Chapter II: Part 2

7. 賈林 Chia Lin is known to have lived under the T‘ang dynasty, for his commentary on Sun Tzŭ is mentioned in the 唐書 and was afterwards republished by 紀燮 Chi Hsieh of the same dynasty together with those of Mêng Shih and Tu Yu.[106] It is of somewhat scanty texture, and in point of quality, too, perhaps the least valuable of the eleven.

8. 梅堯臣 Mei Yao-ch‘ên (1002–1060), commonly known by his “style” as Mei 聖兪 Shêng-yü, was, like Tu Mu, a poet of distinction. His commentary was published with a laudatory preface by the great Ou-yang Hsiu, from which we may cull the following:—

Later scholars have misread Sun Tzŭ, distorting his words and
trying to make them square with their own one-sided views. Thus,
though commentators have not been lacking, only a few have proved
equal to the task. My friend Shêng-yü has not fallen into this
mistake. In attempting to provide a critical commentary for Sun
Tzŭ’s work, he does not lose sight of the fact that these sayings
were intended for states engaged in internecine warfare; that the
author is not concerned with the military conditions prevailing
under the sovereigns of the three ancient dynasties,[107] nor with
the nine punitive measures prescribed to the Minister of War.[108]
Again, Sun Wu loved brevity of diction, but his meaning is always
deep. Whether the subject be marching an army, or handling
soldiers, or estimating the enemy, or controlling the forces of
victory, it is always systematically treated; the sayings are
bound together in strict logical sequence, though this has been
obscured by commentators who have probably failed to grasp their
meaning. In his own commentary, Mei Shêng-yü has brushed aside all
the obstinate prejudices of these critics, and has tried to bring
out the true meaning of Sun Tzŭ himself. In this way, the clouds
of confusion have been dispersed and the sayings made clear. I am
convinced that the present work deserves to be handed down side by
side with the three great commentaries; and for a great deal that
they find in the sayings, coming generations will have constant
reason to thank my friend Shêng-yü.[109]

Making some allowance for the exuberance of friendship, I am inclined to endorse this favourable judgment, and would certainly place him above Ch‘ên Hao in order of merit.

9. 王晳 Wang Hsi, also of the Sung dynasty, is decidedly original in some of his interpretations, but much less judicious than Mei Yao-ch‘ên, and on the whole not a very trustworthy guide. He is fond of comparing his own commentary with that of Ts‘ao Kung, but the comparison is not often flattering to him. We learn from Ch‘ao Kung-wu that Wang Hsi revised the ancient text of Sun Tzŭ, filling up lacunae and correcting mistakes.[110]

10. 何延錫 Ho Yen-hsi of the Sung dynasty. The personal name of this commentator is given as above by 鄭樵 Chêng Ch‘iao in the _T‘ung Chih_, written about the middle of the twelfth century, but he appears simply as 何氏 Ho Shih in the _Yü Hai_, and Ma Tuan-lin quotes Ch‘ao Kung-wu as saying that his personal name is unknown. There seems to be no reason to doubt Chêng Ch‘iao’s statement, otherwise I should have been inclined to hazard a guess and identify him with one 何去非 Ho Ch‘ü-fei, the author of a short treatise on war entitled 備論, who lived in the latter part of the 11th century.[111] Ho Shih’s commentary, in the words of the _T‘ien-i-ko_ catalogue, 有所裨益 “contains helpful additions” here and there, but is chiefly remarkable for the copious extracts taken, in adapted form, from the dynastic histories and other sources.

11. 張預 Chang Yü. The list closes with a commentator of no great originality perhaps, but gifted with admirable powers of lucid exposition. His commentary is based on that of Ts‘ao Kung, whose terse sentences he contrives to expand and develop in masterly fashion. Without Chang Yü, it is safe to say that much of Ts‘ao Kung’s commentary would have remained cloaked in its pristine obscurity and therefore valueless. His work is not mentioned in the Sung history, the _T‘ung K‘ao_, or the _Yü Hai_, but it finds a niche in the _T‘ung Chih_, which also names him as the author of the 百將傳 “Lives of Famous Generals.”[112]

It is rather remarkable that the last-named four should all have flourished within so short a space of time. Ch‘ao Kung-wu accounts for it by saying: “During the early years of the Sung dynasty the Empire enjoyed a long spell of peace, and men ceased to practise the art of war. But when [Chao] Yüan-hao’s rebellion came [1038–42] and the frontier generals were defeated time after time, the Court made strenuous enquiry for men skilled in war, and military topics became the vogue amongst all the high officials. Hence it is that the commentators of Sun Tzŭ in our dynasty belong mainly to that period.”[113]

Besides these eleven commentators, there are several others whose work has not come down to us. The _Sui Shu_ mentions four, namely 王凌 Wang Ling (often quoted by Tu Yu as 王子); 張子尙 Chang Tzŭ-shang; 賈詡 Chia Hsü of 魏 Wei;[114] and 沈友 Shên Yu of 吳 Wu. The _T‘ang Shu_ adds 孫鎬 Sun Hao, and the _T‘ung Chih_ 蕭吉 Hsiao Chi, while the _T‘u Shu_ mentions a Ming commentator, 黃潤玉 Huang Jun-yü. It is possible that some of these may have been merely collectors and editors of other commentaries, like Chi T‘ien-pao and Chi Hsieh, mentioned above. Certainly in the case of the latter, the entry 紀夑注孫子 in the _T‘ung K‘ao_, without the following note, would give one to understand that he had written an independent commentary of his own.

There are two works, described in the _Ssu K‘u Ch‘üan Shu_[115] and no doubt extremely rare, which I should much like to have seen. One is entitled 孫子參同, in 5 _chüan_. It gives selections from four new commentators, probably of the Ming dynasty, as well as from the eleven known to us. The names of the four are 解元 Hsieh Yüan; 張鏊 Chang Ao; 李村 Li Ts‘ai; and 黃治徵 Huang Chih-chêng. The other work is 孫子彚徵 in 4 _chüan_, compiled by 鄭端 Chêng Tuan of the present dynasty. It is a compendium of information on ancient warfare, with special reference to Sun Tzŭ’s 13 chapters.

Appreciations of Sun Tzŭ.

