Chapter V: Basedow and Kant

_Johann Bernard Basedow_

(1723-1790)

The revolutionary ideas contained in Rousseau’s works shook the whole social structure of France so violently that his educational theories were unable to make any systematic and lasting impression. It was the neighboring Germans who received them as the fire for their rising aspiration and the antidote for the existing evils in the field of education. At the head of this new educational movement in Germany under the Rousseauean influence stands Johann Bernard Basedow.

There is almost nothing in Basedow’s fundamental ideas of education which was not said by his three great predecessors and La Chalotais. But while these men were too much ahead of their time, Basedow, with his shrewd perception, saw the practical needs and tendencies of the age, to which he knew how to accommodate himself. Moreover, he, with his strong, though unstable, energy of will and indefatigable fighting spirit, could accomplish what scholarly Comenius, modest Locke, or the visionary Rousseau could not. He blazed the way for the march of realistic and naturalistic pedagogy against the tenacious resistance of traditional forces, and “succeeded in effecting a complete change in the whole nature of education and instruction in Germany” (8: p. 580). The establishment of the _Philanthropium_ in 1774, which was continued by Wolke, Salis, Bahrdt, Trapp, Campe, Rochow, Salzmann, and others, heralds the dawn of new education in Teutonic countries. If Basedow was not great as an educator or an original thinker, he was, in the best sense, one of the greatest educational politicians or agitators we have had in the history of the world.

In the “Philalethie,” one of his earlier works, he already raises the voice of protest against the ineffective, futile, and one-sided education of his day. “Are not there too many doctors?” he writes. “How many of the professors, doctors, or masters will make themselves more useful by working with their hands, by becoming turners, etc.? It is certain that parents push their children too much to the scholarly studies, when the children would do much better to learn commerce, surgery, book trade, fine arts, and especially agriculture.” Again he sneers in the vein of Montaigne at “the learned men who are praised for the dissertations on Virgil and Homer, Corneille and Racine, etc., but who neglect to be good husbands, to be good friends, and to perform well their duties,” and accuses the mistaken purpose and method of learning which “prevents one from living with the people” (9: pp. 190-191).

He proclaims that the “chief purpose of education should be to prepare the child for a useful, public-spirited and happy life” (5: p. 42). To secure one’s own happy existence and to promote the general good of mankind is the end of individual life. By the happiness of an individual he understands a self-contented, cheerful existence, with a “sound mind in a sound body.” Not mere knowledge or accomplishment, but efficiency and virtue, power and character, are the essential things in a man. So, instruction, though important, occupies only a secondary place; the training, the formation of manhood, by inculcating good habits and dispositions, by guarding against the establishing of bad ones, is the first and chief task of education. In this respects Basedow is entirely Lockean. Requirement of absolute obedience for younger children, appeals to the sense of honor as the chief educative motive, are also common in both.

In the initiation of children to language study through play and playthings, in the abundant use of pictures, models, globes, etc., as the handmaid of verbal teaching, in the introduction of more realistic studies and manual activities, in the encouragement of physical culture, he again follows Locke’s suggestions, but carried them into details and elaborations in the practice in his institution. The emphasis laid on the physical culture in the _Philanthropium_ especially became an incentive and model to others; Jahn, the father of German gymnastics, is numbered among those who have been inspired by Basedow.

In writing a text-book for children, comprising elementary knowledge of everything that ought to be known, Basedow took as his model Comenius’s “Orbis Pictus.” His didactics of language owes much to Comenius as well as to Locke. And in “The Book of Methods for Fathers and Mothers of Families and for the People” he foreshadows Pestalozzi. He believed with Comenius that the remedy for a large part of educational evils lies in “good teachers and good books.” So, besides the text-books, there should be an abundance of supplementary reading for the children and reference books for the teacher; school libraries should be established for the use of both. Institutions should be established for the professional training of teachers, with the model schools attached. In fact, the _Philanthropium_ made the beginning of the normal school in its modern sense, and the flourishing age of juvenile literature came as the result of Basedow’s teachings.

