Chapter LVIII: Part V: The Anas (4)

Does the treaty with France leave us free to prohibit her from arming vessels in our ports? Thomas Jefferson, Hamilton, Knox, and Randolph--unanimous--it does. As the treaty obliges us to prohibit the enemies of France from arming in our ports, and leaves us free to prohibit France, do not the laws of neutrality oblige us to prohibit her? Same persons answer they do.

How far may a prohibition now declared be retrospective to the vessels armed in Charleston before the prohibition, to wit, the Citoyen Genet and Sans Culottes, and what is to be done with these prizes? Thomas Jefferson,--It cannot be retrospective at all; they may sell their prizes, and continue to act freely as other armed vessels of France. Hamilton and Knox,--The prizes ought to be given up to the English, and the privateers suppressed. Randolph,--They are free to sell their prizes, and the privateers should be ordered away, not to return here till they shall have been to the dominions of their own sovereign, and thereby purged the illegality of their origin. This last opinion was adopted by the President.

Our citizens who have joined in these hostilities against nations at peace with the United States, are they punishable? E. Randolph gave an official opinion--they were. Thomas Jefferson, Hamilton and Knox joined in the opinion. All thought it our duty to have prosecutions instituted against them, that the laws might pronounce on their case. In the first instance, two only were prosecuted merely to try the question, and to satisfy the complaint of the British men; and because it was thought they might have offended unwittingly. But a subsequent armament of a vessel at New York taking place with full knowledge of this prosecution, all the persons engaged in it, citizens and foreigners, were ordered to be prosecuted.

May the prohibition extend to the means of the party arming, or are they only prohibited from using our means for the annoyance of their enemies? Thomas Jefferson of opinion they are free to use their own means, _i. e._, to mount their own guns, &c. Hamilton and Knox of opinion they are not to put even their own implements or means into a posture of annoyance. The President has as yet not decided this.

May an armed vessel arriving here be prohibited to employ their own citizens found here as seamen or mariners? Thomas Jefferson,--They cannot be prohibited to recruit their own citizens. Hamilton and Knox,--They may and ought to be prohibited. No decision yet by the President.

It appears to me the President wished the Little Sarah had been stopped by military coercion, that is, by firing on her; yet I do not believe he would have ordered it himself had he been here, though he would be glad if we had ordered it. The United States being a ship-building nation, may they sell ships, prepared for war, to both parties? Thomas Jefferson,--They may sell such ships in their ports to both parties, or carry them for sale to the dominions of both parties. E. Randolph of opinion they could not sell them here; and that if they attempted to carry them to the dominions of the parties for sale, they might be seized by the way as _contraband_. Hamilton of same opinion, except that he did not consider them as seizable for contraband, but as the property of a power, making itself a party in the _war_ by an aid of such a nature, and consequently that it would be a breach of neutrality.

Hamilton moves that the government of France be desired to recall Mr. Genet. Knox adds that he be in the meantime suspended from his functions. Thomas Jefferson proposes that his correspondence be communicated to his government, with friendly observations. President silent.

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July the 15th. Thomas Jefferson, Hamilton and Knox met at the President's. Governor Mifflin had applied to Knox for the loan of four cannon to mount at Mud Island. He informed him he should station a guard of thirty-five militia there, and asked what arrangement for rations the general government had taken. Knox told him nothing could be done as to rations, and he would ask the President for the cannon. In the meantime, he promised him to put the cannon on board a boat, ready to send off as soon as permission was obtained. The President declared his own opinion _first_ and fully, that when the orders were given to the government to stop vessels arming, &c., in our ports, even by military force, he took for granted the government would use such diligence as to stop those projects in embryo, and stop them when no force was requisite, or a very small party of militia would suffice; that here was a demand from the government of Pennsylvania to land four cannon under pretext of executing orders of the general government; that if this was granted, we should be immediately applied to by every other governor, and that not for one place only, but for several, and our cannon would be dispersed all over the United States; that for this reason we would refuse the same request to the governors of South Carolina, Virginia, and Rhode Island; that if they erected batteries, they must establish men for them, and would come on us for this too. He did not think the executive had a power to establish permanent guards: he had never looked to anything permanent when the orders were given to the governors, but only an occasional call on small parties of militia in the moments requiring it. These sentiments were so entirely my own, that I did little more than combat on the same grounds the opinions of Hamilton and Knox. The latter said he would be ready to lend an equal number to every government to carry into effect orders of such importance; and Hamilton, that he would be willing to lend them in cases where they happened to be as near the place where they were to be mounted.