Sun Tzŭ has exercised a potent fascination over the minds of some of China’s greatest men. Among the famous generals who are known to have studied his pages with enthusiasm may be mentioned 韓信 Han Hsin (_d._ B.C. 196),[116] 馮異 Fêng I (d. A.D. 34),[117] 呂蒙 Lü Mêng (_d._ 219),[118] and 岳飛 Yo Fei (1103–1141).[119] The opinion of Ts‘ao Kung, who disputes with Han Hsin the highest place in Chinese military annals, has already been recorded.[120] Still more remarkable, in one way, is the testimony of purely literary men, such as 蘇洵 Su Hsün (the father of Su Tung-p‘o), who wrote several essays on military topics, all of which owe their chief inspiration to Sun Tzŭ. The following short passage by him is preserved in the _Yü Hai:_[121]—

Sun Wu’s saying, that in war one cannot make certain of
conquering,[122] is very different indeed from what other books
tell us.[123] Wu Ch‘i was a man of the same stamp as Sun Wu: they
both wrote books on war, and they are linked together in popular
speech as “Sun and Wu.” But Wu Ch‘i’s remarks on war are less
weighty, his rules are rougher and more crudely stated, and there
is not the same unity of plan as in Sun Tzŭ’s work, where the
style is terse, but the meaning fully brought out.[124]

The 性理彚要, ch. 17, contains the following extract from the 藝圃折衷 “Impartial Judgments in the Garden of Literature” by 鄭厚 Chêng Hou:—

Sun Tzŭ’s 13 chapters are not only the staple and base of all
military men’s training, but also compel the most careful
attention of scholars and men of letters. His sayings are terse
yet elegant, simple yet profound, perspicuous and eminently
practical. Such works as the _Lun Yü_, the _I Ching_ and the great
Commentary,[125] as well as the writings of Mencius, Hsün K‘uang
and Yang Chu, all fall below the level of Sun Tzŭ.[126]

Chu Hsi, commenting on this, fully admits the first part of the criticism, although he dislikes the audacious comparison with the venerated classical works. Language of this sort, he says, “encourages a ruler’s bent towards unrelenting warfare and reckless militarism.”[127]

Apologies for War.

Accustomed as we are to think of China as the greatest peace-loving nation on earth, we are in some danger of forgetting that her experience of war in all its phases has also been such as no modern State can parallel. Her long military annals stretch back to a point at which they are lost in the mists of time. She had built the Great Wall and was maintaining a huge standing army along her frontier centuries before the first Roman legionary was seen on the Danube. What with the perpetual collisions of the ancient feudal States, the grim conflicts with Huns, Turks and other invaders after the centralisation of government, the terrific upheavals which accompanied the overthrow of so many dynasties, besides the countless rebellions and minor disturbances that have flamed up and flickered out again one by one, it is hardly too much to say that the clash of arms has never ceased to resound in one portion or another of the Empire.

No less remarkable is the succession of illustrious captains to whom China can point with pride. As in all countries, the greatest are found emerging at the most fateful crises of her history. Thus, Po Ch‘i stands out conspicuous in the period when Ch‘in was entering upon her final struggle with the remaining independent states. The stormy years which followed the break-up of the Ch‘in dynasty are illumined by the transcendent genius of Han Hsin. When the House of Han in turn is tottering to its fall, the great and baleful figure of Ts‘ao Ts‘ao dominates the scene. And in the establishment of the T‘ang dynasty, one of the mightiest tasks achieved by man, the superhuman energy of Li Shih-min (afterwards the Emperor T‘ai Tsung) was seconded by the brilliant strategy of Li Ching. None of these generals need fear comparison with the greatest names in the military history of Europe.

In spite of all this, the great body of Chinese sentiment, from Lao Tzŭ downwards, and especially as reflected in the standard literature of Confucianism, has been consistently pacific and intensely opposed to militarism in any form. It is such an uncommon thing to find any of the literati defending warfare on principle, that I have thought it worth while to collect and translate a few passages in which the unorthodox view is upheld. The following, by Ssŭ-ma Ch‘ien, shows that for all his ardent admiration of Confucius, he was yet no advocate of peace at any price:—

Military weapons are the means used by the Sage to punish
violence and cruelty, to give peace to troublous times, to remove
difficulties and dangers, and to succour those who are in peril.
Every animal with blood in its veins and horns on its head will
fight when it is attacked. How much more so will man, who carries
in his breast the faculties of love and hatred, joy and anger!
When he is pleased, a feeling of affection springs up within him;
when angry, his poisoned sting is brought into play. That is the
natural law which governs his being.... What then shall be said of
those scholars of our time, blind to all great issues, and without
any appreciation of relative values, who can only bark out their
stale formulas about “virtue” and “civilisation,” condemning the
use of military weapons? They will surely bring our country to
impotence and dishonour and the loss of her rightful heritage; or,
at the very least, they will bring about invasion and rebellion,
sacrifice of territory and general enfeeblement. Yet they
obstinately refuse to modify the position they have taken up. The
truth is that, just as in the family the teacher must not spare
the rod, and punishments cannot be dispensed with in the State, so
military chastisement can never be allowed to fall into abeyance
in the Empire. All one can say is that this power will be
exercised wisely by some, foolishly by others, and that among
those who bear arms some will be loyal and others rebellious.[128]

The next piece is taken from Tu Mu’s preface to his commentary on Sun Tzŭ:—

War may be defined as punishment, which is one of the functions of
government. It was the profession of Chung Yu and Jan Ch‘iu, both
disciples of Confucius. Nowadays, the holding of trials and
hearing of litigation, the imprisonment of offenders and their
execution by flogging in the market-place, are all done by
officials. But the wielding of huge armies, the throwing down of
fortified cities, the haling of women and children into captivity,
and the beheading of traitors—this is also work which is done by
officials. The objects of the rack[129] and of military weapons
are essentially the same. There is no intrinsic difference between
the punishment of flogging and cutting off heads in war. For the
lesser infractions of law, which are easily dealt with, only a
small amount of force need be employed: hence the institution of
torture and flogging. For more serious outbreaks of lawlessness,
which are hard to suppress, a greater amount of force is
necessary: hence the use of military weapons and wholesale
decapitation. In both cases, however, the end in view is to get
rid of wicked people, and to give comfort and relief to the
good....[130]

Chi-sun asked Jan Yu, saying: “Have you, Sir, acquired your
military aptitude by study, or is it innate?” Jan Yu replied: “It
has been acquired by study.”[131] “How can that be so,” said
Chi-sun, “seeing that you are a disciple of Confucius?” “It is a
fact,” replied Jan Yu; “I was taught by Confucius. It is fitting
that the great Sage should exercise both civil and military
functions, though to be sure my instruction in the art of fighting
has not yet gone very far.”

