Chapter III: Part 3

Sun Tzŭ said: In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take the enemy’s country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good. So, too, it is better to capture an army entire than to destroy it, to capture a regiment, a detachment or a company entire than to destroy them.

A 軍 “army corps,” according to the _Ssŭ-ma Fa_, consisted nominally
of 12500 men; according to Ts‘ao Kung, a 旅 contained 500 men, a 卒
any number between 100 and 500, and a 伍 any number between 5 and
100. For the last two, however, Chang Yü gives the exact figures
of 100 and 5 respectively.

2. 是故百戰百勝非善之善者也不戰而屈人之兵善之善者也

Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting.

Here again, no modern strategist but will approve the words of the
old Chinese general. Moltke’s greatest triumph, the capitulation
of the huge French army at Sedan, was won practically without
bloodshed.

3. 故上兵伐謀其次伐交其次伐兵下政攻城

Thus the highest form of generalship is to baulk the enemy’s plans;

I.e., as Li Ch‘üan says (伐其始謀也), in their very inception.
Perhaps the word “baulk” falls short of expressing the full force
of 伐, which implies not an attitude of defence, whereby one might
be content to foil the enemy’s stratagems one after another, but
an active policy of counter-attack. Ho Shih puts this very clearly
in his note: “When the enemy has made a plan of attack against us,
we must anticipate him by delivering our own attack first.”

the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy’s forces;

Isolating him from his allies. We must not forget that Sun Tzŭ, in
speaking of hostilities, always has in mind the numerous states or
principalities into which the China of his day was split up.

the next in order is to attack the enemy’s army in the field;

When he is already in full strength.

and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities.

The use of the word 政 is somewhat unusual, which may account for
the reading of the modern text: 其下攻城.

4. 攻城之法爲不得已修櫓轒轀具器械三月而後成距闉又三月而後已

The rule is, not to besiege walled cities if it can possibly be avoided.

Another sound piece of military theory. Had the Boers acted upon
it in 1899, and refrained from dissipating their strength before
Kimberley, Mafeking, or even Ladysmith, it is more than probable
that they would have been masters of the situation before the
British were ready seriously to oppose them.

The preparation of mantlets, movable shelters, and various implements of war, will take up three whole months;

It is not quite clear what 櫓 were. Ts‘ao Kung simply defines them
as 大楯 “large shields,” but we get a better idea of them from Li
Ch‘üan, who says they were to protect the heads of those who were
assaulting the city walls at close quarters. This seems to suggest
a sort of Roman _testudo_, ready made. Tu Mu says they were “what
are now termed 彭排” (wheeled vehicles used in repelling attacks,
according to K‘ang Hsi), but this is denied by Ch‘ên Hao. See
_supra_, II. 14. The name is also applied to turrets on city
walls. Of 轒轀 (_fên yün_) we get a fairly clear description from
several commentators. They were wooden missile-proof structures on
four wheels, propelled from within, covered over with raw hides,
and used in sieges to convey parties of men to and from the walls,
for the purpose of filling up the encircling moat with earth. Tu
Mu adds that they are now called 木驢 “wooden donkeys.” Capt.
Calthrop wrongly translates the term, “battering-rams.” I follow
Ts‘ao Kung in taking 具 as a verb, co-ordinate and synonymous with
修. Those commentators who regard 修 as an adjective equivalent to
長 “long,” make 具 presumably into a noun.

and the piling up of mounds over against the walls will take three months more.

The 距闉 (or 堙, in the modern text) were great mounds or ramparts
of earth heaped up to the level of the enemy’s walls in order to
discover the weak points in the defence, and also to destroy the
樓櫓 fortified turrets mentioned in the preceding note. Tu Yu
quotes the Tso Chuan: 楚司馬子反乘堙而窺宋城也.

5. 將不勝其忿而蟻附之殺士三分之一而城不拔者此攻之災

The general, unable to control his irritation, will launch his men to the assault like swarming ants,

Capt. Calthrop unaccountably omits this vivid simile, which, as
Ts‘ao Kung says, is taken from the spectacle of an army of ants
climbing a wall. The meaning is that the general, losing patience
at the long delay, may make a premature attempt to storm the place
before his engines of war are ready.

with the result that one-third of his men are slain, while the town still remains untaken. Such are the disastrous effects of a siege.

We are reminded of the terrible losses of the Japanese before Port
Arthur, in the most recent siege which history has to record. The
_T‘ung Tien_ reads 不勝心之忿 ... 則殺士卒 ... 攻城之災. For 其忿 the
_Yü Lan_ has 心怒. Capt. Calthrop does not translate 而城不拔者, and
mistranslates 此攻之災.

6. 故善用兵者屈人之兵而非戰也拔人之城而非攻也毁人之國而非久也

Therefore the skilful leader subdues the enemy’s troops without any fighting; he captures their cities without laying siege to them; he overthrows their kingdom without lengthy operations in the field.

Chia Lin notes that he only overthrows the 國, that is, the
Government, but does no harm to individuals. The classical
instance is Wu Wang, who after having put an end to the Yin
dynasty was acclaimed “Father and mother of the people.”

7. 必以全爭於天下故兵不頓而利可全此謀攻之法也

With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery of the Empire, and thus, without losing a man, his triumph will be complete.

Owing to the double meanings of 兵, 頓 [= 鈍] and 利, the latter
part of the sentence is susceptible of quite a different meaning:
“And thus, the weapon not being blunted by use, its keenness
remains perfect.” Chang Yü says that 利 is “the advantage of a
prosperous kingdom and a strong army.”

This is the method of attacking by stratagem.

8. 故用兵之法十則圍之五則攻之倍則分之

It is the rule in war, if our forces are ten to the enemy’s one, to surround him; if five to one, to attack him;

Straightaway, without waiting for any further advantage.

if twice as numerous, to divide our army into two.

