Chapter I: Accuse...! (1)

LETTER TO M. FELIX FAURE, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC.

_Monsieur le Président_:

Will you permit me, in my gratitude for the kindly welcome that you once extended to me, to have a care for the glory that belongs to you, and to say to you that your star, so lucky hitherto, is threatened with the most shameful, the most ineffaceable, of stains?

You have emerged from base calumnies safe and sound; you have conquered hearts. You seem radiant in the apotheosis of that patriotic _fête_ which the Russian alliance has been for France, and you are preparing to preside at the solemn triumph of our Universal Exposition, which will crown our great century of labor, truth, and liberty. But what a mud-stain on your name--I was going to say on your reign--is this abominable Dreyfus affair! A council of war has just dared to acquit an Esterhazy in obedience to orders, a final blow at all truth, at all justice. And now it is done! France has this stain upon her cheek; it will be written in history that under your presidency it was possible for this social crime to be committed.

Since they have dared, I too will dare. I will tell the truth, for I have promised to tell it, if the courts, once regularly appealed to, did not bring it out fully and entirely. It is my duty to speak; I will not be an accomplice. My nights would be haunted by the spectre of the innocent man who is atoning, in a far-away country, by the most frightful of tortures, for a crime that he did not commit.

And to you, _Monsieur le Président_, will I cry this truth, with all the force of an honest man’s revolt. Because of your honor I am convinced that you are ignorant of it. And to whom then shall I denounce the malevolent gang of the really guilty, if not to you, the first magistrate of the country?

First, the truth as to the trial and conviction of Dreyfus.

A calamitous man has managed it all, has done it all--Colonel du Paty de Clam, then a simple major. He is the entire Dreyfus case; it will be fully known only when a sincere investigation shall have clearly established his acts and his responsibilities. He appears as the most heady, the most intricate, of minds, haunted with romantic intrigues, delighting in the methods of the newspaper novel, stolen papers, anonymous letters, meetings in deserted spots, mysterious women who peddle overwhelming proofs by night. It is he who conceived the idea of dictating the _bordereau_ to Dreyfus; it is he who dreamed of studying it in a room completely lined with mirrors; it is he whom Major Forzinetti represents to us armed with a dark lantern, trying to gain access to the accused when asleep, in order to throw upon his face a sudden flood of light, and thus surprise a confession of his crime in the confusion of his awakening. And I have not to tell the whole; let them look, they will find. I declare simply that Major du Paty de Clam, entrusted as a judicial officer with the duty of preparing the Dreyfus case, is, in the order of dates and responsibilities, the first person guilty of the fearful judicial error that has been committed.

The _bordereau_ already had been for some time in the hands of Colonel Sandherr, director of the bureau of information, who since then has died of general paralysis. “Flights” have taken place; papers have disappeared, as they continue to disappear even today; and the authorship of the _bordereau_ was an object of inquiry, when little by little an _a priori_ conclusion was arrived at that the author must be a staff officer and an officer of artillery,--clearly a double error, which shows how superficially this _bordereau_ had been studied, for a systematic examination proves that it could have been written only by an officer of troops. So they searched their own house; they examined writings; it was a sort of family affair,--a traitor to be surprised in the war offices themselves, that he might be expelled therefrom. I need not again go over a story already known in part. It is sufficient to say that Major du Paty de Clam enters upon the scene as soon as the first breath of suspicion falls upon Dreyfus. Starting from that moment, it is he who invented Dreyfus; the case becomes his case; he undertakes to confound the traitor, and induce him to make a complete confession. There is also, to be sure, the minister of war, General Mercier, whose intelligence seems rather inferior; there is also the chief of staff, General de Boisdeffre, who seems to have yielded to his clerical passion, and the sub-chief of staff, General Gonse, whose conscience has succeeded in accommodating itself to many things. But at bottom there was at first only Major du Paty de Clam, who leads them all, who hypnotizes them,--for he concerns himself also with spiritualism, with occultism, holding converse with spirits. Incredible are the experiences to which he submitted the unfortunate Dreyfus, the traps into which he tried to lead him, the mad inquiries, the monstrous fancies, a complete and torturing madness.

Ah! this first affair is a nightmare to one who knows it in its real details. Major du Paty de Clam arrests Dreyfus, puts him in close confinement; he runs to Madame Dreyfus, terrorizes her, tells her that, if she speaks, her husband is lost. Meantime the unfortunate was tearing his flesh, screaming his innocence. And thus the examination went on, as in a fifteenth-century chronicle, amid mystery, with a complication of savage expedients, all based on a single childish charge, this imbecile _bordereau_, which was not simply a vulgar treason, but also the most shameless of swindles, for the famous secrets delivered proved, almost all of them, valueless. If I insist, it is because here lies the egg from which later was to be hatched the real crime, the frightful denial of justice, of which France lies ill. I should like to show in detail how the judicial error was possible; how it was born of the machinations of Major du Paty de Clam; how General Mercier and Generals de Boisdeffre and Gonse were led into it, gradually assuming responsibility for this error, which afterward they believed it their duty to impose as sacred truth, truth beyond discussion. At the start there was, on their part, only carelessness and lack of understanding. At worst we see them yielding to the religious passions of their surroundings, and to the prejudices of the _esprit de corps_. They have suffered folly to do its work.

