Chapter XXIV: Introduction: To the Timæus (3)

XXIV.—For the present, then, we must consider three things:—first, that which is produced,—the second, that in which it is produced,—and the third, that of which the thing produced is the natural resemblance. And especially is it proper to compare that which receives to the mother (_i. e._ which supplies the model), that from which it receives to the father, and the nature intermediate between these to the child;[307] and to consider, also, that as the image should present every possible variety of forms, that in which the model is formed cannot well be prepared for the purpose, unless those forms have been erased from it which it used to receive from other quarters. Indeed, if it were like any of the objects that enter into it, if aught were to present itself of a nature contrary and wholly different, it would produce a bad likeness thereof. And hence from presenting at the same time its own image, that which is destined to receive within itself all the different species possible, should itself be destitute of all form whatever;—just as those preparing sweet-smelling unguents take all pains to render wholly inodorous the liquids that are to receive the perfume,—and as those also who wish to impress figures on a soft substance carefully remove from it any previous impression, and make it, as far as they can, exquisitely smooth and well-polished. In the same way, then, that which is intended properly to receive through its entire extent the resemblances of eternal beings, should be naturally without any form whatever of its own. Hence, as to this mother and receptacle of things created, which is visible and every way perceptible, we cannot term it either earth, air, fire, or water,—nor again, any one of their compounds, or any of the elements from which they were produced; but we should not be at all wrong in calling it a certain invisible and shapeless essence, which receives all things and has a certain share of intelligence,—though how it has it, is a matter very obscure and difficult of apprehension. So far, however, as it is possible to arrive at its nature from what has been previously said, we may very correctly say that fire appears to be something inflamed,[308] water something moist,—and so in like manner, earth and air, so far as it receives the images of these bodies.

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Footnote 307:

This passage is alluded to by Aristotle, Metaph. I. ch. 6.

Footnote 308:

Gr. πῦρ μὲν ἑκάστοτε αὐτοῦ τὸ πεπυρωμἐνον μέρος φαίνεσθαι.

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XXV.—Let us, then, be somewhat more minute in resolving the following question,[309]—whether there is a certain fire subsisting in itself,—and so also, as respects other things which we always say have a separate existence in themselves, whether the objects alone that we see, and which are perceived through the bodily organs, possess reality of being, and nothing besides these has any existence at all,—or whether we are wrong in asserting that each of them has its corresponding idea, when after all it is nothing but idle talk. The present question, therefore, we must not decide without much judicious examination; neither should we add to our present discourse any great length of matter not strictly belonging to the subject:—but if there should appear to be any limit, by which it can be contained within a small compass, that would of all things be the most opportune to our present design.

Thus, then, will I state my opinion. If intellect and true opinion are two separate kinds of things, there must necessarily be self-existing ideas not perceptible by the senses, and to be apprehended only by the intellect; but if, as appears to some, true opinion differs in no respect from intellect, everything perceived through the body should be considered perfectly real. We must consider them, then, as two distinct things, because they both have a separate origin and character, one of them produced in us by learning, the other through persuasion,—one always based on true reason, the other irrational,—the one not to be moved by persuasion, the other subject to such mutation:—and lastly, of true opinion every man has a share; but of intellect only the gods, and some small portion of mankind.

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Footnote 309:

The question now proposed is, whether the elementary bodies have a
separate existence and eternal ideas, or whether those only are
certain that are cognizable by the senses. On this point he says, that
just as _science_ and _opinion_ widely differ, so also do the _ideas_
of things and the _things_ submitted to the senses. Different,
however, from both these is the χώρα or receptacle of that infinite
matter, which can only be conceived by a bastard sort of reason;
because the infinite is not the subject of mental intelligence, but
is, as it were hypothetically, considered by an inferior reasoning
faculty.

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XXVI.—Such being the case, we must acknowledge that there is an idea which subsists according to sameness, unproduced and not subject to decay; receiving nothing into itself from elsewhere, and itself never entering into any other nature, but invisible and imperceptible by senses, and to be apprehended only by pure intellect; while the second, on the other hand, which is like it, and bears the same name, is perceptible by the senses, the effect of production, ever in motion, coming into being in a certain spot, and then again hastening to decay, being apprehended by opinion united with perception. Again, there is a third class of being,—that of eternal place; which is never destroyed, but becomes a seat (or receptacle) for everything created, being perceptible of itself without the interference of the senses, by a sort of bastard reason, though scarcely to be relied on; and hence seeing it, as in a dream, we assert that every being must necessarily be somewhere, and in a certain place, and that nothing can exist which is neither on earth or in the heavens. With regard to all these, and such like opinions and the ideas which are entertained in a waking state and have a positive existence, we cannot, owing to this dreaminess, clearly distinguish the one from the other, and state what is the fact,—that the image, which cannot claim as its own that even for which it is formed, but is ever borne along as the spectre of something else, must consequently be formed in something else, and somehow vindicate to itself a separate essence, if it has any existence at all;—whereas, with regard to real being, true and accurate reason aids it by affirming, that as long as two things differ from each other, they cannot so exist one in another, as to be at the same time two things and one only.[310]

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Footnote 310:

This passage is somewhat difficult and involved; but Plato’s meaning
seems to be, that the things falling under the senses are conformed
according to the example of the ideas, and are, as it were,
representations thereof, though different from the ideas
themselves:—and hence there must necessarily be some matter in which
they have been moulded, or else they can have no permanent existence;
though nevertheless sound reason shows us that there is a wide
difference between them and the ideas properly so called.