Note that 之 does not refer to the enemy, as in the two preceding
clauses. This sudden change of object is quite common in Chinese.
Tu Mu takes exception to the saying; and at first sight, indeed,
it appears to violate a fundamental principle of war. Ts‘ao Kung,
however, gives a clue to Sun Tzŭ’s meaning: 以二敵一則一術爲正一術爲奇
“Being two to the enemy’s one, we may use one part of our army in
the regular way, and the other for some special diversion.” [For
explanation of 正 and 奇, see V. 3, note.] Chang Yü thus further
elucidates the point: “If our force is twice as numerous as that
of the enemy, it should be split up into two divisions, one to
meet the enemy in front, and one to fall upon his rear; if he
replies to the frontal attack, he may be crushed from behind; if
to the rearward attack, he may be crushed in front. This is what
is meant by saying that “one part may be used in the regular
way, and the other for some special diversion.” Tu Mu does not
understand that dividing one’s army is simply an irregular, just
as concentrating it is the regular, strategical method, and he is
too hasty in calling this a mistake.”

9. 敵則能戰之少則能逃之不若則能避之

If equally matched, we can offer battle;

Li Ch‘üan, followed by Ho Shih, gives the following paraphrase:
主客力敵惟善者戰 “If attackers and attacked are equally matched in
strength, only the able general will fight.” He thus takes 能 as
though it were 能者, which is awkward.

if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy;

The _T‘u Shu_ has 守 instead of 逃, which is hardly distinguishable
in sense from 避 in the next clause. The meaning, “we can _watch_ the
enemy,” is certainly a great improvement on the above; but
unfortunately there appears to be no very good authority for the
variant. Chang Yü reminds us that the saying only applies if the
other factors are equal; a small difference in numbers is often
more than counterbalanced by superior energy and discipline.

if quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him.

10. 故小敵之堅大敵之擒也

Hence, though an obstinate fight may be made by a small force, in the end it must be captured by the larger force.

In other words: “C’est magnifique; mais ce n’est pas la guerre.”

11. 夫將者國之輔也輔周則國必强輔隙則國必弱

Now the general is the bulwark of the State: if the bulwark is complete at all points, the State will be strong; if the bulwark is defective, the State will be weak.

隙 cannot be restricted to anything so particular as in Capt.
Calthrop’s translation, “divided in his allegiance.” It is simply
keeping up the metaphor suggested by 周. As Li Ch‘üan tersely puts
it: 隙缺也將才不備兵必弱 “_Ch‘i_, gap, indicates deficiency; if the
general’s ability is not perfect (i.e. if he is not thoroughly
versed in his profession), his army will lack strength.”

12. 故君之所以患於軍者三

There are three ways in which a ruler can bring misfortune upon his army:—

13. 不知軍之不可以進而謂之進不知軍之不可以退而謂之退是謂縻軍

(1) By commanding the army to advance or to retreat, being ignorant of the fact that it cannot obey. This is called hobbling the army.

Ts‘ao Kung weakly defines 縻 as 御 “control,” “direct.” Cf. § 17
_ad fin._ But in reality it is one of those graphic metaphors
which from time to time illuminate Sun Tzŭ’s work, and is rightly
explained by Li Ch‘üan as = 絆. He adds the comment:
如絆驥足無馳驟也. “It is like tying together the legs of a
thoroughbred, so that it is unable to gallop.” One would naturally
think of “the ruler” in this passage as being at home, and trying
to direct the movements of his army from a distance. But the
commentators understand just the reverse, and quote the saying of
T‘ai Kung: 國不可以從外治軍不可以從中御 “A kingdom should not be
governed from without, an army should not be directed from
within.” Of course it is true that, during an engagement, or when
in close touch with the enemy, the general should not be in the
thick of his own troops, but a little distance apart. Otherwise,
he will be liable to misjudge the position as a whole, and give
wrong orders.

14. 不知三軍之事而同三軍之政者則軍士惑矣

(2) By attempting to govern an army in the same way as he administers a kingdom, being ignorant of the conditions which obtain in an army. This causes restlessness in the soldier’s minds.

Ts‘ao Kung’s note is: 軍容不入國國容不入軍禮不可以治兵也, which may be
freely translated: “The military sphere and the civil sphere are
wholly distinct; you can’t handle an army in kid gloves.” And
Chang Yü says: “Humanity and justice (仁義) are the principles on
which to govern a state, but not an army; opportunism and
flexibility (權變), on the other hand, are military rather than
civic virtues.” 同三軍之政, “to assimilate the governing of an
army”—to that of a State, understood. The _T‘ung Tien_ has 欲
inserted before 同, here and in § 15.

15. 不知三軍之權而同三軍之任則軍士疑矣

(3) By employing the officers of his army without discrimination,

That is, he is not careful to use the right man in the right place.

through ignorance of the military principle of adaptation to circumstances. This shakes the confidence of the soldiers.

I follow Mei Yao-ch‘ên here. The other commentators make 不知 etc.
refer, not to the ruler, as in §§ 13, 14, but to the officers he
employs. Thus Tu Yu says: 將若不知權變不可付以勢位 “If a general is
ignorant of the principle of adaptability, he must not be
entrusted with a position of authority.” Tu Mu quotes 黃石公: “The
skilful employer of men will employ the wise man, the brave man,
the covetous man, and the stupid man. For the wise man delights in
establishing his merit, the brave man likes to show his courage in
action, the covetous man is quick at seizing advantages, and the
stupid man has no fear of death.” The _T‘ung Tien_ reads 軍覆疑,
which Tu Yu explains as 覆敗 “is utterly defeated.” Capt. Calthrop
gives a very inaccurate rendering: “Ignorant of the situation of
the army, to interfere in its dispositions.”

16. 三軍既惑且疑則諸侯之難至矣是謂亂軍引勝

But when the army is restless and distrustful, trouble is sure to come from the other feudal princes. This is simply bringing anarchy into the army, and flinging victory away.

Most of the commentators take 引 in the sense of 奪, which it seems
to bear also in the _Li Chi_, 玉藻, I. 18. [卻 is there given as
its equivalent, but Legge tries notwithstanding to retain the more
usual sense, translating “draw ... back,” which is hardly
defensible.] Tu Mu and Wang Hsi, however, think 引勝 means “leading
up to the _enemy’s_ victory.”

17. 故知勝有五知可以戰與不可以戰者勝識衆寡之用者勝上下同欲者勝以虞待不虞者勝 將能而君不御者勝此五者知勝之道也

Thus we may know that there are five essentials for victory: (1) He will win who knows when to fight and when not to fight.

Chang Yü says: “If he can fight, he advances and takes the
offensive; if he cannot fight, he retreats and remains on the
defensive. He will invariably conquer who knows whether it is
right to take the offensive or the defensive.”

