Chapter III: John Locke

(1632-1704)

When the second greatest educational work in the seventeenth century appeared in 1693, the world was only a generation and a half older than when it saw the “Great Didactic.” While we find in Comenius a strange mixture of mediæval and modern thinking, Locke’s “Some Thoughts concerning Education” reflects entirely modern conceptions and tendencies. But the differences between the two works are not wholly due to the difference of the times; they are due more to that of the men themselves and their nationalities.

Though born a Slav, Comenius represents, in his personality and pedagogy, the idealistic and theorizing genius of the German nation. Locke, on the contrary, is a typical Englishman, and perfectly embodies the practical genius of that people. Compare the titles of the two books referred to above. How elaborate and ornate is the one and how homely the other! One might compare the former to a great piece of architecture, built up stone by stone with exactness of sequence and plan. Every detail is manifestly studied and follows a scheme previously laid out. The latter, on the contrary, is like a painting, or a work of artisanship, if you please. There is the design, unity and harmony, but these lie in the artist’s experience or mental make-up, and develop themselves as he moves his hand. Comenius’s pedagogy starts with the highest ideal of humanity, and then proceeds to consider how each and all can be made to conform to it. His plans and practical recommendations are also, in general, more of deductions from his basal hypothesis or philosophy than inductions from the considerations of the actual conditions and problems. With Locke the procedure is very different: a particular boy concerning whose education he was consulted is the starting-point. This boy has to grow up in a particular age, environment, and social class, and must be fitted to all these actual conditions. Not the ultimate end of the race, but the particular destiny of a real boy, his mentality, the best educative forces conducing to the possibly perfect fulfillment of his destiny, are to be the chief considerations. Comenius was a practical as well as theoretical reformer in education, but he was, above all, a scholarly priest, probably the best type that his age could produce. Locke was a great original thinker, the father of English psychology. But he was, essentially, and in its highest sense, a man of the world. In spite of his physical weakness, which hindered him from an active participation in the social and political affairs of his country, he was always concerned and identified with them. Thus the Christian citizenship at which he aimed was not a gazing from the stepladder of this earthly life toward the distant vision of heavenly perfection, but a vigorous, efficient, working and living with others as a child of this world. There is no bold brilliancy in his educational thoughts, but they are full of living truths which come only from the actual broad experience of life, and so can be applied to real life. There is in them no soaring transcendentalism. Yet if we intelligently follow his leadership, we shall find that it does not lack a glow of idealism which can illumine our earthly path. It is a sound philosophy of a sound personality who has seen the wide living world with his own eyes, and expressed his views with the scrupulous conscientiousness and the sincerity of conviction--a perfect product of great common sense. Leibniz, the great German philosopher, who recognized Locke’s Essay on “Human Understanding,” as “one of the most beautiful and most esteemed work” of his time, was disposed to rate his “Thoughts on Education” still higher. Even to-day, after we have become familiar with a host of great and modern thinkers, he finds such an admirer as Professor Laurie, of Edinburgh, who thinks “that no educational writer surpasses him.” Rousseau’s indebtedness to him is a well-known fact, and through Rousseau his influence extends to the whole continental development of educational thought down to the present day. As to the wide and deep effect which his thought directly exerted upon England there can be no question. Oscar Browning, of Cambridge, believes that Locke’s ideas “determine the character of our most characteristic educational institution, the English public school” (2: p. 118). And yet Locke had little interest in the public school of his day. England produced in him her ideal type of a gentleman, and he, as the incarnation of her genius, has formed the gentlemen of England.

Thus, the two greatest educational writers of the seventeenth century, standing at the fountainhead of the pedagogical stream of the modern era, present a very interesting contrast, which is not insignificant in its effects. If one is the harbinger of the idealistic and the theorizing pedagogy of the German type, the other is the champion of the realistic and empirical school of the English type. A religious tendency predominates in the former, a secular tendency in the latter. If Comenius may be called the pedagogue of public education, Locke is to be called that of private education. In the former, the emphasis is on the order, system, and method; in the latter, the stress is laid on the personal influence of the educator. While in the former, instruction is the main thing; in the latter, discipline and training are essential.

