Chapter VIII: Part 8

These are, respectively, the 7th, 14th, 27th, and 28th of the
二十八宮 Twenty-eight Stellar Mansions, corresponding roughly
to Sagittarius, Pegasus, Crater and Corvus. The original text,
followed by the _T‘u Shu_, has 月 in place of 宿; the present
reading rests on the authority of the _T‘ung Tien_ and _Yü Lan_.
Tu Mu says: 宿者月之所宿也. For 箕壁, both _T‘ung Tien_ and _Yü Lan_
give the more precise location 戊箕東壁. Mei Yao-ch‘ên tells us
that by 箕 is meant the tail of the 龍 Dragon; by 壁, the eastern
part of that constellation; by 翼 and 軫, the tail of the 鶉 Quail.

for these four are all days of rising wind.

此四宿者 is elliptical for 月在此四宿之日. 蕭繹 Hsiao I (afterwards
fourth Emperor of the Liang dynasty, A.D. 552–555) is quoted by Tu
Yu as saying that the days 丙丁 of spring, 戊已 of summer, 壬癸 of
autumn, and 甲乙 of winter bring fierce gales of wind and rain.

5. 凡火攻必因五火之變而應之

In attacking with fire, one should be prepared to meet five possible developments:

I take 五 as qualifying 變, not 火, and therefore think that Chang
Yü is wrong in referring 五火 to the five methods of attack set
forth in § 1. What follows has certainly nothing to do with these.

6. 火發於內則早應之於外

(1) When fire breaks out inside the enemy’s camp, respond at once

The _Yü Lan_ incorrectly reads 軍 for 早.

with an attack from without.

7. 火發而其兵靜者待而勿攻

(2) If there is an outbreak of fire, but the enemy’s soldiers remain quiet, bide your time and do not attack.

The original text omits 而其. The prime object of attacking with
fire is to throw the enemy into confusion. If this effect is not
produced, it means that the enemy is ready to receive us. Hence
the necessity for caution.

8. 極其火力可從而從之不可從而止

(3) When the force of the flames has reached its height, follow it up with an attack, if that is practicable; if not, stay where you are.

Ts‘ao Kung says: 見可而進知難而退 “If you see a possible way,
advance; but if you find the difficulties too great, retire.”

9. 火可發於外無待於內以時發之

(4) If it is possible to make an assault with fire from without, do not wait for it to break out within, but deliver your attack at a favourable moment.

Tu Mu says that the previous paragraphs had reference to the fire
breaking out (either accidentally, we may suppose, or by the
agency of incendiaries) inside the enemy’s camp. “But,” he
continues, 若敵居荒澤草穢或營栅可焚之地卽須及時發火不必更待內發作然後應之恐
敵人自燒野草我起火無益 “if the enemy is settled in a waste place
littered with quantities of grass, or if he has pitched his camp
in a position which can be burnt out, we must carry our fire
against him at any seasonable opportunity, and not wait on in
hopes of an outbreak occurring within, for fear our opponents
should themselves burn up the surrounding vegetation, and thus
render our own attempts fruitless.” The famous 李陵 Li Ling once
baffled the 單于 leader of the Hsiung-nu in this way. The latter,
taking advantage of a favourable wind, tried to set fire to the
Chinese general’s camp, but found that every scrap of combustible
vegetation in the neighbourhood had already been burnt down. On
the other hand, 波才 Po-ts‘ai, a general of the 黃巾賊 Yellow
Turban rebels, was badly defeated in 184 A.D. through his neglect
of this simple precaution. “At the head of a large army he was
besieging 長社 Ch‘ang-shê, which was held by 皇甫嵩 Huang-fu Sung.
The garrison was very small, and a general feeling of nervousness
pervaded the ranks; so Huang-fu Sung called his officers together
and said: ‘In war, there are various indirect methods of attack,
and numbers do not count for everything. [The commentator here
quotes Sun Tzŭ, V. §§ 5, 6 and 10.] Now the rebels have pitched
their camp in the midst of thick grass (依草結營), which will
easily burn when the wind blows. If we set fire to it at night,
they will be thrown into a panic, and we can make a sortie and
attack them on all sides at once, thus emulating the achievement
of T‘ien Tan.’ [See p. 90.] That same evening, a strong breeze
sprang up; so Huang-fu Sung instructed his soldiers to bind reeds
together into torches and mount guard on the city walls, after
which he sent out a band of daring men, who stealthily made their
way through the lines and started the fire with loud shouts
and yells. Simultaneously, a glare of light shot up from the
city-walls, and Huang-fu Sung, sounding his drums, led a rapid
charge, which threw the rebels into confusion and put them to
headlong flight.” [_Hou Han Shu_, ch. 71, f. 2 _r_^o.]

10. 火發上風無攻下風

(5) When you start a fire, be to windward of it. Do not attack from the leeward.

Chang Yü, following Tu Yu, says: 燒之必退退而逆擊之必死戰則不便也 “When
you make a fire, the enemy will retreat away from it; if you
oppose his retreat and attack him then, he will fight desperately,
which will not conduce to your success.” A rather more obvious
explanation is given by Tu Mu: “If the wind is in the east, begin
burning to the east of the enemy, and follow up the attack
yourself from that side. If you start the fire on the east side,
and then attack from the west, you will suffer in the same way as
your enemy.”

11. 晝風久夜風止

A wind that rises in the daytime lasts long, but a night breeze soon falls.

Cf. Lao Tzŭ’s saying: 飄風不終朝 “A violent wind does not last the
space of a morning.” (_Tao Tê Ching_, chap. 23.) Mei Yao-ch‘ên and
Wang Hsi say: “A day breeze dies down at nightfall, and a night
breeze at daybreak. This is what happens as a general rule.” The
phenomenon observed may be correct enough, but how this sense is
to be obtained is not apparent.

12. 凡軍必知有五火之變以數守之

In every army, the five developments connected with fire must be known, the movements of the stars calculated, and a watch kept for the proper days.

Tu Mu’s commentary shows what has to be supplied in order to make
sense out of 以數守之. He says: 須筭星𨇠之數守風起之日乃可發火 “We
must make calculations as to the paths of the stars, and watch for
the days on which wind will rise, before making our attack with
fire.” Chang Yü seems to take 守 in the sense of 防: “We must not
only know how to assail our opponents with fire, but also be on
our guard against similar attacks from them.”

13. 故以火佐攻者明以水佐攻者强

Hence those who use fire as an aid to the attack show intelligence;

I have not the least hesitation in rejecting the commentators’
explanation of 明 as = 明白. Thus Chang Yü says: 灼然可以取勝 “...
will _clearly_ [i.e. obviously] be able to gain the victory.” This
is not only clumsy in itself, but does not balance 强 in the next
clause. For 明 “intelligent,” cf. _infra_, § 16, and _Lun Yü_ XII. 6.

those who use water as an aid to the attack gain an accession of strength.