(2) He will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior forces.

This is not merely the general’s ability to estimate numbers
correctly, as Li Ch‘üan and others make out. Chang Yü expounds the
saying more satisfactorily: “By applying the art of war, it is
possible with a lesser force to defeat a greater, and _vice
versâ_. The secret lies in an eye for locality, and in not letting
the right moment slip. Thus Wu Tzŭ says: ‘With a superior force,
make for easy ground; with an inferior one, make for difficult
ground.’”

(3) He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout all its ranks.

Ts‘ao Kung refers 上下 less well to sovereign and subjects.

(4) He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take the enemy unprepared.

(5) He will win who has military capacity and is not interfered with by the sovereign.

Tu Yu quotes 王子 as saying: 指授在君決戰在將也 “It is the
sovereign’s function to give broad instructions, but to decide on
battle is the function of the general.” It is needless to dilate
on the military disasters which have been caused by undue
interference with operations in the field on the part of the home
government. Napoleon undoubtedly owed much of his extraordinary
success to the fact that he was not hampered by any central
authority,—that he was, in fact, 將 and 君 in one.

Victory lies in the knowledge of these five points.

Literally, “These five things are knowledge of the principle of
victory.”

18. 故曰知彼知己百戰不殆不知彼而知己一勝一負不知彼不知己每戰必殆

Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat.

Li Ch‘üan cites the case of 苻堅 Fu Chien, prince of 秦 Ch‘in, who
in 383 A.D. marched with a vast army against the 晉 Chin Emperor.
When warned not to despise an enemy who could command the services
of such men as 謝安 Hsieh An and 桓沖 Huan Ch‘ung, he boastfully
replied: “I have the population of eight provinces at my back,
infantry and horsemen to the number of one million; why, they
could dam up the Yangtsze River itself by merely throwing their
whips into the stream. What danger have I to fear?” Nevertheless,
his forces were soon after disastrously routed at the 淝 Fei River,
and he was obliged to beat a hasty retreat.

If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.

The modern text, represented by the 北堂書鈔 and _T‘u Shu_, has
必敗, which I should be inclined to adopt in preference to 殆 here,
though the _T‘ung Tien_ and _Yü Lan_ both have the latter. Chang
Yü offers the best commentary on 知彼知己. He says that these words
“have reference to attack and defence: knowing the enemy enables
you to take the offensive, knowing yourself enables you to stand
on the defensive.” He adds: 攻是守之機守是攻之策 “Attack is the
secret of defence; defence is the planning of an attack.” It would
be hard to find a better epitome of the root-principle of war.

IV. 形篇

TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS.

形 is a very comprehensive and somewhat vague term. Literally,
“form,” “body,” it comes to mean “appearance,” “attitude” or
“disposition;” and here it is best taken as something between, or
perhaps combining, “tactics” and “disposition of troops.” Ts‘ao
Kung explains it as 軍之形也，我動彼應兩敵相察情也 “marching and
counter-marching on the part of the two armies with a view to
discovering each other’s condition.” Tu Mu says: “It is through
the 形 dispositions of an army that its condition may be
discovered. Conceal your dispositions (無形), and your condition
will remain secret, which leads to victory; show your
dispositions, and your condition will become patent, which leads
to defeat.” Wang Hsi remarks that the good general can
變化其形因敵以制勝 “secure success by modifying his tactics to meet
those of the enemy.” In the modern text, the title of the chapter
appears as 軍形, which Capt. Calthrop incorrectly translates “the
order of battle.”

1. 孫子曰昔之善戰者先爲不可勝以待敵之可勝

Sun Tzŭ said: The good fighters of old first put themselves beyond the possibility of defeat, and then waited for an opportunity of defeating the enemy.

2. 不可勝在己可勝在敵

To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself.

That is, of course, by a mistake on his part. Capt. Calthrop has:
“The causes of defeat come from within; victory is born in the
enemy’s camp,” which, though certainly an improvement on his
previous attempt, is still incorrect.

3. 故善戰者能爲不可勝不能使敵必可勝

Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against defeat,

“By concealing the disposition of his troops, covering up his
tracks, and taking unremitting precautions” (Chang Yü).

but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy.

The original text reads 使敵之可勝, which the modern text has
further modified into 使敵之必可勝. Capt. Calthrop makes out the
impossible meaning, “and further render the enemy incapable of
victory.”

4. 故曰勝可知而不可爲

Hence the saying: One may _know_ how to conquer without being able to _do_ it.

Capt. Calthrop translates: “The conditions necessary for victory
may be present, but they cannot always be obtained,” which is more
or less unintelligible.

5. 不可勝者守也可勝者攻也

Security against defeat implies defensive tactics; ability to defeat the enemy means taking the offensive.

For 不可勝 I retain the sense which it undoubtedly bears in §§ 1–3,
in spite of the fact that the commentators are all against me. The
meaning they give, “He who cannot conquer takes the defensive,” is
plausible enough, but it is highly improbable that 勝 should
suddenly become active in this way. An incorrect variant in the
_Yü Lan_ is 不可勝則守可勝則攻.

6. 守則不足攻則有餘

Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient strength; attacking, a superabundance of strength.

7. 善守者藏於九地之下善攻者動於九天之上故能自保而全勝也

The general who is skilled in defence hides in the most secret recesses of the earth;

Literally, “hides under the ninth earth,” which is a metaphor
indicating the utmost secrecy and concealment, so that the enemy
may not know his whereabouts. The 九地 of this passage have of
course no connection with the 九地 “Nine situations” of chap. XI.

he who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of heaven.

Another metaphor, implying that he falls on his adversary like a
thunderbolt, against which there is no time to prepare. This is
the opinion of most of the commentators, though Ts‘ao Kung,
followed by Tu Yu, explains 地 as the hills, rivers, and other
natural features which will afford shelter or protection to the
attacked, and 天 as the phases of weather which may be turned to
account by the attacking party. Capt. Calthrop’s “The skilful in
attack push to the topmost heaven” conveys no meaning at all.

Thus on the one hand we have ability to protect ourselves; on the other, a victory that is complete.

Capt. Calthrop draws on a fertile imagination for the following:
“If these precepts be observed, victory is certain.”