Hamilton submitted the purchase of a large quantity of salt-petre, which would outrun the funds destined to objects of that class by Congress. We were unanimous we ought to venture on it, and to the procuring supplies of military stores in the present circumstances, and take on us the responsibility to Congress, before whom it should be laid.

The President was fully of the same opinion.

In the above case of the cannon, the President gave no final order while I remained; but I saw that he was so impressed with the disagreeableness of taking them out of the boat again, that he would yield. He spoke sharply to Knox for having put them in that position without consulting him, and declared that, but for that circumstance, he would not have hesitated one moment to refuse them.

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July the 18th, 1793. Lear calls on me. I told him that Irving, an Irishman, and a writer in the treasury, who, on a former occasion, had given the most decisive proofs of his devotion to his principal, was the author of the pieces signed Veritas; and I wished he could get at some of Irving's acquaintances and inform himself of the fact, as the person who told me of it would not permit the name of his informer to be mentioned; [_Note._--Beckley told me of it, and he had it from Swaine, the printer to whom the pieces were delivered;] that I had long before suspected this excessive foul play in that party, of writing themselves in the character of the most exaggerated democrats, and incorporating with it a great deal of abuse on the President, to make him believe it was that party who were his enemies, and so throw him entirely into the scale of the monocrats. Lear said he no longer ago than yesterday, expressed to the President his suspicions of the artifices of that party to work on him. He mentioned the following fact as a proof of their writing in the character of their adversaries; to wit, the day after the little incident of Richet's toasting "the man of the people," (see the gazettes,) Mrs. Washington was at Mrs. Powel's, who mentioned to her that when the toast was given, there was a good deal of disapprobation appeared in the audience, and that many put on their hats and went out; on inquiry, he had not found the fact true, and yet it was put into ----'s paper, and written under the character of a republican, though he is satisfied it is altogether a slander of the monocrats. He mentioned this to the President, but he did not mention to him the following fact, which he knows; that in New York, the last summer, when the parties of Jay and Clinton were running so high, it was an agreed point with the former, that if any circumstances should ever bring it to a question, whether to drop Hamilton or the President, they had decided to drop the President. He said that lately one of the loudest pretended friends to the government, damned it, and said it was good for nothing, that it could not support itself, and it was time to put it down and set up a better; and yet the same person, in speaking to the President, puffed off that party as the only friends to the government. He said he really feared, that by their artifices and industry, they would aggravate the President so much against the republicans, as to separate him from the body of the people. I told him what the same cabals had decided to do, if the President had refused his assent to the bank bill; also what Brockhurst Livingston said to ----, that Hamilton's life was much more precious to the community than the President's.

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July the 29th, 1793. At a meeting at the President's on account of the British letter-of-marque, ship Jane, said to have put up waste boards, to have pierced two port holes, and mounted two cannon (which she brought in) on new carriages which she did not bring in, and consequently having sixteen, instead of fourteen, guns mounted, it was agreed that a letter-of-marque, or vessel armé en guerre, and en marchandise, is not a privateer, and therefore not to be ordered out of our ports. It was agreed by Hamilton, Knox, and myself, that the case of such a vessel does not depend on the treaties, but on the law of nations. Edmund Randolph thought, as she had a mixed character of merchant vessel and privateer, she might be considered under the treaty; but this being overruled, the following paper was written

Rules proposed by Attorney General:

1st. That all equipments purely for the accommodation of vessels, as merchantmen, be admitted. [Agreed.]

2d. That all equipments, doubtful in their nature, and applicable equally to commerce or war, be admitted, as producing too many minutia. [Agreed.]

3d. That all equipments, solely adapted to military objects, be prohibited. [Agreed.]

Rules proposed by the Secretary of the Treasury:

1st. That the original arming and equipping of vessels for military service, offensive or defensive, in the ports of the United States, be considered as prohibited to all. [Agreed.]

2d. That vessels which were armed before their coming into our ports, shall not be permitted to augment these equipments in the ports of the United States, but may repair or replace any military equipments which they had when they began their voyage for the United States; that this, however, shall be with the exception of privateers of the parties opposed to France, who shall not refit or repair. [Negatived--the Secretary of the Treasury only holding the opinion.]

3d. That for convenience, vessels armed and commissioned before they come into our ports, may engage their own citizens, not being inhabitants of the United States. [Agreed.]

I subjoined the following:

I concur in the rules proposed by the Attorney General, as far as respects materials or means of annoyance furnished by us; and I should be for an additional rule, that as to means or materials brought into this country, and belonging to themselves, they are free to use them.

