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Chapter XX: Section C: of my Appendix A, that the crimes of the SS were committed, (2)

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However, such a right is not given to the Prosecution in the Charter. It also stands in contradiction to the natural powers of the Tribunal of including in its decision an acquittal—a power which cannot be eliminated by reservation made by the Prosecution. The evidence material to be examined also cannot be limited through such a limitation as proposed, for the judgment delivered on the indicted organizations must include these organizations as a whole. It is not permissible to seize upon merely the unhealthy elements of groups during a period which was not typical and still declare the organization criminal.

That which is to be considered a group or an organization does not depend on the discretion of the Prosecution, as is also seen in Article 9, Paragraph 1, of the Charter, according to which the criminal character must stand in some relationship to the acts of one of the main defendants. This can only be understood to mean that the membership of the organization must be influenced by the actions of one of the major defendants at a given time. However, this is not for the Prosecution but for the Tribunal to decide.

Accordingly, I should like to answer Questions 2 and 3 as follows:

Question 2: A limiting of the incriminating period does not depend on a motion of the Prosecution. The Tribunal itself can and must limit the length of time, if the organizations or groups were not deserving of punishment throughout the whole period of their existence. If the actions of the main defendant, as a member of the organization, were not incriminating during the whole period of the existence of the organization, then such a limitation must follow.

Question 3: For the limiting of the groups of members the same applies as for the limiting of the period of time.

The Tribunal can, on the basis of its own powers, limit the effect that its verdict will have in the case of all groups and organizations. It must undertake this limitation, if the actions of the main defendant in his capacity as a member of the organization are not to incriminate certain groups of members. A limitation of the Indictment or of the effect of the verdict does not limit the evidence material which is the basis of the judgment.

These were the remarks I wanted to make in answer to the questions of the Tribunal. I should like now merely to take a stand on a question that has also been brought up today, namely, the application for a legal hearing, if the Tribunal permit me to discuss this question. According to Article 10 of the Charter, every member of an organization can be brought to trial, if the organization has been declared criminal. The decision is left up to the Tribunal. The essential task of the Tribunal is the hearing of the members. Without this hearing a sentence is not possible. That is the basic condition without which the proceedings cannot be carried out. So far, the Defense has about 50,000 applications from the millions of members. In order that the Tribunal should not draw the false conclusion that the overwhelming majority of those affected admit their guilt by remaining silent, I must emphasize that such guilt will be most passionately denied by all those affected.

I shall therefore go into the reasons why so few applications have been submitted, and I shall show that this is not the fault of those affected or the result of negligence. Not a lack of interest or disrespect of the Court but rather certain clear facts are responsible for this lack of response.

The announcement in the press and over the radio at the beginning of the proceedings regarding the right to be heard was made at a time when there were practically no newspapers in the destroyed cities and radios were a rarity.

In addition, because of the paper shortage, it was made in small print and for the most part was simply not understood. The Tribunal ordered an announcement to be made in the internment camps, where a great number of the people affected are concentrated. To what extent this announcement actually was made, I have not yet been able to determine. Mr. Justice Jackson showed various documents this morning and from them I shall be able to inform myself. The fact that so few applications have been made gives cause for concern. But even those people who have obtained knowledge of their right have apparently not been able as yet to make applications to the Court. At the time of the announcement there was no postal service between the various zones, and there are still no postal connections with Austria, where there are probably tens of thousands of men in custody.

In the announcement to the organizations, because of the lack of postal facilities, two additional ways were provided for submitting these applications. Both of them proved to be insufficient and are the main reason why we have so few applications. Those members who are not in custody were to submit their applications through the nearest military office.

I know of no case in which an application was made in this way. The attempt to use this procedure failed because of the lack of co-operation on the part of the offices. I could give an example of this.

The interned members were to submit their applications through the commanding officer of their camp. Only in the case of a few camps, weeks and months after the beginning of the Trial, were applications, which had been made in November, received, and even then only from some of the camps in the American and British zones and from a camp in the United States. From the Soviet, Polish, and French zones, as well as from Austria and other camps in foreign countries where there are camps, no applications have as yet been received, so far as I know. I shall leave it to the Tribunal to form its opinion of these facts.

The uniformity of the circumstances shows, however, that it cannot be the fault of the members of the organizations. Of the many difficulties I should like to give only one striking example, which will give an insight into the situation. In one camp about 4,000 members of various organizations asked in November 1945 to be permitted to make use of their right. A few days ago I was told in the camp by a guard officer that at that time no applications were permitted since those in custody, according to the rules of the camp, could not communicate with anyone outside the camp. An army order would have been necessary for transmissions of the applications, but there was no such order and present restrictions were strictly adhered to.

Another reason for the nonarrival of applications is the fact that those concerned feared certain disadvantages. There was the fear that the CIC would take action against the applicants because of their applications. This fear was inspired particularly by the fact that the announcement of the right to make applications was accompanied by the notice that the applicants would not be granted immunity of any kind. The effect of this is seen particularly in the case of those members not in custody, from whom only very few applications have been received, and these very often submitted anonymously or under false names.

