Chapter XXII: Introduction: To the Timæus (1)

The following Dialogue, _which comprises the detailed evolution of the physical or cosmological doctrines of Plato_, is supposed to have taken place on the day following that on which Socrates had been discussing with the same party the nature of an ideal or pattern Republic; and there is so far an internal connexion between the two dialogues, that both will be found to contain the same doctrines of the Ideas (εἴδη or ἰδέαι) and the _Summum bonum_ (viz. τὸ ἕν in contradistinction to τὸ γιγνόμενον. Comp. Tim. ch. ix.), though presented under different aspects,—the former treating them in their relation to moral and political perfection, the latter physically and cosmologically, displaying the beauty, perfection, and benevolence of the Divine work in the formation of the Universe and the organization of Man. The dialogue opens with a lively conversation on the political notions set forth by Socrates (or rather elicited by him from the rest) on the preceding day, more especially with reference to their practicability in real life (ch. i.-iii.):—and Critias, to gratify Socrates, introduces the narrative of a long interview between Solon and some Egyptian priests, about the relative antiquity of the Grecian and Egyptian annals, the object of which is to prove, that the state of Athens, in very remote times, corresponded mainly with the picture of a perfect republic, as exhibited by Socrates (ch. iv.-vii.). The subject, however, is deemed worthy of still further investigation by the different parties present; and the first turn is unanimously conceded to Timæus, the Pythagorean, on account of his profound knowledge of physics and astronomy, who accordingly entertains them with a long and learned discourse on the origin of the Universe and the formation of Man,—Critias following him in the succeeding dialogue called by his name, wherein he tries to show that the men here ideally created (τῷ λόγῳ γεγονότας) by Timæus, and brought into civil training by Socrates in the Republic, actually corresponded in character with the citizens of primitive Athens (ch. vii., viii.).

It is necessary to premise, however, before we enter into any analysis of Timæus’s discourse, that Plato, regarded as a _physical theorist_, was not so much the propounder of new and original views, as a critic and eclecticist, reviewing the various systems that had preceded him, opposing what he deemed false or vicious, and adopting what he thought good and solid in each. Now all the earlier philosophers, whether of Ionia or Magna Græcia, had made it their first business to start different theories, more or less visionary, on the origin of the Universe. Thales held the primary element to be _water_, Anaximenes and Diogenes _air_, Anaximander a vast _chaos_, and Heraclitus _fire_,—to whom at length succeeded Anaxagoras, the first to recognise a _Supreme Intelligence_ (νοῦς) as the principle of life and arranger of the primitive chaotic atoms (and from whom Plato undoubtedly took some of his leading notions). Widely differing from the above, Xenophanes maintained _unity_ (τὸ ἕν)—_the Universe, to be God_,—a notion, which elicited from Parmenides the atheistic dogma, that, as existence is conceivable, and non-existence is not so, _creation is impossible_, as it pre-supposes non-existence; and in this view he was followed by Empedocles, who regarded all things as alike uncreated and indestructible. When such notions were current, it can scarcely be matter for surprise that Heraclitus should have put forth the doctrine (equally atheistical) of _a perpetual flux_, and been followed by the sophist Protagoras, who stated that _all knowledge is sensation_, and that _man is the measure of all existing things whatever_. And lastly, it was the notion of Pythagoras (with whose views Plato was beyond all doubt deeply imbued), that _numbers_ and _music_ are the principles of the entire universe, and that the world is regulated by _numerical harmony_.[257] With all these conflicting views before him, and having at the same time a strong internal conviction of one grand, comprehensive, and intelligent Unity,—in other words, God,—Plato at once boldly impugned the doctrine of the Eleatics, that the world around was an eternal, immutable essence;—maintaining, on the other hand, that, as it was sensible, it must have been produced, and was in fact the necessary result of an effective cause,—_the work of a rational, intelligent, and benevolent Architect_.

Timæus, therefore, in this dialogue,—after stating _in limine_ that there are two classes of things, the one eternal, _constant_ (ταὐτόν), and not subject to change; the other _mutable_ (θάτερον), generated, and liable to decay: the former of which is comprehended by the intellect, the latter by the senses,—broadly sets forth the grand doctrine of Theism, that whatever is generated must proceed from some cause, namely God, who formed the sensible universe, the most perfect of things generated, according to an eternal pattern existing in the Divine Mind (ch. ix.). The whole, indeed, was the work of the Creator’s goodness; and the universe itself likewise was very good,—as it were, an ensouled, rational, living being,—perfect in unity, and composed of four elements indissolubly united,—earth and fire, air and water,—its shape being that of a perfect sphere moving in a circular orbit, and its soul emanating from its abode in the centre to all the other parts, including even the external surface,—in fine, it came forth from its Maker deficient in no single respect, “a blessed God” (ch. x.-xii.).

