Chapter XVI: Anglo-Afghan Relations

Under instructions addressed to Lieutenant-General Sir Donald Stewart, commanding the forces in Northern and Eastern Afghanistan, by the Marquess of Ripon as Viceroy of India, Sir Lepel Griffin on July 20, 1880, communicated the following promise in the course of a letter to Abdur Rahman on his recognition as Amir of Afghanistan by the Afghan Sirdars at Kabul in 1880.

... If any Power should attempt to interfere in
Afghanistan, and if such interference should lead to
unprovoked aggression on the dominions of your Highness,
in that event the British Government would be prepared to
aid you to such extent and in such manner as may appear to
the British Government necessary in repelling it, provided
that your Highness follows unreservedly the advice of the
British Government in regard to your external relations....

In the first years of his reign Abdur Rahman certainly complied with the conditions stipulated by Sir Lepel Griffin, the correctness of his general conduct prompting Lord Ripon nearly three years later, June 16, 1883, in the course of a letter to write:

... Impressed by these considerations, I have determined to
offer to your Highness personally ... a subsidy of 12 lakhs
of rupees a year, payable monthly, to be devoted to the
payment of your troops and to the other measures required
for the defence of your north-western frontier....

In the following year, 1884, the gradual advance of Russia across Central Asia gave rise to apprehensions about the position of Afghanistan. Merv had been annexed in February of this year, when, after repeated inquiries on the part of Great Britain, it was arranged that an Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission should meet in October at Sarakhs, which had just been occupied. The course of events did not improve with this decision since, although Sir Peter Lumsden was despatched to the rendezvous, the Russian commissioner evaded a meeting. Fears for the situation of Afghanistan were not set aside by the seizure of Pul-i-Khatun in the very month--October 1884--for which the Sarakhs meeting had been originally convened, and the existence of very evident preparations for a further forward movement. The legitimacy of these proceedings was debated between St. Petersburg and London, Kabul and Calcutta, but, in spite of all pledges, the Russians in February of 1885 took possession of Zulfikar and Akrobat. Meanwhile in India plans for a full state Durbar at Rawal Pindi on April 8, in honour of T.R.H. the Duke and Duchess of Connaught, were in hand. The presence of the Amir of Afghanistan had been invited by the Viceroy, between whom and Abdur Rahman a conference upon the defence and demarcation of the north-western frontier, the strengthening of Herat, and the extension of the Sakkur-Sibi Railway to Quetta had been settled. While Anglo-Russian friction on the Afghan border did not prevent Abdur Rahman from paying homage to the august pair, the occasion was seized upon by the Russians to engage the Afghans at Tash Kepri on March 30, 1885, when more than 1200 of the Amir’s soldiers were ruthlessly butchered. The next day Abdur Rahman arrived in India, meeting with a magnificent reception. At an interview with Lord Dufferin the Amir, instancing the seizure of Pendjeh, complained that his predictions about the intentions of the Russians had been ignored. The Viceroy, in reply, informed him that any further aggression by Russia against Afghanistan would be considered by England as a _casus belli_, declared that preparations for war had been begun--orders for the mobilisation of two army corps had indeed been issued--and offered the services of engineer officers. At a subsequent audience on April 5, 1885, these fair words were confirmed by a gift of ten lakhs of rupees, 20,000 breech-loading rifles, a heavy battery of four guns, a mountain battery of six guns and two howitzers, besides very liberal rifle and artillery supplies. These presents were guarantees of the benevolence, sincerity, and goodwill of the Government of India; and three days later Abdur Rahman, expressing his appreciation, said, in his speech before the Viceroy:

... In return for this kindness and favour, I am ready
with my arms and people to render any services that
may be required of me or of the Afghan nation. As the
British Government has declared that it will assist me in
repelling any foreign enemy, so it is right and proper that
Afghanistan should unite in the firmest manner and stand
side by side with the British Government....

No doubt so keen a humourist as Abdur Rahman proved himself realised the grim jest which the action of the Russians at Pendjeh had instilled into the Viceroy’s formal confirmation of the pledges existing between India and Afghanistan. Such things are, however, among the unrecorded facts of life. Perhaps, too, it is to be deplored that, in later years, relations between Russia and Great Britain in respect of Afghanistan have been curiously productive of these little ironies.

Proceedings in connection with the Russo-Afghan Boundary question dragged on through 1886 until, after being transferred to St. Petersburg and London, and again returning to the scene itself, they were concluded in the winter of 1887. Difficulties between Russia and India, on behalf of Afghanistan, were for the moment at an end, when, in 1888, the Marquess of Dufferin gave place to the Marquess of Lansdowne as Viceroy of India. With the newcomer an active frontier policy was inaugurated. In quiet furtherance of this the Quetta railway, which in January 1888 had been carried to Kila Abdulla, was continued through the Khwaja Amran beyond Old Chaman to New Chaman. The Amir of Afghanistan professed to regard this extension as a violation of the Treaty of Gandamak which placed the Afghan-Baluch boundary at the foot of the Khwaja Amran--an undesirable site for a railway terminus. This undertaking was the forerunner of much military activity, and twice in this year expeditions took the field against the Hazaras of the Black Mountain. These ventures introduced a disturbing element into conditions prevailing upon the frontier and had an inflammatory effect upon Afghan opinion. At the moment, 1889, the Amir was on service in Afghan-Turkestan superintending certain defensive measures along the northern and north-western frontier, but by the summer of 1890 he had returned to Kabul. In the spring of this year the turbulence of the Khidarzais in the Zhob valley had been suppressed, the increasing energy of the Government of India bringing the danger of a rupture of relations between India and Afghanistan appreciably closer. In view of the position of affairs, the Government of India refused to permit the passage of war materials into Afghanistan, stopping not only the rifles, artillery and ammunition, but also all imports of iron, steel and copper. To this action the Amir replied by repudiating the subsidy of twelve lakhs which had been granted by Lord Ripon. At the same time he wrote a letter to Lord Salisbury, who was then Prime Minister, and, as a more practical measure and a protest against our occupation of New Chaman, he prohibited his people from using the railway from the terminus at the northern foot-hills of the Khwaja Amran to the first station on the south side of the tunnel through the mountains.

