Chapter LVII: Part V: The Anas (3)

I had, five or six days ago, received from Ternant, extracts from the lives of his ministers, complaining of both Gouverneur Morris and Mr. Short. I sent them this day to the President with an extract from a private letter of Mr. Short, justifying himself, and I called this evening on the President. He said he considered the extracts from Ternant very serious--in short, as decisive; that he saw that Gouverneur Morris could be no longer continued there consistent with the public good; that the moment was critical in our favor, and ought not to be lost; that he was extremely at a loss what arrangement to make. I asked him whether Gouverneur Morris and Pinckney might not change places. He said that would be a sort of remedy, but not a radical one. That if the French ministry conceived Gouverneur Morris to be hostile to them; if they would be jealous merely on his proposing to visit London, they would never be satisfied with us at placing him at London permanently. He then observed, that though I had unfixed the day on which I had intended to resign, yet I appeared fixed in doing it at no great distance of time; that in this case, he could not but wish that I would go to Paris; that the moment was important: I possessed the confidence of both sides, and might do great good; that he wished I could do it, were it only to stay there a year or two. I told him that my mind was so bent on retirement that I could not think of launching forth again in a new business; that I could never again cross the Atlantic; and that as to the opportunity of doing good, this was likely to be the scene of action, as Genet was bringing powers to do the business here; but that I could not think of going abroad. He replied that I had pressed him to continue in the public service, and refused to do the same myself. I said the case was very different; he united the confidence of all America, and was the only person who did so: his services therefore were of the last importance; but for myself, my going out would not be noted or known. A thousand others could supply my place to equal advantage, therefore I felt myself free; and that as to the mission to France, I thought perfectly proper. He desired me then to consider maturely what arrangement should be made.

Smith, in speaking of Morris, said, that at his own table, in presence of his company and servants, he cursed the French ministers, as a set of damned rascals; said the king would still be replaced upon his throne. He said he knew they had written to have him recalled, and expected to be recalled. He consulted Smith to know whether he would bring his furniture here duty free. Smith has mentioned the situation of Gouverneur Morris freely to others here. Smith said also that the ministers told him they meant to begin their attack at the mouth of the Mississippi, and to sweep along the Bay of Mexico southwardly, and that they would have no objection to our incorporating into our government the two Floridas.

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February the 25th, 1793. The President desires the opinions of the heads of the three departments, and of the Attorney-General, on the following question, to wit: Mr. Ternant having applied for money equivalent to three millions of livres, to be furnished on account of our debt to France at the request of the executive of that country, which sum is to be laid out in provisions within the United States, to be sent to France. Shall the money be furnished?

The Secretary of the Treasury stated it as his opinion, that making a liberal allowance for the depreciation of assignats, (no rule of liquidation having been yet fixed,) a sum of about three hundred and eighteen thousand dollars may not exceed the arrearages equitably due to France to the end of 1792, and that the whole sum asked for may be furnished within periods capable of answering the purpose of Mr. Ternant's application, without a derangement of the Treasury.

Whereupon the Secretaries of State and War, and the Attorney General, are of opinion that the whole sum asked for by Mr. Ternant ought to be furnished: the Secretary of the Treasury is of opinion that the supply ought not exceed the above-mentioned sum of three hundred and eighteen thousand dollars.

The President having required the attendance of the heads of the three departments, and of the Attorney General, at his house, on Monday the 25th of February, 1793, the following questions were proposed, and answers given:

1. The Governor of Canada having refused to let us obtain provisions from that province, or to pass them along the water communication to the place of treaty with the Indians; and the Indians having refused to let them pass peaceably along what they call the bloody path, the Governor of Canada at the same time proposing to furnish the whole provisions necessary, ought the treaty to proceed? Answer unanimously, it ought to proceed.

2. Have the Executive, or the Executive and Senate together, authority to relinquish to the Indians the right of soil of any part of the land north of the Ohio, which has been validly obtained by former treaties?

The Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary at War, and Attorney General, are of opinion that the Executive and Senate have such authority, provided that no grants to individuals, nor reservations to States, be thereby infringed. The Secretary of State is of opinion they have no such authority to relinquish.

3. Will it be expedient to make any such relinquishments to the Indians, if essential to peace?

The Secretaries of the Treasury and War, and the Attorney General, are of opinion it will be expedient to make such relinquishments if essential to peace, provided it do not include any lands sold or received for special purposes (the reservations for trading places excepted). The Secretary of State is of opinion that the Executive and Senate have authority to stipulate with the Indians, and that if essential to peace, it will be expedient to stipulate that we will not settle any lands between those already sold, or reserved for special purposes, and the lines heretofore validly established with the Indians.

Whether the Senate shall be previously consulted on this point. The opinion unanimously is, that it will be better not to consult them previously.

