Chapter I: Accuse...! (2)

The Attorney-General.--“M. du Paty de Clam declares in his letter, like all the members of the council of war, the hearing of whom has been abandoned because it was evident that it could not be exacted, that professional secrecy prevents him from giving any information whatever. Consequently there is no reason for rejecting his excuse. But M. Labori points out that Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam was interested as a witness in an examination not yet finished, but opened on the complaint of Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart. The reply to this is manifest and direct. There can be no confusion here between M. Zola and the _gérant_ of ‘L’Aurore’ on the one hand, and Colonel Picquart on the other. The latter has lodged a complaint which is being regularly examined, and it is for him alone to intervene if he sees fit. But his proceeding is the proceeding of a third party, so far as these defendants are concerned. From no point of view, then, do the arguments that have just been presented seem to me well founded.”

M. Labori.--“Will the court permit me to indicate the matters concerning which M. Zola desires to hear Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam, and the connection between them and the verdict of January 11? In 1892 Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam, who had not then risen to his present office, was in very close relations with the de Comminges family, whose society Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart also frequented. Mlle. Blanche de Comminges and her brother, Captain de Comminges, have been summoned here as witnesses.”

The Judge.--“I regret to inform you that Mlle. de Comminges is sick, and that she has sent a doctor’s certificate.”

M. Labori.--“We hope that she will be well again within forty-eight hours. There are many sick people in this case. We shall have something to say concerning the things that are happening in this matter to prevent witnesses from coming, and we shall expose all intimidations and threats. Mlle. de Comminges knew Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart and Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam. At the beginning of the campaign in relation to Major Esterhazy, Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart received at Tunis two singular dispatches. One of them read: ‘All is discovered. Speranza.’ The court will remember that this is a signature which has been met already in the Esterhazy trial. The other dispatch said in substance: ‘It is known that Georges (that is the name of Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart) is the author of the telegram. All is discovered. Blanche.’ By Blanche was meant Mlle. Blanche de Comminges, and that this was understood by the military authorities is proved by the fact that they demanded of Mlle. Blanche de Comminges certain specimens of her handwriting. She protested, and lodged a complaint, as did Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart. These dispatches, then, were forgeries. It would be interesting to find out who the forgers are. Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart attributes one of them to the police agent, Souffrain, and we have summoned him. We hope that he will come, and then we shall have an explanation. As for the other telegram, we are curious to know how there could have started from certain circles which must be in touch either with the minister of war or with Major Esterhazy a dispatch signed Blanche which Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart was expected to consider as coming from Mlle. Blanche de Comminges. We should like to hear Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam concerning these matters, and others of an earlier date in which he has been mixed up, and which relate exclusively and very closely to Major Esterhazy. They happened in 1892, and we shall have need also of the testimony of Mlle. de Comminges on the same subject.”

The Judge.--“There is no question here of Mlle. de Comminges. The question is of Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam.”

M. Labori.--“But it is Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam whom these matters concern. He was induced at a certain moment, on the intervention of one of his most eminent superiors, General Davout, to restore to the de Comminges family certain correspondence. I cannot be more precise on this point, and the court understands why; but the matter is in the hands of the prefect of police. One day Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam said that a certain letter belonging to this correspondence was not in his hands, and that he could not give it up directly, because it had fallen into the hands of a woman, but that it was not very difficult to see her, and that the only thing necessary was to hand her a 500-franc bill in exchange for the letter. Then, it seems, on the demand of Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam, a meeting was appointed at the _cours la Reine_, at the very spot to which came the singular veiled lady of Major Esterhazy. There, in the presence of witnesses, Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam entered into conversation with the veiled lady, with whom he remained a long time, and to whom he pretended to have given a 500-franc bill, which, however, no one had sent to him. Then he brought back the letter to transmit it anew to the de Comminges family. These are facts concerning which I can say nothing more, in presence of the interested parties. I can furnish only indications.”

The Judge.--“But I do not see the relation between what you have just said and the matter for which your client is prosecuted.”

M. Labori.--“You shall see. M. Zola does not hesitate to think that the veiled lady, far from being in relations with Colonel Picquart, as they have not feared to state in official reports, and as Major Esterhazy loudly and audaciously charges, belongs to the circle of certain members of the staff, or to the circle of Major Esterhazy himself. Now, concerning this veiled lady we shall have to have explanations. For how can you expect us to prove that a guilty man has been acquitted in obedience to orders, if we do not begin by proving that he is guilty, and by establishing consequently the various circumstances which could culminate in his guilt? Under these circumstances it is for us to examine in detail, in order to get complete light, points that in no way concern the national defence, which has been abused. It is our indisputable right to seek light on Major Esterhazy’s means of defence, which have been welcomed in another place with a facility that they will not meet at the hands of this jury.”

M. Albert Clemenceau.--“At the trial of Major Esterhazy, and in the course of his examination, reference was made to the veiled lady, and this mysterious person was taken so seriously that the president of the council of war asked the accused if he could not give some indications concerning this lady, who had given him the mysterious rendezvous. I conclude therefrom that in the Esterhazy trial, with which we are necessarily concerned, the veiled lady was in question, and that therefore all that concerns her is well within our case. Again, Major du Paty de Clam, in his letter, says that he cannot come here to testify, because he was a judicial officer of police in the first examination. The court perhaps remembers that in this very place, in the case known as the Prado case, they heard Examining Magistrate Guillot, who came to testify concerning facts that took place in his private office. The presiding judge was a Paris magistrate. Now, what was done in the Prado case can be done in this case, and I do not see that the fact that Major du Paty de Clam played a part in another inquiry is a reason why we should not hear him here.”