In the following year, 1891, columns twice moved against the Orakzai clans in the Miranzai valley, the operations against the Hazaras were repeated for the second time, and hostilities, resulting in the subjugation of Hunza and Nagar and the occupation of Chitral, broke out. The troops of the Amir were also on active service in 1891, occupying the Asmar valley in December under the Sipah Salar Ghulam Haidar Khan, a proceeding aimed in a measure at the Government of India, who were contemplating similar action. In 1892 troops again were sent across the frontier, moving against the Isazai clan in the Trans-Indus Isazai territory. The entire frontier was now in a restless state; and, as the tension between Kabul and Calcutta had increased steadily, it seemed desirable that the Amir should be given an opportunity to declare his intentions. Lord Lansdowne thereupon invited Abdur Rahman to visit India; and, when the Amir refused on the plea of the disturbed condition of his country, the Viceroy suggested that a meeting should take place on the Indo-Afghan frontier. Again the Amir of Afghanistan demurred; when, since hostilities appeared inevitable and preparations for war were in progress, the proposal that a British mission should visit Kabul, which Abdur Rahman had first addressed to Lord Ripon and repeated to Lord Dufferin in 1887, was taken up. Abdur Rahman was informed that a military mission under the personal direction of Lord Roberts, the Commander-in-Chief in India, and escorted by a brigade of British troops, would visit Jelalabad. Lord Roberts had been the active exponent of the forward policy since Lord Lansdowne had assumed vice-regal office. The long series of military operations in the frontier region, which had resulted from his energetic direction of affairs, made his selection for a peaceful mission obnoxious to the Amir, who naturally also appreciated the objections of the people of Afghanistan to receive a visit from the hero of the 1878-80 war. Moreover, the situation in Afghanistan itself, at the time when this ultimatum was despatched to Kabul, was menaced with the danger of widespread rebellion. The Hazaras had led the revolt against the Amir and disaffection was manifested even in the capital. Abdur Rahman’s natural adroitness never stood him in better stead than at this period. Returning a polite and very diplomatic reply to the notification to the Government of India, he stated that he was sending to the Viceroy his own personal representative. After a little interval, Mr. (now Sir Salter) Pyne was entrusted with letters for the Viceroy and the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, Mr. (now Sir Mortimer) Durand. By travelling slowly and acting with studied deliberation Mr. Pyne achieved his employer’s object, which was to procrastinate until Lord Roberts, then on the eve of his return to England, had left India. By these means war was undoubtedly averted, misunderstandings abridged, and the way paved by Mr. Pyne for the visit of the Durand Mission, the Amir’s envoy stipulating for an unescorted civil mission.

At this time questions in dispute with Afghanistan were not alone occupied with the vexed areas in occupation by the independent tribes along the north-western frontier of India. The Russians had raised again the Agreement of 1873, by which the northern boundary of Afghanistan was defined by the course of the Oxus, and were pressing for its literal fulfilment. Since the conflict at Pendjeh and the Boundary Commission of 1884-87, Russia had turned her attention to the Pamirs where, hitherto, China and Afghanistan had been solely concerned. Fort Pamir, a frontier post, had been erected by Captain Yonoff on the Sarez Pamir in 1891; the brutal massacre of sixteen Afghan soldiers under Shams-ud-Din Khan by the same officer had occurred at Somatash on the Alichur Pamir, June 22, 1892; and in the month before the arrival of the Durand Mission there had been a further Russo-Afghan encounter on the Badakshan border. These disorders were, perhaps, inseparable from a situation in which the rights of the case were so violently opposed to the policy, interests and intentions of Russia. Insistence upon the justice of the Afghan claim without supporting force would have been futile. The Amir’s invitation therefore offered opportunity for settling not only the very serious problem of the tribes on the north-western frontier of India, but, equally, the question of jurisdiction on the Pamirs.

The Durand Mission left Peshawar on September 19, 1893, accompanied by

_Envoy._ _Political Assistants._ _Medical._ _Military._

Mr. Mortimer Captain MacMahon. Major Fenn. Colonel Ellis.
Durand. Captain Manners Smith.
Mr. Clarke.
Mr. Donald.

The usual honours were paid upon arrival in Kabul. The Mission was met by General Ghulam Haidar Khan, lodged in the Indikki Palace, the residence of Habib Ullah Khan, and presented with a _ziafat_ of 33,895 Kabuli rupees. After preliminary conferences, in pursuance of instructions from Lord Lansdowne, Mr. Mortimer Durand on November 11, 1893, addressed to Abdur Rahman the following letter:

When your Highness came to the throne of Afghanistan, Sir
Lepel Griffin was instructed to give you the assurance
that if any foreign Power should attempt to interfere
in Afghanistan and if such interference should lead to
unprovoked aggression on the dominions of your Highness, in
that event the British Government would be prepared to aid
you to such extent and in such manner as might appear to
the British Government necessary in repelling it, provided
that your Highness followed unreservedly the advice of the
British Government in regard to your external relations. I
have the honour to inform your Highness that this assurance
remains in force, and that it is applicable with regard
to any territory which may come into your possession in
consequence of the Agreement which you have made with me
to-day in the matter of the Oxus frontier. It is the desire
of the British Government that such portion of the Northern
frontier of Afghanistan as has not yet been marked out
should now be clearly defined. When this has been done,
the whole of your Highness’s frontier towards the side of
Russia will be equally free from doubt and equally secure.

And upon November 12, 1893, Abdur Rahman’s acceptance of the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1873 was confirmed by a note signed by himself and the British envoy.

Whereas the British Government have represented to his
Highness the Amir that the Russian Government presses for
the literal fulfilment of the Agreement of 1873 between
Russia and England, by which it was decided that the River
Oxus should form the Northern boundary of Afghanistan from
Lake Victoria (Wood’s Lake) or Sarikul on the East to the
junction of the Kokcha with the Oxus, and whereas the
British Government considers itself bound to abide by the
terms of this Agreement, if the Russian Government equally
abides by them, his Highness Amir Abdur Rahman Khan,
G.C.S.I., Amir of Afghanistan and its Dependencies, willing
to show his friendship to the British Government and his
readiness to accept their advice in matters affecting his
relations with foreign Powers, hereby agrees that he will
evacuate all the Districts held by him to the north of
this portion of the Oxus on the clear understanding that
all the Districts lying to the South of this portion of
the Oxus, and not now in his possession, be handed over to
him in exchange. And Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, K.C.I.E.,
C.S.I., Foreign Secretary to the Government of India,
hereby declares on the part of the British Government that
the transfer to his Highness the Amir of the said Districts
lying to the South of the Oxus being an essential part of
this transaction, he undertakes that arrangements will be
made with the Russian Government to carry out the transfer
of the said lands to the North and South of the Oxus.

