Chapter XXIV: A Naval Study for All Time (4)

There is nothing here from which it can be inferred that—to use Lord Gambier’s own words in his defence—I had driven him “to defend himself against the _loose and indirect accusations_ of an officer so much his inferior in rank.” I had made no accusation whatever against him, having merely and only declared that the service rendered was not worth the thanks of Parliament; the frequency of such thanks for trifling service being at that period so notorious as to become subject for sarcasm, as will appear in the next chapter. Had Lord Gambier construed my parliamentary opposition rightly, he might have thanked me for saving him from himself, and would have done so, had not his peculiar failing, vanity, demanded an ovation for services which under evil advice he had prevented from being fully consummated. So far from accusing Lord Gambier, _I was ordered by the Admiralty to do so_, and refused, to my own detriment[51]; telling the Board _to go to the logs of the fleet, and frame their own accusations, if they had any_. Yet, even this consideration did not prevent Lord Gambier from giving utterance to the following bombast;—

-----

Footnote 51:

See vol. i. p. 407.

-----

“Whether Lord Cochrane supposed that he might with impunity endeavour
to lower me in the opinion of my country and of my sovereign, signal
marks of whose favour had at that instant been exclusively conferred
upon himself,—whether his Lordship thought to _raise his own
reputation at the expense of mine_,—and whether he expected that his
threat would intimidate me to silence, I know not.” (_Minutes_, p.
108.)

How could I “raise my own reputation” at the expense of Lord Gambier, who had, in his first despatch, said that my conduct in the action of Aix Roads “could not be exceeded by any feat of valour hitherto achieved by the British navy;” though in his second despatch, substituted for the first after his return to England, and that too by order of the Board of Admiralty, he only remembered that I “lay with my ship about three miles from the enemy!” His lordship was not once within gunshot of the enemy, whilst my frigate was throughout engaged, and for some time single-handed, against two line-of-battle ships, and a fifty gun ship, the _Calcutta_, which I captured.

So far from “raising my reputation at the expense of Lord Gambier’s,” I voluntarily stated on the court-martial, that “the feelings of Lord Gambier for the honour and interest of his country were as strong as my own.” (_Minutes_, p. 40.) For which mark of good nature, his lordship said in his defence, that even “in the present proceedings, Lord Cochrane stands in a situation only as an officer _under my command_!” (_Minutes_, p. 107) the meaning of which evidently was that I ought not to say anything but by order. The expression could not have had any other meaning.

I will not enter further into Lord Gambier’s unfounded recriminations upon myself, further than to remark, that even had they any foundation, in no way did they bear upon the subject of the trial, much less were they in any way connected with his defence to the inquiry as to _why it was, that with a favourable wind, a rising tide, and plenty of water, he had refrained from attacking eleven ships helplessly ashore, allowing all but three to escape? This was the inquiry before the court, which, departing from the subject of inquiry, connived at its being substituted for recriminations on me for accusing Lord Gambier—though I had never done so._

Upon the real point Lord Gambier in his defence wisely abstained from trusting himself, except in such terms as the following. “_If_ he had sent in any ships, and they should have been necessitated to remain a whole tide in the Roads of Aix; _if_ they had been crippled in going in; _if_ the wind, which was favourable for carrying them in, should not have shifted so as to bring them out again; and that even, _if_ the wind were fair and they should lose their foremasts, the crews would not have been able to get the ships before the wind.” To this, I will add that “_if_,” instead of conjuring up these absurd dangers to be apprehended from an enemy of whom Lord Gambier had said to Captain Broughton, that they were “_already destroyed_,” his Lordship had sent in ships to finish the work, the court-martial would never have been heard of, and he would have enjoyed a legitimate triumph. I was not his enemy. Those who persuaded him not to second my efforts were so unquestionably.

Quitting these “_ifs_,” and calculations of possible risk and conjectural disasters, one or two points professionally connected with the defence remained to be noticed.

Lord Gambier knew, that during the ebb and rising tide, the enemy’s ships ashore were preparing to warp off with the flood, and he also knew that the only two enemy’s ships at anchor, the _Foudroyant_ and _Cassard_, which at the court-martial were converted into bugbears to the whole British fleet, would be prepared in case of the attack which they naturally expected, to cut or slip, and so run for the mouth of the Charente as they did, the moment the ships aground had warped off and escaped.

When the British fleet weighed from Basque Roads, the enemy was, as Captain Broughton testified “_panic struck_.” When, in place of proceeding straight on to the attack, the British ships _came to an anchor_ in Little Basque Roads, the enemy, as their own writers declare, considered “_la mollesse de Lord Gambier_” an unexpected stroke of good luck, and set energetically to work to warp off their ships from the bank on which they were stranded. As Captain Broughton rightly says, had the frigates and smaller vessels been _then_ sent in, and a demonstration only made of others ready to follow, the destruction of the whole must have been complete. This is neither a matter of naval tactics nor science, but a commonplace consequence. It was this which caused Captain Malcolm to say, “Had it appeared to me that there was no other chance of destroying them, but by such an attack, _I certainly think it ought to have been made_.” (_Minutes_, p. 211.) And again, “Had they been attacked by the British ships, they could not, in my opinion, _have been warped off from the shore_, as to do so, it was necessary to lay out anchors to heave them off.” (_Ibid._) There are no “_ifs_” or contingent disasters in Captain Malcolm’s opinion, which, as Captain Hutchinson pertinently remarks, was that of every officer in the fleet.

