes, but the force of truth must dispel the wilful blindness.”

Lord Grey similarly denounced the policy which was “the source of present and impending calamities. Yet these very complications were brought forward in assertion that the system of the government had contributed to the security, prosperity and honour of the country!” &c. &c.

In the House of Commons an unusual circumstance occurred. After the speech had been read by the Speaker, Lord Jocelyn was rising to move the usual complimentary address, but Sir Francis Burdett, having risen at the same time, first caught the eye of the Speaker, who decided that Sir Francis was in possession of the House.

One of the honourable baronet’s cutting speeches followed, in which he denounced the Ministers as an “oligarchy of rotten-boroughmongers”—who alike imposed upon the people and the Prince Regent. “A system of taxation had been created which ruined many and oppressed all. This fiscal tyranny being carried to its height, the lower orders had been reduced to a state of pauperism—whilst the desperate resistance which such pauperism was calculated to produce was kept down by the terrors of a military force. Depôts, barracks, and fortifications had been established in all quarters, and foreign mercenaries, who had been unable to defend their own country, had been brought over to protect the native land of courage and patriotism, or rather to protect its rulers against an indignant and oppressed people, and to support the scandalous invasions of the liberty of the press, and the severe punishments with which those who ventured to express popular opinions were visited by the courts of justice.”

This interruption by Sir Francis took the House by surprise, but still greater was its astonishment when the honourable baronet proposed, in place of the ordinary address to the Prince Regent, a memorial of remonstrance, laying before his Royal Highness all the instances of misgovernment and oppression—of infringement of the public liberty, and accumulation of abuses, which had been characteristic of the system pursued by Government for many years past.

As a matter of course, the address proposed by Sir Francis was read by the Speaker, amidst the ill-concealed dismay of those most affected by it. I then rose to second the address, denouncing the impolicy of the war, and more still the way in which it was conducted, so far as the policy of ministers was concerned. The subjoined is from the usual reports of the period.

“LORD COCHRANE rose for the purpose of seconding the address of the
honourable baronet. He agreed with the speech delivered in the name of
the Prince Regent, that a high tribute was due to the bravery of our
army in Portugal, and to the conduct of the Commander-in-Chief, but he
would deny that the war in the Peninsula would come to speedy or
successful conclusion. The forces of Great Britain there were
insufficient to cope with those Buonaparte could bring against us as
soon as he had completed the subjugation of Spain and obtained command
of its resources. Of this, we were quiet spectators. To what was our
army indebted for its success and for maintaining itself in Portugal,
but to the unproductiveness of that country. Every credit was due to
Lord Wellington for his conduct of affairs, but even his lordship
expected little from the Portuguese, who were dragged to the army more
like slaves than soldiers, to support, they did not know what. At
Peniche he had seen ten thousand of them collected, almost naked, and
in want of every necessary.

“The Portuguese were themselves despots. The dungeons of the
Inquisition were full of victims, and the British minister, who formed
part of the Regency, was lately under the necessity of retiring from
Lisbon that he might not appear to countenance arrests and
imprisonments which he could not approve. He would not scruple to
assert that the Portuguese government was obnoxious to every class of
society in that country. Nay, farther, that both in Sicily and in
Portugal the British name was detested, because of the support which
this country gave to the respective governments of each with all their
oppressive abuses.

“With regard to Sicily, he thought that the real purpose of ministers
was not so much to keep the French out of that island as to keep the
people subject to one of the most despotic governments in existence.
With regard to Portugal, which was considered of such importance, he
would ask, How long would our army defend that country? Only till the
French had made themselves masters of Spain, and then it would be
compelled to retire within its fortified lines, the whole extent of
which could not afford grass enough to feed bullocks for six weeks’
subsistence of the troops alone. He would assert, as a fact,
extraordinary as it might appear, that even at present the bullocks
and flour for the supply of Lord Wellington’s troops passed through
the French army with licenses from the interior of Spain. This was a
notorious fact, and he would leave the House to make reflections upon
it.

“The noble lord then adverted to that part of the honourable baronet’s
proposed address, which referred to the internal state of the country,
and professed his concurrence with the greater portion of the
sentiments therein contained. All must own that the freedom of the
people had been greatly encroached upon, particularly by the
oppressive mode of levying taxes, the produce of which, he regretted
to say, was grossly misapplied. No part of a man’s house was free from
the visits of the tax-gatherer, and a man could not remove articles
that had paid duty on importation, without a permit, even so much as a
dozen of wine. The noble lord trusted that a committee would be
appointed to take both the conduct of the war, and the state of the
nation into consideration.