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February the 26th, 1793. Notes on the proceedings of yesterday. [See the formal opinions given to the President in writing, and signed.]

First question. We are all of opinion that the treaty should proceed merely to gratify the public opinion, and not from an expectation of success. I expressed myself strongly, that the event was so unpromising, that I thought the preparations for a campaign should go on without the least relaxation, and that a day should be fixed with the commissioners for the treaty, beyond which they should not permit the treaty to be protracted, by which day orders should be given for our forces to enter into action. The President took up the thing instantly, after I had said this, and declared that he was so much in the opinion that the treaty would end in nothing, that he then, in the presence of us all, gave orders to General Knox, not to slacken the preparations for the campaign in the least, but to exert every nerve in preparing for it. Knox said something about the ultimate day for continuing the negotiations. I acknowledged myself not a judge on what day the campaign should begin, but that whatever it was, that day should terminate the treaty. Knox said he thought a winter campaign was always the most efficacious against the Indians. I was of opinion, since Great Britain insisted on furnishing provisions, that we should offer to repay. Hamilton thought we should not.

Second question. I considered our right of pre-emption of the Indian lands, not as amounting to any dominion, or jurisdiction, or paramountship whatever, but merely in the nature of a remainder after the extinguishment of a present right, which gave us no present right whatever, but of preventing other nations from taking possession, and so defeating our expectancy; that the Indians had the full, undivided and independent sovereignty as long as they choose to keep it, and that this might be forever; that as fast as we extend our rights by purchase from them, so fast we extend the limits of our society, and as soon as a new portion became encircled within our line, it became a fixed limit of our society; that the executive, with either or both branches of the legislature, could not alien any part of our territory; that by the law of nations it was settled, that the unity and indivisibility of the society was so fundamental, that it could not be dismembered by the constituted authorities, except, 1, where _all power_ was delegated to them (as in the case of despotic governments), or, 2, where it was expressly delegated; that neither of these delegations had been made to our General Government, and therefore, that it had no right to dismember or alienate any portion of territory once ultimately consolidated with us; and that we could no more cede to the Indians than to the English or Spaniards, as it might, according to acknowledged principles, remain as irrevocably and eternally with the one as the other. But I thought, that as we had a right to sell and settle lands once comprehended within our lines, so we might forbear to exercise that right, retaining the property till circumstances should be more favorable to the settlement, and this I agreed to do in the present instance, if necessary for peace.

Hamilton agreed to the doctrine of the law of nations, as laid down in Europe, but that it was founded on the universality of settlement there; consequently, that no lopping off of territory could be made without a lopping off of citizens, which required their consent; but that the law of nations for us must be adapted to the circumstance of our unsettled country, which he conceived the President and Senate may cede; that the power of treaty was given to them by the Constitution, without restraining it to particular objects; consequently, that it was given in as plenipotentiary a form as held by any sovereign in any other society. Randolph was of opinion there was a difference between a cession to Indians and to any others, because it only restored the ceded part to the condition in which it was before we bought it, and consequently, that we might buy it again hereafter; therefore, he thought the executive and Senate could cede it. Knox joined in the main opinion. The President discovered no opinion, but he made some efforts to get us to join in some terms which could unite us all, and he seemed to direct those efforts more towards me; but the thing could not be done.

Third question. We agreed in idea as to the line to be drawn, to wit, so as to retain all lands appropriated, or granted, or reserved.

Fourth question. We all thought if the Senate should be consulted, and consequently apprized of our line, it would become known to Hammond, and we should lose all chance of saving anything more at the treaty than our ultimatum.

The President, at this meeting, mentioned the declaration of some person, in a paper of Fenno, that he would commence an attack on the character of Dr. Franklin. He said the theme was to him excessively disagreeable on other considerations, but most particularly so, as the party seemed to do it as a means of defending him (the President) against the late attacks on him; that such a mode of defence would be peculiarly painful to him, and he wished it could be stopped. Hamilton and Randolph undertook to speak to Fenno to suppress it, without mentioning it as the President's wish. Both observed that they had heard this declaration mentioned in many companies, and that it had excited universal horror and detestation.

The paper in Fenno must lie between two persons, viz., Adams and Izard, because they are the only persons who could know such facts as are there promised to be unfolded. Adams is an enemy to both characters, and might choose this ground as an effectual position to injure both. Izard hated Franklin with unparalleled bitterness, but humbly adores the President, because he is in _loco regis_. If the paper proceeds, we shall easily discover which of these two gentlemen is the champion. In the meantime, the first paper leads our suspicions more towards Izard than Adams, from the circumstance of style, and because he is quite booby enough not to see the injury he would do to the President by such a mode of defence.