8. 見勝不過衆人之所知非善之善者也

To see victory only when it is within the ken of the common herd is not the acme of excellence.

As Ts‘ao Kung remarks, 當見未萌 “the thing is to see the plant
before it has germinated,” to foresee the event before the action
has begun. Li Ch‘üan alludes to the story of Han Hsin who, when
about to attack the vastly superior army of 趙 Chao, which was
strongly entrenched in the city of 成安 Ch‘êng-an, said to his
officers: “Gentlemen, we are going to annihilate the enemy, and
shall meet again at dinner.” The officers hardly took his words
seriously, and gave a very dubious assent. But Han Hsin had
already worked out in his mind the details of a clever stratagem,
whereby, as he foresaw, he was able to capture the city and
inflict a crushing defeat on his adversary. For the full story,
see 前漢書, chap. 34, 韓信傳. Capt. Calthrop again blunders badly
with: “A victory, even if popularly proclaimed as such by the
common folk, may not be a true success.”

9. 戰勝而天下曰善非善之善者也

Neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight and conquer and the whole Empire says, “Well done!”

True excellence being, as Tu Mu says: 陰謀潛運攻心伐謀勝敵之日曾不血刃
“To plan secretly, to move surreptitiously, to foil the enemy’s
intentions and baulk his schemes, so that at last the day may be
won without shedding a drop of blood.” Sun Tzŭ reserves his
approbation for things that

“the world’s coarse thumb
And finger fail to plumb.”

10. 故舉秋毫不爲多力見日月不爲明目聞雷霆不爲聰耳

To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength;

秋毫 is explained as the fur of a hare, which is finest in autumn,
when it begins to grow afresh. The phrase is a very common one in
Chinese writers. Cf. Mencius, I. 1. vii. 10, and Chuang Tzŭ,
知北遊, _et al._

to see sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight; to hear the noise of thunder is no sign of a quick ear.

Ho Shih gives as real instances of strength, sharp sight and quick
hearing: 烏𫉬 Wu Huo, who could lift a tripod weighing 250 stone;
離朱 Li Chu, who at a distance of a hundred paces could see objects
no bigger than a mustard seed; and 師曠 Shih K‘uang, a blind
musician who could hear the footsteps of a mosquito.

11. 古之所謂善戰者勝勝易勝者也

What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who not only wins, but excels in winning with ease.

The original text, followed by the _T‘u Shu_, has 勝於易勝者也. But
this is an alteration evidently intended to smooth the awkwardness
of 勝勝易勝者也, which means literally: “one who, conquering, excels
in easy conquering.” Mei Yao-ch‘ên says: “He who only sees the
obvious, wins his battles with difficulty; he who looks below the
surface of things, wins with ease.”

12. 故善戰者之勝也無智名無勇功

Hence his victories bring him neither reputation for wisdom nor credit for courage.

Tu Mu explains this very well: “Inasmuch as his victories are
gained over circumstances that have not come to light, the world
at large knows nothing of them, and he wins no reputation for
wisdom; inasmuch as the hostile state submits before there has
been any bloodshed, he receives no credit for courage.”

13. 故其戰勝不忒不忒者其所措必勝勝已敗者也

He wins his battles by making no mistakes.

Ch‘ên Hao says: “He plans no superfluous marches, he devises no
futile attacks.” The connection of ideas is thus explained by
Chang Yü: “One who seeks to conquer by sheer strength, clever
though he may be at winning pitched battles, is also liable on
occasion to be vanquished; whereas he who can look into the future
and discern conditions that are not yet manifest, will never make
a blunder and therefore invariably win.” Li Ch‘üan thinks that the
character 忒 should be 貳 “to have doubts.” But it is better not to
tamper with the text, especially when no improvement in sense is
the result.

Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of victory, for it means conquering an enemy that is already defeated.

The _T‘u Shu_ omits 必. 措 is here = 置. Chia Lin says it is put for
錯 in the sense of 雜; but this is far-fetched. Capt. Calthrop
altogether ignores the important word 忒.

14. 故善戰者立於不敗之地而不失敵之敗也

Hence the skilful fighter puts himself into a position which makes defeat impossible, and does not miss the moment for defeating the enemy.

A 不可爲之計 “counsel of perfection,” as Tu Mu truly observes. 地
need not be confined strictly to the actual ground occupied by the
troops. It includes all the arrangements and preparations which a
wise general will make to increase the safety of his army.

15. 是故勝兵先勝而後求戰敗兵先戰而後求勝

Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only seeks battle after the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and afterwards looks for victory.

Ho Shih thus expounds the paradox: “In warfare, first lay plans
which will ensure victory, and then lead your army to battle; if
you will not begin with stratagem but rely on brute strength
alone, victory will no longer be assured.”

16. 善用兵者修道而保法故能爲勝敗之政

The consummate leader cultivates the moral law, and strictly adheres to method and discipline;

For 道 and 法, see _supra_, I. 4 sqq. I think that Chang Yü is
wrong in altering their signification here, and taking them as
爲戰之道 and 制敵之法 respectively.

thus it is in his power to control success.

17. 兵法一曰度二曰量三曰數四曰稱五曰勝

In respect of military method, we have, firstly, Measurement; secondly, Estimation of quantity; thirdly, Calculation; fourthly, Balancing of chances; fifthly, Victory.

18. 地生度度生量量生數數生稱稱生勝

Measurement owes its existence to Earth; Estimation of quantity to Measurement; Calculation to Estimation of quantity; Balancing of chances to Calculation; and Victory to Balancing of chances.

It is not easy to distinguish the four terms 度量數稱 very clearly.
The first seems to be surveying and measurement of the ground,
which enable us to 量 form an estimate of the enemy’s strength, and
to 數 make calculations based on the data thus obtained; we are
thus led to 稱 a general weighing-up, or comparison of the enemy’s
chances with our own; if the latter turn the scale, then 勝 victory
ensues. The chief difficulty lies in 數, which some commentators
take as a calculation of _numbers_, thereby making it nearly
synonymous with 量. Perhaps 量 is rather a consideration of the
enemy’s general position or condition (情 or 形勢), while 數 is
the estimate of his numerical strength. On the other hand, Tu Mu
defines 數 as 機數, and adds: 强弱已定然後能用機變數也 “the question
of relative strength having been settled, we can bring the
varied resources of cunning into play.” Ho Shih seconds this
interpretation, which is weakened, however, by the fact that 稱 is
given as logically consequent on 數; this certainly points to the
latter being a calculation of numbers. Of Capt. Calthrop’s version
the less said the better.