By this Note the matter of the Afghan position on the Pamirs was referred to the Anglo-Russian Pamirs Commission of 1895-96. That tribunal settled the question by dispossessing the Amir in favour of the Tsar. In the interval which elapsed between November 1893 and the assembly of the Commission, a fresh skirmish took place at Yaims in 1894, when an Afghan post was wiped out by Cossacks.

The disposal of the difficulties between Russia and Afghanistan was preliminary to the real work of the Durand Mission. This task, the adjustment of the many grievances set in train by the forward movement, was based upon many important and substantial concessions, the existence of which caused high hopes of the ultimate success of the Mission to be entertained. The assurance of assistance in case of unprovoked aggression given in 1880, and repeated in 1885, was confirmed, the subsidy of twelve lakhs increased to eighteen lakhs, and the right to import munitions of war admitted. Further, this additional engagement, entered as Clause II. of the Durand Agreement, November 12, 1893, was contracted:

The Government of India will at no time exercise
interference in the territories lying ... on the side of
Afghanistan, and His Highness the Amir will at no time
exercise interference in the territories lying ... on the
side of India.

Two days after the conclusion of its labours, November 14, the Mission left Kabul, sharing upon its arrival in India in that prodigal distribution of honours which occasionally reveals but a faint relation between cause and effect. Included in these favours was Mr. Pyne, whose services undoubtedly had constituted him a beneficent factor in the course of the negotiations. This gentleman was knighted, a similar distinction falling to the chief of the Mission. Time, however, has disclosed the Durand Agreement itself to be merely pretentious and possessed of very indifferent qualities.

Apart from the developments of the frontier policy under Lord Roberts, the evacuation of the Ningrahar valley after the Afghan War of 1878-80 contributed very largely to the unsatisfactory situation in which we at this time were placed. Had this position, together with Jelalabad, been retained, we should have cut off the retreat of the Afridis, Orakzais, Mohmands, Swatis and others into Afghan territory. Under existing circumstances these tribes can make good their escape into Afghanistan, even receiving assistance from that country when hard pressed. At the period of the Durand Mission the Government of India laid claim to the entire region--Bulund Khel, Mohmandstan, Asmar and Yaghistan, the latter embracing Chitral, Bajaur, Swat, Buner, Dir, Chilas and Waziristan. The Amir put forward a demand for Chageh, the Asmar valley, which he previously had occupied, and objected to the British pretensions. In point of fact, the rights of the Government of India had been already established by conquest and by moral superiority, since this zone, the home of border ruffians, had always required the watchful initiative of a strong Government. The British position was, therefore, incontestable. Moreover, since we were prepared to increase the subsidy of the Amir as a salve for the extinction of his interest in the Chitral region, there was no need to recede from any point. In regard to matters diplomatic, occasion should have been taken to provide, by a special clause in the treaty, for some proportion of these additional lakhs being devoted by their recipient to the task of assisting our own military authorities to draw the fangs of the more turbulent frontier elements. This precaution was ignored nor was it deemed necessary to allot to the Mission the services of a survey officer. Ultimately, after long discussion, the negotiations concluded, when it was revealed that at needless sacrifice the Asmar valley, commanding the approach to the Pamir-Chitral region and south-eastern Afghanistan and of great importance to strategic considerations on the Indian frontier, had been surrendered to the Amir, the Birmal tract, separated from Waziristan, and an ethnic absurdity perpetrated where the Mohmands country had been divided by the watershed of the Kunar and Panj-kora rivers. Such a process of vivisection, intolerable to a tribe who, although involved in constant dissension among themselves, were a united people, was at once resented.

In a letter, addressed to the Viceroy of India before the Durand Mission had set out for Kabul, Abdur Rahman had warned the Government of the consequence of interfering with the border tribes. He wrote:

As to these frontier tribes known by the name of Yaghistan,
if they were included in my dominions I should be able to
make them fight against any enemy of England and myself,
by the name of a religious war, under the flag of their
co-religious Muslim ruler (myself). And these people being
brave warriors and staunch Mahommedans would make a very
strong force to fight against any power which might invade
India or Afghanistan. I will gradually make them peaceful
subjects and good friends of Great Britain. But if you
should cut them out of my dominions they will neither be
of any use to you nor to me; you will always be engaged in
fighting or other trouble with them, and they will always
go on plundering. As long as your Government is strong
and in peace, you will be able to keep them quiet by a
strong hand, but if at any time a foreign enemy appear on
the borders of India, these frontier tribes will be your
worst enemies. You must remember that they are like a weak
enemy who can be held under the feet of a strong enemy,
as long as he is strong; and the moment he ceases to be
strong enough to hold him the weak one gets out of his
hold and attacks him in return. In your cutting away from
me these frontier tribes who are people of my nationality
and my religion, you will injure my prestige in the eyes
of my subjects, and will make me weak, and my weakness is
injurious for your Government.

Early in 1894 the Marquess of Lansdowne had been succeeded by the Earl of Elgin, Lord Rosebery had become Prime Minister, and Abdur Rahman had been invited to England, the invitation being endorsed by Sir Henry Fowler. Regarding the Durand legacy as a bequest to be fulfilled and undeterred by the fact that frontier feeling was still highly excited over the Mission to Kabul, the Government of India proceeded to appoint various boundary commissions. One, destined for the Afghan-Waziristan border with orders to assemble on October 1, at Dera Ismail Khan, included Messrs. King, Anderson, Grant and Bruce with an escort of 3000 soldiers and six guns. Another, meeting on December 3, at Lundi Khana and intended for the Mohmand-Bajaur-Asmar boundary, comprised

_Political Commissioners._ _Medical._ _Survey._
Mr. R. Udny. Surgeon-Captain Colonel Holdich, R.E.
Mr. C. Hastings. McNabb. Lieut. Coldstream, R.E.

This action on the part of the Government of India attracted the attention of the Amir who summoned the Sipah Salar to Kabul from Jelalabad for a conference upon the subject. Rumours had already indicated Abdur Rahman’s opposition to the Mohmand demarcation and storm clouds were gathering over the Kunar valley when, on June 12, the Commissioner of Peshawar, Mr. Richard Udny, chief of the future boundary commission, issued the following indiscreet proclamation:

PROCLAMATION.