M. Labori.--“Another thing. This is the first time that I have known witnesses to be judged according to the utility of their evidence. M. du Paty de Clam is not sick, nor is he detained, so far as I know, by the duties of his military office. He does not know upon what points he is to be examined, or what we shall ask him. It is his duty to appear in this case. We have to question him as well on matters of fact as on matters of morals pertaining exclusively to the Esterhazy case, and not at all to the Dreyfus case. Under these circumstances it is indispensable that M. du Paty de Clam should appear at this bar. If we question him upon points in regard to which he can take shelter behind professional secrecy, he will take such shelter, and will not answer. And even then it will be our right to make a motion before the court, asking whether, as a matter of law, M. du Paty de Clam can cut himself off behind professional secrecy. M. du Paty de Clam refers to closed doors. Well, if closed doors are necessary in this assize court, we will have them. With a jury, closed doors have no terrors for us. But we shall ask no questions concerning the national defence. None are involved in this affair.”

M. Zola.--“None.”

M. Labori.--“They have put forward the plea of the nation’s defence. But that is a jest.”

The Attorney-General.--“The defence of the nation a jest?”

M. Labori.--“Ah! really, that is not worthy of you, Mr. Attorney-General. I do not accept that. No, no! I will suffer no one, not even you, to suspect my patriotism. No! I repeat, gentlemen of the jury, if there is any question here that concerns the national defence, we shall not approach it. If closed doors are necessary, let the doors be closed; we are willing. But we will not permit them to say, in placing us at the mercy of all calumnies and all insults, that we are paid men, when, in fact, in a trial like this, we are fighting a battle in which we risk our life and honor. We will allow no one to say that we are triflers, and that contempt is the most that we deserve. It will be seen later whether we deserve it.”

The Judge.--“I have a letter from Mme. de Boulancy in which she says: ‘I am kept in bed by an affection of the heart, which gives me much pain just now. I enclose the certificate of my doctor, M. de Basse, 4, Rue de Berlin. I beg to refer you to my evidence before M. Bertulus.’”

M. Labori.--“We must hear Mme. de Boulancy. She cannot lapse into a state of perpetual silence simply because she testified before M. Bertulus. From the standpoint of authenticity Major Esterhazy’s letters belong to this discussion. Major Esterhazy, realizing how terrible a blow the letter in which he styled himself a Uhlan would be to him, in spite of his numerous protectors, has denied its genuineness; now, it is genuine, it is, I declare it! And, if Mme. de Boulancy were here, we would prove it. In the presence of all these obstacles, I have the right, in the name of my client, who, I am sure, will approve me” ...

M. Zola.--“Certainly.”

M. Labori.--“... and it is my duty, to tell the whole. Mme. de Boulancy has other letters” ...

M. Zola.--“That is absolutely true.”

M. Labori.--“... which are authentic and still more serious. For weeks she has been the object of all sorts of threats. Major Esterhazy visits her house daily, with the support and protection of the police, who do not prevent him. And Major Esterhazy threatens her with death, if she gives up the letters. Mme. de Boulancy has also in her hands telegrams from Major Esterhazy of a later date, in which he begs her to give him the letters, and this is a fact known to more than one witness. For instance, there is M. Tysse. We shall be told directly that he will not come because, it seems, the Crédit Lyonnais threatens him with discharge if he comes, and promises to pay his fine if he does not come. We submit these facts to the jurors, and we ask them whether it is M. Zola, or the minister of war by his complaint and his limitations, who is creating in France a situation which, whatever may be said, is really revolutionary.”

M. Albert Clemenceau.--“It was not until this morning that Mme. de Boulancy became afflicted with heart trouble, but for two days we have known that she would not come, and that, in the fear that the court will send an expert physician to examine her, she will remain in bed all day. I must add that Mme. de Boulancy has informed the court that she lives in the Rue de Berlin. I beg the court to send either a doctor or a sheriff’s officer to that address. He will not find Mme. de Boulancy there.”

The Judge.--“She lives in the Boulevard des Batignolles, No. 22.”

M. Zola.--“She is not there either.”

M. Albert Clemenceau.--“You will not find Mme. de Boulancy at 22, Boulevard des Batignolles. I have the honor to offer a motion drawn up forty-eight hours ago, in which we foresaw that Mme. de Boulancy would be afflicted with heart trouble, and here, according to the terms of her letter, she is suffering with an affection of the heart. We were not mistaken.”

M. Clemenceau then offered a formal motion that, whereas Mme. de Boulancy had declared on several occasions that she possessed letters from Major Esterhazy no less insulting to the French army than those already known, and that she would produce them in the assize court, and whereas it was known to the defence that Mme. de Boulancy had recently received three dispatches from Major Esterhazy demanding a return of these letters, and threatening her with death if she should produce them in court, and whereas, because of these threats, Mme. de Boulancy had moved, concealing her new address, a physician be sent to examine her physical condition, and that a police officer be sent to seize the letters and dispatches referred to, wherever he might find them.

