Chapter XXIV: A Naval Study for All Time (1)

CHARTS, ETC., SUPPLIED BY THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT.—REFUSED BY A FORMER
GOVERNMENT.—ALTERATION MADE IN THE CHARTS.—MR. STOKES’S
AFFIDAVITS.—LETTER TO SIR JOHN BARROW.—SINGULAR ADMIRALTY
MINUTE.—SECOND LETTER TO SIR JOHN BARROW.—THE CHARTS AGAIN
REFUSED.—MY DEPARTURE FOR CHILI.—RENEWED APPLICATION TO THE
ADMIRALTY.—KINDNESS OF THE DUKE OF SOMERSET.—DIFFERENCE OF OPINION
AT THE ADMIRALTY.

It will be asked, “How is it that the matters recorded in the present volume are, after the lapse of fifty years, for the first time made public?”

The reply is, that it was not till after the publication of the preceding volume that I have been enabled to place the subject in a comprehensible point of view[1], and that only through the high sense of justice manifested by the late and present First Lords of the Admiralty, in furnishing me with charts and logs, access to which was prohibited by former Boards of Admiralty. On several previous occasions the attempt has been made, but from the obstinate refusal of their predecessors to afford me access to documents by which alone truth could be elicited, it has not hitherto been in my power to arrive at any more satisfactory result than that of placing my own personal and unsupported statements in opposition to the sentence of a court-martial.

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Footnote 1:

This concession will, in the future narrative, render necessary a
slight recapitulation of some matters contained in the previous
volume, but not to any appreciable extent.

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The necessary materials being now conceded, in such a way as to enable me to prepare them for publication in detail, it is, therefore, for the first time in my power to vindicate myself. A brief recapitulation of former refusals, as well as of the manner in which I became possessed of such documentary testimony as will henceforth exhibit facts in a comprehensive point of view, is desirable, as placing beyond dispute matters which would otherwise be incredible.

My declaration previous to the court-martial—that it was in my capacity as a member of the House of Commons alone that I intended to oppose a vote of thanks to Lord Gambier, on the ground that no service had been rendered worthy of so high an honour—will be fresh in the remembrance of the reader[2]; and also that when, at the risk of intrenchment on the privilege of Parliament, the Board of Admiralty called upon me officially to accuse his lordship, I referred them to the logs of the fleet for such information relative to the attack in Aix Roads as they might require[3];—it nevertheless became evident that I was regarded as his lordship’s prosecutor! though, _throughout the trial, excluded from seeing the charts before the Court, hearing the evidence, cross-examining the witnesses, or even listening to the defence!_[4]

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Footnote 2:

See my conversation with Lord Mulgrave, vol. i. pp. 345, 346.

Footnote 3:

See my letter to the Secretary of the Admiralty, vol. i. p. 408.

Footnote 4:

See Minutes of Court-martial, p. 228.

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On the acquittal of Lord Gambier, the ministry did not submit the vote of thanks to Parliament till six months afterwards, viz. in the session of the following year, 1810. To myself, however, the consequences were—as Lord Mulgrave had predicted—immediate; bringing me forthwith under the full weight of ministerial displeasure. The Board of Admiralty prohibited me from joining the _Impérieuse_ in the Scheldt.

The effect of this prohibition in a manner so marked as to be unmistakeable as to its cause, produced on my mind a natural anxiety to lay before the public the reasons for a proceeding so unusual, and, as a first step, I requested of the Board permission to inspect the charts upon which—_in opposition to the evidence of officers present at the attack_—the decision of the court-martial had been made to rest. The request was evaded, both then and afterwards, even though persisted in up to the year 1818, when it was officially _denied_ that the original of the most material chart was in the possession of the Admiralty. Even inspection of _a copy admitted to be in their possession_ was refused.

An assertion of this nature might be dangerous were not ample proof at hand.

It having come to my knowledge, from certain affidavits filed in the Court of Admiralty by Mr. Stokes, the master of Lord Gambier’s flagship, on whose chart the acquittal of Lord Gambier had been based—that, _after the lapse of eight years from the court-martial!_ material alterations had been made _by permission of the Board itself and under the direction of one of its officers_—I naturally became suspicious that the charts might otherwise have been tampered with; the more so, as neither at the court-martial, nor at any period subsequent to it, had I ever been allowed to obtain even a sight of the charts in question.

The very circumstances were suspicious. On the application for head-money to the Court of Admiralty in 1817, the Court had refused to receive Mr. Stokes’s chart, on account of its palpable incorrectness. On this, Mr. Stokes applied to the Admiralty for permission _to alter his chart_! The permission was granted, and in this altered state it was received by the Court of Admiralty, which, on Mr. Stokes’s authority, decreed that the head-money should be given _to the whole fleet_, contrary to the Act of Parliament, _instead of the ships which alone had taken part in the destruction of the enemy’s vessels_.

Fearful that material erasures or additions had been made, I once more applied to the Board for permission to _inspect_ the alterations. The request was again refused, though my opponents had been permitted to make what alterations and erasures they pleased.

The following are extracts from the above-mentioned affidavits of Mr. Stokes:—

Extract from the affidavit, sworn before the High Court of Admiralty on
the 13th of November, 1817, of Thomas Stokes, master of the
_Caledonia_, as to the truth of the MSS. chart, upon which the
acquittal of Lord Gambier was based; _before_ the Court of Admiralty
rejected his chart, and _before_ the alterations were made.

“And this deponent maketh oath that the annexed paper writing marked
with the letter A, being a chart of Aix Roads, _is a true copy[5]
made by this deponent_ of an original French chart found on board
the French frigate _L’Armide_ in September, 1806, which _original
chart is now in the Hydrographic Office in the Admiralty_, and by
comparing the same with the original chart he is enabled to depose,
and _does depose that the said chart is correct and true_, and that
the soundings therein stated accurately describe the soundings at
low water, to the best of his judgment and belief.”