_From_ Mr. R. UDNY, _Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar
Division_

To all Bajauri, Mohmand, and other tribes inhabiting the
country towards the Indian Empire, from the Kabul river to
the southern limit of Chitral, from the boundary line now
agreed upon between the British Government and the Amir of
Afghanistan.

(1) Whereas certain questions were raised regarding the
boundary between Afghanistan and India, and as H.H.
the Amir, as well as the Indian Government, desired to
have these questions disposed of in an amicable and
friendly manner, so that for the future there may not be
a difference of opinion and thought regarding the above
matter between these two kingdoms, who have treaties and
engagements between themselves. The Government of Great
Britain, with the consent of H.H. the Amir of Afghanistan,
during the month of September 1893--Rabbi-al-awal 1311
H., sent a Mission consisting of a few officers under the
leadership of Sir Mortimer Durand to Kabul. And by the
Mercy of God Almighty the two Governments in a friendly
manner concluded an agreement, on November 12, 1893--2
Jamadi-al-awal 1311 H., regarding the limits of the country
of H.H. the Amir towards India, for hundreds of (krohs)
miles from Wakhan on the north to Persia on the south.

(2) In this agreement it was decided between the two
Governments, already bound by agreements and engagements,
that the Indian Government will never interfere at any time
in the countries lying on that side of the line in the
direction of Afghanistan, and that his Highness also will
cause no interference at any time in the countries that
may be lying outside the boundary line in the direction of
India.

(3) With the object of demarcating this long boundary
with facility and celerity, it was agreed upon by the two
kingdoms, already bound by treaties and engagements, to
divide this boundary line into certain parts, and each part
of this line should be marked where it is found necessary
by the British and Afghan Commissioners.

(4) Therefore I send this proclamation to you, that I have
been appointed Commissioner by the Government of India to
demarcate that portion of the boundary which pertains to
the tribes noted at the beginning of this proclamation. In
this condition of affairs I shall probably start shortly
towards Afghan limits for Asmar, and being joined at
this place by a Commissioner appointed by H.H. the Amir,
demarcate the boundaries of Afghanistan from Chanak towards
the Kabul river. I shall then, I hope, be able to point
out the boundary on the spot. Until this is done it is not
an easy matter for me to explain the exact features of the
boundary. But at present a brief sketch of the boundary
will be understood by you from the following details:

(5) Whereas the kingdom of Great Britain has agreed that
H.H. the Amir should retain in his possession the country
of Asmar on the north to Chanak situated on the Kunar
river, or the river of Kashkar, the boundary demarcation
will commence from Chanak in a south-westerly direction up
to Kunar, and at a distance of a few English miles from
the bank of the Kunar river towards Bajaur. From Kunar
the boundary line goes southwards, and, taking a bend,
ascends the hills close to Satala Sar, which hills divide
the watershed between the Kunar and Panj-kora rivers. From
Satala Sar the boundary line passes over the crest of the
hill, on one side of which the waters flowing from the Dag
Hills fall into the Panj-kora river, whilst the waters on
the other side passing through the Satala valley, fall into
the Kabul river. And in the centre of this hill lies the
Kotal of Satala. The extreme end of the boundary touches
the Kabul river in the vicinity of Polosi.

(6) From a review of the above details you will understand
that in addition to the countries watered by the Kunar
river which lie towards the limits of the Indian dominions,
H.H. the Amir has agreed not to interfere in all that
country the eastern waters of which fall into the Panj-kora
river; nor to interfere or stretch his hand in that quarter
of the Mohmand country the waters of which fall into the
Kabul river below Polosi.

(7) On this account your future concerns and relationship
will lie solely with the British Government and no one
else, and I have a hope that by degrees there will be the
same bonds of friendship between you on the one part, and
myself and the frontier officers of the British Government
on the other part, which has existed between the said
officers and other tribes who reside outside the limits of
the boundaries of the Peshawar District.

(8) The last request is that you should firmly believe,
and on this point I will give you every assurance and
satisfaction, that the Government of India has no intention
of going beyond these limits, which form the present
boundaries of the Indian Empire, and that it has no desire
to mix itself in any way with the affairs of your country.
Written on the 7th of Zu’l-hijjah 1311 H.--A.D. June 12,
1894.

Since nothing whatever had been decided about the Mohmand line, the publication of such a rescript was a most improper and provocative proceeding. The Amir was offended, while the Sipah Salar retaliated by destroying all copies of the proclamation that found their way across the border. No doubt, too, it was a sense of lingering irritation which a little later caused Abdur Rahman to repudiate the Durand Agreement, where it concerned the Mohmand-Bajaur region. Ghulam Haidar made the views of the Amir quite clear at a meeting with Mr. R. Udny and Surgeon-Captain McNabb on August 12, in Jelalabad. The Sipah Salar there rejected entirely the proposed division of the Mohmands, claiming, in place of the Panj-kora-Kunar line, to exercise jurisdiction over them down to the Peshawar valley. Similarly, the Afghan Commander-in-Chief refused to secede an inch of Kafiristan. Troubles also followed in the wake of the Bruce mission. Breaking camp on October 1, and marching _viâ_ the Gomul valley into Southern Waziristan, the laager at Wano was attacked by the Waziris on November 3, with such success that an expedition under Sir William Lockhart was immediately sent against them. In the end the boundary, from the Gomul in the south to the Tochi and the Kurram in the north, was settled, the solution of the Mohmand _impasse_ on April 9, 1895, being due solely to the fact that detailed for duty on the Mohmand-Bajaur section was the most distinguished survey officer of his day--Colonel (now Sir Thomas) Holdich. In no wise rebuffed by the remarkable deficiencies of the Durand Agreement nor the discrepancies of the Udny manifesto, this officer contrived through clever adaptation of available geographical data to evolve something of a border line, although no part of the boundary defined south of the Hindu Kush bore any relation to the frontier laid down by Durand or Udny.