19. 故勝兵若以鎰稱銖敗兵若以銖稱鎰

A victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as a pound’s weight placed in the scale against a single grain.

Literally, “a victorious army is like an 鎰 _i_ (20 oz.) weighed
against a 銖 _shu_ (1⁄24 oz.); a routed army as a _shu_ weighed
against an _i_.” The point is simply the enormous advantage which
a disciplined force, flushed with victory, has over one
demoralised by defeat. Legge, in his note on Mencius, I. 2. ix. 2,
makes the 鎰 to be 24 Chinese ounces, and corrects Chu Hsi’s
statement that it equalled 20 oz. only. But Li Ch‘üan of the T‘ang
dynasty here gives the same figure as Chu Hsi.

20. 勝者之戰民也若決積水於千仞之谿者形也

The onrush of a conquering force is like the bursting of pent-up waters into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep. So much for tactical dispositions.

The construction here is slightly awkward and elliptical, but the
general sense is plain. The _T‘u Shu_ omits 民也. A 仞 = 8 尺 or
Chinese feet.

V. 埶篇

ENERGY.

埶 here is said to be an older form of 勢; Sun Tzŭ, however, would
seem to have used the former in the sense of “power,” and the latter
only in the sense of “circumstances.” The fuller title 兵勢 is found
in the _T‘u Shu_ and the modern text. Wang Hsi expands it into 積勢之變
“the application, in various ways, of accumulated power;” and Chang Yü
says: 兵勢以成然後任勢以取勝 “When the soldiers’ energy has reached its
height, it may be used to secure victory.”

1. 孫子曰凡治衆如治寡分數是也

Sun Tzŭ said: The control of a large force is the same in principle as the control of a few men: it is merely a question of dividing up their numbers.

That is, cutting up the army into regiments, companies, etc., with
subordinate officers in command of each. Tu Mu reminds us of Han
Hsin’s famous reply to the first Han Emperor, who once said to
him: “How large an army do you think I could lead?” “Not more than
100,000 men, your Majesty.” “And you?” asked the Emperor. “Oh!” he
answered, “the more the better” (多多益辦耳). Chang Yü gives the
following curious table of the subdivisions of an army:—5 men make
a 列; 2 列 make a 火; 5 火 make a 隊; 2 隊 make a 官; 2 官 make a
曲; 2 曲 make a 部; 2 部 make a 校; 2 校 make a 裨; 2 裨 make a 軍.
A 軍 or army corps thus works out at 3200 men. But cf. III. § 1,
note. For 曲, see I. § 10. It is possible that 官 in that paragraph
may also be used in the above technical sense.

2. 鬥衆如鬥寡形名是也

Fighting with a large army under your command is nowise different from fighting with a small one: it is merely a question of instituting signs and signals.

One must be careful to avoid translating 鬥衆 “fighting _against_ a
large number,” no reference to the enemy being intended. 形 is
explained by Ts‘ao Kung as denoting flags and banners, by means of
which every soldier may recognise his own particular regiment or
company, and thus confusion may be prevented. 名 he explains as
drums and gongs, which from the earliest times were used to sound
the advance and the retreat respectively. Tu Mu defines 形 as 陳形
“marshalling the troops in order,” and takes 名 as the flags and
banners. Wang Hsi also dissents from Ts‘ao Kung, referring 形 to
the ordering of the troops by means of banners, drums and gongs,
and 名 to the various names by which the regiments might be
distinguished. There is much to be said for this view.

3. 三軍之衆可使必受敵而無敗者奇正是也

To ensure that your whole host may withstand the brunt of the enemy’s attack and remain unshaken—this is effected by manœuvres direct and indirect.

For 必, there is another reading 畢, “all together,” adopted by
Wang Hsi and Chang Yü. We now come to one of the most interesting
parts of Sun Tzŭ’s treatise, the discussion of the 正 and the 奇.
As it is by no means easy to grasp the full significance of these
two terms, or to render them at all consistently by good English
equivalents, it may be as well to tabulate some of the
commentators’ remarks on the subject before proceeding further. Li
Ch‘üan: 當敵爲正傍出爲奇 “Facing the enemy is _chêng_, making
lateral diversions is _ch‘i_.” Chia Lin: 當敵以正陳取勝以奇兵 “In
presence of the enemy, your troops should be arrayed in normal
fashion, but in order to secure victory abnormal manœuvres must be
employed.” Mei Yao-ch‘ên: 動爲奇靜爲正靜以待之動以勝之 “_Ch‘i_ is
active, _chêng_ is passive; passivity means waiting for an
opportunity, activity brings the victory itself.” Ho Shih:
我之正使敵視之爲奇我之奇使敵視之爲正正亦爲奇奇亦爲正 “We must cause the
enemy to regard our straightforward attack as one that is secretly
designed, and _vice versâ_; thus _chêng_ may also be _ch‘i_, and
_ch‘i_ may also be _chêng_.” He instances the famous exploit of
Han Hsin, who when marching ostensibly against 臨晉 Lin-chin (now
朝邑 Chao-i in Shensi), suddenly threw a large force across the
Yellow River in wooden tubs, utterly disconcerting his opponent.
[_Ch‘ien Han Shu_, ch. 34.] Here, we are told, the march on
Lin-chin was 正, and the surprise manœuvre was 奇. Chang Yü gives
the following summary of opinions on the words: “Military writers
do not all agree with regard to the meaning of _ch‘i_ and _chêng_.
尉繚子 Wei Liao Tzŭ [4th cent. B.C.] says: 正兵貴先奇兵貴後 ‘Direct
warfare favours frontal attacks, indirect warfare attacks from the
rear.’ Ts‘ao Kung says: ‘Going straight out to join battle is a
direct operation; appearing on the enemy’s rear is an indirect
manœuvre.’ 李衛公 Li Wei-kung [6th and 7th cent. A.D.] says: ‘In
war, to march straight ahead is _chêng_; turning movements, on the
other hand, are _ch‘i_.’ These writers simply regard _chêng_ as
_chêng_, and _ch‘i_ as _ch‘i_; they do not note that the two are
mutually interchangeable and run into each other like the two
sides of a circle [see _infra_, § 11]. A comment of the T‘ang
Emperor T‘ai Tsung goes to the root of the matter: ‘A _ch‘i_
manœuvre may be _chêng_, if we make the enemy look upon it as
_chêng_; then our real attack will be _ch‘i_, and _vice versâ_.
The whole secret lies in confusing the enemy, so that he cannot
fathom our real intent.’” To put it perhaps a little more clearly:
any attack or other operation is 正, on which the enemy has had his
attention fixed; whereas that is 奇, which takes him by surprise or
comes from an unexpected quarter. If the enemy perceives a
movement which is meant to be 奇, it immediately becomes 正.