Extract from a second affidavit, sworn by Mr. Stokes, before the High
Court of Admiralty, on the 17th of April, 1818, _after_ the Court
had refused to admit his chart from its incorrectness; and _after_
the alterations had been made!

“Appeared personally, Thomas Stokes, master in the Royal Navy, and made
oath that the original MSS. chart found on board the French frigate
_L’Armide_, and marked A, annexed to his affidavit of the 13th of
November, 1817, were delivered at the Hydrographic Office at the
Admiralty, and this deponent for _greater convenience of reference!
inserted a scale of a nautic mile!!_ the original manuscript chart
having only a scale of French toises; that in inserting a scale of a
nautic mile, this deponent _had allowed a thousand French toises to
a nautic mile_, and that Mr. Walker, the Assistant-Hydrographer,
accordingly made the erasures which now appear on the face of the
chart!” &c.

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Footnote 5:

The original was neither produced at the court-martial nor before the
Court of Admiralty. A far greater and more deliberate error will
appear in a future chapter.

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In these affidavits Mr. Stokes first distinctly swore that his chart, copied from a French MSS. was _correct_; 2ndly—when detected by the Court of Admiralty—that it was _incorrect_; 3rdly—that the original was _deposited in the Hydrographic Office at the Admiralty_.

My application to Sir John Barrow, then Hydrographer to the Admiralty, was as follows:—

“May 4th, 1818.

“SIR,—As it appears by the affidavit of which I enclose a copy that
two charts of Aix Roads, the one stated to be a copy of the other,
were deposited in the Hydrographic Office, and that the one
_purporting to be the copy_ has been delivered up for the purpose of
being exhibited as evidence on the part of my opponents in a cause now
pending in the High Court of Admiralty, and as it further appears that
_an alteration_ in the last-mentioned chart was made by Mr. Stokes,
and a further alteration by Mr. Walker, Assistant-Hydrographer, I have
to request that the Right Honourable the Lords Commissioners will be
pleased to permit me to see the other or original chart of Mr. Stokes
still remaining at the Hydrographic Office, in order that I may be
enabled to judge for myself of the nature and effect of the
alterations now acknowledged to have been made on the charts. The
reasonableness of this request will, I presume, be manifest to their
Lordships, and the more especially, seeing that my opponents _are not
only allowed similar access, but have been permitted to withdraw one
of the said charts for the purpose of exhibiting it in evidence_,
notwithstanding that a variation from the original has been avowedly
made therein.

I have, &c.,
“COCHRANE.

“Sir John Barrow, Hydrographer, &c.”

To this request Sir John Barrow, on the 6th of May, returned the following refusal:—

“As Mr. Stokes’s charts have been restored to him, and _a copy_ made
for the use of the office, I am directed to acquaint your Lordship
that my Lords cannot comply with your request in respect _to the
original chart_, and as to _the copy_ of the chart made in this office
and now remaining here, their Lordships _do not feel themselves at
liberty to communicate it_.

“I have the honour, &c.
“JOHN BARROW.”

This refusal was accompanied by the following copy of a minute from the Admiralty: in which it was pretended that Stokes had only _lent_ the original chart to the Hydrographer’s office, _to be copied for the use of the Hydrographic Department_—though it had been made use of to acquit an admiral, to the rejection of the charts of the fleet, as will presently be seen.

“Mr. Stokes _lent_ the original chart to the Hydrographer’s office, to
be copied for the _use of that department_.

“Mr. Stokes then went abroad.

“On his return he applied for his chart, which being _mislaid_ they
gave him the _copy_.

“Stokes, finding the alteration objected to in a court of law, applied
about a month since for his own chart, the _original_ of which was
_restored to him_, copy being made.”—23, 141, 147.

To this singular communication and minute I returned the subjoined reply:—

“13, Henrietta Street, Covent Garden.
18th May, 1818.

“SIR,—Your letter of the 6th of May was delivered to me as I was going
out of town, consequently I had no opportunity of referring to
documents which I have since consulted, in order to refute the
statements which the Lords of the Admiralty appear to have received.

“You inform me, by command of their Lordships, that ‘it appears by a
report from the Hydrographer that Mr. Stokes had become possessed of
the original chart which he _lent_ to the Hydrographer’s office for
the use of that department.’ This appears to imply that Mr. Stokes
became possessed of the original chart at the time of the attack in
the _Charente_ under Lord Gambier, whereas Mr. Stokes made oath that
it was taken from the _Armide_ in 1806, two years and a half previous
to the attack in question. As it does not appear from the Minutes of
the court-martial on Lord Gambier that the original chart was then
produced, and as it is not now forthcoming in the cause now pending in
the Court of Admiralty, I am compelled to disbelieve its existence, or
at least to believe that it underwent material alterations after it
came into Mr. Stokes’s possession. The original ought to have been
exhibited with the copy at the trial of Lord Gambier, and both either
were or ought to have been filed in the office of the Admiralty with
the Minutes of the proceedings; but whether _either_ are so filed
their Lordships _have not permitted me to ascertain_.

“If the original were filed, it could not afterwards have been ‘_lent_
by Mr Stokes to the Hydrographer’s office to be copied for the use of
that department.’ Even had the copy only been filed—sworn as it was by
Mr. Stokes ‘_to be correct!_’ there could have been no necessity—if
Mr. Stokes was deemed worthy of belief—for the Hydrographer to _borrow
the original_. _Eight years_ having elapsed since the court-martial on
Lord Gambier, you inform me that ‘Mr. Stokes on his return from abroad
applied for his chart accordingly, which chart happening to be
mislaid, he was furnished _with the copy_ in question,’ viz. that
‘made for the use of the Hydrographer’s department.’ It is important
to observe that _this is completely at variance with the affidavit_ of
Mr. Stokes, who swears that ‘_he himself made the copy_,’ and that
‘_both the copy and the original were delivered at the Hydrographic
Office!_’ It cannot fail to be observed, that to ‘deliver’ a chart at
the Hydrographic Office, and to ‘_lend_ a chart to be copied for the
use of that department’—the language of the letter before me—are
different expressions, conveying widely different meanings.