He next proceeds to unfold the nature and structure of the Universe in its several parts. And first, he assumes it to consist of two parts,—one eternal and fixed, because related to the world of intellect; the other corporeal, mutable, and capable of division,—both of which are so united on the principles of number and music, as to produce a happy and well-settled harmony both in structure and motion. This universal soul, moreover, pervades even the distant orbits of the fixed stars and planets, all of which depend for their life and circular motion on the eternal and constant principles of number and harmony,—the fixed stars moving _westward_ on the eternal principle of sameness, the planets _eastward_ on that of mutability and difference (ch. xii.). But in connexion with this soul, the universe possesses also a material body, whereby it becomes cognizant of material things,—the subjects of opinion and persuasion, as well as of the abstract truths that form the groundwork of reasoning and science (ch. xiii.).[258] Next came the creation of _time_, which was effected by the formation of the sun, moon, and five planets, whose motion, particularly that of the first, creates, determines, and watches over, the several divisions of days and nights, months and perfect years (ch. xiv.). The form and motions of the world thus once arranged, the Creator proceeds to people it with living beings,—first, the heavenly gods (_i. e._ the stars and other celestial bodies); secondly, airy and winged creatures; thirdly, those living in the water; and lastly, those moving on the earth. The stars, indeed, are termed a race of heavenly gods, yet generated and visible, endowed with fiery, spherical bodies, and called immortal, as not being subject to dissolution or decay (ch. xv.); but whether the earth itself is, like the other bodies, to be considered an ensouled, generated god, and whether at rest or in motion, is not exactly certain.

Next follows a narrative, almost purely mythical, of the formation of the mortal races of animals (ch. xvi.-xviii.), which the Supreme himself does not deign personally to create, but commits that task to the lower gods, reserving only the office of imparting to these new creatures whatever was to be immortal in their constitution. A like number of these perishable animals is assigned to each of the stars; and the first birth being the same in all,—that of the human male; nor was it till after a fixed period, that the female and all other animals,—beasts, fishes, and birds,—issued from this mortal form. Of this being, Man, consisting, like the universe, of body and soul mysteriously conjoined, Timæus next gives a detailed description, beginning with the head, which contains the leading organs of sense (ch. xix., xx.); and he then diverges into a long investigation of the elements of earthly bodies, particularly as respects their geometric forms, as well also, as of their various affections, viz. motion or rest, heat or cold, heaviness or lightness, smell, colour, &c., the discussion of which must necessarily precede any satisfactory account of the intellectual and physical man (ch. xxi.-xlii.). Man, he proceeds to observe, is composed of a corruptible body enshrining an immortal soul; but besides this, he possesses an inferior sort of soul, whereby he becomes cognizant of the various passions and emotions, viz., pleasure and pain, hope, fear, anger, desire, &c.; and all the parts of his body are composed with wonderful skill, and yet kept in constant subjection to the dominance of reason and intellect:—and he now parenthetically intimates the existence of two sets of causes,—the _divine_ and _necessary_,—as constantly operating together; of the former of which we can gain only a very imperfect knowledge (though for our happiness’ sake we should ever aspire thereto), while the latter we should investigate for the sake of getting at the former (ch. xliii.).

Next succeed separate and particular (though somewhat fanciful) descriptions of the heart, lungs, stomach, liver, spleen, intestines, spinal marrow and brain, skull and bones, ligaments and tendons, muscles and flesh, the nerves round the head, teeth, tongue, lips, hair, skin, pores, &c. &c., all of which are kept in healthy action by the united operation of the alimentary and respiratory systems (ch. xliv.-lxii.),—the object of the whole of these speculations being to show the existence of design and the adaptation of means to ends throughout the work of creation. Now the regular, unimpeded, action of all these organs and component parts constitutes bodily health; whereas the disorders and decay of the component elements of life are either productive of disease or else slowly bring on old age and bodily decay (ch. lxii.). Then follow some curious details respecting the diseases of the body, which are ascribed to many various causes, mostly fanciful,—some few only real, formed on a knowledge of the human frame (ch. lxiii.-lxviii.). Far more important, however, and far more severe, are the diseases of the soul; and these are assigned to two causes,—first, bodily infirmity, and secondly, improper training, it being a vulgar error to suppose that any one is willingly evil. The great, and indeed only disease of the soul, is madness, which assumes two forms,—madness (μανία), and folly or idiocy (ἀμαθία), both caused by the unhealthy predominance of the animal passions over the reason and conscience. Great care must therefore be observed constantly to maintain the _mens sana in corpore sano_, to attend diligently to both, without neglecting either,—to form the body by constant and suitable exercise as well as strict temperance, and to cultivate the soul by engaging the intellect in the contemplation of divine things and eternal truth, including those heavenly revolutions with which the human soul also has a close relation and harmony (ch. lxix.-lxxi.).

The concluding chapters of the dialogue comprise some observations on the origin of the lower animals, from which it appears that Plato entertained the Pythagorean doctrine of the transmigration of souls; for he thinks it probable that those who have lived unrighteously and effeminately will, at their second birth, be changed into women,—those of both sexes who have lived innocently but frivolously, foolishly believing that heavenly things could be seen by mortal eye, being changed into birds of the air; those, thirdly, who have been totally estranged from philosophy, into beasts of the earth; and those, fourthly, who are to the last degree foolish and ignorant, becoming mere fishes, creatures of the water, to whom the gods that formed them have denied even the privilege of breathing a thin and pure atmosphere (ch. lxxii., lxxiii., compared with ch. xvii., where he touches, though more briefly, on the same philosophic dogma). Lastly, the whole dialogue concludes with a brief, but elegant summary of the great doctrine, of which the philosopher has exhibited throughout it so many satisfactory proofs,—that “this world, which comprises and is filled with all kinds of living beings, both mortal and immortal, thus becomes a visible animal embracing visible natures,—an image of the great Intelligence,—a sensible god,—the greatest and best, the fairest and most perfect,—this the one and only begotten Universe.”