“Lord Cochrane then adverted to that part of the speech which referred
to the naval defences of the country, and maintained that our naval
force was not rendered efficient in annoying the enemy. Commanding the
seas, as this country did, our navy ought to be employed in
threatening the coast of France in all directions, by which means
Buonaparte would be compelled to keep his armies at home, instead of
sending them to be _fed, clothed, and paid by our allies!_ for the
purpose of their own subjugation. Were the gigantic naval force of
England used as it ought to be, _the whole force of France, vast as it
was, would prove inadequate to the defence of its widely extended
shores_. Perhaps demonstrations of attack might prove sufficient. If
the enemy despised these, it would _then_ be, as at this moment _it
was_, easy to destroy everything on the French coasts, for England
could, in spite of all the efforts of the enemy, being a force to any
given point far superior to anything the enemy could assemble for our
annoyance, and thus we might effect most powerful diversions.”

The address proposed by Sir Francis and seconded by myself was, of course, unsuccessful. The mover of the address originally intended was Lord Jocelyn, who, when I had concluded, made not a word of allusion to any part of the speeches of Sir Francis or myself, beyond stating that “_he wholly disapproved of all we had said_.” Such was legislation in those days, that the arguments of those who did not belong to the ruling faction were not listened to, much less answered. Lord Jocelyn’s address, which was only an echo of the Lords Commissioners’ speech, had, however, to be proposed as _an amendment_ to that of Sir Francis, and was carried without a division.

The feeling towards myself for having—as was said—“thought fit to countenance Sir Francis”—needs not be animadverted on. Yet I had given some good advice as to the way in which our naval power was frittered away to no purpose. English historians, by their silence on this point, appear to have little conception as to the extent of the evil.

As in seconding the address of Sir Francis Burdett, I had mentioned Sicily, I will give a remarkable example of the way in which war was carried on in that quarter _against the French_! The reader may deduce from that why I was not permitted to put my plans of harassing the French coast into execution.

The following letter is from Captain Robert Hall, commanding what was singularly enough called the “_army flotilla_” at Messina. The document is a curious one, and may do something towards enlightening future English historians:—

“Messina, Jan. 14, 1812.

“MY DEAR LORD,—It is so long since I heard of you, and being
disappointed at not seeing you in this country, as the papers gave us
reason to believe, that I must take the liberty of asking you how you
are. We were led to expect you in the Mediterranean with a flying
squadron, but I am sorry to see there is _now_ no probability of it.

“I am serving here in an _amphibious_ kind of way—having the rank of
brigadier to command an ‘_army flotilla!_’ but why it should be an
‘army’ one I cannot find out, though I have well considered the matter
_for the last eighteen months_.

“There is _an immense naval establishment here of a hundred and forty
vessels of different descriptions quite independent of the
Admiral!_[79] These are maintained by the British Government, at an
expense of at least 140,000_l._ per annum. I have, in fact, lessened
its expense by 60,000_l._ a year, merely by reducing the pay of the
seamen to the standard of our own, though they have been paid at
double the rate of English sailors, whilst the _padrones_ of gunboats,
taken from the streets, _are paid more than our lieutenants_.

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Footnote 79:

I had only asked for three or four handy frigates to carry out my
plans, and indeed, could not have employed more with effect, as
being under my entire supervision.

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“It is a singular thing that this establishment cannot be thrown into
its proper channel—the navy. The island of Zante has another flotilla
of 60,000 dollars a month to protect it, and the commandant of the
barren rock of Lissa—not content with his gunboats—sent in, the other
day, a serious memorial, stating the necessity of defending his
island, by placing gunboats _all round it_, wherever there were no
guns on shore! If this flotilla mania should reach our West India
Islands, what will be the consequence? At least, I should think as
army matters are conducted, an expense equal to one half that of the
whole navy! It is the duty of officers to serve where they are
ordered, but this mixture of services is, I believe, altogether new,
and may, if followed up, be fatal to the independent spirit of the
navy. If that spirit perishes all ardour is gone, and we shall be like
some foreign countries where the services are mixed—neither the one
thing nor the other.

“My Lord, I believe you know me. You may therefore guess my feelings,
after _eighteen years’ service_, to be ordered to serve under a person
_who is a perfect stranger to the service to which I belong_. What do
you think of an order to make a passage to Zante in the dead of winter
by _sailing close to the land in the Gulf of Tarento_? It is too
ridiculous—and really deserves the consideration of the Admiralty.