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February the 28th. Knox, E. Randolph and myself met at Knox's, where Hamilton was also to have met, to consider the time, manner and place of the President's swearing in. Hamilton had been there before, and had left his opinion with Knox, to wit, that the President should ask a judge to attend him in his own house to administer the oath, in the presence of the Heads of departments, which oath should be deposited in the Secretary of State's office. I concurred in this opinion. Randolph was for the President's going to the Senate's chamber to take the oath, attended by the marshal of the United States, who should then make proclamation, &c. Knox was for this, and for adding the House of Representatives to the presence, as they would not yet be departed. Our individual opinions were written, to be communicated to the President, out of which he might form one. In the course of our conversation, Knox, stickling for parade, got into great warmth, and swore that our government must either be entirely new modeled, or it would be knocked to pieces in less than ten years; and that as it is at present, he would not give a copper for it; that it is the President's character, and not the written constitution, which keeps it together.

Same day. Conversation with Lear. He expressed the strongest confidence that republicanism was the universal creed of America, except of a very few; that a republican administration must of necessity immediately overbear the contrary faction; said that he had seen with extreme regret that a number of gentlemen had for a long time been endeavoring to instil into the President, that the noise against the administration of the government was that of a little faction, which would soon be silent, and which was detested by the people, who were contented and prosperous; that this very party, however, began to see their error, and that the sense of America was bursting forth to their conviction.

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March the 2d, 1793. See in the papers of this date, Mr. Giles's resolutions. He and one or two others were sanguine enough to believe that the palpableness of these resolutions rendered it impossible the House could reject them. Those who knew the composition of the House, 1, of bank directors; 2 holders of bank stock; 3, stock jobbers; 4, blind devotees; 5, ignorant persons who did not comprehend them; 6, lazy and good-humored persons, who comprehended and acknowledged them, yet were too lazy to examine, or unwilling to pronounce censure; the persons who knew these characters, foresaw that the three first descriptions making one-third of the House, the three latter would make one-half of the residue; and, of course, that they would be rejected by a majority of two to one. But they thought that even this rejection would do good, by showing the public the desperate and abandoned dispositions with which their affairs were conducted. The resolutions were proposed, and nothing spared to present them in the fulness of demonstration. There were not more than three or four who voted otherwise than had been expected.

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March the 30th, 1793. At our meeting at the President's, February the 25th, in discussing the question, whether we should furnish to France the three millions of livres desired, Hamilton, in speaking on the subject, used this expression, "When Mr. Genet arrives, whether we shall receive him or not, will then be a question for discussion," which expression I did not recollect till E. Randolph reminded me of it a few days after. Therefore, on the 20th instant, as the President was shortly to set out for Mount Vernon, I observed to him, that as Genet might arrive in his absence, I wished to know beforehand how I should treat him, whether as a person who would or would not be received? He said he could see no ground of doubt but that he ought to be received. On the 24th he asked E. Randolph's opinion on the subject, saying he had consulted Colonel Hamilton thereon, who went into lengthy considerations of doubt and difficulty, and viewing it as a very unfortunate thing that the President should have the decision of so critical a point forced on him; but, in conclusion, said, since he was brought into that situation, he did not see but that he must receive Mr. Genet. Randolph told the President he was clear he should be received, and the President said he had never had any doubt on the subject in his mind. Afterwards, on the same day, he spoke to me again on it, and said Mr. Genet should unquestionably be received; but he thought not with too much warmth or cordiality, so only as to be satisfactory to him. I wondered at first at this restriction; but when Randolph afterwards communicated to me his conversation of the 24th, I became satisfied it was a small sacrifice to the opinion of Hamilton.

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March the 31st. Mr. Beckley tells me, that the merchants' bonds for duties on six months' credit became due the 1st instant to a very great amount, that Hamilton went to the bank on that day, and directed the bank to discount for those merchants all their bonds at thirty days, and that he would have the collectors credited for the money at the treasury. Hence, the treasury lumping its receipts by the month in its printed accounts, these sums will be considered by the public as only received on the last day; consequently, the bank makes the month's interest out of it. Beckley had this from a merchant who had a bond discounted, and supposes a million of dollars were discounted at the bank here. Mr. Brown got the same information from another merchant, who supposed only six hundred thousand dollars discounted here. But they suppose the same orders went to all the branch banks to a great amount.

_Eodem die._ Mr. Brown tells me he has it from a merchant, that during the last winter the directors of the bank ordered the freest discounts. Every man could obtain it. Money being so flush, the six per cents run up to twenty-one and twenty-two shillings. Then the directors sold out their private stocks. When the discounted notes were becoming due, they stopped discounts, and not a dollar was to be had. This reduced six per cents to eighteen shillings and three pence; then the same directors bought in again.