Such is a succinct account of the leading arguments of the Timæus, which, both as respects language and deep philosophic matter, is by far the most difficult of any of Plato’s dialogues,—there being many passages in it, which still in fact puzzle even the most ingenious of its commentators. The reader who would seek further information than can be afforded within the limits of a translation, is referred to Tiedemann’s Introductions to the Platonic Dialogues, to Stallbaum’s Prolegomena and notes to his edition of the Timæus, to Ritter’s remarks on the physical doctrines of Plato (vol. ii. pp. 338-384), and, above all, to the valuable notes and dissertations in Martin’s _Etudes sur le Timée de Platon_, 2 vols. 8vo. 1842.

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Footnote 257:

The reader is referred for further information on the pre-Socratic
theories of nature, to Stallbaum’s Prolegomena to the Timæus, pp.
48-54; as well as to Introductions to the Protagoras and Theœtetus, in
vol. i. of this translation.

Footnote 258:

Plato, in ch. xxiii. designates _matter_ as the receptacle, and, as it
were, the nurse (ὑποδοχὴν, οἷον τιθήνην) of all production; while God,
on the other hand,—the sum of all ideas,—is the Father and fashioner
of the Universe. In ch. xxvi. also, it is described as one and the
same with space, which furnishes a place for all generated things.
This principle of nature, therefore, is without form,—without _an
idea_; and it is only in the productions of the creative energy and
the all-susceptible nature,—that is, in the son of the father and
mother,—that there is form and determinate idea. This is clearly laid
down in ch. xxiv.; and Ritter accordingly very rightly
observes:—“Matter is nothing more than the condition of all human
existence, which, however, is a necessary condition, and so causes the
_natural_ itself to appear as _necessary_; whereas the shape received
from the good is that which under this condition comes into being and
has its actual existence in nature.”—(Ritter, ii. p. 341, compared
with ch. xliii. of this Dialogue.)

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THE TIMÆUS.

———●———

SOCRATES, TIMÆUS, CRITIAS, HERMOCRATES.

I.—SOC. One, two, three:—but where, dear Timæus, is that fourth of us who yesterday were your guests, but are entertainers now?

TIM. Some illness has befallen him, Socrates; for he would not willingly have missed such a meeting as the present.

SOC. It is your business, then, of yourself, and [that of] these present, to fill up the place of the absent guest.

TIM. Quite so, Socrates; and, as far as we can, we will not fail to do so: for it would be unjust for the rest of us, whom you yesterday so handsomely entertained, not to treat you with readiness in return.

SOC. Do you recollect, then, the magnitude and nature of the things on which I charged you to speak?

TIM. Some, indeed, we do recollect; but what we do not, you, who were present, can recal to our memory: or rather, if it be not too much trouble, once more briefly run over the whole from the beginning, that it may be the more firmly established in our minds.

SOC. Be it so. The sum of yesterday’s discussion respecting a republic was, what form I thought the best, and of what sort of men it should be composed.

TIM. And indeed, Socrates, all that you said was quite according to our mind.

SOC. Did we not in the first place separate the class of husbandmen, and ever so many other artificers, from that of those who fight in defence of the state?

TIM. Yes.

SOC. And when we had assigned to every one that single employment which was suited to his own nature, and had prescribed to each his particular art, we bade the military caste confine themselves to the simple duty of protecting the state from the hostile incursions both of internal and external foes;—mildly to administer justice to their subjects, as being naturally friends, but fiercely to combat with such foes as might fall in their way.

TIM. Quite so, of course.

SOC. We asserted, I think, that the souls of the guardians should be naturally high-spirited, and at the same time remarkably philosophic, so as to enable them towards either friends or foes respectively to be gentle or severe.

TIM. You did so.

SOC. But what about their training? Did we not say that they ought to be instructed in gymnastic exercises, music, and other suitable branches of science?

TIM. Yes.

SOC. With respect at least to those thus trained, it was somehow said, that they should regard neither gold nor silver nor any such property, as their own private possession, but rather, like subordinates, should receive the wages of their guardianship from those whom they defend and preserve, their recompense being no more than sufficient for temperate men, and that they should spend their income in common, with a view only to mutual subsistence, bestowing their attention wholly on virtue, in preference to every other pursuit.

TIM. This too was so stated.

II.--SOC. Respecting women, too, we asserted that their nature should be aptly conformed to resemble that of men, and that they should all engage in common with them, both in the duties of war and the other employments of life.

TIM. This too you alleged.

SOC. But what about the procreation of children? This perhaps you easily remember, on account of the novelty of the proposal; for we ordered that marriage-unions and children should be in common to all persons whatsoever, special care being taken also that no one should be able to distinguish his own children individually, but all consider all as their kindred; regarding those of an equal age, and in the prime of life, as their brothers and sisters,—those prior to them, and yet further back, as parents and grandsires,—and those below them, as their children and grandchildren.[259]

TIM. Aye,—these things too, in the way you describe them, are easily remembered.

SOC. That they might at once acquire then the best possible natural disposition, I recollect that we decreed that the rulers, male and female, whom we placed over the marriage contract, should secretly contrive, through certain lots, that the worthy should assort only with the worthy, the base with the base,—and that no discord might arise from this connexion, we should refer all the blame of the union to fortune alone.

TIM. This, too, we remember.