Events in the Mohmand country were not confined to the excitement emanating from the proposed delimitation of the hinterland. During the last five years an Afghan freebooter from Jandol, Umra Khan, had made bold bids for supremacy alternately against the Khan of Jandol and the Mir of Dir, uniting with the one against the other as his interests dictated and opportunity served. Success attended him when, in an attempt to occupy part of the Kunar valley, upon which Abdur Rahman had already cast eyes, he was badly defeated by Ghulam Haidar. In due course he recovered and re-establishing his rule over Dir and Nawagai, he contracted an alliance with Shir Afzal, lately Mehtar of Chitral. At the moment this man was a fugitive; and, as such, a cat’s-paw of the Amir of Afghanistan from whose custody he had been permitted to escape, since Abdur Rahman was proposing to step into his shoes if any conspicuous result attended Umra Khan’s operations in Chitral. Moreover, Ghulam Haidar and Umra Khan had come to terms upon a basis which furnished the Afghan king-maker with supplies, volunteers and ammunition. If the nature of the agreement between Abdur Rahman and Shir Afzal were never entirely disclosed, the character of the understanding between the Sipah Salar of the Amir of Afghanistan and the progressive ruffian from Jandol was soon confirmed. As Ghulam Haidar watched over the welfare of the Udny party in the Lower Kunar valley, the situation shifted early in the New Year of 1895 from the Mohmand country to Chitral. Here the sudden appearance of Umra Khan at the head of a motley force on behalf of Shir Afzal had precipitated a dynastic war. While Umra Khan seized Kala Drosh in Lower Chitral proclaiming Shir Afzal, the British agent in Gilgit, Dr. (now Sir George) Robertson, advancing from that station threw himself into Chitral and set up a cadet of the reigning family as the rightful ruler. Umra Khan, supported by large numbers of well-armed Afghan infantry from the Sipah Salar’s camp at Asmar and plentifully supplied with Kabul breechloaders and ammunition, advanced against Dr. Robertson, inflicting upon him a crushing defeat. The effect of this disaster on British prestige was in a measure effaced by the pluck and determination of the Chitral garrison, before whom, on March 3, 1895, Umra Khan settled himself for a siege. His triumph was short lived, since on April 18, the investment was rudely disturbed by the arrival of Colonel Kelly with 650 men from Gilgit. By then, too, a larger force had taken the field, for General Sir Robert Low, at the head of 15,000 soldiers with 30,000 transport animals and 10,000 followers, had embarked upon a campaign in the Swat-Bajaur-Chitral country.

Through the accidence of these events matters had come to an absolute dead-lock in the Mohmand-Bajaur-Asmar region. The Udny commission had been withdrawn with only a part of its work accomplished, the chief receiving the honour of knighthood for his services. Elsewhere, too, the situation was unsatisfactory. The border tribes, alarmed at the prospect of enforced demarcation, their fears accentuated by the establishment of military posts at Wano, in the Tochi and Kurram valleys, on the Malakand--the key to Swat--at Chakdara where the Panj-kora had been bridged, and on the Samana ridge, trembled for their independence. Moreover the presence of these survey parties was constantly used for the purpose of exploiting tribal sentiment by Ghulam Haidar, who would not have acted as he did without very definite instructions and very acute knowledge of the Amir’s sympathies. Abdur Rahman was thus engaging in a double game. Exercising a potent inimical authority over events in the Chitral crisis, as that affair waned he was at pains to show his amiability towards Great Britain. In April 1895, almost simultaneously with the raising of the Chitral siege, Nasr Ullah left Kabul on his visit to England. He arrived in London in May, leaving for Kabul in the following August, the recipient of a G.C.M.G. and the bearer of a similar honour to his brother Habib Ullah. The real purport of the Mission, to secure authority to open direct relations between Kabul and the India Office as well as with the Viceroy and to establish official representation in London, failed. The Amir of Afghanistan professed to find a slight in the curt refusal of the Imperial Government to accede to his requests, and was in high dudgeon. Nevertheless, there was nothing remarkable in this rejection of the Amir’s petition. Sir Henry Fowler, however, committed a blunder in sanctioning an invitation which led merely to the ventilation of grievances and paved the way for those preposterous claims to independent sovereignty which distinguished the later years of Abdur Rahman’s rule, and, since his demise, have ranked among the many pretensions of Habib Ullah.

By the autumn of 1895 the Chitral imbroglio had been straightened, and the remaining months of the year were occupied with the proceedings of the Pamir Boundary Commission and the doings of the Afghan army in Kafiristan. Here Abdur Rahman had embarked upon a brief campaign, which, after forty days of actual warfare, terminated in the spring of 1896. Aside from these operations, interest in the frontier situation was riveted upon the curious theological studies which Abdur Rahman had been pursuing in Kabul. Expectations were also raised by communications evidently passing between Ghulam Haidar and the principal border fanatics Said Akbar of the Aka Khels, the Sarlor Fakir--the Mad Mullah of the Swat--and the Hadda Mullah. After much labour and while the letters were in exchange, Abdur Rahman had composed a treatise, the Twakim-ud-din, expounding the merits of the _jehad_ or holy war, and the virtues of the _ghazi_. Satisfied with this work, at the close of 1895, he convened for the Nauroz festival, March 21, 1896, a great convocation of mullahs drawn from all parts of his dominions and the Indo-Afghan borderland as well, at which he dilated upon the essential principles of that doctrine which specially enjoins the extinction of the infidel. It was a dangerous way to secure his recognition as one of the supreme heads of Islam, and obviously antagonistic to the preservation of harmonious relations between the tribesmen and the Government of India. After much earnest exhortation the holy men were dismissed, comforted by many gifts and gracious words. Concerned at the action of the Amir and compelled to notice the conduct of Ghulam Haidar, the Viceroy of India (Earl of Elgin) on May 2, 1896, addressed to Abdur Rahman a remonstrance upon the unfriendly attitude of his frontier officials. The reply from Kabul is best illustrated by the action of some mullahs who had been summoned to the Nauroz festival. At the Id of Pilgrimage, May 25, the title Zia-ul-Millat wa ud-Din, the Light of the Nation and Religion, was offered to Abdur Rahman. When confirmation of this tribute had been received from the whole of Afghanistan the Amir adopted it at a special Durbar on August 24, at the same time appropriating to himself the further dignity of King of Islam.