If we are justified in thinking that the intellectual side of the Renaissance attained its true destiny in the Baconian conception of science and its principles, so we might say with equal validity that the practical genius of the ancient Greeks and Romans blossomed again in Locke in the new soil of Christian consciousness. In spite of his sharing with Bacon a strong intolerance of the prevailing humanistic, classical education, it is evident that he imbibed deeply the spirit of ancient culture. He once admitted that “amongst the _Grecians_ is to be found the original, as it were, and foundation of all that learning which we have in this part of the world,” and “no man,” he held, “can pass for a scholar that is ignorant of the Greek tongue” (7: p. 170). Thus, Sparta’s example of building up a vigorous physique and character in her youth through hard discipline, of inculcating wisdom through free conversation with older people, Pythagoras’s teaching of the harmony of body and soul, Socrates’s fidelity to truth and unbiased attitude of mind, Plato’s exaltation of virtue above all things, Aristotle’s ideal of a perfectly balanced life, regulated by reason, the Roman fidelity, patriotism, and statesmanship,--these together with the true spirit of Christianity flowed into his life and into his philosophy of education. Locke had, like every other reformer, his predecessors, such as Rabelais and Montaigne. But what was in them, mainly mockery and ridicule of the current education, became in Locke more positive and more comprehensive assertion. His philosophy of education was grounded on his new empirical psychology, which was, after Bacon, the next great stimulus to the intellectual activity of the world.

With the Montaignean dictum: “A sound mind in a sound body,” Locke begins his Thoughts on Education. This is, he says, “a short but full description of a happy state in this world--he that has these two, has little more to wish for; and he that wants either of them, will be but little the better for anything else” (7: p. 1). For Locke, the art of education was synonymous with the art of hygiene in its broadest sense--i. e., the formation and the maintenance of a healthful life, mental and moral as well as physical. How can we form such a healthful life? His answer is simple: By accustoming ourselves to a healthy mode of living. Habituation is the keynote of his whole pedagogy.

Although the human body was conceived by him still as “the clay cottage” of the mind, yet he wanted us to understand “how necessary _Health_ is to our business and happiness, and how requisite a strong constitution, able to endure hardship and fatigue” (7: p. 2). So he began his treatise with the physical care of the child. A simple, rigorous life was his ideal, and so he prescribed the following rules for children: Plenty of open air, of exercise, and of sleep; plain diet, no wine or strong drink, and very little or no drugs; not too warm or straight clothing; the head and feet especially to be kept cold, and the feet to be accustomed by exposure to wetness. Locke studied medicine, and once practiced it with much success. And the hygienic rules above cited, which were the result of his own experience and experimentation, introduced almost a revolution in the physical bringing up of children. We see how subsequent writers, like Rousseau and Kant, reflect his thoughts.

His ideas of mental training rest on his theory of the mind. According to him, the mind of a new-born child is a _tabula rasa_: there is nothing innate in it; experience is what makes a mind. Every sensation one receives or every act one does, however small and insignificant it may seem, leaves some impression upon it, and contributes not only to the constitution of its content, but also to the formation of a definite tendency. He recognized the important rôle played by the unconscious or automatic part of the mind in our actual life, which is nothing more than an aggregate or a system of various habits. Volition has but little power against it; it works more “constantly and with greater facility than reason, which, when we have most need of it, is seldom fairly consulted and more rarely obeyed” (7: p. 91). Habit formation is, therefore, the great thing in education. The significance of any act of a child, of any educational process, is to be measured only by what kind of habit it is likely to lead to.

Although he compared children’s minds to water which we can easily turn this way or that, or to wax upon which we can impress any figure as we like, yet he meant to illustrate by this simply the extreme plasticity and flexibility of childhood. He was not blind to the great individual differences, and was perfectly aware that “there are possibly scarce two children who can be conducted by exactly the same method” (7: p. 187). Moreover, he says: “We must not hope wholly to change their original tempers, nor make the gay pensive and grave, nor the melancholy sportive, without spoiling them; God has stamped certain characters upon men’s minds which, like their shapes, may perhaps be a little mended, but can hardly be totally alter’d and transformed into the contrary” (7: p. 40). The uniformatization of method, then, is a crime of educational art instead of its aim. The only common rule to be fixed is not to have any definite rule, but to find out about every child, what his temperament, inclinations, defects are, and apply methods or treatment that are “adapted to his capacity” and “suited to his natural genius and constitution.”