Capt. Calthrop gives an extraordinary rendering of the paragraph:
“... if the attack is to be assisted, the fire must be
unquenchable. If water is to assist the attack, the flood must be
overwhelming.”

14. 水可以絶不可以奪

By means of water, an enemy may be intercepted, but not robbed of all his belongings.

Ts‘ao Kung’s note is: 但可以絶敵道分敵軍不可以奪敵蓄積 “We can merely
obstruct the enemy’s road or divide his army, but not sweep away
all his accumulated stores.” Water can do useful service, but it
lacks the terrible destructive power of fire. This is the reason,
Chang Yü concludes, why the former is dismissed in a couple of
sentences, whereas the attack by fire is discussed in detail. Wu
Tzŭ (ch. 4) speaks thus of the two elements: 居軍下濕水無所通霖雨數至
可灌而沉居軍荒澤草楚幽穢風飆數至可焚而滅 “If an army is encamped on
low-lying marshy ground, from which the water cannot run off, and
where the rainfall is heavy, it may be submerged by a flood. If an
army is encamped in wild marsh lands thickly overgrown with weeds
and brambles, and visited by frequent gales, it may be
exterminated by fire.”

15. 夫戰勝攻取而不修其功者凶命曰費留

Unhappy is the fate of one who tries to win his battles and succeed in his attacks without cultivating the spirit of enterprise; for the result is waste of time and general stagnation.

This is one of the most perplexing passages in Sun Tzŭ. The
difficulty lies mainly in 不修其功, of which two interpretations
appear possible. Most of the commentators understand 修 in the
sense (not known to _K‘ang Hsi_) of 賞 “reward” or 舉 “promote,”
and 其功 as referring to the merit of officers and men. Thus Ts‘ao
Kung says: 賞善不踰日 “Rewards for good service should not be
deferred a single day.” And Tu Mu: “If you do not take opportunity
to advance and reward the deserving, your subordinates will not
carry out your commands, and disaster will ensue.” 費留 would then
probably mean 留滯費耗 “stoppage of expenditure,” or as Chia Lin
puts it, 惜費 “the grudging of expenditure.” For several reasons,
however, and in spite of the formidable array of scholars on the
other side, I prefer the interpretation suggested by Mei Yao-ch‘ên
alone, whose words I will quote: 欲戰必勝攻必取者在因時乘便能作爲功也作
爲功者修火攻水攻之類不可坐守其利也坐守其利者凶也 “Those who want to make
sure of succeeding in their battles and assaults must seize the
favourable moments when they come and not shrink on occasion from
heroic measures: that is to say, they must resort to such means of
attack as fire, water and the like. What they must not do, and
what will prove fatal, is to sit still and simply hold on to the
advantages they have got.” This retains the more usual meaning of
修, and also brings out a clear connection of thought with the
previous part of the chapter. With regard to 費留, Wang Hsi
paraphrases it as 費財老師 “expending treasure and tiring out
[_lit._, ageing] the army.” 費 of course is expenditure or waste
in general, either of time, money or strength. But the soldier is
less concerned with the saving of money than of time. For the
metaphor expressed in “stagnation” I am indebted to Ts‘ao Kung,
who says: 若水之留不復還也. Capt. Calthrop gives a rendering which
bears but little relation to the Chinese text: “unless victory or
possession be obtained, the enemy quickly recovers, and
misfortunes arise. The war drags on, and money is spent.”

16. 故曰明主慮之良將修之

Hence the saying: The enlightened ruler lays his plans well ahead; the good general cultivates his resources.

As Sun Tzŭ quotes this jingle in support of his assertion in § 15,
we must suppose 修之 to stand for 修其功 or something analogous.
The meaning seems to be that the ruler lays plans which the
general must show resourcefulness in carrying out. It is now
plainer than ever that 修 cannot mean “to reward.” Nevertheless, Tu
Mu quotes the following from the 三略, ch. 2: 霸者制士以權結士以
信使士以賞信衰則士疏賞虧則士不用命 “The warlike prince controls his
soldiers by his authority, knits them together by good faith, and
by rewards makes them serviceable. If faith decays, there will be
disruption; if rewards are deficient, commands will not be
respected.”

17. 非利不動非得不用非危不戰

Move not unless you see an advantage;

起, the _Yü Lan’s_ variant for 動, is adopted by Li Ch‘üan and Tu Mu.

use not your troops unless there is something to be gained; fight not unless the position is critical.

Sun Tzŭ may at times appear to be over-cautious, but he never goes
so far in that direction as the remarkable passage in the _Tao Tê
Ching_, ch. 69: 吾不敢爲主而爲客不敢進寸而退尺 “I dare not take the
initiative, but prefer to act on the defensive; I dare not advance
an inch, but prefer to retreat a foot.”

18. 主不可以怒而興師將不可以愠而致戰

No ruler should put troops into the field merely to gratify his own spleen; no general should fight a battle simply out of pique.

Again compare Lao Tzŭ, ch. 68: 善戰者不怒. Chang Yü says that 愠 is
a weaker word than 怒, and is therefore applied to the general as
opposed to the sovereign. The _T‘ung Tien_ and _Yü Lan_ read 軍
for 師, and the latter 合 for 致.

19. 合於利而動不合於利而止

If it is to your advantage, make a forward move; if not, stay where you are.

This is repeated from XI. § 17. Here I feel convinced that it is an
interpolation, for it is evident that § 20 ought to follow immediately
on § 18. For 動, the _T‘ung Tien_ and _Yü Lan_ have 用. Capt. Calthrop
invents a sentence which he inserts before this one: “Do not make war
unless victory may be gained thereby.” While he was about it, he might
have credited Sun Tzŭ with something slightly less inane.

20. 怒可以復喜愠可以復悅

Anger may in time change to gladness; vexation may be succeeded by content.

According to Chang Yü, 喜 denotes joy outwardly manifested in the
countenance, 悅 the inward sensation of happiness.

21. 亡國不可以復存死者不可以復生

But a kingdom that has once been destroyed can never come again into being;

The Wu State was destined to be a melancholy example of this
saying. See p. 50.

nor can the dead ever be brought back to life.

22. 故明君愼之良將警之此安國全軍之道也

Hence the enlightened ruler is heedful, and the good general full of caution.

警, which usually means “to warn,” is here equal to 戒. This is a
good instance of how Chinese characters, which stand for ideas,
refuse to be fettered by dictionary-made definitions. The _T‘u
Shu_ reads 故曰, as in § 16.

This is the way to keep a country at peace and an army intact.

It is odd that 全軍 should not have the same meaning here as in
III. § 1, _q.v._ This has led me to consider whether it might not
be possible to take the earlier passage thus: “to preserve your
own army (country, regiment, etc.) intact is better than to
destroy the enemy’s.” The two words do not appear in the _T‘ung
Tien_ or the _Yü Lan_. Capt. Calthrop misses the point by
translating: “then is the state secure, and the army victorious in
battle.”