“It is also material to observe that it is strange alterations _at
all_ should have been made on a chart represented to be a _copy_ of an
_original_, and exhibited as evidence in a court of law. That such
original _is not forthcoming_ is a very material and a very
_suspicious circumstance_. If it be true, or if there really be any
other chart than that which is described as a copy and _admitted_ to
be altered, I may fairly infer that such altered copy differs so
materially and so fraudulently from the original, or that the
original—so called—is itself so palpable a fabrication, or has so
obviously been altered, that Mr. Stokes and his employers _do not dare
to exhibit it in a court of law_; and have withdrawn it from the
Hydrographer’s office for the purpose of suppressing so convincing a
proof of the fraud practised on Lord Gambier’s trial.

“Exclusive of the glaring contradiction between the statements of Mr.
Stokes on the court-martial, and that which you have been commanded to
make to me, when it is considered that Mr. Stokes is detected in
_having altered_ a document which he exhibits in a court of law as a
correct copy of an original, and that he is no sooner detected than he
endeavours to defend the alteration by declaring that it proceeded
from the Hydrographer’s office, where the _original was deposited_;
and that upon such defence leading to an application for leave to
inspect the _original_, answer is made that such original _had merely
been borrowed of Mr. Stokes_, and had been returned to him _at his own
request_, and that request, too, made in consequence of the alteration
in the alleged copy _having been detected_—it is impossible not to
infer a juggle between Mr. Stokes, the Hydrographic Office, and others
whom I shall not here undertake to name, for the purpose of defeating
the ends of justice.

“COCHRANE.

“Sir John Barrow, Hydrographer, &c.”

Receiving no reply to this letter, I subsequently addressed the following to the Secretary of the Admiralty.

“9, Bryanstone Street, Portman Square,
2nd July, 1818.

“SIR,—I feel it proper to inclose to you, as Secretary of the
Admiralty, a copy of an affidavit, accompanied by a general outline of
the chart of Basque Roads, the originals of which are filed in the
High Court of Admiralty, by which their Lordships will clearly
perceive that five more ships of the line _might_ and _ought_ to have
been taken or destroyed, had the enemy been attacked between daybreak
and noon on the 12th of April. And I have to request, Sir, that you
will have the goodness to lay these documents before their Lordships
(as well as the inclosed printed case which they have already partly
seen in manuscript), with my respectful and earnest desire that their
Lordships may be pleased to cause the facts therein set forth to be
verified by comparing them with the original documents, logs, charts,
and records in their Lordships’ possession. I am the more solicitous
that the present Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty should adopt
this mode of proceeding, as it will enable them decisively to judge on
a subject of great national importance, and also to ascertain (what a
portion of the public know) that it is not by false evidence from
amongst the lower class of society alone that my character has been
assailed, in order not only to perpetuate the concealment of neglect
of duty, but to prevent an exposure of the perjury, forgery, and fraud
by which that charge was endeavoured to be refuted.

“I beg, Sir, that you will assure their Lordships on my part, that as
a deep sense of public duty alone induced me formerly to express a
hope that the thanks of Parliament might not be pressed for the
conduct of the affair in Basque Roads, so, in addition to that
feeling, which made me disregard every private interest, I have formed
a fixed determination never, whilst I exist, to rest satisfied until I
expose the baseness and wickedness of the attempts made to destroy my
character, which I value more than my life.

“As the affidavits of Captains Robert Kerr and Robert Hockings (which,
as well as my own, are filed in the High Court of Admiralty) may
immediately be made the subject of indictment in a court of law, and
as the proceedings in the Admiralty Court have been put off under the
pretence of obtaining further evidence in support of the
mis-statements of these officers and the claim of Lord Gambier, I have
respectfully to request that when the Lords Commissioners of the
Admiralty shall have instituted an inquiry into the logs, charts, and
documents, and ascertained the conduct of the before-named officers,
they will be pleased to cause public justice to be done in a matter
involving the character of the naval service so deeply.

“If, Sir, through their Lordships’ means, a fair investigation shall
take place, it will be far more gratifying than any other course of
proceeding.

“I have the honour to be, &c. &c.,
“COCHRANE.

“Jno. Wilson Croker, Esq., Secretary, &c., Admiralty.”

After the above correspondence I gave up, as hopeless, all further attempts to obtain even so much as a sight of the charts without which any public explanation on my part would have been unintelligible.

In the year 1819—when nearly ruined by law expenses, fines, and deprivation of pay—in despair moreover, of surmounting the unmerited obloquy which had befallen me in England—I accepted from the Chilian government an invitation to aid in its war of independence; and removed with Lady Cochrane and our family to South America, in the vain hope of finding, amongst strangers, that sympathy which, though interested, might, in some measure compensate for the persecutions of our native land.[6] I will not attempt to describe the agonised feelings of this even temporary exile under such circumstances from my country, in whose annals it had been my ambition to secure an honourable position. No language of mine could convey the mental sufferings consequent on finding aspirations—founded on exertions which ought to have justified all my hopes—frustrated by the enmity of an illiberal political faction, which regarded services to the nation as nothing when opposed to the interests of party.

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Footnote 6:

The malice of offended faction pursued me even to this remote part of
the globe, in the shape of a “Foreign Enlistment Act” (59th George
III. cap. 69). This Act was introduced by the Attorney-General, Sir
Samuel Shepherd, for the express purpose of preventing any one from
assisting the South American States then at war with Spain; the Act
being thus especially levelled at me, though injuriously driven from
the service of my own country.

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On my return to England, from causes which will appear in the sequel, the subject of the charts was not again officially renewed.