The Judge.--“M. Lebrun-Renault writes: ‘I am summoned only because of the special service that I performed January 5, 1895, at the parade in which Captain Dreyfus was disgraced. I can report what took place in the course of this service only to my hierarchical chiefs, and that is what I did. It is for them to make such use of my report as may seem to them proper. As for me, outside of them, I am bound to silence by my professional duty. Wherefore it is impossible for me to testify before the jurors. Under these circumstances I shall not respond.’”

M. Labori then offered a motion that, whereas there had been for some weeks a question in the press and at the tribune of the chamber of deputies of pretended confessions made by ex-Captain Dreyfus to Captain Lebrun-Renault on the day of the former’s degradation, the court order the hearing, first, of M. Lebrun-Renault, who will be asked to state whether he received the confession from Dreyfus and under what conditions, whether he reported the confession officially and under what circumstances, and whether he has spoken to various persons concerning them, and especially to M. Forzinetti, the baron de Vaux, M. P..., M. Fontbrune, and M. Dumont, and, second, of any other witness who can be usefully questioned concerning these matters.

The judge then read the following letter from Major Ravary:

My presence at the trial would be absolutely useless. I abstain, then, from appearing.

RAVARY.

M. Labori.--“Major Ravary was the first to establish officially, in a report that has been read publicly, the existence of what is known as the secret documents in the Dreyfus case. This is a point wholly pertinent to the discussion, since M. Zola and his fellow-defendant are authorized to prove that an illegality was committed in 1894 and covered in 1898. Therefore it is indispensable that M. Ravary be heard, and I shall have the honor to make a motion to that effect.”

The Judge.--“I have received a letter from General Mercier, in which he says that the prosecution of M. Zola deals only with the Esterhazy verdict, with which he had nothing do. He says that he has received from General Billot an authorization not to appear.”

M. Labori.--“I am greatly surprised that General Mercier, like so many others, should constitute himself judge of the question whether it is incumbent upon him to appear before the court. The minister of war may confine his complaint within limits, but he has no right as complainant to pursue the shocking and monstrous course of interposing an obstacle, not juridical, but material to the facts that we wish to establish. General Mercier is a witness of the first importance. Perhaps he will read tomorrow in the newspapers what has occurred at this first hearing, which is given in the presence, not of fifteen hundred persons simply, but of all France. M. Zola declares that in 1894 General Mercier, then minister of war, constituting himself judge in a council of war, did, after the hearing was over, outside of the discussion, without the knowledge of the accused, without examination of the accused upon the matter, and without even submitting it to his counsel, communicate to the council of war a secret document, and a document, for that matter, of no significance. If that is not true, let General Mercier come here tomorrow and say so. If it is true, I have no further use for him.”

The judge then announced that Major Rivals and the court clerk, Vallecalle, had notified him that they would not appear.

M. Labori.--“The complainant is represented here by the attorney-general. We should like him to inform us whether the minister of war has given to all these witnesses, as to General Mercier, an authorization which to them would have been more than an authorization,--that is, an order. If the attorney-general does not know, I would like him to put the question to the minister of war between now and tomorrow, in order to give us an answer.”

M. Zola.--“In short, we should like to know whether these persons have received orders from Billot, or are acting on their own initiative.”

M. Labori.--“Have they been ordered not to come? If so, let it be stated frankly, and the court tomorrow will pass upon our motion, which possibly will ask for a postponement of the case, in order that it may be judged when we are in full possession of the facts.”

M. Albert Clemenceau.--“The president of the republic refused to sign the decree of the minister of justice summoning M. Billot; then M. Billot authorized General Mercier not to appear in the assize court. Knowing the beginning of the story, we are interested in knowing the sequel, and I ask the attorney-general to inform us at the next hearing if the other officers, of a lower grade than that of General Mercier, have likewise been authorized by their superiors not to appear in court. If so, I may be permitted to express my astonishment that there has not been found a person in all this hierarchy to understand that there is one thing which is above the minister of war,--namely, justice. We thought so until today.”

The court then presented the refusals of Colonel Maurel, president of the council of war of 1894, M. Autant, architect, and M. Eichmann, who sat in the first council of war; and the defence, as in the previous cases, insisted upon their appearance.

The Judge.--“A letter from General de Boisdeffre reads as follows: ‘I do not need to tell you that, out of respect to the jury and deference to the court, I would willingly appear, but I have been in no way connected with the Esterhazy case, which was conducted entirely by the military government of Paris. Outside of professional secrecy, therefore, I could furnish no useful information.’”

M. Labori.--“All these witnesses seem to imagine that they constitute a caste apart and independent, and that it is permissible to them to rise above the law, above justice itself, and personally constitute themselves judges of the question whether they are useful or not as witnesses in a trial. Consequently in the case of General de Boisdeffre, as in the other cases, we insist and we protest.”