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XXVII.—This, then, is a summary of my opinion,—that there are three distinct things which existed before the formation of the universe, _being_, _place_, and _generation_;—that the nurse of generation, moistened and inflamed, receiving the forms of earth and air, and experiencing all the other accidents thereon consequent, appeared under many various aspects; but as it was contained by powers neither similar nor equally balanced, it could not possibly be balanced itself, and through the want of such balance, became itself impelled by these forces, to which it again in turn gave impulse;[311] while the parts in motion were separately hurried along in different directions, like things shaken and winnowed by sieves (πλοκάνων) and machines used for the cleansing of corn, the dense and heavy particles in one direction, those that are light settling in another quite different. Thus when these four classes were agitated by their receptacle, which was itself moved as by the shaking of the [above-mentioned] instrument, there was a separation of the dissimilar parts, and a crowding together of those most alike; in consequence of which these other things also occupied a different position, before the universe was created and from such materials reduced to order. Before this, indeed, they all subsisted irrationally, and without measure;—but when the Creator undertook to arrange the universe, he first gave shapes with forms and numbers to fire and earth, water and air, which possessed indeed certain traces of their true essence, though, nevertheless, wholly so situated, as everything would probably be, in the absence of its god.[312] And let us above all things hold, and ever hold, that the Deity made them as far as possible the most beautiful and the best, when before they were in a totally different condition. Now, then, I will try to show you the distribution and generation of these things individually by a somewhat unusual mode of proof; but yet, as you have trodden the paths of mathematical learning, through which we must necessarily make our demonstration, you will not fail to follow me.

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Footnote 311:

On the full meaning of this passage, see Stallbaum’s long note _ad
locum_.

Footnote 312:

What Plato here means is, that the elements before the creation,
although infinite, shapeless, and soulless, contained within them
certain traces of their true essence, and were afterwards made finite
and of fixed shape by being clothed, as it were, with forms and
numbers.

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XXVIII.—First, then, that fire and earth, water and air, are bodies, is evident surely to every one. But every species of body possesses solidity; and every solid must necessarily be contained by planes. Again, a base formed of a perfectly plane surface is composed from triangles.[313] But all triangles are originally of two kinds, each of them having one angle a right angle, and the two others acute:—and one of these has an equal part of a right angle divided by the equal sides; while in the other, two unequal parts of a right angle are divided by the unequal sides. This, then, we lay down, according both to probability and necessity, as the origin and principle of fire and all other bodies;—but as for the heavenly principles thereof, these indeed are known only to the Deity, and to those among men who enjoy God’s favour.

We must relate, then, of what kind those four most beautiful bodies were that thus came into being, and which, however unlike each other, may yet be produced from each other by dissolution. By accomplishing this, indeed, we shall ascertain the truth about the generation of earth and fire, as well those elements (_i. e._ water and air) which in their just proportion hold an intermediate position; for then we shall allow no one to assert that there are visible bodies more beautiful than these, each of which belongs to a separate class. It must be our endeavour, therefore, to unite together these four kinds of bodies so excellent in beauty, and so prove to you that we have sufficiently apprehended their nature. Of the two triangles, indeed, the isosceles has but one form, while the oblong or scalene admits of infinite variety. We must select, therefore, the most beautiful among the infinites, if we would begin and proceed in due order:—still if any one can prove that he has found any form yet better and more suitable for the composition of these bodies, he shall be treated not as an enemy but a friend, and his opinion shall prevail. As for us, however, we fix on one only as the most beautiful of all the many triangles, passing over all the rest;—that out of which is formed a third, the equilateral triangle.[314] To explain the reason of this would indeed require a somewhat lengthened proof:—nevertheless we propose a handsome reward for him who by a diligent investigation finds this not to be the case. We select, therefore, two triangles out of many, from which the bodies of fire and the other elements have been constructed,—one being an isosceles, the other one always having the square of its longer side the triple of that of the shorter.

But what we formerly asserted rather obscurely, we must

now more accurately define. For all the four kinds [of elements] seemed to be mutually generated among each other from not being correctly represented; for there are generated from the triangles which we have just chosen, four kinds [of solid figures]—three of them, indeed, from one having unequal sides, and the fourth alone constructed from the isosceles triangle.[315] All of them, therefore, cannot, by dissolution into each other, produce from many small things a few that are large,—this being effected only by three of them; for all things whatever naturally arise from one only, and when the greater parts are dissolved, many small parts will be formed out of them, receiving figures suitable to each; and again, when the numerous small parts are dispersed into triangles, a single number is formed, and the entire bulk constitutes one separate body of large size.[316] Thus much then may suffice concerning their mutual generation.

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Footnote 313:

Gr. ἡ δὲ ὀρθὴ τῆς ἐπιπέδου βάσεως ἐκ τριγώνων ξυνέστηκε. These notions
about triangles were decidedly Pythagorean, as we are informed by
Proclus in Euclid, II. 46. οἱ δὲ Πυθαγόρειοι τὸ μὲν τρίγωνον ἁπλῶς
ἀρχὴν γεννήσεως εἶναί φασιν καὶ τῆς τῶν γεννητῶν εἰδοποιΐας, &c. See
also Martin’s note, 67, _Études sur le Timée_, ii. p. 236-8. Plato,
however, could have been no mean geometrician himself, having studied
under Theodorus.