SOC. We ordered, moreover, that the children of the good should be properly trained, but those of the bad secretly sent to the other part of the state, while of those who are constantly arriving at manhood, such as are found to be of a good disposition, should be recalled from exile; those, among them, on the contrary, who have proved themselves unworthy, being in their turn banished to the place occupied by those just promoted.

TIM. Just so.

SOC. Have we, then, sufficiently summed up yesterday’s discussion; or do we need anything further, friend Timæus, that has been omitted?

TIM. By no means, Socrates; for these were the very things discussed.

III.—SOC. You shall now hear some further details respecting the republic that we have described, and how I feel towards it. The feeling, then, seems to me somewhat similar to this,—as if some one, on beholding beautiful animals, either wrought by the graver’s art, or really alive, but in a state of perfect rest, were to entertain a desire to behold them in motion, struggling, as it were, in those exercises which seem best suited to their bodies. Just the same do I feel towards that form of state which we have described; for I should gladly listen to any one who recited the story of the contests that one state engages in with others, when it ventures becomingly on war, and exhibits in the course of it a conduct worthy of its nurture and training, as regards both active encounters and verbal negotiations with individual states. On these points, indeed, Critias and Hermocrates, I am conscious of my own inability to praise the men and the state according to their desert; and that I should be so incapable is no wonder, as I have formed the same opinion respecting the poets both of the past and present age;—not that I despise the poet-tribe, but still every one must see, that being an imitative race, they most easily and in the best manner imitate those things in which they have been trained; while, on the contrary, whatever is unconnected with their training, is hard for them to imitate well even in actions, and in words even yet more difficult. And as for the tribe of Sophists, I deem them indeed mighty clever, both in multiplying words and many other fine accomplishments; yet I fear, as they have no settled abode, but wander through various cities, and dwell in no abode of their own, they will form false conjectures respecting both philosophers and politicians, as to the magnitude and nature both of the actions which they achieve in war, and of the words they employ in their mutual intercourse. The only people remaining, then, to whom I can apply, are those of your character and habit, versed both by nature and training in philosophy and political science. For Timæus here of Locris, in Italy, which is governed by the best of laws,[260] being withal not inferior to any of his fellow-citizens in wealth and nobility, has in his own state attained to the highest official honours, and has likewise in my opinion reached the summit of all philosophy. Critias, too, as we all know, is not ignorant of the particulars that we are now mentioning;—and respecting Hermocrates also, we have ample testimony for the belief that he is both by nature and education well suited to all these pursuits.[261] Hence, when I perceived yesterday your great anxiety to discuss the formation of a republic, I was much pleased at it, being well aware, that if you pleased, none could better unfold the successive points for discussion;—inasmuch as, by properly adapting the state for warlike purposes, you would be the only person in the present age who could supply it with all things becoming its constitution. Having spoken, then, in compliance with your request, I now require you, in your turn, to comply with mine; and, as a matter of course, you have agreed to carry on the discussion among yourselves in common and so forthwith repay my hospitality with the feast of reasoning. Here, therefore, am I arrayed for the purpose, and readiest of all to partake of the promised banquet.

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Footnote 259:

This subject is considered at some length in the third, fourth, and
fifth books of the Republic, as well as in the Laws, v. 739, b.

Footnote 260:

Its code was formed by Zaleucus, and it was said by the Syracusans to
be the best governed of all the Greek cities of Italy. Comp. the Laws,
i. 638.

Footnote 261:

Critias was a man of a generous, vigorous-minded disposition, who was
so fond of the company of philosophers, that he was said to be ἰδιώτης
μὲν ἐν φιλοσόφοις, φιλόσοφος δὲ ἐν ἰδιώταις. He was afterwards one of
the thirty tyrants, and Socrates’ most bitter enemy. Hermocrates was a
celebrated Syracusan general, several times alluded to by Thucydides
and Xenophon, and who made a vow to live by certain rules (κατὰ νόμον
ζῆν ἐφιέμενος).

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IV.—HERM. Aye, truly, Socrates, as Timæus here just observed, neither will we lack zeal in fulfilling your desire; nor will we offer any excuse for neglecting it; since only yesterday, just after leaving this, when we went to the lodging of Critias, where both there and before that on the way thither, we discussed this very subject. He here then unfolded to us a story from ancient tradition, which—prythee, Critias, even now repeat to Socrates, that he may judge whether or not it concerns his demand.

CRI. This we must surely do, if agreeable to Timæus, our third partner in this discussion.

TIM. I, for my part, fully consent.

CRI. Listen now then, Socrates, to a story very strange indeed, yet in every respect true, as it was once related by Solon, the wisest of the seven [sages of Greece]. He was the kinsman and intimate friend of our great-grandfather Dropides, as he himself often tells us in his poems; and he (Dropides) informed our grandfather Critias (as the old man himself in turn told us), that this state had formerly achieved great and admirable actions, the knowledge of which nevertheless had been lost through lapse of time and the decay of mankind,—one act in particular being more illustrious than the rest,—in remembrance of which it were fitting, that we should not only return you thanks, but also in full assembly hymn forth to the goddess our true and just acclaim of praise.

SOC. Well observed:—but what is this achievement, which Critias described as having been not only related by Solon, but really accomplished by this state in days of yore?

