Chapter VI: Part 6

THE PRESIDENT: No doubt you will comment upon them in your final speech. You say that they are mostly documents which have already been put in, and therefore it would not be necessary to make any preliminary comment upon them. You will be able to deal with them in your final speech.

DR. SEIDL: But I should have liked to quote a few passages during my submission of evidence, since this is necessary to establish the connection, and as it would be impossible to do all that during my final speech; but I do not think that too much time will be lost through that.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Dr. Seidl, it would not be very useful to the Tribunal for you to make a commentary upon the documents at a later stage, when your witnesses have been finished and somebody else’s—some other defendant’s—witnesses have been interpolated; therefore, the Tribunal thinks it will be much better and much more convenient to the Tribunal if you defer your comments on the documents until your final speech.

Well, Dr. Seidl, as I understand, you have two books which are before us now. Three is it?

DR. SEIDL: There is a total of five books. The other three do not appear to have been bound.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but you say that most of the documents in them are documents which are already in evidence.

DR. SEIDL: The diary of the Defendant Dr. Frank, which contains 42 volumes, has been submitted, but the Prosecution has used only those parts which appeared favorable for them. In my opinion it is, therefore, necessary that the connections should to some extent be re-established during the submission of evidence. Also, there are other documents in the document book which I believe should be read, at least in extract, before this Tribunal, but I shall, of course, limit myself to the absolutely necessary passages when I read the documents. I should like to suggest to the Tribunal that the matter be handled as it was in the case of the Defendant Von Ribbentrop, so that I submit the individual documents to the Tribunal as exhibits. There are several speeches by the Defendant Frank, there are decrees and legal regulations, there are two affidavits, and I really think that somehow an opinion with regard to them should be given during the submission of evidence; and, besides, individual documents will have to be given exhibit numbers. Up to now only one document has been submitted as evidence on behalf of the Defendant Frank, and that is the affidavit of the witness Dr. Bühler; but I have the intention of bringing a whole series of further documents formally to the notice of the Tribunal and would like to postpone that only because the Tribunal has not yet received the bound document books.

THE PRESIDENT: When will these other books be ready, Dr. Seidl?

DR. SEIDL: I was told that they would be completed by this evening.

THE PRESIDENT: How long do you think you will take in dealing with these books?

DR. SEIDL: I think that two hours will be enough.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal will adjourn now.

[_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, the Tribunal would like you to deal with your documents now, and insofar as they are documents which have already been put in evidence, unless you wish to refer to other passages in them, they think that you need only tell us what the documents are and put them in evidence, unless it is very important to you to refer to any particular document. So far as they are new documents, you will, no doubt, offer them in evidence and make such short comments as you think necessary. But the Tribunal hopes that you will be able to finish this afternoon. With reference to the other books that you have, we understand that you have all the documents in German yourself, and therefore you can refer us to those documents now.

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, upon the wish of the Prosecution and also, I believe, of the Tribunal, I have reduced the original bulk of my document books considerably. The first five document books, as I had had them prepared, contained more than eight hundred pages. The new form is considerably shorter; but I have not received the German text of the new form, so that I am not in a position just now to give the number of pages to the Tribunal or to co-ordinate my page numbers with the numbered pages of the translations. If I may express a wish, it is that we should first wait until the five document books in their new form are available, because otherwise it is very likely that the numbering of the pages would not correspond to the numbering of the individual documents as exactly as might be desired.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks it best that you should begin now with the first three volumes. We have them here.

DR. SEIDL: If the Tribunal has the first three volumes, then I will begin. I begin with Volume I. The first document on Page 1 is the decree of the Führer and Reich Chancellor, dated 12 October 1939, concerning the administration of the occupied Polish territories. This decree defines in detail the authority of the Governor General. In Paragraphs 5 and 6 some of the limitations to the authority of the Governor General are included, which the witnesses Dr. Lammers and Dr. Bühler have already pointed out. This document bears the number 2537-PS and it will be Exhibit Frank-2.

I pass to Page 3 of the document book. This document is the decree of the Führer concerning the establishment of a State Secretariat for Security in the Government General, dated 7 May 1942. I quote Paragraph 2:

“The State Secretary for Security serves at the same time as
deputy of the Reichsführer SS in his capacity as Reich
Commissioner for the Preservation of German Nationality.”

On Page 4 I quote Paragraph IV:

“The Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police is
authorized to give the State Secretary for Security direct
instructions in the province of security and the preservation of
German Nationality.”

This document will be Exhibit Frank-3 (Document Number Frank-3).

Following the decree of the Führer of 7 May 1942 comes the decree for the transfer of authority to the State Secretary for Security, of 23 June 1942. I do not know whether that decree is already bound in that volume. Apparently that decree, which was added later, has not yet been translated.

THE PRESIDENT: What is the date?

DR. SEIDL: 23 June 1942.

THE PRESIDENT: We have one of 27 May 1942.

DR. SEIDL: That decree apparently has not yet been translated because it was added afterwards, and I will put it in the document book later. It will be Document Frank-4. In Paragraph 1 of that decree, we find, “The jurisdictions of the administrative and creative branches of the Police referred to in appendices A and B are now transferred to the State Secretary for Security.” In Appendix 1 the spheres of authority of the Order Police are mentioned under 15 headings—no, I must correct that—26 headings; and in Appendix B the spheres of authority of the Order Police come under 21 headings.