But even after the enemy’s ships had escaped, and the two at anchor, the _Foudroyant_ and _Cassard_ _had_ run for the Charente, the Commander-in-chief allowed an hour and a half to escape before a single ship was sent into the inner roads, nor would any have been sent at all had not I taken the _Impérieuse_ in alone, and then hoisted the signal “in want of assistance.” Had not this been done, not a single ship of the enemy’s fleet would have been destroyed, unless from the impossibility of getting her again afloat, and I am not aware that any such instance occurred.

To excuse this neglect, the hypothesis of banks and shoals, in the charts of Messrs. Stokes and Fairfax was resorted to, for they neither existed in the French charts, nor in reality. Coupled with this was the alleged danger of point blank shot from the dilapidated batteries!

“Scarcely,” says Lord Gambier, “had the _Cæsar_ reached Aix Roads, before she grounded, and _lay in a perilous situation exposed to the point blank shot of the batteries_.” (_Minutes_, p. 128.) Unfortunately for this hypothesis, a careful search in the _Cæsar’s_ log shows that _she was never once touched by shot or shell!!_ and that in place of grounding in Aix Roads, she grounded on the Boyart Sand—on her way to Aix Roads—and that she lay there beyond the reach of shot; thus proving what other officers testified, viz. that there was plenty of room in the channel to avoid shot. The _Cæsar_ only went a few feet too far, and came off next morning without damage of any kind.

A still less worthy part of the defence was, in laying the fault on myself and Captain, now Admiral Seymour, of the _Pallas_ that nothing more was done. “Lord Cochrane,” says the Commander-in-chief, “_remained_ in the Road of Aix, during the 13th and 14th, accompanied by the _Pallas_, sloops and gun-brigs, but nothing was attempted by those two frigates.” (_Minutes_, p. 129.) The fact was, that in the fight with the line-of-battle ships destroyed on the evening of the 12th, before any assistance came, the _Impérieuse_ was severely damaged, so much so, as to occupy the whole of the 13th in repairs. This was why Admiral Seymour so gallantly stood by us, and the 14th was occupied in vain attempts even then to get a force sent in. Had Admiral Seymour run the _Pallas_ alone amongst the line-of-battle ships which remained, at the mouth of the Charente, he would not have earned the high reputation he now enjoys. But when Lord Gambier threw out this questionable insinuation, he forgot to mention that Admiral Stopford lay at a short distance with two line-of-battle ships and half a dozen frigates, besides having our two frigates and all the smaller vessels under his command. Had Admiral Stopford been asked why, with such a force under his orders, he remained inactive, the reply would have not been to the Commander-in-chief’s credit. Admiral Stopford would not have been a spectator only, could he have helped himself.

I now quit this miserable subject for ever. The real fact is, that from over-persuasion of those who were jealous of a junior officer originating and being appointed to carry out plans deemed impossible by others, Lord Gambier declined to second my efforts, as Admiral Austen has plainly said in his letter previously quoted, the fact being as completely confirmed by Captain Hutchinson. This decision of his lordship was no doubt arrived at, when a council of officers were summoned on board the flag-ship, on the morning of the 12th, at which time the enemy’s fleet was lying helplessly ashore.

That, after such council, his Lordship never intended to make _any attack at all_ on the French ships, is proved _beyond question_, by the subjoined testimony of Captain Broughton.

“A ship or two might have been placed, in my opinion against the
batteries on the southern part of Ile d’Aix, so as to take off their
fire AND SILENCE THEM. I mentioned to Sir H. Neale, when the signal
was made for all captains in the morning, that I thought _they were
attackable_—speaking of the confused state in which the French ships
appeared to be at the time.”

“_I heard my Lord Gambier the same morning say_ (at this council) _it
had been his intention to have gone against the batteries I now speak
of, but as the enemy were on shore he did not think it necessary to
run any unnecessary risk of the fleet when the object of their
destruction seemed to be already obtained_.” (_Minutes_, pp. 221,
222.)

That is, he admits my exertions to have destroyed the French fleet, (which was not destroyed—all except three ships having escaped) and plainly tells Captain Broughton that _he will do nothing more_! This should for ever decide the point.

If, however, proof be still wanted of the utter worthlessness of any opposition in the power of the enemy to offer, whether by fortifications or ships, it is to be found in the following statement at the close of Lord Gambier’s defence:—

“I conclude by observing that the service actually performed has been
of great importance, as well in its immediate effects as in its
ultimate consequences; for the Brest fleet is so reduced as to be no
longer effective. It was upon this fleet the enemy relied for the
succour and protection of their West India colonies, and _the
destruction of their ships was effected in their own harbour, in sight
of thousands of the French. I congratulate myself and my country that
this important service has been effected, under Providence, with the
loss only of ten men killed, thirty-five wounded, and one missing._
NOT EVEN ONE OF THE SMALLEST OF OUR VESSELS EMPLOYED HAS BEEN DISABLED
FROM PROCEEDING ON ANY SERVICE THAT MIGHT HAVE BECOME NECESSARY.”
(_Minutes_, p. 138.)

By this voluntary admission of Lord Gambier I am willing to be judged—feeling certain that posterity will be as fully convinced of the inability of the enemy to inflict material damage on our ships, as was Lord Gambier himself, according to his own testimony, as quoted in the above passage. As Lord Gambier truly says, no damage worth mentioning _was_ done to any of our ships, to which I shall add, that at no period after the enemy’s ships were driven ashore were they in a condition to inflict damage. This his lordship not only admits, but _proves_, in the concluding paragraph of his defence, and yet the whole point of the trial is made to rest on the surmise that had Lord Gambier done _anything_ against the enemy’s ships aground, _the destruction of the British force must have been the consequence_. That is, _by doing nothing the enemy’s ships were destroyed; though by doing anything our own would have been in danger_!!!

