Chapter XXXIV: Book 2: , and reads (2)

After the settlement of the Sudeten crisis you had withdrawn completely from political life; is that true?

VON NEURATH: Yes. I was very rarely in Berlin. For the most part I was on my estate in Württemberg or in the mountains.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In September 1939, were you in Berlin, and did you have any knowledge of Hitler’s plans for an invasion of Czechoslovakia?

VON NEURATH: You mean in the late winter of 1939?

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In the late winter, yes.

VON NEURATH: No, I had kept aloof. The differences between Germany, Czechoslovakia...

THE PRESIDENT: September 1939?

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: That was my mistake. I meant in the late winter.

THE PRESIDENT: Of 1938, you mean?

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: 1939.

VON NEURATH: 1938-1939.

The differences between us and Czechoslovakia on the treatment of the Sudeten Germans by the Czechs had been solved by the separation of the Sudetenland. The way to friendly co-operation was paved. One of the focal points of danger for the peace of Europe had been eliminated.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Then there came the famous dispute between Hitler and the President of the Czechoslovakian Republic, Hacha, in the night of 14 to 15 March 1939 in Berlin. This conference has already been discussed here. I do not believe I need go into it in much detail. Anyhow you know of it.

I should like to ask you, did you know of these events as described, particularly as given in Document Number 2798-PS?

VON NEURATH: No, I did not know of them. I learned of them only much later. I only learned here of the notes of Herr Hewel, but after I learned of these events I disapproved strongly, and I would not have taken office as Reich Protector under any circumstances if I had known of these things at the time. I was completely surprised by the events in March 1939. I no longer received any foreign political information, as I have already said. I was dependent upon the radio and the newspapers. The preparation for attack on Czechoslovakia in 1938 I considered to have been eliminated after the Munich Agreement.

I learned of Hacha’s visit to Berlin, like every other German, by radio and newspapers the next morning. The official statement of the taking over of protection of the remainder of Czechoslovakia seemed not improbable to me after Slovakia had become independent, and after I learned that the Czech Foreign Minister, Chvalkovsky, in the course of the winter 1938-39 had said in Berlin that Czechoslovakia’s former policy must be completely changed and that closer connections would have to be sought with Germany. However, I was concerned about how the signatory powers of Munich would react to this development, which was in contravention of the agreement which had been reached in Munich. My first question to Hitler, when I went to Vienna at his request, was whether England and France had been informed beforehand and had given their approval. When he said no, that that was quite unnecessary, and that the Czech Government itself had asked us to take over the protection, I immediately realized how dangerous the situation was, and said so to Hitler.

However, at the time I still believed that it had, in fact, been a free decision of the Czech Government. Hitler’s request that I should take the post of Reich Protector was a complete surprise to me, the more so since I had discovered that he had very much taken amiss my spontaneous intervention in September 1938, which led to the Munich conference. I had misgivings about taking the office, which I also expressed to Hitler. I realized that an invasion of Czechoslovakia would, at the very least, strongly offend the signatory powers of the Munich Agreement, even if Hacha had asked for protection of his own accord, and it was also clear to me that any aggravation of the situation through bad treatment of the Czechs would bring about an immediate danger of war. The patience of England and France must surely be exhausted. I mentioned this to Hitler, too. Hitler’s answer was that that was precisely the reason why he was asking me to take over the post—to show that he did not wish to carry on a policy hostile to Czechoslovakia. I was generally known abroad as a peaceful and moderate man, and he would give me the most extensive powers to oppose all excesses, especially by the Sudeten German element. When I still hesitated and said that I did not know conditions in Czechoslovakia and that I was not an administrator, Hitler said that I should try it, that it could be changed at any time. He gave me two experienced men who knew the conditions. I did not realize at the time that the fact that the Police and the SS were not subordinate to any higher authority, already a practice then, would make it impossible for me to prevent the rule by force of Himmler and his agencies.