XIII. 用間篇

THE USE OF SPIES.

間 is really a vulgar form of 閒, and does not appear in the _Shuo
Wên_. In practice, however, it has gradually become a distinct
character with special meanings of its own, and I have therefore
followed my edition of the standard text in retaining this form
throughout the chapter. In VI. § 25, on the other hand, the
correct form 閒 will be found. The evolution of the meaning “spy”
is worth considering for a moment, provided it be understood that
this is very doubtful ground, and that any dogmatism is out of
place. The _Shuo Wên_ defines 閒 as 隟 (the old form of 隙) “a
crack” or “chink,” and on the whole we may accept 徐鍇 Hsü Ch‘ieh’s
analysis as not unduly fanciful: 夫門夜閉閉而見月光是有閒隟也 “At
night, a _door_ is shut; if, when it is shut, the light of the
_moon_ is visible, it must come through a _chink_.” From this
it is an easy step to the meaning “space between,” or simply
“between,” as for example in the phrase 往來閒諜 “to act as a
secret spy between enemies.” Here 諜 is the word which means “spy;”
but we may suppose that constant association so affected the
original force of 閒, that 諜 could at last be dropped altogether,
leaving 閒 to stand alone with the same signification. Another
possible theory is that the word may first have come to mean 覗 “to
peep” (see 博雅, quoted in _K‘ang Hsi_) which would naturally be
suggested by “crack” or “crevice,” and afterwards the man who
peeps, or spy.

1. 孫子曰凡興師十萬出兵千里百姓之費公家之奉日費千金內外騷動怠於道路不得操事者 七十萬家

Sun Tzŭ said: Raising a host of a hundred thousand men and marching them great distances entails heavy loss on the people and a drain on the resources of the State. The daily expenditure will amount to a thousand ounces of silver.

Cf. II. §§ 1, 13, 14.

There will be commotion at home and abroad, and men will drop down exhausted on the highways.

怠於道路, which is omitted by the _Yü Lan_, appears at first sight
to be explained by the words immediately following, so that the
obvious translation would be “(enforced) idleness along the line
of march.” [Cf. _Tao Tê Ching_, ch. 30: 師之所處荆棘生焉 “Where
troops have been quartered, brambles and thorns spring up.”] The
commentators, however, say that 怠 is here equivalent to 疲—a
meaning which is still retained in the phrase 倦怠. Tu Mu refers 怠
to those who are engaged in conveying provisions to the army. But
this can hardly be said to emerge clearly from Sun Tzŭ’s text.
Chang Yü has the note: “We may be reminded of the saying: ‘On
serious ground, gather in plunder’ [XI. § 13]. Why then should
carriage and transportation cause exhaustion on the highways?—The
answer is, that not victuals alone, but all sorts of munitions of
war have to be conveyed to the army. Besides, the injunction to
‘forage on the enemy’ only means that when an army is deeply
engaged in hostile territory, scarcity of food must be provided
against. Hence, without being solely dependent on the enemy for
corn, we must forage in order that there may be an uninterrupted
flow of supplies. Then, again, there are places like salt deserts
(磧鹵之地), where provisions being unobtainable, supplies from home
cannot be dispensed with.”

As many as seven hundred thousand families will be impeded in their labour.

Mei Yao-ch‘ên says: 廢於耒耜 “Men will be lacking at the
plough-tail.” The allusion is to 井田 the system of dividing land
into nine parts, as shown in the character 井, each consisting
of a 夫 or 頃 (about 15 acres), the plot in the centre being
cultivated on behalf of the State by the tenants of the other
eight. It was here also, so Tu Mu tells us, that their cottages
were built and a well sunk, to be used by all in common. [See II.
§ 12, note.] These groups of eight peasant proprietors were called
鄰. In time of war, one of the families had to serve in the army,
while the other seven contributed to its support (一家從軍七家奉弓).
Thus, by a levy of 100,000 men (reckoning one able-bodied soldier
to each family) the husbandry of 700,000 families would be affected.

2. 相守數年以爭一日之勝而愛爵祿百金不知敵之情者不仁之至也

Hostile armies may face each other for years, striving for the victory which is decided in a single day. This being so, to remain in ignorance of the enemy’s condition simply because one grudges the outlay of a hundred ounces of silver in honours and emoluments,

“For spies” is of course the meaning, though it would spoil the
effect of this curiously elaborate exordium if spies were actually
mentioned at this point.

is the height of inhumanity.

Sun Tzŭ’s argument is certainly ingenious. He begins by adverting
to the frightful misery and vast expenditure of blood and treasure
which war always brings in its train. Now, unless you are kept
informed of the enemy’s condition, and are ready to strike at the
right moment, a war may drag on for years. The only way to get
this information is to employ spies, and it is impossible to
obtain trustworthy spies unless they are properly paid for their
services. But it is surely false economy to grudge a comparatively
trifling amount for this purpose, when every day that the war
lasts eats up an incalculably greater sum. This grievous burden
falls on the shoulders of the poor, and hence Sun Tzŭ concludes
that to neglect the use of spies is nothing less than a crime
against humanity.

3. 非人之將也非主之佐也非勝之主也

One who acts thus is no leader of men, no present help to his sovereign,

An inferior reading for 主 is 仁, thus explained by Mei Yao-ch‘ên:
非以仁佐國者也.

no master of victory.

This idea, that the true object of war is peace, has its root in
the national temperament of the Chinese. Even so far back as 597
B.C., these memorable words were uttered by Prince 莊 Chuang of the
Ch‘u State: 夫文止戈爲武 ... 夫武禁暴戢兵保大定功安民和衆豐財者也 “The
character for ‘prowess’ (武) is made up of 止 ‘to stay’ and 戈 ‘a
spear’ (cessation of hostilities). Military prowess is seen in the
repression of cruelty, the calling in of weapons, the preservation
of the appointment of Heaven, the firm establishment of merit, the
bestowal of happiness on the people, putting harmony between the
princes, the diffusion of wealth.” [_Tso Chuan_, 宣公 XII. 3 _ad
fin._]

4. 故明君賢將所以動而勝人成功出於衆者先知也

Thus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is _foreknowledge_.

That is, knowledge of the enemy’s dispositions, and what he means
to do.

5. 先知者不可取於鬼神不可象於事不可驗於度

Now this foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits;

以禱祀 “by prayers or sacrifices,” says Chang Yü. 鬼 are the
disembodied spirits of men, and 神 supernatural beings or “gods.”

it cannot be obtained inductively from experience,

Tu Mu’s note makes the meaning clear: 象, he says, is the same as
類 reasoning by analogy; 不可以他事比類而求 “[knowledge of the
enemy] cannot be gained by reasoning from other analogous cases.”

nor by any deductive calculation.