The subjoined chart B will show, at a glance, the whole affair.

CHART B

---

ISLE D’AIX AND LES PALLES,

Being a tracing from the official French Chart, and showing the
positions of the enemy’s ships as they lay ashore on the morning of the
12th of April 1809, previous to their escape.

A. _Ocean_ three-decker and group on the north-west edge of the Palles
Shoal. These were permitted to escape.

B. _Calcutta_, captured by the _Impérieuse_ and set on fire.

C. _Ville de Varsovie_, hauled down her colours to the assisting
ships. Afterwards burned.

D. _Tonnerre_, ditto, ditto.

The last three were destroyed _on the falling tide_, but no others!
These being the only enemy’s ships which, after the escape of the
other four, remained assailable.

E. The position taken up by the _Impérieuse_, she being at the time of
the arrival of the assisting force engaged with the _Calcutta_, and
with the other two ships.

F. Position of the British ships sent in after the _Ocean_ and group
had warped off, viz. within pistol shot of the sand on which the
escaped ships lay till 1 p.m. aground.

The best comment, perhaps, on the whole affair of Aix Roads is what had previously been effected with a less force than that under Lord Gambier, and when the fortifications were perfect. The subjoined historical facts should for ever put an end to all controversy on the subject, and at the same time to the untenable defence set up at this memorable court-martial.

“A well-planned and vigorous attack on the coast of France being in
1757 much desired, with a view to give a decisive blow to the marine
of that kingdom (_the very purpose for which Lord Gambier was sent,
and which Lord Mulgrave especially impressed on me_), a fleet was
ordered to be got in readiness, under the command of Sir E. Hawke,
Rear-Admiral Knowles being appointed second in command. On the 20th of
September the fleet made the Island of Oleron, and Sir E. Hawke
ordered the Vice-Admiral to proceed to Basque Road, to stand in _as
near_ to Ile d’Aix as the pilot would carry him, with such ships of
his division as he thought necessary, and _to batter the fort, until
the garrison should either abandon it or surrender_.”

“On the 22nd of September the fleet entered the bay called the Road of
Basque, between the islands of Rhé and Oleron. _About eight the next
morning_ Admiral Knowles in the _Neptune_, with the _Magnanime_,
_Barfleur_, _America_, _Alcide_, _Burford_, and _Royal William_, _made
sail towards Aix_. Captain Howe (_afterwards Earl Howe_) in the
_Magnanime_ led the van. At _half-past twelve_ the fort upon the
island began to fire, but he continued to advance without exchanging a
single shot, continually urging his pilot to lay his ship as close to
the fort as possible. _He dropped his anchor under the very walls._ It
was, however, near an hour before the fort struck its colours.”
(_Biographical Memoir of Earl Howe in the Naval Chronicle_, vol. i.
1799; see also _Campbell’s Lives of the Admirals_.)

This was the very fort, only now _in ruins_,—or to use Lord Gambier’s words, “_no obstacle, from the dilapidated condition of the fortifications_”—that his lordship adduced as a reason for not endangering the British fleet by exposing the ships to its fire. Admiral Harvey had perhaps Lord Howe’s exploit in his mind’s eye when he told Lord Gambier to his face that “had Nelson been there, he would not have waited for fire-ships, but would have dashed at once at the enemy;” an assertion of which there can be no doubt, though poor Harvey was dismissed the service for this and similar opinions.

Another extract, from Lord Clarendon’s remarks on Admiral Blake, shall close the subject.

“He despised those rules which had been long in practice, to _keep his
ship and men out of danger, which had been held in former times a
point of great ability and circumspection; as if the principal art
requisite in the captain of a ship had been to be sure to come home
safe again_! He was the first man who brought ships to contemn
_castles on shore_, which had been thought ever very formidable, and
were discovered by him to _make a noise only, and to fright those who
could be rarely hurt by them_.” (CLARENDON’S _History of the
Rebellion_.)

CHAP. XXVIII.

THE VOTE OF THANKS.

MY MOTION FOR MINUTES OF COURT-MARTIAL.—MR. TIERNEY’S OPINION RESPECTING
THEM.—MR. WHITBREAD’S VIEWS.—THE MINUTES INDISPENSABLE.—MR.
WILBERFORCE ON THE SAME POINT.—LORD GREY’S OPINION OF THE
MINISTRY.—THE VOTE OF THANKS LEAVES OUT MY NAME, YET THE CREDIT OF
THE AFFAIR GIVEN TO ME.—INCONSISTENCY OF THIS.—I IMPUGN THE DECISION
OF THE HOUSE.—SIR FRANCIS BURDETT’S OPINION.—MR. WINDHAM’S.—LORD
MULGRAVE TURNS ROUND UPON ME.—HIS LORDSHIP’S MISREPRESENTATIONS.—YET
ADMITS THE SERVICE TO BE “BRILLIANT.”—LORD MULGRAVE REBUKED BY LORD
HOLLAND.—EARL GROSVENOR’S VIEWS.—LORD MELVILLE HITS UPON THE TRUTH,
THAT I, BEING A JUNIOR OFFICER, WAS LEFT OUT.—VOTE OF THANKS IN
OPPOSITION TO MINUTES.—THE VOTE, THOUGH CARRIED, DAMAGED THE
MINISTRY.

From this time forward I never trod the deck of a British ship of war at sea, as her commander, till thirty-nine years afterwards I was appointed by her present most gracious Majesty to command the West India squadron; the greater portion of the interval being marked by persecution of which the court-martial on Lord Gambier was only the starting-point.