I pass now to Document Book I, Page 5. That is the decree of the Führer concerning the appointment of officials and the termination of this status as officials in the sphere of the Government General, of 20 May 1942. I quote from the figure 3, Paragraph 2:

“The Governor General’s sphere of activity does not, in the
sense of this decree, include officials belonging to the
province of the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police
in the Reich Ministry of the Interior, or those belonging to the
Customs Frontier Service.” (Document Number Frank-4(e).)

I pass to Page 6 of the document book, the decree of the Führer and Reich Chancellor, for the Preservation of German Nationality, of 7 October 1939, which is already Exhibit USA-305 (Document Number 686-PS).

The next document is the letter from Reich Marshal Göring to the Chief of the Security Police and the SD, of July 1941.

MR. DODD: Mr. President, I suggest that an exhibit number be given as we go along so that we can follow better, and later on have some track of the exhibits as they go in. The last one and this one have not been given any exhibit number.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Francis Biddle, Member for the United States): The last one was Frank-5, was it not?

THE PRESIDENT: No. Frank-5 was the one of the 27th of May 1942.

MR. DODD: We did not know that; we did not get the number over the speaker. I am sorry.

THE PRESIDENT: It may not have been stated but I took it down as that myself. Will you take care to state each time, Dr. Seidl, what the exhibit number is that you are giving. You are dealing now with the letter of the 31st of July 1941.

DR. SEIDL: Yes. This letter has a USA number, namely, 509.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Wait a minute, perhaps I made a mistake. Yes, Mr. Dodd, I think I made a mistake. The reason why Dr. Seidl did not give a number was because it was already in evidence as USA-305. I made a mistake. It was not Frank-5. He only got to Frank-4. The next one is USA-509.

DR. SEIDL: 509 (Document Number 710-PS). I pass to Page 10 of the document book. That is an order, a directive rather, of the High Command of the Armed Forces concerning Case Barbarossa, USA-135 (Document Number 447-PS), and I quote Paragraph 2:

“It is not intended to declare East Prussia and the Government
General an operational area of the Army. On the other hand, on
the basis of the unpublished Führer decrees of 19 and 21 October
1939 the Commander-in-Chief of the Army is authorized to enact
measures that are necessary for the execution of his military
task and for the security of his troops.”

I pass to Page 11 of the document book, a directive for the execution of the Führer decree concerning the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor, of 27 March 1942. I quote Paragraph 4:

“The Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor will
have at his disposal for the performance of his tasks the
authority delegated to me by the Führer to issue instructions to
the highest Reich authorities, their subordinate offices, as
well as to the offices of the Party and its formations and
affiliated organizations; to the Reich Protector; to the
Governor General; to the military commanders and the chiefs of
the civil administrations.”

This document becomes Exhibit Number Frank-5 (Document Number Frank-5).

The next document is on Page 12—the decree by the Führer, concerning a Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor, of 21 March 1942, from which it can be seen that his authority to issue instructions included the Government General. It becomes Exhibit Number Frank-6 (Document Number Frank-6).

The document on Page 13 of the document book deals also with the authority of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor to issue instructions. It is already Exhibit USA-206 (Document Number 3352-PS).

The document on Page 15 is a letter from Professor Dr. Kubiowicz, Chairman of the Ukrainian Control Committee, to the Defendant Dr. Frank. It already has the Exhibit Number USA-178 (Document Number 1526-PS); and I will read only the first sentence from that document, in order to show what the relation was between the Defendant Dr. Frank and the author of that letter. I quote:

“Complying with your wish I send you this letter, in which I
should like to state the abuses and the painful incidents which
create an especially difficult position for the Ukrainian
population within the Government General.”

Then I pass on to Page 16 of the document book. That is an excerpt from Exhibit USA-275 (Document Number 1061-PS), namely, the report of SS Brigadeführer Stroop about the destruction of the Warsaw ghetto. I quote the second paragraph of Section II, from which it can be seen that the order came directly from the Reichsführer SS Himmler:

“When the Reichsführer SS visited Warsaw in January 1943, he
ordered the SS and Police Leader in the District of Warsaw to
transfer to Lublin the armament factories and other enterprises
of military importance which were installed within the ghetto,
including the workers and the machines.”

The affidavit which the Prosecution submitted during the cross-examination of the Defendant Kaltenbrunner should then really follow after Page 16 of the document book.

COLONEL Y. V. POKROVSKY (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): As far as I can gather, there has been some misunderstanding on this point. Under the number mentioned by Dr. Seidl in his document book there is no document referring to the Warsaw ghetto, but there is a document from the Chief of Police and SS in Galicia relating to the solution of the Jewish problem in Galicia. I should like this elucidated.

DR. SEIDL: The document on Page 16 is the report by the SS Brigadeführer Stroop which has already been submitted as Exhibit USA-275. The report by SS Führer Katzmann, which the Russian Prosecutor apparently means, concerning the solution of the Jewish question in Galicia, is on Page 17 of the document book, that is, on the next page. Apparently the insertion of Page 16 in the document book which was prepared for the Russian Prosecution was overlooked.