Li Ch‘üan says: 夫長短闊狹遠近小大卽可驗之於度數人之情僞度不能知也
“Quantities like length, breadth, distance and magnitude, are
susceptible of exact mathematical determination; human actions
cannot be so calculated.”

6. 必取於人知敵之情者也

Knowledge of the enemy’s dispositions can only be obtained from other men.

Mei Yao-ch‘ên has rather an interesting note: 鬼神之情可以筮卜知形氣之
物可以象類求天地之理可以度數驗唯敵之情必由間者而後知也 “Knowledge of the
spirit-world is to be obtained by divination; information in
natural science may be sought by inductive reasoning; the laws of
the universe can be verified by mathematical calculation: but the
dispositions of an enemy are ascertainable through spies and spies
alone.”

7. 故用間有五有鄉間有內間有反間有死間有生間

Hence the use of spies, of whom there are five classes: (1) Local spies; (2) inward spies; (3) converted spies; (4) doomed spies; (5) surviving spies.

8. 五間俱起莫知其道是謂神紀人君之寳也

When these five kinds of spy are all at work, none can discover the secret system.

道 is explained by Tu Mu as 其情泄形露之道 “the way in which facts
leak out and dispositions are revealed.”

This is called

爲 is the reading of the standard text, but the _T‘ung Tien_, _Yü
Lan_ and _T‘u Shu_ all have 謂.

“divine manipulation of the threads.”

Capt. Calthrop translates 神紀 “the Mysterious Thread,” but Mei
Yao-ch‘ên’s paraphrase 神妙之綱紀 shows that what is meant is the
_control_ of a number of threads.

It is the sovereign’s most precious faculty.

“Cromwell, one of the greatest and most practical of all cavalry
leaders, had officers styled ‘scout masters,’ whose business it
was to collect all possible information regarding the enemy,
through scouts and spies, etc., and much of his success in war was
traceable to the previous knowledge of the enemy’s moves thus
gained.”[184]

9. 鄉間者因其鄉人而用之

Having _local spies_

鄉間 is the emended reading of Chia Lin and the _T‘u Shu_ for the
unintelligible 因間, here and in § 7, of the standard text, which
nevertheless reads 鄉間 in § 22.

means employing the services of the inhabitants of a district.

Tu Mu says: “In the enemy’s country, win people over by kind
treatment, and use them as spies.”

10. 內間者因其官人而用之

Having _inward spies_, making use of officials of the enemy.

官 includes both civil and military officials. Tu Mu enumerates the
following classes as likely to do good service in this respect:
“Worthy men who have been degraded from office, criminals who have
undergone punishment; also, favourite concubines who are greedy
for gold, men who are aggrieved at being in subordinate positions,
or who have been passed over in the distribution of posts, others
who are anxious that their side should be defeated in order that
they may have a chance of displaying their ability and talents,
fickle turncoats who always want to have a foot in each boat
(飜覆變詐常持兩端之心者). Officials of these several kinds,” he
continues, “should be secretly approached and bound to one’s
interests by means of rich presents. In this way you will be able
to find out the state of affairs in the enemy’s country, ascertain
the plans that are being formed against you, and moreover disturb
the harmony and create a breach between the sovereign and his
ministers.” The necessity for extreme caution, however, in dealing
with “inward spies,” appears from an historical incident related
by Ho Shih: “羅尙 Lo Shang, Governor of 益州 I-chou, sent his
general 隗伯 Wei Po to attack the rebel 李雄 Li Hsiung of 蜀 Shu in
his stronghold at 郫 P‘i. After each side had experienced a number
of victories and defeats, Li Hsiung had recourse to the services
of a certain 朴泰 P‘o-t‘ai, a native of 武都 Wu-tu. He began by
having him whipped until the blood came, and then sent him off to
Lo Shang, whom he was to delude by offering to co-operate with him
from inside the city, and to give a fire signal at the right
moment for making a general assault. Lo Shang, confiding in these
promises, marched out all his best troops, and placed Wei Po and
others at their head with orders to attack at P‘o-t‘ai’s bidding.
Meanwhile, Li Hsiung’s general, 李驤 Li Hsiang, had prepared an
ambuscade on their line of march; and P‘o-t‘ai, having reared
long scaling-ladders against the city walls, now lighted the
beacon-fire. Wei Po’s men raced up on seeing the signal and began
climbing the ladders as fast as they could, while others were
drawn up by ropes lowered from above. More than a hundred of Lo
Shang’s soldiers entered the city in this way, every one of whom
was forthwith beheaded. Li Hsiung then charged with all his
forces, both inside and outside the city, and routed the enemy
completely.” [This happened in 303 A.D. I do not know where Ho
Shih got the story from. It is not given in the biography of Li
Hsiung or that of his father Li 特 T‘ê, _Chin Shu_, ch. 120, 121.]

11. 反間者因其敵間而用之

Having _converted spies_, getting hold of the enemy’s spies and using them for our own purposes.

By means of heavy bribes and liberal promises detaching them
from the enemy’s service, and inducing them to carry back false
information as well as to spy in turn on their own countrymen.
Thus Tu Yu: 因厚賂重許反使爲我間也. On the other hand, 蕭世諴 Hsiao
Shih-hsien in defining the 反間 says that we pretend not to
have detected him, but contrive to let him carry away a false
impression of what is going on (敵使人來候我我佯不知而示以虛事).
Several of the commentators accept this as an alternative
definition; but that it is not what Sun Tzŭ meant is conclusively
proved by his subsequent remarks about treating the converted spy
generously (§ 21 _sqq._). Ho Shih notes three occasions on which
converted spies were used with conspicuous success: 1) by T‘ien
Tan in his defence of Chi-mo (see _supra_, p. 90); 2) by Chao Shê
on his march to O-yü (see p. 57); and by the wily 范雎 Fan Chü
in 260 B.C., when Lien P‘o was conducting a defensive campaign
against Ch‘in. The King of Chao strongly disapproved of Lien P‘o’s
cautious and dilatory methods, which had been unable to avert a
series of minor disasters, and therefore lent a ready ear to the
reports of his spies, who had secretly gone over to the enemy and
were already in Fan Chü’s pay. They said: “The only thing which
causes Ch‘in anxiety is lest 趙括 Chao Kua should be made general.
Lien P‘o they consider an easy opponent, who is sure to be
vanquished in the long run.” Now this Chao Kua was a son of the
famous Chao Shê. From his boyhood, he had been wholly engrossed
in the study of war and military matters, until at last he came
to believe that there was no commander in the whole Empire who
could stand against him. His father was much disquieted by this
overweening conceit, and the flippancy with which he spoke of such
a serious thing as war, and solemnly declared that if ever Kua was
appointed general, he would bring ruin on the armies of Chao. This
was the man who, in spite of earnest protests from his own mother
and the veteran statesman 藺相如 Lin Hsiang-ju, was now sent to
succeed Lien P‘o. Needless to say, he proved no match for the
redoubtable Po Ch‘i and the great military power of Ch‘in. He
fell into a trap by which his army was divided into two and his
communications cut; and after a desperate resistance lasting 46
days, during which the famished soldiers devoured one another, he
was himself killed by an arrow, and his whole force, amounting,
it is said, to 400,000 men, ruthlessly put to the sword. [See
歷代紀事年表, ch. 19, ff. 48–50].