It would be welcome if the Tribunal could inform the public that such fears are without foundation, and that the participation of all is sought so that a false decision can be avoided. Thereby the inadequacy of the present procedure for making applications would be remedied.

From all this it can be seen that the first stage of the making of applications has already shown itself to be so inadequate that the legal hearing is a mere illusion. But even those applications that have been received are, with a few exceptions, worthless, and for the following reasons: On the basis of the applications the Tribunal is to decide whether persons should be heard. But for practical purposes this can happen only if these applications state the reasons. Such reasons are either entirely lacking in the applications or they are useless. An application without contents or an application which contains in the main mere asseverations and figures of speech can form no basis for a decision.

Some of the applications do not even mention the official function of the member in the organization or his civilian profession. This faulty sort of application can obviously be traced back in the case of the men in custody to an order issued by the camp commander which permitted only collective or group applications or prescribed certain forms to be followed. All those affected, whether in custody or not, were not able to set out their reasons intelligently, because those accused know only that their organization is said to have been criminal, but they do not know in what this criminality consists. Insofar as detailed statements were made, in single cases, they are based on assumptions.

In order to relieve the situation, Defense Counsel have visited various camps known to them to clear up the matter and to get practical information. I shall not go into the difficulties which had to be overcome. I do not want to discuss the limitation placed on the length of time that we could stay in the camp and similar things; but I must mention that the visits to the camps have been without success insofar as I have not yet received the sworn affidavits and the other written statements of the members made subsequent to our visit, although I know that in one case they were handed over to the camp commander.

In these circumstances the fact is that today, 3 months after the beginning of the Trial, the technical basis for the procedure for hearing the members is not yet in existence. Defense Counsel for the large organizations are also hardly in a position to make up for this delay in a short period of time. On the other hand, the actual material is extremely comprehensive, as in the case of the political leaders, where there are about fifteen to twenty categories, such as the Workers’ Front, Propaganda Section, Organization Section, and so forth, which must be examined as to their functions and as to their criminal character. None of this can be neglected, and even the appearance of a less careful treatment must be avoided. I shall not discuss the difficulties which confront the Defense Counsel as a result of the fact that Defense Counsel now for the first time learn from the Prosecution of certain legal questions.

The members in custody are particularly interested that their case be decided quickly. Nevertheless, I am compelled by prevailing conditions to make a motion, namely, that the proceedings against the groups and organizations that are to be declared criminal be separated from the main trial and be carried out as a special subsequent trial. This motion is also compatible with the particular nature of the trial as I discussed it at the beginning of my remarks.

I should like to add to my motion a suggestion as to how the legal hearing might be made possible. This proposal of mine is occasioned by the proposal made this morning for carrying out the hearing by means of a “master,” that is, I assume, a legal officer of the Allied armies.

I cannot object too energetically to this suggestion. In my opinion, it is one of the main rights of a Defense Counsel to collect his own information, and it is the right of every defendant to speak with his counsel. It would be incomprehensible that the Allies, who are concerned with the prosecution, should at the same time work for the Defense. One cannot expect that an officer, despite any amount of objectivity, could be so objective in his feelings that he would give information to the defendant and have an understanding of the latter and his feelings.

My proposal is this: That each camp should have a German lawyer who receives his information from the main Defense Counsel and instructs the members interned in the camp and collects information. Then, in a relatively short period of time, a selection of material can be made by the Defense Counsel—a selection of the persons who can appear here as well as of the material that can be submitted of the latter and his feelings.

In the proposal made here this morning by the Prosecution I see an elimination of the Defense Counsel, and I should have to ponder a long while as to what stand I, on behalf of the Defense, would take to such a proposal.

DR. RUDOLF MERKEL (Counsel for the Gestapo): Regarding the general questions concerning the admissibility of declaring an organization criminal, the technical procedure for the submission of evidence, and the criminal character of the organizations in general, I refer to what my colleagues Dr. Kubuschok and Dr. Servatius have said. I have just a few additional statements to make.

Regarding the question of applications, I can say from my own experience that it has seemed strange to me, too, that the length of time between the formulation of applications in the individual camps and the arrival of these applications in the hands of the Defense is so extremely long.

To mention one example, a few days ago we received applications from a camp in Schleswig-Holstein, some of which were drawn up in November and December. I, myself, in order to get information, sent letters to the camps. I sent them 5, 6, and 7 weeks ago and I have so far received no answer.

In Camp Hersbruck, for example, I know that in November an application for a hearing, with reasons given in detail, is said to have been sent by members of the SS and Gestapo to the Defense Counsel—this has been confirmed to me by reliable sources. Neither the Defense Counsel of the SS nor I have received this application.