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August the 1st. Met at the President's, to consider what was to be done with Mr. Genet. All his correspondence with me was read over. The following propositions were made: 1. That a full statement of Mr. Genet's conduct be made in a letter to G. Morris, and be sent with his correspondence, to be communicated to the Executive Council of France; the letter to be so prepared, as to serve for the form of communication to the Council. Agreed unanimously. 2. That in that letter his recall be required. Agreed by all, though I expressed a preference of expressing that desire with great delicacy; the others were for peremptory terms. 3. To send him off. This was proposed by Knox; but rejected by every other. 4. To write a letter to Mr. Genet, the same in substance with that written to G. Morris, and let him know we had applied for his recall. I was against this, because I thought it would render him extremely active in his plans, and endanger confusion. But I was overruled by the other three gentlemen and the President. 5. That a publication of the whole correspondence, and statement of the proceedings, should be made by way of appeal to the people. Hamilton made a jury speech of three-quarters of an hour, as inflammatory and declamatory as if he had been speaking to a jury. E. Randolph opposed it. I chose to leave the contest between them. Adjourned to next day.

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August the 2d. Met again. Hamilton spoke again three-quarters of an hour. I answered on these topics. _Object_ of the appeal.--The democratic society; this the great circumstance of alarm; afraid it would extend its connections over the continent; chiefly meant for the local object of the ensuing election of Governor. If left alone, would die away after that is over. If opposed, if proscribed, would give it importance and vigor; would give it a new object, and multitudes would join it merely to assert the right of voluntary associations. That the measure was calculated to make the President assume the station of the head of a party, instead of the head of the nation. _Plan_ of the appeal.--To consist of _facts_ and the _decisions_ of the President. As to facts we are agreed; but as to the decisions, there have been great differences of opinion among us. Sometimes as many opinions as persons. This proves there will be ground to attack the decisions. Genet will appeal also; it will become a contest between the President and Genet--anonymous writers--will be same difference of opinion in _public_, as in our cabinet--will be same difference in _Congress_, for it must be laid before them--would, therefore, work very unpleasantly _at home_. How would it work _abroad_? France--unkind--after such proofs of her friendship, should rely on that friendship, and her justice. Why appeal to the world? Friendly nations always negotiate little differences in private. Never appeal to the world, but when they appeal to the sword. Confederacy of Pilnitz was to overthrow the government of France. The interference of France to disturb other governments and excite insurrections, was a measure of reprisal. Yet these Princes have been able to make it believed to be the system of France. Colonel Hamilton supposes Mr. Genet's proceedings here are in pursuance of that system; and we are so to declare it to the world, and to add our testimony to this base calumny of the Princes. What a triumph to them to be backed by our testimony. What a fatal stroke at the cause of liberty; _et tu Brute_. We indispose the French government, and they will retract their offer of the treaty of commerce. The President manifestly inclined to the appeal to the people.[11] Knox, in a foolish incoherent sort of a speech, introduced the pasquinade lately printed, called the funeral of George W--n, and James W--n, King and Judge, &c., where the President was placed on a guillotine. The President was much inflamed; got into one of those passions when he cannot command himself; ran on much on the personal abuse which had been bestowed on him; defied any man on earth to produce one single act of his since he had been in the government, which was not done on the purest motives; that he had never repented but once the having slipped the moment of resigning his office, and that was every moment since; that _by God_ he had rather be in his grave than in his present situation; that he had rather be on his farm than to be made _Emperor of the world_; and yet that they were charging him with wanting to be a King. That that _rascal Freneau_ sent him three of his papers every day, as if he thought he would become the distributor of his papers; that he could see in this, nothing but an impudent design to insult him: he ended in this high tone. There was a pause. Some difficulty in resuming our question; it was, however, after a little while, presented again, and he said there seemed to be no necessity for deciding it now; the propositions before agreed on might be put into a train of execution, and perhaps events would show whether the appeal would be necessary or not. He desired we would meet at my office the next day, to consider what should be done with the vessels armed in our ports by Mr. Genet, and their prizes.

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August the 3d. We met. The President wrote to take our opinions, whether Congress should be called. Knox pronounced at once against it. Randolph was against it. Hamilton said his judgment was against it, but that if any two were for it, or against it, he would join them to make a majority. I was for it. We agreed to give separate opinions to the President. Knox said we should have had fine work, if Congress had been sitting these two last months. The fool thus let out the secret. Hamilton endeavored to patch up the indiscretion of this blabber, by saying "he did not know; he rather thought they would have strengthened the executive arm." It is evident they do not wish to lengthen the session of the _next Congress_, and probably they particularly wish it should not meet till Genet is gone. At this meeting I received a letter from Mr. Remson at New York, informing me of the event of the combat between the Ambuscade and the Boston. Knox broke out into the most unqualified abuse of Captain Courtany. Hamilton, with less fury, but with the deepest vexation, loaded him with censures. Both showed the most unequivocal mortification at the event.