But I cannot refrain from pointing out that great responsibility for further developments lies with the other powers, especially the signatory powers of Munich. Instead of making protest on paper, I had expected that they would at least recall their ambassadors. Then, perhaps, the tension might have increased for the moment, but the German people would have realized how serious the situation was, and Hitler would have avoided taking further aggressive steps and the war could have been prevented.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: The charge is made that you took this office so that by misuse of your humane and diplomatic reputation the impression could be given to the world that the Czechs were to be treated moderately, while the contrary was to be the case. Will you comment briefly on this point?

VON NEURATH: That is absolutely wrong. Hitler said that I was to attempt to reconcile the Czechs to the new conditions and to keep from excesses the German population which was filled with hatred by the years of struggle over nationality and measures of suppression.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What assurances did Hitler give you with regard to your office?

VON NEURATH: He assured me that he would support me in every way and at all times in my work of settling the national conflicts justly and winning over the Czechs by a conciliatory and moderate policy. In particular, he would protect my administration from all attacks by political radicals, above all by the SS and Police and Sudeten Germans; I had pointed out this danger particularly.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Were you convinced at that time that, in making these assurances of humane treatment for the Czechs, Hitler was serious and honest?

VON NEURATH: Yes, I definitely had that impression.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Then you believed that he would abide by the assurances he gave you?

VON NEURATH: Yes.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: At that time did you know of any plans or even intention with regard to forcible Germanization of the Czechs?

VON NEURATH: No, that was completely unknown to me. I would have considered that such nonsense that I would not have believed that anyone could have such an idea.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you still believe that Hitler’s assurances and expressed intentions at that time were meant honestly, and that they were only made illusory through further developments?

VON NEURATH: Yes, they were certainly meant honestly at that time.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In this connection I should like to refer to a document in my Document Book 5, under Number 142, which contains an excerpt from Henderson’s _Failure of a Mission_. I should like to ask the Court to take judicial notice of that.

[_Turning to the defendant._] In connection with that period, the conclusion of the German-Slovakian Treaty of March 1939 concerning the independence of Slovakia is charged against you by the Prosecution.

Did you have anything at all to do with drawing up this treaty or with declaring Slovakia autonomous?

VON NEURATH: No. I learned of the declaration of autonomy for Slovakia and of all these events only after they had been made public.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What were the principles of your program for your administration in Prague?

VON NEURATH: It was quite clear to me that reconciliation of the Czech people with the newly created conditions could be brought about only gradually, by sparing their national feelings as far as possible, and without radical measures. Under more favorable circumstances that would have taken several generations. I therefore attempted a gradual adjustment and a diminishing of the previously hostile policies.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In this connection I should like to refer to Document 143 in my Document Book 5. This is a reproduction of an article which Herr Von Neurath published about the aims of his administration in Prague in the _Europäische Revue_ at the end of March 1939. I ask the Court to take judicial notice of this.

This article shows quite clearly with what intentions and with what tendencies Herr Von Neurath took up his office at that time. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it.

What were the conditions which you found in Prague when you took over your office in April?

VON NEURATH: The Czechs were generally disillusioned by the conduct of their former allies in the autumn of 1938. To a large extent they seemed ready to be loyal and to co-operate. However, the influence of anti-Czech and Sudeten-German circles, supported by Himmler and the SS, was considerable. This influence was personified especially in the Sudeten leader Karl Hermann Frank, who had been appointed my State Secretary at Himmler’s instigation. I had the greatest difficulty with him from the very beginning, because he favored a completely different policy toward the Czechs.

The office of the Reich Protector was still being built up. The head of the administration was an experienced administration official, State Secretary Von Burgsdorff, who was examined here. Under him were the various departments, which were built up directly by the Berlin ministries.

In the provincial administration German “Oberlandräte” were appointed as supervisory officers for each Czech district. They were appointed by the Reich Ministry of the Interior.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: To whom were the Police subordinate?