But here is Dreyfus before the council of war. The most absolute secrecy is demanded. Had a traitor opened the frontier to the enemy in order to lead the German emperor to Notre Dame, they would not have taken stricter measures of silence and mystery. The nation is awe-struck; there are whisperings of terrible doings, of those monstrous treasons that excite the indignation of History, and naturally the nation bows. There is no punishment severe enough; it will applaud even public degradation; it will wish the guilty man to remain upon his rock of infamy, eaten by remorse. Are they real then,--these unspeakable things, these dangerous things, capable of setting Europe aflame, which they have had to bury carefully behind closed doors? No, there was nothing behind them save the romantic and mad fancies of Major du Paty de Clam. All this was done only to conceal the most ridiculous of newspaper novels. And, to assure one’s self of it, one need only study attentively the indictment read before the council of war.

Ah! the emptiness of this indictment! That a man could have been condemned on this document is a prodigy of iniquity. I defy honest people to read it without feeling their hearts leap with indignation and crying out their revolt at the thought of the unlimited atonement yonder, on Devil’s Island. Dreyfus knows several languages--a crime; no compromising document was found on his premises--a crime; he sometimes visits the neighborhood of his birth--a crime; he is industrious, he is desirous of knowing everything--a crime; he does not get confused--a crime; he gets confused--a crime. And the simplicities of this document, the formal assertions in the void! We were told of fourteen counts, but we find, after all, only one,--that of the _bordereau_. And even as to this we learn that the experts were not in agreement; that one of them, M. Gobert, was hustled out in military fashion, because he permitted himself to arrive at another than the desired opinion. We were told also of twenty-three officers who came to overwhelm Dreyfus with their testimony. We are still in ignorance of their examination, but it is certain that all of them did not attack him, and it is to be remarked, furthermore, that all of them belonged to the war officers. It is a family trial; there they are all at home; and it must be remembered that the staff wanted the trial, sat in judgment at it, and has just passed judgment a second time.

So there remained only the _bordereau_, concerning which the experts were not in agreement. It is said that in the council-chamber the judges naturally were going to acquit. And, after that, how easy to understand the desperate obstinacy with which, in order to justify the conviction, they affirm today the existence of a secret overwhelming document, a document that cannot be shown, that legitimates everything, before which we must bow, an invisible and unknowable god. I deny this document; I deny it with all my might. A ridiculous document, yes, perhaps a document concerning little women, in which there is mention of a certain D---- who becomes too exacting; some husband doubtless, who thinks that they pay him too low a price for his wife. But a document of interest to the national defence the production of which would lead to a declaration of war tomorrow! No, no; it is a lie; and a lie the more odious and cynical because they lie with impunity, in such a way that no one can convict them of it. They stir up France; they hide themselves behind her legitimate emotion; they close mouths by disturbing hearts, by perverting minds. I know no greater civic crime.

These, then, _Monsieur le Président_, are the facts which explain how it was possible to commit a judicial error; and the moral proofs, the position of Dreyfus as a man of wealth, the absence of motive, this continual cry of innocence, complete the demonstration that he is a victim of the extraordinary fancies of Major du Paty de Clam, of his clerical surroundings, of that hunting down of the “dirty Jews” which disgraces our epoch.

And we come to the Esterhazy case. Three years have passed; many consciences remain profoundly disturbed, are anxiously seeking, and finally become convinced of the innocence of Dreyfus.

I shall not give the history of M. Scheurer-Kestner’s doubts, which later became convictions. But, while he was investigating for himself, serious things were happening to the staff. Colonel Sandherr was dead, and Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart had succeeded him as chief of the bureau of information. And it is in this capacity that the latter, in the exercise of his functions, came one day into possession of a letter-telegram addressed to Major Esterhazy by an agent of a foreign power. His plain duty was to open an investigation. It is certain that he never acted except at the command of his superiors. So he submitted his suspicions to his hierarchical superiors, first to General Gonse, then to General de Boisdeffre, then to General Billot, who had succeeded General Mercier as minister of war. The famous Picquart documents, of which we have heard so much, were never anything but the Billot documents,--I mean, the documents collected by a subordinate for his minister, the documents which must be still in existence in the war department. The inquiries lasted from May to September, 1896, and here it must be squarely affirmed that General Gonse was convinced of Esterhazy’s guilt, and that General de Boisdeffre and General Billot had no doubt that the famous _bordereau_ was in Esterhazy’s handwriting. Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart’s investigation had ended in the certain establishment of this fact. But the emotion thereat was great, for Esterhazy’s conviction inevitably involved a revision of the Dreyfus trial; and this the staff was determined to avoid at any cost.