4. 兵之所加如以碬投卵者虛實是也

That the impact of your army may be like a grindstone dashed against an egg—this is effected by the science of weak points and strong.

虛實, literally “the hollow and the solid,” is the title of chap.
VI. 碫 _tuan_ is the _T‘u Shu_ reading, 碬 _hsia_ that of the
standard text. It appears from K‘ang Hsi that there has been much
confusion between the two characters, and indeed, it is probable
that one of them has really crept into the language as a mistake
for the other.

5. 凡戰者以正合以奇勝

In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, but indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory.

Chang Yü says: 徐發奇兵或擣其旁或擊其後 “Steadily develop indirect
tactics, either by pounding the enemy’s flanks or falling on his
rear.” A brilliant example of “indirect tactics” which decided the
fortunes of a campaign was Lord Roberts’ night march round the
Peiwar Kotal in the second Afghan war.[169]

6. 故善出奇者無窮如天地不竭如江河終而復始日月是也死而復生四時是也

Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhaustible as Heaven and Earth, unending as the flow of rivers and streams;

奇 is the universally accepted emendation for 兵, the reading of
the 北堂書鈔.

like the sun and moon, they end but to begin anew; like the four seasons, they pass away but to return once more.

Tu Yu and Chang Yü understand this of the permutations of 奇 and
正. But at present Sun Tzŭ is not speaking of 正 at all, unless,
indeed, we suppose with 鄭友賢 Chêng Yu-hsien that a clause
relating to it has fallen out of the text. Of course, as has
already been pointed out, the two are so inextricably interwoven
in all military operations, that they cannot really be considered
apart. Here we simply have an expression, in figurative language,
of the almost infinite resource of a great leader.

7. 聲不過五五聲之變不可勝聽也

There are not more than five musical notes,

宮商角微羽.

yet the combinations of these five give rise to more melodies than can ever be heard.

8. 色不過五五色之變不可勝觀也

There are not more than five primary colours,

靑黃赤白黑 blue, yellow, red, white and black.

yet in combination they produce more hues than can ever be seen.

9. 味不過五五味之變不可勝嘗也

There are not more than five cardinal tastes,

酸辛醎甘苦 sour, acrid, salt, sweet, bitter.

yet combinations of them yield more flavours than can ever be tasted.

10. 戰埶不過奇正奇正之變不可勝窮也

In battle, there are not more than two methods of attack—the direct and the indirect; yet these two in combination give rise to an endless series of manœuvres.

11. 奇正相生如循環之無端孰能窮之

The direct and the indirect lead on to each other in turn. It is like moving in a circle—you never come to an end. Who can exhaust the possibilities of their combination?

The _T‘u Shu_ adds 哉. The final 之 may refer either to the circle
or, more probably, to the 奇正之變 understood. Capt. Calthrop is
wrong with: “They are a mystery that none can penetrate.”

12. 激水之疾至於漂石者埶也

The onset of troops is like the rush of a torrent which will even roll stones along in its course.

13. 鷙鳥之疾至於毁折者節也

The quality of decision is like the well-timed swoop of a falcon which enables it to strike and destroy its victim.

For 疾 the _Yü Lan_ reads 擊, which is also supported by a
quotation in the 呂氏春秋 [3rd cent. B.C.]. 節 in this context is a
word which really defies the best efforts of the translator. Tu
Mu says that it is equivalent to 節量遠近 “the measurement or
estimation of distance.” But this meaning does not quite fit the
illustrative simile in § 15. As applied to the falcon, it seems to
me to denote that instinct of _self-restraint_ which keeps the
bird from swooping on its quarry until the right moment, together
with the power of judging when the right moment has arrived. The
analogous quality in soldiers is the highly important one of being
able to reserve their fire until the very instant at which it
will be most effective. When the “Victory” went into action at
Trafalgar at hardly more than drifting pace, she was for several
minutes exposed to a storm of shot and shell before replying with
a single gun. Nelson coolly waited until he was within close
range, when the broadside he brought to bear worked fearful havoc
on the enemy’s nearest ships. That was a case of 節.

14. 是故善戰者其埶險其節短

Therefore the good fighter will be terrible in his onset, and prompt in his decision.

Tu Yu defines 節 here by the word 斷, which is very like “decision”
in English. 短 is certainly used in a very unusual sense, even if,
as the commentators say, it = 近. This would have reference to the
measurement of distance mentioned above, letting the enemy get
near before striking. But I cannot help thinking that Sun Tzŭ
meant to use the word in a figurative sense comparable to our
own idiom “short and sharp.” Cf. Wang Hsi’s note, which after
describing the falcon’s mode of attack, proceeds: 兵之乘機當如是耳
“This is just how the ‘psychological moment’ should be seized in
war.” I do not care for Capt. Calthrop’s rendering: “The spirit of
the good fighter is terrifying, his occasions sudden.”

15. 埶如彍弩節如發機

Energy may be likened to the bending of a cross-bow; decision, to the releasing of the trigger.

“Energy” seems to be the best equivalent here for 埶, because the
comparison implies that the force is potential, being stored up in
the bent cross-bow until released by the finger on the trigger.
None of the commentators seem to grasp the real point of the simile.

16. 紛紛紜紜鬥亂而不可亂也渾渾沌沌形圓而不可敗也

Amid the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may be seeming disorder and yet no real disorder at all; amid confusion and chaos, your array may be without head or tail, yet it will be proof against defeat.