“If we can combine our naval and military tactics, it will be a
greater effort of human ingenuity than has hitherto been devised. We
may then dispense with the rapidity of our manœuvres and ‘_march in
ordinary time_.’ Figure to yourself _eighteen subalterns of different
regiments commanding divisions of the flotilla_! When I took it out to
sea, they were all sea-sick, and——about the decks! Each of these
subalterns received _seventeen and sixpence a day for this
extraordinary and fatiguing service_;—nearly three times as much as a
lieutenant in the navy!

“Endeavour, my Lord, to reconcile the meaning of such an
establishment, glancing your eye at the same moment on the manner of
conducting the flotilla establishment at Cadiz. We have at this moment
_more troops on the Faroe line, than the French have in both
Calabrias_—independent of those which, under our nautico-military
chief, sacrificed our friends in Catalonia.

Yet there is a sad outcry here. We tell the Sicilians that they mean
to murder us all, and there is no doubt their will is good enough.[80]
Numerous are the remonstrances against sending a single soldier out of
the island. The firm and manly mind of Lord William Bentinck was proof
to this outcry, and it is to be regretted that circumstances did not
admit of this zealous and active officer accompanying the expedition
himself. Nothing can equal my respect for Lord William Bentinck as a
soldier and a gentleman, but I must say with old Neptune, when jealous
of the interference of some _“long shore” Deity_,

‘Non illi imperium pelagi sævumque tridentem
Sed mihi—sorte datum est.’

What end, what purpose, can it answer, to put a naval establishment
under the command of a person who acknowledges that he does not know
how to use it? As it was formed under the auspices of my Lord
Mulgrave, this arrangement may probably have been made with a view of
simplifying naval matters. For example, my Lord, the long sentence of
“_back the main topsail_,” might be more readily expressed by the
short word “_halt_!” “Filling and making sail,” according to the
strength of wind, might be called “_marching in quick or ordinary
time_!” Instead of boatswain’s mates to “_march off_” the different
“_detachments_” of the watch, it would, according to our present
system, be more regular to “_march them off with corporals_!” though
in squally weather this might be inconvenient. In short, there might
be many improvements. The _army officer_ appointed to command one of
our vessels mislaid what he called the “_route given him by the
Quarter-Master-General_!” “_lost his way_,” as he expressed it, and
got ashore in the Gulf of Squillace. On his exchange he reported to me
that “the night was _so dark, he could not see the rock on which the
vessel ran_!” and that when fast, “_a board broke in her bottom_, so
that the water ran in so fast, he could not _scoop it out_ again! Thus
it is, that Mr. Bull is humbugged. For my part, I have remonstrated
repeatedly on the folly of this establishment, and it only remains
with me to serve where I am ordered.

“Of the politics of this country the public journals will have
informed your Lordship. We are certainly doing nothing in the way of
amelioration, and all parties seem discontented. The newfangled
constitution strikes too much home to be popular amongst those who
profited by the old system. Our views are certainly for the prosperity
of Sicily, yet no Sicilian thinks so. They dislike us, and I believe
they know not why. Some of the knowing ones appear apprehensive of our
assuming the government altogether; and urge their fears of our
treating them as we do the Irish Catholics! The French partisans, of
course, make the most of this state of things.

“It is to be hoped that Buonaparte’s failure in Russia will blast his
other prospects, or Sicily will be his in a short time, if we do not
oblige the Government to adopt some energetic measures. If they would
only put the troops we have here on shore in Calabria, there would be
no necessity for gunboats. They would excite an immediate
insurrection, and would throw plenty of grain, of which we are in
want, into Sicily. But if the Sicilian troops should intend running
away on the approach of a French regiment—as they did formerly—we had
better remain and _colonise_ at Messina.

“Your Lordship’s faithful servant,
“ROBERT HALL.

“The Lord Cochrane.”

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Footnote 80:

See my speech on the address of Sir Francis Burdett.

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The above will show the useless manner in which our best naval force and officers were employed—no less than their testimony to their own uselessness. Yet with upwards of a thousand ships in commission, we had no naval enemy to oppose, and persisted in employing our seamen anywhere but on the enemy’s coast! For simply urging the common sense employment of our numerous navy, and a proper investigation into the minor details which crippled its action, I was regarded as a common disturber of the ministerial peace.

Yet it had not been my intention to throw blame on the Admiralty, but simply on _the system_ under which they continued to act, but which, for all practical purposes, had become obsolete. The Admiralty, whatever might be its wish, was unable to do its work for want of some one of high professional skill and resolute character, whose business it should be authoritatively to investigate the efficiency of naval establishments, and personally to superintend investigation alike into inefficiency and suggested improvements. Had this been done, many evils, hidden from the knowledge of successive Admiralties, would be perceived and remedied.