Then there must have been a psychological moment, full of anguish. Note that General Billot was in no way compromised; he came freshly to the matter; he could bring out the truth. He did not dare, in terror, undoubtedly, of public opinion, and certainly fearful also of betraying the entire staff, General de Boisdeffre, General Gonse, to say nothing of their subordinates. Then there was but a minute of struggle between his conscience and what he believed to be the military interest. When this minute had passed, it was already too late. He was involved himself; he was compromised. And since then his responsibility has only grown; he has taken upon his shoulders the crime of others, he is as guilty as the others, he is more guilty than they, for it was in his power to do justice, and he did nothing. Understand this; for a year General Billot, Generals De Boisdeffre and Gonse have known that Dreyfus is innocent, and they have kept this dreadful thing to themselves. And these people sleep, and they have wives and children whom they love!

Colonel Picquart had done his duty as an honest man. He insisted in the presence of his superiors, in the name of justice; he even begged of them; he told them how impolitic were their delays, in view of the terrible storm which was gathering, and which would surely burst as soon as the truth should be known. Later there was the language that M. Scheurer-Kestner held likewise to General Billot, adjuring him in the name of patriotism to take the matter in hand, and not to allow it to be aggravated till it should become a public disaster. No, the crime had been committed; now the staff could not confess it. And Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart was sent on a mission; he was farther and farther removed, even to Tunis, where one day they even wanted to honor his bravery by charging him with a mission which would surely have led to his massacre in the district where the marquis de Morès met his death. He was not in disgrace; Gen. Gonse was in friendly correspondence with him; but there are secrets which it does one no good to find out.

At Paris the truth went on, irresistibly, and we know in what way the expected storm broke out. M. Mathieu Dreyfus denounced Major Esterhazy as the real author of the _bordereau_, at the moment when M. Scheurer-Kestner was about to lodge a demand for a revision of the trial with the keeper of the seals. And it is here that Major Esterhazy appears. The evidence shows that at first he was dazed, ready for suicide or flight. Then suddenly he determines to brazen it out; he astonishes Paris by the violence of his attitude. The fact was that aid had come to him; he had received an anonymous letter warning him of the intrigues of his enemies; a mysterious woman had even disturbed herself at night to hand to him a document stolen from the staff, which would save him. And I cannot help seeing here again the hand of Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam, recognizing the expedients of his fertile imagination. His work, the guilt of Dreyfus, was in danger, and he was determined to defend it. A revision of the trial,--why, that meant the downfall of the newspaper novel, so extravagant, so tragic, with its abominable _dénouement_ on Devil’s Island. That would never do. Thenceforth there was to be a duel between Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart and Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam, the one with face uncovered, the other masked. Presently we shall meet them both in the presence of civil justice. At bottom it is always the staff defending itself, unwilling to confess its crime, the abomination of which is growing from hour to hour.

It has been wonderingly asked who were the protectors of Major Esterhazy. First, in the shadow, Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam, who devised everything, managed everything; his hand betrays itself in the ridiculous methods. Then there is General de Boisdeffre, General Gonse, General Billot himself, who are obliged to acquit the major, since they cannot permit the innocence of Dreyfus to be recognized, for, if they should, the war offices would fall under the weight of public contempt. And the beautiful result of this prodigious situation is that the one honest man in the case, Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart, who alone has done his duty, is to be the victim, the man to be derided and punished. O justice, what frightful despair grips the heart! They go so far as to say that he is a forger; that he manufactured the telegram, to ruin Esterhazy. But, in heaven’s name, why? For what purpose? Show a motive. Is he, too, paid by the Jews? The pretty part of the story is that he himself was an anti-Semite. Yes, we are witnesses of this infamous spectacle,--the proclamation of the innocence of men ruined with debts and crimes, while honor itself, a man of stainless life, is stricken down. When a society reaches that point, it is beginning to rot.

There you have, then, _Monsieur le Président_, the Esterhazy case,--a guilty man to be declared innocent. We can follow the beautiful business, hour by hour, for the last two months. I abridge, for this is but the _résumé_ of a story whose burning pages will some day be written at length. So we have seen General de Pellieux, and then Major Ravary, carrying on a rascally investigation whence knaves come transfigured and honest people sullied. Then they convened the council of war.

How could it have been expected that a council of war would undo what a council of war had done?

I say nothing of the choice, always possible, of the judges. Is not the superior idea of discipline, which is in the very blood of these soldiers, enough to destroy their power to do justice? Who says discipline says obedience. When the minister of war, the great chief, has publicly established, amid the applause of the nation’s representatives, the absolute authority of the thing judged, do you expect a council of war to formally contradict him? Hierarchically that is impossible. General Billot conveyed a suggestion to the judges by his declaration, and they passed judgment as they must face the cannon’s mouth, without reasoning. The preconceived opinion that they took with them to their bench is evidently this: “Dreyfus has been condemned for the crime of treason by a council of war; then he is guilty, and we, a council of war, cannot declare him innocent. Now, we know that to recognize Esterhazy’s guilt would be to proclaim the innocence of Dreyfus.” Nothing could turn them from that course of reasoning.