Latterly, however, considering that at my advanced age there was a probability of quitting the world with the stigma attached to my memory of having been the indirect cause of bringing my commander-in-chief to a court-martial—though in reality the charges were made by the Admiralty—I determined to make one more effort to obtain those documents which alone could justify the course I had deemed it my duty to pursue. In the hope that the more enlightened policy of modern times might concede the boon, which a former period of political corruption had denied, I applied to Sir John Pakington, late First Lord of the Admiralty, for permission to inspect such documents relative to the affair of Aix Roads as the Board might possess.

Permission was kindly and promptly granted by Sir John Pakington; but Lord Derby’s ministry going out of office before the boon could be rendered available, it became necessary to renew the application to the successor of the Right Honourable Baronet, viz. his Grace the Duke of Somerset, who as promptly complied with the request. The reader may judge of my surprise on discovering, in its proper place, bound up amongst the Naval Records, in the usual official manner, the _very chart the possession of which had been denied by a former Board of Admiralty_!

The Duke of Somerset, moreover, with a consideration for which I feel truly grateful, ordered that whatever copies of charts I might require, should be supplied by the Hydrographic Office; so that by the kindness of Captain Washington, the eminent hydrographer to the Board, tracings of the suppressed charts have been made, and are now appended to this volume. His grace further ordered that the logs of Lord Gambier’s fleet should be submitted to the inspection of Mr. Earp, with permission to make extracts; an order fully carried out by the courtesy of Mr. Lascelles, of the Record Office, to the extent of the logs in his possession.

It is, therefore, only after the lapse of fifty-one years and in my own eighty-fifth year,—a postponement too late for my peace, but not for my justification,—that I am, from official documents, and proofs deduced from official documents which were from the first and still are in the possession of the Government, enabled to remove the stigma before alluded to, and to lay before the public such an explanation of the fabricated chart, together with an Admiralty copy of the chart itself, as from that evidence shall place the whole matter beyond the possibility of dispute. It will in the present day be difficult to credit the existence of such practices and evil influences of party spirit in past times as could permit an Administration, even for the purpose of preserving the _prestige_ of a Government to claim as a glorious victory! a neglect of duty which, to use the mildest terms, was both a naval and a national dishonour.

The point which more immediately concerns myself is, however, this:—that the verdict founded on this fabricated chart, together with the subsequent official enmity directed against me in consequence of my determination to oppose the vote of thanks to Lord Gambier, was persevered in year after year, till it reached its climax in the consequences of that subsequent trial which was made the pretext for driving me from the navy, in defiance of remonstrance at the Board of Admiralty itself. I have not long been aware of the latter fact. Admiral Collier has recently informed me that Sir W.J. Hope, then one of the Naval Lords of the Admiralty, told him that considering the sentence passed against me cruel and vindictive, he refused to sign his name to the decision of the Board by which my name was struck off the Navy List.

CHART A.
Tracing from the official French Chart of the isles of Ré and d’Olleron.
Tendered to the Court-Martial by Lord COCHRANE, and rejected.

_Soundings in feet at Low Water Springs_
London: Richard Bentley: 1860.
]

CHAP. XXV.

A NAVAL STUDY—_continued_.

FRENCH HYDROGRAPHIC CHARTS.—ONE TENDERED BY ME TO THE COURT.—REJECTED BY
THE PRESIDENT.—GROUNDS FOR ITS REJECTION.—THE OBJECT OF THE REJECTED
CHART.—WOULD HAVE PROVED TOO MUCH, IF ADMITTED.—REJECTION OF OTHER
CHARTS TENDERED BY ME.—MR. STOKES’S CHART.—ITS FALLACY AT FIRST
SIGHT.—JUDGE ADVOCATE’S REASONS FOR ADOPTING IT.—ITS ERRORS DETECTED
BY THE PRESIDENT, AND EXPOSED HERE.—PROBABLE EXCUSE FOR THE
ERROR.—IMAGINARY SHOAL ON THE CHART.—FALSIFICATION OF WIDTH OF
CHANNEL.—LORD GAMBIER’S VOUCHER FOR STOKES’S CHART.—STOKES’S VOUCHER
FOR ITS WORTHLESSNESS.—STOKES’S CHART IN A NATIONAL POINT OF
VIEW.—TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF BY THE FRENCH.

The charts to which the reader’s attention is invited are those alluded to in the last chapter, as having, after the lapse of fifty-one years, been traced for me by Captain Washington, by the order of his Grace the Duke of Somerset. The subject being no longer of personal but of historical interest, there can be no impropriety in laying before the naval service, for its judgment, materials so considerately supplied by the present First Lord of the Admiralty.

CHART A

is a correct tracing of Aix Roads from the _Neptune François_, a set of charts issued by the French Hydrographical Department—bound in a volume, and supplied for the use of the French navy previous to 1809[7]; copies from the same source being at that period supplied under the auspices of the Board of Admiralty for the use of British ships on the French coasts—these, in fact, forming the only guides available at that period.

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Footnote 7:

Sets of these charts, bound as described, were found on board the
grounded ships captured in the afternoon of the 12th of April, and
were therefore available for the purposes of the court-martial, had it
been deemed expedient to consult them.

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Chart A shows a clear entrance of two miles, without shoal or hindrance of any kind, between Ile d’Aix and the Boyart Sand; the soundings close to the latter marking thirty-five feet at low water, with from thirty to forty feet in mid-channel. The chart shows, moreover, a channel leading to a spacious anchorage between the Boyart and Palles Sands, marking clear soundings at low water of from twenty to thirty feet close to either sand, with thirty feet in mid-channel. In this anchorage line-of-battle-ships could not only have _floated_, without danger of grounding, but could have effectively operated against the enemy’s fleet, even in its entire state before the attack, wholly out of range of the batteries on Ile d’Aix, as will hereafter be corroborated by the logs and evidence of experienced officers present in the attack, and therefore practically acquainted with the soundings. To a naval eye, it will be apparent that, by gaining this anchorage, it would not at any time have been difficult for the British force to have interposed the enemy’s fleet between itself and the fortifications on Ile d’Aix in such a way as completely to neutralise the fire of the latter.