After that report by Brigadeführer Stroop, Exhibit USA-275 should be inserted as Page 16a, the affidavit by SS Brigadeführer Stroop which was submitted during the cross-examination of the Defendant Dr. Kaltenbrunner under Exhibit Number USA-804. That affidavit bears the Document Number 3841-PS. I could not include that affidavit in the document book because it was submitted by the Prosecution only after I had sent the document book to be translated.

As Page 16b another document should be put in which was also submitted during the cross-examination of Dr. Kaltenbrunner. That is the affidavit by Karl Kaleske. That affidavit bears the Exhibit Number USA-803, Document Number 3840-PS. That would be Page 16b of the document book.

Now I come to the report which the Soviet Prosecutor had in mind and which deals with the solution of the Jewish question in Galicia. It is on Page 17 of the document book. That measure has the Exhibit Number USA-277 and the Document Number L-18. I quote Pages 4 and 5, word for word:

“After it had been found in more and more cases that Jews had
succeeded in making themselves indispensable to their employers
by providing them with scarce goods, _et cetera_, it was
considered necessary to introduce really Draconic measures.”

I pass to Paragraph 2 and quote:

“As the administration was not in a position and showed itself
too weak to master this chaos, the SS and Police Leader simply
took over the whole question of the employment of Jewish labor.
The Jewish labor agencies, which were staffed by hundreds of
Jews, were dissolved. All employment certificates given by firms
or administrative offices were declared invalid, and cards given
Jews by the labor agencies were made valid again by being
stamped by the police offices.”

I pass to Page 19 of the document book. That deals with the letter of the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery to Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police Himmler, of 17 April 1943. That document is Number 2220-PS and Exhibit Number USA-175. I quote:

“In our conference of 27 March of this year we had agreed to
prepare written memoranda about conditions in the Government
General on which to base our intended report to the Führer.

“The material compiled for this purpose by SS Obergruppenführer
Krüger has already been submitted to you directly. On the basis
of this material I have had a report prepared which sums up the
most important points contained therein, subdivides them
clearly, and culminates in an explanation of the measures to be
taken.

“The report has been checked with SS Obergruppenführer Krüger
and has his complete concurrence. I am submitting a part of it
to you herewith.”—It is signed—“Dr. Lammers.”

I pass on to Page 20 of the document book and I quote:

“Secret. Concerning conditions in the Government General...

“The German administration in the Government General has to
accomplish the following tasks: 1) To increase agricultural
production for the purpose of securing food for the German
people and seize as much of it as possible, to allot sufficient
rations to the native population occupied with work essential to
the war effort, and to remove the rest for the Armed Forces and
the homeland.”

I leave out the following points and pass to the letter “B”, where Krüger or his assistant criticized the measures of the Governor General. I quote:

“German administration in the Government General has failed
grossly with respect to the tasks listed under “A”. Even if a
relatively high percentage, namely, over 90 percent, of the
delivery quota of agricultural products for the Armed Forces and
the homeland was successfully met in the year 1942 and if the
labor procurement requirements of the homeland were generally
satisfied, nevertheless, on the other hand, two things must be
made clear: First, these accomplishments were not achieved until
the year 1942. Before that, for example, only 40,000 tons of
bread grain had been delivered for the Wehrmacht. Secondly, and
above all, there was the omission to create for the attainment
of such performances those prerequisites of an organizational,
economic, and political character which are indispensable if
such performances are not to lead to a breakdown in the
situation as a whole, from which chaotic conditions in every
respect could eventually come about. This failure of the German
administration can be explained in the first place by the system
of the German administrative and governmental activity in the
Government General as embodied in the Governor General himself,
and secondly by the misguided principles of policy in all
questions decisive for conditions in the Government General.

“I) The spirit of the German administration in the Government
General.

“From the beginning it has been the endeavor of the Governor
General to make a state organization out of the Government
General which was to lead its own existence in complete
independence of the Reich.”

Then I pass to Page 22 of the report, Paragraph 3 and I quote:

“3) The treatment of the native population can only be led in
the right direction on the basis of clean and orderly
administrative and economic leadership. Only such a foundation
makes it possible to handle the native population firmly and if
necessary even severely, on the one hand; and, on the other
hand, to act generously with them and cause a certain amount of
satisfaction among the population by allowing certain liberties,
especially in the cultural field. Without such a foundation
severity strengthens the resistance movement, and meeting the
population halfway only undermines respect for the Germans. The
above-mentioned facts prove that this foundation is lacking.
Instead of trying to create this foundation, the Governor
General inaugurates a policy of encouraging the individual
cultural life of the Polish population, which in itself is
already overshooting the goal but which, under the existing
conditions and viewed in connection with our military situation
during the past winter, can only be interpreted as weakness, and
must achieve the opposite of the aim intended.

“4) The relationship between racial Germans and the
Polish-Ukrainian population in the Government General.

“The cases are numerous in which the German administration has
permitted the requirements of racial Germans in the Government
General to be put into the background in favor of the interests
of the Poles and Ruthenians, in its endeavor to win over the
latter. The opinion was advanced that racial Germans resettled
from somewhere else were not to be installed immediately as
settlers, but for the duration of the war were only to be
employed as farm workers. A legal foundation for the
expropriation of Polish property has not been created so far.
Bad treatment of racial Germans by their Polish employers was
not stopped. German citizens and racial German patients were
allowed to be treated in Polish hospitals by Polish physicians,
badly and at great expense. In German spas in the Government
General the sheltering of children of German citizenship from
territories threatened with bombing, and of veterans of
Stalingrad was hampered, while foreigners took convalescent
vacations there, and so on.