The commencement of the parliamentary session in 1810, was remarkable for its votes of thanks, and the refusal of all information which might justify them. This led Lord Milton to declare in the House of Commons, that “votes of thanks, from their frequency, had lost their value, and ceased to be an honour. They had got so much into the habit of voting thanks that it was almost an insult not to vote them.” (Feb. 1st.)

On the 25th of January 1810, Lord Grenville adverted in the House of Lords to notice of motion for a vote of thanks to Lord Gambier, for _his_ services in destroying the enemy’s ships in Basque Roads; and observed that as the last intimation on the journals respecting Lord Gambier was his arrest, it would be necessary that the _Minutes_ of the court-martial should be laid before the House, in order to enable it to judge of the necessity for a vote of thanks. To this Lord Mulgrave strongly objected, on the ground that it “would appear as if it was wished to retry the case.” Laying the sentence of acquittal only before the House, said his lordship, would be “sufficient to render their proceedings regular, and would answer all the purposes of the noble lord.” With this the House was obliged to be content, though how that sentence had been obtained the reader is now made aware.

On the 29th of January, in pursuance of notice previously given, I made a motion for the production of the _minutes of the court-martial_ in the House of Commons; as being, from the extraordinary discrepancy between the nature of the evidence and the sentence, absolutely necessary, in order to enable members fairly and impartially to decide whether the thanks in contemplation of ministers _were due_ to Lord Gambier for the part he took in what had been by them denominated a victory in Basque Roads.[52]

-----

Footnote 52:

The action took place in Aix Roads. The only victory gained by Lord
Gambier in Basque Roads was that of bringing his ships to anchor there
whilst the enemy’s ships were quietly heaving off from the banks on
which they had been driven, nine miles distant from the fleet.

-----

In support of this production of the minutes, I adverted to a previously expressed opinion of the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Perceval), that Lord Gambier had been honourably acquitted, but that an officer’s having done no wrong _did not entitle him to the thanks of the House_; which, if bestowed on trifling, or, indeed, on any but brilliant achievements, would dwindle into contempt, even with those on whom they should be conferred. Votes of thanks were already lightly esteemed in the Navy, and I pledged myself—if the House would insist on the production of the minutes—to prove that “Lord Gambier’s defence was contradicted by itself—by his lordship’s official letters—and by his own witnesses; many of whom, as to essential facts, were at variance with themselves and with each other.” Lastly, I undertook to prove to the House, that the chart of the 12th of April was “in a most material point false—and in every respect a fabrication.”

I will not inflict on the reader a recapitulation of the long discussion which followed, but the opinions of some whose names are to this day held in respect are too much to the point to be passed over. The opinion expressed by Mr. Tierney is so remarkable that I shall give it entire as reported.

“The question was not as to the noble lord’s (Gambier) innocence, but
as to his claim to a most distinguishing reward. The honours of the
House were high things, dear and valuable; but dear only because they
implied merit, valuable only because that merit must be rare. Honours
too frequently bestowed lost their value, and became signs of nothing
but the weakness which lavished them, or the worthlessness on which
they were to be thrown away.

“He would vote for the minutes, but in his vote he begged to be
understood as merely calling for matter to enable him to shape his
opinion. He could mean no slight to Lord Gambier. He respected his
lordship’s character. He had some opportunities of hearing him spoken
of, and it was always in a high strain of praise and estimation. But
he had never understood that Lord Gambier took _any share_ of the
merit of the achievement to himself. _He had not approached the French
fleet nearer than seven miles._ Ministers had praised Lord Gambier for
discretion; _he hoped they had not intended this_ as an instance in
the enumeration of its proofs.

“It became the House to be cautious of being prodigal of honours
entrusted to their distribution. Lord Cochrane ought to be heard; his
judgment and character, his signal gallantry and signal honours[53]
deserved the serious attention of the House. Even his feelings, led as
they were, perhaps, astray by an excess of strength and sensibility,
deserved all the attention which could be paid to them.”

-----

Footnote 53:

The red ribbon.

-----

The opinions of Mr. Whitbread are no less remarkable. Sir C. Hamilton had said that the reason why no more ships were destroyed was solely attributable _to me!_ and that he would engage to prove it to the House.[54] Mr. Wynne also declared, on behalf of the Ministry, that the evidence was _all on Lord Gambier’s side!_ and opposed to it only my solitary evidence. This called up Mr. Whitbread, whose remarks are reported as follows:—

-----

Footnote 54:

He however omitted so to do.

-----

“The noble lord (Cochrane) had done wrong in returning any answer to
the application of the Admiralty.[55] He ought to have told them, as a
member of the House of Commons, he had no answer whatever to make; and
if they thought the logs _inconclusive_ why did they not manfully come
down and try the question in that House?

“The hon. gentleman (Mr. Wynne) talked of the injustice of trying an
officer in that House! Must not the merits of every officer be
inquired into when it is proposed to confer on him a vote of thanks?
Was he not _then_ on his trial? Was not that a species of trial to
which any officer must necessarily be exposed before he could receive
the high honour of the thanks of Parliament? After a court-martial, by
which Lord Gambier had been acquitted, did it follow, as a matter of
necessity that they must grant him the thanks of that House? He
presumed this by no means followed.