M. Albert Clemenceau.--“We are a little at sea. In the letters read, some witnesses declare that they will not come because they know certain facts, while others, like M. de Boisdeffre, declare that they will not come because they do not know any facts in this case. We do not know which of these two observations is sound, but it is impossible for both of them to be. It is interesting also to the jurors to know that former cabinet ministers, who are by no means the first comers, MM. Guérin and Trarieux, former keepers of the seals, and M. Raymond Poincaré, former minister of finance, have responded to the summons. It is certain that they would have had nothing to fear, if they had written to the court that they could not come. These former cabinet ministers come; yet among the military officers we cannot get a single witness. I believe it is well for the jurors to remember that.”

The court announcing that ex-President Casimir-Perier would appear, the defence withdrew its motion for his further summons. But M. Labori then offered a formal motion that MM. d’Ormescheville, Ravary, General Mercier, Patron, Vallecalle, Maurel, Autant, Eichmann, de Boisdeffre, and Captain de Comminges be forcibly constrained to appear. And he submitted a further motion that Mlle. Blanche de Comminges be constrained to appear, unless it should be found that her illness was genuine, and that, in the latter case, a commission should be appointed to visit her and ask her the following questions:

(1) Is she aware that her name has been used in writing to Colonel Picquart?

(2) How did she become aware of it?

(3) Did she not give the nickname “demigod” to Captain Lallement?

(4) Does she know whether this name was used in a telegram which is said to have been a forgery?

(5) Had Colonel du Paty de Clam any reason for entertaining a revengeful feeling toward her and her family?

(6) Is it not within her knowledge that he resorted in 1892 to very serious manœuvres, notably the employment of anonymous letters?

(7) Was not this matter put in the hands of M. Lozé, prefect of police, and did not General D---- have to intervene?

(8) Did not Colonel du Paty de Clam arrange, for the restitution of a letter, a scene that took place at _cours la Reine_, in which a veiled lady appeared?

After hearing these motions, the court adjourned for the day.

SECOND DAY--FEBRUARY 8.

The second day’s hearing began at half past twelve with the announcement of the court that, before proceeding to the hearing of the witnesses, there were new excuses to be read. The first was from Major Esterhazy, who wrote as follows:

I have been accused by M. Mathieu Dreyfus of the crime of high treason, and my judges have acquitted me by a unanimous decree of the council of war. Today I receive, at the instance of a simple individual, M. Emile Zola, a summons to appear as a witness in his trial in the assize court. It is plain, on the other hand, that in this trial the object of M. Zola is at the same time to revise by a revolutionary method the decree of acquittal rendered in my favor, and to sully, by representing them as criminals, the judges whom I respect. Such is the work in which M. Emile Zola invites me to participate. Under such circumstances I consider that I am not obliged to respond to M. Zola’s summons.

M. Labori.--“Major Esterhazy was present yesterday. It does not become me to inquire what suggestions he obeys today. I have not consulted M. Emile Zola, but I can say this for myself: it was a feeling of high discretion that led us to summon Major Esterhazy. He will not be here as an accused person, since he has been acquitted, and we consider his case a thing judged. But we have a right to the testimony of Major Esterhazy for the purpose of proving M. Zola’s good faith. Major Esterhazy refuses. So be it. I do not insist. We will discuss his _rôle_ without him.”

M. Albert Clemenceau.--“Pardon me. For my part, I do not give up his testimony. I have some questions to put to Major Esterhazy in the name of the _gérant_ of ‘L’Aurore.’ I demand that he be summoned again, and, if need be, forced to come.”

The next letter was from a widow Chapelon, who declared herself afflicted with influenza.

M. Albert Clemenceau.--“Mme. Chapelon appeared at the office of ‘L’Aurore’ a week ago; it was after she had been notified. She asked that her name be struck from the list of witnesses. She was asked why. She replied that she was soliciting for her son a scholarship at Chaptal, and that, if she were to testify, they would not give it to her. M. Perrenx informed her that this was not a good reason, and that she was required to come to the assize court and tell the truth. She went away, slamming the doors, and saying: ‘If you force me to come, I will tell the opposite of the truth.’ I insist that this witness shall come, and I demand that, as in the case of Major Esterhazy, she be brought to court after a second summons.”

The Judge.--“There is a doctor’s certificate.”

M. Clemenceau.--“I ask that an expert physician be sent to her. The one who is to see Mme. de Boulancy can see her too.”

The court then rendered its decision on the motions of the day before, ordering that Dr. Socquet be sent to examine Mme. de Boulancy, Mlle. Blanche de Comminges, M. Autant, and the widow Chapelon, and that a second summons be served upon Captain Lebrun-Renault, Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam, Major d’Ormescheville, Major Ravary, General Mercier, MM. Patron, Vallecalle, Maurel, Eichmann, General de Boisdeffre, and Major Esterhazy, directing them to appear on February 9.

_Testimony of Mme. Dreyfus._

The calling of the witnesses was then begun, the first to take the stand being Mme. Lucie Dreyfus, wife of ex-Captain Dreyfus.

M. Labori.--“I would like Mme. Dreyfus to have the goodness to tell us what she thinks of M. Zola’s good faith, and in this connection to make known to us under what circumstances in 1894 she learned of her husband’s arrest, and what was the attitude at that time of Colonel du Paty de Clam, who was then only a major.”

The Judge.--“What has that to do with the case?”