“The big plans for resettlement in the Lublin district for the
benefit of racial Germans could have been carried out with less
friction if the Reich Commissioner for the Preservation of
German Nationality had found the administration willing to
co-operate and assist in the proper manner.”

I pass to Page 24 and quote, under C:

“The administrative system, embodied in the Governor General
personally, and the material failure of the general German
administration in the most various fields of decisive importance
has not only shaken the confidence and the will to work of the
native population, but has also brought about the result that
the Poles, who have been socially divided and constantly
disunited throughout their history, have come together in a
united national body through their hostility to the Germans. In
a world of pretense, the real foundations are lacking on which
alone the achievements which the Reich requires from the
Government General, and the aims which it must see realized in
the latter, can be brought about and fulfilled in the long run.
The non-fulfillment of the tasks given to the general
administration—as happened, for example, in the field of the
Preservation of German Nationality—led to a condition which
made it necessary for other administrative bodies (the Reich
Commissioner for the Preservation of German Nationality...and
the Police) to take over these tasks.”

Now I pass to Page 27 of the document book. That is the repeatedly mentioned report by the Governor General to the Führer of 19 June 1943. The document is Number 437-PS, Exhibit USA-610. Of this document the Prosecution has so far quoted only Pages 10 and 11. These are the very points in this memorandum which the Governor General most severely criticized.

THE PRESIDENT: Are you speaking now of the report which begins on Page 20?

DR. SEIDL: I am speaking of the report which begins on Page 27. I have already finished the report which begins on Page 20.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, what number did you give to that on Page 20?

DR. SEIDL: The report on Page 20 is an integral part of the letter which begins on Page 19, and which already has the number USA-175.

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, I see, yes.

DR. SEIDL: Now I come to the document on Page 27. That is a memorandum which has already been mentioned by various witnesses and was submitted under Exhibit Number USA-610 (Document Number 437-PS) by the Prosecution. Of this report the Prosecution has only read Pages 10 and 11, which are Pages 36 and 37 of the document book, that is to say, only those passages in the report which were condemned as excesses of the Police, and against which excesses the Governor General complained to the Führer.

I do not intend to read the whole memorandum; but I will pass on to Page 27 of the report, which is Page 53 of the document book, and I quote under Section 2:

“The almost complete discontinuation of the possibilities for
participation in the cultural field has led, even among the
lowest classes of the Polish people, to considerable discontent.
The Polish middle and upper classes have a great need for
self-expression. Experience shows that the possibility of
cultural activity would at the same time mean a diversion from
the political questions of the day. German propaganda frequently
comes across the objection, on the part of the Poles, that the
restriction of cultural activity enforced by the German
authorities not only prevents a contrast being made with the
Bolshevist lack of culture, but also shows that Polish cultural
activity falls below the degree of culture allowed to Soviet
citizens...

“3. The closing of colleges, high schools, and secondary schools
is on the same level. Its well-considered purpose is without
doubt the lowering of the Polish educational standard. The
realization of this goal appears, from the point of view of the
necessities of war, not always beneficial to German interests.
As the war goes on the German interest increases in the
mobilization of able foreign replacements in the various fields
of knowledge. But more important than that is the fact that the
crippling of the school system and the severe hampering of
cultural activities foster the growth of a Polish national body,
led by the intelligentsia, to conspire against Germany. What was
not possible during the course of Polish national history, what
even the first years of German dominion could not bring about,
namely, the achievement of national unity in a common purpose to
hold together through thick and thin, now threatens to become a
reality, slowly but surely, because of the German measures.
German leadership cannot allow this process of unifying the
individual classes of the Polish population to pass unheeded in
the face of the growing power of resistance of the Poles. German
leadership should promote class distinction by certain cultural
concessions and should be able to play one class off against the
other.

“4. The recruiting of labor and the methods employed, even
though often exercised under the unavoidable pressure of
circumstances, have, with the aid of clever Bolshevist
agitation, evoked a strong feeling of hatred among all classes.
The workers thus obtained often come to work with firm resolve
to engage in positive resistance, even active sabotage.
Improvement of recruiting methods, together with the continued
effort to arrest the abuses still practiced in the treatment of
Polish workers in the Reich, and lastly, some provision, however
meager it may be, for the families left behind, would cause a
rise in morale, and the result would be an increased desire to
work and increased production in the German interest.

“5. When the German administration was set up at the beginning
of the war the Polish element was removed from all important
positions. The available German staff had always been inadequate
in quantity and quality. Besides, during the past year, a
considerable number of German personnel have had to be
transferred to meet the replacement needs of the armed forces.
Already an increased amount of non-German manpower has had to be
obtained compulsorily. An essential change in the treatment of
the Poles would enable the administration, while exercising all
necessary precaution, to induce a greater number of Poles to
collaborate. Without this the administration, in view of the
present amount of personnel—not to speak of future
transfers—cannot continue to function. The increased
participation of Poles would further help to raise the morale
itself.