VON NEURATH: The police force was completely independent of my office. It was directly under the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police; that is to say, Himmler.

Himmler appointed my own State Secretary Frank as Higher SS and Police Chief, who thus had a double position. Under Frank, in turn, was the commander of the Security Police. All police measures were ordered by Frank or directly by Himmler and the Reich Security Main Office without a request for my approval, without my even having been informed previously. From this fact resulted most of the difficulties with which I constantly had to struggle in Prague.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: The treatment of the position of the Police in a Czechoslovakian report under Number USSR-60, which was submitted by the Prosecution, presents the matter in a somewhat different light. Do you adhere to the description which you have just given?

VON NEURATH: Yes, absolutely.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: You were informed of police measures only afterward, but were not asked for your approval beforehand?

VON NEURATH: Yes, and I was informed afterward only sporadically. I frequently learned only from the Czech Government, or through private persons, of incidents which I was not informed about by the Police even afterward; then I had to inquire of Frank.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I refer in this connection to the decree of 1 September 1939, which I have submitted verbatim as Number 149 in my Document Book 5, and I should like to point out the following: This order is divided into two completely separate sections. Part I concerns the building up of the administration of the Reich Protector; and Part II, completely separated therefrom, deals with the establishment of the German Security Police, which is directly under the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police. Already this external form of the order, this ostentatious separation of the two administrative branches, if I may express it in that way, proves that the Police and the police power were only under Himmler or under his Berlin authorities. This already emphasized the fact that the Reich Protector could exert no influence on them. This is the great tragedy of Herr Von Neurath’s activities as Reich Protector. Matters are automatically charged against him for which he never can and never did take the responsibility. The Prosecution refers particularly to Paragraph 13 in this order, which mentions administrative measures according to which the Reich Protector, and the Reichsführer SS in agreement with the former, can take administrative measures necessary for the maintenance of security and public order in the Protectorate even beyond the limits determined for this purpose.

What does this mean?

VON NEURATH: I do not know what this order means by “administrative measures.” It seems to me to be a very general order, presumably referring to the issuing of general instructions. At any rate, as long as I was in Prague, neither I nor the Reichsführer SS made any use of this power. Arrests were all made without informing me previously, on the basis of Paragraph 11 of the order which has just been read, and which does not in any way subordinate the Police in the Protectorate to me.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did Hitler not assure you, in Vienna, that you were to have full executive powers in the Protectorate, and that that would include the Police?

VON NEURATH: No; I have already mentioned that.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you attempt to change this situation and to obtain from Hitler control over the Police, or at least exert influence over the Police?

VON NEURATH: Yes. I repeatedly made representations to Hitler in connection with the recurring violations and excesses of the Police. He promised me repeatedly that he would investigate these circumstances, but nothing was changed. The influence of Himmler, who considered the Police throughout the Reich to be his own domain, was too powerful.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: The Czechoslovakian report on which the Indictment is based, in addition to the Police Chief, also holds the Reich Protector until September 1941—that is you— responsible for the terror acts of the Gestapo. On the basis of the statements which you have just made, do you assume such responsibility to any extent?

VON NEURATH: No. I must deny it very emphatically. I have already explained what the real circumstances were, that I had no influence whatever.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I should like to quote two or three sentences in this connection from Document 153 in my Document Book 5, which consist of minutes from the examination of former State Secretary Frank by the Czechoslovakian delegation on 30 May 1945. These minutes from Frank’s testimony say:

“Neither the Reich Protector nor I myself was responsible for
the actions of the Police. The highest responsibility was with
Heinrich Himmler as Chief of the German Police. The Gestapo
received its instructions directly from Berlin, either from
Hitler himself or from the Reich Security Main Office.”

By your presence in Prague could you actually do anything in practice to modify at least the worst measures inflicted by the Police or the Gestapo, or to minimize the most severe effects afterward? Will you please describe how you intervened and how you attempted to influence Frank in these matters?