Further inspection of the chart will indicate an inner anchorage, called _Le Grand Trousse_, to which any British vessel disabled by the enemy’s ships—two only of which, out of thirteen, remained afloat,—might have retired with safety to an anchorage capable of holding a fleet—the soundings in _Le Grand Trousse_ marking from thirty to forty feet at low water. Between these anchorages it will be seen on the chart that there is no shoal, nor any other danger whatever.[8]

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Footnote 8:

This anchorage was plainly marked on the French charts supplied to the
British ships, as deposed to by the officers present in the action.
(See the evidence of Captain Broughton, _Minutes_, p. 222, and that of
Captain Newcomb, p. 198). The correctness of the chart furnished by me
being thus clearly established in evidence.

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The rise of tide marked on the chart was from ten to twelve feet[9], consequently amply sufficient _on a rising tide_ for the two-deckers and frigates to have been sent to the attack of the enemy’s ships aground on the Palles Shoal, as testified by the evidence of Captains Malcolm and Broughton.[10] The flood-tide making about 7·0 A.M. gave assurance of abundant depth of water by 11·0 A.M., which is the time marked in the Commander-in-chief’s log[11] as that of _bringing the British ships to an anchor!_ in place of forwarding them to the attack of ships on shore!

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Footnote 9:

In reality, from eighteen to twenty feet, at spring tides, as appeared
from the testimony of various officers, Admiral Stopford amongst
others. Even Mr. Stokes marked on his chart a rise of twenty-one feet,
so that there was abundance of water for the operation of ships of the
largest class. The defence of the Commander-in-chief was, that there
was not sufficient water at half-flood to float the ships!

Footnote 10:

See pp. 58 and 63.

Footnote 11:

Erroneously, according to the logs of the other ships.

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This chart was tendered by me to the Court, in explanation of my evidence. It was, however, rejected, because I could not _produce the French hydrographer to prove its correctness!_ though copies of a similar chart, as has been said, were furnished to British ships for their guidance! Being thus repudiated, my chart was flung contemptuously under the table, and neither this nor any other _official_ chart was afterwards allowed to corroborate the facts subsequently testified by the various officers present in the action, they being imperatively ordered to base their observations on the chart of Mr. Stokes alluded to in the last chapter, as having been—eight years after the court-martial—pronounced by the Court of Admiralty so incorrect as to require material alteration before it could be put in evidence in a court of law! To this point we shall presently come.

A singular circumstance connected with the rejected chart should rather have _secured its reception_, viz. that it was taken by my own hands out of the _Ville de Varsovie_ French line-of-battle ship shortly before she was set fire to, and therefore its authenticity, as having been officially supplied by the French government for the use of that ship, was beyond doubt or question. I also produced two similar charts, on which were marked the places of the enemy’s ships aground at daylight on the 12th of April, as observed from the _Impérieuse_, the only vessel then in proximity. The positions of the grounded vessels are marked on Chart B.

The manner of the rejection by the Court—at the suggestion of the Judge-Advocate—of the chart tendered by me, is worthy of note.

PRESIDENT.—“I think your lordship said just now, that you thought
there was water enough for ships of any draught of water?”

LORD COCHRANE.—“Yes.”

PRESIDENT.—“Have you _an authenticated chart_, or any evidence that
can be produced to show that there is _actually_ such a depth of
water?”

LORD COCHRANE (_putting in the charts_).—“It was _actually_ from the
soundings we had going in, provided the tide does not fall more than
twelve feet, which I am not aware of. I studied the chart of Basque
Roads for some days before. The rise of the tide, as I understand from
that, is from ten to twelve feet. It is so mentioned in the French
chart. I have no other means of judging.”[12]

_Judge-Advocate._—“THIS CHART IS NOT EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT,
BECAUSE HIS LORDSHIP CANNOT PROVE ITS CORRECTNESS!!”

PRESIDENT.—“_No! It is nothing more than to show upon what grounds his
lordship forms his opinion on the rise and fall of the tide!!_”[13]

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Footnote 12:

This was fully corroborated by Captain Malcolm, when, having said that
“there were _no obstacles_ to prevent the frigates and some ships of
the line from going into Aix Roads, he was asked by the President, “if
he made known to the Commander-in-chief that by keeping close to the
Boyart Shoal the ships _might have gone in?_”

The reply was in every way remarkable.

CAPTAIN MALCOLM.—“I do not know that I mentioned this to the
Commander-in-chief. _The charts showed it._”—_Minutes_, p. 214. A
complete corroboration of the correctness of my charts tendered to but
rejected by the Court; though as these had been supplied under the
sanction of the Admiralty, it was out of the question to reject them
as the basis of evidence, inasmuch as there could be none other of a
reliable nature.

Footnote 13:

The following extract from my evidence, and the singular remark from
Admiral Young, are extracted from the minutes of the court-martial.

“The Commander-in-chief had the same charts as I was in possession of,
and from these I formed my conclusion with respect to the anchorage.
In reconnoitring the enemy’s fleet, _so near as to induce him to open
a fire from almost his whole line_, I reported to the
Commander-in-chief the ruinous state of Ile d’Aix, _the inner
fortifications being completely blown up and destroyed_. There were
only 13 guns mounted.”

ADMIRAL YOUNG.—“Will you consider, my Lord Cochrane, before you go on,
HOW FAR THIS IS RELEVANT”!!!—_Minutes_, p. 58.

My assertion of the fact that the Commander-in-chief’s charts were
identical with my own, as having come from the Admiralty, was
considered _irrelevant_, because, had they been put in, or mine not
rejected, there could have been no doubt of the result of the
court-martial.