Very few applications have been received from members of the Gestapo. In my opinion one of the reasons is that the far greater number of internees doubtless do not know that they are being represented and defended in this Trial, for the announcement sent to the camps was made in November of last year. Defense Counsel for the organizations were not appointed until the decision of 17 December 1945. The correctness of my opinion can be seen conclusively, I believe, from the following: About three weeks ago in a German newspaper, the _Neue Zeitung_, an article appeared regarding this question of the organizations and in this article it states, word for word: “The organizations, as is, of course, well-known, are not represented in the Nuremberg Trial.” Thus, if not even the press knows of the fact that Defense Counsel for the organizations have been sitting here in the front row for months and have often spoken here from the lectern, what can one expect the individual internees, who are living in camps hermetically shut off from contact with the rest of the world, to know about the facts of the Defense? That is what has to be said on this point.

I, also, by the way take the point of view that the question whether the organizations in their entirety can be indicted here is an absolute _terra nova_ in the history of jurisprudence and that it is something which in its extent and its scope and in its effects shakes the very foundations of jurisprudence. In addition, as has been mentioned, organizations are to be judged which ceased to exist almost a year ago. In the criminal procedure of all civilized countries it is a basic condition that the defendant still be alive; proceedings cannot take place against a dead defendant.

According to Mr. Justice Jackson’s statements today, the organizations of the Gestapo and SS, for example, are to be held responsible for the liquidation of the Jews in the East; and it is pointed out that because of the death of millions of Jews and the impossibility of determining who the individual perpetrators were, the organizations as such must be judged in order that the guilty be punished. Of course, the Defense holds the conviction and takes the point of view that the guilty must be punished, but only the guilty. It is a fact, for example, that an Einsatzgruppe of the SD, whose task it was to solve the Jewish problem in the East, contained on the average only about 250 members of the Gestapo. Considering the total number of 45,000 to 50,000 members of the Gestapo, this figure is thus a very small one. In the case of a general verdict against, for instance, the Gestapo, more than 45,000 people would be affected who had absolutely nothing to do with this matter. I refer to the example of a mass murderer who cannot be captured, and whose whole family is taken into custody in his stead and condemned.

In view of the very important statements which have been made today by the Prosecution regarding the question of the organizations, I ask the Tribunal for permission, after the record has been received, to state my attitude, if necessary, to just a few other points today; first of all, to the question of the time during which the Gestapo is to be considered criminal. In this connection I must assert that at least until the year 1939 the Gestapo was a lawful, legally established institution. It is also true that the Indictment refers to crimes which can be charged to the Gestapo only after the autumn of 1939, that is, after the beginning of the war.

Today the Prosecution have furthermore excluded secretarial and office workers from the Indictment. I am in agreement with this. It is in accordance with the motion made by me already in December. I submit further that not only the secretarial and office personnel but also all other employees be excepted, because the reason for dropping the charges against the office personnel is doubtless that the Prosecution are convinced that this office personnel had nothing to do with the crimes of which the Gestapo is accused.

It should also be considered whether the administrative officials of the Gestapo, who represented about 70 percent of the personnel of the Gestapo, should be excluded from the Indictment. All of the 500 applications received so far are from such administrative officials. These officials were trained only in the field of administration. They had neither the training nor the knowledge for the making of criminal investigators. They could not be used for the execution of any criminal actions, because they had no executive power. They were active only in matters of personnel and finance—personnel matters such as the appointment of officials, promotions, dismissals, and so forth; matters of finance such as the administering of budget funds, figuring out and compiling salary and wage lists, renting of offices, _et cetera_. These are all things which have nothing to do with executive power, and especially not with the crimes imputed to the Gestapo by the Prosecution. In my opinion these people are just as entitled to exemption as the secretarial and office personnel, who have already been exempted by the Prosecution.

I should like to touch briefly on one other point of view, that is, the question of voluntary joining of an organization—a question which has played an important role. On 7 June 1945 Mr. Justice Jackson, in his statement to the President of the United States, said, among other things, the following: Units such as the Gestapo and SS were fighting units and consisted of volunteers—people especially suited for and fanatically inclined to the plans of violence of these units. To what extent that is true of the SS, I do not know. As far as the Gestapo is concerned, it certainly is not true, for the Gestapo was a State organization founded by the Defendant Göring on the basis of the law of 23 April 1933. It was a police authority just as was the Criminal Police whose duty it was to track down crimes or the Regular Police who were responsible for controlling traffic. The personnel consisted mostly of life-long career officials, some of whom had been in the police service many years before the creation of the Gestapo, and who, when this police organization was created and in the ensuing years, were ordered to, detailed to, or transferred to this police authority. According to the German law affecting civil servants these officials were obliged to follow such orders. They had never come voluntarily to the Gestapo. At the most there might perhaps have been 1 percent who were voluntary members; but 99 percent of the members were forcibly ordered on the basis of this law.