M. Labori.--“It concerns M. Zola’s good faith.”

M. Zola.--“I ask to be allowed here the liberty that is accorded thieves and murderers. They can defend themselves, summon witnesses, and ask them questions; but every day I am insulted in the street; they break my carriage windows, they roll me in the mud, and an unclean press treats me as a bandit. I have the right to prove my good faith, my probity, my honor.”

The Judge.--“Do you know Article 52, of the law of 1881?”

M. Zola.--“I do not know the law, and at the present moment I do not want to know it. I appeal to the probity of the jurors. I make them judges of the situation in which I am placed, and I entrust myself to them.”

The Judge.--“I remind you of the terms of the decree rendered yesterday by the court, the provisions of Article 52 of the law of 1881, and the terms of your summons. Let us not depart therefrom. Any question outside of these limits will not be put by me. Let that be well understood. It is useless to recur to the matter.”

M. Zola.--“I ask to be treated here as well as thieves and murderers. All accused persons are entitled to prove their probity, their good faith, and their honor.”

M. Labori.--“Will you permit me to point out the bearing of my questions? M. Zola has made two assertions. He has asserted that the council of war of 1894 convicted, in the person of ex-Captain Dreyfus, an innocent man by illegal methods.”

The Judge.--“He is not prosecuted for that.”

M. Labori.--“Pardon me, he is prosecuted for having said that the second council of war knowingly acquitted a guilty man by covering, in obedience to orders, the illegality committed by the first.”

M. Zola.--“It is in the summons.”

M. Labori.--“M. Zola asks to prove this illegality, and the elements out of which it grew, from the standpoint of his good faith. This illegality is not confined to the moment of the verdict of the council of war, but extends over the very period of inquiry in which occurred facts of the highest gravity which M. Zola asks to produce. If the court considers that Mme. Dreyfus can not be heard on this point, I shall be obliged to offer a motion.”

The Judge.--“Offer your motion. The question will not be put by me.”

M. Clemenceau.--“I ask to make a simple observation, addressed especially to the jurors. I am of the opinion that the law must be complied with, whatever it may be. But I beg you to remember, gentlemen of the jury, that M. Zola has written an article which fills sixteen pages of the pamphlet in my hands. Out of these sixteen pages the public prosecutor, at the order of the minister of war, complains of only fifteen lines, and, when we come to court, it transpires that, in spite of a judicious selection of fifteen lines from sixteen pages, the prosecution is still embarrassed by one of these fifteen lines. They tell us in these fifteen lines there are still six which must be put aside, because, were we to leave them there, embarrassing evidence would be put in.”

The Judge.--“I repeat that no question will be put which would be a means of arriving at the revision of a case sovereignly judged.”

M. Clemenceau.--“Then the court will put no question concerning good faith?”

The Judge.--“Concerning anything that relates to the Dreyfus case. No. Offer your motions. I repeat that I will not put the question.”

M. Labori.--“Will you permit me, _Monsieur le Président_, in our common interest, to ask you, then, what practical means you see by which we may ascertain the truth?”

The Judge.--“That does not concern me.”

M. Labori then made a formal motion that, whereas the matters upon which the testimony of Mme. Dreyfus was required bore directly upon the matters expressly set out in the complaint, and especially upon the illegality charged, and whereas the defendants maintained, in spite of the court’s decree, the right to prove their good faith, and whereas the refusal to hear the witnesses summoned would constitute the highest violation of the defendants’ rights, the court order the following questions to be put to Mme. Dreyfus:

(1) What do you think of M. Zola’s good faith?

(2) What are the reasons that have led you to believe in his good faith?

(3) Do you consider from what you know that the measures taken against your husband were legal or illegal?

(4) Will you describe the first visit of Major du Paty de Clam at your house? Who were present?

(5) Did not M. du Paty de Clam utter the grossest insults against your husband?

(6) Did he not pretend to demonstrate his guilt geometrically and by drawing concentric circles?

(7) Did he not speak of the Iron Mask?

(8) Did he not expressly forbid you to speak of the arrest to anyone whomsoever, even to his family?

(9) After how long a time were you allowed the right to write to your husband?

(10) After how long a time did you again see your husband?

(11) Did not M. du Paty de Clam say to you: “He denies, but I shall succeed in making him spit out all that he has in his body”?

(12) Did not M. du Paty de Clam nevertheless lead you to hope that perhaps there had been an error, and that up to November?

(13) Did not M. du Paty de Clam try, by the most irregular means, and even by insidious means, to tear confessions from you throughout the trial and after the verdict?

(14) What do you think of your husband’s character and morals? What was the nature of your life with him after your marriage?

(15) Did not your husband steadily declare, during the trial and after, that this whole matter was incomprehensible, and that he was the victim of a conspiracy?

The reading of these questions being received with a hostile manifestation from those present in the court-room, M. Labori turned to the audience, and shouted: “If you think you can prevent me from doing my duty, you are mistaken. I am embarrassed only when I am applauded. Let them howl! It is all one to me.”

The Attorney-General.--“I simply call attention to this,--that these incidents are rehearsed before the audience, but they are always the same, and that the jurors whom you have just addressed will remember that you have for the thing judged yesterday the same respect that you have for the thing judged on a previous occasion. I said at the beginning that a plan had been fixed upon; it is being carried out, and you have just given us the formula: ‘I do not know the law, and I do not want to know it.’ Well, we know it, and we will see that it is respected, with the aid of the jurors, in whom I have absolute confidence.”