Save for these occurrences in Kabul, a few riots in the Tochi valley in February, and the conclusion of the work of the Pamir Boundary Commission the year 1896 was undisturbed. Intrigues were afoot, however, and emissaries of the Mahommedan religion, in the shape of bigoted travelling fakirs, were “out” as the perfervid exponents of a Moslem crusade. Early in May 1897, Abdur Rahman received at Kabul with great state a Turkish visitor from Constantinople. A few hours later on the same day the Amir summoned all the mullahs of the city to a private audience. Meanwhile correspondence passed between the leading lights of the Moslem world on both sides of the frontier, and evidences of unrest and disaffection were increasing. With suspicions lulled by eighteen months’ comparative calm, or set at rest by the fact that the Chitral reliefs had been unmolested, the frontier political officers in the Tochi explored routes, made surveys and constructed roads in continuation of the protective works which were begun in the Tochi valley so soon as that area was occupied. The Tochi lies only a little north of Waziristan and so close to Wano that the Waziris were readily roused to avenge themselves by the mullahs when opportunity offered. It came--with the visit of Mr. Gee, the political officer in Tochi, to Maizar, June 10, 1897, when a treacherous attack was made upon the party and 72 casualties inflicted. In spite of the extreme heat of this month retaliatory measures were at once put into execution, General Corrie Bird taking the field with 7000 soldiers, 10,000 transport animals and 3000 followers.

The mullahs were now actively extolling the cause of the _jehad_ to their disciples when the persistent efforts of the Hadda Mullah to excite Mahommedan fanaticism in Swat, Bajaur and Dir were unexpectedly furthered by the appearance in Swat of the Mad Mullah. The companion of the Hadda Mullah in his recent stay in Kabul, he had come direct from the Afghan capital, declaring everywhere that a holy war had been proclaimed. Under the enthusiasm inspired by the eloquence of this restless spirit, the Mad Fakir’s progress through Swat was in the nature of a triumph. Thana had declared itself for him, when on July 26, the fury of the storm broke over Malakand and Chakdara. By August 1, a field force of two brigades under Major-General Sir Bindon Blood arrived at Malakand, where the opposing tribesmen numbered 20,000 men. Meanwhile, the apostles of the movement looked to Kabul for their orders. Letters and proclamations, purporting to describe the Amir’s interest in it, were issued; and, as the tribes rallied to his call, Hadda Mullah, relying upon the kindly offices of Ghulam Haidar and emulating the example of the Mad Fakir, led on August 7, an attack against the British frontier post at Shabkaddar. Unfortunately for Indo-Afghan relations the muster for this affair contained, besides several thousand Mohmands, a large proportion of Afghans from the Kunar valley, the Khugiani country, the Laughman and Jelalabad districts, the Basawal and Hazarnao villages, and soldiers in plain clothes from the Kabul garrison. It was no longer possible for the Government of India to ignore the complicity of the Afghan frontier officials. So pronounced was their sympathy with the rising that Abdur Rahman addressed a _firman_ to the Sipah Salar, containing an expression of his grave displeasure at their misconduct.

Matters had gone too far to be adjusted by such means, and on August 13, 1897, Sir Richard Udny, instrumental with Brigadier-General (now Major-General Sir Edmond) Elles, who was commanding at Peshawar, in abandoning the Khyber Pass to the unsupported custody of Afridi militia, directed an emphatic remonstrance to the Amir of Afghanistan. His Highness was informed of the nature of the reports which had reached the Government of India, and was required to take immediate steps to recall his subjects and to prevent the repetition of so exceedingly grave an offence. After reminding the Amir that the Viceroy, in May 1896, had called his Highness’s attention to the unfriendly conduct of the Sipah Salar, the letter concluded as follows:

It is impossible that Afghan sepoys can have joined in
this attack without the knowledge of the Sipah Salar, and
the Viceroy is constrained to warn your Highness that, if
you do not control the Sipah Salar, or withdraw him from
his command on the frontier, your Highness must be held
responsible for his actions.

Abdur Rahman replied at once to the charges of the Government of India, returning a denial and reading the correspondence at a Kabul Durbar held on August 18, in commemoration of his assumption of the title Zia-ul-Millat wa ud-Din. Facts were a little too strong for much importance to be attached to this refutation; but the rebuke, which had now been administered, warned him, doubtless, that the limits of Government patience in his direction had been reached. Correspondence on the question became protracted, and the initial response from Kabul had barely been received when a further fillip was given to the fighting on the frontier. For several days, as early as August 16, warnings had been received that the Afridis were preparing to descend upon the Khyber. It was further stated that this area of operations would be increased by a simultaneous attack from the Orakzais against the Samana ridge in support of the Afridi movement. To its subsequent confusion the Indian Government at the time was relying upon reports from Sir Richard Udny, Commissioner of Peshawar, and Brigadier-General Elles, whose conception of the seriousness of the situation did not prompt him to employ in support of the posts in the Khyber any portion of the 10,000 men lying idle under his command. Equally with those of Sir Richard Udny, the exertions of General Elles upon this occasion were very disappointing.

On August 17, when no less a frontier personage than Malik Amin Khan reported that an Afridi _lasakar_ of 10,000 men accompanied by 1500 mullahs was preparing to descend upon the Khyber, Sir Richard Udny telegraphed to Simla:

I am watching events in Orakzai and Afridi country very
carefully from this side, and all my reports from reliable
sources say that up to date there is no serious or general
movement, either among Orakzais or Afridis....

Two days later, August 19, Brigadier-General Elles, telegraphing to Simla, stated that Sir Richard Udny had informed him that Malik Amin Khan’s information was much exaggerated, adding that Captain Barton, Commandant of the Khyber rifles, had reported the Afridi gathering to be smaller than originally imagined. On the next day, August 20, alarmed at the gravity of his position and advised by the officer commanding the Peshawar forces, Sir Richard Udny withdrew Captain Barton from his post at Lundi Kotal. After consultation with Colonel Aslam Khan and Brigadier-General Elles, on the same day in a telegram to the Punjab Government, he advocated, in spite of the objections of Colonel Aslam Khan to such a policy, the leaving of the defence of the Khyber positions to the unsupported activities of the native levies, in accordance with the terms of the Khyber Agreement of 1881 by which the Afridis were made responsible for the safety of the pass. In this singular point of view Brigadier-General Elles concurred, contenting himself, in spite of the condition of affairs with a faint-hearted and useless promenade in the direction of Jamrud. Meanwhile, with assistance withheld, disaster was deliberately invited. So it happened that, on August 23, when Sir Richard Udny, in a telegram to the Government of India, was again referring to the terms of the Khyber Agreement, the advancing wave of the Afridi tide actually broke against Ali Masjid. From early morning of this day Afridi met Afridi in a brief, bloody struggle round British supremacy in this border stronghold. True to their salt, the men who had been in charge of our posts held out against their own tribesmen until unsupported resistance was no longer possible. Fort Maude and Ali Masjid fell that same night, Lundi Kotal resisted valiantly until August 25, capitulating almost at the moment when the Orakzais were advancing to the attack against the Samana ridge. There the position was cleared by General Yeatman Biggs who, having reinforced the garrisons, dissipated his victory in an ignominious withdrawal harried by his enemy. Tactical blundering thus accomplished at this point what political irresolution had effected in respect of the Khyber.