The natural development of the child into an ideal citizen, through a free life of frolic and unrestrained pleasurable learning and occupations, was the central idea of Basedowean education. Rousseau’s motto, “The child for the child,” was not well understood by him or did not appeal to him. The chief inspiration he drew from the French Romanticist was the principle, “the child as the child.” And the child, in his understanding, was essentially a gayety-seeking, pleasure-seeking, noisy, restless creature. “Children are fond of movement and noise” (7: p. 23). This was the major premise of his didactic. But utility was another central principle which he shared with all French and English empiricists. And his conception of utility was more like Locke’s than Rousseau’s, namely, that viewed from the standpoint of society and the adult life. The child ought to learn everything useful for becoming an efficient, patriotic member of society--those things alone which are useful. This is the minor premise of his didactic. Now, what conclusions can he draw from these two premises? How a child could be built up to the requirements of adult life without acting against his child nature, how he could be taught everything necessary to make a useful citizen without restraining his playful instincts, this was the problem he tried to solve in his philanthropic institute. The invention of many devices and schemes--all manner of educational machinery was the result. And though he often carried things too far and left several trivial contrivances which have made him a laughing-stock of contemporary and subsequent critics, yet his historic merit as an ingenious inventor of many useful and commendable methods, systems, and plans is certainly undeniable. Moreover, by this ingenuity he exemplified how Lockean and Rousseauean ideals could be made practicable, and how they could be introduced systematically into group education. With all his shortcomings he is entitled to be numbered among the most influential educational reformers and the great promoters of human weal.

_Immanuel Kant_

(1724-1804)

If Basedow was the first great apostle of “the nature evangelism of education” in the practical world, Rousseau finds in Kant “his most illustrious disciple” among scholars. Kant was not only greatly influenced by Rousseau in his educational ideas, but even in his conceptions of morality, religion, and anthropology. Kant also put himself among the conspicuous thinkers of the age, like Goethe, Mendelssohn, Lavater, as an ardent admirer and indorser of Basedow’s _Philanthropium_, which he deemed an excellent experiment, opening a new way to the progress of educational art. But as Basedow had already modified Rousseau’s naturalistic pedagogy, so our Scotch-German philosopher, whose life was perfectly regulated by reason, also departed widely from the French Romanticist. Nay, the two are opposite in many respects. The rationalistic element is so prominently developed in Kant’s pedagogy that the Rousseauean characteristics are almost effaced. Kant learned much from Rousseau, but he was not, after all, his disciple in its true sense.

The founder of that gigantic system, which is said to have determined the general course of philosophic thought of the nineteenth century, has not left us any systematic theory of education. We have only a glimpse of his educational views in his “Lecture Notes on Pedagogy,” which were collected and arranged by one of his students, Theodor Rink. The grand conception of humanity, the large view of education was worthy of this father of German idealistic philosophy, but he does not always soar in the world of these great ideas; he condescends to come down to the world of actuality and discuss the details of educational practice in a Lockean manner. His lectures exhibit a mixture of the two tendencies: English Empiricism on the one hand and German Idealism on the other, and these tendencies, we find, also characterize his whole system of philosophy. Exaltation of reason, of inner freedom, and of moral dignity run through whole pages of his lecture notes, as in all his critical writings.

Education, Kant conceives as the humanization of mankind, through the coeffort of all members of society. “Man is the only creature that must be educated” (1: p. 101), because there is in him immense possibility which is not yet developed, and a grand destiny for him, which is not yet attained. Of the universal good and the perfection of humanity, which is to be the destiny of man, we have not yet reached a full and clear conception. Hence, education is the greatest and yet the hardest problem to which man can devote himself. “No individual man, no matter what degree of culture may be reached by his pupils, can insure their attaining their destiny. To succeed in this, not the work of a few individuals only is necessary, but that of the whole human race” (2: p. 10); because man lives in society, and on society, too; and any individual would never be able to realize a perfect manhood unless society or the race became perfect. Education must be, thus, the cosmopolitan process, in order to fulfill its aim. Then consider education as an art. “What a vast culture and experience does not this conception presuppose!” It can only become perfect through the practice of many generations, and advance by slow degrees, for “insight depends on education, and education in its turn depends on insight” (2: pp. 11-12). “Our only hope is that each generation, provided with the knowledge of the foregoing one, is able, more and more, to bring about an education which shall develop man’s natural gifts in their due proportion and relation to their end, and thus advance the whole human race toward its destiny” (2: pp. 10-11).