M. Labori.--“M. Zola will answer in a moment, and it is to assure him the means of doing so that I take the floor.”

The Judge.--“Take it once for all, and do not renew this scene with each witness.”

M. Labori.--“Pardon me, I am much grieved if the line of conduct which I follow is in any way inconvenient or disagreeable to anyone whomsoever. But I know very well that it is dictated to me by a conviction so profound and a resolution so fixed that nothing, nothing, shall force me to deviate from it by a line. That said, I answer the attorney-general in a word. The attorney-general, who, after a firm and energetic beginning, preserved a profound silence throughout the last part of yesterday’s hearing” ...

The Attorney-General.--“To the point of self-denial.”

M. Labori.--“To the point of self-denial, ... rises today to tell us that we are confronted with a fixed plan, and that the same incidents, starting from the same preconceived idea, are being rehearsed. Very well, but the plan that we have fixed is the plan that leads to the light. There is another plan which is being rehearsed at the other side of the bar,--the plan which leads to obscurity and darkness. Reference has been made to the thing judged. We respect it. We respect the thing judged yesterday, but between that and the other the difference is that the thing judged yesterday was legally judged, and that the other was judged illegally.”

M. Zola.--“Gentlemen of the jury, to you will I address myself. I am not an orator, I am a writer; but unfortunately” ...

The Judge.--“You should address the court.”

M. Zola.--“I ask your pardon. I thought that I had permission to address the jurors. But I will address myself to you. What I have to say will be as well said. I am a writer; I am not accustomed to public speaking; moreover, I am an extremely nervous being, and am liable to use words that ill express my thought. Undoubtedly I have expressed it ill, since I have been misunderstood. I am quoted as saying that I have placed myself above the law. Did I say that?”

M. Labori.--“You said: ‘I have not to know the law at this moment.’”

M. Zola.--“I meant to say, at any rate, that I do not revolt against this grand idea of the law. I submit to it completely, and from it I expect justice. I meant to say that my revolt was against the processes that find expression in all these quibbles raised against me, against the way in which I am prosecuted, against the limitation of the complaint to fifteen lines from my long letter of accusation; and these things I declare unworthy of justice. I say that these few lines are not to be taken and passed upon without regard to all that I have said. A writing is consecutive; phrases lead to phrases, ideas lead to ideas; and to fix upon a single thing therein because it brings me under the law is, I say, unworthy. That is what I say, and that is what I meant. I do not place myself above the law, but I am above hypocritical methods.”

M. Labori.--“Bravo!”

The Attorney-General.--“So, M. Labori, you give the signal for these bravos?”

M. Labori.--“It is true, I said ‘Bravo;’ but frankly, it was the cry of my conscience.”

M. Albert Clemenceau.--“There is one point beyond dispute,--that we are authorized to prove that M. Zola has accused the council of war of having committed an illegality. Well, I ask you how it is possible for us to prove this, if we do not begin by establishing that an illegality has been committed.”

The court denied the motion of M. Labori, and the second witness was called,--M. Leblois, a lawyer of the appellate court.

_Testimony of M. Leblois._

The Judge.--“M. Labori, what question do you desire me to put to the witness?”

M. Labori.--“Will you ask M. Leblois at what date and under what circumstances he came into possession of the facts now within his knowledge concerning the Esterhazy case?”

The court interposing no objection, M. Leblois made the following statement:

“I have been for many years the friend of Colonel Picquart. We made all our studies together, and we have remained faithful to this friendship. In 1890 Colonel Picquart was made professor in the School of War, and since then I have seen him more or less frequently. Then he entered the war department, to which he had already been attached for several years, and finally, about the middle of 1895, if I am not mistaken, he was appointed chief of the bureau of information. It would have been natural at that time for him to consult me occasionally upon the legal difficulties that he met, since I was his intimate friend and had belonged to the magistracy for ten years. Nevertheless he spoke to me of only two cases,--a case of criminal procedure that was under way at Nancy, and a batch of documents relating to carrier pigeons, which was nothing but a collection of ministerial decrees upon that question. When, on November 16, 1896, Colonel Picquart was suddenly obliged to quit the war department, he had never said a word to me, either of the Dreyfus case or of the Esterhazy case, and I was absolutely unaware that he was concerning himself with either of them. All who know Colonel Picquart will not be astonished at this reserve.

“In June, 1897, I received a visit from Colonel Picquart, who had come to pass a fortnight’s leave of absence in Paris. On June 3, he had received at Sousse a threatening letter, which had been written to him by one of his former subordinates, and thus he found himself under the necessity of consulting a lawyer. For purposes of his defence he made known to me some of the facts in the cases of Dreyfus and Esterhazy. I say, gentlemen, some of the facts, for Colonel Picquart never revealed to me any military secret, in that sense of the term secret in which it is employed in military language. Colonel Picquart had become convinced of the innocence of Captain Dreyfus, and he explained to me the facts upon which his conviction rested. I had too much confidence in his intelligence and honesty not to admit the materiality of the facts that he made known to me, and from them I came to the same conclusion that he had arrived at. I was profoundly disturbed by what I had just learned, for I not only deplored the possibility of so grave an error, and the submission to undeserved torture of a man who seemed to be innocent, but I was anxious lest such revelations might agitate the country; and so I determined to exercise the greatest prudence.