They have rendered an iniquitous verdict which will weigh forever upon our councils of war, which will henceforth tinge with suspicion all their decrees. The first council of war may have been lacking in comprehension; the second is necessarily criminal. Its excuse, I repeat, is that the supreme chief had spoken, declaring the thing judged unassailable, sacred and superior to men, so that inferiors could say naught to the contrary. They talk to us of the honor of the army; they want us to love it, to respect it. Ah! certainly, yes, the army which would rise at the first threat, which would defend French soil; that army is the whole people, and we have for it nothing but tenderness and respect. But it is not a question of that army, whose dignity is our special desire, in our need of justice. It is the sword that is in question; the master that they may give us tomorrow. And piously kiss the sword-hilt, the god? No!

I have proved it, moreover; the Dreyfus case was the case of the war offices, a staff officer, accused by his staff comrades, convicted under the pressure of the chiefs of staff. Again I say, he cannot come back innocent, unless all the staff is guilty. Consequently the war offices, by all imaginable means, by press campaigns, by communications, by influences, have covered Esterhazy only to ruin Dreyfus a second time. Ah! with what a sweep the republican government should clear away this band of Jesuits, as General Billot himself calls them! Where is the truly strong and wisely patriotic minister who will dare to reshape and renew all? How many of the people I know are trembling with anguish in view of a possible war, knowing in what hands lies the national defence! And what a nest of base intrigues, gossip, and dilapidation has this sacred asylum, entrusted with the fate of the country, become! We are frightened by the terrible light thrown upon it by the Dreyfus case, this human sacrifice of an unfortunate, of a “dirty Jew.” Ah! what a mixture of madness and folly, of crazy fancies, of low police practices, of inquisitorial and tyrannical customs, the good pleasure of a few persons in gold lace, with their boots on the neck of the nation, cramming back into its throat its cry of truth and justice, under the lying and sacrilegious pretext of the _raison d’Etat_!

And another of their crimes is that they have accepted the support of the unclean press, have suffered themselves to be championed by all the knavery of Paris, so that now we witness knavery’s insolent triumph in the downfall of right and of simple probity. It is a crime to have accused of troubling France those who wish to see her generous, at the head of the free and just nations, when they themselves are hatching the impudent conspiracy to impose error, in the face of the entire world. It is a crime to mislead opinion, to utilize for a task of death this opinion that they have perverted to the point of delirium. It is a crime to poison the minds of the little and the humble, to exasperate the passions of reaction and intolerance, while seeking shelter behind odious anti-Semitism, of which the great liberal France of the rights of man will die, if she is not cured. It is a crime to exploit patriotism for works of hatred, and, finally, it is a crime to make the sword the modern god, when all human science is at work on the coming temple of truth and justice.

This truth, this justice, for which we have so ardently longed,--how distressing it is to see them thus buffeted, more neglected and more obscured. I have a suspicion of the fall that must have occurred in the soul of M. Scheurer-Kestner, and I really believe that he will finally feel remorse that he did not act in a revolutionary fashion, on the day of interpellation in the senate, by thoroughly ventilating the whole matter, to topple everything over. He has been the highly honest man, the man of loyal life, and he thought that the truth was sufficient unto itself, especially when it should appear as dazzling as the open day. Of what use to overturn everything, since soon the sun would shine? And it is for this confident serenity that he is now so cruelly punished. And the same is the case of Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart, who, moved by a feeling of lofty dignity, has been unwilling to publish General Gonse’s letters. These scruples honor him the more because, while he remained respectful of discipline, his superiors heaped mud upon him, working up the case against him themselves, in the most unexpected and most outrageous fashion. Here are two victims, two worthy people, two simple hearts, who have trusted God, while the devil was at work. And in the case of Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart we have seen even this ignoble thing,--a French tribunal, after suffering the reporter in the case to publicly arraign a witness and accuse him of every crime, closing its doors as soon as this witness has been introduced to explain and defend himself. I say that is one crime more, and that this crime will awaken the universal conscience. Decidedly, military tribunals have a singular idea of justice.

Such, then, is the simple truth, _Monsieur le Président_, and it is frightful. It will remain a stain upon your presidency. I suspect that you are powerless in this matter,--that you are the prisoner of the constitution and of your environment. You have none the less a man’s duty, upon which you will reflect, and which you will fulfill. Not indeed that I despair, the least in the world, of triumph. I repeat with more vehement certainty; truth is on the march, and nothing can stop it. Today sees the real beginning of the affair, since not until today have the positions been clear: on one hand, the guilty, who do not want the light; on the other, the doers of justice, who will give their lives to get it. When truth is buried in the earth, it accumulates there, and assumes so mighty an explosive power that, on the day when it bursts forth, it hurls everything into the air. We shall see if they have not just made preparations for the most resounding of disasters, yet to come.

But this letter is long, _Monsieur le Président_, and it is time to finish.

I accuse Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam of having been the diabolical workman of judicial error,--unconsciously, I am willing to believe,--and of having then defended his calamitous work, for three years, by the most guilty machinations.

I accuse General Mercier of having made himself an accomplice, at least through weakness of mind, in one of the greatest iniquities of the century.

I accuse General Billot of having had in his hands certain proofs of the innocence of Dreyfus, and of having stifled them; of having rendered himself guilty of this crime of _lèse-humanité_ and _lèse-justice_ for a political purpose, and to save the compromised staff.