That is what I have to say at the moment. I should like, however, to reserve for myself the right to speak some time later about today’s discussions.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly. We will adjourn now.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 1 March 1946 at 1000 hours._]

SEVENTY-FIRST DAY
Friday, 1 March 1946

_Morning Session_

THE PRESIDENT: At the conclusion of the argument on the organizations, which the Tribunal anticipates will finish before the end of today’s session, the Tribunal will adjourn into closed session. Tomorrow morning at 10 o’clock the Tribunal will sit in open session for consideration of the applications for witnesses and documents by the second four defendants. Will the defendant’s counsel who was in the middle of his argument now continue? Dr. Merkel, had you finished?

DR. MERKEL: Yes, Sir.

DR. MARTIN LÖFFLER (Counsel for the SA): May it please the Tribunal: The objections and misgivings expressed yesterday by the Defense regarding the criminal proceedings against the six accused organizations are particularly applicable when judging the SA.

No other organization is so much exposed to the danger of a sentence contrary to our sense of justice as is the SA. I ask the Tribunal’s permission to submit the reasons for this fact.

The demand of the Prosecution that the SA should be declared a criminal organization affects at least 4 million people at a conservative estimate. The limitation according to groups approved yesterday by Justice Jackson was gratifying and welcome; but it will have no appreciable effect on the numbers since the groups eliminated yesterday, the armed SA units and the bearers of the SA Sports Badge, were not full members of the SA. The only persons so far eliminated, therefore, are the SA Reserves. As no limitation according to time was made, these criminal proceedings will include everyone who ever belonged to the SA, even for a very short time, during the 24 years between its establishment in 1921 and its dissolution in 1945, that is to say, during a period of almost a quarter of a century.

We heard yesterday from the Prosecution that the criminal acts charged to the organizations are the same as those charged to the main defendants, namely, Crimes against Peace, crimes against the laws or customs of war, and Crimes against Humanity, as well as participation in the common conspiracy.

If we now contemplate the possible participation of these 4 million former SA men in these four important categories of crime, we get the following picture:

Crimes against the laws or customs of war are not charged to the SA. It is true that the Prosecution presented an affidavit saying that the SA also took part in guarding concentration camps and prisoner-of-war camps and in supervising forced labor; but, according to the presentation of the Prosecution, this did not occur until 1944 within the framework of the total war raging at that time, and it has not been charged that this activity of the SA involved any excesses or ill-treatment.

In none of the atrocities reported here by witnesses and documents did the SA with its 4 million members participate. The few offenses against humanity charged to the SA by the Prosecution and committed by individual members in the course of almost a quarter of a century can in no way be compared with the serious crimes against humanity of which we have heard here.

The occupation of the trade-union buildings by the SA, adduced by the Prosecution as another point, took place on the order of Reichsleiter Ley, who used the SA for this operation, and this happened after the seizure of power.

Even the Prosecution did not assert that any outrages, ill-treatment, or excesses occurred when this operation was carried out. The fact that in connection with the seizure of power in the spring of 1933 individual excesses occurred, and that the American citizens Rosemann and Klauber, according to the affidavits submitted by the Prosecution, were beaten on this occasion is certainly regrettable. However, such excesses on the part of individual persons are unavoidable in organizations comprising millions of people and, considered by themselves, are hardly proper grounds for declaring the entire organization criminal.

The participation, finally, of the SA as guard troops in concentration camps is, according to the presentation of the Prosecution, restricted to single exceptions and ended anyway in 1934. The commandant of the Concentration Camp Oranienburg, according to the presentation of the Prosecution, was an SA Führer. However it is not asserted that he committed any atrocities.

The second case, the ill-treatment of prisoners in the camp of Hohnstein by SA and SS members in 1934 led to criminal proceedings and the SA men guilty were sentenced to imprisonment of up to 6 years.

As a last individual act there remains the participation of the SA in the excesses during the night of 10 and 11 November 1938, when the windows of Jewish stores were broken and the synagogues were burned. Here, too, the plan and the order did not originate with the SA. The SA was simply commissioned by the highest Party leadership to carry out this order. Finally if we consider that during the political struggles of 1921 to 1933 the old SA was involved in brawls—often purely defensive—with political opponents and that it did not develop into an organization with millions of members until after the seizure of power, we arrive at the following conclusion, expressed in figures:

On the basis of the presentation of the Prosecution at most 2 percent of all the indicted former SA members participated in punishable individual actions; 98 percent of the 4 millions, according to their conviction, kept their hands clean of any such punishable individual acts.

Here, too, the Prosecution will not want to insist that the excesses of these 2 percent considered by themselves should brand the entire organization as criminal. These 98 percent, that is in round numbers 3,900,000 former SA members, must nevertheless defend themselves here against the charge of having participated in the preparation of the war of aggression or in the planning or execution of the common conspiracy, or, formulated more strongly, against the charge of having belonged to organizations which pursued these criminal purposes.