The Admiralty, even as at present constituted, is not sufficiently numerous to execute so many and such varied duties, even though the ability of the members comprised all professional knowledge, and that their industry was indefatigable. The overwhelming pressure of detail renders inquiry into, and deliberation on, important matters impracticable, whilst on minor matters it is prohibitory, and thus abuses remain unremedied, because unperceived.

The Board, at all times within my recollection, has been one of reference to persons in inferior departments. These persons pronounce _an unquestioned verdict_ on all matters referred to them; their reports remaining concealed under a rule adopted to avoid trouble or correspondence, the framers of the rule not anticipating that such concealment may be fraught with the most injurious consequences to the navy, whilst it may shield from exposure the most self-interested and flagrant impositions.

This, however, is not the place to enter on a subject, the ramifications of which have penetrated into every department, till beyond the control of the most patriotic and unflinching; who, with all their pains, can only arrive at the one fact, that the whole system requires renovation, which, as it is nobody’s business, is never undertaken.

So long, however, as such a system exists, so long shall we be in danger of being taken unawares by powers fully alive to the importance of unity of purpose and action. To such a system we have nothing to oppose in case of emergency but our own embarrassment.

CHAP. XXXIV.
MY SECRET PLANS.

MY PLANS SUBMITTED TO THE PRINCE OF WALES.—NEGOTIATIONS THEREON.—A
MODIFIED PLAN SUBMITTED, WHICH CAME TO NOTHING.—INCONSIDERATE
PROPOSITION.—RECENT REPORT ON MY PLANS.—OPINIONS OF THE
COMMISSIONERS.—PLANS PROBABLY KNOWN TO THE FRENCH.—FAITH KEPT WITH
MY COUNTRY IN SPITE OF DIFFICULTIES.—INJURIOUS RESULTS TO MYSELF
BOTH ABROAD AND AT HOME.—OPPOSITION TO MY PLANS INEXPLICABLE.—THEIR
SOCIAL EFFECT.—THE SUBJECT OF FORTIFICATIONS: THESE GREATLY
OVERRATED.—REASONS WHY.—THE NAVY THE ONLY RELIANCE.

Soon after my return from the Mediterranean, I had the honour of laying before His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, a new and most formidable method of attacking and destroying an enemy’s fleet, and of performing other warlike operations on a large scale. His Royal Highness was pleased to refer the plans laid before him to a Secret Committee, consisting of the late Duke of York, as president, Lord Keith, Lord Exmouth, and the two Congreves, one of whom, Sir William, was the celebrated inventor of the rocket which bears his name.

These officers—as stated to me in a private letter from Lord Keith, who took a warm interest in the matter—gave it as their opinion that under the circumstances detailed in my explanatory paper, such a mode of attack would be irresistible, and the effect of the power and means proposed, infallible; adding, however, that if the plan was divulged, it might become perilous to our Colonial possessions; an observation marked by no little foresight, _for had the same plan been known to the rebels in the late Indian mutiny, not a European in India would have escaped_.

The Prince Regent and the Duke of York fully concurred with the Committee in the destructive character of the plans submitted, for their consideration as well as in the danger of divulging them. His Royal Highness sending for me to Carlton House, commanded secresy on my part. I told His Royal Highness that my plans were only known to Sir Alexander Cochrane, and to my uncle, Mr. Cochrane Johnstone, who had, in fact written out for me the papers which had been laid before His Royal Highness, but that I would obey his injunctions, and had no fear of my relatives disclosing so important a secret. The investigation being secret, of course no official report was made on the subject.

Not long after this interview Lord Melville signified to me his intention to put in execution _a portion_ of my plans, and requested my attendance at the Admiralty for the purpose of conferring on the subject. To this partial execution of the project I of course demurred, as unfair to the invention and necessarily incomplete in operation, whilst development of a portion might give the enemy such an insight of the whole as would enable him to turn it against ourselves on a large scale; his lordship, nevertheless, did not seem inclined to give way, and I quitted the Admiralty without having been enabled to arrive at any satisfactory conclusion.

Lord Melville having mentioned to Lord Keith the result of our interview, Lord Keith urged me to acquiesce in the First Lord’s views, adding, that he was too well acquainted with the soundness of my plans to doubt the practicability of destroying with a portion only the enemy’s ships in Genoa harbour and the outer roads of Toulon. His lordship further urged that a success once achieved, the popular voice would place it in my power to enforce the execution of the more destructive portion of the invention within the enemy’s inner harbours.

In deference to Lord Keith’s opinion I at once prepared a plan of attack on the outer roads of Toulon, in accordance with the views of Lord Melville. That communication, omitting the essential parts of the plan, I now subjoin.