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April the 7th, 1793. Mr. Lear called on me, and introduced of himself a conversation on the affairs of the United States. He laughed at the cry of prosperity, and the deriving it from the establishment of the treasury: he said, that so far from giving into this opinion, and that we were paying off our national debt, he was clear the debt was growing on us; that he had lately expressed this opinion to the President, who appeared much astonished at it. I told him I had given the same hint to the President last summer, and lately again had suggested, that we were even depending for the daily subsistence of government on borrowed money. He said, that was certain, and was the only way of accounting for what was become of the money drawn over from Holland to this country. He regretted that the President was not in the way of hearing full information, declared he communicated to him everything he could learn himself; that the men who vaunted the present government so much on some occasions, were the very men who at other times declared it was a poor thing, and such a one as could not stand, and he was sensible they only esteemed it as a stepping stone to something else, and had availed themselves of the first moments of the enthusiasm in favor of it, to pervert its principles and make of it what they wanted; and that though they raised the cry of anti-federalism against those who censured the mode of administration, yet he was satisfied, whenever it should come to be tried, that the very men whom they called anti-federalists, were the men who would save the government, and he looked to the next Congress for much rectification.

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April the 18th. The President sends a set of questions to be considered, and calls a meeting. Though those sent me were in his own hand writing, yet it was palpable from the style, their ingenious tissue and suite, that they were not the President's, that they were raised upon a prepared chain of argument, in short, that the language was Hamilton's, and the doubts his alone. They led to a declaration of the executive, that our treaty with France is void. E. Randolph, the next day, told me that the day before the date of these questions, Hamilton went with him through the whole chain of reasoning of which these questions are the skeleton, and that he recognized them the moment he saw them.

We met. The first question, whether we should receive the French minister, Genet, was proposed, and we agreed unanimously that he should be received; Hamilton, at the same time, expressing his great regret that any incident had happened, which should oblige us to recognize the government. The next question was, whether he should be received absolutely, or with qualifications. Here Hamilton took up the whole subject, and went through it in the order in which the questions sketch it. See the chain of his reasoning in my opinions of April the 28th. Knox subscribed at once to Hamilton's opinion that we ought to declare the treaty void, acknowledging, at the same time, like a fool as he is, that he knew nothing about it. I was clear it remained valid. Randolph declared himself of the same opinion, but on Hamilton's undertaking to present to him the authority in Vattel (which we had not present) and to prove to him, that if the authority was admitted, the treaty might be declared void, Randolph agreed to take further time to consider. It was adjourned. We determined, unanimously, the last question, that Congress should not be called. There having been an intimation by Randolph, that in so great a question he should choose to give a written opinion, and this being approved by the President, I gave in mine April the 28th. Hamilton gave in his. I believe Knox's was never thought worth offering or asking for. Randolph gave his May the 6th, concurring with mine. The President told me, the same day, he had never had a doubt about the validity of the treaty; but that since a question had been suggested, he thought it ought to be considered; that this being done, I might now issue passports to sea vessels in the form prescribed by the French treaty. I had for a week past only issued the Dutch form; to have issued the French, would have been presupposing the treaty to be in existence. The President suggested, that he thought it would be as well that nothing should be said of such a question having been under consideration.

Written May the 6th.

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May the 6th, 1793. When the question was, whether the proclamation of April the 22d should be issued, Randolph observed, that there should be a letter written by me to the ministers of the belligerent powers, to declare that it should not be taken as conclusive evidence against our citizens in foreign courts of admiralty, for contraband goods. Knox suddenly adopted the opinion, before Hamilton delivered his. Hamilton opposed it pretty strongly. I thought it an indifferent thing, but rather approved Randolph's opinion. The President was against it; but observed that _as there were three for it, it should go_. This was the first instance I had seen of an opportunity to decide by a mere majority, including his own vote.

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May the 12th. Lear called on me to-day. Speaking of the lowness of stocks, (sixteen shillings,) I observed it was a pity we had not money to buy on public account. He said, yes, and that it was the more provoking, as two millions had been borrowed for that purpose, and drawn over here, and yet were not here. That he had no doubt those would take notice of the circumstance whose duty it was to do so. I suppose he must mean the President.

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May the 23d. I had sent to the President yesterday, draughts of a letter from him to the Provisory Executive Council of France, and of one from myself to Mr. Ternant, both on the occasion of his recall. I called on him to-day. He said there was an expression in one of them, which he had never before seen in any of our public communications, to wit, "our republic." The letter prepared for him to the Council, began thus: "The Citizen Ternant has delivered to me the letter wherein you inform me, that yielding, &c., you had determined to recall him from his mission, as your Minister Plenipotentiary to _our republic_." He had underscored the words, _our republic_. He said that certainly ours was a republican government, but yet we had not used that style in this way; that if any body wanted to change its form into a monarchy, he was sure it was only a few individuals, and that no man in the United States would set his face against it more than himself; but that this was not what he was afraid of; his fears were from another quarter; that there was more danger of anarchy being introduced. He adverted to a piece in Freneau's paper of yesterday; he said he despised all their attacks on him personally, but that there never had been an act of the government, not meaning in the executive line only, but in any line, which that paper had not abused. He had also marked the word republic thus , where it was applied to the French republic. (See the original paper.) He was evidently sore and warm, and I took his intention to be, that I should interpose in some way with Freneau, perhaps withdraw his appointment of translating clerk to my office. But I will not do it. His paper has saved our constitution, which was galloping fast into monarchy, and has been checked by no one means so powerfully as by that paper. It is well and universally known, that it has been that paper which has checked the career of the monocrats; and the President, not sensible of the designs of the party, has not with his usual good sense and _sang froid_, looked on the efforts and effects of this free press, and seen that, though some bad things have passed through it to the public, yet the good have preponderated immensely.