Footnote 314:

ἐξ οὗ τὸ ἰσόπλευρον τρίγωνον ἐκ τρίτου συνέστηκε. The sense of the
whole passage is explained geometrically in Stallbaum’s note. We here
give only what seems the correct rendering of the Greek.

Footnote 315:

Namely, the _tetrahedron_ or pyramid, _octahedron_, and _icosahedron_,
which are generated from six equal-sided triangles, and fourthly, the
_cube_, generated from an equilateral triangle. See Stallbaum, _ad
locum_.

Footnote 316:

Gr. γενόμενος εἷς ἀριθμὸς ἑνὸς ὄγκου μέγα ἀποτελέσειεν ἂν ἄλλο εἶδος
ἕν, lit. _one number being formed will complete one separate and large
kind of single mass_.

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XXIX.—We must speak next in order concerning the quality of each class individually, and show from what composition of numbers each was formed. The first, then, indeed, is that composed from the smallest triangles, its element being that which has its subtending side twice the length of the shorter. Now, two of these triangles being mutually brought together to form a diagonal diameter, and this being thrice repeated, so that the diagonals and shorter sides shall meet in the same point, as in a centre, the result will be one equilateral triangle composed of six triangles. But four equilateral triangles form by the union of three plane angles one solid angle, the size of which exceeds that of the most obtuse plane angle; and thus by forming a figure that comprises four of these angles, we constitute that first species of solid, [the tetrahedron,] which divides into equal and similar parts the entire sphere in which it is inscribed. The second species of solid, [the octahedron,] is formed from the same triangles, which unite to form eight equilateral triangles, and form one solid angle from four plane angles, six solid angles being requisite to constitute this second class of solids. The third, [the icosahedron,] is formed from the union of one hundred and twenty elements, so united as to form twelve solid angles, each formed by five plane equilateral triangles, and it has for its bases (or faces) twenty equilateral triangles. These are the only solids that can be formed from this element, [viz. the scalene triangle]. It was the isosceles triangle, however, that produced the fourth elementary figure,—four of them being so united with their right angles at the centre, as to form one equilateral four-sided plane; and six of these again united forming eight solid angles, each of which is formed by the combination of three plane right angles;—the figure of the body thus composed being cubical, having six plane quadrangular equilateral bases. There was yet a certain fifth combination, [the regular dodecahedron;] and this the Deity employed in tracing the plan of the universe.[317]

XXX.—Should any one then, after careful consideration of all these points, be at a loss to determine whether the number of worlds is infinite or finite,[318] let him consider that to admit an infinite number thereof, would be the notion only of one who is ignorant of all that he should best know. Still it may with much propriety be questioned whether there is in reality only one world, or whether there are five. According to our opinion, indeed, which is founded on probable reasoning, there is but one world; though others perhaps, regarding the question in another point of view, may be of a different opinion. Let us now leave alone further speculations of this kind, and returning to the elementary forms that have now been created in our discussion, let us assign them respectively to fire, earth, water, and air. To earth, indeed, let us assign a cubical form; for of all the four kinds earth is the most immoveable, and is of all bodies the most easy to model,—such being necessarily the case with that which has the most secure bases. Among the triangles, then, that we originally mentioned, that which has equal sides possesses firmer bases than one having unequal sides; and of the two equilateral plane figures thus formed, the square has necessarily a firmer base than the triangle, whether considered with reference to its parts or the whole. On this account, in assigning this figure to the earth, we still preserve probability;—and we shall do this also by assigning to water that figure which is the least moveable of the whole, to fire that which is most so, and to air that which is intermediate between the two,—assigning also the smallest body to fire, the greatest to water, and to air one of a size intermediate between fire and water;—and again, the most subtile body to fire, the next in this respect to air, and the third to water. Among all these then, that body which possesses the fewest bases must necessarily be the most easily moveable, as well as most penetrating, and in every way most acute, being also exceedingly light, from being composed of the smallest possible number of elements:—and so also the second has these properties in a secondary degree, and the third in the third degree. Let it be agreed then, that, according both to strict and probable reasoning, the solid form of the pyramid is the element and germ of fire; that the second form described is air; and the third water. All these elements then, we must conceive to be so minutely small, that the individual parts of each kind may from their smallness escape notice, and yet when many of them are collected together, they become from their bulk the objects of our perception.[319] Moreover, as respects their relative proportions, numbers, motions, and other properties, the Deity, so far as the nature of necessity has willingly and obediently given way, has firmly established and united them together in just proportion.[320]

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Footnote 317:

On these geometric forms or elementary particles, we must refer the
reader to Martin’s _Études sur le Timée_, notes 66-69, ii. pp.
234-250, where the whole subject is exceedingly well explained and
illustrated.

Footnote 318:

It was the opinion of Democritus that the worlds are infinite; and the
same notion was afterwards entertained by Epicurus. Comp. Diog. Laert.
ix. sect. 44, and Cic. Acad. Q. iv. 17.