What is the result if we apply the definition of the criminal nature of an organization as formulated yesterday by Justice Jackson and Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe?

The SA members will acknowledge that the criteria under Points 1 and 2 as defined yesterday are also true for the SA, namely, that the SA was an aggregation of numerous persons with collective aims and a membership which was voluntary in principle. However, they will strenuously deny the application of the Criteria 3, 4, and 5. Point 3 requires that the organization pursued objectively criminal aims in the sense of Article 6 of the Charter. The millions of members, if testifying here, would state that neither in the programs nor in the speeches of their leaders had they been called upon to pursue such criminal aims or methods. Whether the leaders of the SA pursued such criminal aims in secret or not these people are not in a position to judge. Whether such criminal aims were pursued secretly by the leadership of the SA can be determined only by the Tribunal, and only now when the archives have been opened, witnesses can testify, and the documents are laid open to the Court.

Now, Point 4 of the Prosecution’s definition, if I understood Justice Jackson correctly yesterday, requires, beyond this, as an element of crime involving subjective guilt, that the aims and methods of this organization were of such character that a reasonable, normal man may properly be charged with knowledge of them.

I should like at this point to emphasize particularly that I, in agreement with my colleagues, do not consider this definition an adequate protection, since it means that a member may be punished even if he did not recognize the criminal nature of the organization but ought to have recognized it by application of reasonable care. I know of no system of penal law in any modern civilized state which holds that negligence, even of a gross or serious nature, is sufficient to constitute guilt of an infamous common crime, that is, of a crime belonging to the group of severest offenses. A crime of this category can be committed only with intention. Perhaps the Prosecution can later discuss this question on the basis of their knowledge of the particulars of Anglo-Saxon and other foreign legal systems.

This point seems of particular importance to me because—if it is neglected—there is the danger that the judges, particularly the Anglo-Saxon judges, will apply the political standards of their countries to German conditions. The sober political instinct that is characteristic of the citizens of England and America is nonexistent in the Germans. We are a politically immature people, credulous, and consequently especially susceptible to political misguidance. The Court should not overlook this dissimilarity when passing its judgment on the good faith of the individual members of the organizations. According to the impressions which the Defense of the SA has received to date from its visits to camps and from numerous letters, the majority of SA members are convinced that they did not belong to any criminal organization. Among other reasons are the following subjective ones:

It was generally known and has been specifically stated in the _Organization Book_ of the Party—Document 1893-PS, Page 365—that only a person whose character was unobjectionable could join the SA. It is further stated verbatim, and I quote: “Unobjectionable reputation and no criminal record.” The members of the SA maintain that they know of no case in which a gang of criminals or conspirators required in their statutes similar conditions for membership.

Part of the essence of a conspiracy is the idea that its criminal aims be kept secret from its opponents. An organization of several millions is, by its very nature, not suited to carrying out a plot. The leaders of the SA emphasized in numerous addresses that they wanted to maintain peace under all circumstances. They pointed out that Germany would be rather a danger to European peace if she were without defense and arms in the heart of Europe and that being in a state of preparedness was the best guarantee for securing future peace in Europe. The simple members point again and again to the fact that foreign powers gave diplomatic recognition to the leaders of National Socialism. They consider this fact not simply an act of “international courtesy” but are convinced that foreign governments would not have entered into relations with the German Government if that German Government had consisted of open criminals.

I might mention a particularly characteristic example: the Indictment against the SA is substantiated by a number of documents. These are Documents 2822- and 2823-PS. According to these documents, as early as May 1933 Lieutenant Colonel Auleb, a deputy of the Reich War Ministry of that time, was detailed to the high command of the SA in order to assure liaison between the heads of the two organizations. But the whole affair is treated as strictly secret, and it is ordered that Auleb should wear the SA uniform for the purpose of “camouflage.” How, I ask, should or could a simple SA member have known anything of such affairs? I have mentioned here only a few points put forward by SA members which, in the opinion of the Defense, do not constitute unfounded subterfuges, but which show that the majority of these people never thought of participating in a criminal conspiracy.

Also the fifth criterion set up yesterday by the Prosecution to define a criminal organization—the close connection between the main defendants and the SA—is in the case of no organization so difficult to prove as in the case of the SA. This may, at first, sound surprising; of the main defendants here, six were high-ranking members of the SA. Nevertheless, a closer scrutiny shows that there were no close connections at all. Except for Göring, none of the main defendants ever exercised command authority over the entire SA. The rank which these main defendants had in the SA was an honorary rank; and, so to speak, merely decorative. Consequently, the Prosecution has mentioned only Göring’s connection with the SA in its recent list of the criminal elements. But even Göring’s connection with the SA curiously enough is very slight and is actually confined to a period of three quarters of a year—that is—9 months, namely, from February 1923 to 9 November 1923, that is to say, 23 years ago. Göring was never, as stated in Appendix A of the Indictment, Reichsführer of the SA. That is an error. Rather, in February 1923 Göring was commissioned to take over the command of the then existing Party group for the protection of meetings—the so-called Sturmabteilung. Göring led the SA until the November Putsch of 9 November 1923. On that day his command power over the SA came to an end and was never revived. Later Göring was given by Hitler honorary command of the unit Feldherrnhalle. He was the honorary commander, not the active commander of this unit. I believe the difference between honorary and active command of a regiment is known in all states. I do not have to give any further explanation. Honorary command has a purely decorative significance.