With this grand aim and task in view, education should not be left to the home nor to rulers. For “parents usually educate their children merely in such a manner that, however bad the world may be, they may adapt themselves to its present conditions,” or “_make their way_ in the world,” and “sovereigns look upon their subjects merely as tools for their purposes,” neither have they the universal good so much in view as the well-being of the state; while the child should be educated not according to the present, but for the better future state of the human race--i. e., the ideal of humanity and its destiny (2: pp. 14-15). The rulers may help or lighten the task of education with influence or money; but the practice of education ought to depend entirely upon the judgment of the most enlightened experts, who best represent the highest attainment of the age.

Education consists in care, discipline, and culture, including instruction. The necessity of care arises from the insufficiency of man’s instincts for his self-preservation; the necessity of the discipline and instruction arises from man’s capability to rise above his instincts. The chief function of care is the prevention of the harmful uses by children of their natural powers; its nature should be largely negative on the part of educators. “We have not to add anything to the provision of Nature, but merely to see that such provision is duly carried out. If any addition to this is necessary on our part, it must be the process of hardening the child” (2: p. 39). All artificial contrivances are more harmful than beneficial for his healthy growth. Therefore keep his freedom and only prevent his forming effeminate habits.

By discipline “we must understand that influence which is always restraining our animal nature from getting the better of our manhood, either in the individual as such, or in man as a member of society. Discipline, then, is merely restraining unruliness” (2: p. 18). Reason, not instinct, determines good conduct. But, since man comes into the world with undeveloped reason “in the first period of childhood, the child must learn submissive and positive obedience” (2: p. 26). “The love of freedom is naturally so strong in man that when once he has grown accustomed to freedom, he will sacrifice everything for its sake. For this very reason discipline must be brought into play very early; for when this has not been done it is difficult to alter character later in life” (2: p. 4). Neglect of culture can be remedied later in life, but neglect or mistake in discipline never.

Kant’s view on care and discipline, in its general character and details, very much reminds us of that of Locke. Kant is peculiarly empirical here in his procedure, and his protest against playing with and flattering the child, against indiscriminate punishment, his plea for the freedom of children’s bodily activities, for early inculcation of self-restraint and obedience, for gaining the child’s confidence and respect, his opinion in regard to manners, and children’s crying, his advocation of the hardening process, all seem to be the repetitions of Locke in a modified language. In regard to habit formation, the two writers seem to differ from each other, for Kant repeatedly opposes the formation or fostering of any habits in children. He says: “The more habits a man allows himself to form, the less free and independent he becomes; ... for whatever he has been accustomed to early in life always retains a certain attraction for him in after-life” (2: p. 45). But if we read his lines a little more carefully we find this opposition more apparent than real. One emphasizes the establishing of good habits while the other lays stress on the prevention of the formation of harmful habits. Whether Kant ever read Locke’s “Thoughts on Education,” and was thus influenced by him or not, I am unable to ascertain. This great similarity may come from their common experience in tutorship. Or we might attribute it largely to the influence he received from Rousseau and Basedow, and not directly to that of Locke.

Care and discipline were in Kant’s view essentially negative functions. The positive side of education he calls culture. It includes the physical, mental, and moral training. It is the building up or the unfolding of naturally endowed faculties of man by their exercise. Instruction is sometimes necessary, but it is only as an aid to the self-activity of the child. Children should be provided with ample opportunities for such exercise.