Now, who the author was of this rigid distinction between the
“civil” and the “military,” and the limitation of each to a
separate sphere of action, or in what year of which dynasty it
was first introduced, is more than I can say. But, at any rate,
it has come about that the members of the governing class are
quite afraid of enlarging on military topics, or do so only in a
shamefaced manner. If any are bold enough to discuss the subject,
they are at once set down as eccentric individuals of coarse and
brutal propensities. This is an extraordinary instance of the way
in which, through sheer lack of reasoning, men unhappily lose
sight of fundamental principles.[132]

When the Duke of Chou was minister under Ch‘êng Wang, he
regulated ceremonies and made music, and venerated the arts of
scholarship and learning; yet when the barbarians of the River Huai
revolted,[133] he sallied forth and chastised them. When Confucius
held office under the Duke of Lu, and a meeting was convened at
Chia-ku,[134] he said: “If pacific negotiations are in progress,
warlike preparations should have been made beforehand.” He rebuked
and shamed the Marquis of Ch‘i, who cowered under him and dared
not proceed to violence. How can it be said that these two great
Sages had no knowledge of military matters?[135]

We have seen that the great Chu Hsi held Sun Tzŭ in high esteem. He also appeals to the authority of the Classics:—

Our Master Confucius, answering Duke Ling of Wei, said: “I have
never studied matters connected with armies and battalions.”[136]
Replying to K‘ung Wên-tzŭ, he said: “I have not been instructed
about buff-coats and weapons.”[137] But if we turn to the meeting
at Chia-ku,[138] we find that he used armed force against the men
of Lai,[139] so that the marquis of Ch‘i was overawed. Again, when
the inhabitants of Pi revolted, he ordered his officers to attack
them, whereupon they were defeated and fled in confusion.[140]
He once uttered the words: “If I fight, I conquer.”[141] And
Jan Yu also said: “The Sage exercises both civil and military
functions.”[142] Can it be a fact that Confucius never studied or
received instruction in the art of war? We can only say that he
did not specially choose matters connected with armies and
fighting to be the subject of his teaching.[143]

Sun Hsing-yen, the editor of Sun Tzŭ, writes in similar strain:—

Confucius said: “I am unversed in military matters.” He also
said: “If I fight, I conquer.”[144] Confucius ordered ceremonies
and regulated music. Now war constitutes one of the five
classes of State ceremonial,[145] and must not be treated as an
independent branch of study. Hence, the words “I am unversed in”
must be taken to mean that there are things which even an inspired
Teacher does not know. Those who have to lead an army and devise
stratagems, must learn the art of war. But if one can command the
services of a good general like Sun Tzŭ, who was employed by Wu
Tzŭ-hsü, there is no need to learn it oneself. Hence the remark
added by Confucius: “If I fight, I conquer.”[146]

The men of the present day, however, wilfully interpret these
words of Confucius in their narrowest sense, as though he meant
that books on the art of war were not worth reading. With blind
persistency, they adduce the example of Chao Kua, who pored over
his father’s books to no purpose,[147] as a proof that all
military theory is useless. Again, seeing that books on war have
to do with such things as opportunism in designing plans, and
the conversion of spies, they hold that the art is immoral and
unworthy of a sage. These people ignore the fact that the studies
of our scholars and the civil administration of our officials
also require steady application and practice before efficiency is
reached. The ancients were particularly chary of allowing mere
novices to botch their work.[148] Weapons are baneful[149] and
fighting perilous; and unless a general is in constant practice,
he ought not to hazard other men’s lives in battle.[150] Hence it
is essential that Sun Tzŭ’s 13 chapters should be studied.[151]

Hsiang Liang used to instruct his nephew Chi[152] in the art of
war. Chi got a rough idea of the art in its general bearings,
but would not pursue his studies to their proper outcome, the
consequence being that he was finally defeated and overthrown. He
did not realise that the tricks and artifices of war are beyond
verbal computation. Duke Hsiang of Sung[153] and King Yen of
Hsü[154] were brought to destruction by their misplaced humanity.
The treacherous and underhand nature of war necessitates the use
of guile and stratagem suited to the occasion. There is a case on
record of Confucius himself having violated an extorted oath,[155]
and also of his having left the Sung State in disguise.[156] Can
we then recklessly arraign Sun Tzŭ for disregarding truth and
honesty?[157]

Bibliography.

The following are the oldest Chinese treatises on war, after Sun Tzŭ. The notes on each have been drawn principally from the 四庫全書簡明目錄 _Ssŭ k‘u ch‘üan shu chien ming mu lu_, ch. 9, fol. 22 _sqq._

1. 吳子 Wu Tzŭ, in 1 _chüan_ or 6 篇 chapters. By 吳起 Wu Ch‘i (_d._ B.C. 381). A genuine work. See _Shih Chi_, ch. 65.

2. 司馬法 Ssŭ-ma Fa, in 1 _chüan_ or 5 chapters. Wrongly attributed to 司馬穰苴 Ssŭ-ma Jang-chü of the 6th century B.C. Its date, however, must be early, as the customs of the three ancient dynasties are constantly to be met with in its pages.[158] See _Shih Chi_, ch. 64.

The _Ssŭ K‘u Ch‘üan Shu_ (ch. 99, f. 1) remarks that the oldest three treatises on war, _Sun Tzŭ_, _Wu Tzŭ_ and the _Ssŭ-ma Fa_, are, generally speaking, only concerned with things strictly military—the art of producing, collecting, training and drilling troops, and the correct theory with regard to measures of expediency, laying plans, transport of goods and the handling of soldiers[159]—in strong contrast to later works, in which the science of war is usually blended with metaphysics, divination and magical arts in general.

3. 六韜 Liu T‘ao, in 6 _chüan_ or 60 chapters. Attributed to 呂望 Lü Wang (or Lü 尙 Shang, also known as 太公 T‘ai Kung) of the 12th century B.C.[160] But its style does not belong to the era of the Three Dynasties.[161] 陸德明 Lu Tê-ming (550–625 A.D.) mentions the work, and enumerates the headings of the six sections, 文, 武, 虎, 豹, 龍 and 犬, so that the forgery cannot have been later than the Sui dynasty.