“Besides the positive changes set down in these proposals, a
number of methods employed up till now in the treatment of Poles
should be changed or even completely abandoned, at least for the
duration of the fighting in Europe.

“1) I have already shown in special reports that confiscation
and evacuation of agricultural land have caused great and
irreparable damage to agricultural production. Not less great is
the damage to morale caused by such actions. Already the seizure
of a great part of the large Polish estates has understandably
embittered those affected by it, who naturally represent that
strata of the population which is always anti-Bolshevist. But,
because of their numerically small strength and their complete
isolation from the mass of the people, their opposition does not
count nearly as much as the attitude of the mass of the
population which consists mainly of small farmers. The
evacuation of Polish peasants from the defense zone, no doubt
necessary for military-political reasons, has already had an
unfavorable effect on the opinion and attitude of many farmers.
At any rate, this evacuation was kept within certain territorial
limits. It was carried out with careful preparation on the part
of the governmental offices with a view to avoiding unnecessary
hardship. The evacuation of Polish farmers from the Lublin
district, held to be necessary by the Reich Commissioner for the
Preservation of German Nationality, for the purpose of settling
racial Germans there, was much more serious. Moreover—as I have
already reported separately—the pace at which it was carried
out and the methods adopted caused immeasurable bitterness among
the populace. At short notice families were torn apart; those
able to work were sent to the Reich, while old people and
children were directed to evacuate Jewish ghettos. This happened
in the middle of the winter of 1942-43 and resulted in
considerable loss of life, especially among members of the last
mentioned group. The dispossession meant the complete
expropriation of the movable and immovable property of the
farmers. The entire population succumbed to the belief that
these deportations meant the beginning of a mass deportation of
the Poles from the region of the Government General. The general
impression was that the Poles would meet a fate similar to that
of the Jews. The evacuation from the Lublin District was a
welcome opportunity for communist agitation, with its own
peculiar skill, to poison the feeling in the entire Government
General, and even in the annexed Eastern territories, for a long
time. Thus it came about that considerable portions of the
population in the territories to be evacuated, but also in
territories not affected, fled into the woods and considerably
increased the strength of the guerrillas. The consequence was a
tremendous deterioration of the security situation. These
desperate people were incited by skillful agents to upset
agricultural and industrial production according to a definite
plan.

“2) One has only to mention the crime of Katyn for it to become
obvious that the safeguarding of personal security is an
absolute condition for winning over the Polish population to the
fight against Bolshevism. The lack of protection against
seemingly arbitrary arrests and executions makes good copy for
communist propaganda slogans. The shooting of women, children,
and old men in public, which took place again and again without
the knowledge and against the will of the government, must be
prevented in all circumstances. Naturally this does not apply to
the public executions of bandits and partisans. In cases of
collective punishments, which nearly always hit innocent persons
and are applied against people who are fundamentally politically
indifferent, the unfavorable psychological effect cannot
possibly be overestimated. Serious punitive measures and
executions should be carried out only after a trial based at
least upon the elementary conceptions of justice and accompanied
by publication of the sentence. Even if the court procedure is
carried on in the most simple, imperfect and improvised manner,
it serves to avoid or to lessen the unfavorable effect of a
punitive measure which the population considers purely
arbitrary, and disarms Bolshevist agitation which claims that
these German measures are only the prelude to future events.
Moreover, collective punishment, which by its nature is directed
primarily against the innocent, in the worst case against forced
or desperate persons, is not exactly looked upon as a sign of
strength of the ruling power, which the population expects to
strike at the terrorists themselves and thereby liberate them
from the insecurity which burdens them.”

I pass now to Page 37 of the report and quote under Section 3:

“Besides the most important prerequisites mentioned in 1) and 2)
to restore calm in the Government General, security of property
among non-agricultural people must also be guaranteed, insofar
as it is not counter to the urgent needs of war. Expropriation
or confiscation without compensation in the industrial sector,
in commerce and trade, and of other private property, should not
take place in any case if the owner or the custodian has not
committed an offense against the German authorities. If the
taking over of industrial enterprises, commercial concerns, or
real estate is necessary for reasons connected with the war, one
should proceed in every case in such a way as to avoid hardship
and under guarantee of appropriate compensation. Such a
procedure would on the one hand further the initiative of Polish
business men, and on the other hand avoid damage to the
interests of German war economy.

“4) In any attempt to influence the attitude of the Poles,
importance must be attached to the influence of the Catholic
Church which cannot be overestimated. I do not deny that the
Catholic Church has always been on the side of the leading
fighters for an independent national Poland. Numerous priests
also made their influence felt in this direction even after the
German occupation. Hundreds of arrests were carried out among
them. A number of priests were taken to concentration camps and
also shot. However, in order to win over the Polish population,
the Church must be given at least a legal status even though it
might not be possible to co-operate with it. It can without
doubt be won over to reinforce the struggle of the Polish people
against Bolshevism, especially today under the effect of the
crime of Katyn, for the Church would always oppose a Bolshevist
regime in the Vistula area, if only out of the instinct of
self-preservation. To achieve that end, however, it is necessary
to refrain in the future from all measures against its activity
and its property, insofar as they do not run directly counter to
war requirements.