I accuse General de Boisdeffre and General Gonse of having made themselves accomplices in the same crime, one undoubtedly through clerical passion, the other perhaps through that _esprit de corps_ which makes of the war offices the Holy Ark, unassailable.

I accuse General de Pellieux and Major Ravary of having conducted a rascally inquiry,--I mean by that a monstrously partial inquiry, of which we have, in the report of the latter, an imperishable monument of naive audacity.

I accuse the three experts in handwriting, Belhomme, Varinard, and Couard, of having made lying and fraudulent reports, unless a medical examination should declare them afflicted with diseases of the eye and of the mind.

I accuse the war offices of having carried on in the press, particularly in “L’Eclair” and in “L’Echo de Paris,” an abominable campaign, to mislead opinion and cover up their faults.

I accuse, finally, the first council of war of having violated the law by condemning an accused person on the strength of a secret document, and I accuse the second council of war of having covered this illegality, in obedience to orders, in committing in its turn the judicial crime of knowingly acquitting a guilty man.

In preferring these charges, I am not unaware that I lay myself liable under Articles 30 and 31 of the press law of July 29, 1881, which punishes defamation. And it is wilfully that I expose myself thereto.

As for the people whom I accuse, I do not know them, I have never seen them, I entertain against them no feeling of revenge or hatred. They are to me simple entities, spirits of social ill-doing. And the act that I perform here is nothing but a revolutionary measure to hasten the explosion of truth and justice.

I have but one passion, the passion for the light, in the name of humanity which has suffered so much, and which is entitled to happiness. My fiery protest is simply the cry of my soul. Let them dare, then, to bring me into the assize court, and let the investigation take place in the open day.

I await it.

Accept, _Monsieur le Président_, the assurance of my profound respect.

EMILE ZOLA.

At the sitting of the French chamber of deputies on the day of the appearance of the foregoing letter, Comte de Mun, a member of the chamber and representing the monarchical party, questioned the government “as to the measures which the minister of war intends to take, in consequence of the article published this morning by M. Emile Zola.” After a stormy debate and a suspension of the sitting, M. Méline, the prime minister, reluctantly declared the intention of the government to prosecute the author of the article.

Accordingly, on January 20, the assize court of the Seine served notice on M. Zola and M. Perrenx to appear before it at the Palais de Justice on the following February 7, and there answer to a charge of having publicly defamed the first council of war of the military government of Paris, the charge being based on the following passages from the incriminated article:

“A council of war has just dared to acquit an Esterhazy in obedience to orders, a final blow at all truth, at all justice. And now it is done; France has this stain upon her cheek; it will be written in history that under your presidency it was possible for this social crime to be committed.”

“They have rendered an iniquitous verdict which will weigh forever upon our councils of war, which will henceforth tinge all their decrees with suspicion. The first council of war may have been lacking in comprehension; the second is necessarily criminal.”

“I accuse the second council of war of having covered this illegality, in obedience to orders, in committing in its turn the judicial crime of knowingly acquitting a guilty man.”

On January 22 “L’Aurore” published a second letter from M. Zola, addressed to the minister of war, in which he complained that the government had based its charge of defamation exclusively on those passages of his first letter which related to the trial of Major Esterhazy, carefully refraining from specification of those passages relating to the trial of Captain Dreyfus, lest thereby the truth about the latter should come to light and compel a revision of his case. This second letter concluded as follows:

Why were you afraid to take notice of all my charges? I will tell you.

Fearing an open discussion, you have resorted, in order to save yourself, to the methods of a prosecuting attorney. They have called to your attention, in the law of July 21, 1881, an Article 52 which permits me to offer proof concerning only the matters “set forth and complained of in the summons.”

And now you are quite at your ease, are you not?

Well, you are mistaken; I warn you in advance; you have been ill-advised.

The first thought was to bring me before the police court, but they did not dare, for the court of appeals would have upset the whole procedure.

Then they conceived the idea of delaying matters by greatly prolonging the preliminary examination; but they were afraid that this might give a new development to the case, and pile up against you a crushing mass of evidence, methodically recorded.

Finally, in desperation, they decided to impose upon me an unequal struggle, tying my hands in advance, to assure you, by the methods of a lawyer’s clerk, the victory that undoubtedly you did not expect from a free discussion.

You have forgotten that I am to have for judges twelve French citizens, in possession of their independence.

I shall find a way to win by the force of justice; I shall illuminate consciences with the effulgence of truth. At the first words we shall see the methods of the quibblers swept away by the imperious necessity of proof. This proof the law bids me give, and the law would be a liar if, imposing on me this duty, it should refuse me the means of doing it.

How could I prove the charges of which you complain, if I were not allowed to show the concatenation of facts and were prevented from placing the whole matter in the fullest light?

Liberty to prove,--that is the power on which I depend.

On January 24 M. Zola’s counsel served notice on the attorney-general of a long list of witnesses whom he intended to summon, in which notice he called on the attorney-general to produce in court all the papers relating to the trials of Captain Dreyfus and Major Esterhazy, and made formal offer to prove, not only the matters set forth in the summons, but also, as inseparable from them, the charges preferred in the letter to President Faure against Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam, General Mercier, General Billot, General de Boisdeffre, General Gonse, General de Pellieux, Major Ravary, the three experts in handwriting,--Belhomme, Varinard, and Couard,--the war offices, and the Dreyfus council of war.