12. 死間者爲誑事於外令吾間知之而傳於敵

Having _doomed spies_, doing certain things openly for purposes of deception, and allowing our own spies to know of them and report them to the enemy.

傳 is Li Ch‘üan’s conjecture for 待, which is found in the _T‘ung
Tien_ and the _Yü Lan_. The _T‘u Shu_, unsupported by any good
authority, adds 間也 after 敵. In that case, the doomed spies would
be those of the enemy, to whom our own spies had conveyed false
information. But this is unnecessarily complicated. Tu Yu gives
the best exposition of the meaning: “We ostentatiously do things
calculated to deceive our own spies, who must be led to believe
that they have been unwittingly disclosed. Then, when these spies
are captured in the enemy’s lines, they will make an entirely
false report, and the enemy will take measures accordingly, only
to find that we do something quite different. The spies will
thereupon be put to death.” Capt. Calthrop makes a hopeless muddle
of the sentence. As an example of doomed spies, Ho Shih mentions
the prisoners released by Pan Ch‘ao in his campaign against
Yarkand. (See p. 132.) He also refers to 唐儉 T‘ang Chien, who
in 630 A.D. was sent by T‘ai Tsung to lull the Turkish Khan 頡利
Chieh-li into fancied security, until Li Ching was able to deliver
a crushing blow against him. Chang Yü says that the Turks revenged
themselves by killing T‘ang Chien, but this is a mistake, for we
read in both the Old and the New T‘ang History (ch. 58, fol. 2 and
ch. 89, fol. 8 respectively) that he escaped and lived on until
656. 酈食其 Li I-chi[185] played a somewhat similar part in 203
B.C., when sent by the King of Han to open peaceful negotiations
with Ch‘i. He has certainly more claim to be described as a 死間;
for the King of Ch‘i, being subsequently attacked without warning
by Han Hsin, and infuriated by what he considered the treachery of
Li I-chi, ordered the unfortunate envoy to be boiled alive.

13. 生間者反報也

_Surviving spies_, finally, are those who bring back news from the enemy’s camp.

This is the ordinary class of spies, properly so called, forming a
regular part of the army. Tu Mu says: 生間者必取內明外愚形劣心壯趫健勁勇
閑於鄙事能忍饑寒垢耻者爲之 “Your surviving spy must be a man of
keen intellect, though in outward appearance a fool; of shabby
exterior, but with a will of iron. He must be active, robust,
endowed with physical strength and courage; thoroughly accustomed
to all sorts of dirty work, able to endure hunger and cold, and to
put up with shame and ignominy.” Ho Shih tells the following story
of 達奚武 Ta-hsi Wu of the Sui dynasty: “When he was governor of
Eastern Ch‘in, 神武 Shên-wu of Ch‘i made a hostile movement upon
沙苑 Sha-yüan. The Emperor T‘ai Tsu [? Kao Tsu] sent Ta-hsi Wu to
spy upon the enemy. He was accompanied by two other men. All three
were on horseback and wore the enemy’s uniform. When it was dark,
they dismounted a few hundred feet away from the enemy’s camp and
stealthily crept up to listen, until they succeeded in catching
the passwords used by the army. Then they got on their horses
again and boldly passed through the camp under the guise of
night-watchmen (警夜者); and more than once, happening to come
across a soldier who was committing some breach of discipline,
they actually stopped to give the culprit a sound cudgelling! Thus
they managed to return with the fullest possible information about
the enemy’s dispositions, and received warm commendation from the
Emperor, who in consequence of their report was able to inflict a
severe defeat on his adversary.” With the above classification it
is interesting to compare the remarks of Frederick the Great:[186]
“Es giebt vielerley Sorten von Spions: 1. Geringe Leute, welche
sich von diesem Handwerk meliren. 2. Doppelte Spions. 3. Spions
von Consequenz, und endlich 4. Diejenigen, welche man zu diesem
unglücklichen Hankwerk zwinget.” This of course is a bad
cross-division. The first class (“Bürgersleute, Bauern, Priesters,
etc.”) corresponds roughly to Sun Tzŭ’s “local spies,” and the
third to “inward spies.” Of “Doppelte Spions” it is broadly stated
that they are employed “um dem Feinde falsche Nachrichten
aufzubinden.” Thus they would include both converted and doomed
spies. Frederick’s last class of spies does not appear in Sun
Tzŭ’s list, perhaps because the risk in using them is too great.

14. 故三軍之親莫親於間賞莫厚於間事莫密於間

Hence it is that with none in the whole army are more intimate relations to be maintained than with spies.

The original text and the _T‘u Shu_ have 事 in place of the first
親. Tu Mu and Mei Yao-ch‘ên point out that the spy is privileged to
enter even the general’s private sleeping-tent. Capt. Calthrop has
an inaccurate translation: “In connection with the armies, spies
should be treated with the greatest kindness.”

None should be more liberally rewarded.

Frederick concludes his chapter on spies with the words: “Zu allem
diesem füge ich noch hinzu, dass man in Bezahlung der Spions
freygebig, ja verschwenderisch seyn muss. Ein Mench, der um eures
Dienstes halber den Strick waget, verdienet dafür belohnet zu
werden.”

In no other business should greater secrecy be preserved.

Tu Mu gives a graphic touch: 出口入耳也, that is to say, all
communications with spies should be carried on “mouth-to-ear.”
Capt. Calthrop has: “All matters relating to spies are secret,”
which is distinctly feeble. An inferior reading for 密 is 審. The
following remarks on spies may be quoted from Turenne, who made
perhaps larger use of them than any previous commander: “Spies
are attached to those who give them most, he who pays them ill is
never served. They should never be known to anybody; nor should
they know one another. When they propose anything very material,
secure their persons, or have in your possession their wives
and children as hostages for their fidelity. Never communicate
anything to them but what it is absolutely necessary that they
should know.”[187]

15. 非聖智不能用間

Spies cannot be usefully employed

This is the _nuance_ of Tu Yu’s paraphrase 不能得間人之用.

without a certain intuitive sagacity.