What should be observed in physical culture relates either to the exercise of voluntary movements or of the organs of sense. As to the motor training, the first condition is that “the child should always help himself” (2: p. 60). Strength and skill, quickness and self-reliance are thus developed. He recognizes a coördinate relation between the sense and muscle. Touching upon the psychology and pedagogy of various outdoor games common among children, he recommends those games as the best which “unite the development of skill with the exercise of the senses.” Moreover, these games entered upon by the children serve them as an unconscious training for self-denial, hardship, privations, and the habit of constant occupation, and, besides, have a beneficial bearing on their social life. “A lively boy will sooner become a good man than a conceited and priggish lad” (2: p. 64). He also drops a line on the task of gymnastics, saying that since they are merely intended to direct Nature, we must not aim at artificial grace nor the perfection of performance. Thus, Kant not only shows his broad pedagogical view in advocating children’s games for the culture of the senses and muscles, but anticipates one of the great discoveries of modern psychology--the mentality of the muscles.

In mental culture we can distinguish two kinds: one “free,” the other “scholastic.” By free culture children’s natural learning by their spontaneous activities is meant; it is, so to speak, a play, a pastime, or an occupation in leisure. It goes on all the time, without our interference; our function is simply to observe and guide it properly. Scholastic culture, on the other hand, constitutes work, business, or an occupation by compulsion. “In _work_, the occupation is not pleasant in itself, but it is undertaken for the sake of the end in view.... It is of great importance that children should learn to work. Man is the only animal who is obliged to work. He must go through a long apprenticeship before he can enjoy anything for his own sustenance” (2: pp. 68-69). And it is in man’s nature that he wants occupation, even though it involves a certain amount of restraint. Therefore, Kant disagrees with Basedow’s view “that children should be allowed to learn everything, as it were, in play.” Play and work should go together, and the school is intended for the cultivation of the work interest and work-habit.

The principal rule of mental culture is that “no mental faculty is to be cultivated by itself, but always in relation to others,” inferior faculties only with a view to the superior (2: p. 70-71). The superior mental faculties are, according to Kant, understanding, judgment, and reason. By understanding, he means the knowledge of the general; by judgment, the application of the general to the particular; by reason, the power of understanding the connection between the general and the particular. Memory and imagination as lower faculties should only serve these higher ones. Culture includes instruction and teaching, but its chief aim should be not to impart knowledge, but to train general and particular faculties. The various subjects of the curriculum are to be simply means for mental gymnastics, but not the ends in themselves. “It is culture which brings out ability. Ability is the possession of a faculty which is capable of being adapted to various ends” (2: p. 19).

To mental culture the inculcation of prudence and civility should be added, for by this man is made fit to live in harmony with society at large. But “the moralization of humanity” is the highest aim of education. According to Kant, “We live in the epoch of disciplining, culturing, and civilizing, but we are still a long way off from the epoch of moralizing” (1: p. 124). Discipline is negative; it is the prevention of evil tendencies and of defective growth. Moral culture is positive; it is the inculcation of principles, the shaping of the manner of thinking. It is not mere formation of good manners or habits, but the establishment of character.

Character consists in firmness of purpose and the power to realize it, persistency in the choice of one aim or object, and the renunciation of hindering desires and inclinations. Character is the result of such consistency in the exercise of inner freedom of will. Sudden conversion cannot transform a man’s personality from a vicious to a virtuous one, nor can any artificial, external means, such as mortifications, fastings, pilgrimages, and the like. A man who acts without settled principles, with no uniformity, has no character. A man may have a good heart and no character, because he is dependent upon impulses, and does not act according to maxims. Firmness and unity of principles are essential to character. So, he says: “First form character, then a good character.”