-----

It was not put in for any purpose of the kind—for I had expressly said that I had no opinion as to the rise and fall of the tide, except as marked on the French official charts. The object of my putting in those charts was to _show the truth of the whole matter before the Court_. The president, however, flung the chart under the table with as much eagerness as the Judge-Advocate had evinced when objecting to its reception in evidence.[14]

-----

Footnote 14:

It is a singular circumstance that notwithstanding the chart was flung
under the table and rejected by the Court, I found it _bound up
amongst the Admiralty records_!

-----

The object of the chart was in fact to prove, as indeed _was subsequently proved_ by the testimony of eminent officers, and _would_ have been proved even by the ships’ logs had they been consulted, that there was plenty of channel room to keep clear of the batteries on Ile d’Aix, together with abundant depth of water[15]; and that the commander-in-chief, in ordering all the ships to _come to an anchor_, in place of sending a portion[16] of the British ships to the attack of the enemy’s vessels aground on the north-west part of the Palles Shoal, on the morning of the 12th of April, had displayed a “_mollesse_”—as it was happily termed by Admiral Gravière—unbecoming the Commander-in-chief of a British force, superior in numbers, and having nothing to fear from about a dozen guns on the fortifications of Aix; which, had the ships been sent in along the edge of the Boyart, could have inflicted no material damage, either by shot or shell.[17]

-----

Footnote 15:

The ships which were sent in though too late were untouched by shot or
shell. For the depth of water they found on going in, see page 71.

Footnote 16:

My signals were, “_half the fleet_ can destroy the enemy.” Then, “the
_frigates alone_ can destroy the enemy.” Yet in his defence Lord
Gambier assumed that I had signalled for the fleet at a time when, as
he alleged, it could not have floated for want of water?

Footnote 17:

See Captain Malcolm’s evidence, page 58. Also Captain Godfrey’s, of
the _Etna_, who “_thinks_ some of the enemy’s shot went over them”
(_Minutes_, p. 173), but admits that not a mast, yard, or even a
rope-yarn was touched.

-----

These were precisely the points which the ministry did not want proved, and which—as will presently be seen—the Court was no less anxious to avoid proving. Had the French chart been received in evidence, as it ought to have been—I do not say mine, but those on board the flagship itself, or indeed _any copy_ supplied by the Admiralty to the fleet—a vote of thanks to Lord Gambier would have been _impossible_, and with the impossibility would have vanished the Government _prestige_ of a great victory gained by their commander-in-chief, under their auspices.[18]

-----

Footnote 18:

“I was furnished by Lord Cochrane with a French chart, _and considered
it a good one_.”—_Evidence of Captain Newcomb_, p. 199.

I had for several years been in the possession of official French
charts, which, in my previous cruises, had not been found defective,
and from those charts I had at all times drawn my conclusions with
respect to the depth of water, or other circumstances which related to
the navigation on the enemy’s coast.”

PRESIDENT.—“The coast of the enemy, I suppose you mean?”

LORD COCHRANE.—“I refer to the French coast.”

ADMIRAL YOUNG.—“When did you discover that there was this anchorage in
deep water?”

LORD COCHRANE.—“I have said that in going in I found the soundings
correct, and that, in fact, I had such confidence in the chart, that I
had said to Admiral Keates, when we were off there, and to Admiral
Thornborough, that there _could be no difficulty in going in there and
destroying the enemy’s fleet_. I took the chart on board Admiral
Thornborough’s ship.”—See my Letter to Admiral Thornborough, vol. i.
p. 195.—_Lord Cochrane’s Evidence_, p. 57.

-----

The French official chart being thus adroitly got rid of by the Judge-Advocate, the other charts tendered by me to mark the positions of the enemy’s ships aground shared the like fate, though not open to the same objection. The exactness of the positions was moreover confirmed by the evidence of Mr. Stokes, the master of the _Caledonia_, Lord Gambier’s flagship; though his chart, substituted for those in use amongst the British ships, was in direct contradiction to his oral evidence.

The positions, of the ships aground as marked on my charts, were as follows.

The _Ocean_, three-decker, bearing the flag of Admiral Allemand, and forming a group with three other line-of-battle ships close to her, lay aground on the north-west edge of the Palles Shoal, nearest the deep water, where even a gun-boat, had it been sent whilst they lay on their bilge, could have so perforated their bottoms, that they could not have floated with the rising tide. All were immoveably aground, and were therefore incapable of opposition to an attacking force[19]; whilst each of the group of three lay so much inclined towards each other as to present the appearance of having their yards locked together.[20] They had, in fact, drifted with the same current, into the same spot, and being nearly of the same draught of water, had grounded close to each other. The one separate was a vessel of less draught than these, and had gone a little further on the shoal.

-----

Footnote 19:

“Till _about noon_, the _Ocean_, three-decker, was _heeling
considerably, and appeared to me to be heaving her guns
overboard_.”—_Captain Malcolm_ (_Minutes_, p. 209). She escaped about
two o’clock P.M., just before I advanced in the _Impérieuse_, lest all
should escape.

-----

The correctness of these positions, as marked on my chart, was completely confirmed by Mr. Stokes, master of the flag-ship, in his oral evidence as subjoined.

QUESTION.—“State the situation of the enemy’s fleet on the morning of
the 12th of April.”

MR. STOKES.—“At daylight I observed _the whole of the enemy’s ships,
except two of the line, on shore_. Four of them _lay in group_, or lay
together on the western part of the Palles Shoal. The three-decker
(_L’Océan_, flagship) was _on the north-west edge_ of the Palles
Shoal, with her broadside flanking the passage; _the north-west point
nearest the deep water_.”[20]—(_Minutes_, page 147.)