Mei Yao-ch‘ên says: 知其情僞辨其邪正則能用 “In order to use them, one
must know fact from falsehood, and be able to discriminate between
honesty and double-dealing.” Wang Hsi takes 聖 and 智 separately,
defining the former as 通而先識 “intuitive perception” and the
latter as 明於事 “practical intelligence.” Tu Mu strangely refers
these attributes to the spies themselves: 先量間者之性誠實多智然後可用之
“Before using spies we must assure ourselves as to their integrity
of character and the extent of their experience and skill.” But he
continues: 厚貌深情險於山川非聖人莫能知 “A brazen face and a crafty
disposition are more dangerous than mountains or rivers; it takes
a man of genius to penetrate such.” So that we are left in some
doubt as to his real opinion on the passage.

16. 非仁義不能使間

They cannot be properly managed without benevolence and straightforwardness.

Chang Yü says that 仁 means “not grudging them honours and pay;”
義, “showing no distrust of their honesty.” “When you have
attracted them by substantial offers, you must treat them with
absolute sincerity; then they will work for you with all their
might.”

17. 非微妙不能得間之實

Without subtle ingenuity of mind, one cannot make certain of the truth of their reports.

Mei Yao-ch‘ên says: “Be on your guard against the possibility of
spies going over to the service of the enemy.” The _T‘ung Tien_
and _Yü Lan_ read 密 for 妙.

18. 微哉微哉無所不用間也

Be subtle! be subtle!

Cf. VI. § 9: 微乎微乎. Capt. Calthrop translates: “Wonderful indeed
is the power of spies.”

and use your spies for every kind of business.

19. 間事未發而先聞者間與所告者皆死

If a secret piece of news is divulged by a spy before the time is ripe, he must be put to death together with the man to whom the secret was told.

The Chinese here is so concise and elliptical that some expansion
is necessary for the proper understanding of it. 間事 denotes
important information about the enemy obtained from a surviving
spy. The subject of 未發, however, is not this information itself,
but the secret stratagem built up on the strength of it. 聞者 means
“is heard”—by anybody else. Thus, word for word, we get: “If spy
matters are heard before [our plans] are carried out,” etc. Capt.
Calthrop, in translating 間與所告者 “the spy who told the matter,
and the man who repeated the same,” may appeal to the authority of
the commentators; but he surely misses the main point of Sun Tzŭ’s
injunction. For, whereas you kill the spy himself 惡其泄 “as a
punishment for letting out the secret,” the object of killing the
other man is only, as Ch‘ên Hao puts it, 以滅口 “to stop his mouth”
and prevent the news leaking any further. If it had already been
repeated to others, this object would not be gained. Either way,
Sun Tzŭ lays himself open to the charge of inhumanity, though Tu
Mu tries to defend him by saying that the man deserves to be put
to death, for the spy would certainly not have told the secret
unless the other had been at pains to worm it out of him. The
_T‘ung Tien_ and _Yü Lan_ have the reading ... 先聞其間者與, etc.,
which, while not affecting the sense, strikes me as being better
than that of the standard text. The _T‘u Shu_ has ... 聞與所告者,
which I suppose would mean: “the man who heard the secret and the
man who told it to him.”

20. 凡軍之所欲擊城之所欲攻人之所欲殺必先知其守將左右謁者門者舍人之姓名令吾間 必索知之

Whether the object be to crush an army, to storm a city, or to assassinate an individual, it is always necessary to begin by finding out the names of the attendants,

左右 is a comprehensive term for those who wait on others, servants
and retainers generally. Capt. Calthrop is hardly happy in
rendering it “right-hand men.”

the aides-de-camp,

謁者, literally “visitors,” is equivalent, as Tu Yu says, to
主告事者 “those whose duty it is to keep the general supplied with
information,” which naturally necessitates frequent interviews
with him. Chang Yü goes too far afield for an explanation in
saying that they are 典賓客之將 “the leaders of mercenary troops.”

the door-keepers and sentries

閽吏 and 守舍之人.

of the general in command.

守將, according to Chang Yü, is simply 守官任職之將 “a general on
active service.” Capt. Calthrop is wrong, I think, in making 守將
directly dependent on 姓名 (... “the names of the general in
charge,” etc.).

Our spies must be commissioned to ascertain these.

As the first step, no doubt, towards finding out if any of these
important functionaries can be won over by bribery. Capt. Calthrop
blunders badly with: “Then set the spies to watch them.”

21. 必索敵人之間來間我者因而利之導而舍之故反間可得而用也

The enemy’s spies who have come to spy on us must be sought out,

必索 is omitted by the _T‘ung Tien_ and _Yü Lan_. Its recurrence is
certainly suspicious, though the sense may seem to gain by it. The
_T‘u Shu_ has this variation: ... 敵間之來間吾者, etc.

tempted with bribes, led away and comfortably housed.

舍 is probably more than merely 居止 or 稽留 “detain.” Cf. § 25 _ad
fin._, where Sun Tzŭ insists that these converted spies shall be
treated well. Chang Yü’s paraphrase is 館舍.

Thus they will become converted spies and available for our service.

22. 因是而知之故鄉間內間可得而使也

It is through the information brought by the converted spy that we are able to acquire and employ local and inward spies.

Tu Yu expands 因是而知之 into 因反敵間而知敵情 “through conversion of
the enemy’s spies we learn the enemy’s condition.” And Chang Yü
says: 因是反間知彼鄉人之貪利者官人之有隙者誘而使之 “We must tempt the
converted spy into our service, because it is he that knows which
of the local inhabitants are greedy of gain, and which of the
officials are open to corruption.” In the _T‘ung Tien_, 鄉 has been
altered to 因, doubtless for the sake of uniformity with § 9.

23. 因是而知之故死間爲誑事可使告敵

It is owing to his information, again, that we can cause the doomed spy to carry false tidings to the enemy.

“Because the converted spy knows how the enemy can best be
deceived” (Chang Yü). The _T‘ung Tien_ text, followed by the _Yü
Lan_, has here the obviously interpolated sentence 因是可得而攻也.

24. 因是而知之故生間有使如期

Lastly, it is by his information that the surviving spy can be used on appointed occasions.

Capt. Calthrop omits this sentence.

25. 五間之事主必知之知之必在於反間故反間不可不厚也

The end and aim of spying in all its five varieties is knowledge of the enemy;

I have ventured to differ in this place from those commentators—Tu
Yu and Chang Yü—who understand 主 as 人主, and make 五間之事 the
antecedent of 之 (the others ignoring the point altogether). It
is plausible enough that Sun Tzŭ should require the ruler to be
familiar with the methods of spying (though one would rather
expect 將 “general” in place of 主). But this involves taking 知之
here in quite a different way from the 知之 immediately following,
as also from those in the previous sentences. 之 there refers
vaguely to the enemy or the enemy’s condition, and in order to
retain the same meaning here, I make 主 a verb, governed by
五間之事. Cf. XI. § 19, where 主 is used in exactly the same
manner. The sole objection that I can see in the way of this
interpretation is the fact that the 死間, or fourth variety of spy,
does not add to our knowledge of the enemy, but only misinforms
the enemy about us. This would be, however, but a trivial
oversight on Sun Tzŭ’s part, inasmuch as the “doomed spy” is in
the strictest sense not to be reckoned as a spy at all. Capt.
Calthrop, it is hardly necessary to remark, slurs over the whole
difficulty.

and this knowledge can only be derived, in the first instance, from the converted spy.