Footnote 319:

Gr. ξυνασθροισθέντων δὲ πολλῶν τοὺς ὄγκους αὐτῶν ὁρᾶσθαι.

Footnote 320:

Gr. ταύτῃ πάντῃ δι’ ἀκριβείας ἀποτελεσθεισῶν ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ ξυνηρμόσθαι
ταῦτα ἀνὰ λόγον. Here is an awkward anacoluthon from the introduction
of the passive perfect ξυνηρμόσθαι, for which Stephens suggested, as
an emendation, ξυναρμόσασθαι.

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XXXI.—From all then that we have before said about the nature of these bodies, the following account seems to be the most probable:—Earth, when it meets with fire, and is dissolved by its subtility, is borne along hither and thither in a dissolved state either in the fire itself, or in the air, or in the water,—till its parts, meeting together, and again mutually harmonizing, once more become earth; for they can never take any other form. But water, when divided by fire or air, may, by the re-composition of its parts, become either one body of fire, or two bodies of air;—and as for the air, when it is decomposed, one only of its particles will produce two of fire. And again, likewise, when fire receives into itself either air or water or earth, though in small quantities relatively to the mass which contains it, if it be dragged along by the movements of these bodies and overcome in spite of all resistance, and at last be decomposed and broken in pieces, these two bodies of fire will coalesce into one of air; and if again the air is overcome and separated into parts, then from two wholes and a half there will be formed one whole body of water. Again, let us consider this matter as follows:—When any one of the other forms is enclosed by fire, and is cut by the acuteness of its angles and sides, it escapes further division by passing into the nature of fire:—for among bodies that are uniform and similar to each other, no one by itself can cause any change in one of the same class, or experience any itself, with respect to that which it resembles; whereas, when one class of bodies is contained within another, and the weak one contends with the stronger, it will not fail to be destroyed. And again, when the smaller, being comprehended in the greater, and the few by the many, are broken in pieces and extinguished, if they be disposed to adopt the form of the prevailing nature, they cease to be extinguished; and air becomes generated from fire,—water from air:—but if they attack and fall into contention with any of the rest that they may meet, the agitated parts continue to be dissolved, till being every way repulsed and dissolved, they fly to their kindred nature; or else, being overcome, and joined into one out of many similar to the prevailing power, they abide there in familiar union. And especially, as the result of these affections, all things whatever are mutually changing their positions;—for the numerous individuals of each class are distinguished according to their respective places through the motion of their receptacle, while those that are mutually dissimilar, but yet resemble others, are hurried on by the concussion [of other bodies] to the place occupied by the bodies they resemble. All unmixed and primary bodies then are generated from such causes as these:—but that other classes of bodies are naturally inherent in these forms, is owing to the composition of each rudimental part (στοιχεῖον); which not only at first produces one triangle, possessed of a certain magnitude, but others also, both greater and smaller, equal in number to the various classes existing in the forms themselves;—and hence, these being mingled with themselves and each other, are infinite in their variety,—-a fact which every one should consider, who means to argue with probability respecting the nature of things.

XXXII.—Concerning motion, then, and position, unless a person can clearly understand in what manner and in conjunction with what these two take place, he will meet with many hindrances in the subsequent part of this discourse. This matter indeed we have already partly discussed; but besides this, we must still inquire whether it be true, that motion never willingly resides in smoothness, inasmuch as it is difficult, or rather impossible, to conceive the existence of anything moving without a mover, or of a mover without something in motion;—motion being impossible while these are away, and it being equally impossible that these should be equable and smooth. Thus, then, we must assign a state of rest to smoothness, and motion to that which is unequal and rough; inequality indeed being the cause again of a rough uneven nature. Now, as regards the generation of inequality, that we have already discussed; but how the several bodies, when divided according to their classes, do not cease from their mutual courses and motions, this we did not explain:—and so we will once more make it the subject of inquiry. The revolution of the universe, since it comprehends the various classes of things, and is of circular shape and naturally desirous of uniting with itself, compresses all things together, and suffers no place to remain void. On this account is it, that fire most of all penetrates through everything, and air, in the next degree, being second to the former in subtility and tenuity;—and the rest in the same way [according to their degree:]—for such as are composed of very large parts have a very large vacuity in their composition,—those, on the contrary, that are very small, a very small vacuity. The union, then, resulting from compression drives together the small parts into the intervals of the larger; and thus, the small parts being placed side by side with the large, the smaller dividing the greater, while the latter compress the smaller, they are all borne upwards and downwards to the places respectively suitable to each;—for each, on changing its magnitude, changes its position likewise: and so, from these causes the production of diversity is constantly maintained, giving that perpetual motion to these bodies, which both now subsists and ever will continue.