形圓, literally “formation circular”, is explained by Li Ch‘üan as
無向背也 “without back or front.” Mei Yao-ch‘ên says: “The
subdivisions of the army having been previously fixed, and the
various signals agreed upon, the separating and joining, the
dispersing and collecting which will take place in the course of a
battle, may give the appearance of disorder when no real disorder
is possible. Your formation may be without head or tail, your
dispositions all topsy-turvy, and yet a rout of your forces quite
out of the question.” It is a little difficult to decide whether
鬥亂 and 形圓 should not be taken as imperatives: “fight in
disorder (for the purpose of deceiving the enemy), and you will be
secure against real disorder.” Cf. I. § 20: 亂而取之.

17. 亂生於治怯生於勇弱生於彊

Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline; simulated fear postulates courage; simulated weakness postulates strength.

In order to make the translation intelligible, it is necessary to
tone down the sharply paradoxical form of the original. Ts‘ao Kung
throws out a hint of the meaning in his brief note: 皆毁形匿情也
“These things all serve to destroy formation and conceal one’s
condition.” But Tu Mu is the first to put it quite plainly: “If
you wish to feign confusion in order to lure the enemy on, you
must first have perfect discipline; if you wish to display
timidity in order to entrap the enemy, you must have extreme
courage; if you wish to parade your weakness in order to make the
enemy over-confident, you must have exceeding strength.”

18. 治亂數也勇怯埶也彊弱形也

Hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is simply a question of subdivision;

See _supra_, § 1.

concealing courage under a show of timidity presupposes a fund of latent energy;

It is passing strange that the commentators should understand 埶
here as “circumstances”—a totally different sense from that which
it has previously borne in this chapter. Thus Tu Mu says:
見有利之勢而不動敵人以我爲實怯也 “seeing that we are favourably
circumstanced and yet make no move, the enemy will believe that we
are really afraid.”

masking strength with weakness is to be effected by tactical dispositions.

Chang Yü relates the following anecdote of Kao Tsu, the first Han
Emperor: “Wishing to crush the Hsiung-nu, he sent out spies to
report on their condition. But the Hsiung-nu, forewarned,
carefully concealed all their able-bodied men and well-fed horses,
and only allowed infirm soldiers and emaciated cattle to be seen.
The result was that the spies one and all recommended the Emperor
to deliver his attack.” 婁敬 Lou Ching alone opposed them, saying:
“When two countries go to war, they are naturally inclined to make
an ostentatious display of their strength. Yet our spies have seen
nothing but old age and infirmity. This is surely some _ruse_ on
the part of the enemy, and it would be unwise for us to attack.”
The Emperor, however, disregarding this advice, fell into the trap
and found himself surrounded at 白登 Po-têng.”

19. 故善動敵者形之敵必從之予之敵必取之

Thus one who is skilful at keeping the enemy on the move maintains deceitful appearances, according to which the enemy will act.

Ts‘ao Kung’s note is 見羸形也 “Make a display of weakness and
want,” but Tu Mu rightly points out that 形 does not refer only to
weakness: “If our force happens to be superior to the enemy’s,
weakness may be simulated in order to lure him on; but if
inferior, he must be led to believe that we are strong, in order
that he may keep off. In fact, all the enemy’s movements should be
determined by the signs that we choose to give him.” The following
anecdote of 孫臏 Sun Pin, a descendant of Sun Wu, is related at
length in the 史記, chap. 65: In 341 B.C., the 齊 Ch‘i State being
at war with 魏 Wei, sent 田忌 T‘ien Chi and Sun Pin against the
general 龐涓 P‘ang Chüan, who happened to be a deadly personal
enemy of the latter. Sun Pin said: “The Ch‘i State has a
reputation for cowardice, and therefore our adversary despises us.
Let us turn this circumstance to account.” Accordingly, when the
army had crossed the border into Wei territory, he gave orders to
show 100,000 fires on the first night, 50,000 on the next, and the
night after only 20,000. P‘ang Chüan pursued them hotly, saying to
himself: “I knew these men of Ch‘i were cowards: their numbers
have already fallen away by more than half.” In his retreat, Sun
Pin came to a narrow defile, which he calculated that his pursuers
would reach after dark. Here he had a tree stripped of its bark,
and inscribed upon it the words: “Under this tree shall P‘ang
Chüan die.” Then, as night began to fall, he placed a strong body
of archers in ambush near by, with orders to shoot directly they
saw a light. Later on, P‘ang Chüan arrived at the spot, and
noticing the tree, struck a light in order to read what was
written on it. His body was immediately riddled by a volley of
arrows, and his whole army thrown into confusion. [The above is Tu
Mu’s version of the story; the _Shih Chi_, less dramatically but
probably with more historical truth, makes P‘ang Chüan cut his own
throat with an exclamation of despair, after the rout of his army.]

He sacrifices something, that the enemy may snatch at it.

予 here = 與.

20. 以利動之以卒待之

By holding out baits, he keeps him on the march; then with a body of picked men he lies in wait for him.

This would appear to be the meaning if we retain 卒, which Mei
Yao-ch‘ên explains as 精卒 “men of spirit.” The _T‘u Shu_ reads 本,
an emendation suggested by 李靖 Li Ching. The meaning then would
be, “He lies in wait with the main body of his troops.”

21. 故善戰者求之於埶不責於人故能擇人而任埶

The clever combatant looks to the effect of combined energy, and does not require too much from individuals.

Tu Mu says: “He first of all considers the power of his army in
the bulk; afterwards he takes individual talent into account, and
uses each man according to his capabilities. He does not demand
perfection from the untalented.”

Hence his ability to pick out the right men and to utilise combined energy.

Another reading has 之 instead of 埶. It would be interesting if
Capt. Calthrop could tell us where the following occurs in the
Chinese: “yet, when an opening or advantage shows, he pushes it to
its limits.”

22. 任埶者其戰人也如轉木石木石之性安則靜危則動方則止圓則行

When he utilises combined energy, his fighting men become as it were like unto rolling logs or stones. For it is the nature of a log or stone to remain motionless on level ground, and to move when on a slope; if four-cornered, to come to a standstill, but if round-shaped, to go rolling down.

Ts‘ao Kung calls this 任自然勢 “the use of natural or inherent
power.” Capt. Calthrop ignores the last part of the sentence
entirely. In its stead he has: “So await the opportunity, and so
act when the opportunity arrives”—another absolutely gratuitous
interpolation. The _T‘ung Tien_ omits 任.