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August the 6th, 1793. The President calls on me at my house in the country, and introduces my letter of July the 31st, announcing that I should resign at the close of the next month. He again expressed his repentance at not having resigned himself, and how much it was increased by seeing that he was to be deserted by those on whose aid he had counted; that he did not know where he should look to find characters to fill up the offices; that mere talents did not suffice for the department of State, but it required a person conversant in foreign affairs, perhaps acquainted with foreign courts; that without this, the best talents would be awkward and at a loss. He told me that Colonel Hamilton had three or four weeks ago written to him, informing him that private as well as public reasons had brought him to the determination to retire, and that he should do it towards the close of the next session. He said he had often before intimated dispositions to resign, but never as decisively before; that he supposed he had fixed on the latter part of next session, to give an opportunity to Congress to examine into his conduct; that our going out at times so different, increased his difficulty; for if he had both places to fill at once, he might consult both the particular talents and geographical situation of our successors. He expressed great apprehensions at the fermentation which seemed to be working in the mind of the public; that many descriptions of persons, actuated by different causes, appeared to be uniting; what it would end in he knew not; a new Congress was to assemble, more numerous, perhaps of a different spirit; the first expressions of their sentiments would be important; if I would only stay to the end of that, it would relieve him considerably.

I expressed to him my excessive repugnance to public life, the particular uneasiness of my situation in this place, where the laws of society oblige me always to move exactly in the circle which I know to bear me peculiar hatred; that is to say, the wealthy aristocrats, the merchants connected closely with England, the new created paper fortunes; that thus surrounded, my words were caught, multiplied, misconstrued, and even fabricated and spread abroad to my injury; that he saw also, that there was such an opposition of views between myself and another part of the administration, as to render it peculiarly unpleasing, and to destroy the necessary harmony. Without knowing the views of what is called the republican party here, or having any communication with them, I could undertake to assure him, from my intimacy with that party in the late Congress, that there was not a view in the republican party as spread over the United States, which went to the frame of the government; that I believed the next Congress would attempt nothing material, but to render their own body independent; that that party were firm in their dispositions to support the government; that the manœuvres of Mr. Genet might produce some little embarrassment, but that he would be abandoned by the republicans the moment they knew the nature of his conduct; and on the whole, no crisis existed which threatened anything.

He said he believed the views of the republican party were perfectly pure, but when men put a machine into motion, it is impossible for them to stop it exactly where they would choose, or to say where it will stop. That the constitution we have is an excellent one, if we can keep it where it is; that it was, indeed, supposed there was a party disposed to change it into a monarchical form, but that he could conscientiously declare there was not a man in the United States who would set his face more decidedly against it than himself. Here I interrupted him, by saying, "No rational man in the United States suspects you of any other disposition; but there does not pass a week, in which we cannot prove declarations dropping from the monarchical party that our government is good for nothing, is a milk and water thing which cannot support itself, we must knock it down, and set up something of more energy." He said if that was the case, he thought it a proof of their insanity, for that the republican spirit of the Union was so manifest and so solid, that it was astonishing how any one could expect to move it.