CRI. I will acquaint you with that ancient story, which I indeed received from no mere youth; for at that time Critias, as he himself said, was almost ninety years old, and I myself about ten; and it chanced then to be the time of the _Cureotis Apaturiorum_.[262] The boys indeed were then going through the ceremonies customary with them at this festival;—for our parents proposed prizes for singing verses; and therefore a multitude of verses of many poets were recited, and many of us especially sang the poems of Solon, as being at that time new. Then one of our tribe, whether it was his real opinion or he wished to gratify Critias, said he thought Solon not only the wisest of men in matters generally, but as regards poetry the most noble of all poets. On hearing this, the old man (for I well remember it) was exceedingly pleased, and said, laughing—‘If Solon, oh Amynander, had not considered poetry as a mere amusement, but made it, as others do, a serious employment, and so completed the history which he had brought from Egypt; and, had not been forced to relinquish it by the seditions and numerous other troubles in which he found his country involved, I do not think that either Hesiod, Homer, or any other poet, would have acquired more distinguished renown.’ ‘And what was that story, Critias?’ asked he. ‘One about an action,’ replied he, ‘the greatest and most celebrated, which this state ever achieved; although, through lapse of time and the death of those by whom it was undertaken, its fame has not descended to our own day.’ ‘Tell it,’ said he, ‘from the beginning; and say what that was, which Solon asserted as true, as well as how and from whom he heard it.’

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Footnote 262:

The _Apaturia_, according to Proclus and Suidas, were festivals in
honour of Dionysus, publicly celebrated for the space of three days;
and they were assigned this name, δι’ ἀπάτην, that is, on account of
the deception through which Poseidon is reported to have vanquished
Xanthus. The first day of these festivals was called δόρπεια, in
which, as the name indicates, those of the same tribe feasted
together; and hence (says Proclus) on this day εὐωχίαι καὶ δεῖπνα
πολλά, splendid banquets and much feasting took place:—the second day
was called ἀνάῥῥυσις, _a sacrifice_, because many victims were
sacrificed in it; the victims being called ἀναῤῥύματα:—the third day,
of which Plato speaks in this place, was called κουρεώτης, because on
this day κοῦροι, that is, boys or girls, were collected to have their
names registered in their tribes (φρατρίαι:)—to these some add a
fourth day, which they call ἐπίβδα, or _the day after_.

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V.—‘In Egypt,’ said he, ‘in the Delta, about the summit of which the streams of the Nile are divided, is the district (νομός) surnamed Saitical; the chief city of which is Sais, whence also came the king Amasis; and it had a presiding divinity, whose name is in the Egyptian tongue _Neith_, which they say corresponds with the Greek _Athena_; and the people profess to be great friends of the Athenians, and united with them in a sort of close alliance. Solon said that on his arrival thither, he was very honourably received; and, especially, on his inquiring about ancient affairs of those priests who possessed superior knowledge in such matters, he perceived that neither himself nor any one of the Greeks (so to speak) had any antiquarian knowledge at all. And once on a time desirous of inducing them to narrate their ancient stories, he undertook to describe those events which had formerly happened among us in days of yore,—those about the first Phoroneus and Niobe, and again after the deluge of Deucalion and Pyrrha (as described by the mythologists), together with their posterity, paying due attention to the different ages in which these events are said to have occurred:—on which one of their extremely ancient priests exclaimed, “Solon, Solon, you Greeks are always children, and aged Greek there is none.” Solon, on hearing this, replied, “How can you say this?” To whom the priest, “You are all youths in intelligence; for you hold no ancient opinions derived from remote tradition, nor any system of discipline that can boast of a hoary old age:—and the cause of this is the multitude and variety of destructions that have been and will be undergone by the human race, the greater indeed arising from fire and water, others of less importance from ten thousand other contingencies. The story, for instance, that is current among you, that Phaeton, the offspring of the Sun, once attempting to drive his father’s chariot, and not being able to keep the track observed by his parent, burnt up the surface of the earth, and perished himself, blasted by lightning, is generally regarded as fabulous, but in point of fact it refers to a declination (or parallax) of the heavenly bodies revolving round the earth, and indicates that, at certain long intervals of time, the earth’s surface is destroyed by mighty fires.[263] When this occurs, then those who dwell either on mountains, or in lofty and dry places, perish in greater numbers than those dwelling near rivers, or on the sea-shore;—whereas to us the Nile is not only our safeguard from all other troubles, but liberates and preserves us also from this in particular;—and again when the gods, to purify the earth, deluge its surface with water, then the herdsmen and shepherds on the mountains are preserved in safety, while the inhabitants of your cities are hurried away to the sea, by the impetuosity of the rivers. In this our country, on the other hand, the waters neither then fell, nor ever have fallen from above upon the plains, but on the contrary are naturally driven upwards from the earth’s interior:—and to these causes it is owing, that the most ancient things are said to be here preserved. The truth is, however, that in all places where there is neither intense cold nor immoderate heat, the race of man is always found to exist, sometimes in less, sometimes in greater number. And all the noble, great, or otherwise distinguished achievements, performed either by ourselves, or by you, or elsewhere, of which we have heard the report,—all these have been engraven in our temples in very remote times, and preserved to the present day; while, on the contrary, with you and all other nations, they are only just committed to writing, and all other modes of transmission which states require,—when again, at the usual period, a current from heaven rushes on them like a pestilence, and leaves the survivors among you both destitute of literary attainments and unacquainted with music;—and thus you become young again, as at first, knowing nothing of the events of ancient times, either in our country or yours. As for the transactions, indeed, Solon, which you have just related from your antiquities, they differ but little from puerile fables:—for in the first place you only mention one deluge of the earth, whereas there had been many before; and in the next place you are unacquainted with that most noble and excellent race of men, who once inhabited your country, from whom you and your whole present state are descended, though only a small remnant of this admirable people is now remaining,—your ignorance in this matter resulting from the fact that their posterity for many generations died without the power of speech through the medium of letters;[264] for long before the chief deluge, a city of Athenians existed, regulated by the best laws both in military and all other matters, whose noble deeds and civil institutions are said to have been the most excellent of all that we have heard to exist under heaven.”