In discussing the process of discipline, he first makes a plea for the free expression of the play instinct. “This gamesome humour,” he says, “which is wisely adapted by Nature to their age and temper should rather be encourag’d to keep up their spirits, and improve strength and health, than curb’d or restrain’d” (7: p. 38). A “misapply’d and useless correction” in this case may serve “only to spoil the temper both of body and of mind.” Our hope of education will be gone if we kill this tendency to spontaneous activity at its growth. For here is just the point of grasp by which alone we can lead children anywhere we desire. “The chief art of the educator is to make all that they have to do sport and play, too.” (7: p. 38).

Shall we then put no restraint whatever upon their conduct? No, far from that. Locke insists that even “the plays and diversions of children should be directed towards good and useful habits or else they will introduce ill ones” (7: p. 113). He demands a stern and rigorous discipline, and accuses parents of weakening their little ones by too much fondling. Children ought not to be allowed to satisfy a craving which comes from their whims and fancies and not from their natural wants. They ought to learn the control of their passions and appetites from their cradles, and so be kept in absolute subjection to the parents’ authority while their own reason is not yet developed. Their instinctive sense of awe should be utilized and obedience be made implicit and natural. But as they grow up, more liberty should be allowed, and friendliness, love, and even respect should take the place of authority.

Nevertheless, Locke does not believe in severe punishment. “The usual lazy and short way by chastisement and rod,” he thinks, encourages “our natural propensity to indulge in corporeal and present pleasure and to avoid pain at any cost,” instead of conducing to its mastery, and “thereby strengthens that in us which is the root from whence spring all vicious actions, and the irregularities of life” (7: p. 30). Again, “such a sort of _slavish Discipline_ makes a _slavish Temper_” (7: p. 31). It creates a hypocrite who dissembles obedience, yet with his natural inclination only heightened and increased on account of external suppression. It creates “a low-spirited, moped creature, who, however, with his unnatural sobriety may please silly people, who commend tame inactive children, because they make no noise, nor give them any trouble; yet, at last, will probably prove as uncomfortable a thing to his friends, as he will be all his life as useless a thing to himself and others” (7: p. 31). It severs a child from the parent or the teacher who administers it, and causes disgust for work when applied for its enforcement. But in case of lying and obstinacy, which he considered as the two grave moral faults issuing from the conscious volition of the child, Locke allows and even advises us to resort to severe measures, in order to check them at their first manifestation. Here the rod should be heavy and unswerving, and not laid down until it has brought the child’s will into a complete subjugation. But he thinks that if we keep our strict hand constantly over the unnatural desires of the child, from its cradle, and at the same time give a full freedom to its natural wants and activities, we shall seldom find an occasion which calls for the rod.

Material rewards are equally condemned by Locke as the physical punishment. He admits, however, that pain and pleasure, reward and punishment, are “the only motives to a rational creature,” “the spur and reins whereby all mankind are set to work and guided.” “Remove hope and fear, and there is an end of all discipline” (7: p. 33). What he wished, was to accustom children to connect their hope and fear, pain and pleasure, with proper objects, in such a way as not to form those habits which are detrimental to their future happiness and virtue. There is a force or motive power in human life equally strong or even stronger than material, physical pain and pleasure. It is the sense of honor, the desire for esteem and the hate of disgrace. This shall be used as the lever to move the young. “Make his mind as sensible of credit and shame as may be; and when you have done that, you have put a principle into him which will influence his actions when you are not by; to which the fear of a little smart of a rod is not comparable; and which will be the proper stock whereon afterwards to graft the true principles of morality and religion” (7: p. 177). If you succeed in this, “by all arts imaginable,” “the business is done and the difficulty is over” (7: p. 34).