He returned to the difficulty of naming my successor; he said Mr. Madison would be his first choice, but that he had always expressed to him such a decision against public office, that he could not expect he would undertake it. Mr. Jay would prefer his present office. He said that Mr. Jay had a great opinion of the talents of Mr. King; that there was also Mr. Smith of South Carolina, and E. Rutledge; but he observed, that name whom he would, some objections would be made, some would be called speculators, some one thing, some another; and he asked me to mention any characters occurring to me. I asked him if Governor Johnson of Maryland had occurred to him? He said he had; that he was a man of great good sense, an honest man, and he believed, clear of speculations; but this, says he, is an instance of what I was observing; with all these qualifications, Governor Johnson, from a want of familiarity with foreign affairs, would be in them like a fish out of water; everything would be new to him, and he awkward in everything. I confessed to him that I had considered Johnson rather as fit for the Treasury Department. Yes, says he, for that he would be the fittest appointment that could be made; he is a man acquainted with figures, and having as good a knowledge of the resources of this country as any man. I asked him if Chancellor Livingston had occurred to him? He said yes; but he was from New York, and to appoint him while Hamilton was in, and before it should be known he was going out, would excite a newspaper conflagration, as the ultimate arrangement would not be known. He said McLurg had occurred to him as a man of first-rate abilities, but it is said that he is a speculator. He asked me what sort of a man Wolcott was. I told him I knew nothing of him myself; I had heard him characterized as a cunning man. I asked him whether some person could not take my office _par interim_, till he should make an appointment, as Mr. Randolph, for instance. Yes, says he, but there you would raise the expectation of keeping it, and I do not know that he is fit for it, nor what is thought of Mr. Randolph. I avoided noticing the last observation, and he put the question to me directly. I then told him, I went into society so little as to be unable to answer it: I knew that the embarrassments in his private affairs had obliged him to use expedients, which had injured him with the merchants and shop-keepers, and affected his character of independence; that these embarrassments were serious, and not likely to cease soon. He said if I would only stay in till the end of another quarter (the last of December) it would get us through the difficulties of this year, and he was satisfied that the affairs of Europe would be settled with this campaign; for that either France would be overwhelmed by it, or the confederacy would give up the contest. By that time, too, Congress will have manifested its character and view. I told him that I had set my private affairs in motion in a line which had powerfully called for my presence the last spring, and that they had suffered immensely from my not going home; that I had now calculated them to my return in the fall, and to fail in going then, would be the loss of another year, and prejudicial beyond measure. I asked him whether he could not name Governor Johnson to my office, under an express arrangement that at the close of the session he should take that of the Treasury. He said that men never chose to descend; that being once in a higher department, he would not like to go into a lower one. He asked me whether I could not arrange my affairs by going home. I told him I did not think the public business would admit of it; that there never was a day now in which the absence of the Secretary of State would not be inconvenient to the public. And he concluded by desiring that I would take two or three days to consider whether I could not stay in till the end of another quarter, for that like a man going to the gallows, he was willing to put it off as long as he could; but if I persisted, he must then look about him and make up his mind to do the best he could; and so he took leave.

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August the 20th. We met at the President's to examine by paragraphs the draught of a letter I had prepared to Gouverneur Morris on the conduct of Mr. Genet. There was no difference of opinion on any part of it, except on this expression, "An attempt to embroil both, to add still another nation to the enemies of his country, and to draw on both a reproach which it is hoped will never stain the history of either, that of _liberty warring on herself_." Hamilton moved to strike out these words, "that of liberty warring on herself." He urged generally that it would give offence to the combined powers; that it amounted to a declaration that they were warring on liberty; that we were not called on to declare that the cause of France was that of liberty; that he had at first been with them with all his heart, but that he had long since left them, and was not for encouraging the idea here, that the cause of France was the cause of liberty in general, or could have either connection or influence in our affairs. Knox, according to custom, jumped plump into all his opinions. The President, with a good deal of positiveness, declared in favor of the expression; that he considered the pursuit of France to be that of liberty, however they might sometimes fail of the best means of obtaining it; that he had never at any time entertained a doubt of their ultimate success, if they hung well together; and that as to their dissensions, there were such contradictory accounts given, that no one could tell what to believe. I observed that it had been supposed among us all along that the present letter might become public; that we had therefore three parties to attend to,--1st, France; 2d, her enemies 3d, the people of the United States; that as to the enemies of France, it ought not to offend them, because the passage objected to, only spoke of an attempt to make the United States, a _free nation_, war on France, a _free nation_, which would be liberty warring against liberty; that as to France, we were taking so harsh a measure (desiring her to recall her minister) that a precedent for it could scarcely be found; that we knew that minister would represent to his government that our executive was hostile to liberty, leaning to monarchy, and would endeavor to parry the charges on himself, by rendering suspicions the source from which they flowed; that, therefore, it was essential to satisfy France, not only of our friendship to her, but our attachment to the general cause of liberty, and to hers in particular; that as to the people of the United States, we knew there were suspicions abroad that the executive, in some of its parts, was tainted with a hankering after monarchy, an indisposition towards liberty, and towards the French cause; and that it was important, by an explicit declaration, to remove these suspicions, and restore the confidence of the people in their government. Randolph opposed the passage on nearly the same ground with Hamilton. He added, that he thought it had been agreed that this correspondence should contain no expressions which could give offence to either party. I replied that it had been my opinion in the beginning of the correspondence, that while we were censuring the conduct of the French minister, we should make the most cordial declarations of friendship to them; that in the first letter or two of the correspondence, I had inserted expressions of that kind, but that himself and the other two gentlemen had struck them out; that I thereupon conformed to their opinions in my subsequent letters, and had carefully avoided the insertion of a single term of friendship to the French nation, and the letters were as dry and husky as if written between the generals of two enemy nations; that on the present occasion, how ever, it had been agreed that such expressions ought to be inserted in the letter now under consideration, and I had accordingly charged it pretty well with them; that I had further thought it essential to satisfy the French and our own citizens of the light in which we viewed their cause, and of our fellow feeling for the general cause of liberty, and had ventured only four words on the subject; that there was not from beginning to end of the letter one other expression or word in favor of liberty, and I should think it singular, at least, if the single passage of that character should be struck out.