XXXIII.—In the next place, we must understand that there are many kinds of fire;—as for instance, flame,—that which emanates from flame,[321] which without burning furnishes light to the eyes,—and that which abides in ignited bodies, even after the flame has been extinguished. In like manner, with respect to air, one kind is of the greatest purity, that denominated _æther_,—a second most turbulent, cloudy, and dark; and besides these, there are other nameless kinds formed by the inequality of the triangles. As respects water, again, it admits of a twofold division, one kind being liquid, the other fusible. The liquid kind, therefore, being composed of very small and unequal parts of water, becomes moveable, both of itself and by other bodies, through the inequality of its composition and peculiar shape of its figure; whereas the fusible kind, which is composed of large and smooth parts, is more stable than the former, as well as heavier and more compact, owing to its smoothness;[322]—and when fire enters into and dissolves its substance, it becomes more moveable, from losing its uniformity; and when it is thus rendered easily moveable, and is repelled by the surrounding air, and extended on the earth, it is said to be _liquefied_, by way of expressing the division of its masses, and is said to _flow_ also, in order to show its extension over the earth:—and these two words express both the changes which it undergoes. Again, when fire escapes from this body, it does not retire into a vacuum, but the surrounding air repelled [by the fire] drives the easily-moveable mass of moisture into the place before occupied by the fire, with which at the same time it becomes mingled;—but when the mass by close compression once more becomes equable and smooth, it then resumes its smoothness and consistency, because fire, the artificer of inequality, has taken its departure;—and this departure of fire we denominate _cooling_, while the union that takes place without the presence of fire is termed a _condensation_ [or hardening]. But among all those which we term fusible fluids, there is one that becomes most dense, though formed from the most subtile and equable parts, and is of an uniform character, and partaking of a lustrous yellow colour:—it is that most highly prized possession,—gold, which is produced by filtration through a rock. And a node (ὄζος) of gold, rendered by its density very hard and turned black, is called _adamant_. But that which consists of parts greatly resembling gold, and has more than one species, which surpasses gold in density, and that it may become the harder, contains but a small and insignificant portion of earth, though at the same time it is lighter, owing to the great intervals between its internal atoms;—this is a separate kind of lustrous and dense fluids, termed _brass_. But an earthy nature is therewith mingled, which, when through age the two parts become separated soon becomes visible of itself, and is denominated _rust_. All other such matters also, it would be no hard task further to discuss by pursuing the plan of probable arguments;—and any one, who by way of recreation interrupts for a while his reasonings on eternal being, and enters into probable speculations about the generation of material things, will by these means acquire a pleasure of which he need not repent, and establish for himself a moderate and wise recreation during life.

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Footnote 321:

Gr. τό τε ἀπὸ τῆς φλογὸς ἀπιόν. The old editions read ἁπτόν.

Footnote 322:

The distinction between τὸ ὑγρόν and τὸ χυτόν is not easily conveyed
in translation. The former means an elastic fluid like water,—the
latter, a mass of greater density and less elasticity, such as jelly,
syrup, or oil. We have rendered it _fused_, because in the next page
the term is used respecting metals.

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XXXIV.—Thus indulging ourselves, let us next recount certain probable reasons concerning what next follows of the same subject. Water that is mingled with fire, which being very thin and moist, takes its name[323] (ὑγρὸν) from its motion and the manner in which it rolls on the earth, and which is also called soft and yielding, because its bases are less stable than those of earth,—this, when separated from fire and bereft of air, acquires more uniformity, and through their departure (_i. e._ of air and fire) is compressed into itself;—and when it is thus condensed above the earth, it becomes hail, if on the earth, ice; but when there is less of it and only half the amount of freezing, [the water so condensed] above the earth becomes snow, and that on the earth, which is formed from dew, is called hoar-frost. When again the numerous kinds of water are mingled together, the entire liquid thus formed, which is filtered from the earth through plants, takes the name of juices or saps. Owing, however, to their mode of admixture, these individual fluids present through their dissimilarity many different undescribed varieties, although four of them, which are of a fiery character, and particularly transparent, have obtained appropriate appellations;—that which heats the soul as well as the body being called _wine_,—secondly, that which is smooth, and dazzling to the sight,[324] and hence bright, glittering, and apparently of an oily nature, such as pitch, the gum of the kiki-plant,[325] oil, and other things having similar properties;—again, that which possesses a power, as far as nature permits, of diffusing the substances of nutrition over the palate, and by this property presents the idea of sweetness, has obtained the general name of _honey_;—and lastly, that frothy fluid, which dissolves the flesh by burning, has been distinguished from all the other juices by the name of _opium_ (ὀπός).

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Footnote 323:

The Greek text is evidently corrupt. It stands as follows:—τὸ——ὕδωρ,
ὅσον λεπτὸν ὑγρόν τε διὰ τὴν κίνησιν καὶ τὴν ὁδὸν ἣν κυλινδούμενον ἐπὶ
γῆς ὑγρὸν λέγεται, &c. Stallbaum suggests the removal of the last
ὑγρόν, and the insertion of ἐστί after κυλινδούμενον. This suggestion
has been followed in our translation.

Footnote 324:

Gr. διακριτικὸν ὄψεως, lit. _having the power of separating sight_.

Footnote 325:

This is the same as the σιλλικύπριον or _Palma Christi_. Comp. Herod.
ii. 94, and D. Turner’s note thereon.