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Footnote 263:

It was the opinion of Heraclitus and many of the old philosophers,
that the earth would be periodically destroyed by fire or water. The
notion was borrowed, perhaps, from the Egyptians. (Comp. Herod. ii.
ch. 142.)

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VI.—‘Solon, on hearing this, expressed his admiration, and exhibited the most ardent desire, entreating the priests to relate to him accurately and in order the whole history of his ancient fellow-citizens. And then one of the priests replied, “I have no objection, Solon; and for your sake, and that of your city, I will relate the whole, and more particularly on account of that goddess, to whom is assigned the guardianship both of your state and ours, and by whom both have been founded and fostered; yours indeed having a priority over ours of a thousand years, from having received its origin from Hephæstus and the Earth; and the annals even of our own city [Sais] have been preserved eight thousand years in our sacred writings. I will briefly describe, then, the laws and more illustrious actions of those states which have existed nine thousand years; and when we are more at leisure, we will take the sacred writings themselves, and recount an exact history of every particular.

‘“Now, consider the laws of these people, as compared with those prevailing here; for you will find here even at the present day many examples of institutions that formerly existed in your city. First of all, the priests passed their life separate from all the rest; and next, the artificers so exercised their crafts, that each followed his own employment without mingling with any other class of workmen. The same method was likewise adopted with shepherds, hunters, and husbandmen. The soldiers, too, you will find, were separated from other kinds of men, and were enjoined by the laws to engage in nothing but war. The armour, too, which each employed, such as shields and darts, resembled that which we used first of all the Asiatics,—the goddess in those places, as she did to you, first pointing out their use. Again, with respect to wisdom, you may perceive what attention the law paid to it even from the first, as likewise to all that respects the universe, including even divination and medicine, that conduces to the preservation of health; and from these, which are divine things, the inquiry proceeds to human affairs and all other branches of learning therewith connected. Such then was the principle of distribution and arrangement on which the goddess first founded and established your state, choosing for that purpose the place in which you were born; because she foresaw that from its excellent temperature, the region would produce men of the most consummate wisdom; and, the goddess, of course, being a lover both of wisdom and war, selected a spot likely to produce men most resembling herself; and fixed on this first as their settled abode. You proceeded to settle, then, under the protection of such like laws, and what is more, under good government, surpassing all men likewise in every virtue, as becomes the descendants and disciples of the gods.

‘“Many and mighty deeds of your state, then, are here recorded in writing [in our sacred records,] and call forth our admiration; nevertheless there is one in particular, which in magnitude and valour surpasses them all;—for these writings relate what a prodigious force your city once overcame, when a mighty warlike power, rushing from the Atlantic sea, spread itself with hostile fury over all Europe and Asia. That sea indeed was then navigable, and had an island fronting that mouth which you in your tongue call the Pillars of Hercules; and this island was larger than Libya and Asia put together; and there was a passage hence for travellers of that day to the rest of the islands, as well as from those islands to the whole opposite continent that surrounds that the real sea. For as respects what is within the mouth here mentioned, it appears to be a bay with a kind of narrow entrance; and that sea is indeed a true sea, and the land that entirely surrounds it may truly and most correctly be called a continent. In this Atlantic island, then, was formed a powerful league of kings, who subdued the entire island, together with many others, and parts also of the continent; besides which they subjected to their rule the inland parts of Libya, as far as Egypt, and Europe also, as far as Tyrrhenia. The whole of this force, then, being collected in a powerful league, undertook at one blow to enslave both your country and ours, and all the land besides that lies within the mouth. This was the period, Solon, when the power of your state was universally celebrated for its virtue and strength;—for, surpassing all others both in magnanimity and military skill, sometimes taking the lead of the Greek nation, at others left to itself by the defection of the rest, and brought into the most extreme danger, it still prevailed, raised the trophy over its assailants, kept from slavery those not as yet enslaved, insured likewise the most ample liberty for all of us without exception who dwell within the Pillars of Hercules. Subsequently, however, through violent earthquakes and deluges which brought desolation in a single day and night, the whole of your warlike race[265] was at once merged under the earth; and the Atlantic island itself was plunged beneath the sea, and entirely disappeared;—whence even now that sea is neither navigable nor to be traced out, being blocked up by the great depth of mud[266] which the subsiding island produced.’”[267]

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Footnote 264:

Gr. γράμμασι τελευτᾶν ἀφώνους, which can only be paraphrastically
rendered.

Footnote 265:

τὸ παρ’ ὑμῖν μάχιμον. So reads Stallbaum, on the authority of several
MSS., the old reading being παρ’ ὑμῶν, which is retained by Bekker.

Footnote 266:

Gr. πηλοῦ κάρτα βαθέος ἐμποδὼν ὄντος. The old reading is καταβραχέος.
We have here followed Bekker’s emendation.

Footnote 267:

The whole of the story about the Atlantic isles, so much canvassed by
the critics, is so improbable and so at variance with the geographical
knowledge of the Greeks, even in Plato’s time, that it can only be
considered as a mere myth. See Martin’s admirable remarks, _Études sur
le Timée_.