“What then was the situation to which the House was reduced? The noble
lord (Cochrane) had committed himself more than he had ever heard man
do in that House to prove his statements respecting the conduct of
Lord Gambier. And now a member (Sir C. Hamilton) came forward and said
that the duty intrusted to Lord Cochrane had not been properly
executed, and that if it had been he might have done far more injury
to the enemy’s ships. The hon. baronet (Hamilton) said that at the
time Lord Cochrane was in command, and made signals to the vessels
employed under him, ‘_some of them obeyed and others disobeyed_ the
instructions they received, and that those who disobeyed were
ultimately successful, whilst those who obeyed at the moment failed.’
The worthy baronet also added that ‘those who _disobeyed_ the signals
were promoted, whilst those who _obeyed_ were not.’ What would become
of the subordination of our Navy if our officers were to be informed,
in any one instance, that those who obeyed the instructions of their
superior officer were to be _passed by_, while those who disobeyed his
signals _might expect to be promoted_![56]

“From the disagreeable situation in which the House was placed on both
sides, he thought they must unavoidably have the _Minutes_.”

-----

Footnote 55:

Demanding the reasons for my opposition to the vote of thanks. See
vol. i. p. 404.

Footnote 56:

This admission by a ministerial partisan was true. It was chiefly
owing to this that the fireships, to use Lord Gambier’s words, “failed
to take effect on the enemy’s ships;” viz. by kindling them where they
drifted on the shoals or went wide of the enemy’s fleet.

-----

Various other opinions were expressed. Mr. Wilberforce thought acquiescence in my motion for the production of the minutes “most important, as throwing a _stigma on all the members of the court-martial_;” which was true enough, one of my objects being to show that the influence of a corrupt government had been used to vitiate a tribunal upon which the very safety of the Navy depended. How far I should have succeeded in this may be left to the reader’s judgment.[57]

-----

Footnote 57:

See Lord Grey’s expressions, _infra_.

-----

Mr. Ponsonby would not agree to the motion because its adoption would be a violation of the fundamental principles of jurisprudence. Sir Francis Burdett said, that “Lord Gambier’s plan seemed to be a desire _to preserve his fleet_—my plan, to destroy the enemy’s fleet. He had never heard that the articles of war held out an instruction to preserve the fleet. What if Nelson, at the Nile or Trafalgar, had acted on this principle? He had never heard that Lord Gambier, in the affair of Basque Roads, pretended to have done any hard, or even important service. His only merit seemed to consist in what he omitted to do.”

Having thus been put on my defence by direct accusation on the part of a Ministerial supporter that I had not done my duty, I implored the House to give me an opportunity, not only of defending myself, but of laying bare matters of more importance to the country than either my judgment or character. I again pledged myself to prove all I had asserted, and to stake everything that was valuable to man on the issue, at the same time telling the House that, if the minutes were granted, I would expose such matters as might make the country tremble for its safety—and entreating it well to consider that there was another tribunal to which it was answerable, that of posterity, which would try all our actions and judge impartially.

Neither argument nor a sense of justice availed, and the word “_sentence_” was substituted for “_Minutes_,” in an amendment carried by a large majority of the faction, in that day dependent on and wielded by Ministers—of whose general conduct Lord Grey, in the opening debate of the session, thus thought it necessary to express himself:—“He was glad to find from the humble and chastened tone of Ministers that they _appeared to feel some remorse for the numerous miseries which, by their imbecility and misconduct they had inflicted on their country. Had it been otherwise, he should have supposed the Almighty vengeance was hanging over this nation, and that therefore the hearts of its rulers had been hardened in proportion as their understandings were darkened._” This merited censure from one of the great lights of that day and of all time, passed unheeded in the conduct of the session, which outdid its predecessors in acts of subserviency to the faction in power by whose supremacy it was felt that the rotten-borough interest could alone maintain itself against the national execration which was now beginning to make itself heard.

At the conclusion of the preliminary debate, the Chancellor of the Exchequer rose to move a vote of thanks to Lord Gambier for _his eminent services in destroying the French fleet_ in the Basque Roads! My name, as having effected anything, was _purposely and very ingeniously left out!_ but warm thanks were accorded to those who directed the fireships,—not against the enemy, but against the banks of the Boyart and Palles shoals!

The passage in the vote of thanks is curious: “for their gallant and highly meritorious conduct on this glorious occasion, _particularly marked by the brilliant and unexampled success of the difficult and perilous mode of attack by fireships, conducted under the immediate direction of Captain Lord Cochrane_!” Yet Lord Gambier stated in his defence, “The success of the first part of the enterprise arose from the terror excited by the _appearance_ of the fireships! _as they failed in the principal effect they were intended to produce_.” (_Minutes_, p. 131.) If the House had been in the possession of the minutes of the court-martial, would they have voted thanks to officers of whom the Commander-in-chief says that they “_failed in their object_”? Not a word of thanks to me for having conducted it, but to the Commander-in-chief, then twelve miles off, his only merit consisting in coming three miles nearer, anchoring out of gunshot—and to men whom a ministerial supporter had praised by saying they had been promoted for “_disobeying my signals_!” And this though the First Lord of the Admiralty had offered me his own regiment—a squadron of frigates, with _carte blanche_ to do what I pleased with them—and a vote of thanks, conjointly with Lord Gambier, if I would not offer any opposition!

The value of such a vote under such circumstances had been rightly estimated, even by those who acquiesced in it. The value of the service rendered was paltry, in comparison with what it ought to have been; and the vote, either to myself or my superiors, would have been worthy of it. I had from the first refused to have my name coupled with such pretence, as a fraud on national honours.

Yet, leaving me altogether out of the vote of thanks, so long as thanks were voted, and giving them to the Commander-in-chief and the officers under “my immediate direction,” was a specimen of party spite so transparent that it could deceive nobody. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, either ashamed of his subject, or forgetting the purpose in hand, most unaccountably gave me in his harangue _the credit of the whole affair_! He could only have done this from two motives. Either he was too much a gentleman to permit his personal honour to be trampled under foot by his colleagues, or he could not have read the vote of thanks till he came to it at the conclusion of his speech. There is, however, a third hypothesis. The subjoined eulogy might have been pronounced to blind the House.