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XXXV.—As respects the different kinds of earth, one of them, stone, is produced by the filtration of water in the manner following. The commingled water, when it loses its coherence, passes into the form of air, but, on becoming air, rises to its appropriate place. As, however, there is no vacuum, it presses on the surrounding air; and this, being weighty, and impelled against the mass of earth that it surrounds, violently compresses it, driving it into the vacant spaces whence the new air had before ascended. The earth, also, by the compression of the air into indissoluble union with water, is formed into stones; the more beautiful sorts of which acquire a lustre from the equality and smoothness of their parts, the opposite being the case with those that are ugly and valueless. But when all the moisture is thrown off by the violence of fire, and the body is thus unusually dried up, then is formed the kind of earth that we call clay. Sometimes also, even without losing its moisture, the earth is fused by the fire, and on cooling becomes a stone of a black colour.[326] In the same manner, when this earth is deprived of the water it holds in mixture, but yet has small particles and is of a saline nature, it forms a half-solid body, still capable of solution in water,—either nitre, which purifies both oil and earth, or else salt, a substance so well adapted to give flavours pleasing to the palate, and deemed by the law as agreeable to the gods. The compounds of these two substances are not soluble by water, but yet can be melted by fire, for the following reasons. Neither fire nor air liquefies masses of earth; because, being naturally composed of elements smaller than the interstices (or pores) of earth, they easily penetrate through these capacious pores without subjecting it either to dissolution or liquefaction. The parts of water, on the other hand, as they are larger, strive to force a passage, and so dissolve and liquefy the earthy mass:—and hence, when the earth has no strong consistency, water alone will dissolve it, whereas if in a compact state, nothing will affect it but fire, which is the only body that can find an entrance. As for water, again, its strong cohesiveness of parts, [when frozen], can be overcome only by fire, whereas, when the cohesion is less strong, it can be equally decomposed by fire and air, the latter entering its interstices and the former separating even its constituent triangles. Nothing, however, can dissolve air strongly condensed, without attacking its composing elements; though when it coheres less strongly, it may be dissolved, though only by fire. Again, in bodies composed of water and earth, while the water occupies all the interstices in its state of compression, the particles of water from without, not finding egress, flow round the entire mass without suffering decomposition; whereas the particles of fire that enter into the interstices of water, as water into those of earth, and have the same effect on water that fire has on air, alone possess the power of dissolving and liquefying the compound body. And among these, some contain less water than earth; such as all kinds of glass, and such stones as are termed fusible; while others, on the contrary, contain more water, such as wax and aromatic substances.

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Footnote 326:

Lindau conjectures this to be _basalt_. It is probably lava, or some
similar volcanic product. The same commentator conceives the λίτρον
mentioned in the succeeding sentence to be _potash_ or some alkali
suitable for mingling with oil to form soap.

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XXXVI.—Having thus then enumerated the several figures and classes of bodies variously formed by admixtures and mutual changes, we must now try to explain the causes of the feelings with which they impress us. First, then, the bodies here spoken of must be always perceptible. As yet, however, we have not discoursed on the generation of flesh, and what belongs to flesh, nor on that part of the soul which is mortal. This nevertheless cannot be suitably explained without at the same time explaining the sensations and impressions produced by external objects; and although one subject cannot be unfolded without a knowledge of the other, yet the two cannot be explained together. We must settle one first, and then proceed to the other. In order, then, in speaking of impressions, to observe the same order as in speaking of the bodies producing them, let our first inquiry be into those that concern the body and soul.

First, then, let us inquire why fire is called _hot_, the reason of which we shall perceive by considering its penetrating and cutting power about our bodies. Now, that this affection is a certain sharpness[327] is nearly evident to all; and as regards the tenuity of its sides, the sharpness of its angles, the smallness of its particles, and the velocity of its motion, through all which it becomes violent, penetrating and capable of instantly dividing whatever it meets; this we should carefully consider, recalling to mind the generation of its figure;—inasmuch as it is this, and no other nature, which separates and parcels out our bodies into small portions, and produces in us that affection which is very properly denominated _heat_. Now the contrary to this is sufficiently manifest; but still we must not pass it without explanation:—for in truth, among the humid particles surrounding the body, those that have the largest elementary parts enter and drive out the smaller; but being unable to occupy their places, they compress our bodily humours, and from being uneven and in a state of agitation, fix them and render them motionless through their evenness and density;—whereas things brought into contact against nature are naturally opposed and mutually repel each other. From this contest and agitation then there resulted a certain trembling and numbness; and the whole of this affection, as well as the cause that produces it, has the name of cold. Again we call those bodies _hard_ to which our flesh yields; and those _soft_, which yield to the pressure of our flesh;—thus using the terms comparatively, with reference to each other. Bodies also yield to pressure when placed on a small base, while those resting on quadrangular bases are the least impressible, owing to their very firm position, and because from their own extreme density they strongly resist all opposing pressure.

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Footnote 327:

Gr. ὀξύ τι τὸ πάθος,—meaning, that the affection resembles the
impression formed by an acute angular body.