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VII.—The above, O Socrates, is the sum of what the elder Critias repeated from the narration of Solon:—and when yesterday you were discoursing about a republic and the citizens composing it, I was reminded to my surprise of what I have now mentioned; for I perceived how divinely, as it were, by a kind of good luck, and without wandering from the mark, you in most respects coincided with Solon’s statement. Still I was unwilling to disclose these particulars immediately; since, from the long lapse of time since I first heard them, I did not remember them with sufficient accuracy [for repetition]. I considered, therefore, that I ought, before relating it, first of all to rehearse the whole diligently to myself. And this was why I yesterday speedily complied with your demands, conceiving, as is most important in such matters, that we ought not to lack ability to present a discourse suited to the object in view. Hence was it, as Hermocrates here observed, that as soon as we left here yesterday, I brought up the subject before my friends here, in order to refresh my memory; and by afterwards meditating on it at night, I acquired nearly a complete recollection of the whole story. According to the proverb, indeed, what we learn in childhood takes a wonderful hold on the memory:—for with respect to myself, for instance, I am not certain that I could recall the whole of yesterday’s discourse, though I should be very much astonished if anything that I had heard a very long time ago were to escape my remembrance. What I then heard, indeed, was listened to with great pleasure and delight; and the old man very readily recounted it, even when I frequently asked for a repetition; and thus the story became like the brands of indelible writing fixed in my memory. Well then, as soon as it was day I repeated the narrative to my friends, that they might aid me in fairly recounting my story. Now, therefore, as respects the object of all that has been said, Socrates, I am prepared to relate, not only the general heads, but the particulars also of all that I heard. As for the citizens and state which you described to us yesterday as in a fable, we will now convert it into a reality, and consider the state established by you as no other than this [of Athens,] and the citizens which you described as no other than those real ancestors of ours, alluded to by the Egyptian priests. Indeed they will harmonize in every respect; and we shall not be far from the mark[268] in asserting that your citizens are the very people who existed at that time. Each taking our share then in this discussion, we will try our utmost to bestow suitable attention to the task that you have assigned us. It is requisite therefore to consider, O Socrates, whether this narrative answers our purpose,[269] or we should seek some other in its stead.

SOC. And what other, O Critias, can we receive in preference to this, which, from its affinity, is extremely suitable to the festival of the goddess, and has the all-important merit of being not a cunningly devised fable, but a true history? It is impossible, therefore, to say, how and whence, if we abandon your narrative, we should find another more suitable. We cannot; but must acknowledge that you have been happy in your narration; and, as for me, after my discourse of yesterday, I will now rest, and be in my turn a listener.

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Footnote 268:

Gr. οὐκ ἀπᾳσόμεθα, _lit. we shall not sing out of tune_. The old
reading is ἀπωσόμεθα, which is untranslatable.

Footnote 269:

Gr. εἰ κατὰ νοῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν οὗτος.

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VIII.—CRI. Consider then, Socrates, the arrangement of this banquet of yours, how we settled it. For we think it right that Timæus, who is the most astronomical of us all, and has bestowed much pains in acquainting himself with the nature of the universe, should be the first to discourse to us, beginning from the creation of the world, and ending with the nature of men;—and also that I after him, receiving from him, as it were, the men which have been ideally produced—and some of them, too, excellently educated by you,—should introduce them among us here, according to the word and law of Solon, as to proper judges, and make them members of this city; as being really those very Athenians of bygone days, which were described as unknown to us in the report of the sacred writings;—and so, in future, we will treat them in our discourse as citizens and Athenians.

SOC. I am now, it seems, to be plentifully and splendidly entertained in my turn with a banquet of arguments:—it is for you, then, O Timæus, to begin the discourse, having first of all invoked the gods according to the usual custom.

TIM. Well, Socrates, this at any rate is true,—that those who have even the least share of wisdom, always invoke the deity on entering every undertaking, whether small or great; and so we likewise (unless we be in every respect unwise) who are now about to speak concerning the universe, whether it be generated or without generation, shall (if we be not very unwise) make it our first duty to invoke the gods and goddesses, and pray that what we speak may be first of all pleasing to them, and also in consistence with ourselves. And as respects the invocation of the gods, so have I acted for myself; while as respects ourselves, we must lead you by that way which you may most easily understand, and which will best enable me to explain my meaning about the proposed subjects of discussion.

IX.—I think we ought, in the first place, to define what that is which is _ever-existent_, and has no generation; and what that is which is _in a state of generation_ or becoming, but never really _is_. The former of these, indeed, which is apprehended by reflection united with reason, always subsists according to _sameness_;[270]—while the latter is perceived by opinion united with irrational perception; since it subsists in a state of generation and corruption, and never really is. And, again, whatever is generated is necessarily generated from a certain cause; for it is wholly impossible that anything should be generated without a cause. An artificer, therefore, of anything, if he looks to that which always subsists according to sameness, and from this as a sort of pattern, works out the form and nature of his work, he must thus, necessarily, produce something wholly beautiful:—but where he employs for his pattern only what is generated, it cannot be beautiful.