“First, I collected all the information that I could procure. I consulted certain persons who had been familiar with other facts, making my study more precise by reading documents published in 1896. I gathered information as to the Dreyfus family, and as to Captain Dreyfus, whom I did not know, and finally I studied the various questions of law to which the case might give rise. In the course of these inquiries I learned that M. Scheurer-Kestner had been concerning himself with the Dreyfus case for a year, and had collected facts of some interest. About the same time I met M. Scheurer-Kestner at a dinner, and an interview was arranged between us for a subsequent day. When he found that I was in possession of important information, he urged me strongly to tell him more. He was so insistent, and showed so keen anxiety, that I could not refrain from enlightening him more completely. My original plan, the only one that seemed possible to me, was to promptly put the government in possession of the facts that I had learned through Colonel Picquart. M. Scheurer-Kestner, vice-president of the senate, seemed to me the best person that I could find through whom to approach the government. For these reasons I thought it my duty to yield to M. Scheurer-Kestner’s solicitations, and I gave him the desired enlightenment. Especially I spoke to him of letters that General Gonse had written to Colonel Picquart. M. Scheurer-Kestner begged me to show him these letters immediately, and he accompanied me to my house to get them. From that moment he was convinced of the innocence of Dreyfus, and his conviction has never since been shaken. He will never abandon the cause that he has undertaken.

“Meanwhile, the vacation season was approaching, and it seemed very difficult to institute proceedings at that time. It seemed to me that an affair of this sort should not be entered upon, unless there was a possibility of pursuing it to the end. Furthermore, M. Scheurer-Kestner deemed it necessary to have in his hands certain material proofs which both he and I lacked,--proofs in the shape of examples of Major Esterhazy’s handwriting, which was supposed to be identical with that of the _bordereau_. Nevertheless, I thought it my duty to submit to M. Scheurer-Kestner at that moment the idea of presenting to the keeper of the seals a petition for the cancellation of the verdict of 1894, because it seemed to me a settled fact that a secret document had been communicated to the judges, and that consequently the judgment was void. M. Scheurer-Kestner thought that it was too early to take such a step in the absence of material proofs. He made arrangements to get examples of Major Esterhazy’s handwriting as soon as possible, and toward the end of July started on his vacation. In the course of the following months he succeeded in procuring examples of Major Esterhazy’s handwriting, and, on returning to Paris, he entered into communication with the government. Concerning that, he will testify himself. For my part, I have nothing more to say upon this point. Nevertheless I add that, when M. Scheurer-Kestner made his interpellation in the senate on November 7, 1897, it seemed to him that this should be the end of his personal participation in the matter. In fact, the declarations of the government pointed to an honest and full investigation, and it did not seem to M. Scheurer-Kestner that there was any occasion for him to interfere in the working-up of a criminal case. So about Christmas time he thought himself entitled to take a few days’ rest, of which he was in great need.

“At that moment I had been informed by Colonel Picquart of the conspiracies against him,--conspiracies of extreme gravity, the most serious and important point of which is found in two telegrams addressed to him from Paris on November 10, 1897, and reaching him at Sousse, the first on November 11, the second on November 12 in the morning. These telegrams were forgeries. It seemed plain that they could not have been drawn up, except upon information emanating from the bureau of information, and this it would be easy to demonstrate; but Colonel Picquart will demonstrate it better than I. As the jury and the court will see, this was a new incident in an extremely serious matter, since these telegrams were dated November 10, 1897. Nevertheless it was a conspiracy which had long been in preparation, for in December, 1896, false letters had been addressed to the minister of war signed with the same name, ‘Speranza,’ that appeared at the foot of the two telegrams of November 10, 1897. It seemed to me it was my first duty to inform the government of this situation. But, having with the government no easy and direct means of communication, I asked M. Trarieux, senator and former keeper of the seals, whom I had met several times at the house of a friend, and who, moreover, had taken part in the senate discussion of M. Scheurer-Kestner’s interpellation, to give me the benefit of his sanction by acting as an intermediary between myself and the government. He will tell you what steps he took. For my part I could do but one thing,--lodge, on behalf of my client, a complaint with the government attorney, which complaint is under examination by M. Bertulus, who has already taken the deposition of Mlle. Blanche de Comminges.