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XXXVII.—Again, the nature of heavy and light will become most evident, if investigated with that of _up_ and _down_;—for it is by no means right to assert that there are naturally two distinct places opposite one to the other;—one termed _down_, to which all bodies tend that are endued with bulk, but the other _up_, to which bodies ascend contrary to their inclination. The whole universe, indeed, being spherical, all such things as are at the extremities (or circumference) and equally distant from the centre must all in like manner naturally belong to the extremities, while the centre, being in the same proportion distant from all these extremities, must be said to occupy quite an opposite position. Such then being the nature of the world, would not any one who reversed the position of the above-mentioned objects be fairly thought to apply names to them that are quite unsuitable? For the middle place in it cannot be fairly said to be either naturally down or up, but only the centre itself; and the circumference is neither the middle, nor does it contain within it any parts more distant than the rest either from the centre, or any of the opposite extremities. But when all the parts are naturally so similar, how can any one with propriety assign to them contrary names?—For supposing there were any regular solid body in the centre of the universe, it would never be carried to any of the extremities, owing to their entire uniformity;—but on the other hand, if any one were to move in a circle round this solid, he would often stand with his feet opposite to where they before were, and so call the same part of himself both the upside and down. Since the universe, therefore, as we have just observed, is of a spherical figure, no prudent man should assert that it has any part which is [absolutely] either up or down;—yet, as regards the origin and usual application of these terms which we thus transfer to the universe, this we agree to be a proper subject of investigation. If, in that spot of the universe which specially belongs to fire, and where the principal mass is collected with which it has a tendency to unite, any one were to ascend thither and being possessed of the requisite power, were to take up the particles, place them in a balance, and raising the scale, were forcibly to draw the fire towards the air, with which it has no affinity, it is clear that in this case the smaller mass would be more easily impelled than the larger. Indeed, when two things are simultaneously raised by one and the same power, the smaller quantity must of course yield more readily than the greater to the impulsive force by which they are constrained; and hence, the one is called _heavy_ and gravitating downwards, the other _light_ and tending upwards. The same thing also is observable in what we ourselves do, who inhabit this place [the earth]. For when, in walking on the earth, we separate particles of an earthy nature, and sometimes even portions of the earth itself, forcibly and unnaturally drawing them towards the air which is dissimilar,—then that which is smaller yielding more readily to our impulse is sooner attracted towards the foreign element:—this then we call _light_ and the place towards which it is drawn, _up_ (or _above_), giving to their contraries the terms _heavy_ and _down_ (or _below_) respectively. Hence these must mutually differ from each other, owing to the contrary positions that the several elements occupy:—for that which is light in one place is contrary to one corresponding with it in an opposite position, and so also to a heavy body another that is heavy, and to bodies placed above or below others, opposed to them in their respective positions;—and they will all be found, whether in a state of becoming or actually existing, to be contrary, transverse, and every way differing from each other. This one thing, moreover, is to be understood concerning all these matters, that the tendency of each towards a body of similar nature gives to the body so attracted the name _heavy_, and the place to which it tends, _down_ (or _below_); and thus to contrary things are assigned contrary appellations. Such are the causes that we assign to these phenomena. And again, as to the cause of the impression of smoothness and roughness, every one who has investigated it will be able to disclose it to others; for roughness comes from hardness joined with unevenness, while smoothness is the united effect of uniformity and density.

XXXVIII.—It remains for us now to consider what is most important in those affections common to the whole body, which are the chief causes of pleasure and pain, and to inquire how it is that certain impressions excite through the parts of the body certain sensations invariably attended by pleasure and pain. Thus then let us examine all our impressions, whether sensible or not, calling to mind the distinctions that we before made between bodies moved with ease and those with difficulty;—for this is the way to arrive at the point that we wish to determine. When a body by nature easily moveable has received an impression ever so slight, the several parts communicate it to the parts placed around them, producing on these parts the same effect, until at length they reach the intellect itself, to which they announce the power of the agents producing such impression;—whereas a body, which on the contrary is firm and stable and has no circular motion, is simply affected by itself without moving any of the surrounding bodies; and hence, as their components do not mutually communicate the first received impression, the entire animal remains unmoved, and experiences no sensation. This is the case indeed as respects the bones and hair, and such other parts of the body as are chiefly of an earthy nature; whereas the phenomena above described principally refer to the organs of sight and hearing, which contain an abundance of fire and air. This is what we should hold then concerning pleasure and pain:—an impression produced in us contrary to nature, and with violence, causes pain,—one that is conformable to our nature, however strong, pleasure;—whereas an impression that is gentle and gradual is unperceived, while the contrary to these produces contrary effects. An impression, again, the whole of which is easily produced, is pre-eminently an object of sensation, but is not affected by pleasure and pain:—and of this kind are the affections belonging to the sight; which indeed, as we have above asserted, is a body of a nature daily becoming allied to ourselves.[328] For in this way the impressions caused by cuttings and burnings, and other similar accidents, do not cause pain to the sight; nor again, does it experience pleasure, from returning to its previous condition:—whereas the sensations that are strongest and most clear do this, so far as any one is affected by any object; and this is the reason why there is no violence whatever either in its expansion or contraction. But bodies composed from larger parts, which yield with difficulty to impelling agents, and distribute their motion over the whole body, do experience pleasure and pain; pain indeed, when they are often alienated from their own nature, but pleasure when restored to their former condition. Again, all bodies that admit of very gradual withdrawals, and, as it were, emptyings of their own nature, and at the same time receive supplies on a large scale, have no perception of loss, though they have of what accrues to them; and hence, they do not give pain to the mortal part of the soul, but on the contrary the greatest delight:—and the truth of this is manifest from the sensation of pleasant odours. But such bodies, on the other hand, as suffer excessive variation, and can scarcely be restored even gradually to their pristine condition, are affected in a manner quite the reverse of those we have just described; the truth of which is manifest in the case of burnings and wounds inflicted on the body.