4. 尉繚子 Wei Liao Tzŭ, in 5 _chüan_. Attributed to Wei Liao (4th cent. B.C.), who studied under the famous 鬼谷子 Kuei-ku Tzŭ. The 漢志, under 兵家, mentions a book of Wei Liao in 31 chapters, whereas the text we possess contains only 24. Its matter is sound enough in the main, though the strategical devices differ considerably from those of the Warring States period.[162] It has been furnished with a commentary by the well-known Sung philosopher 張載 Chang Tsai.

5. 三略 San Lüeh, in 3 _chüan_. Attributed to 黃石公 Huang-shih Kung, a legendary personage who is said to have bestowed it on Chang Liang (_d._ B.C. 187) in an interview on a bridge.[163] But here again, the style is not that of works dating from the Ch‘in or Han period. The Han Emperor Kuang Wu [A.D. 25–57] apparently quotes from it in one of his proclamations; but the passage in question may have been inserted later on, in order to prove the genuineness of the work. We shall not be far out if we refer it to the Northern Sung period [420–478 A.D.], or somewhat earlier.[164]

6. 李衞公問對 Li Wei Kung Wên Tui, in 3 sections. Written in the form of a dialogue between T‘ai Tsung and his great general 李靖 Li Ching, it is usually ascribed to the latter. Competent authorities consider it a forgery, though the author was evidently well versed in the art of war.[165]

7. 李靖兵法 Li Ching Ping Fa (not to be confounded with the foregoing) is a short treatise in 8 chapters, preserved in the _T‘ung Tien_, but not published separately. This fact explains its omission from the _Ssŭ K‘u Ch‘üan Shu_.

8. 握奇經 Wu Ch‘i Ching,[166] in 1 _chüan_. Attributed to the legendary minister 風后 Fêng Hou, with exegetical notes by 公孫宏 Kung-sun Hung of the Han dynasty (_d._ B.C. 121), and said to have been eulogised by the celebrated general 馬隆 Ma Lung (_d._ A.D. 300). Yet the earliest mention of it is in the 宋志. Although a forgery, the work is well put together.[167]

Considering the high popular estimation in which 諸葛亮 Chu-ko Liang has always been held, it is not surprising to find more than one work on war ascribed to his pen. Such are (1) the 十六策 Shih Liu Ts‘ê (1 _chüan_), preserved in the 永樂大典 _Yung Lo Ta Tien_; (2) 將苑 Chiang Yüan (1 _ch._); and (3) 心書 Hsin Shu (1 _ch._), which steals wholesale from Sun Tzŭ. None of these has the slightest claim to be considered genuine.

Most of the large Chinese encyclopaedias contain extensive sections devoted to the literature of war. The following references may be found useful:—

通典 T‘ung Tien (_circâ_ 800 A.D.), ch. 148–162.

太平御覽 T‘ai P‘ing Yü Lan (983), ch. 270–359.

文獻通考 Wên Hsien T‘ung K‘ao (13th cent.), ch. 221.

玉海 Yü Hai (13th cent.), ch. 140, 141.

三才圖會 San Ts‘ai T‘u Hui (16th cent.), 人事 ch. 7, 8.

廣博物志 Kuang Po Wu Chih (1607), ch. 31, 32.

潛確類書 Ch‘ien Ch‘io Lei Shu (1632), ch. 75.

淵鑑類函 Yüan Chien Lei Han (1710), ch. 206–229.

古今圖書集成 Ku Chin T‘u Shu Chi Ch‘êng (1726), section XXX,
_esp._ ch. 81–90.

續文獻通考 Hsü Wên Hsien T‘ung K‘ao (1784), ch. 121–134.

皇朝經世文編 Huang Ch‘ao Ching Shih Wên Pien (1826), ch. 76, 77.

The bibliographical sections of certain historical works also deserve mention:—

前漢書 Ch‘ien Han Shu, ch. 30.

隋書 Sui Shu, ch. 32–35.

舊唐書 Chiu T‘ang Shu, ch. 46, 47.

新唐書 Hsin T‘ang Shu, ch. 57–60.

宋史 Sung Shih, ch. 202–209.

通志 T‘ung Chih (_circâ_ 1150), ch. 68.

To these of course must be added the great Catalogue of the Imperial Library:—

四庫全書總目提要 Ssŭ K‘u Ch‘üan Shu Tsung Mu T‘i Yao (1790), ch. 99, 100.

I. 計篇

LAYING PLANS.

This is the only possible meaning of 計, which M. Amiot and Capt.
Calthrop wrongly translate “Fondements de l’art militaire” and
“First principles” respectively. Ts‘ao Kung says it refers to the
deliberations in the temple selected by the general for his
temporary use, or as we should say, in his tent. See § 26.

1. 孫子曰兵者國之大事

Sun Tzŭ said: The art of war is of vital importance to the State.

2. 死生之地存亡之道不可不察也

It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected.

3. 故經之以五校之以計而索其情

The art of war, then, is governed by five constant factors, to be taken into account in one’s deliberations, when seeking to determine the conditions obtaining in the field.

The old text of the _T‘ung Tien_ has 故經之以五校之計, etc. Later
editors have inserted 事 after 五, and 以 before 計. The former
correction is perhaps superfluous, but the latter seems necessary
in order to make sense, and is supported by the accepted reading
in § 12, where the same words recur. I am inclined to think,
however, that the whole sentence from 校 to 情 is an interpolation
and has no business here at all. If it be retained, Wang Hsi must
be right in saying that 計 denotes the “seven considerations” in
§ 13. 情 are the circumstances or conditions likely to bring about
victory or defeat. The antecedent of the first 之 is 兵者; of the
second, 五. 校 contains the idea of “comparison with the enemy,”
which cannot well be brought out here, but will appear in § 12.
Altogether, difficult though it is, the passage is not so
hopelessly corrupt as to justify Capt. Calthrop in burking it
entirely.

4. 一曰道二曰天三曰地四曰將五曰法

These are: (1) The Moral Law; (2) Heaven; (3) Earth; (4) The Commander; (5) Method and discipline.