“I said just now that Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart suddenly left the war department on November 16, 1896, on the eve of the Castelin interpellation in the chamber of deputies. His friends were unaware of his departure, and I in particular went several times, and during several weeks, to see him, and failed to find him. One of his friends wrote to the minister of war a letter which should be among the documents in the hands of M. Bertulus, and which, at any rate, constitutes one of the papers in the investigations made by General de Pellieux and Major Ravary. This letter was insignificant, but in it there was a brief allusion to a personage who, in the _salon_ of Mlle. de Comminges, had been nicknamed the ‘demigod.’ The letter contained this sentence: ‘Every day the demigod asks Mme. the Countess [that is Mlle. de Comminges] when he will be able to see the good God.’ In this circle, where Colonel Picquart was very popular, he was known as ‘the good God,’ and the name ‘demigod’ had been given to a certain Captain Lallement, who was the orderly of General des Garet, commanding the sixteenth army corps at Montpellier. This letter was intended for Colonel Picquart, but reached him only after it had been secretly opened and copied at the war department. The following month there came to the bureau of information a letter which was intercepted entirely, and of which no knowledge came to Colonel Picquart. This letter is surely the work of a forger. It is signed ‘Speranza.’ That was the beginning, in December, 1896, of the attempt to compromise Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart. The existence of the second letter was concealed for more than a year, and he learned of it for the first time in the course of General de Pellieux’s investigation. But it was made the basis of all the conspiracies for the ruin of this officer. Be not astonished, then, that last November, when this matter came to public attention and enlisted the interest of parliament, new conspiracies came to light. In the evening of November 10, 1897, two telegrams started from Paris together. The first read thus: ‘Stop, demigod. Affair very serious. Speranza.’ From this telegram it seemed that the demigod must be a very important personage, probably a political personality, perhaps M. Scheurer-Kestner. The second telegram read: ‘We have proofs that the dispatch was manufactured by Georges. Blanche.’ This second telegram, which was evidently a part of the same conspiracy to which the first belonged, tended to destroy the authenticity, and consequently the force as evidence, of a certain dispatch on which rested the investigation opened by Colonel Picquart in the spring of 1896 concerning Major Esterhazy. Thus they endeavored to represent Colonel Picquart as the tool of a politician and the author of a forgery. I should add that it is certain that Colonel Picquart was not acquainted with M. Scheurer-Kestner, and that he had no communication with him, direct or indirect. As for the charge of forgery brought against Colonel Picquart, it has been completely abandoned, for, although there were some insinuations to that effect in Major Ravary’s report, Colonel Picquart recently appeared before a council of inquiry, and among the things with which he was reproached there was not the slightest allusion to the possibility of a forgery in the case of the document in question.”

The Judge.--“What do you know about it?”

M. Leblois.--“_Monsieur le Président_, I know it in the most certain and natural way, because I was myself a witness before the council of inquiry.”

The Judge.--“Were you there throughout the hearing?”

M. Leblois.--“No, but I have knowledge of the facts with which the colonel was reproached.”

The Judge.--“You say that you have knowledge of them, but you do not know them of your own knowledge, since you were not there.”

M. Labori.--“Permit me to observe, _Monsieur le Président_, that the witnesses should have the advantage of the right to give their testimony without being interrupted, according to the terms of Article 315 of the code of criminal examination. I claim this right for M. Leblois. As to the fact which he affirms, the question is not how he knows it, but whether it is true.”

The Judge.--“Permit me, Maître Labori; I suppose that the court is entitled to question witnesses.”

M. Labori.--“It is not entitled to interrupt them.”

The Judge.--“I did not interrupt M. Leblois. I asked him for indications on a point which it is necessary to throw light upon. I will continue to do so, rest assured.”

M. Labori.--“I do not pretend to discuss with you the duties of the judge of the assize court. You know them better than I do. I add that I am ready to render homage to the great impartiality with which you endeavor to direct the debate. But, on the other hand, this is a matter in which it is impossible for us to part with the smallest particle of our rights. They deprive us here of all the faculties that they can deprive us of. We are here face to face with testimony which is entitled to be heard; we ask that it shall be heard freely and independently. Now, Article 315 of the code of criminal examination authorizes witnesses to give their testimony without interruption, without prejudice to the right of the court to ask them, after their deposition, whatsoever questions it sees fit.”

The Judge.--“That is what I have just done.”

M. Labori.--“The deposition of M. Leblois is not finished. He was in the course of it when you interrupted him.”

The Judge.--“Pardon, M. Leblois had finished. I asked him a question to throw light upon his deposition.”

M. Leblois.--“I will answer you in the clearest fashion. In the first place, I declare that I know that Colonel Picquart was asked but four questions. As to the source of this knowledge, I do not think that I am bound to give it, and for a good reason; I am Colonel Picquart’s lawyer.”

The Judge.--“You should have said so at the beginning.”

M. Leblois.--“I did say so.”

The Judge.--“I did not hear it.”

M. Leblois.--“I said just now that I was first introduced to this affair in June, 1897, when Colonel Picquart came to ask my aid and protection against written threats that he had received on June 3 from one of his former subordinates. It was for purposes of his defence that Colonel Picquart related to me a portion of the facts, but not those concerning military secrets, and it was for purposes of his defence that he gave me General Gonse’s letters. I consider that you are now reassured as to the source of my information.

“I add that nothing is easier than to establish materially the proof of what I have just said, for information telegraphed by a provincial agency on February 2, and not contradicted since by any newspaper or otherwise, specifies the points raised in the debate before the council of inquiry. Furthermore, Colonel Picquart has received, in conformity with military regulations, a clear notification of the questions concerning which he was examined. In fact, if a single question is to be put in a council of inquiry, the law requires that the person to be questioned shall receive a notice of the points on which the discussion will turn. Then Colonel Picquart, being in possession of such notice, emanating from the reporter in the case, is clearly in a position to prove what I have just said.”