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Footnote 328:

Allusion is here made to ch. xix. p. 350 of this translation.

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XXXIX.—Having thus then pretty fully discussed the common affections of the whole body, and the appellations assigned to their effective causes, we must now endeavour to explain, as far as we can, the affections that arise in particular parts of us, as well as the causes by which they are induced. In the first place then, let us if possible complete the explanation of what we before left unfinished about those of the juices—namely, the particular affections subsisting about the tongue.[329] And these, as well as most others, appear to be produced by certain expansions and contractions, the impressions formed thereby depending more on smoothness and roughness than all other circumstances; because, whenever anything falls on the small veins round the tongue (which are the arbiters, as it were, of the taste stretching to the heart), in such a way as to penetrate the moist and delicate texture of the flesh, which through its earthy nature is in a melting state, it contracts and dries up the veins:—and where these penetrating substances are rougher than usual, they have an acrid taste (στρυφνά), if less so, only one of sourness (αὐστηρά). Those on the contrary which purge, and wash away whatever adheres to the tongue, if they do this to such an immoderate degree, as somewhat to liquefy its nature, as nitre does;—all such as these are termed _bitter_; while substances of inferior power to nitre, which purge only moderately, we conceive to be _salt_, without that rough bitterness, and to be more friendly to our nature. Again, things heated by the temperature of the mouth, and thereby softened—which reciprocally heat and are heated by it—and which through their lightness are elevated towards the senses of the head, dividing at the same time whatever comes in their way;—all these, owing to such properties, are termed _pungent_ (δριμέα). But when these same particles, thinned by putrefaction, enter into the narrow veins, and there come into contact with earthy and airy particles of a suitable size, and by making them mutually revolve, so mix them together as to cause a confusion of their elements, and thus by entering other veins form interstices in which the liquid, sometimes earthy, sometimes quite pure, forms, as it were, certain air-cavities enclosed by water, some of which formed of pure liquid are transparent, and called _bubbles_, while those composed of earthy liquid and in a state of agitation have received the name of seething (or boiling), and yeast (or leven);—the effective cause of all this being termed _acid_ (ὀξύ). And an affection contrary to all that has been asserted about these, proceeds from a contrary cause; for, when the liquid compounds that enter the mouth are naturally suited to the quality of the tongue, they lubricate its asperities, as well as contract or relax such parts as were before unnaturally dilated or compressed, and restore them, as far as possible, to their proper and natural habit. Hence all such substances are pleasant and friendly to every one, become the remedies of violent passions, and are denominated _sweet_. And thus much may suffice concerning particulars of this kind.

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Footnote 329:

Plato was not aware that the palate is the chief organ of taste, and
that these sensations are transmitted to the sensorium by means of
nerves (_i. e._ minute tubes filled with cerebral matter), all of
which communicate either with the spinal marrow or the brain
itself,—the centre of all sensation, as Herophilus and Erasistratus
held long prior to Galen. Plato, on the contrary, maintained that
these sensations were carried by certain small veins (or arteries,—for
he makes no distinction between them), to the liver—regarded by him as
the seat (comp. ch. xliv.) of the lower mortal soul. The heart was
regarded by Aristotle as the centre of the sensations.

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XL.—As respects the faculty of the nostrils, it admits of no classification: for all odours whatever are but half-begotten,—there being no substances so proportioned, as to give forth any particular smell. Besides, our veins surrounding the nose are too narrow to admit the various kinds of earth and water, and too broad for those of fire and air; and hence no one ever perceives an odour from any of these,—odours being produced from bodies that are damp, putrefying, liquid, or vaporous;—for odours are generated by the change of water into air, or air into water; and all these are either smoke or vapour. And of these, that which passes from air into water is _vapour_,—that which is changed from water into air, _smoke_;—whence it comes to pass that all odours are more subtile than water, and denser than air. And these facts are clearly shown, when any one, owing to any obstruction of the respiration, draws his breath inwards; for then no odour filters through, but breath only—unattended by any odours. This is why these two varieties of them are without a name, being formed neither from many nor from a simple species, the only two distinct terms respecting them, being _pleasant_ or _unpleasant_; the latter of which irritate and violently disturb the whole cavity lying between the top of the head and the navel, while the former soothe the same part, and kindly restore it to its natural condition.

XLI.—Let us next speak of and investigate the third kind of sense,—the hearing, and the causes giving rise to the affections peculiar thereto. Now we may generally define _voice_ as a certain pulsation of the air, penetrating through the ears, brain, and blood, as far as the soul; and the motion hence arising, which commences from the head and ends in the seat of the liver, _hearing_;—and that when this motion is swift, it emits a sharp sound, when slow, a flat one,—the former being uniform and smooth, the latter quite the reverse and rough:—likewise, that when the motion is on a large scale it will produce a loud sound, and when on a small scale only a low one. But respecting the harmony of these sounds we must speak in the subsequent part of this discourse.

XLII.—The fourth kind of sense, which is still left for us to discuss, comprises a very large variety of what we generally term _colours_, which consist of a flame emanating from individual bodies, and having parts proportioned to the sight for producing sensation. But we have already considered the effective causes of sight.[330] Here then we ought to speak of colours, and what seems to us the most probable theory respecting them.