It appears from what follows that Sun Tzŭ means by 道 a principle
of harmony, not unlike the Tao of Lao Tzŭ in its moral aspect. One
might be tempted to render it by “morale,” were it not considered
as an attribute of the _ruler_ in § 13.

5. 道者令民與上同意也

6. 故可與之死可與之生而民不畏危

_The Moral Law_ causes the people to be in complete accord with their ruler, so that they will follow him regardless of their lives, undismayed by any danger.

The original text omits 令民, inserts an 以 after each 可, and
omits 民 after 而. Capt. Calthrop translates: “If the ruling
authority be upright, the people are united”—a very pretty
sentiment, but wholly out of place in what purports to be a
translation of Sun Tzŭ.

7. 天者陰陽寒暑時制也

_Heaven_ signifies night and day, cold and heat, times and seasons.

The commentators, I think, make an unnecessary mystery of 陰陽.
Thus Mêng Shih defines the words as 剛柔盈縮 “the hard and the
soft, waxing and waning,” which does not help us much. Wang Hsi,
however, may be right in saying that what is meant is 總天道 “the
general economy of Heaven,” including the five elements, the four
seasons, wind and clouds, and other phenomena.

8. 地者遠近險易廣狹死生也

_Earth_ comprises distances, great and small; danger and security; open ground and narrow passes; the chances of life and death.

死生 (omitted by Capt. Calthrop) may have been included here
because the safety of an army depends largely on its quickness to
turn these geographical features to account.

9. 將者智信仁勇嚴也

_The Commander_ stands for the virtues of wisdom, sincerity, benevolence, courage and strictness.

The five cardinal virtues of the Chinese are (1) 仁 humanity or
benevolence; (2) 義 uprightness of mind; (3) 禮 self-respect,
self-control, or “proper feeling;” (4) 智 wisdom; (5) 信 sincerity
or good faith. Here 智 and 信 are put before 仁, and the two
military virtues of “courage” and “strictness” substituted for 義
and 禮.

10. 法者曲制官道主用也

By _Method and discipline_ are to be understood the marshalling of the army in its proper subdivisions, the gradations of rank among the officers, the maintenance of roads by which supplies may reach the army, and the control of military expenditure.

The Chinese of this sentence is so concise as to be practically
unintelligible without commentary. I have followed the
interpretation of Ts‘ao Kung, who joins 曲制 and again 主用. Others
take each of the six predicates separately. 曲 has the somewhat
uncommon sense of “cohort” or division of an army. Capt. Calthrop
translates: “Partition and ordering of troops,” which only covers
曲制.

11. 凡此五者將莫不聞知之者勝不知者不勝

These five heads should be familiar to every general: he who knows them will be victorious; he who knows them not will fail.

12. 故校之以計而索其情

Therefore, in your deliberations, when seeking to determine the military conditions, let them be made the basis of a comparison, in this wise:—

The _Yü Lan_ has an interpolated 五 before 計. It is obvious,
however, that the 五者 just enumerated cannot be described as 計.
Capt. Calthrop, forced to give some rendering of the words which
he had omitted in § 3, shows himself decidedly hazy: “Further,
with regard to these and the following seven matters, the
condition of the enemy must be compared with our own.” He does not
appear to see that the seven queries or considerations which
follow arise directly out of the Five heads, instead of being
supplementary to them.

13. 曰主孰有道將孰有能天地孰得法令孰行兵衆孰强士卒孰練賞罰孰明

(1) Which of the two sovereigns is imbued with the Moral law?

I.e., “is in harmony with his subjects.” Cf. § 5.

(2) Which of the two generals has most ability?

(3) With whom lie the advantages derived from Heaven and Earth?

See §§ 7, 8.

(4) On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced?

Tu Mu alludes to the remarkable story of Ts‘ao Ts‘ao (A.D.
155–220), who was such a strict disciplinarian that once, in
accordance with his own severe regulations against injury to
standing crops, he condemned himself to death for having allowed
his horse to shy into a field of corn! However, in lieu of losing
his head, he was persuaded to satisfy his sense of justice by
cutting off his hair. Ts‘ao Ts‘ao’s own comment on the present
passage is characteristically curt: 設而不犯犯而必誅 “when you lay
down a law, see that it is not disobeyed; if it is disobeyed, the
offender must be put to death.”

(5) Which army is the stronger?

Morally as well as physically. As Mei Yao-ch‘ên puts it, 內和外附,
which might be freely rendered “_esprit de corps_ and ‘big
battalions.’”

(6) On which side are officers and men more highly trained?

Tu Yu quotes 王子 as saying: “Without constant practice, the
officers will be nervous and undecided when mustering for battle;
without constant practice, the general will be wavering and
irresolute when the crisis is at hand.”

(7) In which army is there the greater constancy both in reward and punishment?

明, literally “clear;” that is, on which side is there the most
absolute certainty that merit will be properly rewarded and
misdeeds summarily punished?

14. 吾以此知勝負矣

By means of these seven considerations I can forecast victory or defeat.

15. 將聽吾計用之必勝留之將不聽吾計用之必敗去之

The general that hearkens to my counsel and acts upon it, will conquer:—let such a one be retained in command! The general that hearkens not to my counsel nor acts upon it, will suffer defeat:—let such a one be dismissed!

The form of this paragraph reminds us that Sun Tzŭ’s treatise was
composed expressly for the benefit of his patron 闔閭 Ho Lü, king of
the Wu State. It is not necessary, however, to understand 我 before
留之 (as some commentators do), or to take 將 as “generals under my
command.”

16. 計利以聽乃爲之勢以佐其外

While heeding the profit of my counsel, avail yourself also of any helpful circumstances over and beyond the ordinary rules.

Capt. Calthrop blunders amazingly over this sentence: “Wherefore, with
regard to the foregoing, considering that with us lies the advantage,
and the generals agreeing, we create a situation which promises
victory.” Mere logic should have kept him from penning such frothy
balderdash.

17. 勢者因利而制權也

According as circumstances are favourable, one should modify one’s plans.