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June the 7th, 1793. Mr. Beckley, who has returned from New York within a few days, tells me that while he was there, Sir John Temple, Consul General of the northern States for Great Britain, showed him a letter from Sir Gregory Page Turner, a member of Parliament for a borough in Yorkshire, who, he said, had been a member for twenty-five years, and always confidential for the ministers, in which he permitted him to read particular passages of the following purport: "that the government was well apprized of the predominancy of the British interest in the United States; that they considered Colonel Hamilton, Mr. King, and Mr. W. Smith of South Carolina, as the main supports of that interest; that particularly, they considered Colonel Hamilton, and not Mr. Hammond, as their effective minister here; that if the anti-federal interest (that was his term), at the head of which they considered Mr. Jefferson to be, should prevail, these gentlemen _had secured_ an asylum to themselves in England." Beckley could not understand whether they had secured it _themselves_,[10] or whether they were only notified that it was secured to them. So that they understand that they may go on boldly in their machinations to change the government, and if they should be overset and choose to withdraw, they will be secure of a pension in England, as Arnold, Deane, &c., had. Sir John read passages of a letter (which he did not put into Beckley's hand, as he did the other) from Lord Grenville, saying nearly the same things. This letter mentions to Sir John, that though they had divided the Consul Generalship, and given the southern department to Bond, yet he, Sir John, was to retain his whole salary. [By this it would seem, as if, wanting to use Bond, they had covered his employment with this cloak.] Mr. Beckley says that Sir John Temple is a strong republican. I had a proof of his intimacy with Sir John in this circumstance. Sir John received his new commission of Consul for the northern department, and instead of sending it through Mr. Hammond, got Beckley to enclose it to me for his exequatur. I wrote to Sir John that it must come through Mr. Hammond, enclosing it back to him. He accordingly then sent it to Mr. Hammond.

In conversation with the President to-day, and speaking about General Greene, he said that he and General Greene had always differed in opinion about the manner of using militia. Greene always placed them in his front: himself was of opinion, they should always be used as a reserve to improve any advantage, for which purpose they were the _finest fellows_ in the world. He said he was on the ground of the battle of Guilford, with a person who was in the action, and who explained the whole of it to him. That General Greene's front was behind a fence at the edge of a large field, through which the enemy were obliged to pass to get at them; and that in their passage through this, they must have been torn all to pieces, if troops had been posted there who would have stood their ground; and that the retreat from that position was through a thicket, perfectly secure. Instead of this, he posted the North Carolina militia there, who only gave one fire and fell back, so that the whole benefit of their position was lost. He thinks that the regulars, with their field pieces, would have hardly let a single man get through that field.

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_Eodem die_ (June the 7th). Beckley tells me that he has the following fact from Governor Clinton. That before the proposition for the present General Government, _i. e._ a little before Hamilton conceived a plan for establishing a monarchial government in the United States, he wrote a draught of a circular letter, which was to be sent to about ---- persons, to bring it about. One of these letters, in Hamilton's handwriting, is now in possession of an old militia General up the North River, who, at that time, was thought _orthodox_ enough to be entrusted in the execution. This General has given notice to Governor Clinton that he has this paper, and that he will deliver it into his hands, and no one's else. Clinton intends, the first interval of leisure, to go for it, and he will bring it to Philadelphia. Beckley is a man of perfect truth as to what he affirms of his own knowledge, but too credulous as to what he hears from others.

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June the 10th, 1793. Mr. Brown gives me the following specimen of the phrenzy which prevailed at New York on the opening of the new government. The first public ball which took place after the President's arrival there, Colonel Humphreys, Colonel W. S. Smith and Mrs. Knox were to arrange the ceremonials. These arrangements were as follows: a sofa at the head of the room, raised on several steps, whereon the President and Mrs. Washington were to be seated. The gentlemen were to dance in swords. Each one, when going to dance, was to lead his partner to the foot of the sofa, make a low obeisance to the President and his lady, then go and dance, and when done, bring his partner again to the foot of the sofa for new obeisances, and then to retire to their chairs. It was to be understood, too, that gentlemen should be dressed in bags. Mrs. Knox contrived to come with the President, and to follow him and Mrs. Washington to their destination, and she had the design of forcing an invitation from the President to a seat on the sofa. She mounted up the steps after them unbidden, but unfortunately the wicked sofa was so short, that when the President and Mrs. Washington were seated, there was not room for a third person; she was obliged, therefore, to descend in the face of the company, and to sit where she could. In other respects the ceremony was conducted rigorously according to the arrangements, and the President made to pass an evening which his good sense rendered a very miserable one to him.