In whatever degree the Amir of Afghanistan by his letter of August 18, may have exculpated himself from events preliminary to the Tirah campaign, the exodus of armed bands from Afghan territory continued to meet with only passive resistance from the frontier officials. Under pressure of accumulating evidence, forwarded direct from Kabul by the British agent, the Viceroy of India on August 30, 1897, addressed a further communication to Abdur Rahman, in the course of which he wrote:

... It is right that I should tell your Highness that
the information which I have received indicates that
tribesmen from your Highness’s territories have joined
the Mullah of Hadda, and have in other respects committed
aggression against the British Government. Bodies of men
from Jelalabad district crossed the Kabul river openly
with flags flying and drums beating. After the fight at
Shabkaddar they returned in the same manner, carrying
their dead and helping their wounded. On the side of Khost
numbers of camels stolen from my troops in Dawar have been
taken across the border, and it is even reported that
these camels have been ordered to be collected by Sirdar
Sherindil Khan. Your Highness will no doubt recognise the
propriety of directing the restoration of camels belonging
to the Government of India, which have been stolen and
carried into Afghan territory.

Your Highness has said that “tribesmen can never join such
a movement openly for fear of me. If any one has come he
must have gone secretly.” What I now ask your Highness, in
accordance with those assurances of friendship which you
have so readily made, is that you will publicly announce
to the tribesmen through your local officers that, if they
cross the border and join in disturbances against the
British Government, they will incur your displeasure. The
belief is entertained by many misguided persons that they
will not incur your Highness’s displeasure by acting in a
hostile manner against the British Government, and this
belief can be dispelled if your Highness’s local officers
will keep watch along the Kabul river and at other places
in order to prevent your Highness’s subjects from crossing
the frontier with hostile intentions, whether secretly or
openly. I ask your Highness, therefore, to issue orders to
this effect....

Before the Amir could reply to the letter of August 30 from the Viceroy, a deputation of Afridi elders, whose intentions certainly lent colour to the Viceroy’s plaint, arrived at Jelalabad _en route_ to Kabul for the purpose of presenting a petition to Abdur Rahman. This document, dated September 5, 1897, was as follows:

The British Government has been from olden times gradually
encroaching upon our country, and even upon Afghan
territory, and has erected forts at various points within
our borders. We have complained of this to the Afghan
Government on many occasions, but your Highness has paid
no attention to our complaints. Therefore, being helpless
and having regard to Islam and our constancy in religion,
we have now, under the guidance of God, opened the door of
_jehad_ in the face of the said Government, and we have
severed our connection with them in every way. We have
plundered and destroyed five forts on the Samana above
Hangu, one fort at Shinauri, at the foot of the Samana, in
British territory, one fort at the Ublan Pass, near Kohat,
etc., etc. There are, however, three big forts on the top
of the said mountain (the Samana) which have not been taken
yet. By the grace of God we will destroy and burn these
also. All the people of Tirah have taken up their position
on the top of the mountain (Samana); and at its base, from
Kohat to the Rud-i-Kurman in the district of Kurram the
frontier of the Orakzai runs, and the tribesmen have been
making _jehad_ from time to time within their respective
limits. We will never consent to tender our allegiance to
the British Government and become their subjects. We will
never give up the reins of authority of our country to the
hands of the Government. On the contrary we are willing to
tender our allegiance to the King of Islam. It is incumbent
on the Government of Islam not only to look after our
interests, and consider our position, but that of the whole
of Afghanistan. We therefore send these eighteen persons
from among our Maliks, Mullahs, and Elders, with our
petitions to your Highness’s presence. We are at present
engaged in a _jehad_ on the Samana range, and we request
that your Highness will be pleased to do what is for our
good and benefit; and, by the grace of God, we will act
up to your Highness’s instructions, because we leave the
conduct and management of our affairs in the hands of your
Highness in every respect. We have used our endeavours with
our tribesmen to do service to your Highness. This is the
time to gain the object of your Highness. All the Moslems
are now at the disposal of your Highness in the shape of
regular troops, artillery and money. If the British prove
victorious, they will ruin the Moslems. The services to be
done on this side may be left to us by your Highness. We
hope that after the perusal of our petition your Highness
will favour us with a reply. _Dated 7 Rabi-us-Sani_, 1315
(September 7, 1897).

This prayer of the Afridis had not reached Kabul, when a further letter, September 6, was sent to the Amir from the Government of India, anticipating Afghan assistance in catching the Hadda Mullah should he escape into the Kunar valley. Meanwhile, the aspect of the precise relations existing between Kabul and the revolting tribesmen, and disclosed by this deputation from the Afridi _jirga_ was not very much improved when, on September 10, Abdur Rahman, in acknowledging the letter of August 30, wrote:

... I have ordered the local officers to keep watch on
Afghan subjects to the best of their ability, and prevent
them from joining Mullah Hadda.... No tribesmen from my
territories can do such an act in an open manner. Some of
them, however, have great faith in Mullah Hadda, and it is
possible that they may have joined him during the night,
travelling like thieves by unfrequented roads. How is it
possible to keep watch on thieves during nights along
such an extensive frontier?... My kind friend, such an
arrangement could only be possible by posting about 10,000
soldiers on all the mountain tops and at all the fords in
that district. Then they will be able to execute properly
such an arrangement, otherwise how would it be possible to
stop the people who are familiar with the country? If the
well-known roads be guarded against them, they can owing to
their knowledge of the country find paths over mountains
and through desert tracts to cross the frontier. As far as
possible, however, the local officials have been watching
and will watch any open movements of the tribesmen.

As regards the dead and the wounded whom your Excellency
writes that the tribesmen carried away with them after
the fight at Shabkaddar, I beg to state that, if they
have brought back their dead secretly, they have already,
according to their custom, buried them, and now no trace
can be obtained of them. As to the wounded, if questions be
asked they explain that they are always engaged in tribal
feuds, with one another, and they often kill and wound
one another, and that the wounded men have received their
wounds in such tribal feuds; and, as the witnesses belong
to the people concerned, it is difficult to prove anything
contrary to what they allege....