Sun Tzŭ, as a practical soldier, will have none of the “bookish
theoric.” He cautions us here not to pin our faith to abstract
principles; “for,” as Chang Yü puts it, “while the main laws of
strategy can be stated clearly enough for the benefit of all and
sundry, you must be guided by the actions of the enemy in attempting
to secure a favourable position in actual warfare.” On the eve of the
battle of Waterloo, Lord Uxbridge, commanding the cavalry, went to the
Duke of Wellington in order to learn what his plans and calculations
were for the morrow, because, as he explained, he might suddenly find
himself Commander-in-chief and would be unable to frame new plans in a
critical moment. The Duke listened quietly and then said: “Who will
attack the first to-morrow—I or Bonaparte?” “Bonaparte,” replied Lord
Uxbridge. “Well,” continued the Duke, “Bonaparte has not given me any
idea of his projects; and as my plans will depend upon his, how can
you expect me to tell you what mine are?”[168]

18. 兵者詭道也

All warfare is based on deception.

The truth of this pithy and profound saying will be admitted by
every soldier. Col. Henderson tells us that Wellington, great in
so many military qualities, was especially distinguished by “the
extraordinary skill with which he concealed his movements and
deceived both friend and foe.”

19. 故能而示之不能用而示之不用近而示之遠遠而示之近

Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near.

20. 利而誘之亂而取之

Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him.

取, as often in Sun Tzŭ, is used in the sense of 擊. It is rather
remarkable that all the commentators, with the exception of Chang
Yü, refer 亂 to the enemy: “when he is in disorder, crush him.” It
is more natural to suppose that Sun Tzŭ is still illustrating the
uses of deception in war.

21. 實而備之强而避之

If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. If he is in superior strength, evade him.

The meaning of 實 is made clear from chap. VI, where it is opposed
to 虛 “weak or vulnerable spots.” 强, according to Tu Yu and other
commentators, has reference to the keenness of the men as well as
to numerical superiority. Capt. Calthrop evolves an
extraordinarily far-fetched translation: “If there are defects,
give an appearance of perfection, and awe the enemy. Pretend to be
strong, and so cause the enemy to avoid you”!

22. 怒而撓之卑而驕之

If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irritate him. Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant.

I follow Chang Yü in my interpretation of 怒. 卑 is expanded by Mei
Yao-ch‘ên into 示以卑弱. Wang Tzŭ, quoted by Tu Yu, says that the
good tactician plays with his adversary as a cat plays with a
mouse, first feigning weakness and immobility, and then suddenly
pouncing upon him.

23. 佚而勞之親而離之

If he is taking his ease, give him no rest.

This is probably the meaning, though Mei Yao-ch‘ên has the note:
以我之佚待彼之勞 “while we are taking our ease, wait for the enemy
to tire himself out.” The _Yü Lan_ has 引而勞之 “Lure him on and
tire him out.” This would seem also to have been Ts‘ao Kung’s
text, judging by his comment 以利勞之.

If his forces are united, separate them.

Less plausible is the interpretation favoured by most of the
commentators: “If sovereign and subject are in accord, put
division between them.”

24. 攻其無備出其不意

Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected.

25. 此兵家之勝不可先傳也

These military devices, leading to victory, must not be divulged beforehand.

This seems to be the way in which Ts‘ao Kung understood the
passage, and is perhaps the best sense to be got out of the text
as it stands. Most of the commentators give the following
explanation: “It is impossible to lay down rules for warfare
before you come into touch with the enemy.” This would be very
plausible if it did not ignore 此, which unmistakably refers to the
maxims which Sun Tzŭ has been laying down. It is possible, of
course, that 此 may be a later interpolation, in which case the
sentence would practically mean: “Success in warfare cannot be
taught.” As an alternative, however, I would venture to suggest
that a second 不 may have fallen out after 可, so that we get:
“These maxims for succeeding in war are the first that ought to be
imparted.”

26. 夫未戰而廟算勝者得算多也未戰而廟算不勝者得算少也多算勝少算不勝而況於無算 乎吾以此觀之勝負見矣

Now the general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his temple ere the battle is fought.

Chang Yü tells us that in ancient times it was customary for a
temple to be set apart for the use of a general who was about to
take the field, in order that he might there elaborate his plan of
campaign. Capt. Calthrop misunderstands it as “the shrine of the
ancestors,” and gives a loose and inaccurate rendering of the
whole passage.

The general who loses a battle makes but few calculations beforehand. Thus do many calculations lead to victory, and few calculations to defeat: how much more no calculation at all! It is by attention to this point that I can foresee who is likely to win or lose.

II. 作戰篇

WAGING WAR.

Ts‘ao Kung has the note: 欲戰必先算其費務 “He who wishes to fight
must first count the cost,” which prepares us for the discovery
that the subject of the chapter is not what we might expect from
the title, but is primarily a consideration of ways and means.

1. 孫子曰凡用兵之法馳車千駟革車千乘帶甲十萬千里饋糧則內外之費賓客之用膠漆之材 車甲之奉日費千金然後十萬之師舉矣

Sun Tzŭ said: In the operations of war, where there are in the field a thousand swift chariots, as many heavy chariots, and a hundred thousand mail-clad soldiers,

The 馳車 were lightly built and, according to Chang Yü, used for
the attack; the 革車 were heavier, and designed for purposes of
defence. Li Ch‘üan, it is true, says that the latter were light,
but this seems hardly probable. Capt. Calthrop translates
“chariots” and “supply wagons” respectively, but is not supported
by any commentator. It is interesting to note the analogies
between early Chinese warfare and that of the Homeric Greeks. In
each case, the war-chariot was the important factor, forming as it
did the nucleus round which was grouped a certain number of
foot-soldiers. With regard to the numbers given here, we are
informed that each swift chariot was accompanied by 75 footmen,
and each heavy chariot by 25 footmen, so that the whole army would
be divided up into a thousand battalions, each consisting of two
chariots and a hundred men.

with provisions enough to carry them a thousand _li_,

2.78 modern _li_ go to a mile. The length may have varied slightly
since Sun Tzŭ’s time.

the expenditure at home and at the front, including entertainment of guests, small items such as glue and paint, and sums spent on chariots and armour, will reach the total of a thousand ounces of silver per day.

則, which follows 糧 in the _textus receptus_, is important as
indicating the apodosis. In the text adopted by Capt. Calthrop it
is omitted, so that he is led to give this meaningless translation
of the opening sentence: “Now the requirements of War are such
that we need 1,000 chariots,” etc. The second 費, which is
redundant, is omitted in the _Yü Lan_. 千金, like 千里 above, is
meant to suggest a large but indefinite number. As the Chinese
have never possessed gold coins, it is incorrect to translate it
“1000 pieces of gold.”