“The attack having thus recommenced on the night of the 13th
successively[58] was followed up on the next day by the noble lord
(Cochrane)[59] with peculiar gallantry. The consequence was that no
less than three sail of the line and a fifty-gun ship were completely
destroyed. The House would not, therefore, he trusted, be disposed to
refuse its thanks _for eminent services when performed under such
great peril and risk_, whilst the enemy were possessed of the
protection of their own batteries[60], and other advantages which they
could bring into play for the security of their own vessels. _It was
an enterprise of great and peculiar hazard and difficulty._ The result
had been highly injurious to the enemy, and had the effect of not only
disabling but of removing the enemy’s whole squadron from the
possibility of being for a considerable time available for the
purposes of the naval campaign. _Was not this an object of great
magnitude?_”

-----

Footnote 58:

There was no attack at all on the night of the 13th, for all the ships
taken were destroyed on the afternoon and night of the 12th.

Footnote 59:

No such thing. I followed up nothing on the 14th, except trying to
evade Lord Gambier’s signals of recall. A pretty clear proof that the
Chancellor had never even read the despatches, and less the minutes of
the court-martial!

Footnote 60:

About which I did not trouble myself, and by which the _Impérieuse_
was not once hit.

-----

From this speech it is clear that the Chancellor of the Exchequer considered that the whole success was attributable to my exertions, and it is no less apparent that he contemplated my being included in the vote of thanks.

Then why leave me out of the vote of thanks, and give thanks to those who had nothing to do with this “_work of great magnitude_?”

Lord Mulgrave made no such blunder in the House of Lords, nor even mentioned my name _except in terms of reprobation_—possibly because I refused his lordship’s temptation of a squadron and a regiment to hold my peace! Yet it may be that the Chancellor of the Exchequer made no mistake. His eulogy might have been merely intended to appeal to the popular ear, whilst contemptuously excluding me from the vote. Be this as it may, the trick succeeded, and my voice was drowned amidst the clamour of faction, as were the voices of those who supported me in the House.

Still I was not disposed to allow the vote to pass without further protest. I again warned the House that “even their verdict was not conclusive upon character, but that there was another tribunal to which even that House was amenable, and that the public would one day exercise a judgment, even though the House might shrink from a just decision. I inquired what portion of Lord Gambier’s exploit merited thanks, or what had been the nature of his exploit? He lay at a distance—never brought his fleet to the place of action, or even within danger, and yet for such supineness he was to receive the highest honours of his country! The ground taken by ministers was frivolous—that where the subordinates admittedly deserved the praise, the superiors must receive it. The public _would one day read the minutes, though the House would not. The public would judge from the facts, though the House would not. The public would not submit to have its eyes bound because the House chose to keep theirs shut._ Let a single reason be adduced for this vote of thanks, and I was ready to vote for it—but the _reasons_ which had been obtruded on the House were unworthy the name of _arguments_.”

Sir John Orde, of all the supporters of the ministry, gave the only honest reason for his vote in favour of Lord Gambier, though probably his argument might not pass current at the present day. It was this:—“As thanks to his Lordship have been proposed, I shall vote for them, because I entertained this opinion of Lord Gambier’s conduct before the prorogation of Parliament, _and their Lordships of the Admiralty appeared to do the same_!!” Poor Sir John! He must have had better reasons for his arguments than arguments for his reasons.

A few more reasonable opinions than that of worthy Sir John shall be transcribed _verbatim_, and first those of Sir Francis Burdett:—

“Sir Francis Burdett wished to know whether the service of Lord
Gambier was worth the thanks of Parliament, even admitting it to have
all the value attributed to it by anything but the unblushing and
profuse spirit of ministerial favouritism.[61] He would not ask
whether, on the other hand, there was not the full and decided
testimony of a man competent to give his judgment, and of whose
admirable valour and good fortune the House and the nation had but one
opinion? He felt that in making these observations he might be
treading on perilous ground. He was probably bringing on himself some
charitable retorts, particularly those of a gentleman whose charity
was of a very peculiar nature. But he was careless about such remarks;
for though he deprecated that person’s charity, he would not shun but
would rather court his hostility.[62]

“Had there been anything said to make out a reason of the vote
demanded? Where was the evidence of the Commander-in-chief’s
_intrepidity or skill? Of that boldness which bursts its way through
all obstacles? Of that genius before which obstacles vanish?_ In place
of this, the House was insulted with a dry catalogue of negatives, and
an account as to how the noble Admiral inspected the action _at a
distance of seven miles_.[63] The question had been treated lightly;
but levity was unbecoming the grave matter for their deliberation.”

-----

Footnote 61:

Lord Gambier had recently been a colleague of the Lords of the
Admiralty.

Footnote 62:

Mr. Croker, who did not, however, respond to the challenge of my
excellent colleague. Had he done so, the House would, no doubt, have
been highly amused at the result. But Mr. Croker was “wise in his day
and generation.”

Footnote 63:

Nine.

-----

Mr. Windham said:—

“The thanks of that House did not deserve to be lavished on any man,
unless his services were of that rank which forced itself into
universal report and universal admiration. It was not to be evolved in
some obscure process of official chemistry, not to be drawn out under
bundles of obscure records, not to be elicited by any keen, cunning,
recondite, subtilising process[64] beyond the practice or perception
of the general mass of mankind. To be praised, it must be known; to
become matter of thanks, it must be matter of public fact.