As explained in §§ 22–24. He not only brings information himself,
but makes it possible to use the other kinds of spy to advantage.

Hence it is essential that the converted spy be treated with the
utmost liberality.

26. 昔殷之興也伊摯在夏周之興也呂牙在殷

Of old, the rise of the Yin dynasty

Sun Tzŭ means the 商 Shang dynasty, founded in 1766 B.C. Its name
was changed to Yin by 盤庚 P‘an Kêng in 1401.

was due to I Chih

Better known as 伊尹 I Yin, the famous general and statesman who
took part in Ch‘êng T‘ang’s campaign against 桀癸 Chieh Kuei.

who had served under the Hsia. Likewise, the rise of the Chou dynasty was due to Lü Ya

呂尙 Lü Shang, whose “style” was 子牙, rose to high office
under the tyrant 紂辛 Chou Hsin, whom he afterwards helped to
overthrow. Popularly known as 太公, a title bestowed on him by Wên
Wang, he is said to have composed a treatise on war, erroneously
identified with the 六韜.

who had served under the Yin.

There is less precision in the Chinese than I have thought it well to
introduce into my translation, and the commentaries on the passage are
by no means explicit. But, having regard to the context, we can hardly
doubt that Sun Tzŭ is holding up I Chih and Lü Ya as illustrious
examples of the converted spy, or something closely analogous. His
suggestion is, that the Hsia and Yin dynasties were upset owing to the
intimate knowledge of their weaknesses and shortcomings which these
former ministers were able to impart to the other side. Mei Yao-ch‘ên
appears to resent any such aspersion on these historic names: “I Yin
and Lü Ya,” he says, “were not rebels against the Government
(非叛於國也). Hsia could not employ the former, hence Yin employed him.
Yin could not employ the latter, hence Chou employed him. Their great
achievements were all for the good of the people.” Ho Shih is also
indignant: 伊呂聖人之耦豈爲人間哉今孫子引之者言五間之用須上智之人如伊呂之才智者
可以用間葢重之之辭耳 “How should two divinely inspired men such as I and
Lü have acted as common spies? Sun Tzŭ’s mention of them simply means
that the proper use of the five classes of spies is a matter which
requires men of the highest mental calibre like I and Lü, whose
wisdom and capacity qualified them for the task. The above words only
emphasise this point.” Ho Shih believes then that the two heroes are
mentioned on account of their supposed skill in the use of spies. But
this is very weak, as it leaves totally unexplained the significant
words 在夏 and 在殷. Capt. Calthrop speaks, rather strangely, of “the
province of Yin ... the country of Hsia ... the State of Chu ... the
people of Shang.”

27. 故惟明君賢將能以上智爲間者必成大功此兵之要三軍之所恃而動也

Hence it is only the enlightened ruler and the wise general who will use the highest intelligence of the army for purposes of spying,

Ch‘ên Hao compares § 15: 非聖智不能用間. He points out that 湯武之聖
伊呂宜用 “the god-like wisdom of Ch‘êng T‘ang and Wu Wang led them
to employ I Yin and Lü Shang.” The _T‘u Shu_ omits 惟.

and thereby they achieve great results.

Tu Mu closes with a note of warning: 夫水所以能濟舟亦有因水而覆沒者間
所以能成功亦有憑間而傾敗者 “Just as water, which carries a boat from
bank to bank, may also be the means of sinking it, so reliance on
spies, while productive of great results, is oft-times the cause
of utter destruction.”

Spies are a most important element in war, because on them depends an army’s ability to move.

The antecedent to 此 must be either 間者 or 用間者 understood from
the whole sentence. Chia Lin says that an army without spies is
like a man without ears or eyes.

CHINESE CONCORDANCE

[PROPER NAMES ARE INDICATED BY AN ASTERISK]

Ai 愛 VIII. 12; X. 25, 26; XI. 18, 66; XIII. 2.

„ 阨 X. 21.

an 安 II. 20; V. 22; VI. 4; XII. 22.

Cha 詐 VII. 15.

ch‘a 察 I. 2; VIII. 14; IX. 39; X. 13, 20; XI. 41.

chan 戰 _passim_.

„ 霑 XI. 28.

chang 障 IX. 21.

„ 仗 IX. 29.

ch‘ang 常 VI. 32, 34; X. 18; XI. 29.*

„ 長 VI. 34.

„ 嘗 V. 9.

chao 朝 VII. 28.

chê 者 _passim_.

„ 折 V. 13; XI. 63.

chên 軫 XII. 4.*

ch‘ên 陳 VII. 32; IX. 25, 27; X. 18.

„ 塵 IX. 23.

chêng 爭 III. 7; VII. 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 22: VIII. 3; XI. 1, 4, 11, 47, 55; XIII. 2.

chêng 正 V. 3, 5, 10, 11; VII. 32; XI. 35.

„ 政 III. 3, 14; IV. 16; VII. 23; XI. 32, 56, 63.

„ 整 XI. 18.

ch‘êng 成 III. 4; XI. 62; XIII. 4, 27.

„ 城 II. 2; III. 3, 4, 5, 6; VIII. 3; XI. 7, 55; XIII. 20.

„ 乘^2 II. 4, 17; XI. 19.

„ 乘^4 II. 1, 17.

„ 稱 IV. 17, 18, 19.

chi 計 I. 3, 12, 15, 16; VI. 22; VII. 4, 22; X. 21; XI. 22.

„ 及 VI. 10; VII. 6; XI. 15, 19, 68.

„ 汲 IX. 30.

„ 急 II. 12.

„ 己 III. 18; IV. 2; VI. 18; X. 31; XI. 55.

„ 紀 XIII. 8.

„ 𦮼 II. 15.

„ 擊 VI. 15, 30; VII. 29, 32; VIII. 3; IX. 4; X. 7, 15, 19, 27, 28, 29; XI. 9, 29; XIII. 20.

chi 亟 IX. 7, 15; XI. 65.

„ 極 VI. 25; XII. 8.

„ 集 IX. 32; XI. 16.

„ 激 V. 12.

„ 既 III. 16; VII. 25.

„ 疾 V. 12, 13; VII. 17; IX. 12; XI. 10.

„ 機 V. 15; XI. 38.

„ 飢 VI. 4; VII. 31; IX. 29.

„ 積 IV. 20; VII. 11; XI. 22; XII. 1.

„ 㦸 II. 14.

„ 籍 II. 8.

„ 箕 XII. 4.*

„ 濟 IX. 4; XI. 30.