“12 Portman Square, May 12th, 1812.

“MY LORD,—In consequence of the conversation I had the honour of
holding with your Lordship yesterday, and of your desire that I should
state what force would be required for carrying into execution the
plan submitted for the destruction of the Toulon fleet, I beg to
submit the following arrangements as applicable _to this particular
object_.[81]

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Footnote 81:

Viz. as not having reference to the execution of the whole.

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“One seventy-four.

“Two 38-gun frigates.

“Two 18-gun brigs.

“Two cutters or schooners.

“The above force is requisite as an escort, and to protect the boats.

“In order to ensure success, although one-half will probably be
sufficient, the subjoined will be necessary.

[Here follow particulars.]

“As your Lordship permitted me to recommend such officers as I thought
best calculated for this service, I beg leave to name the following:—

“Captain Robert Baine.

“Sir Thomas Staines, now of the _Hamadryad_.

“Captain Johnstone, now commanding the _Avenger_, if he has not
sailed; and if he has—

“Captain Hall, now commanding the gunboats at Messina, and lastly

“The Honourable Lieutenant Napier, now in the Mediterranean.

“My late first Lieutenant, Travers, now in the _Impérieuse_, to be
first of whatever ship your Lordship may be pleased to assign to me,
which, in order further to conceal the enterprise, may, if your
Lordship should think proper, be placed under the command of my
brother Captain Archibald Cochrane, late of the _Fox_ frigate. I can
furnish him confidentially with all the necessary instructions, so
that I might at once proceed to Lisbon, apparently in a private
capacity, so as to disarm suspicion.

“I have taken the liberty of submitting the names of the above
officers to your Lordship, because I am well acquainted with their
characters and zeal for the service, and am sure that whatever is
undertaken by them will first be well weighed, and then executed with
determination.

“The above operation is calculated _without the assistance of troops_,
but if your Lordship wish to _secure_ the ships, instead of
_destroying_ them, 4000 troops should be embarked at Messina[82] as
though under the destination of Catalonia, and having been shifted
into the ships of war now blockading Toulon, should be held in
readiness to be disembarked in the peninsula of Cape Cepet, the
heights of which may be held, although not yet fortified, against any
force that may be brought against them. When I was last there, with
Lord Collingwood’s fleet, I stood particularly close in, within point
blank range of shot, and there were not sufficient men in any of the
batteries to train more than one gun at a time—indeed, they appeared
merely to be stationed there to take charge of the stores. There was
neither smoke in the chimneys of the barrack-rooms, nor was there a
door or window open, though the weather was extremely hot.

“If the operations are to be extended along the coasts, your Lordship
will see the propriety of embarking 300 marines on board the
seventy-four, and 100 in each of the frigates.

“The expense of the expedition will be _within three months’ cost of
that of the blockading force_, and half the stores enumerated may
accomplish the service.

“I have, &c. &c.
“COCHRANE.

“The Right Honourable Lord Melville, &c. &c.”

-----

Footnote 82:

How well these could have been spared is evident from Capt. Hall’s
letter, see page 221.

-----

Inconsiderable as was the expense, in comparison with other armaments producing little or no result, Lord Melville hesitated to incur it; or rather, as I have reason to believe, his lordship was overruled by the ill-feeling against me at the Admiralty, as the concurrence of the Board would have placed me in command of a squadron, with my flag flying in a line-of-battle ship. This was evidently considered too high a position for one who had been for three years kept unemployed from political and personal dislike, was evidently not to be thought of, and the project after long fruitless expectation was dropped.

I then proposed to conduct a similar expedition against Flushing, but this also was declined. As, however, public dissatisfaction began to manifest itself, Lord Melville informed me that I might make an attempt on Toulon _on a small scale_! In other words, that I might, “on a small scale,” show the enemy how to put my plans in operation against ourselves _on a large scale_! The permission was so preposterous, besides being not altogether free from the suspicion that failure would be more acceptable than success, I declined it, notwithstanding the renewed recommendation of Lord Keith to close with Lord Melville’s offer. As at this time only a few sail of the line remained at Toulon, I hesitated to comply, considering that the result of destroying these would have been badly compensated by the disclosure of the means whereby their destruction had been effected.

Soon after the accession of William IV. I submitted my plans to His Majesty’s consideration, and being himself a practical seaman, His Majesty at once admitted their importance and honoured me with personal interviews on the subject, at which I explained my methods of putting them in execution under various circumstances. His Majesty was further pleased to observe that I ought to be rewarded as well for the plans as for the secrecy which had been observed, yet not the slightest reward did I ever reap for the invention or for having kept my secret out of pure love to my country, a motive which will be better appreciated when subsequent temptations to divulge it come to be shown.