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June the 12th. Beckley tells me that Klingham has been with him to day, and relates to him the following fact: A certificate of the old Congress had been offered at the treasury and refused payment, and so indorsed in red ink as usual. This certificate came to the hands of Francis, (the quondam clerk of the treasury, who, on account of his being dipped in the infamous case of the Baron Glaubec, Hamilton had been obliged to dismiss, to save appearances, but with an assurance of all future service, and he accordingly got him established in New York.) Francis wrote to Hamilton that such a ticket was offered him, but he could not buy it unless he would inform him and give him his certificate that it was good. Hamilton wrote him a most friendly letter, and sent him the certificate. He bought the paper, and came on here and got it recognized, whereby he made twenty-five hundred dollars. Klingham saw both the letter and certificate.

Irving, a clerk in the treasury, an Irishman, is the author of the pieces now coming out under the signature of Veritas, and attacking the President. I have long suspected this detestable game was playing by the fiscal party, to place the President on their side.

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June the 17th, 1793. At a meeting of the Heads of department at the President's this day, on summons from him, a letter from Mr. Genet of the 15th inst. (addressed to the Secretary of State on the subject of the seizure of a vessel by the Governor of New York, as having been armed, equipped and manned in that port, with a design to cruize on the enemies of France), was read, as also the draught of an answer prepared by the Secretary of State, which was approved.

Read, also, a letter of June 14th from Mr. Hammond to the Secretary of State, desiring to know whether the French privateers, the Citizen Genet, and Sans Culottes, are to be allowed to return or send their prizes into the ports of the United States. It is the opinion that he be informed that they were required to depart to the dominions of their own sovereign, and nothing expressed as to their ulterior proceedings; and that in answer to that part which states that the Sans Culottes had increased its force in the port of Baltimore, and remained there in the avowed intention of watching the motions of a valuable ship now lying there, it be answered that we expect the speedy departure of those privateers will obviate the inconveniences apprehended, and that it will be considered whether any practical arrangements can be adopted to prevent the augmentations of the force of armed vessels.

THOMAS JEFFERSON.
ALEXANDER HAMILTON.
HENRY KNOX.

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June the 20th, 1793. At a meeting this day of the Heads of department at the President's, on summons from him, a letter from Messrs. Viar and Jaudenes, dated June 18th, and addressed to the Secretary of State, was read; whereupon it is the opinion that a full detail of the proceedings of the United States with respect to the southern Indians and the Spaniards be prepared, and a justification as to the particular matters charged in the said letter; that this be sent, with all the necessary documents, to our commissioners at the court of Madrid, leaving to them a discretion to change expressions in it which to them may appear likely to give offence in the circumstances under which they may be at the time of receiving it; and that a copy be sent to Mr. Pinckney for his information, and to make such use of the matter it contains as to him should seem expedient; that an answer be written to Messrs. Viar and Jaudenes informing them that we shall convey our sentiments on the subject to their court through our commissioners at Madrid, and letting them see that we are not insensible to the style and manner of their communications.

A draught of a letter from the Secretary of State to Mr. Hammond, asking when an answer to his letter of May 29th, 1792, might be expected, was read and approved.

THOMAS JEFFERSON.
ALEXANDER HAMILTON.
HENRY KNOX.

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July the 5th, 1793. A meeting desired by Alexander Hamilton at my office. Himself, Knox, and myself met accordingly. He said that according to what had been agreed on in presence of the President, in consequence of Mr. Genet's declining to pay the $45,000 at his command in the treasury, to the holders of the St. Domingo bills, we had agreed to pay the holders out of other moneys to that amount; that he found, however, that these bills would amount to $90,000, and the question was whether he should assume $90,000 to be paid out of the September instalment. This, he said, would enable holders to get discounts at the banks, would therefore be equal to ready money, and save them from bankruptcy. Unanimously agreed to. We also agreed to a letter written by General Knox to Governor Mifflin, to have a particular inquiry made whether the Little Sarah is arming, &c., or not. I read also Governor Lee's letter about the Governor of South Carolina's proclamation respecting pestilential disease in West Indies. We are all of opinion the evidence is too slight for interference, and doubt the power to interfere. Therefore let it lie.