-----

Footnote 20:

“I _think_ their yards were not locked.”—_Evidence of Mr. Fairfax_,
_Minutes_, p. 144. It was, however, _so nearly_, that Mr. Fairfax, a
witness carefully in Lord Gambier’s interest, could only _think_ about
it. He reluctantly admitted that all lay “_within a ship’s length of
each other_,” and ships lying aground on their bilge inclined towards
each other at an angle of thirty degrees are—if not locked
together—completely incapable of resistance.

-----

This was the truth as to the positions of the grounded ships which escaped; these being referred to in Mr. Stokes’s evidence precisely as marked on my rejected chart. That is, his evidence showed, in corroboration of my chart, the _utter helplessness of an enemy which a British admiral refrained from attacking, though aground_!

The French charts produced by me being thus rejected, those in the possession of the Commander-in-chief not produced, and those connected with the fleet not being called for, the court decided to rely upon two charts professedly constructed for the occasion by the master of the _Caledonia_, Mr. Stokes, and the master of the fleet, Mr. Fairfax, _neither of whom was present in the attack_.[21]

-----

Footnote 21:

It is a remarkable fact that many of the witnesses chiefly relied on
by the Commander-in-chief, in confirmation of his having done his
duty, _had not been in Aix Roads at all_, and could therefore have no
knowledge of anything, except their remaining inactive with the fleet
whilst the enemy’s ships were warping off. Mr. Stokes was of this
number; yet all were questioned on points known only to officers
intimately acquainted with Aix Roads, and present at the action. But
for the court to adopt _exclusively_, as will presently be seen, a
chart constructed by a man who admitted that an important portion had
been laid down _from hearsay_, was monstrous; the more so, as the
official charts, would have shown the truth.

-----

* * * * * * *

CHART C

was tendered to the Court by Mr. Stokes, the master of Lord Gambier’s flag-ship _Caledonia_.

CHART C.
Constructed by M^r Stokes for the purposes of the Court Martial, and
exclusively adopted, though it narrows the channel to Aix Roads to _one
mile_ only, the official French Charts marking _two miles_.

SKETCH OF D’AIX ANCHORAGE.
London: Richard Bentley, 1860.
]

This chart professed to show, and was sworn to by Mr. Stokes as showing, the positions of the enemy’s ships aground _on the morning of the 12th of April_, before the _Ocean_ three-decker, together with a group of three outermost ships near her, had been permitted by the delay of the Commander-in-chief to warp off and escape. Instead, however, of placing these on his chart as they lay helplessly aground “nearest the deep water” as _he had sworn in his evidence_, they were placed in on the other side of the sand, in the positions occupied _after their escape!_ and _to this Mr. Stokes swore as their_ position _when first driven ashore_! The _Ocean_ three-decker, and group in particular, which, according to Mr. Stokes’s oral evidence, must, as already stated, have been an easy prey to a gunboat had such been sent on the first quarter instead of the last quarter flood, was thus placed on his chart where no vessel could have approached them![22]

-----

Footnote 22:

Mr. Stokes, moreover swore, in his evidence, that the _Ocean_
three-decker lay _on the north-west edge of the Palles Shoal_, and
that the group lay on the _western_ part of the same shoal, though the
latter observation was incorrect, as the group lay around the Ocean,
which formed a part of it. On his chart these vessels are placed to
the SOUTH-EAST of the shoal, and _the remainder_ nearly DUE EAST!!
That is, in place of being “_nearest the deep water_,” where they were
easily attackable, they were placed on the chart “_farthest from the
deep water_,” where they were not attackable. He swore too that they
lay with their broadsides “_flanking the passage_” to Aix Roads. On
his chart, not one of them “flanks the passage,” but all are made to
_flank the opposite direction_; so that they could not have fired on
any British ship which might have been sent in.

-----

This falsehood on Mr. Stokes’s chart, in opposition to his oral evidence just given, as well as to the evidence of other officers, formed one of the principal grounds of Lord Gambier’s acquittal; and it was for this end that the official French charts presented by me for the information of the court were rejected by the judge-advocate.

On the presentation of Mr. Stokes’s chart to the court, the subjoined colloquy took place as to the methods adopted in its construction.

MR. BICKNELL.—“Produce a chart or drawing of the anchorage at Isle
d’Aix, with the relative positions of the British and French fleets,
and other particulars, on and previous to the 12th of April last.”

_The Witness produced it._

MR. BICKNELL.—“Did you prepare this drawing, and from what documents,
authorities, and observations; and are the several matters delineated
therein accurately delineated, to the best of your knowledge and
belief?”

MR. STOKES.—“I prepared that _drawing_ (Chart C), partly from the
knowledge I gained in sounding to the southward of the Palles Shoal,
and the anchorage of the Isle of Aix.[23] _The outlines of the chart
are taken from the Neptune François_, and the position of the enemy’s
fleet from Mr. Edward Fairfax, and from the French captain of the
_Ville de Varsovie_, and the British fleet from my own observation.”
The distance between the sands was copied from a French MS. which will
be produced, and that _I take it_ is correct.

MR. BICKNELL.—“Are the matters and things therein accurately
described?”

MR. STOKES.—“They are.”

PRESIDENT (_inspecting Mr. Stokes’s chart_).—“There was a large chart
you lent me?”

MR. STOKES.—“That is the chart I allude to. This chart I produce as
containing the _various positions_.”

JUDGE-ADVOCATE (_to the President_).—“THIS CHART IS PRODUCED TO SAVE A
GREAT DEAL OF TROUBLE!!” (_Minutes_, pp. 23, 24.)

-----

Footnote 23:

In his subsequent evidence Mr. Stokes admitted that he had _never
sounded there at all_ previous to the action!

QUESTION.—“Had you any knowledge of that anchorage previous to the
12th of April?”

MR. STOKES.—“NONE WHATEVER!”—_Minutes_, p. 148.