The President again spoke. He came into the idea that attention was due to the two parties who had been mentioned, France and the United States; that as to the former, thinking it certain their affairs would issue in a government of some sort--of considerable freedom--it was the only nation with whom our relations could be counted on; that as to the United States, there could be no doubt of their universal attachment to the cause of France, and of the solidity of their republicanism. He declared his strong attachment to the expression, but finally left it to us to accommodate. It was struck out, of course, and the expressions of affection in the context were a good deal taken down.

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August the 23d, 1793. In consequence of my note of yesterday to the President, a meeting was called this day at his house to determine what should be done with the proposition of France to treat. The importance of the matter was admitted; and being of so old a date as May 22d, we might be accused of neglecting the interests of the United States, to have left it so long unanswered, and it could not be doubted Mr. Genet would avail himself of this inattention. The President declared it had not been inattention, that it had been the subject of conversation often at our meetings, and the delay had proceeded from the difficulty of the thing.

If the struggles of France should end in the old despotism, the formation of such a treaty with the present government would be a matter of offence; if it should end in any kind of free government, he should be very unwilling, by inattention to their advances, to give offence, and lose the opportunity of procuring terms so advantageous to our country. He was, therefore, for writing to Mr. Morris to get the powers of Mr. Genet renewed to his successor. [As he had expressed this opinion to me the afternoon before, I had prepared the draught of a letter accordingly.] But how to explain the delay? The Secretary of the Treasury observed on the letter of the National Convention, that as it did not seem to require an answer, and the matters it contained would occasion embarrassment if answered, he should be against answering it; that he should be for writing to Mr. Morris, mentioning our readiness to treat with them, and suggesting a renewal of Mr. Genet's powers to his successor, but not in as strong terms as I had done in my draught of the letter--not as a thing anxiously wished for by us, lest it should suggest to them the asking a price; and he was for my writing to Mr. Genet _now_, an answer to his letter of May 22d, referring to the meeting of the Senate the entering on the treaty. Knox concurred with him, the Attorney General also,--except that he was against suggesting the renewal of Mr. Genet's powers, because that would amount to a declaration that we would treat with that government, would commit us to lay the subject before the Senate, and his principle had ever been to do no act, not unavoidably necessary, which, in the event of a counter revolution, might offend the future governing powers of that country. I stated to them that having observed from our conversations that the propositions to treat might not be acceded to immediately, I had endeavored to prepare Mr. Genet for it, by taking occasion in conversations to apprize him of the control over treaties which our constitution had given to the Senate; that though this was indirectly done, (because not having been authorized to say anything official on the subject, I did not venture to commit myself directly,) yet, on some subsequent conversation, I found it had struck him exactly as I had wished; for, speaking on some other matter, he mentioned incidentally his propositions to treat, and said, however, as I know now that you cannot take up that subject till the meeting of the Senate, I shall say no more about it now, and so proceeded with his other subject, which I do not now recollect. I said I thought it possible by recalling the substance of these conversations to Mr. Genet, in a letter to be written now, I might add that the Executive had at length come to a conclusion, that on account of the importance of the matter, they would await the meeting of the Senate; but I pressed strongly the urging Mr. Morris to procure a renewal of Genet's powers, that we might not lose the chance of obtaining so advantageous a treaty. Edmund Randolph had argued against our acceding to it, because it was too advantageous; so much so that they would certainly break it, and it might become the cause of war. I answered that it would be easy, in the course of the negociation, to cure it of its inequality by giving some compensation; but I had no fear of their revoking it, that the islanders themselves were too much interested in the concessions ever to suffer them to be revoked; that the best thinkers in France had long been of opinion that it would be for the interest of the mother country to let the colonies obtain subsistence wherever they could cheapest; that I was confident the present struggles in France would end in a free government of some sort, and that such a government would consider itself as growing out of the present one, and respect its treaties. The President recurred to the awkwardness of writing a letter now to Mr. Genet, in answer to his of May 22d; that it would certainly be construed as merely done with a design of exculpation of ourselves, and he would thence inculpate us. The more we reflected on this, the more the justice of the observation struck us. Hamilton and myself came into it--Knox still for the letter--Randolph half for it, half against it, according to custom.

It was at length agreed I should state the substance of my verbal observations to Mr. Genet, in a letter to Mr. Morris, and let them be considered as the answer intended; for being from the Secretary of State, they might be considered as official, though not in writing.

It is evident that taking this ground for their future justification to France and to the United States, they were sensible they had censurably neglected these overtures of treaty; for not only what I had said to Mr. Genet was without authority from them, but was never communicated to them till this day. To rest the justification of delay on answers given, it is true in time; but of which they had no knowledge till now, is an ostensible justification only.