The task which the SA had to carry out under Göring in the year 1923 was the protection of meetings. Anyway, it cannot be charged that at that time the SA, in co-operation with Göring, already planned the crimes stated in Article 6 of the Charter or that these aims could have been anticipated at that time in any tangible form. Neither can it be charged that Göring ever made use of the SA after 1923 for carrying out any criminal plan. The man who led the SA from 1930 to 1934, Ernst Röhm, was an embittered opponent of Göring’s. After his death the SA was led by Victor Lutze from 1934 to 1943 and from 1943 until its dissolution, by Wilhelm Schepmann.

According to Article 9, Paragraph 1, of the Charter, an organization can be declared criminal only in connection with any act of which a main defendant may be convicted. From a legal and factual point of view I have the gravest doubts as to whether the facts of the case in 1923, as described by me, are sufficient to comply with the requirements of the Charter as far as the SA is concerned. This could be done only if the Tribunal had reason now to pass sentence on Göring’s activity as leader of the SA group for protecting meetings 23 years ago, including the November Putsch, as a special crime. This, however, would be at variance with the fact that this entire action was settled with legal effect by the amnesty of the democratic Reich Government, whereby the matter was, at the time, disposed of in this fashion.

May it please the Tribunal, if it is a fact in the case of any organization, then certainly it is a fact in the case of the SA, that its being listed among the criminal organizations is contrary to the real picture. Large circles abroad, particularly those who were forced to leave Germany in 1933, knew nothing of the complete change of structure which the SA underwent during the following years. The foreign countries heard at every Reichstag session the traditional song, “The SA Marches,” while, as a matter of fact, the SA had long since lost all political influence and had been transformed _en masse_ into an association with a huge membership, the very size of which rendered it harmless as far as conspiracy was concerned and which showed all the characteristics of the so-called German club-mindedness. I refer in full here to the statements made by Colonel Storey, himself, in his speech for the Prosecution. This is on Page 1546 of the Court’s Record (Volume IV, Page 138). The organization through which the SA was then eliminated from political life was, as is well known, the SS, and this happened on the occasion of the so-called Röhm Putsch in 1934. That, indeed, the SA and SS always confronted each other like rival brothers is a fact which, in the interest of truth, should not remain unmentioned. For all these reasons the SA is judged on a completely different basis, even by German opponents of National Socialism; and this has already led to contradictory results, the speedy elimination of which by the Prosecution or the Court would be highly desirable.

At this opportunity the following facts should be pointed out: The SA, up to the higher ranks, is not, as a matter of principle, subject to arrest, which is at variance with probably all the other organizations. The new denazification law which recently came into force after thorough consultation between German circles and the Military Government and which is now the law in force throughout the entire American Zone, regards all SA members of a rank lower than that of Sturmführer neither as active Nazis nor much less as criminals. According to the electoral procedure now in force in the American Zone of Occupation, which recently was the basis for elections in thousands of German communities under the directives of the Military Government, the ordinary SA members, insofar as they were not Party members, were not only permitted to vote, but were also eligible for election. The same people who are before the Court accused of serious crimes may at the same time, according to the law in force, be elected as community councillors, and, in fact, are being so elected.

I talked personally about two weeks ago to an SA man and asked him whether, following the notice of the Court, he had reported here for interrogation. He declared that he saw no reason for doing that, because in the meantime he had been elected and approved as community councillor.

The regulations of Law Number 30, regarding the application of the German community order of 20 December 1945, namely, Articles 36 and 37, which show that SA men are eligible for election, also confirm the fact, which is known in Germany, but apparently not in foreign countries, that an ordinary Party member had—only by comparison, naturally—a more active political position than the completely uninfluential SA member. Whoever was a Party member before 1937 cannot vote, and whoever at any time was a Party member cannot be elected.

A comparison of Party members, who are not indicted here, and SA members, who are indicted here, shows the following facts:

If at the time of National Socialism one was politically incriminated or suspected one could, without difficulty, become an SA member but under no circumstances a Party member, because in regard to Party membership—and even ordinary Party membership—much higher political qualifications were required than in the case of SA members. There were certainly many SA members who joined this organization only to escape to some extent the persecution they had to expect because of their incriminating political record in the past.