He swears that everything on his chart is _accurately described_—then,
that “the distance between the sands,” which was one of the most
important points of the court-martial, _was copied from a French MS.!_
the name of whose author he does not think proper to communicate, nor
does the court ask him! nor was any MSS. produced in Court. Yet, as
master of the Admiral’s flagship, Mr. Stokes must have navigated her
by the French charts supplied by the Admiralty, though these when
tendered by me to the Court had been rejected. The fleet could, in
fact, have had no other for its guidance, as no British survey of Aix
Roads was in existence. Such charts were surely a better guide in any
case than an anonymous MSS.

-----

No doubt—the trouble of confirming the Commander-in-chief’s neglect of duty in not following up a manifest advantage, as would have been shown had the court allowed the _Neptune François itself_ to have been put, in evidence; for it would have shown a clear passage of _two miles_ wide, extending beyond reach of shot, instead of the _one mile_ passage in Mr. Stokes’s “_accurate outlines_” of the French chart, and no shoal where he had marked only twelve feet of water![24] That the president should have allowed this to pass, after having himself detected the imposition practised on the court, is a point upon which I will not comment.

-----

Footnote 24:

Compare charts A and C.

-----

Mr. Stokes further admitted his chart to be valueless, as regarded the position of the enemy’s fleet ashore, for he said that position was taken “_from Mr. Edward Fairfax and the captain of the Ville de Varsovie_”, and the British fleet _from “his own observations._” That is, he confessed to know nothing but from hearsay as to the position of _the enemy’s fleet_, the important object before the court; but only of the position _of the British fleet_, lying at anchor nine miles from the enemy’s fleet ashore, a matter with which the court had nothing to do; he being all the time on board the flagship, at that distance. Yet the court insisted on this chart being _exclusively_ referred to throughout the court-martial![25] It is strange that such a chart should have been used at all, when the charts of the fleet were available, but more strange that, when the court saw the two miles passage in the French chart was reduced to little more than _one mile_ in Mr. Stokes’s chart, he was not even asked the reason why he had not conformed to the scale of the French chart, _to the correctness of the outlines of which he had sworn_!

-----

Footnote 25:

The President thus dictated to Captain Beresford:—“Captain Beresford
_must_ say whether the ships are marked on _that_ chart (Mr. Stokes’s)
as they appeared to him.” Captain Beresford took no notice of the
order.

Captain Bligh was less independent when asked to vouch for the
accuracy of Mr. Stokes’s chart. He “_thinks_ the enemy’s ships, on the
morning of the 12th, were as there represented, though Mr. Stokes, in
contradiction to his own chart, had sworn _that they were not so
marked, but only those that were destroyed_!”

When asked if the ships aground could have annoyed the British ships
had they been sent in? Captain Bligh replied, “I _think_ they were
capable of annoying the British ships.”—_Minutes_, p. 154. He,
however, immediately afterwards stated that the ships “were not within
reach of the guns of the British squadron.”

Captain Kerr “_thinks_ the situation of the enemy’s fleet on the
morning of the 12th was marked on Mr. Stokes’s chart _as nearly as it
can be_. There were seven sail-of-the-line ashore, and two
afloat.”—_Minutes_, p. 166. What had the numbers ashore or afloat to
do with their exact position? A palpable evasion of the question was
permitted by the court.

-----

But the most glaring contradiction of Mr. Stokes’s chart is this: he swore to his chart as truly depicting the positions of the _Ocean_ and other grounded ships, as they lay _on the morning of the 12th of April, which was the point before the Court_; but being further questioned, reluctantly admitted that he had marked the _Ocean as she lay on the 13th of April_, viz. _on the following day when an attack was made on her by the bomb vessel!_ though he had just sworn to the positions of the ships on the chart as being those _on the morning of the 12th_, immediately after having run ashore to escape destruction.

The fact was, as will be seen on inspection of the chart, that _not one_ of the ships under the cognizance of the court is marked on Stokes’s chart as they lay on the morning of the 12th, which position, and not that on the 13th, was the subject of inquiry. Though as already said this misrepresentation was detected by the President, the court nevertheless persisted in the exclusive use of Mr. Stokes’s chart throughout the trial, in accordance with the suggestion of the Judge-Advocate, that it was produced to “_save a great deal of trouble_.”

The President thus commented on the manifest contradiction.

PRESIDENT.—“I observe in the chart I had from you the situation of the
_Ocean_ particularly is _not marked on the 12th. She is marked on the
13th as advanced up the Charente!_”

MR. STOKES.—“The _only ships_ marked on the chart _on the 12th are
those that were destroyed_. The reason I marked her on the 13th is,
that a particular attack was made on her by the bombs. _I observed her
from the mizentop of the Caledonia_[26], and I _also had an
observation from an officer_, so that I have no doubt her position is
put down within a cable’s length.” (_Minutes_ p. 147.)

-----

Footnote 26:

Nine miles off. This answer shows most forcibly the nature of the data
on which Mr. Stokes’s chart was constructed.

-----

There is something in this evidence almost too repugnant for observation. Mr. Stokes first swore that his chart accurately described the positions of the enemy’s ships ashore on the _morning of the 12th_. He then admitted that the most material ship of the enemy’s fleet was marked as she lay _on the 13th_!! On this mis-statement being detected by the president, he then swore that the only ships marked on the 12th were _those which were destroyed_, viz. _on the evening and night of the 12th!_—a matter foreign to the subject of inquiry; which was _how the ships lay on the morning of the 12th, and whether Lord Gambier was to blame for refraining from attacking them at that particular time_? So that the positions of the enemy’s ships aground on the morning of the 12th, according to Mr. Stokes’s own admission, _were not marked on his chart at all!_ though he had sworn to this very chart _as giving those positions accurately to the best of his knowledge and belief_; and with the full knowledge that their position on the _morning_ of the 12th, when they were helplessly aground, was the point before the court,—not their position _in the evening_, and on the following day after their escape to a spot where the British ships could not have pursued them.