VON NEURATH: I received continual requests from President Hacha, the Czech Government, and private persons. My office was for the most part busy working on these cases. I had every request presented to me personally, and in all cases in which intervention was at all justified, I had Frank or the commander of the Security Police report to me and tried to influence them in favor of releasing the arrested person. It was, however, an incessant struggle with Frank and the Police, although it was successful in many cases. In the course of time many hundreds of persons who had been arrested were released at my instigation. In addition many sentences were mitigated with respect to postal communication, sending of food, and so forth.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Soon after you took office did you not prevent the arrest and subjection to so-called atonement measures of the members of the families remaining in Prague of the Ministers Netschas and Feierabend, who had fled abroad?

VON NEURATH: Yes, that is right. Frank had ordered the arrest of the members of the families of these two ministers. When I learned about it I induced him to desist from taking this step.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, may I make a suggestion to break off now, because this section is finished and I come now to individual questions?

[_A recess was taken._]

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now, first of all, I should like to refer to individual police measures for which you have been held responsible to a greater or lesser degree by the Prosecution. Were there many arrests of Czechoslovak nationals already in the summer of 1939?

VON NEURATH: No; the activity of the Police in the summer of 1939 was slight, and I hoped that it would be possible to restrict these police measures increasingly.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: The Czechoslovakian Indictment, under USSR-60, in Appendix Number 6, Supplement 1, submits a proclamation which you, as Reich Protector, issued in August 1939, that is, just prior to the outbreak of the war. This is a proclamation which was to serve as a warning to the people of the Protectorate against acts of sabotage. I shall have this proclamation submitted to you at this point.

I should like you to comment on it. This appendix is attached to the Document USSR-60 as Appendix 1. The proclamation, which I have just had given to the defendant, reads as follows—if I may, with the permission of the Tribunal, read the most important part:

“1.) Each act of sabotage against the interests of the Greater
German Reich, against German administration in the Protectorate,
and against the German Wehrmacht will be prosecuted with
unrelenting harshness, and will be punished most severely.

“2.) By sabotage as described in Paragraph 1, is meant all
disturbances of the public and economic life, particularly the
damaging of essential installations such as railroads,
telephones, and so forth, lines of communication, waterworks,
electrical works, gas works, and factories, as well as the
hoarding of consumer goods, raising of prices, and the spreading
of rumors by word or in writing.

“3.) The population must observe all special directives of the
organs of the Reich working in the Protectorate such as have
been published or such as will be published in the future.
Refusal to obey or acting against any organs of the Reich will
be considered as sabotage and punished accordingly.
Responsibility for all acts of sabotage will be placed not only
on the person who is committing the act, but rather on the
entire Czechoslovakian population.

“I expect under all circumstances that the Czechoslovakian
population, through a loyal, peaceful, and quiet demeanor, will
prove themselves worthy of the autonomy which the Führer has
guaranteed to the countries of Bohemia and Moravia.”

Will you please comment on this?

VON NEURATH: I cannot imagine from what point of view the release of this public warning against sabotage can be used as the basis of an accusation against me. At this period of the greatest political tension, it was to be feared that radical elements would exploit the situation in order to commit acts of sabotage which could damage public services. In my opinion, this would not have been tolerated in any state at such a time without severe punishment. Through this warning we wanted to try to eliminate all incentives for committing acts of sabotage. Moreover, as far as I recall, this warning had the desired effect and practically no acts of sabotage actually took place. Besides, the threat of special punishment is not contained in this warning at all, but it refers only to provisions for severe punishment which already existed.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Shortly after the publication of this proclamation the war broke out. What was your attitude toward this war?

VON NEURATH: I considered this war the greatest piece of stupidity, for on the basis of my knowledge of British psychology and politics, I was convinced that England would keep her promise to Poland, and that therewith the war against England and France would also commence, in which the United States, with its tremendous production capacity, would stand behind these powers. That was clear to me from all the statements made by President Roosevelt before the beginning of the war. I also rejected and condemned the rather reckless beginning of this war because of my ethical convictions and my ideology.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: For what reasons did you remain in your office instead of resigning?