Such is the cost of raising an army of 100,000 men.

Capt. Calthrop adds: “You have the instruments of victory,” which
he seems to get from the first five characters of the next sentence.

2. 其用戰也勝久則鈍兵挫銳攻城則力屈

When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in coming, the men’s weapons will grow dull and their ardour will be damped.

The _Yü Lan_ omits 勝; but though 勝久 is certainly a bold phrase,
it is more likely to be right than not. Both in this place and in
§ 4, the _T‘ung Tien_ and _Yü Lan_ read 頓 (in the sense of “to
injure”) instead of 鈍.

If you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust your strength.

As synonyms to 屈 are given 盡, 殫, 窮 and 困.

3. 久暴師則國用不足

Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the State will not be equal to the strain.

久暴師 means literally, “If there is long exposure of the army.”
Of 暴 in this sense K‘ang Hsi cites an instance from the biography
of 竇融 Tou Jung in the _Hou Han Shu_, where the commentary defines
it by 露. Cf. also the following from the 戰國策: 將軍久暴露於外
“General, you have long been exposed to all weathers.”

4. 夫鈍兵挫銳屈力殫貨則諸侯乘其幣而起雖有智者不能善其後矣

Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardour damped, your strength exhausted and your treasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to take advantage of your extremity. Then no man, however wise, will be able to avert the consequences that must ensue.

Following Tu Yu, I understand 善 in the sense of “to make good,”
i.e. to mend. But Tu Mu and Ho Shih explain it as “to make good
plans”—for the future.

5. 故兵聞拙速未睹巧之久也

Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has never been seen associated with long delays.

This concise and difficult sentence is not well explained by any
of the commentators. Ts‘ao Kung, Li Ch‘üan, Mêng Shih, Tu Yu, Tu
Mu and Mei Yao-ch‘ên have notes to the effect that a general,
though naturally stupid, may nevertheless conquer through sheer
force of rapidity. Ho Shih says: “Haste may be stupid, but at any
rate it saves expenditure of energy and treasure; protracted
operations may be very clever, but they bring calamity in their
train.” Wang Hsi evades the difficulty by remarking: “Lengthy
operations mean an army growing old, wealth being expended, an
empty exchequer and distress among the people; true cleverness
insures against the occurrence of such calamities.” Chang Yü says:
“So long as victory can be attained, stupid haste is preferable to
clever dilatoriness.” Now Sun Tzŭ says nothing whatever, except
possibly by implication, about ill-considered haste being better
than ingenious but lengthy operations. What he does say is
something much more guarded, namely that, while speed may
sometimes be injudicious, tardiness can never be anything but
foolish—if only because it means impoverishment to the nation.
Capt. Calthrop indulges his imagination with the following:
“Therefore it is acknowledged that war cannot be too short in
duration. But though conducted with the utmost art, if long
continuing, misfortunes do always appear.” It is hardly worth
while to note the total disappearance of 拙速 in this precious
concoction. In considering the point raised here by Sun Tzŭ, the
classic example of Fabius Cunctator will inevitably occur to the
mind. That general deliberately measured the endurance of Rome
against that of Hannibal’s isolated army, because it seemed to him
that the latter was more likely to suffer from a long campaign in
a strange country. But it is quite a moot question whether his
tactics would have proved successful in the long run. Their
reversal, it is true, led to Cannae; but this only establishes a
negative presumption in their favour.

6. 夫兵久而國利者未之有也

There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare.

The _Yü Lan_ has 圖 instead of 國—evidently the mistake of a scribe.

7. 故不盡知用兵之害者則不能盡知用兵之利也

It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the evils of war that can thoroughly understand the profitable way of carrying it on.

That is, with rapidity. Only one who knows the disastrous effects
of a long war can realise the supreme importance of rapidity in
bringing it to a close. Only two commentators seem to favour this
interpretation, but it fits well into the logic of the context,
whereas the rendering, “He who does not know the evils of war
cannot appreciate its benefits,” is distinctly pointless.

8. 善用兵者役不再籍糧不三載

The skilful soldier does not raise a second levy, neither are his supply-waggons loaded more than twice.

Once war is declared, he will not waste precious time in waiting
for reinforcements, nor will he turn his army back for fresh
supplies, but crosses the enemy’s frontier without delay. This may
seem an audacious policy to recommend, but with all great
strategists, from Julius Caesar to Napoleon Buonaparte, the value
of time—that is, being a little ahead of your opponent—has counted
for more than either numerical superiority or the nicest
calculations with regard to commissariat. 籍 is used in the sense
of 賦. The _T‘ung Tien_ and _Yü Lan_ have the inferior reading 藉.
The commentators explain 不三載 by saying that the waggons are
loaded once before passing the frontier, and that the army is met
by a further consignment of supplies on the homeward march. The
_Yü Lan_, however, reads 再 here as well.

9. 取用於國因糧於敵故軍食可足也

Bring war material with you from home, but forage on the enemy. Thus the army will have food enough for its needs.

用, “things to be used,” in the widest sense. It includes all the
impedimenta of an army, apart from provisions.

10. 國之貧於師者遠輸遠輸則百姓貧

Poverty of the State exchequer causes an army to be maintained by contributions from a distance. Contributing to maintain an army at a distance causes the people to be impoverished.

The beginning of this sentence does not balance properly with the
next, though obviously intended to do so. The arrangement,
moreover, is so awkward that I cannot help suspecting some
corruption in the text. It never seems to occur to Chinese
commentators that an emendation may be necessary for the sense,
and we get no help from them here. Sun Tzŭ says that the cause of
the people’s impoverishment is 遠輸; it is clear, therefore, that
the words have reference to some system by which the husbandmen
sent their contributions of corn to the army direct. But why
should it fall on them to maintain an army in this way, except
because the State or Government is too poor to do so? Assuming
then that 貧 ought to stand first in the sentence in order to
balance 近 (the fact that the two words rhyme is significant), and
thus getting rid of 國之, we are still left with 於師, which latter
word seems to me an obvious mistake for 國. “Poverty in the army”
is an unlikely expression, especially as the general has just been
warned not to encumber his army with a large quantity of supplies.
If we suppose that 師 somehow got written here instead of 國 (a
very simple supposition, as we have 近於師 in the next sentence),
and that later on somebody, scenting a mistake, prefixed the gloss
國之 to 貧, without however erasing 於師, the whole muddle may be
explained. My emended text then would be 貧於國者, etc.