Locke does not believe in “charging children’s memories upon all occasions with _Rules_ and precepts, which they often do not understand, and constantly so soon forget as given” (7: p. 38). Mere admonition or verbal instruction cannot teach what long experience and broad generalization alone taught the race. Even commanding is more effective than teaching. But the lesson by example, learning by imitation, is the method he recommends. “The tincture of company sinks deeper than the outside; and possibly, if a true estimate were made of the morality and religions of the world, we should find that the far greater part of mankind received even those opinions and ceremonies they would die for, rather from the fashions of their countries, and the constant practice of those about them than from any conviction of their reasons” (7: p. 128). If this is true of those in whom reason is already developed, still more so with children. So, the self-discipline of parents themselves, the most careful choice of tutor, friends, nurse, governess, and servants, are spoken of by Locke as a matter of the first importance. Nobody has felt the great significance of environment in education deeper than Locke. He says:

“Having named _Company_, I am almost ready to throw away my pen and trouble you no further on this subject: For, since that does more than all precepts, rules, and instructions, methinks it is almost wholly in vain to make a long discourse of other things, and to talk of that almost to no purpose” (7: p. 45).

The main aim of education for Locke is character-building, since he conceived virtue as “the first and most necessary of those endowments that belong to a man or a gentleman.” Next to virtue, wisdom is the most necessary quality for a man. Wisdom means “a man’s managing his business ably and with foresight in this world.” And since “this is the product of a good natural temper, application of mind, and experience together,” we cannot teach it to children. “To accustom a child to have true notions of things, and not to be satisfied till he has them; to raise his mind to great and worthy thoughts, and to keep him at a distance from falsehood and cunning, which has always a broad mixture of falsehood in it, is the fittest preparation of a child for wisdom” (7: pp. 119-120). The rest is “to be learned from time, experience and observation, and an acquaintance with men.” Let him inform his mind by engaging in conversation with “men of parts and breeding,” as soon as he is capable of benefitting by it, and send him to travel when he reaches mature adolescence.

The third important quality is good breeding. “The happiness that all men so steadily pursue consisting in pleasure--he that knows how to make those he converses with easy, without debasing himself to low and servile flattery, has found the true art of living in the world, and being both welcomed and valued everywhere” (7: p. 124). The aim of good breeding is to avoid a sheepish bashfulness on the one hand, and a misbecoming negligence and disrespect on the other; to cultivate a modest but assured, courteous yet not mean attitude of mind and outward demeanor accompanying it, this is “a great skill which good sense, reason, and good company can only reach.” Here, again, rules and exhortation avail little, unless good examples are shown. “Be as busy as you like with discourses of _Civility_ to your son, such as is his company, such will be his manners” (7: p. 125). But young children should not be too much interfered with as to the outward manners; carelessness and clumsiness are natural to them, and age will cure them, if you only “teach them humility and to be good-natured,” and always choose for them good company. Dancing should be taught as soon as they are capable of learning it, for “nothing appears to me to give children so much becoming confidence and behavior, and so to raise them to the conversation of those above their age, as _Dancing_” (7: p. 42). To give a “freedom and ease to all the motions of the body” is the main thing in dancing. “One that teaches not this is worse than none at all: natural unfashionableness being much better than apish affected postures; and I think it much more passable to put off the hat and make a leg like an honest country gentleman than like an ill-fashioned dancing master. For as for the jigging part and the figures of dances, I count that little or nothing further than as it tends to perfect graceful carriage” (7: p. 174).

Learning is the last and least concern in Locke’s philosophy of education. It is, he recognizes, a great help both to virtue and wisdom in all well-disposed minds; but “in others not so disposed, it helps them only to be the most foolish or worse men.” When Locke saw “what ado is made about a little _Latin_ and _Greek_, how many years are spent in it, and what a noise and business it makes to no purpose,” he could not but despise it, and say: “A great part of learning now in fashion in the schools of Europe, and that goes ordinarily into the round of education, a gentleman may in a good measure be unfurnished with, without any disparagement to himself or prejudice to his affairs” (7: p. 74). “_Learning_,” he declares, “must be had, but in the second place, as subservient to greater qualities.... Place him (your child) in hands where you may, as much as possible, secure his innocence, cherish and nurse up the good, and gently correct and weed out any bad inclinations, and settle in him good habits. This is the main point, and this being provided for, learning may be had into the bargain” (7: pp. 128-129).