VON NEURATH: I told myself that during the war, on the one hand, the Czechs would try, if not to throw off German rule, at least to disturb, either openly or secretly, through uprisings, sabotage, _et cetera_, the military measures of the Armed Forces taken in the Protectorate and that on the other hand due to this the severest measures would be taken against the population on the part of Germany, which would cause the Police, above all the Gestapo, to proceed with all kinds of terrorist acts. Through my remaining in office I wanted to prevent both of these things, and I also wanted to prevent a harsher treatment of the Czech population by the policy of conciliation and compromise which I followed.

To lay down my office at a moment like that would have been desertion. But, on the other hand, I believed that in a war in which the existence of the German people was at stake I could not, as a German—which I am, with full devotion—refuse my services and my knowledge. After all, it was not a question of Hitler or the Nazi regime, but rather of my people and their existence.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Therefore, by remaining in office you did not wish to indicate your approval of this war, which was brought about by Hitler?

VON NEURATH: Never. For it was an accomplished fact, to which I had not contributed; and I told Hitler my attitude and my opinion about the insanity of the war quite clearly. But I would have considered myself a traitor to the German and Czech peoples if, in this hour of need, I had abandoned the difficult task which I had undertaken for the benefit and welfare of both peoples, as long as I could even in a restricted measure live up to my task. I do not believe that any decent person would have acted differently, for, above all, and beyond personal wishes, there is one’s duty to one’s own people.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: On the day of the outbreak of the war, in the Protectorate as well as everywhere in the Reich, so-called preventive measures were taken in the form of numerous arrests, involving at any rate more than a thousand persons, especially representatives of the intelligentsia insofar as they were considered politically unreliable.

Were you advised of these arrests in advance, as should have been done according to Paragraph 11 of the order of 1 September 1939, which has been quoted earlier?

VON NEURATH: No, not even afterward. I learned of these arrests through President Hacha.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What did you have done then?

VON NEURATH: First of all, I had Frank come to me and remonstrated with him. He said that he had not been informed either, and that this was a general police preventive measure.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Which came directly from Berlin?

VON NEURATH: Yes, which Himmler had ordered the Gestapo and SD to take.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you now try to have the people liberated who had been arrested, and who had for the most part been taken into the Reich?

VON NEURATH: Yes. I constantly exerted pressure on Frank, and on Himmler and Heydrich in Berlin, to that end.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And how successful were your efforts?

VON NEURATH: Hundreds of these people who had been arrested—whose names I had to get from the Czechs with great difficulty as the German Police refused to give me these names—were released in the course of time.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: On 28 October 1939 public demonstrations occurred in Prague for the first time on the occasion of the Czech Independence Day. On this occasion, some of the demonstrators and some policemen were either killed or injured; for the Police took rather strong measures against the people demonstrating.

Regarding these police measures before, during, and after this demonstration, did you have knowledge of them and did you endorse them?

VON NEURATH: At that time I was not in Prague, and only on 29 October did Frank inform me over the telephone about the unrest. The details I did not learn until I returned on 30 or 31 October. I told Frank that through his personal interference on the streets and through the use of the SS he had intensified the tumult instead of leaving the restoration of order to the Czech police.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Frank sent a report dealing with these cases of unrest to Berlin, which he mentioned when he was interrogated by the Czech delegation on 5 May 1945.