Mr. Genet called on me, and read to me very rapidly instructions he had prepared for Michaud, who is going to Kentucky; an address to the inhabitants of Louisiana, and another to those of Canada. In these papers it appears that, besides encouraging those inhabitants to insurrection, he speaks of two generals in Kentucky who have proposed to him to go and take New Orleans, if he will furnish the expense, about £3,000 sterling. He declines advancing it, but promises that sum ultimately for their expenses; proposes that officers shall be commissioned by himself in Kentucky and Louisiana; that they shall rendezvous _out of the territories of the United States_,--suppose in Louisiana, and there making up a battalion to be called the ---- ---- of inhabitants of Louisiana and Kentucky, and getting what Indians they could, to undertake the expedition against New Orleans, and then Louisiana to be established into an independent State, connected in commerce with France and the United States; that two frigates shall go into the river Mississippi, and co-operate against New Orleans. The address to Canada was to encourage them to shake off English yoke, to call Indians to their assistance, and to assure them of the friendly dispositions of their neighbors of the United States.

He said he communicated these things to me, not as Secretary of State, but as Mr. Jefferson. I told him that his enticing officers and soldiers from Kentucky to go against Spain, was really putting a halter about their necks; for that they would assuredly be hung if they commenced hostilities against a nation at peace with the United States. That leaving out that article I did not care what insurrections should be excited in Louisiana. He had about a fortnight ago sent me a communication for Michaud as consul of France at Kentucky, and desired an Exequatur. I told him this could not be given, that it was only in the _ports_ of the United States they were entitled to consuls, and that if France should have a consul at Kentucky, England and Spain would soon demand the same, and we should have all our interior country filled with foreign agents. He acquiesced, and asked me to return the commission and his note, which I did; but he desired I would give Michaud a letter of introduction for Governor Shelby. I sent him one a day or two after. He now observes to me that in that letter I speak of him only as a person of botanical and natural pursuits, but that he wished the Governor to view him as something more; as a French citizen possessing his confidence. I took back the letter and wrote another.

_Memorandum of a Meeting at the State House, Philadelphia relative to the case of the Little Sarah._

July the 8th, 1793. At a meeting at the State House of the City of Philadelphia,

Present: the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of War.

It appears that a brigantine, called the Little Sarah, has been fitted out at the port of Philadelphia, with fourteen cannon and all other equipment, indicating that she is intended to cruise under the authority of France, and that she is now lying in the river Delaware, at some place between this city and Mud Island; that a conversation has been had between the Secretary of State and the Minister Plenipotentiary of France, in which conversation the Minister refused to give any explicit assurance that the brigantine would continue until the arrival of the President, and his decision in the case, but made declarations respecting her not being ready to sail within the time of the expected return of the President, from which the Secretary of State infers with confidence, that she will not sail till the President will have an opportunity of considering and determining the case; that in the course of the conversation, the Minister declared that the additional guns which had been taken in by the Little Sarah were French property, but the Governor of Pennsylvania declared that he has good ground to believe that two of her cannon were purchased here of citizens of Philadelphia.

The Governor of Pennsylvania asks advice what steps, under the circumstances, he shall pursue?

The Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of War are of opinion, that it is expedient that immediate measures should be taken provisionally for establishing a battery on Mud Island, under cover of a party of militia, with direction that if the brig Sarah should attempt to depart before the pleasure of the President shall be known concerning her, military coercion be employed to arrest and prevent her progress.

The Secretary of State dissents from this opinion.

_Reasons for his Dissent._

I am against the preceding opinion of the Secretaries of the Treasury and War, for ordering a battery to be erected on Mud Island, and firing on the Little Sarah, an armed vessel of the Republic of France:

Because I am satisfied, from what passed between Mr. Genet and myself at our personal interview yesterday, that the vessel will not be ordered to sail till the return of the President, which, by a letter of this day's post, we may certainly expect within eight and forty hours from this time.

Because the erecting a battery and mounting guns to prevent her passage might cause a departure not now intended, and produce the fact it is meant to prevent.

Because were such battery and guns now in readiness and to fire on her, in the present ardent state of her crew just in the moment of leaving port, it is morally certain that bloody consequences would follow. No one could say how many lives would be lost on both sides, and all experience has shown, that blood once seriously spilled between nation and nation, the contest is continued by subordinate agents, and the door of peace is shut. At this moment, too, we expect in the river twenty of their ships of war, with a fleet of from one hundred to one hundred and fifty of their private vessels, which will arrive at the scene of blood in time to continue it, if not to partake in it.

Because the actual commencement of hostilities against a nation, for such this act may be, is an act of too serious consequence to our countrymen to be brought on their heads by subordinate officers, not chosen by them nor clothed with their confidence; and too presumptuous on the part of those officers, when the chief magistrate, into whose hands the citizens have commited their safety, is within eight and forty hours of his arrival here, and may have an opportunity of judging for himself and them, whether the buying and carrying away two cannon, (for according to information, the rest are the nation's own property,) is sufficient cause of war between Americans and Frenchmen.