May it please the Tribunal, I have tried by means of these examples to show the extraordinary danger existing in the particular case of the SA, if all its members, including its millions of ordinary SA men, are legally declared criminals by the Tribunal. I am sorry I cannot share the opinion expressed yesterday by Justice Jackson that the verdict sought from this Court would be a purely declaratory one with no penalties involved. On the contrary I know that hundreds and thousands of SA members, who were simple followers and were not even Party members, have been dismissed from their positions, and their future and their existence will depend on the verdict of this Court. A declaratory judgment of this Court is sufficient to make them outlaws and to exclude them from positions and professions in the future. Therefore the members of the SA are correct in pointing out that they are denied the right of judicial hearing. There is no direct evidence and no direct trial. A court does not decide the fate of lifeless creatures of the law or formal organizations that have long since ceased to exist; it passes judgment on living human beings, and no court should forego the opportunity of seeing in person those whom it is trying. A good judge is always a good psychologist and soon can tell what kind of person is on trial—whether he is a criminal or somebody who has been deceived and misled.

No law on earth since time immemorial ever allowed the passing of judgment against an organization instead of against its single members. The laws and precedents quoted yesterday by the Prosecution regarding criminal gangs and conspiracy certainly recognize to a large extent the collective responsibility for acts of accomplices, but two requirements must be fulfilled there too: Firstly, the member must know that he is party to a criminal conspiracy or criminal association; secondly, the indictment is not directed against the conspiracy as such, and the conspiracy will not be judged, but the persons of the individual participants. It is the conviction of the Defense that the Charter did not intend to stand in contradiction to these legal principles of all states.

The late President Roosevelt, whom Justice Jackson named the spiritual father of the Charter, has in his great speeches, particularly in those of 25 October 1941 and 7 October 1942, stated clearly that the leaders and instigators shall be called to account. Permit me, Mr. President, to read two sentences from the speech by President Roosevelt taken from the official collection, _Speeches and Essays by President Roosevelt_, published on order of the government of the United States.

I quote from the speech of 25 October 1941:

“Civilized peoples long ago adopted the basic principle that no
man should be punished for the deed of another.”

The second quotation is from the speech of President Roosevelt on 7 October 1942, and I quote:

“The number of persons eventually found guilty will undoubtedly
be extremely small compared to the total enemy populations. It
is not the intention of this Government or of the Governments
associated with us to resort to mass reprisals. It is our
intention that just and sure punishment shall be meted out to
the ringleaders responsible for the organized murder of
thousands of innocent persons and the commission of atrocities
which have violated every tenet of the Christian faith.”

In addition to these fundamental objections to such a separation of the proceedings there is also an important technical objection. If the Tribunal passes a declaratory judgment against the organizations, as requested, all these millions of members of the organizations will automatically become outlaws pending the definite legal decision in the subsequent trials. Until that date every individual is under serious suspicion of being a criminal, since it is questionable whether he will succeed in exonerating himself in the subsequent trial. Since, however, an individual person, without such exoneration will probably not be able to return to his profession—and will also be excluded from the ranks of honorable citizens until he is exonerated—the right to have such a subsequent trial should not be denied to him. I believe that Justice Jackson will agree with me in this. But if, as desired by the Prosecution, 7 million members of organizations, according to a conservative estimate, are affected by the declaratory judgment of the Tribunal and thus temporarily become outlaws, then millions of subsequent trials will have to take place. We shall have to assume that in the course of 1 year, perhaps 100,000 trials can be completed. I believe that this is a very optimistic estimate, as our German courts will not be able to participate; it is well known that they are completely overworked since they have now only a small portion of their former personnel. Of these millions of cases, the courts will probably have to deal first with those of the most criminal nature. The accused, whose existence is at stake, will defend themselves during the subsequent trials with all legal means at their disposal. There is the danger that the really innocent people will have to wait for many years, even for decades, before they will have an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves through a process of exoneration. I believe that it would have been possible to find some sort of solution. For instance, if the Control Council had passed a law to the effect that, since there is the suspicion that offenses and crimes against peace and humanity have been committed with the aid of these organizations, the courts have the right and the duty to try those of whom it can be proved that they participated in these crimes as principals or accessories in some way or other—if such a formula could be found, then I believe that both the Prosecution and the Defense would consider that a just solution. The effect would be limited to those who are actually guilty. The Defense objects in no way to the punishment of those who are actually guilty, provided that their guilt is determined in regular unobjectionable proceedings.

Should the Court, however, adhere to a verdict against the organizations, as requested by the Prosecution, then I request for all the reasons adduced, arising as they do from the presentation of the Prosecution and from the impressions made by those applications which have been filed, that judgment not be passed against the entire SA. The point of view brought forward by Justice Jackson in the case of the other organizations, namely, that in the face of so many murders and atrocities the individual members of an organization can no longer be determined as perpetrators, this point of view, noteworthy as it is, does not apply to the SA. The few excesses which, according to the presentation of the Prosecution, took place here, happened in Germany in public. The perpetrators are known. Some regional courts have already opened proceedings of this kind. I have heard, for example, that the city of Bamberg has opened proceedings against the destroyers of the synagogue there and against the perpetrators of the action of 10 and 11 November 1938.