As regards the camels which the Waziri thieves stole from
the troops in Dawar, and brought to Khost where they sold
them to the inhabitants, I have to state that Sirdar
Sherindil Khan has ordered the owners of the camels to keep
them safe. If your Excellency considers it necessary that
the camels should be taken back from them, then, as the
inhabitants of Khost have bought the camels from the Waziri
thieves, the price current in the country should be given
to them and the camels taken back, so that the people of
Khost may not suffer loss...!

The air of truculent triumph which pervaded this communication elicited no rebuke. Naturally enough a government, which made no effective preparation to protect the native guards of British posts in their hour of need, would hesitate to take exception at the twist of a Persian phrase. Two days later, September 12, the same strain of insolence, coupled with many amiable sentiments, could be detected in the reply to the Viceroy’s letter of September 6. With remarkable effrontery Abdur Rahman expressed the fear that collisions might occur in the Kunar valley between the Afghan and British forces, if the pursuit of Hadda Mullah were pushed too far in that direction.

Events, culminating with the fall of Saraghari fort on September 12, were making it incumbent to administer sharp punishment to the Afridis; and the Tirah field force, 60,000 strong, was concentrated at Kohat under Lieutenant-General Sir William Lockhart for this purpose. Concerned at the dislocation of border affairs, at the loss of revenue attendant upon the closing of the Khyber, and deriving an inspiration from the magnitude of the force which was collecting for service with General Lockhart, the Amir himself from this time became less obstructive, withdrawing his own troops from outlying posts, refusing to harbour armed fugitives and turning a very cold shoulder to those who invoked his aid. In consequence of this change of front he refused to permit the Afridi elders to come to Kabul, detaining them in Jelalabad while he posted in public in the capital on September 23, the following reply:

I have perused your petitions, all of which were with one
object. I now write to you in reply that it is eighteen
years since I came to Kabul, and you know yourselves that I
went to Rawal Pindi (in April 1885) by the Khyber route. In
consideration of my friendship with the British Government
I had gone to their country as their guest, and on my way I
found many of your tribesmen on both sides of the pass, who
made _salaams_ to me. If what you state now is true, why
did you not tell me at that time about the matter, so that
I might have conferred with H.E. the Viceroy about it? Some
years after this when the boundary was being laid down,
Sir Mortimer Durand passed through the Khyber and came to
Kabul. All the frontier tribesmen knew of this, and saw the
Mission with their own eyes. Why did not then your Mullahs,
and Maliks, and Elders come to me when Sir Mortimer Durand
came with authority to settle the boundary, so that I could
have discussed the matter with him? At that time you all
remained silent, and silence indicates consent. I do not
know on what account now a breach has taken place between
you and the English. But after you have fought with them,
and displeased them, you inform me.

I have entered into an alliance with the British Government
in regard to matters of State, and up to the present time
no breach of the agreement has occurred from the side of
the British, notwithstanding that they are Christians. We
are Moslems and followers of the religion of the Prophet,
and also of the four Kalifs of the Prophet. How can we
then commit a breach of an agreement? What do you say
about the verse in the Koran--Fulfil your promise; to
fulfil your promise is the first duty of a Moslem. God,
on the day when the first promise was taken, asked all
the creatures whether he was their God or not. They said,
“Yes, you are our God and our Creator.” Therefore, on the
day of the resurrection the first question will be about
the observance of agreements. Infidels and Moslems will
thus be distinguished by this test. You will thus see that
the matter of the agreement is of great importance. I will
never, without cause or occasion, swerve from an agreement,
because the English, up to the present time, have in no way
departed from the line of boundary laid down in the map
they have agreed upon with me. Then why should I do so? To
do so will be far from justice. I cannot, at the instance
of a few interested people, bring ignominy on myself and my
people.

What you have done with your own hands you must now carry
on your own backs. I have nothing to do with you. You are
the best judge of your affairs. Now that you have got into
trouble (literally, spoiled the matter) you want me to help
you. You have allowed the time when matters might have been
ameliorated to slip by. Now I cannot say or do anything. I
have sent back from Jelalabad the Maliks you had deputed
to me. I gave them each a _lungi_ and ten rupees for their
road expenses, and I did not trouble them to come to Kabul.

In spite of the Amir’s attitude towards the Afridi deputation on September 23, and his emphatic denial of the complicity of Ghulam Haidar in his letter to the Viceroy on August 18, evidence of Afghan participation was again unpleasantly prominent, negotiations for peace with certain of the tribal factions being complicated by the acts of the Afghan commander-in-chief. On one occasion, September 1, when the Hadda Mullah had been compelled to disperse an Afghan _lashkar_ by specific orders from the Amir, Ghulam Haidar had sent the fakir encouraging messages, a present of five British rifles, cartridges and a horse. Five weeks later Major Deane, political agent in the Dir-Swat-Chitral country, complained on October 8 that two mule-loads of ammunition sent by Umra Khan from Kabul had passed through Ghulam Haidar’s camp at Asmar; while a few days previously Sir Bindon Blood had reported from Panj-kora, September 28:

The _jirga_ told the native political assistant that the
Sipah Salar had encouraged them to attack the troops,
promising ammunition as well as compensation in kind for
any loss of grain....

Again, when the Mahmunds finally submitted, dreading Kabul reprisals for their surrender they begged to be protected from Abdur Rahman and Ghulam Haidar. Although these were merely the under-currents of the situation as it appeared at the outset of the Tirah campaign in 1897, by the close of those operations in 1898 tribesmen of all denominations of fanatical obstinacy were alluding to the encouragement which they had received from the Sipah Salar and Abdur Rahman. Over the singular propensity for blundering which distinguished the elect in these two years and the protracted misfortunes attending Anglo-Indian arms during the long series of minor wars which concluded with the Tirah, it is permissible at length to draw the veil. In any case, the Tirah, no less a stage in the course of Anglo-Afghan history than were the earlier occurrences, is of fading interest in this little survey; the trend of affairs passes, almost with relief, to consideration of the happier prospect which the advent of a new Viceroy, Lord Curzon of Kedleston, January 1899, inaugurated for India itself and of the more encouraging note introduced into Imperial relations with the spheres beyond its borders.