On February 7 M. Zola and M. Perrenx appeared for trial, and the record of the court proceedings here follows.

THE TRIAL.

FIRST DAY--FEBRUARY 7.

The first day’s proceedings began with the entrance of the presiding judge, M. Delegorgue, the other members of the court being Councillors Lault and Bousquet. Attorney-General Van Cassel appeared for the prosecution, M. Fernand Labori for M. Zola, and M. Albert Clemenceau, assisted by his brother, M. Georges Clemenceau, for M. Perrenx, the _gérant_ of “L’Aurore.” The court-room of the assize court of the Seine was crowded to its utmost capacity; wherefore the judge, on taking his seat, addressed those present as follows:

“I notify the public that we shall not begin until all are seated. I likewise warn the public that every sort of manifestation, whether for or against the accused, is formally forbidden, and that at the first sign of disorder I shall order the court-room cleared. Please consider this said once for all, for I shall not repeat it.”

The usual dialogue then ensued between the judge and M. Zola.

“Your name?”

“Emile Zola.”

“Your profession?”

“Man of letters.”

“Your age?”

“Fifty-eight years.”

“Your residence?”

“21 _bis_, Rue de Bruxelles.”

The drawing of the jury was then proceeded with. Three challenges were used by the prosecution, and seven by the defence, the jurors finally selected being as follows:

Foreman, Auguste Dutrieux, merchant; Auguste Leblond, roof-builder; Pierre Emery, merchant; Bernier, molder in copper; Edouard Gressin, clerk; Bouvier, proprietor; Albert Chevanier, wine merchant; Nigon, leather-dresser; Charles Fouquet, seedsman; Joseph Moureire, wire-drawer; Charles Huet, market-gardener; Brunot, linen-draper. Supplementary jurors: Antoine Jourde, tradesman; Alfred Boucreux, butcher.

Then began the reading of the documents in the case by the clerk, the only one of interest being the complaint of Gen. Billot. Referring to M. Zola’s letter, the complainant declared:

This article contains a series of insults and slanders directed against two ministers of war, general officers, and army officers of all grades under their orders. Chiefs and subordinates are above such outrages, and the opinion of parliament, of the country, and of the army has already placed them beyond reach of attack. Though the minister of war does not consider it his duty to lodge a complaint for the persons above referred to, any more than for the council of war which rendered the verdict of 1894, the authority of which must remain intact, we cannot admit any suspicion of the independence of military justice or any accusation that it rendered on January 11 in obedience to orders an iniquitous sentence and committed a judicial error in knowingly acquitting a guilty man. Consequently I have the honor to lodge a complaint against the _gérant_ of “L’Aurore” and M. Emile Zola on account of the defamation directed against the first council of war of the military government of Paris, which at its sessions of January 10 and 11, 1898, declared the acquittal of Major Esterhazy.

After the reading of the documents, Attorney-General Van Cassel took the floor to make what he described as “a statement of the case,” speaking as follows:

“The minister of war has taken notice, in his complaint, of the imputation cast by M. Emile Zola upon the first council of war of having acquitted Major Esterhazy in obedience to orders. The summons could not go beyond the terms of the complaint. It is natural that every complainant should circumscribe the grievances for which he demands reparation. Otherwise it would be too easy for the accused to turn the discussion from its proper course, and create a diversion for the audience, which is the great art in the assize court. A single question is submitted to you, gentlemen of the jury: _Did the first council of war act in obedience to orders in acquitting Major Esterhazy?_ The other imputation contained in M. Zola’s article the minister of war holds in contempt. Nevertheless the accused assert the right to discuss all the allegations contained in the article. Their avowed plan is to make you judges of the legality of the sentence passed upon Dreyfus. We shall not permit it. I warn them that any attempt on their part to provoke a sort of indirect revision of the Dreyfus case would be illegal and futile. No one has a right to indirectly call in question the thing judged. Our legislation, in its desire to avoid judicial error, has laid down rules for revision. These rules were broadened by the law of 1895. This law was passed prior to the trial of Dreyfus. Why have the accused not availed themselves of it? Why have they not attempted revision by the legal methods? They have not done so. They have tried to secure the conviction of a second officer on account of the crime of which Dreyfus was convicted. They have failed in their undertaking. Since then no new fact has been produced; no unknown document of such a nature as to establish the innocence of the condemned has been revealed to justice. In the absence of material wherewith to secure a legal revision, they wish--I use the words of M. Emile Zola--to provoke a revolutionary revision. The court will not lend itself to this manœuvre. Respect for the thing judged requires that the discussion be circumscribed to the single matter of which the minister of war takes notice in his complaint. Therefore no evidence can be admitted here except such as tends to prove the charges relating to the pretended iniquity committed in obedience to orders in 1898 by the military judges of Major Esterhazy. Accusations foreign to this special matter must remain outside of the discussion. I ask, then, that the accused may not be authorized to attempt proof thereof, either by documents or by testimony. The charges preferred by them against the officers, the witnesses, the experts, the members of the council of war of 1894, which convicted Dreyfus, have no connection with the defamation of the council of war of 1898.”