Because, should the vessel, contrary to expectation, depart before the President's arrival, the adverse powers may be told the truth of the case: that she went off contrary to what we had a right to expect; that we shall be justifiable in future cases to measure our confidence accordingly; that for the present we shall demand satisfaction from France, which, with the proof of good faith we have already given, ought to satisfy them. Above all, Great Britain ought not to complain: for, since the date of the order forbidding that any of the belligerent powers should equip themselves in our ports with our arms, these two cannon are all that have escaped the vigilance of our officers on the part of their enemies, while their vessels have carried off more than ten times the number, without any impediment; and if the suggestion be true (and as yet it is but suggestion) that there are fifteen or twenty Americans on board the Little Sarah, who have gone with their own consent, it is equally true that more than ten times that number of Americans are at this moment on board English ships of war, who have been taken forcibly from our merchant vessels at sea or in port, wherever met with, and compelled to bear arms against the friends of their country. And is it less a breach of our neutrality towards France to suffer England to strengthen herself with our force, than towards England to suffer France to do so? And are we equally ready and disposed to sink the British vessels in our ports by way of reprisal for this notorious and avowed practice?

Because it is inconsistent for a nation which has been patiently bearing for ten years the grossest insults and injuries from their late enemies, to rise at a feather against their friends and benefactors; and that, too, in a moment when circumstances have kindled the most ardent affections of the two people towards each other; when the little subjects of displeasure which have arisen are the acts of a particular individual, not yet important enough to have been carried to his government as causes of complaint; are such as nations of moderation and justice settle by negociation, not making war their first step; are such as that government would correct at a word, if we may judge from the late unequivocal demonstrations of their friendship towards us; and are very slight shades of the acts committed against us by England, which we have been endeavoring to rectify by negociation, and on which they have never condescended to give any answer to our minister.

Because I would not gratify the combination of kings with the spectacle of the two only republics on earth destroying each other for two cannon; nor would I, for infinitely greater cause, add this country to that combination, turn the scale of contest, and let it be from our hands that the hopes of man received their last stab.

It has been observed that a general order has been already given to stop by force vessels arming contrary to rule in our ports, in which I concurred. I did so because it was highly presumeable that the destination of such a vessel would be discovered in some early stage, when there would be few persons on board, these not yet disposed nor prepared to resist, and a small party of militia put aboard would stop the procedure without a marked infraction of the peace. But it is a much more serious thing when a vessel has her full complement of men, (here said to be one hundred and twenty,) with every preparation and probably with disposition to go through with their enterprise. A serious engagement is then a certain consequence. Besides, an act of force, committed by an officer in a distant port, under general orders, given long ago, to take effect on all cases, and with less latitude of discretion in him, would be a much more negociable case than a recent order, given by the general government itself (for that is the character we are to assume) on the spot, in the very moment, pointed at this special case, professing full discretion and not using it. This would be a stubborn transaction, not admitting those justifications and explanations which might avert a war, or admitting such only as would be entirely humiliating to the officers giving the order, and to the government itself.

On the whole, respect to the chief magistrate, respect to our countrymen, their lives, interests, and affection, respect to a most friendly nation, who, if we give them the opportunity, will answer our wrongs by correcting and not by repeating them; respect to the most sacred cause that ever man was engaged in, poising maturely the evils which may flow from the commitment of an act which it would be in the power and probably in the temper of subordinate agents to make an act of continued war, and those which may flow from an eight and forty hours suspension of the act, are motives with me for suspending it eight and forty hours, even should we thereby lose the opportunity of committing it altogether.

_Copy of a minute given to the President._

July the 12th, 1793. At a meeting of the Heads of the departments at the President's, on summons from him, and on consideration of various representations from the Minister Plenipotentiary of France and Great Britain, on the subject of vessels arming and arriving in our ports, and of prizes;--it is their opinion that letters be written to the said ministers, informing them that the executive of the United States is desirous of having done what shall be strictly conformable to the treaties of the United States; and the laws respecting the said cases has determined to refer the questions arising therein to persons learned in the laws; that as this reference will occasion some delay, it is expected that, in the meantime, the Little Sarah, or Little Democrat, the ship Jane, and the ship William, in the Delaware, the Citoyen Genet and her prizes, the brigs Lovely-Lass and Prince William Henry, and the brig in the Chesapeake, do not depart till the further order of the President.

That letters be addressed to the judges of the Supreme Court of the United States, requesting their attendance at this place on Thursday the 18th instant, to give their advice on certain matters of public concern, which will be referred to them by the President.

That the Governor be desired to have the ship Jane attended to with vigilance, and if she be found augmenting her force and about to depart, that he cause her to be stopped.

THOMAS JEFFERSON.
ALEXANDER HAMILTON.
HENRY KNOX.

_A recapitulation of questions whereon we have given opinions._