“Much harm has been done even quite recently by the closing of
monasteries, charitable institutions, and church
establishments.”

THE PRESIDENT: I had thought that your extracts were going to be brief. But you have now read from Page 53 to Page 65.

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, this document is the only one of this kind which is available to me, and in view of the fact that the Prosecution has quoted in full only those passages which the Defendant Dr. Frank himself criticized most severely, I consider it my duty now to read a number of passages, to quote them, in order to give the entire picture correctly and to show what the Defendant Dr. Frank really intended to achieve with this document. I shall only quote a few more lines and then I will pass to another document.

THE PRESIDENT: I had hoped that one or two extracts from that document would show what the Defendant Frank was putting forward—one or two paragraphs.

DR. SEIDL: I will go on to the next document, Mr. President, that is on Page 68, the affidavit by the witness Dr. Bühler, which I presented to the witness today and which has been given the document number Frank-1; Page 68 in the document book.

On Page 70 there appears Exhibit USA-473 (Document Number L-49). If I remember correctly this document has already been read in full by the Prosecution, and I would like to ask the Court only to take judicial notice of that also in the defense of Dr. Frank.

On Page 72 of the document book is an affidavit of the former Kreishauptmann, Dr. Albrecht. To be exact I have to state that this is not really an affidavit in the true sense of the word. It is only a letter which Kreishauptmann Dr. Albrecht sent to me through the General Secretary of the Tribunal. I then returned the letter in order to have it sworn to by the witness, but I have to say that until now that sworn statement has not been returned, so that for the time being this exhibit would only have the material value of a letter. Therefore I ask the Tribunal to decide whether that document can be accepted by the Tribunal as an exhibit in the form of a letter.

THE PRESIDENT: I think the Tribunal did consider that matter before when your application was before it. They will accept the document for what it is worth. If you get the document in affidavit form you will no doubt put it in.

DR. SEIDL: Yes. That will be Document Number Frank-7. I forego the quoting of the first points and proceed directly to Page 74 of the document book and I quote under Section 4:

“Dr. Frank’s fight against the exploitation and neglect of the
Government General in favor of the Reich. Conflict with Berlin.

“The first meeting with Dr. Frank occurred shortly after the
establishment of the Government General in the autumn of 1939,
in the Polish district capital Radom, where the 10 Kreis chiefs
of this district had to report concerning the condition of the
population in their administrative district and the problem of
reconstructing, as quickly and effectively as possible, the
general as well as the administrative and economic life. What
struck one most was the keen awareness of Dr. Frank and his deep
concern about the area entrusted to him. This found expression
in the instructions not to consider or treat the Government
General or allow it to be treated, as an object of exploitation
or as a waste area, but rather to consider it as a center of
public order and an area of concentration at the back of the
fighting German front and at the gates of the German homeland,
forming a link between the two. Therefore the loyal native
inhabitants of this country should have claim to the full
protection of the German administration as citizens of the
Government General. To this end the constant efforts of all
authorities and economic agencies would be demanded by him, also
constant control through supervisors, which would be personally
superintended by him in periodical inspection trips with the
participation of the specialized central offices. In this way,
for instance, the two districts which were administered by me
were inspected by him personally three times in 4 years.

“In face of the demands of the Berlin central authorities, who
believed it possible to import more from the Government General
into the Reich than the former could afford, Dr. Frank asserted
vigorously the political independence of the Government General
as an ‘adjunct of the Reich’ and his own independence as being
directly subordinated only to the Supreme Head of the State, and
not to the Reich Government. He also instructed us on no account
to comply with demands which might come to us on the basis of
personal relations with the authorities by whom we were sent, or
with the ministries concerned; and if by so doing we came into
conflict with our loyalty to the Reich, which was equally
expected of us, to report to him about it. This firm attitude
brought Dr. Frank the displeasure of the Berlin government
circles, and the Government General was dubbed ‘Frankreich.’ A
campaign of calumny was initiated in the Reich against him and
against the entire administration of the Government General by
systematically generalizing and exaggerating regrettable
ineptitudes and human weaknesses of individuals, at the same
time attempting to belittle the actual constructive
achievements.”

I should like to ask the Tribunal merely to take official notice of Section 5, also Section 6, and I will only quote from Section 7.

“7) Dr. Frank as an opponent of acts of violence against the
native population, especially as an opponent of the SS.

“Besides the exploitation and the pauperization of the
Government General, the accusation of the enslaving of the
native population as well as deporting it to the Reich, and many
atrocities of various kinds which have appeared in the newspaper
reports on the Nuremberg War Crimes Trial, were interpreted as
serious evidence against Dr. Frank. As far as atrocities are
concerned, the guilt lies not with Dr. Frank but in some measure
with the numerous non-German agitators and provocateurs who,
with the growing pressure on the fighting German fronts,
increased their underground activity; but more especially with
the former State Secretary for Security in the Government
General, SS Obergruppenführer Krüger, and his agencies. My
observations in this respect are sketchy, because of the strict
secrecy of these offices.