I have submitted an excerpt from the record of this interrogation which will be found in my Document Book 5 under Number 152. I should like to quote a few sentences from this report:

“This was the first time that the population demonstrated
publicly and that these slogans”—that were mentioned
earlier—“were heard in the open. This matter was therefore
taken seriously, and I personally reported to Berlin about all
incidents. I should like to say that I was an eyewitness to
these demonstrations and that I had the impression that they
were of a dangerous nature. In the report which I sent to Berlin
I stated specifically that these were the first demonstrations,
and that, therefore, special importance was to be attached to
them since they took place in the open street. I asked for
directives which I received immediately from the Führer’s
headquarters. These directives were sent from Berlin direct to
the Security Police and I received knowledge of their contents.
The entire program was carried through directly by the Police.”

Did you have knowledge of this report of Frank’s, and the measures which are mentioned therein, before it was sent off, or afterward?

VON NEURATH: No. This report was completely unknown to me until now in Nuremberg; but Frank always reported directly to Berlin. Apart from that, I was never of the opinion that this demonstration, which was carried on mostly by young people, should be considered especially important or that it should necessitate special police measures.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: At the funeral on 15 November of one of the students who was killed on 28 October there were fresh demonstrations in Prague, in the course of which numerous students were shot, others arrested, and the universities closed. What do you know about these incidents?

VON NEURATH: When this student, Opletal, who was injured in the fracas, died of his wounds, the Police, in order to prevent new demonstrations, prohibited the participation of students at the funeral, which was to take place on 15 November. Despite this, crowds collected, and when the Police attempted to disperse them, renewed demonstrations and shootings resulted. When this was reported to Hitler by Frank, Hitler was greatly enraged and called me, Frank, and the Military Plenipotentiary, General Friderici, to a conference to be held in Berlin. Hitler had also asked the Czech Minister, Chvalkovsky, the former Foreign Minister, to be present at this conference. Hitler was in a rage. I tried to calm him, but despite that he made serious charges against the Czech Minister and gave him instructions to tell the Czech Government that if such events should recur he would take the most severe measures against the people who were disturbing the peace and, furthermore, that he would hold the entire Czech Government liable. The language used by Hitler was quite uncontrolled and the proceeding was extremely distressing to us who were listening. After the Czech Minister had left, we stayed with Hitler for a few minutes longer. He asked me how long I would remain in Berlin and I told him 1 to 2 days. Then we were asked to dinner, but there was no further discussion about these incidents. Hitler asked State Secretary Frank to come back later. Hitler said no word about the shooting of the leaders of the demonstration or taking the students to concentration camps; neither did he mention the closing of the universities.

When, toward evening, I asked after the pilot of my airplane in order to give him instructions, I was told at the airport that he had flown back to Prague in my airplane together with Frank. The following day I returned to Prague by train and only then did I learn that Hitler had decreed the closing of all Czech universities for 3 years, the arrest of some 1,200 students and their transfer to a concentration camp, as well as the shooting of the ringleaders of the demonstration. At the same time a proclamation, which was signed with my name, was submitted to me in which these orders were announced which had been published in the press and had been posted publicly. I had Frank summoned immediately and challenged him with these unheard-of things which had taken place without my knowledge. He referred to a specific decree of Hitler’s. I had not even seen this proclamation. My name had been affixed to it illegally by Frank. Even as my deputy, he was not justified in doing this; but later, through an official in my office, I learned that Frank often misused my name in this way. If I had had any advance knowledge of these decrees of Hitler—and, of course, he had the opportunity to reach me by telephone in Berlin—I would naturally have objected to these decrees and at that time would have asked to resign.

Immediately I tried to have these students released. I tried with Hitler personally and tried going to Himmler, and gradually most of them were released, I believe more than 800 in all, the last of their number being released in the summer of 1941.

Shortly after this incident, when I was again present in Berlin, I complained bitterly to Hitler about his conduct toward me. He evaded an answer, as far as I recall, but he promised me that the students would be released very soon and that the Czech universities would be reopened after 1 year. Neither of these promises did he keep.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I should like to read to you the answer of Legation Counsellor Von Holleben, who at that time participated in the Protectorate Government, to Question 21 of his interrogatory of 18 May 1946. This interrogatory may be found under Number 158 in my Document