11. 近於師者貴賣貴賣則百姓財竭

On the other hand, the proximity of an army causes prices to go up; and high prices cause the people’s substance to be drained away.

近, that is, as Wang Hsi says, before the army has left its own
territory. Ts‘ao Kung understands it of an army that has already
crossed the frontier. Capt. Calthrop drops the 於, reading 近師者,
but even so it is impossible to justify his translation “Repeated
wars cause high prices.”

12. 財竭則急於丘役

When their substance is drained away, the peasantry will be afflicted by heavy exactions.

Cf. Mencius VII. 2. xiv. 2, where 丘民 has the same meaning as
丘役. 丘 was an ancient measure of land. The full table, as given
by 司馬法, may not be out of place here: 6 尺 = 1 步; 100 步 = 1 畝;
100 畝 = 1 夫; 3 夫 = 1 屋; 3 屋 = 1 井; 4 井 = 1 邑; 4 邑 = 1 丘; 4
丘 = 1 甸. According to the _Chou Li_, there were nine husbandmen
to a 井, which would assign to each man the goodly allowance of
100 畝 (of which 6.6 now go to an acre). What the values of these
measures were in Sun Tzŭ’s time is not known with any certainty.
The lineal 尺, however, is supposed to have been about 20 cm. 急
may include levies of men, as well as other exactions.

13. 力屈財殫中原內虛於家百姓之費十去其七

14. 公家之費破車罷馬甲胄矢弩戟楯蔽櫓丘牛大車十去其六

With this loss of substance and exhaustion of strength, the homes of the people will be stripped bare, and three-tenths of their incomes will be dissipated;

The _Yü Lan_ omits 財殫. I would propose the emended reading
力屈則中, etc. In view of the fact that we have 財竭 in the two
preceding paragraphs, it seems probable that 財 is a scribe’s
mistake for 則, 殫 having been added afterwards to make sense.
中原內虛於家, literally: “Within the middle plains there is
emptiness in the homes.” For 中原 cf. _Shih Ching_ II. 3. vi. 3 and
II. 5. ii. 3. With regard to 十去其七, Tu Mu says: 家業十耗其七也,
and Wang Hsi: 民費大半矣; that is, the people are mulcted not of
3⁄10, but of 7⁄10, of their income. But this is hardly to be
extracted from our text. Ho Shih has a characteristic tag:
國以民爲本民以食爲天居人上者宜乎重惜 “The _people_ being regarded as
the essential part of the State, and _food_ as the people’s
heaven, is it not right that those in authority should value and
be careful of both?”

while Government expenses for broken chariots, worn-out horses, breast-plates and helmets, bows and arrows, spears and shields, protective mantlets, draught-oxen and heavy waggons, will amount to four-tenths of its total revenue.

The _Yü Lan_ has several various readings here, the more important
of which are 疲 for the less common 罷 (read _p‘i_^2), 干 for 蔽,
and 兵牛 for 丘牛, which latter, if right, must mean “oxen from the
country districts” (cf. _supra_, § 12). For the meaning of 櫓, see
note on III, § 4. Capt. Calthrop omits to translate 丘牛大車.

15. 故智將務食於敵食敵一鍾當吾二十鍾𦮼秆一石當吾二十石

Hence a wise general makes a point of foraging on the enemy. One cartload of the enemy’s provisions is equivalent to twenty of one’s own, and likewise a single picul of his provender is equivalent to twenty from one’s own store.

Because twenty cartloads will be consumed in the process of
transporting one cartload to the front. According to Ts‘ao Kung, a
鍾 = 6 斛 4 㪷, or 64 㪷, but according to Mêng Shih, 10 斛 make a
鍾. The 石 picul consisted of 70 斤 catties (Tu Mu and others say
120). 𦮼秆, literally, “beanstalks and straw.”

16. 故殺敵者怒也取敵之利者貨也

Now in order to kill the enemy, our men must be roused to anger; that there may be advantage from defeating the enemy, they must have their rewards.

These are two difficult sentences, which I have translated in
accordance with Mei Yao-ch‘ên’s paraphrase. We may incontinently
reject Capt. Calthrop’s extraordinary translation of the first:
“Wantonly to kill and destroy the enemy must be forbidden.” Ts‘ao
Kung quotes a jingle current in his day: 軍無財士不來軍無賞士不往. Tu
Mu says: “Rewards are necessary in order to make the soldiers see
the advantage of beating the enemy; thus, when you capture spoils
from the enemy, they must be used as rewards, so that all your men
may have a keen desire to fight, each on his own account.” Chang Yü
takes 利 as the direct object of 取, which is not so good.

17. 故車戰得車十乘已上賞其先得者而更其旌旗車雜而乘之卒善而養之

Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more chariots have been taken, those should be rewarded who took the first.

Capt. Calthrop’s rendering is: “They who are the first to lay
their hands on more than ten of the enemy’s chariots, should be
encouraged.” We should have expected the gallant captain to see
that such Samson-like prowess deserved something more substantial
than mere encouragement. The _T‘u Shu_ omits 故, and has 以上 in place
of the more archaic 已上.

Our own flags should be substituted for those of the enemy, and the chariots mingled and used in conjunction with ours. The captured soldiers should be kindly treated and kept.

18. 是謂勝敵而益强

This is called, using the conquered foe to augment one’s own strength.

19. 故兵貴勝不貴久

In war, then, let your great object be victory, not lengthy campaigns.

As Ho Shih remarks: 兵不可玩武不可黷 “Soldiers are not to be used as
playthings. War is not a thing to be trifled with.” Sun Tzŭ here
reiterates the main lesson which this chapter is intended to enforce.

20. 故知兵之將民之司命國家安危之主也

Thus it may be known that the leader of armies is the arbiter of the people’s fate, the man on whom it depends whether the nation shall be in peace or in peril.

In the original text, there is a 生 before the 民.

III. 謀攻篇

ATTACK BY STRATAGEM.

1. 孫子曰凡用兵之法全國爲上破國次之全軍爲上破軍次之全旅爲上破旅次之全卒爲上破卒次 之全伍爲上破伍次之