In voting thanks it was time to pause. These old rewards had become
worthless. It had been said that nothing was left but the peerage, and
even of that high honour ministers had been most lavish. This was the
natural process when there was no distinct scale of merit and reward.
It was high time to stop. They had in their hands the great provision
for national virtue. They had the honours of the country intrusted to
them, and it became them as legislators not to suffer its streams to
be idly diverted, nor to be prodigally and profusely poured forth to
slake the thirst of undeserving ambition, still panting, still
insatiable.”

-----

Footnote 64:

Alluding to the court-martial.

-----

Argument and fact were alike unavailing, and Sir John Orde’s extraordinary reasons and opinions prevailed. To 161 of the Admiralty opinion, only 39 could be found alive to a true sense of legislative dignity or functions.

A few remarks on what passed in the House of Lords, where similar thanks were voted, are necessary.

Lord Mulgrave said that it was with great surprise that he first heard that a noble lord serving under the noble Admiral, and a member of another House, had intimated his intention to oppose the vote of the House of Commons, on the ground that his commander had not done his duty to _the utmost_. Lord Mulgrave, of course, alluded to my conversation with him nine months before, though I never said anything of the kind to his Lordship. What I said was, “that the Commander-in-chief had not done anything deserving the thanks of Parliament.” Had the _Minutes_ been allowed to be produced in either House, this would have been proved beyond question, in spite of the _sentence of acquittal_, which was alone laid on the table.

Lord Mulgrave was no less unjust in attempting to convince the peers that I had done nothing but carry out _Lord Gambier’s plan of fireships_; referring them to Lord Gambier’s letter of March 19th, 1809, in which, instead of recommending an attack by fireships, Lord Gambier had denounced such an attempt as “_hazardous, if not desperate_,”[65] as would have appeared had the minutes of the court-martial been laid before them.

-----

Footnote 65:

See Lord Gambier’s letter, Vol. I. p. 342.

-----

Mine, as explained in the first volume, was not an attack by fireships alone, for such an attack could only have ended in the boarding of the fireships by the enemy’s row-boats, and the murdering of the crews. It was an attack by means of explosion-vessels, which should impress the enemy with the idea that every fireship was similarly charged, so as to have the effect of deterring them from boarding, and thus, the fireships, had they been properly directed, must have done their work in spite of the enemy’s row-boats.

Yet Lord Mulgrave followed Lord Gambier in this “_suppressio veri_.” On the very day Lord Gambier had _not_ recommended the use of fireships—though Lord Mulgrave’s speech would lead the House, in the absence of the minutes of the court-martial, to infer that he _had_ recommended their use—the Commander-in-chief had stated that an attack with fireships would be “_hazardous, if not desperate_.” A curious way, truly, of recommending the use of fireships; though, had he recommended them, they would have been of no use without the explosion-vessels, the terror created by which formed the very essence of my plan, and was the sole cause even of the trifling success gained. Again, said Lord Mulgrave:—

“Lord Cochrane arrived at Plymouth. He had on a former occasion been
employed in blockading Rochefort, and was acquainted with the coasts.
He was, therefore, consulted, and _spoke with greater confidence of
the success of the attempt than those who wrote from that quarter_, It
was not, however, merely the zeal and _desire of execution_ he showed,
but also the talent he displayed in meeting the objections _started by
naval men_, which induced the Admiralty to employ his Lordship.”

This representation was thoroughly incorrect. So far from there being any “desire of execution” on my part, I tried every means in my power to avoid being intrusted with the execution of my own—not Lord Gambier’s,—plans as Lord Mulgrave insinuated. He, however, unconsciously admitted that other naval men “started” such objections, that they could not be got to undertake an attack with fireships, and therefore the duty was _thrust_ on me, with the addition of the explosion-vessels I had suggested, thus convincing the Admiralty Board that an attack, on my plan, was both easy of execution and certain in its result. Lord Mulgrave’s expression of “those who wrote from that quarter,” viz Lord Gambier, showed that the Commander-in-chief had _no confidence_ in fireships. Neither had I, unless accompanied by my plan of explosion-vessels.

Still persisting that this was an attack by fireships merely, Lord Mulgrave told the House that it was nothing new, which was the case, if the explosion-vessels were left out, but that—

“In the course of the last century there were two services performed
by fireships; the first in 1702 at Vigo, and the second off Minorca in
1792. But _what was the present service_? Recollect, a fleet protected
by _shoals and currents_, in sight of their own coast, and in presence
of their countrymen. _Nothing in the annals of our Navy was more
brilliant!_”

Who, then, performed that “_brilliant_” service, than which nothing could be more satisfactory? Lord Mulgrave told the House that Lord Gambier did, _whilst lying with his fleet nine miles off_, and reluctantly sending two line-of-battle ships and some frigates to my “assistance,” when almost too late to rescue me from the dilemma into which, in sheer despair of anything being done, I had voluntarily rushed, with the determination that if my frigate was sacrificed, while he was calmly looking on, he should take the consequences, and what they would have been I need not say. It was this act of mine, and this only, which caused the paltry service to be effected of destroying two line-of-battle ships and a store ship, instead of the whole enemy’s fleet!

Lord Mulgrave’s statements were severely rebuked by Lord Holland:—

“Lord Holland represented in strong terms the light in which ministers
placed themselves before Parliament and the country by coming forward,
so hastily in the first instance to procure thanks, and then suddenly
sending Lord Gambier to a court-martial _with the thanks on their
lips_. He thought that in a case of parliamentary thanks the case
should be _clear and strong_ to receive such a reward. What said Lord
Cochrane in his reply to the Admiralty?[66] ‘_Look at and sift the
log-books!_ and not ask me for accusations.’ He (Lord Holland)
condemned the precipitancy of ministers, who by their measures had
endeavoured to _stultify the House as they had already stultified
their own administration_.