Let this universe then be called _heaven_, or _the world_, or by any other name that it usually receives; and let us, in the first place, consider respecting it, what ought to be investigated at the very outset of our proposed inquiry about the universe,—whether it always existed, having no beginning, or was generated, beginning from some certain commencement. It is generated;—for this universe is palpable, and has a body; and all such things are perceptible (_i. e._ are to be apprehended by the senses); and things perceptible being apprehended by opinion, in conjunction with perception, appear to be in a state of becoming, and subject to generation. Again, with reference to what exists, it must necessarily have arisen from some cause.

To discover then the _Creator_ and _Father_ of this universe, as well as his work, is indeed difficult; and when discovered, it is impossible to reveal him to mankind at large. And this too, we must consider respecting him, according to which of two patterns he modelled the world; whether with reference to one subsisting ever in a state of sameness and similarly affected, or with reference to one that is only generated. If this world then is beautiful and its artificer good, he evidently looked to an eternal pattern; but if it be without beauty, and what it is not lawful to mention, he must have looked to one that is generated. It is evident, however, to every one that he looked to one that was eternal;—for the universe is the most beautiful of generated things, and its artificer the best of causes. Being thus generated, then, it has been framed according to principles that can be comprehended by reason and reflection, and ever abides in sameness of being. This, then, being the case, this world must necessarily be the resemblance of something;—although to describe its origin according to nature is the greatest of all undertakings. We should distinguish between an image and its pattern; just as words are connected with the things of which they are the interpreters:—and so when we speak of that which is stable and firm, and mentally intelligible, our language should be in like manner stable and immutable, and as far as possible unrefutable and immovable, having in this respect no deficiency; whereas, in speaking concerning its image only, and as compared to it, we should use probable arguments, that are in strict analogy thereto. Moreover, precisely as essence (or true being) is to generation, so is truth to faith (or mere conjecture). You must not wonder, then, O Socrates, since different people differ so much in opinion about the gods and the formation of the universe, if I should be unable to put forth generally approved and scrupulously exact statements on so difficult a subject; but even if we should only advance reasons not less probable than those of others, you should still be content, remembering that both I who am speaking, and you who are my judges, possess a common human nature; and you must be satisfied therefore, if my assertions are but probable statements, and should inquire no farther.

SOC. Capitally well said, Timæus; and we must proceed wholly as you recommend. As regards the prelude then of your discourse, we wonderfully approve of it: and now proceed to the strain (or main subject) itself.

X.—TIM. Let us declare then on what account the framing Artificer settled the formation of this universe.[271] He was good; and in the good, envy is never engendered about anything whatever. Hence, being free from this (envy), he desired that all things should as much as possible resemble himself. Any one, therefore, who receives this as the leading principle of generation and the universe from intelligent men, will receive it most correctly. For as the deity desired, as far as possible, that all things should be good, and nothing evil,—he accordingly took everything that was visible and not in a state of rest, but in excessive agitation and disorder, and then reduced it from disorder into order, conceiving the latter to be far better than the former. It is not, indeed, and never was, lawful to do anything else but what is most honourable; and accordingly, he found by reasoning that of things naturally visible, nothing without intelligence could be more beautiful than what is wholly endowed with intellect, and besides this, that apart from the soul no one could possess intelligence.[272] In pursuance of this reasoning, placing intellect in soul and soul in body, he constructed the universe; that thus it might be a work naturally the most beautiful and the best. Hence, therefore, we have a reasonable motive for calling the world an animal with a soul, truly intellectual, and created through the providence of the deity.

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Footnote 270:

The terms ταὐτόν—θάτερον, ὅμοιον—ἀνόμοιον, so constantly met with in
this dialogue, express _eternal constancy_, as contrasted with
_mutability_; and they are found among the ten pairs of opposites
which, according to the Pythagoreans, constituted the _elements_ of
the universe.

Footnote 271:

Gr. γένεσιν καὶ τὸ πᾶν τόδε.

Footnote 272:

Plato seems, therefore, to regard the soul (ψυχή) as an intermediate
agent and uniting bond between perishable bodies and the eternal and
indestructible intellect, powerfully acting on matter; but yet, on the
other hand, closely and necessarily connected with intellect; though
not like the latter, naturally eternal and indestructible, but the
best of things generated and constituted eternal by the divine
decrees.

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XI.—This being the case, let us next consider, in the likeness of what animals the composing artificer framed the universe. We must by no means then think, that he would deign to fashion it like animals subsisting as a part of anything (_i. e._ in an incomplete form): for nothing resembling an imperfect animal can possibly be beautiful. But we may consider it on the other hand, as most nearly of all resembling what contains the other animals both separately and collectively as parts [of a whole:]—for it (the universe) comprises within itself all intelligible animals, just as this world contains us and all other visible creatures.[273] The deity, indeed, desirous of making it in all respects resemble the most beautiful and entirely perfect of intelligible objects, formed it into one visible animal, _containing within itself all the other_ animals with which it is naturally allied. Are we not, then, right in concluding that there is but one heaven (or universe); or is it more correct to assert that there are many and infinite? One only, [I answer,] if it has been fabricated according to the original pattern. For that which comprehends all intelligible animals whatever, can never be second to any other:—for there would be need of another animal again to comprise these two, of which they would both be parts; and it would be more proper to assert that the universe resembles this comprehending third, rather than the other two. In order, therefore, that the world may in its substantive existence [κατὰ τὴν μόνωσιν] resemble the all-perfect animal—on this account the framer of the worlds produced neither two nor an infinite number; but this, the solely-begotten heaven (or universe) having been generated, now exists and ever will exist.