But should the Tribunal be of the opinion that judgment is nevertheless to be passed against the SA as an organization, then I ask the Tribunal as far as possible to make use of the right to provide certain limitations in regard to periods of time and categories of members, as both the Prosecution and the Defense agree that the Tribunal has the power to make such limitations.

Very important distinctions are to be made here, first as to the different periods of time. The SA men who joined the SA after the seizure of power in 1933 joined an organization that on its face bore the stamp of approval by the state. Admittedly not even a state authority can declare crimes against humanity legal; but when weighing the degree of guilt and the severity of the penalty it is, nevertheless, of considerable importance whether the perpetrator acted outside the bounds of the laws in force and committed offenses against the positive law, or whether his acts, although they may offend a higher moral order, are not contrary to the laws of his country. Therefore an exemption should be made at any rate of all those SA members who joined after 1933, and who can be proved to have had no part in the events of 10 and 11 November 1938.

In regard to categories, I urgently request, in the interest of justice, a double limitation:

1. Simple SA members up to the rank of Sturmführer should be exempted at any rate and, if possible, very soon. I mentioned previously why this appears imperative in the interests of justice, at least in the American Zone. Perhaps—and I should welcome this tremendously—Justice Jackson would have the kindness to pay special attention to this matter once more. The idea of such limitation is also supported by the fact that it would considerably reduce the numbers by eliminating the simple followers; and in this way the technical difficulties, which seem almost insurmountable, would also be considerably simplified.

2. It was gratifying that the Prosecution yesterday agreed to separate proceedings against the SA Wehrmannschaften, the bearers of the SA Sports Badge, and the members of the SA Reserve—or rather, to exempt them altogether. In the interest of equality and justice as recognized by the law and by this Tribunal, it would be fair to separate from the SA all those special sport units which had only a loose organizational connection with the SA. These are the Navy SA (Marine-SA) and the Cavalry SA (Reiter-SA).

There are a number of applications before the Court, and it is well known in Germany to everybody involved that these particular units were exclusively devoted to their respective sports, namely, sailing and rowing on the one hand, and horsemanship and holding of tournaments on the other hand. When in 1933 the Party came to power, it attempted to take charge of all sport activities in Germany. Consequently, the various navy clubs and the so-called country riding clubs became affiliated with the Party, but both clubs had hardly anything to do with the political SA, even after their regrouping. Only their chiefs were, according to the organizational system, subordinate to the SA. They are very well suited for separate proceedings because they constituted a completely closed group within the SA.

None of the main defendants present here was ever a member of one of these sport groups. Members of the Cavalry SA feel that they are at a particular disadvantage because the Prosecution has not indicted the NS Kraftfahrkorps (National Socialist Motor Corps) and the NS Fliegerkorps (National Socialist Flier Corps), which is perfectly justified, since it is known that they were by nature sport organizations. The NS Kraftfahrkorps and the NS Fliegerkorps were, however, until the year 1934, exactly like the Reiterkorps, sport divisions of the SA. The NS Kraftfahrkorps succeeded in gaining organizational independence since 1934 or 1935, due to the political influence of its leader Hühnlein. The NS Fliegerkorps also succeeded in doing so. The NS Reiterkorps, however, did not have such influence and merely succeeded in 1936 in being recognized as an independent NS Reiterkorps; but it still remained formally connected through its leadership with the SA, since Litzmann, the Chief of the Reiterkorps, was subordinate to the Chief of the SA. For this purely formal reason about 100,000 farmers and farmhands who enjoyed education in horsemanship through these country riding clubs are indicted here. It can be proved that they never took part in politics or in any activities against Jews or people of other beliefs. Likewise a pursuit of militaristic aims is out of question in the case of the Cavalry SA. Already after the First World War it was evident that the horse had no further role in war. This charge would rather be in point as far as the Kraftfahrkorps and the Fliegerkorps are concerned. The Prosecution stated correctly that these organizations were by nature predominantly sport organizations.

For this reason I should be grateful to the Prosecution if they would once more examine the cases I have mentioned in order to find out whether or not the same conditions exist in this case as in the case of the SA Reserve and the armed SA units.

As the last group I mention the SA university units (SA Hochschulstürme), because they were almost without exception obligatory organizations for those students who would not have been admitted to the state examinations without a record of activity in such organizations. The same thing applies to the SA health units (SA Sanitätsstürme), which represented an obligatory activity for many physicians who were applying for positions.

I should like to correct myself on one point, because it has been called to my attention that I wanted to set a time limit for those SA members joining after 1933. I should have said, “after 30 January 1933,” the day of the seizure of power.

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Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremburg 14 November 1945-1 October 1946, Volume 08Chapter XX: Section C: of my Appendix A, that the crimes of the SS were committed, (2)

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