An incontrovertible proof of the efficiency of the plans submitted by me to various ministries is on record in the shape of a report _from a comparatively recent commission_, one of the commissioners—who ranks amongst the highest in his profession—_being still living_. As from the non-employment of those plans on any occasion, an opinion may have gone abroad that their destructive character is illusory, I feel myself justified in dispelling the illusion by subjoining the report.

Towards the close of 1846, when the late Lord Auckland was at the Admiralty, suspicion being excited as to the motives and intentions of the then French government, another commission was appointed, to decide upon a mode of trying my inventions in a way to satisfy the public as to their efficacy, and at the same time to preserve secresy. This being found impracticable, the trial was never made, but the commission proceeded to report on the plans. The members were Sir Thomas Hastings, Sir J.F. Burgoyne, and Lieut.-Col. Colquhoun.

The subjoined is their report, addressed to the then Master of the Ordnance and forwarded to me by Lord Auckland.

“Ordnance Office, Jan. 16, 1847.

“MY LORD,—In conformity with your Lordship’s instructions, we, the
undersigned, have met to consider and report on the secret war plans
of Vice-Admiral the Earl of Dundonald, transmitted to us by the First
Lord of the Admiralty, the Earl of Auckland.

“These plans may be classed under three heads:—

“1st. One, on which an opinion may be formed without experiment, for
concealing or making offensive warlike operations; and we consider
that, under many particular circumstances this method of his Lordship
may be made available as well by land as by sea, and we therefore
suggest that a record of this part of Lord Dundonald’s plans should be
deposited with the Admiralty, to be made use of when in the judgment
of their Lordships the opportunity of employing it may occur.

“2nd. One on which experiments would be required before a satisfactory
conclusion could be arrived at.

“3rd. Nos. 1 and 2 continued for the purpose of hostile operations.

“After mature consideration, we have resolved that it is not desirable
that any experiments should be made. We assume it to be possible that
the plan _contains power for producing the sweeping destruction the
inventor ascribes to it_; but it is clear this power could not be
retained exclusively by this country, because its first employment
would develope its principle and application. The last observation
applies equally to plan No. 1.

“We considered in the next place, how far the adoption of the proposed
secret plans would accord with the feelings and principles of
civilised warfare. We are of unanimous opinion that plans Nos. 2 and
3, would not do so.

“We therefore recommend that, as hitherto, plans Nos. 2 and 3 _should
remain concealed_. We feel that _great credit is due to Lord Dundonald
for the right feelings which prompted him not to disclose his secret
plans when serving in war as naval Commander-in-Chief of the forces of
other nations, under very trying circumstances, in the conviction that
those plans might eventually be of the highest importance to his own
country_.

“We have only to add that we have sealed up, under one cover all the
papers which have been submitted to our consideration by the First
Lord of the Admiralty and the Earl of Dundonald, and our
correspondence with the latter in another—both of which we have marked
‘secret.’

“With regard to the disposal and future custody of these papers, we
await instructions from your Lordship, or the Earl of Auckland, to
whom we propose this letter should—after your Lordship has perused
it—be transmitted.

“We have the honour to be,
“Your Lordship’s obedient servants,
“THOMAS HASTINGS, Capt. R.N., and
Principal Storekeeper.
“J.F. BURGOYNE.
“J.S. COLQUHOUN, Lieut.-Col. R.A.

“To the Marquis of Anglesey, K.G. and K.C.B.”

Let the public now judge of the nature and value of those plans—of the merit of never having disclosed them, though exposed to severely trying circumstances, and also whether they are impracticable.

I have been told, on indubitable authority that during the late war with Russia an interchange of warlike plans took place between the English and French Governments. It was further pointed out to me but the other day, that a French journal of high authority had remarked to this effect, “_should a war arise between England and France, the latter power would bring warlike engines into play to which rifled cannon were a trifle_.” From this I make little doubt but that my plans _are_ known to the French Government, and if so, whenever they are applied, the people of this country will find them no “trifle”—for as the report just adduced infers, no power on earth can stand against them. It is one of my most bitter reflections that such plans have been utterly thrown away as regards our own nation, and that from the imprudence of Governments they may one day be turned against my own country.

In the late war with Russia, I twice offered these plans to the Government. The first time they were declared “_inexpedient!_” The second time I offered to _conduct them myself_, either against Cronstadt or Sebastopol—old as I was—the forts of Cronstadt being especially open to their application. As regarded Sebastopol, the question was put to me whether I would instruct two engineer officers in applying them? My answer was, “No, I have offered to risk my own life and reputation on their efficacy, but will not impart my mode of applying them to others, who may not, either from preconceived notions or professional jealousy of naval inventions, comprehend them.”