In learning, too, acquirement of habits is the chief educational process. Not so much to supply ready-made knowledge nor to impart the teacher’s own ideas, as to implant, by practice, a proper habit of reading, thinking, observing, and doing is the goal to be striven for. The educator must see to the constant and correct exercise of the powers to be developed. But premature use or overexercise is as detrimental to the vigorous development of the mind as neglect or too little exercise. “The mind, by being engaged in a task beyond its strength, like the body strained by lifting at a weight too heavy, has often its force broken, and thereby gets an unaptness or an aversion to any vigorous attempt ever after” (8: pp. 87-88). Children’s natural weakness of mind should be understood and not taken for their willful fault. Healthful activity of mind is the thing to be secured, and for this the following principles are laid down by Locke, which we may regard as the laws of hygiene of attention and association:

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1. Keep up the natural tendency of children to free, spontaneous activity; if they lack this, awaken it. Introduce them to something, anything, which they can do with pleasure and enthusiasm. “None of the things they are to learn should ever be made a burden, or imposed upon them as a _Task_. Whatever is so proposed, presently becomes irksome” (7: p. 52), and they will form an habitual prejudice against it. This manifestation of spontaneous activity has its ebb and flow; so catch the proper moment as well as the proper subject for setting them to work.

2. Cherish the curiosity or natural inquisitiveness of children and give it encouragement. However foolish and trifling their questions may appear to you, do not forget that for them these questions are matters of great moment. Treat them as “a stranger in an unknown land,” and thus lead them to useful knowledge that they should know. Knowledge grows by constant quest, and thus only.

3. The wandering mind and the fleeting thought are the result of the natural constitution of childhood. It is the law of mental economy, especially dominant in children, that “their thoughts should be perpetually shifting from what disgusts them, and seek better entertainment in more pleasing objects” (7: p. 143). A frequent change of subject, introduction of some new, strange objects, making instruction interesting, and thus holding the involuntary attention, are therefore necessary in teaching children.

4. Children’s minds are strongly susceptible to emotional disturbances. “Passionate words or blows from the tutor fill the child’s mind with terror and affrightment, which immediately takes it wholly up, and leaves no room for other impressions” (7: p. 143). Therefore, “keep the mind in an easy, calm temper, when you would have it receive your instructions or any increase of knowledge. It is as impossible to draw fair and regular characters on a trembling mind as on a shaking paper” (7: p. 143).

5. However great the part which involuntary attention plays in the process of learning, the cultivation of the power of voluntary attention should not be neglected. Children should be habituated to the voluntary direction or control of attention “by trying them sometimes, when they are by laziness unbent, or by avocation bent another way, and endeavoring to make them buckle to the thing proposed” (7: p. 54). Some bodily labor which requires a constant vigilance and application of mind is recommended as a remedy for a diffused attention. The work interest stands to the voluntary attention in the same relation as the play interest to the involuntary attention. So, the former should be stimulated by letting the child see “by what he has learned, that he can do something which he could not do before; something, which gives him some power and real advantage above others who are ignorant of it” (7: p. 144).

6. We find in our mind often an association of ideas which is accidental and arbitrary in its origin, but once being established is almost inseparable and imperative. This wrong association “has such an influence, and is of so great force to set us awry in our action, as well moral as natural, passions, reasonings, and notions themselves, that perhaps there is not any one thing that deserves more to be looked after” (9: vol. ii, Book II, chapter 33, § 9). To prevent such erroneous associations in the mind of children, the strict order of learning should be observed. “Give them first one simple idea, and see that they take it right, and perfectly comprehend it, before you go any further; and then add some other simple idea which lies next in your way to what you aim at; and so proceeding by gentle and insensible steps, children without confusion and amazement will have their understandings opened and their thoughts extended farther than could have been expected” (7: p. 158).

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Mathematics is recommended as a help to the training of reasoning power, for a mathematical demonstration represents the coherent process of reasoning. As for logic, he thinks with Bacon that it, “catching at what it cannot reach, has served to confirm and establish errors, rather than to open a way to truth” (8: p. 19).

No general improvement of memory is affected by any usual method of “committing to memory,” or “learning by heart.” For in his psychology (9: vol. ii, Book II, chapter xxxiii, xxxix; vol. i, Book II, chapter x) our memory of ideas or impressions depends upon the strength of power to hold them in mind--namely, attention, on the one hand, and upon that of the power to retain and recall them, on the other. Yet the intensity and duration of attention is largely determined by interest, and the retentive power is owing to our constitution, and therefore beyond education. Thus he says: “What the mind is intent upon and careful of, that it remembers best, ... to which if method and order be joined, all is done, I think, that can be for the help of a weak memory; and he that will take any other way to do it, especially that of charging it with a train of other people’s words, which he that learns cares not for, will, I guess, scarce find the profit answer half the time and pains employed in it.” For memory is not a power that is transferable from one thing to another. “The learning pages of _Latin_ by heart, no more fits the memory for retention of anything else, than the graving of one sentence in lead makes it the more capable of retaining firmly any other characters” (7: pp. 154-155). Improvement of memory can come only through the formation of habits of fixating attention and of orderly association.