A good character consists in the readiness to act according to moral principles, which the inner reason gives us as necessary and universal laws. The youth, therefore, must be taught to honor reason, and be allowed to exercise his inner freedom of personality. But in the case of younger children things are different. Reason is not yet developed in them, so they must first begin by following the external reason exercised for them--namely, they must be accustomed to give prompt obedience to the objective laws assigned by parents or schools. And although willing obedience is desirable and important, even “absolute” obedience is necessary to prepare the child “for the fulfilment of laws that he will have to obey later, as a citizen, even though he may not like them” (2: p. 86). Of course, it goes without saying, that these laws assigned by teachers or parents should always represent the universal laws, not their caprice or arbitrary will. Kant is not so rigorous in regard to the moral education of children as he is in his moral metaphysics. He admits a place for “inclination,” and permits use to be made of children’s instinct of fear. Yet he still makes a plea for the inculcation of the sense of duty, saying: “Even though a child should not be able to see the reason of a duty, it is nevertheless better that certain things should be prescribed to him in this way; for, after all, a child will always be able to see that he has certain duties as a child, while it will be more difficult for him to see that he has certain duties as a human being” (2: p. 87). The duties they have to perform must be placed, as far as possible, by examples and rules.

According to Kant, the child’s duty toward himself consists in “being conscious that man possesses a certain dignity, which ennobles him above all other creatures,” and in “so acting as not to violate in his own person this dignity of mankind” (2: p. 101). Uncleanness, lying, and the like should be most effectively taught as unbecoming to mankind and degrading to oneself, and at the critical period of adolescence, the idea of dignity of man can alone suffice to keep young men in bound. The child’s duty toward others consists in the recognition of the dignity of mankind in the personality of others--namely, in justice. “A child should learn early to reverence and respect the rights of others, and we must be careful to see that his reverence is realized in his actions” (2: p. 102). Generosity is a virtue beyond the child’s comprehension and power. As to benevolence, it is well to arouse the sympathies of children, “not so much to feel for the sorrows of others as to a sense of their duty to help them” (2: p. 104). Children ought to be prevented from contracting a habit of sentimental, maudlin, sympathy, which is really nothing else than the delicacy of sensitiveness, and is “an evil, consisting as it does merely in lamenting over a thing” (2: p. 97).

We must avoid exciting emulation, envy, or pride in a child by comparing his work with that of others. He ought only to compare himself with the conceptions of reason, or with the standard of moral perfection. Yet, on the other hand, frankness and unassuming confidence is a desirable virtue to be cultivated, which will “enable him to exhibit his talent in a becoming manner.”

Kant recommends as a means of cultivating children’s moral ideas the use of a catechism, which “should contain, in popular form, every day questions of right and wrong.” For youth, the Socratic method is recommended as cultivating best the moral as well as logical reason.

Early adolescence receives special consideration from him. He saw, with Rousseau, a peculiar educational need of the period.

“Nature has spread a certain veil of secrecy over this subject, as if it were something unseemly for man, and merely an animal need in man. She has, however, sought to unite it, as far as possible, with every kind of morality” (2: p. 115).

Sex-consciousness is the natural result of physiological growth. “Thus it is impossible to keep the youth in ignorance and the innocence which belongs to ignorance. By silence, the evil is but increased. We must speak openly, clearly, and definitely with the youth. We must allow that it is a delicate point, for we cannot look upon it as a subject for open conversation; but if we enter with sympathy into his impulses all will go well” (2: p. 116). We must guard the youth from the unnatural vices common among them and also from too early marriage. We must cultivate in them a proper respect for the other sex, and the true conception of a happy marriage.

At this time the youth begins to be conscious of the distinction of rank and the inequality of men. “As a child he must not be allowed to notice this.” As a youth, “the consciousness of the equality of men together with their civil inequality may be taught him little by little” (2: p. 119). Interest in others and in the progress of the world should now be encouraged. Kant’s cosmopolitanism here flashes forth:

“Children should be made acquainted with this interest, so that it may give warmth to their hearts. They should learn to rejoice at the world’s progress, although it may not be to their own advantage or to that of their country” (2: p. 121).