To this contention M. Labori made the following reply:

“I am not much astonished, gentlemen, at the difficulties which M. Zola meets in this affair, and I expect that this incident, which is the first, will not be the last. We expected that they would offer to you and impose upon us a restricted discussion. Such was the desire of the minister of war, and it was his right. It will be ours, at a certain moment, to ask what could have been the underlying reasons for the exercise of this right under the circumstances in which the minister of war has made use of it. However that may be, it was his right, and I do not deny it. But, gentlemen, I do not believe that the form of the complaint within which he confines himself involves the consequences which he has hoped for.”

Reading then all the charges made at the end of M. Zola’s letter, M. Labori continued:

“You know, gentlemen, what was the reply. It began on the day when, after five days and five nights of deliberation and uncertainty, the minister of war preferred this complaint, the bearing of which you now know, and it continues today in the motions which the attorney-general now makes in the name of the complainant and in his own name. Do you think that that is going to strangle the discussion? Absurd! It is as if one should place himself in the middle of a torrent to prevent it from flowing. The discussion is open. If they wanted to stifle it, they need not have prosecuted either Perrenx or Zola. They had the right to refrain; and, in fact, public opinion, to which, gentlemen, I shall speak,--public opinion, which is not enlightened, and which, admirable in generosity and in faith, but blind, most faithfully supports the ruling powers,--public opinion perhaps would have given its sanction to such a course. But they have chosen to prosecute M. Zola. Being accused, he will defend himself. Are they, then, serious when they say to us today that the three paragraphs cited from this letter of two thousand lines have nothing to do with the intention of M. Zola on the one hand, or, on the other, with the article as a whole and the other charges contained in it? Can the court accept that? Between the three matters taken notice of by the minister of war and the sum total of the matters which I have read to the court there is a connection not only close, but indivisible. In the first place, gentlemen, Major Esterhazy was prosecuted for the same crime of treason for which Captain Dreyfus had been prosecuted. The document of the trial was the _bordereau_; the _bordereau_ concerning which the first experts testified; the _bordereau_ concerning which, at the second trial, experts testified again. And it is not strange to read that the experts of both trials, not being the same, feel no desire to meet at this bar in contradiction of each other in a discussion where the light is to be complete. But it is certain that the document in question, and which was the object of discussion in the Esterhazy trial and in the Dreyfus trial, is the _bordereau_. The two crimes were the same. M. Mathieu Dreyfus had denounced Major Esterhazy. If Major Esterhazy had been condemned, the setting aside of the verdict against Captain Dreyfus would have followed as a matter of necessity. Major Esterhazy was acquitted. The question remains open, and we are to deal with it. The question takes the form of a dilemma. Either we are to be prevented from offering any proof, and in that case we shall see; or, on the contrary, we are to be permitted to examine the situation of Captain Dreyfus as well as that of Major Esterhazy, since both are closely connected, and it would not be possible for us to prove here the guilt of Major Esterhazy and his acquittal in obedience to orders, if we had not the right to prove at the same time the innocence of Captain Dreyfus. To say nothing of the fact, gentlemen, that the minister of war, in drawing up his complaint, perhaps not perceiving this dangerous detail, allowed a little paragraph to slip in, in which it was said that the second council of war covered the illegality to which the first had committed itself. Now, gentlemen, how are we to demonstrate that they have covered an illegality, unless we are allowed to demonstrate first that an illegality has been committed? Unless, indeed, they mean--and I confess that that would seem to me a really curious preliminary to this discussion--to acknowledge that the illegality has been committed, and that it is recognized in the face of France and the civilized world. If not, then on this point as on others we must be permitted the opportunity of proof. You know, gentlemen, what the authorities say. It is a matter of doctrine and of law that, outside of the matters set forth in the summons, it is permissible to prove matters connected with them by close and indivisible ties. I have shown you that the matters which it is our right to prove are closely bound up with the other matters of which we likewise offer proof. It remains only to say a single word in answer to a last objection of the attorney-general,--the thing judged. The thing judged! What will be left of it, gentlemen, if we succeed in showing that it has been irregularly and illegally judged, this thing, in which public opinion has such faith that it considers as public malefactors those who dream for a second of doubting it, even though they have declared that they are ready to furnish the proof? Citizens respect this thing judged. It is their right and their duty to respect it. But only, I repeat, because they believe it to have been regularly and legally judged. Where there is no right, there is no legality, no justice, no thing judged, Mr. Attorney-General, and let us say no more of exceptions.”

In reinforcement of the position of M. Labori, M. Albert Clemenceau then addressed the court:

“I wish to speak simply of two points made by the attorney-general. He has told us that his hands are tied by the minister of war, that he is unable to broaden the discussion, and that it must take the form that the minister of war desires. We suspected it, but I believe that it will be interesting to the jury to know that, if he had desired a general discussion, the minister of war perhaps would have done as all French citizens do when they believe themselves injured,--namely, would have lodged a complaint with the attorney-general. The attorney-general is supposed to know something about law. He would have read M. Zola’s article, and it is probable that he would have had us indicted on grounds much more numerous than those which this complaint specifically alleges. So much for the first point. The second is this. The attorney-general, who knows the meaning of words, began his observations by saying: ‘Gentlemen, I am going to make a statement of the case’; but he made an argument, and he finished in a way of which the jury had had no warning, asking the court to limit the discussion which we desire to carry on at this bar.”