„ 繼 XI. 49.

ch‘i 其 _passim_.

„ 期 IX. 27; XI. 38, 66; XIII. 24.

„ 旗 II. 17; VII. 23, 24, 26, 32; IX. 33.

„ 器 III. 4.

„ 漆 II. 1.

„ 起 II. 4; IX. 22; XII. 3, 4; XIII. 8.

„ 隙 III. 11; IX. 15.

„ 齊 IX. 43; XI. 16, 32.

„ 七 II. 13; XIII. 1.

„ 奇 V. 3, 5, 6, 10, 11.

„ 谿 IV. 20; X. 25.

„ 氣 VII. 27, 28, 29; XI. 22.

chia 家 I. 25; II. 13, 14, 20; XIII. 1.

„ 甲 II. 1, 14; VII. 7.

„ 加 V. 4; XI. 54, 55.

chia 葭 IX. 17.

chiang 江 V. 6.

„ 彊 V. 17, 18.

„ 將^1 XI. 18, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50.

„ 將^4 I. 4, 9, 11, 13, 15; II. 15, 20; III. 5, 11, 17; VII. 1, 7, 9, 27; VIII. 1, 4, 5, 12, 13, 14; IX. 33; X. 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21; XI. 35, 40, 61; XII. 16, 18, 22; XIII. 3, 4, 20, 27.

„ 蔣 IX. 17.

ch‘iang 强 I. 13, 21; II. 18; III. 11; IX. 24; X. 16, 19; XII. 13.

chiao 交 III. 3; VII. 2, 12; VIII. 2; IX. 8; XI. 1, 5, 12, 28, 48, 52, 54, 55.

„ 校 I. 3, 12.

„ 教 IX. 44; X. 18.

„ 驕 I. 22; X. 26.

„ 膠 II. 1.

ch‘iao 巧 II. 5; XI. 62.

„ 樵 IX. 23.

chieh 竭 II. 11, 12; V. 6.

„ 皆 VI. 27; XI. 33; XIII. 19.

„ 戒 XI. 19, 25.

„ 潔 VIII. 12.

„ 節 V. 13, 14, 15.

„ 解 VIII. 9.

„ 結 XI. 48.

ch‘ieh 且 III. 16; XI. 23.

ch‘ieh 怯 V. 17, 18; VII. 25.

chien 閒 or 間 VI. 25; XIII. _passim_.

„ 澗 IX. 15.

„ 兼 VII. 7.

„ 姦 IX. 17.

„ 堅 III. 10.

„ 賤 IX. 11; XI. 15.

„ 踐 XI. 67.

„ 見 I. 26; IV. 8, 10; VII. 23; IX. 31.

ch‘ien 千 II. 1; IV. 20; V. 23; VI. 6, 19; XI. 61; XIII. 1.

„ 淺 XI. 42, 44.

„ 前 VI. 17, 20; IX. 9; XI. 15, 45.

chih 知 _passim_.

„ 智 I. 9; II. 4, 15; IV. 12; VIII. 7; XIII. 15, 27.

„ 之 _passim_.

„ 之 [=至] VI. 12; XI. 39.

„ 止 V. 22; XI. 11, 17; XII. 8, 11, 19.

„ 支 X. 1, 6, 7.

„ 直 VII. 3, 4, 22.

„ 制 I. 7, 10, 17; VI. 27, 31; X. 21.

„ 志 XI. 46.

„ 摯 XIII. 26.*

„ 鷙 V. 13.

„ 治 V. 1, 17, 18; VII. 29, 30, 31, 32; VIII. 6; X. 26; XI. 35.

„ 至 III. 16; V. 12, 13; VI. 3, 9, 25; VII. 4, 8, 9, 10; IX. 14, 37; X. 13, 20; XI. 6, 26, 29; XIII. 2.

chih 致 VI. 2; XII. 18.

ch‘ih 馳 II. 1.

„ 斥 IX. 7, 8.

chin 近 I. 8, 19; II. 11; VI. 20; VII. 31; IX. 15, 16, 18; X. 21.

„ 進 III. 13; VI. 10; VII. 25; IX. 19, 24, 28, 31, 40; X. 24; XI. 49.

„ 盡 II. 7; XI. 23.

„ 金 II. 1; VII. 23, 24; XIII. 1, 2.

„ 謹 IX. 17, 39; XL 22, 48.

„ 禁 XI. 26.

„ 襟 XI. 28.

ch‘in 親 I. 23; IX. 42; XI. 25; XIII. 14.

„ 擒 III. 10; VII. 7; IX. 41.

„ 侵 VII. 18.

„ 靜 V. 22; VI. 23; VII. 30; IX. 18; XI. 35; XII. 7.

„ 旌 II. 17: VII. 23, 24, 26; IX. 33.

„ 井 IX. 15, 17.

„ 勁 VII. 8.

„ 經 I. 3.

„ 精 IX. 37.

„ 警 XII. 22.

„ 境 XI. 43.

ch‘ing 情 I. 3, 12; XI. 19, 41, 51; XIII. 2, 6.

„ 請 IX. 26.

ch‘ing 輕 IX. 25; XI. 1, 3, 11, 44, 46.

chio 角 VI. 24.

„ 爵 XIII. 2.

chiu 九 IV. 7; VIII. 4, 5, 6; XI. 41.

„ 久 II. 2, 3, 5, 6, 19; III. 6; IX. 39; XII. 11.

„ 救 VI. 11, 20; XI. 15, 30.

ch‘iu 求 IV. 15; V. 21; X. 24; XI. 25.

„ 丘 II. 12, 14.

„ 邱 VII. 33; IX. 13.

„ 秋 IV. 10.

chiung 窘 IX. 36.

ch‘iung 窮 V. 6, 10, 11; VI. 28; VII. 36; IX. 34; X. 30.

cho 拙 II. 5.

chou 晝 VII. 26, 28; XII. 11.

„ 舟 XI. 30, 39.

„ 周 III. 11: XIII. 26.*

„ 胄 II. 14.

chu 主 I. 10, 13; II. 20; X. 23, 24; XI. 19, 20; XII. 16, 18; XIII. 3, 25.

„ 諸 II. 4; III. 16; VII. 12; VIII. 10; XI. 2, 6, 28,* 38, 52.

„ 著 IX. 45.

„ 助 IX. 13; X. 21.

„ 誅 XI. 64.

„ 屬 XI. 6, 46.

ch‘u 處^3 VI. 1, 24, 30; VII. 7; IX. 1, 2, 6, 8, 9, 12, 13: XI. 68.

ch‘u 處^4 IX. 17.

„ 出 I. 24; V. 6; VI. 5; IX. 25; X. 5, 6, 7; XIII. 1, 4.

chuan 專 VI. 13, 14; VII. 25; XI. 20, 42.

„ 轉 V. 22, 23.