Had I not adduced the report of the last committees appointed to examine the plans, this might be thought the bombast of an old admiral whose physical vigour had outlived his judgment. I flatter myself, however, that more years of sharp experience than usually falls to the lot, even of admirals, has fixed my judgment of warlike operations too firmly to be shaken even by age. I repeat that should those plans ever be turned against ourselves, the English public will be in a condition to pronounce an opinion on that point.

The report of the committee gives me great credit for _not having made use of those plans elsewhere_. As before stated, I promised the Prince Regent never to divulge them except for the honour and advantage of my own country, and although driven from the profession of my choice I did not forget my promise.

It may be permitted me to add that when, in 1820, I came with four ships before the Castles of Callao, it was perfectly well known to me that money and property considerably exceeding in value a million sterling, besides all the plate in Lima, had been sent to these castles for security. I could, with the aid of a small portion of my plans only, and in spite of opposition, have possessed myself of this treasure in an hour, and my share could not have been less than half a million sterling.

Let posterity judge of my conduct, as compared with the blind enmity of those who persecuted me wrongfully. Yet there was every inducement to employ my own plans for my own benefit. When I entered the service of the South American States, my private income, never large, and entirely of my own creation, had been wholly wasted by the expenses consequent on forced litigation and in defending myself from an iniquitous prosecution. For more than four years I had been deprived of my professional income, and at forty years of age found myself thrown on the world to seek the means of making provision for myself and an increasing family.

Had I been indifferent to the welfare of my own country, my position, as Commander-in-Chief of the squadrons of Chili and Peru, and afterwards of the Brazilian squadron, would have enabled me to amass an immense fortune, by putting an early end to the wars of those countries through the adoption of secret plans, as the Governments of those states expected. For not having done so, they manifested their displeasure and declined to pay me the stipulated rewards for what I effected towards their liberation.

It was forcibly urged upon me by the South American governments that the unjust deprivation of rank and honour in my own country released me from any obligation to obey the injunction of secresy which had been imposed upon me, and that I ought to profit from my own discovery, by applying it to the ample opportunities before me. I can safely say, that love of country, alone restrained me from listening to their temptations, and that I did not yield to the great necessities of my position is now one of the proudest consolations of my life.

Yet I repeat—and the assertion will one day be confirmed—that these plans afford the infallible means of securing at one blow our maritime superiority and of thereafter maintaining it in perpetuity—of at once commencing and terminating war by one conclusive victory. A hundred millions employed in war could not complete the ruin of our maritime opponents so effectually as could be done by the simple methods indicated in my plans; and that too in spite of the apparently formidable fortifications and other defences of ports and roadsteads. The expenditure of millions in the construction of such works on the coasts of any country would be in vain, when any hostile power in possession of the knowledge of such means of attack, could at a trifling cost and with the utmost facility accomplish in a few hours any assignable amount of destruction without impediment from such costly but really impotent safeguards. Still more easily might this country protect itself by destroying at one blow the marine of an enemy, and that by a process which our most eminent engineer officers—as has been seen—have pronounced infallible.

It is somewhat singular—that, notwithstanding my admitted experience, as demonstrated by the acts and success of my early life, and notwithstanding the destructive character of my plans as certified by committees of the most eminent men to be found in both services, _I have never, throughout my whole life, been officially consulted on the means of defence of this country!_

This cannot have been accidental. It is not probable that any prime minister should consider himself so well up in naval matters as to despise my experience. Nor is it probable that he should prefer consulting officers who never saw a shot fired in actual warfare,—as was frequently the case previous to the Russian war,—to the opinions of one whom committees of the highest professional character had declared to be the inventor of plans which would totally change the aspect of war, and supersede every known system of warlike operations.

When the dominion of the sea, the existence of our mercantile marine, and the peace of Europe were—_as they are at this moment_—in question, it is nevertheless difficult to conceive this extraordinary inconsistency. Still there is the fact. None to whom my plans have been submitted, have ever pretended to throw doubt on their efficacy. Some, it is true, have said, “For heaven’s sake, don’t encourage such plans,—what is to become of us?” What? Universal peace: for after their disclosure not a man would be found to engage in war except for defence of his country, when, as was said of the cholera by an eminent French surgeon, “_Il cadavreisera le monde_.”