23. 故善戰人之埶如轉圓石於千仞之山者埶也

Thus the energy developed by good fighting men is as the momentum of a round stone rolled down a mountain thousands of feet in height. So much on the subject of energy.

The _T‘ung Tien_ omits 善. The chief lesson of this chapter, in Tu
Mu’s opinion, is the paramount importance in war of rapid
evolutions and sudden rushes. “Great results,” he adds, “can thus
be achieved with small forces.”

VI. 虛實篇

WEAK POINTS AND STRONG.

Chang Yü attempts to explain the sequence of chapters as follows:
“Chapter IV, on Tactical Dispositions, treated of the offensive
and the defensive; chapter V, on Energy, dealt with direct and
indirect methods. The good general acquaints himself first with
the theory of attack and defence, and then turns his attention to
direct and indirect methods. He studies the art of varying and
combining these two methods before proceeding to the subject of
weak and strong points. For the use of direct or indirect methods
arises out of attack and defence, and the perception of weak and
strong points depends again on the above methods. Hence the
present chapter comes immediately after the chapter on Energy.”

1. 孫子曰凡先處戰地而待敵者佚後處戰地而趨戰者勞

Sun Tzŭ said: Whoever is first in the field and awaits the coming of the enemy, will be fresh for the fight; whoever is second in the field and has to hasten to battle, will arrive exhausted.

Instead of 處, the _Yü Lan_ has in both clauses the stronger word
據. For the antithesis between 佚 and 勞, cf. I. § 23, where
however 勞 is used as a verb.

2. 故善戰者致人而不致於人

Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on the enemy, but does not allow the enemy’s will to be imposed on him.

The next paragraph makes it clear that 致 does not merely mean, as
Tu Mu says, 令敵來就我 “to make the enemy approach me,” but rather
to make him go in any direction I please. It is thus practically
synonymous with 制. Cf. Tu Mu’s own note on V. § 19. One mark of a
great soldier is that he fights on his own terms or fights not at
all.[170]

3. 能使敵人自至者利之也能使敵人不得至者害之也

By holding out advantages to him, he can cause the enemy to approach of his own accord; or, by inflicting damage, he can make it impossible for the enemy to draw near.

In the first case, he will entice him with a bait; in the second,
he will strike at some important point which the enemy will have
to defend.

4. 故敵佚能勞之飽能飢之安能動之

If the enemy is taking his ease, he can harass him;

This passage may be cited as evidence against Mei Yao-Ch‘ên’s
interpretation of I. § 23.

if well supplied with food, he can starve him out;

飢 is probably an older form than 饑, the reading of the original
text. Both are given in the 說文.

if quietly encamped, he can force him to move.

The subject to 能 is still 善戰者; but these clauses would read
better as direct admonitions, and in the next sentence we find Sun
Tzŭ dropping insensibly into the imperative.

5. 出其所必趨趨其所不意

Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend; march swiftly to places where you are not expected.

The original text, adopted by the _T‘u Shu_, has 出其所不趨; it has
been altered to suit the context and the commentaries of Ts‘ao
Kung and Ho Shih, who evidently read 必趨. The other reading would
mean: “Appear at points to which the enemy cannot hasten;” but in
this case there is something awkward in the use of 趨. Capt.
Calthrop is wrong of course with “appearing where the enemy is not.”

6. 行千里而不勞者行於無人之地也

An army may march great distances without distress, if it marches through country where the enemy is not.

We must beware of understanding 無人之地 as “uninhabited country.”
Sun Tzŭ habitually uses 人 in the sense of 敵, e.g. _supra_, § 2.
Ts‘ao Kung sums up very well: 出空擊虛避其所守擊其不意 “Emerge from
the void [_q.d._ like “a bolt from the blue”], strike at
vulnerable points, shun places that are defended, attack in
unexpected quarters.” The difference of meaning between 空 and 虛
is worth noting.

7. 攻而必取者攻其所不守也守而必固者守其所不攻也

You can be sure of succeeding in your attacks if you only attack places which are undefended.

所不守 is of course hyperbolical; Wang Hsi rightly explains it as “weak
points; that is to say, where the general is lacking in capacity, or
the soldiers in spirit; where the walls are not strong enough, or the
precautions not strict enough; where relief comes too late, or
provisions are too scanty, or the defenders are variance amongst
themselves.”

You can ensure the safety of your defence if you only hold positions that cannot be attacked.

_I.e._, where there are none of the weak points mentioned above. There
is rather a nice point involved in the interpretation of this latter
clause. Tu Mu, Ch‘ên Hao, and Mei Yao-ch‘ên assume the meaning to be:
“In order to make your defence quite safe, you must defend _even_
those places that are not likely to be attacked;” and Tu Mu adds: “How
much more, then, those that will be attacked.” Taken thus, however,
the clause balances less well with the preceding—always a
consideration in the highly antithetical style which is natural to the
Chinese. Chang Yü, therefore, seems to come nearer the mark in saying:
“He who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of
heaven [see IV. § 7], making it impossible for the enemy to guard
against him. This being so, the places that I shall attack are
precisely those that the enemy cannot defend.... He who is skilled in
defence hides in the most secret recesses of the earth, making it
impossible for the enemy to estimate his whereabouts. This being so,
the places that I shall hold are precisely those that the enemy cannot
attack.”

8. 故善攻者敵不知其所守善守者敵不知其所攻

Hence that general is skilful in attack whose opponent does not know what to defend; and he is skilful in defence whose opponent does not know what to attack.

An aphorism which puts the whole art of war into a nutshell.

9. 微乎微乎至於無形神乎神乎至於無聲故能爲敵之司命

O divine art of subtlety and secrecy! Through you we learn to be invisible, through you inaudible;

Literally, “without form or sound,” but it is said of course with
reference to the enemy. Chang Yü, whom I follow, draws no sharp
distinction between 微 and 神, but Tu Mu and others think that 微
indicates the secrecy to be observed on the defensive, and 神 the
rapidity to be displayed in attack. The _Yü Lan_ text differs
considerably from ours, reading: 微乎微乎故能隱於常形神乎神乎故能爲敵
司命.

and hence we can hold the enemy’s fate in our hands.