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September the 4th, 1793. At a meeting held some days ago, some letters from the Governor of Georgia were read, in which a consultation of officers, and a considerable expedition against the Creeks was proposed. We were all of opinion no such expedition should be undertaken. My reasons were that such a war might bring on a Spanish, and even an English war; that for this reason the aggressions of the Creeks had been laid before the last Congress, and they had not chosen to declare war, therefore the Executive should not take on itself to do it; and that according to the opinions of Pickens and Blount, it was too late in the season.

I thought, however, that a temperate and conciliatory letter should be written to the Governor, in order that we might retain the disposition of the people of the State to assist in an expedition when undertaken. The other gentlemen thought a strong letter of disapprobation should be written. Such a one was this day produced, strong and reprehendatory enough, in which I thought were visible the personal enmities of Knox and Hamilton, against Telfair, Gun, and Jackson--the two last having been of the council of officers. The letter passed without objection, being of the complexion before determined.

Wayne's letter was read, proposing that six hundred militia should set out from Fort Pitt to attack certain Miami towns, while he marched against the principal towns. The President disapproved it, because of the difficulty of concerted movements at six hundred miles distance; because these six hundred men might, and probably would have the whole force of the Indians to contend with; and because the object was not worth the risking such a number of men. We all concurred. It appeared to me, further, that to begin an expedition from Fort Pitt, the very first order for which is to be given now, when we have reason to believe Wayne advanced as far as Fort Jefferson, would be either too late for his movements, or would retard them very injuriously. [_Note._--The letters from the Commissioners were now read, announcing the refusal of the Indians to treat, unless the Ohio were made the boundary; and that they were on their return.]

A letter from Governor Clinton read, informing of his issuing a warrant to arrest Governor Galbaud, at the request of the French Consul, and that he was lead to interfere because the judge of the district lived at Albany. It was proposed to write to the judge of the district, that the place of his residence was not adapted to his duties; and to Clinton, that Galbaud was not liable to arrest. Hamilton said, that by the laws of New York, the Governor has the powers of a justice of peace, and had issued the warrant as such.

I was against writing letters to judiciary officers. I thought them independent of the Executive, not subject to its coercion, and, therefore, not obliged to attend to its admonitions.

The other three were for writing the letters. They thought it the duty of the President to see that the laws were executed; and if he found a failure in so important an officer, to communicate it to the legislature for impeachment.

Edmund Randolph undertook to write the letters, and I am to sign them as if mine. The President brought forward the subject of the ports, and thought a new demand of answer should be made to Mr. Hammond. As we had not Mr. Hammond's last answer (of June 20th) on that subject, agreed to let it lie over to Monday.

Hammond proposed, that on Monday we should take into consideration the fortification of the rivers and ports of the United States, and that though the Executive could not undertake to do it, preparatory surveys should be made to be laid before Congress, to be considered on Monday.

The letters to Genet covering a copy of mine to Gov. Morris--of ---- to the French consuls, threatening the revocation of their Exequaturs--to Mr. Pinckney on the additional instructions of Great Britain to their navy for shipping our corn, flour, &c., and to Gov. Morris on the similar order of the French National Assembly, are to be ready on Monday.

My letter to Mr. Hammond, in answer to his of August 30th, was read and approved. Hamilton wished not to narrow the ground of compensation so much as to cases after August 7th. Knox joined him, and by several observations showed he did not know what the question was. He could not comprehend that the letter of August 7th, which promised compensation (because we had not used all the means in our power for restricting), would not be contradicted by a refusal to compensate in cases after August 7th, where we should naturally use all the means in our power for restriction, and these means should be insufficient. The letter was agreed to on Mr. Randolph's opinion and mine; Hamilton acquiescing, Knox opposing.

* * * * *

At sundry meetings of the Heads of departments and Attorney General, from the 1st to the 28th of November, 1793, at the President's, several matters were agreed upon, as stated in the following letters from the Secretary of State, to wit:--

November the 8th. Circular letter to the representatives of France, Great Britain, Spain, and the United Netherlands, fixing provisionally the extent of our jurisdiction into the sea at a sea league.

10th. Circular letter to the district attorneys, notifying the same, and committing to them the taking depositions in those cases.

10th. Circular to the foreign representatives, notifying how depositions are to be taken in those cases.

The substance of the preceding letters was agreed to by all; the rough drafts were submitted to them and approved.

November the 14th. To Mr. Hammond, that the United States are not bound to restore the Roehampton. This was agreed by all. The rough draught was submitted to and approved by Colonel Hamilton and Mr. Randolph. General Knox was on a visit to Trenton.