What can have been the cause of such neglect and contumely as I have suffered, under the full knowledge that such a secret was in my power? There can only have been two causes,—unmerited personal aversion without reason, or want of political courage to put my plans in execution. Whether of the two causes be accepted, they form the highest compliment which was ever paid to man, viz. _that no amount of neglect or persecution could induce me to betray my country_. The report of the committee paid me the compliment which is at least my right, and how great a compliment it is, futurity may one day unexpectedly have to decide.

No doubt to use such powers for ambitious purposes would be wicked; but what guarantee have we that if in the possession of ambitious nations, they may not be turned against us. To use them in the defence of order and civilisation would be praiseworthy, but to let the world know that we are at all times prepared to use them against aggression, would be a protection of the best interests of mankind no less than of our own. Such knowledge can only be dangerous to those who have cause to fear it, but to those possessing it it is power, strength, and safety.

The public is now in possession of all material circumstances connected with the subject, except the plans themselves, which, for obvious reasons, are, it is to be hoped, _still secret_.

I am not certain whether—were the plans disclosed—the advantage would not be in favour of publicity. Such disclosure would demonstrate that there could be no security in coast defences and other stationary asylums, on the construction of which it is now proposed to expend so many millions of the public money. It would show the inexpediency of an expenditure of ten—which may mean twenty—millions for the construction of forts and harbours, instead of applying half the amount to remodel and renovate the navy. The disclosure might have the effect of preventing useless expenditure, and of averting the danger of future parsimonious naval administration, by leading to the adoption of essential measures of nautical improvement, by which alone the safety of the country can be preserved.

The disclosure of these plans would also have the effect of binding over nations to keep the peace. Still less would the English public countenance the extravagant and inefficient projects devised for the protection of their insular position, open at all points, and only to be protected by a superior naval force, which shah avert danger on the first menace.

As the subject of fortifications is now uppermost in every man’s mind, I will venture a few remarks on my experience of this mode of defence.

A story is told of the Duke of Wellington which embraces the whole subject. On his appointment as Warden of the Cinque Ports, the inhabitants of Dover, well known for their keen scent of a profitable job, applied to the Duke for an increase of their fortifications, already a stupendous monument to the folly of those who have added to them.

The Duke’s reply was the perfection of military wisdom. “_The fortifications of Dover would be, no doubt, very useful if an enemy came in that way, but I don’t think he would! They might also be very useful if an enemy went out that way, but I don’t think he would!_” In that sentence is comprised the whole subject of fortifications, unless erected specifically for the defence of a dockyard or an arsenal, as at Portsmouth, Plymouth, &c. It is true that in his last years the Duke retracted his opinion in some degree, but I could never learn the reasons he assigned for so doing.

Why should an enemy go to a coast fortification when he can land miles away from it? I will take the instance of the Dover fortifications, which are amongst the most stupendous in this country. What is there to prevent an enemy from landing at Walmer, where there is nothing to oppose him but the six popguns in the flower garden of the Castle? He may effect a debarkation there at all times of the tide, in any wind and almost in any weather. The distance from the fortifications of Dover is little short of seven miles. By making a strong feint by sea on Dover, the garrison could not quit their works to prevent the disembarkation at Walmer, for if they did the feint would be turned into a real attack. Neither, when the disembarkation had been effected, would they be likely to quit their works for the purpose of harassing the invaders, for so surely as they marched out for this purpose a sufficient portion of the enemy would march in. The whole would simply amount to this, that the garrison, say 10,000 or 20,000, would be cut off from communication with the army elsewhere, and would thus be completely neutralised. Lastly, when disembarked at Walmer, the fortifications of Dover could not in the slightest degree interrupt the enemy’s communications by sea. Nothing but an efficient navy could do that; and with an efficient navy the disembarkation at Walmer would never be attempted. All this is plain enough; for, after all, military tactics are founded on common sense, and the amount of common sense decides their superiority.

Where fortifications are the key to a province, frequently advisable to capture them, and this may be an easier matter than military men in general are willing to admit. Of course, if they sit down before fortifications _secundum artem_, the matter is one merely of time and calculation, as we have learned at Sebastopol.

When on the coast of Chili I captured a province with 120 men only, and that by storming its fortifications. These were thirteen in number, and were garrisoned by 2000 men. I was accused of rashness for the attempt; yet no more doubted the fact of my success than I doubted the reality of the attack. It was simply a matter of well matured deliberation and calculation, in which, of course, the panic of the enemy formed an important item. The result was that I did not lose a man, whilst the enemy’s killed and wounded amounted to more in number _than my whole force_! With this in addition to my former experience it perhaps will not be wondered at that my respect for fortifications is by no means great, though my respect for an efficient navy _is_ excessive.