Thus, to sum up, learning by self-active, pleasurable exercise of mental powers, directed in an orderly manner and constantly repeated, is the fundamental principle of intellectual education.

Although learning was a matter of secondary importance in Locke’s plan for the education of a “young gentleman,” the curriculum he proposed was as rich as that of Comenius, and the practical suggestions he gives as to the teaching of each subject are of much worth. The subject-matter comprises: reading, writing, drawing, shorthand, French, Latin, geography, arithmetic, chronology, history, geometry, astronomy, anatomy, ethics, law, English grammar, rhetoric taught in a practical way, letter-writing, natural philosophy containing biblical history, and physics. Gardening, carpentry, turning, varnishing, graving, metal and jeweler’s work, and other manual occupations are recommended as healthful diversions. Bookkeeping also makes a part of a gentleman’s useful accomplishments. He recommends dancing and wrestling, but depreciates music, painting, fencing, and riding, from one reason or another. The main difference between Locke and Comenius lies in that, while one considers knowledge and information in themselves of great value, as deserving the dignity of man, the other values these rather for their influence on the efficiency and happiness of actual life. Comenius is often called the father of realistic pedagogy, but in my opinion his ideals of education and curriculum are still largely humanistic and even scholastic. It is in Locke that we see the complete victory of realism. Bacon’s influence upon Comenius was mainly in his ideal of universal knowledge. But the real spirit of the new scientific learning found its true supporter in Locke. Comenius drew his philosophical arguments for education from the Bible and from the analogy of Nature. But by Locke pedagogy was put upon a scientific basis--namely, physiology and psychology.

At the opening of the chapter, I contrasted Locke as the pedagogue of private education with Comenius as that of public education. Comenius aimed at the enlightenment of the masses, so the machinery of school was necessarily of high importance; hence the dictum: “Good teacher, good books, good method.” Locke, on the other hand, had in view the perfect bringing up of an individual; consequently, a good home with a good tutor was naturally esteemed above everything else. The advantage of group education lies, according to him, in that it will make a boy “bolder, and better able to bustle and shift among boys of his own age; and the emulation of school-fellows often puts life and industry into young lads” (7: p. 46). And the main disadvantage of home education lies in that it makes a youth more ignorant of the world; “wanting there change of company, and being used constantly to the same faces, he will, when he comes abroad, be a sheepish or conceited creature” (7: p. 46). But these shortcomings can be remedied by providing him good company at home and by later traveling. As for the inculcation of virtues and manners, home is decidedly the better place.

“The difference is great between two or three pupils in the same house, and three or four score boys lodged up and down; for let the master’s industry and skill be never so great, it is impossible he should have fifty or a hundred scholars under his eye any longer than they are in the school together; nor can it be expected that he should instruct them successfully in anything but their books; the forming of their minds and manners requiring a constant attention, and particular application to every single boy, which is impossible in a numerous flock, and would be wholly in vain, (could he have time to study and correct every one’s particular defects and wrong inclinations) when the lad was to be left to himself, or the prevailing infection of his fellows, the greatest part of the four and twenty hours”.

“What qualities are ordinarily to be got from such a troop of play-fellows as schools usually assemble together from parents of all kinds, that a father should so much covet, is hard to divine” (7: pp. 48-49).

Thus we see that while Comenius pointed to an ideal school and preached its gospel, Locke, by showing us the defects of the school, persuades us to flee into his idealized home. The actual condition of the average home and the increasing need of modern society makes the school indispensable, in spite of its imperfections as an educational institution. Nevertheless, it is well for us always to keep our eyes open to the defects and dangers of mass education.

REFERENCES

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9. ---- An Essay on the Human Understanding. 3 vols. M. Tegg, London, 1832.

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