10th. Letters to Mr. Genet and Hammond, and the 14th to Mr. Hollingsworth, for taking depositions in the cases of the Conningham and Pilgrim.

13th. Ditto, to Mr. Genet, Hammond, and Bowle, for depositions in the case of the William.

14th. Ditto, to Hollingsworth, to ascertain whether Mr. Moissonier had passed sentenced on the Rochampton and Pilgrim.

These last-mentioned letters of the 10th, 13th, and 14th were, as to their substance, agreed to by all, the draughts were only communicated to Mr. Randolph, and approved by him.

November the 13th. To Mr. Hammond, inquiring when we shall have an answer on the inexecution of the treaty. The substance agreed by all. The letter was sent off without communication, none of the gentlemen being at Germantown.

22d. To Mr. Genet, returning the commissions of Pennevert and Chervi, because not addressed to the President.

22d. To Mr. Genet, inquiring whether the Lovely-Lass, Prince William Henry, and Jane, of Dublin, have been given up; and if not, requiring that they be restored to owners. These were agreed to by all, as to their matter, and the letters themselves were submitted before they were sent to the President, the Secretary of War, and the Attorney-General.

22d. To Mr. Gore, for authentic evidence of Dannery's protest on the President's revocation of Duplaine's Exequatur. The substance agreed by all. The letter sent off before communication.

THOMAS JEFFERSON.
HENRY KNOX.
EDMUND RANDOLPH.
ALEXANDER HAMILTON.

November 23d, 1793.

* * * * *

November the 5th, 1793. E. Randolph tells me, that Hamilton, in conversation with him yesterday, said, "Sir, if all the people in America were now assembled, and to call on me to say whether I am a friend to the French revolution, I would declare that _I have it in abhorrence_."

* * * * *

November the 8th, 1793. At a conference at the President's, where I read several letters of Mr. Genet; on finishing one of them, I asked what should be the answer? The President thereupon took occasion to observe, that Mr. Genet's conduct continued to be of so extraordinary a nature, that he meant to propose to our serious consideration, whether he should not have his functions discontinued, and be ordered away? He went lengthily into observations on his conduct, to raise against the executive, 1, the people; 2, the State governments; 3, the Congress. He showed he felt the venom of Genet's pen, but declared he would not choose his insolence should be regarded any further, than as might be thought to affect the honor of the country. Hamilton and Knox readily and zealously argued for dismissing Mr. Genet. Randolph opposed it with firmness, and pretty lengthily. The President replied to him lengthily, and concluded by saying he did not wish to have the thing hastily decided, but that we should consider of it, and give our opinions on his return from Reading and Lancaster.

Accordingly, November the 18th, we met at his house; read new volumes of Genet's letters, received since the President's departure; then took up the discussion of the subjects of communication to Congress. 1. The Proclamation. E. Randolph read the statement he had prepared; Hamilton did not like it; said much about his own views; that the President had a right to declare his opinion to our citizens and foreign nations; that it was not the interest of this country to join in the war, and that we were under no obligation to join in it; that though the declaration would not legally bind Congress, yet the President had a right to give his opinion of it, and he was against any explanation in the speech, which should yield that he did not intend that foreign nations should consider it as a declaration of neutrality, future as well as present; that he understood it as meant to give them that sort of assurance and satisfaction, and to say otherwise now, would be a deception on them. He was for the President's using such expressions, as should neither affirm his right to make such a declaration to foreign nations, nor yield it. Randolph and myself opposed the right of the President to declare anything future on the question, shall there or shall there not be war, and that no such thing was intended; that Hamilton's construction of the effect of the proclamation, would have been a determination of the question of the _guarantee_, which we both denied to have intended, and I had at the time declared the executive incompetent to. Randolph said he meant that foreign nations should understand it as an intimation of the President's opinion, that neutrality would be our interest. I declared my meaning to have been, that foreign nations should understand no such thing; that on the contrary, I would have chosen them to be doubtful, and to come and bid for our neutrality. I admitted the President, having received the nation at the close of Congress in a state of peace, was bound to preserve them in that state till Congress should meet again, and might proclaim anything which went no farther. The President declared he never had an idea that he could bind Congress against declaring war, or that anything contained in his proclamation could look beyond the first day of their meeting. His main view was to keep our people in peace; he apologized for the use of the term neutrality in his answers, and justified it, by having submitted the first of them (that to the merchants, wherein it was used) to our consideration, and we had not objected to the term. He concluded in the end, that Colonel Hamilton should prepare a paragraph on this subject for the speech, and it should then be considered. We were here called to dinner.