M. Labori then submitted a formal motion that the court authorize the introduction of evidence on all the matters referred to in M. Zola’s letter.

Before the court had passed upon this motion, the three experts in handwriting, Couard, Belhomme, and Varinard, intervened through their counsel, M. Cabanes, asking that, in view of the fact that they had prosecuted M. Zola and “L’Aurore” in the police courts, no introduction of their names into the case now on trial should be permitted.

The Judge.--“The purpose of this motion is to enable the experts, in case it is granted, to prosecute M. Zola in the assize court for outrages upon witnesses because of their testimony before the council of war.”

M. Albert Clemenceau.--“We accept any discussion before the assize court.”

M. Labori.--“If that is the motive of the intervention of the experts, I ask the court to suspend judgment on the motion, until that point in the discussion is reached which concerns the experts and their testimony. And, if it is a matter of reserving to these gentlemen a special right, which will end, I imagine, in one facility more for the production of the explanations that we have to furnish, we can only congratulate ourselves in so far as we are concerned. I speak in the name of M. Zola and M. Perrenx.”

M. Zola.--“Complete light!”

M. Clemenceau.--“Whatever motions may be made in this court, and from whatsoever persons they may come, if their object is to bring about a public discussion in the assize court, we second them. In fact, I do not care even to know whether these motions are well founded in law; you warn us that their tendency would be to bring us here again on another charge; we accept every sort of discussion before the assize court.”

Without passing upon the motion of M. Cabanes, the court then rendered an adverse decision on M. Labori’s motion for the introduction of evidence concerning all the charges preferred by M. Zola, claiming that they were not indivisibly connected with the matter on trial.

The time having arrived for the calling of the witnesses, the court announced that it had received letters from several of them, in explanation of their absence.

The Judge.--“I have a letter from the keeper of the seals, saying that the minister of war, General Billot, has not been authorized to respond to the summons. M. Labori and M. Clemenceau, do you forego this witness’s evidence?”

M. Labori.--“In regard to him we make a reservation.”

The Judge.--“Here is a letter from General Gonse. He asks to be heard among the first, because of his service.”

M. Labori.--“We shall be able to hear General Gonse among the first. It was our intention to do so. But, in spite of our great desire to hear him, we cannot take his personal convenience into consideration.”

The Attorney-General.--“Nor his service?”

M. Labori.--“Nor his service.”

The Judge.--“Here is a letter from Major d’Ormescheville, declaring that, having been the reporter for the council of war, he does not believe it his duty to respond to the summons.”

M. Labori.--“I make a reservation, as in the case of General Billot.”

The Judge.--“Here is a letter from M. Gibert, cited as a witness by M. Zola. ‘I have left Havre, and have retired to.... In view of the gravity of my condition, it is impossible for me to come to testify in person, and I have just sent what I have to say to M. Labori.’”

M. Labori.--“I have not yet received it.”

The Judge.--“Then you make a reservation?”

M. Labori.--“Yes.”

The Judge.--“Here is a letter from M. Casimir-Perier, in which he says: ‘I am unable to enlighten justice on any matter that has occurred since my resignation of the presidency of the republic. I add that, if I were questioned concerning matters which occurred when I held the presidency, personal responsibilities would impose silence upon me. Out of deference for the court, I am ready to appear before it, if it deems it necessary that I repeat this declaration verbally.’”

M. Labori.--“I make a reservation in regard to M. Casimir-Perier.”

The Judge.--“Here is a letter from Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam. He says: ‘In the Dreyfus case I performed the functions of an officer of judicial police. My only part in the Esterhazy trial was to testify behind closed doors, and in the matter of this testimony I am bound to professional secrecy. Under these circumstances I have the honor to pray you to excuse me from appearing in court, where I should be unable to furnish any information concerning the matters mentioned in the summons.’”

M. Labori.--“M. Zola and M. Perrenx deem Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam a witness of the highest importance, not only in matters relating to the Dreyfus trial, but in matters relating to the Esterhazy trial. Furthermore, the testimony of Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam is necessary, because it bears upon the good faith of the accused, for, if certain information that has come to M. Zola, and the production of which he will call for before this court, is to be believed, Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam has been mixed up in matters which concerned Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart, certain of which are very curious. Furthermore, a complaint has been lodged against Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam, the consideration of which has been entrusted to Examining Magistrate Bertulus. For all these reasons the testimony of Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam is indispensable. We cannot produce here certain evidence that concerns him, unless he is called to explain himself in person. And under these circumstances I believe it my duty to make formal motion that all legal means be employed to make Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam come here and testify concerning his relations with the de Comminges family, concerning the scene with the mysterious lady in 1892, and concerning the telegrams signed ‘Speranza’ and ‘Blanche,’ addressed to Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart at Tunis.”