Morality and religion were for Kant one and inseparable at bottom. Religion is nothing else than “the consciousness of all our duties as divine commands.” Or it is “the law in us in so far as it derives emphasis from a Lawgiver and Judge above us” (2: p. 111). Morality is the realization of duties from the consciousness of the inner law. The relation of our actions to this inner law we call conscience. “The reproaches of conscience will be without effect if it be not considered as the representative of God, who has His lofty seat above us, but who has also established a tribunal in us” (1: p. 215). On the other hand, if religion is not joined with a moral conscientiousness, it is of no effect. The rationalism of the eighteenth century did not recognize, or rather did not justify, the æsthetic side of religion. So Kant thought all religious acts without morality “a superstitious worship.” Religious education is nothing more or less than the inculcation of the consciousness of the inner law and the Lawgiver. As to the common usages of worship, the more ignorant the child is the better. “This much is certain,” he says, “that, could it be brought about that children should never witness a single act of veneration to God, never even hear the name of God spoken, it might then be the right order of things to teach them first about ends and aims, and of what concerns mankind; to sharpen their judgment; to instruct them in the _order and beauty of the works of Nature_; then to add a wider knowledge of the structure of the universe; and then only might be revealed to them for the first time the idea of a Supreme Being--a Lawgiver” (2: pp. 109-110). But the actual condition of society necessitates our taking a short-cut and giving early instruction to the child in the right ideas of religion.

This is done, Kant believes, by pointing to God through moral consciousness within the child and through the teleology in Nature without. Lead him to the understanding “that there is a law of duty which is not the same as ease, utility, or other consideration of the kind, but something universal, which is not governed by the caprice of men” (2: pp. 110-111), and he will come to be conscious of the presence of something in us, which is above us, above human creation. Show him “how everything is disposed for the preservation of the species and their equilibrium, but at the same time with consideration in the long run for man, that he may attain happiness” (2: p. 111), and he will see the existence of the universal law, which governs the world, yet is intimately related to himself. Kant thought these two as the only ways to reach the idea of God. One is the evidence of Practical Reason, the other the proof of the heart (_Herzensbeweis_). But here again in religious education he shows his indulgence to children, for he says:

“The idea of God might first be taught by analogy with that of a father under whose care we are placed, and in this way we may with advantage point out to the child the unity of men as represented by one family” (2: p. 111).

And the Christian pulpit has followed his advice. We can summarize his ideals of moral and religious education in his own words as follows:

“Everything in education depends upon establishing correct principles, and leading children to understand and accept them. They must learn to substitute the abhorrence of what is revolting and absurd, for hatred; the fear of their conscience, for the fear of man and divine punishment; self-respect and inward dignity, for the opinions of men; the inner value of actions, for words and mere impulses; understanding, for feeling; and joyousness and piety with good humour, for a morose, timid, and gloomy devotion” (2: pp. 108-109).

Ziegler, in his “History of Pedagogy,” epitomizes Kant’s most important influence on the general trend of thought as the remodeling of our concept of the universe, the introduction of exact and critical thinking, the exaltation of mathematical instruction, the substitution of morality of conscience for the morality of eudemonism or prudence, the last-mentioned being probably the greatest and most lasting one. Ziegler tells us further that “the categorical imperative” has since become “the steel and iron in our blood” (18: p. 282), and that the German victory in the war for independence owes its debt above all others to Kant and Fichte. As to his position in the history of pedagogy itself, we may say, with Dr. Ernst Temming, that “the German Rationalistic Pedagogy (_Aufklärungspädagogik_) found in Kant both its founder and undaunted representative” (17: p. 4). Like Locke in England and Rousseau in France, he, with Basedow in Germany, can be said to have firmly established education on the human basis, making moral culture independent of positive Christianity, and religion subordinate to education. Moreover, by proclaiming from the honored chair of Königsberg University his grand concept of the education of humanity, he gave to the contemporary and subsequent generations of scholars a stimulus to take up pedagogy as a work worthy of philosophers.

REFERENCES

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