“On the other hand, Dr. Frank went so far in meeting the Polish
population that this was frequently objected to by his German
compatriots. That he did the correct thing by his stand for the
just interests of the Polish population is proved, for example,
by the impressive fact that barely a year and a half after the
defeat of the Polish people in a campaign of 18 days, the
concentration of German army masses against Russia in the Polish
area took place without any disturbance worth mentioning, and
that the Eastern railroad was able, with Polish personnel, to
move the troop transports up to the most forward unloading
points without being delayed by acts of sabotage.”

I quote the last paragraph on Page 79:

“This humane attitude of Dr. Frank, which earned him respect and
sympathy among considerable groups of the native population,
led, on the other hand, to bitter conflicts with the SS, in
whose ranks Himmler’s statement, ‘They shall not love us, but
fear us,’ was applied as the guiding principle of their thoughts
and deeds.

“At times it came to a complete break. I still recall quite
clearly that during a government visit to the Carpathian areas
in the summer of 1943 in the district center of Stanislav, when
he took a walk alone with me and my wife in Zaremcze on the
Prut, Dr. Frank complained most bitterly about the arbitrary
acts of the SS, which quite frequently ran counter to the
political line taken by him. At that time he called the SS the
‘Black Plague’; and when he noticed our astonishment at hearing
such criticism coming from his lips, he pointed out that if, for
example, my wife were to be wrongfully arrested one day or night
by agencies of the Gestapo and disappear, never to be seen
again, without having been given the opportunity of defense in a
court trial, absolutely nothing could be done about it. Some
time afterwards he made a speech to the students in Heidelberg,
which attracted much attention and was loudly applauded, about
the necessity for the re-establishment of a German
constitutional state such as had always met the real needs of
the German people. When he wanted to repeat this speech in
Berlin, he is said to have been forbidden by the Führer and
Reich Chancellor, at Himmler’s instigation, to make speeches for
3 months, as reported to me by a reliable, but unfortunately
forgotten, source. The struggle against the methods of violence
used by the SS led to Dr. Frank’s having a nervous breakdown,
and he had to take a fairly long sick leave. As far as I can
remember this was in the winter of 1943-44.”

I ask the Court to take official notice of Section 8, and I pass on to Page 84 of the document book. That is an affidavit by SS Obergruppenführer Erich Von dem Bach-Zelewski, of 21 February 1946. This affidavit becomes Document Frank-8.

THE PRESIDENT: Did this witness not give evidence?

DR. SEIDL: The witness was questioned here by the Prosecution, and I made the motion at that time that either I be allowed to interrogate the witness again or be granted the use of an affidavit. On 8 March 1946 the Tribunal made the decision, if I remember correctly, that I could use an affidavit from that witness but that the Prosecution would be free if they desired to question the witness again.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

DR. SEIDL: I shall read the statements of the witness concerning this matter, and I quote:

“1) Owing to the infiltration of Russian partisan groups over
the line of the river Bug into the Government General in 1943,
Himmler declared the Government General to be a ‘guerrilla
warfare territory.’ Thus it became my duty as Chief of
Anti-Partisan Units to travel about the Government General to
collect information and get experience, and to submit reports
and suggestions for fighting the partisans.

“In the general information Himmler gave me, he called the
Governor General Dr. Frank a traitor to his country, who was
conspiring with the Poles and whom he would expose to the Führer
very shortly. I still remember two of the reproaches Himmler
made against Frank:

“a) At a lawyer’s meeting in the Old Reich territory Frank is
said to have stated that ‘he preferred a bad constitutional
state to the best conducted police state’; and

“b) During a speech to a Polish delegation Frank had disavowed
some of Himmler’s measures and had disparaged, in front of the
Poles, those charged with carrying them out, by calling them
‘militant personalities.’

“After having, on a circular tour, personally obtained
information on the spot about the situation in the Government
General, I visited the higher SS and Police Führer Krüger and
the Governor General, Dr. Frank, in Kraków.

“Krüger spoke very disapprovingly about Dr. Frank and blamed
Frank’s faltering and unstable policy towards the Poles for
conditions in the Government General. He called for harsher and
more ruthless measures and said that he would not rest until the
traitor Frank was overthrown. I had the impression, from
Krüger’s statements, that personal motives also influenced his
attitude, and that he himself would have liked to become
Governor General.

“After that I had a long discussion with Dr. Frank. I told him
of my impressions; and he went into lengthy details about a new
policy for Poland, which aimed at appeasing the Poles by means
of concessions. In agreement with my personal impressions Dr.
Frank considered the following factors responsible for the
crisis in the Government General:

“a) The ruthless resettlement action carried out now in the
midst of war, especially the senseless and purposeless
resettlement carried out by the SS and Police Führer Globocznik
in Lublin.

“b) The insufficient food quota allotted to the Governor
General.

“Dr. Frank called Krüger and Globocznik declared enemies of any
conciliatory policy, and said it was absolutely essential that
they should be recalled.

“Being convinced that if Dr. Frank failed, he would be succeeded
only by a more ruthless and uncompromising person, I promised
him my support. Having been assured of strictest secrecy I told
Frank I shared his opinion that Krüger and Globocznik would have
to disappear. He, Dr. Frank, knew however that Himmler hated him
and that he was urging Hitler to have him removed. With such a
state of affairs any request on Frank’s part to have Krüger and
Globocznik recalled would not only be rejected but would even
strengthen their position with Himmler. Frank should give me a
free hand, then I could promise him that both would be relieved
of their posts within a short time. Dr. Frank agreed to that,
and I then made use of the military mistakes that Krüger and
Globocznik had committed in order to bring about their recall by
Himmler.