“After sending Lord Gambier through the ordeal of a court-martial,
Lord Mulgrave now came down, pronounced his praises, and called upon
the House to vote him their thanks! It was not in this manner that the
French government conducted itself towards their admirals and
generals. They instituted a very severe inquiry as to this affair at
Basque Roads, and many of their commanders were most severely
punished.[67] They did not give thanks to General Monnet for his
defence of Flushing, but, on the contrary, censured his conduct most
severely.[68]

“If the barren thanks of both Houses of Parliament were _often to be
voted in this way, they would soon cease to be of any value_. The
noble Lord (Mulgrave) had said a great deal about the battle of
Talavera, and the resistance made to the vote of thanks in that
instance. Now it did not appear to him (Lord Holland) that the battle
of Talavera could have anything to do with the action of Basque Roads
or with the conduct of Lord Gambier. But if resistance to the vote of
thanks to Lord Wellington were adduced as a proof of party motives, it
might well be considered a proof of party spirit on the other side to
bring forward motions of thanks for services of such a description as
were those of Lord Gambier.”

-----

Footnote 66:

See Vol. I. p. 408.

Footnote 67:

For having, as Buonaparte afterwards said (see Vol. I. p. 421),
suffered themselves to be terrified by the explosion-vessels, so as to
take every fireship for one, and then to run their ships ashore in
order to avoid the impending danger; this result forming the very
essence of my plan. Poor Captain Lafon of the _Calcutta_ was shot,
_not for surrendering to Lord Gambier’s fleet_, but to the
_Impérieuse_ frigate under my command, she being a vessel of inferior
force to the _Calcutta_.

Footnote 68:

Though he had thwarted, but not so effectively as he might have done,
the powerful armament mentioned at the commencement of the next
chapter.

-----

The remarks of other noble lords were more to the purpose:—

“Earl Grosvenor did not think the services of Lord Gambier of such a
nature as to require the particular thanks of the House. He thought
such should only be given on very signal and important victories.
Nobody could doubt they were due to Lord Howe for his victory on the
1st of June, to Lord Duncan for his victory at Camperdown; to Lord St.
Vincent for his glorious achievements near the cape which gave him his
title, or to the immortal Nelson for the splendid exploits with which
he had adorned our naval history. These were things which spoke for
themselves, and nobody could doubt the propriety of voting thanks, as
it were, by acclamation. He thought, however, _the services of Lord
Gambier were of a very inferior description, and called for no such
reward_.”

“Earl Darnley had no objection to the vote of thanks, but at the same
time he thought the present vote one of the efforts now too often
resorted to _to throw a false lustre on the Government_. To compare
the services rendered by Lord Gambier at Basque Roads with the battles
of the Nile or Trafalgar would be the height of presumption!”

Lord Darnley was right; the vote itself, no less than the assumption of victory, where, through the pusillanimity of the Commander-in-chief, none had been achieved, had no other object than to “throw a false lustre upon a Government” powerful in rotten-borough influence, but justly mistrusted by all besides, whether in Parliament or out of it. Because I acted practically and conscientiously on these sentiments, I have been marked through life an object of party malevolence.

However dexterous might be the ministerial legerdemain which could convert into victory the admitted intention of the Commander-in-chief _not to fight_,[69] Lord Melville alone exposed the real secret of the matter:—

Footnote 69:

See Captain Broughton’s Evidence, p. 95.

“Lord Melville conceived the Admiralty to have acted extremely wrong
in giving to Lord Cochrane a command so contrary to the usual rules of
the service, and which must have been so galling and disgusting to the
feelings of other officers in Lord Gambier’s fleet. He respected as
much as any man could the zeal, intrepidity, and enterprise of Lord
Cochrane, but it was wrong to presume that these qualities were
wanting in officers of that fleet of superior standing to his
Lordship. Such a selection naturally put Lord Cochrane upon attempting
enterprises whereby great glory might be obtained.”

Here lies the gist of the whole matter. Had I devised the plan of attack, and had the Board of Admiralty acceded to my earnest wish, and left it to my seniors to execute, or had I persisted in my determination to refuse a command which the Admiralty literally forced upon me, all would have been well. Even had Lord Mulgrave fulfilled his promise of satisfying the _amour-propre_ of the fleet—which he neither did nor intended to do—all might have been well. As it was, I was exposed to the full amount of hostility which formed my reason for declining the command in the first instance.

It was felt—as Admiral Austen plainly says—by the officers of the fleet in Basque Roads, that a decisive victory would elevate me in national estimation over my seniors, as it unquestionably would have done. Lord Gambier was an easy man, and the “shoal and current” bugbear was successfully used to bring the fleet to an anchor in place of going on to the attack, he knowing no better, and having taken no trouble to ascertain the fact; in short, confining himself to mere blockade. This was the fault of the Commander-in-chief, but it did not justify him in bringing forward charts made up for the purpose of proving imaginary dangers from ruined fortifications and shoals where none existed.[70] Nor did it justify the evidence of influenced witnesses to _prove_ danger—in defiance of his Lordship’s own admission that _no ship suffered injury_![71] It did not justify his Lordship in assuming many things in his defence, which were not in evidence at all, and many more things that were totally at variance with the evidence contained in the minutes. To have declined pushing an advantage to victory, in deference to the jealousy of senior officers, was one thing; to trump up a story of _an old storeship breaking up a boom of more than a mile in lineal extent, and moored with a hundred anchors, was another_.

-----

Footnote 70:

See Captain Broughton’s evidence, p. 64.

Footnote 71:

See Lord Gambier’s defence, p. 100.

-----