“3) The Warsaw revolt of 1944...”

THE PRESIDENT: I must point out to you that you said you were going to be only 2 hours over five volumes. You have now been over an hour over one volume, and you are reading practically everything in these documents. It is not at all what the Tribunal has intended. You have been told that you may make short comments showing how the documents are connected with each other and how they are connected with all the evidence. That is not what you are doing at all.

DR. SEIDL: In that case I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of Paragraph 3 of the affidavit by Von dem Bach-Zelewski.

Paragraph 3 deals with the Warsaw revolt in the year 1944 and the question as to whether the Governor General had anything to do with the crushing of that revolt.

Then I pass on to Page 92.

THE PRESIDENT: As a matter of fact, does the Indictment charge anything in connection with the crushing of the Warsaw revolt in 1944?

DR. SEIDL: There is nothing in the Indictment itself about the part played by the Governor General in the crushing of that revolt. The Soviet Prosecution have, however, submitted a telegram which, while it is not clear whether it was sent, nevertheless connects the Defendant Dr. Frank in some way with the Warsaw revolt. But I shall not go into details about that now.

I pass on to Page 92 of the document book.

This is an affidavit by the witness Wilhelm Ernst von Palezieux, in whose case the Tribunal has approved an interrogatory. But I was told by the Tribunal that in place of an interrogatory I could submit an affidavit. I quote only the two main paragraphs as follows:

“The art treasures stored in the castle in Kraków, from the
spring of 1943, were under official and legal supervision there.
When speaking to me Dr. Frank always referred to these art
treasures as state property of thy Government General.
Catalogues of the existing art treasures had already been made
before I came to Poland. The list of the first selection had
been printed in book form as a catalogue with descriptions and
statements of origin, and had been ordered by the Governor
General.”

THE PRESIDENT: Now you are reading the affidavit all over again. We do not want that sort of...

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President. I assumed that in those cases where a witness does not appear before the Tribunal in person, it is admissible that either the interrogatory or the affidavit be read, because otherwise the contents of his testimony would not become part of the record nor, therefore, part of the proceedings.

THE PRESIDENT: That rule was in order that the defendants and their counsel should have the document before them in German; that is the reason for reading the documents through the earphones. The Tribunal will adjourn now, but I want to tell you that you must shorten your presentation of this documentary evidence. We have already been a good deal more than an hour over one book and we have four more books to deal with, and it does not do your case any good to read all these long passages because we have some more weeks of the trial. It is only necessary for you to give such connecting statements as make the documents intelligible, and to correlate them with the oral evidence that is being given.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 24 April 1946 at 1000 hours._]

ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTEENTH DAY
Wednesday, 24 April 1946

_Morning Session_

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl.

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, Gentlemen of the Tribunal: I left off yesterday at the last document of Volume I. It is the affidavit of the witness Ernst von Palezieux, and I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it. The affidavit is given the document number Frank-9, and that completes the first volume.

THE PRESIDENT: The first volume, what page?

DR. SEIDL: That was Page 92 of the first volume, Document Frank-9.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. That is the end of the first volume, isn’t it?

DR. SEIDL: Yes, that is the end of the first volume. Volumes II, III, and IV of the document book comprise extracts from the diary of the Defendant Dr. Frank. I do not propose to number all these extracts individually, but I ask the Tribunal to accept the whole diary as Document Frank-10 (Document 2233-PS), and I propose to quote only a few short extracts. For example Pages 1 to 27, Mr. President, are extracts from the diary which have already been submitted by the Prosecution. I have put the extracts submitted by the Prosecution into a more extensive context, and by quoting the entire passages I have attempted to prove that some of these extracts do not represent the true and essential content of the diary. Those are Exhibits USA-173, on Page 1 of the document book, USSR-223 on Page 3, USA-271 on Page 8, USA-611 on Page 11 of the document book. On Page 14 of the document book there appears to be a misprint. The USA number is not 016 but 613.

THE PRESIDENT: It begins on Page 13 in my copy, doesn’t it?

DR. SEIDL: No, it is on Page 14. It is an entry dated 25 January 1943.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, the document that I have and which I think you are referring to, is Document 2233 (aa)-PS, Exhibit USA-613. That is on Page 13. I don’t think it makes any difference.

DR. SEIDL: In that case it must be an error by the Translation Department. At any rate I do not think it is important, I mean this quotation.

I now turn to Page 20 of the document book, a quotation by the Soviet Prosecution. On Page 22 there is a quotation by the Soviet Prosecution. Page 24 of the document book contains quotations by the Prosecution of both the United States and of the Soviet Union. Exhibit USA-295. Perhaps I may point out that these extracts are only a few examples merely to show that in a number of cases the impression obtained is different if one reads either the entire speech or at least a portion of it.

I then turn to Page 32 of the document book, an entry dated 10 October 1939, in which the Defendant Dr. Frank gives instructions for negotiations with the Reich Food Ministry regarding the delivery of 5,000 tons of grain per week—Page 32 of the document book.

On Page 34 there is an entry of 8 March 1940, and I quote the first three lines. The Governor General states: