Chapter VII: The Programs of Min Shêng (3)

100 It might again be pointed out that Sun Yat-sen differed with Marxism
which, while it, of course, does not hold that all knowledge is
already found, certainly keeps its own first premises beyond all
dispute, and its own interpretations sacrosanct. The dialectics of
Marx and Hegel would certainly appear peculiar in the Chinese
environment. Without going out of his way to point out the
difference between Sun’s Nationalism and Marxism-Leninism, the
author cannot refrain—in view of the quite popular misconception
that Sun Yat-sen was at one time almost a Marxist convert—from
pointing out the extreme difference between the premises, the
methods, and the conclusions of the two philosophies.

101 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 344.

102 Hsü, _Confucianism_, cited, contains two chapters relevant to the
consideration of this problem. Ch. III, “The Doctrine of
Rectification” (pp. 43-61), and Ch. XI, “Social Evolution” (pp.
219-232), discuss rectification and ideological development within
the Confucian ideology.

103 As an illustration of Dr. Sun’s continued activity as a medical man,
the author begs the reader’s tolerance of a short anecdote. In 1920
or 1921, when both Judge Linebarger and Sun Yat-sen were in
Shanghai, and were working together on the book that was to appear
as _Sun Yat-sen and the Chinese Republic_, the younger son of Judge
Linebarger—the brother of the present author—fell ill with a rather
obscure stomach disorder. The Western physicians having made little
or no progress in the case, Sun Yat-sen intervened with an old
Chinese herbal prescription, which he, a Western-trained physician,
was willing to endorse. The remedy was relatively efficacious—more
so than the suggestions of the European doctors. Even though Sun
Yat-sen very early abandoned his career of professional medical man
for that of revolutionist, he appears to have practised medicine
intermittently throughout his life.

104 Sun Yat-sen wrote, in Wei Yung translation, cited, p. 115: “In our
age of scientific progress the undertaker [sic!], seeks to know
first before undertaking. This is due to the desire to forestall
blunders and accidents so as to ensure efficiency and economy of
labor. He who is able to develop ideas from knowledge, plans from
ideas, and action from plans can be crowned with success in any
undertaking irrespective of its profoundness or the magnitude of
labor involved.”

105 Tai, cited, p. 66: “Wir sind Chinesen, und was wir zunächst zu
ändern haben liegt in China. Aber wenn alle Dinge in China wertlos
gewerden sind, wenn die chinesische Kultur in der Kulturgeschichte
der Welt keine Bedeutung mehr hat, und wenn das chinesische Volk die
Kraft, seine Kultur hochzuhalten, verloren hat, dann können wir
gleich mit gebundenen Händen den Tod abwarten; zu welchem Zweck
brauchen wir dann noch Revolution zu treiben!”

106 An interesting discussion of this attitude is to be found in Li Chi,
_The Formation of the Chinese People_, Cambridge (Massachusetts),
1928.

107 See Tsui Shu-chin, cited, pp. 96-146. The work of Tsui is good for
the field covered; his discussion of the contrasting policy of the
Communists and of Sun Yat-sen with respect to nationalities may be
regarded as reliable.

108 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 67 and following.

109 See above, “The Nation and State in Chinese Antiquity.”

110 The present state of Western knowledge of the sociology of China is
not sufficient to warrant reference to any authorities for the
description of egalitarianism and mobility. These matters are still
on that level of unspecialized knowledge where every visitor to
China may observe for himself. The bibliography on the social life
of the Chinese on pp. 240-242 of Kenneth Scott Latourette, _The
Chinese: Their History and Culture_, New York, 1934, contains some
of the leading titles that touch on the subject. Prof. A. R.
Radcliffe-Brown of the University of Chicago informed the present
author that he contemplates the planning of an extensive program of
socio-anthropological field work in Chinese villages which will
assist considerably in the understanding of the sociology of old
China.

111 Hsü, _Confucianism_, cited, p. 49, states the function of the
Confucian leaders quite succinctly: “... the Confucian school
advocates political and social reorganization by changing the social
mind through political action.”

112 Hsü, cited, p. 104.

113 Hsü, cited, pp. 195-196.

114 Mariano Ponce, _Sun Yat Sen, El fundador de la Republica de China_,
Manila, 1912, p. 23.

“Y tampoco era posible sustituirla por otra dinastía nacional. Sólo
existen al presente dos familias en China, de donde podían salir los
soberanos: uno es la descendencia de la dinastía Ming, de que
usurparon los mandchüs el trone, hace más de dos siglos y medio, y
la otra es la del filósofo Confucio, cuyo descendiente lineal
reconocido es el actual duque Kung. Ni en una, ni en otra existen
vástagos acondicionados para regir un Estado conforme á los
requerimientos de los tiempos actuales. Hubo de descartarse, pues,
de la plataforma de la ‘Joven China’ el pensamiento de instalar en
el trono á una dinastía nacional. Y sin dinastía holgaba el trono.

“No sabemos si aún habiendo en las dos familias mencionados miembros
con condiciones suficientes para ser el Jefe supremo de un Estado
moderno, hubiese prosperado el programa monarquico.

“Lo que sí pueda decir es que desde los primeros momentos
evolucionayon las ideas de Sun Yat Sen hacia el republicanismo....”

Ponce then goes on to point out Sun Yat-sen’s having said that the
decentralized system of old government and the comparative autonomy
of the vice-regencies presented a background of “a sort of
aristocratic republic” (“une especie de república aristocrática”).

115 Ponce, cited, p. 24. “... la única garantía posible, el único medio
por excelencia para obtener los mejores gobernantes....”

116 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 234.

117 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 235.

118 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 255.

119 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 266, note 1. Father d’Elia discusses
the reasons which made it seem more probable that Sun was
transliterating the name Millar into Chinese rather than (John
Stuart) Mill.

120 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 256 and following.

121 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 271.

122 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 273.

123 d’Elia translation, cited, pp. 242-243.

124 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 223 and following. Dr. Hsü (cited, p.
263 and following) translates these four epochs as following: _hung
fang_, “the stage of the great wilderness”; _shen ch’üan_, “the
state of theocracy”; _chun ch’üan_, “the stage of monarchy”; and
_min ch’üan_, “the stage of democracy.”

125 d’Elia translation, cited, pp. 241-242.

126 Linebarger, _Conversations_, cited, Book II, ch. 2.

127 It is of interest to note that the “New Life Movement” inaugurated
by Chiang Chieh-shih is concerned with many such petty matters such
as those enumerated above. Each of these small problems is in itself
of little consequence; in the aggregate they loom large.

128 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 331.

129 Hsü translation, cited, p. 352. It is interesting to note that the
translation by Father d’Elia gives a more literal translation of the
names that Sun Yat-sen applied to these categories. He translates
the Chinese terms as _pre-seeing_, _post-seeing_, and _non-seeing_.

130 Hsü translation, cited, p. 352.

131 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 348.

132 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 352. Sun Yat-sen defined democracy
thus: “... under a republican government, the people is sovereign.”

133 Tai Chi-tao, cited, p. 25, refers to this distinction as being
between force (_Gewalt_) and power (_Macht_). To the people
belonged, and rightfully, the force which could sanction or refuse
to sanction the existence of the government and the confirmation of
its policies. The government had the power (_Macht_), which the
people did not have, of formulating intelligent policies and
carrying them out in an organized manner.

134 Liang Chi-ch’ao, cited, pp. 50-52.

135 d’Elia translation, cited, pp. 279 and following.

136 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 368.

137 d’Elia translation, cited, pp. 368-9. Dr. Wou Saofong, in his _Sun
Yat-sen_ (Paris, 1929), summarizes his thesis of Sun Yat-sen in
somewhat different terms: “... Sun Yat-sen compare, le gouvernement
à un appareil mécanique, dont le moteur est constitué _par les lois_
ou les ministres, tandis que l’ingénieur que dirige la machine était
autrefois le roi et aujourd’hui le peuple,” p. 124. (Italics mine.)
This suggestion that the state-machine, in the theory of Sun
Yat-sen, is composed of laws as well as men is quite interesting;
Sun Yat-sen himself does not seem to have used this figure of speech
and it may be Dr. Wou’s applying the juristic interpretation on his
own initiative. Sun Yat-sen, in his sixth lecture on democracy,
says, “Statesmen and lawyers of Europe and America say that
government is a machine of which law is a tool.” (d’Elia
translation, cited, p. 368.)

138 It must always remain one of those conjectures upon which scholars
may expend their fantasy what Sun Yat-sen would have thought of the
necessity of the juristic state, which involved a quite radical
change throughout the Chinese social organism, had he lived to see
the ebb of juristic polity and, for all that, of voting democracy.
It is not unlikely that his early impressions of the United States
and his reading of Montesquieu would have led him to retain his
belief in a juristic-democratic state in spite of the fact that such
a state would no longer represent the acme of ultra-modernism.

139 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 378 and following.

140 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 369.

141 Reginald Johnston, _Twilight in the Forbidden City_, cited above,
presents an apparently true account of the conspiracies of the
various Northern generals which centered around the person of P’u
Yi. According to Johnston Tsao Kun was defeated in his attempt to
restore the Manchu Emperor only by the jealousies of his
fellow-militarists.

142 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 406.

143 Father d’Elia devotes the whole second chapter of his introduction
to the consideration of a suitable rendition of _San Min Chu I_,
which he calls the Triple Demism. (Work cited, pp. 36-49.) Again on
p. 402, he explains that, while he had translated _min shêng_ as
_socialism_ in the first French edition of his work, he now renders
it as _the economic Demism_ or _sociology_. The most current
translation, that of Frank Price, cited, gives _the principle of
livelihood_. Paul Linebarger gave it as _socialism_ as far back as
1917 (_The Chinese Nationalist Monthly_, December, 1917, Chicago) in
Chicago, at the time when Lin Shen, Frank C. Lee and he were all
working for Sun in that city. Dr. H. H. Kung, a high government
official related by marriage to Mme. Sun Yat-sen, speaks of the
three principles of _liberty_, _democracy_, and _economic
well-being_ (preface to Hsü, _Sun_, cited, p. xvi). Dr. V. K.
Wellington Koo, one of China’s most eminent diplomats, speaks of
_social organization_ (_Memoranda Presented to the Lytton
Commission_, New York City, n. d.). Citations could be presented
almost indefinitely. _Min_ means “people,” and _shêng_ means “life;
vitality, the living, birth, means of living” according to the
dictionary (S. Wells Williams, _A Syllabic Dictionary of the Chinese
Language_, Tungchou, 1909). The mere terms are of very little help
in solving the riddle of _min shêng_. Laborious examination is
needed, and even this will not, perhaps, lead us to anything more
than probability. Sun Yat-sen, in his lectures, called it by several
different names, which seem at first sight to contradict each other.

144 d’Elia translation, cited, pp. 91-92.

145 Linebarger, _Conversations_, cited, Bk. IV, p. 62: “I must confess
that the idea of using the sacred cult of ancestor worship as a
political machine is very abhorrent to me. In fact, I think that
even the rashest fool would never attempt to use this intimate cult
with its exclusively domestic privacy as a revolutionary
instrument.”

146 Linebarger, _Sun Yat-sen and the Chinese Republic_, New York, 1925,
pp. 68-9.

147 The same, pp. 135-139.

148 The same, pp. 104-105.

149 The same, pp. 122-123.

150 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 472.

151 Karl A. Wittfogel, _Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Chinas_, Leipzig,
1931. The author, the German Marxian who wrote the best Marxist
critique of Sun Yat-sen, is the only scholar to seek a really
complete picture of the old Chinese economy by the technique of
modern Western economic analysis. Described by the author as an
“attempt,” the first volume of this work runs to 737 pages. It is
valuable for the large amount of statistical material which it
contains, and for its systematic method; its Marxian bias narrows
its interest considerably.

152 Both works of Wittfogel, cited above, are useful for the
understanding of the transition from the old economy to the new. For
a general view of the economic situation and potentialities of
China, see George B. Cressey, _China’s Geographic Foundations_, New
York, 1934. The bibliography on Chinese economy to be found in
Latourette, cited above, vol. II, pp. 116-119, is useful.

153 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 97.

154 See below, section on the national economic revolution.

155 Hsü translation, cited, pp. 186-187. The d’Elia translation gives a
more exact rendering of Sun Yat-sen’s words (p. 97), but, by
following Sun Yat-sen in calling China a hypo-colony, is less
immediately plain to the Western reader than is the translation of
Dr. Hsü, who in this instance uses “sub” and “hypo” interchangeably.

156 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 443.

157 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 452.

158 His _International Development of China_, New York, 1922
(republished 1929), is a colossal plan which could only be compared
with the _Piatiletka_ or with the New Deal in the United States,
since Sun Yat-sen suggested that—in order to avoid the consequences
of a post-war depression—the nations of the world might cooperate in
the equal exploitation of Chinese national resources with the
Chinese. He proposed the modernization of China by a vast
international loan which could permit the Western nations to
maintain their war-time peak production, supplying China (1929 ed.,
p. 8). He concludes the work: “In a nutshell, it is my idea to make
capitalism create socialism in China so that these two economic
forces of human civilization will work side by side in future
civilization” (p. 237). The work is, however, generally regarded as
a transportation plan, since Sun Yat-sen sketched out a railway map
of China which would require decades to realize, and which
overshadowed, by its very magnitude, the other aspects of his
proposals.

159 At the risk of digression, one might comment on an interesting
element of the Euramerican ideology which is in sharp contrast to
the Chinese. The West has, apparently, always been devoted to
dichotomies of morality. The Greeks had reason and unenlightenment,
and whole series of ideals that could be fought for and against, but
the real division of good and bad in the West came, of course, with
Christianity, which accustomed Westerners to think for centuries in
terms of holiness versus evil—they being, geographically, holy, and
the outsiders (heathen), evil. Now that the supernatural foundations
of Christianity have been shaken by the progress of scientific and
intellectual uncertainty, many Westerners find an emotional and an
intellectual satisfaction in dividing the world into pure and
unclean along lines of sometimes rather abstruse economic questions.
This new morality seems to be based on distributive economics rather
than on deity. It is employed, of course, by the Marxians, but their
adversaries, in opposing them with equal passion, fall into the same
habit. It is shocking and unbelievable to such persons to discover
that there is a society whose ideology does not center around the
all-meaningful point of the ownership of the means of production.
Their only reaction is a negation of the possibility of such
thought, or, at least, of its realism. The intellectual position of
Sun Yat-sen in the modern world would be more clearly appreciated if
the intellectuals of the West were not adjusting their ideological
and emotional habits from religion to economics, and meanwhile
judging all men and events in economic terms. The present discussion
of Sun Yat-sen’s economic ideology is a quite subordinate one in
comparison to the examination of his ideology as a whole, but some
persons will regard it as the only really important point that could
be raised concerning him.

160 Tsui, cited, p. 345, quotes Nathaniel Peffer: “... Peffer said that
Dr. Sun never ‘attained intellectual maturity, and he was completely
devoid of the faculty of reason. He functioned mentally in sporadic
hunches. It was typical of him that he met Joffe, read the Communist
Manifesto, and turned Communist, and then read one book by an
American of whom he knew nothing, and rejected communism all in a
few months.’ ” Sun Yat-sen knew Marxism, years before the Russian
Revolution. The Communist Manifesto was not new to him. He was
extraordinarily well read in Western political and economic thought.
Sun Yat-sen never turned Communist, nor did he subsequently reject
communism any more than he had done for years.

161 The author hopes, at some future time, to be able to fill in the
intellectual background of Sun Yat-sen much more thoroughly than he
is able to at the present, for lack of materials. One interesting
method would involve the listing of every Western book with which
Sun Yat-sen can be shown to have been acquainted. It might be a
fairly accurate gauge of the breadth of his information.

162 d’Elia translation, cited, pp. 461-468. Father d’Elia’s note on the
relative positions of Henry George and Sun (p. 466) is interesting.
For a discussion of the actual program proposed by Sun, see below,
“The Program of _Min Shêng_” section on land policy.

163 Lyon Sharman, _Sun Yat-sen_, cited, p. 58.

164 The same, pp. 98-99. There is an inconsistency of wording here,
which may or may not be the fault of the translator. The oath refers
to the “equitable redistribution of the land” (p. 98); the platform
speaks of “the nationalization of land” (p. 98); and one of the
slogans is “Equalize land-ownership!”

165 See also the discussion in Tsui, _Canton-Moscow Entente_, cited, pp.
371-376; and in Li Ti-tsun, “The Sunyatsenian principle of
Livelihood,” _The Chinese Students’ Monthly_, XXIV (March 1929), pp.
230. Li declares that Sun envisioned immediate redistribution but
ultimate socialization, but does not cite his source for this. Li’s
discussion of sources is good otherwise.

166 Sharman, p. 58; the same authority for the statement as to the 1905
manifesto.

167 Sharman, p. 94.

168 Wittfogel, _Sun Yat-sen_, cited, p. 61.

169 Wittfogel, _Sun Yat-sen_, cited, p. 66: “Dieses sehr unpräzise
Programm, das die Frage der Klasseninteressen und des Klassenkampfes
als des Mittels zur Brechung privilegierter Klasseninteressen nicht
aufwirft, war objektiv gar nicht Sozialismus, sondern etwas durchaus
anderes: Lenin hat die Formel ‘_Subjektiver Sozialismus_’ dafür
geprägt.”

170 Wittfogel, _Sun Yat-sen_, cited, p. 67: “So bedeutete denn Suns
‘Sozialismus’ im Munde der Chinesischen Bourgeoisie nichts als ein
Art Bekenntness zu einer ‘sozialen,’ d.h. massenfreundlichen
Wirtschaftspolitik.”

171 T’ang, cited, p. 46.

172 T’ang, cited, p. 172.

173 T’ang, cited, p. 172.

174 T’ang, cited, pp. 171-172.

175 Wittfogel, cited, pp. 117-118.

176 Wittfogel, cited, p. 140: “... Seine Drei Prinzipien verkörpern in
ihrer _Entwicklung_ den objektiven Wandel der ökonomisch-sozialen
Situation Chinas, in ihren _Widersprüchen_ die realen Widersprüche
der chinesischen Revolution, in ihren _jüngsten Tendenzen_ die
Verlagerung des sozialen Schwerpunktes der Revolution, die Klassen
in Aktion setzt, deren Ziel nicht mehr ein
bürgerlich-kapitalistisches, sondern ein
proletarisch-sozialistisches und ein bauerlich-agrar-revolutionäres
ist.

“Sun Yat-sen ist demnach nicht nur der bisher mächtigste
Repräsentant der bürgerlich-nationalen, antiimperialistischen
Revolutionen des erwach-enden Asiens überhaupt, er weist zugleich
über die bürgerliche Klassen-schranke dieser ersten Etappe der
asiatischen Befreiungsbewegung hinaus. Dies zu verkennen, wäre
verhängnisvoll, gerade auch für die proletarisch-kommunistische
Bewegung Ostasiens selbst.”

177 Statement of Judge Linebarger to the author. See also Linebarger,
_Conversations_, references to Communism which occur throughout the
whole book.

178 Tsui, cited, p. 144. It would involve a duplication of effort for
the present author to repeat the material of Dr. Tsui’s excellent
monograph on Sun Yat-sen and the Bolsheviks. Since the purpose of
the present work is to undertake an exposition of the Nationalist
political ideology and programs against the background of the old
Chinese ideology, such an emphasis upon one comparatively small
point in Sun Yat-sen’s doctrines would be entirely disproportionate
as well as superfluous. The reader is referred to the work of Dr.
Tsui for any details of these relations that he may wish to examine.

179 See Tsui, cited, and section below, on the class struggle of the
nations.

180 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 450. See also Tsui, cited, pp.
353-354; and Li, cited, pp. 229 and following.

181 Sun, _Development of China_, cited, p. 237.

182 Maurice William, _Sun Yat-sen Versus Communism_, Baltimore, 1932, p.
4.

183 William, in his _Sun Yat-sen Versus Communism_, cited, proves beyond
doubt that Sun Yat-sen was strongly indebted to him for many
anti-Marxian arguments.

184 See above, Chapter One, second, third, and fourth sections.

185 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 423.

186 Tsui, cited, pp. 121-123, n. 72.

187 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 472.

188 Hsü translation, cited, p. 422. The Hsü version will be cited from
time to time, whenever Father d’Elia’s interesting neologisms might
make the citation too disharmonious, in wording, with the comment.

189 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 294.

190 Francis W. Coker, _Recent Political Thought_, New York—London, 1934,
pp. 545-562, Ch. XX, “Empirical Collectivism.”

191 Coker, cited, pp. 546-547.

192 Coker, cited, pp. 548-549. Throughout the discussion of empirical
collectivism the present author will cite, by and large, the
categories given by Coker. Any special exceptions will be noted, but
otherwise the discussion will be based on Coker’s chapter on
“Empirical Collectivism,” cited above.

193 Linebarger, _Conversations_, cited, Book III, p. 31.

194 Linebarger, _Conversations_, cited, Book III, p. 30.

195 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 475.

196 See, however, the d’Elia translation, cited, pp. 298-301, for a
reference to labor unions and a statement for their need of
competent and honest leadership.

197 See Wittfogel, _Sun Yat-sen_, cited, “Die Arbeiter,” pp. 97-99.
T’ang, Hsü, and the various biographies of Sun almost all contain
references from time to time to Sun’s friendliness toward and
approval of organized labor.

198 Wittfogel, _Sun Yat-sen_, cited, pp. 325-329. The next speech of Sun
Yat-sen given in Wittfogel’s work is Sun’s indignant attack on “the
so-called Labor Government” of England, which permitted the old
methods of British Far Eastern imperialism to continue.

199 Linebarger, _Conversations_, cited, Book III, p. 18. This work,
while it cannot be given the weight of direct quotations from Sun’s
own writings or speeches, does contain a good deal about the
policies of _min shêng_ which does not appear elsewhere. The author
has sought to avoid citation of it where direct sources are
available, since the nature of the material makes it by no means so
authoritative as others might be.

200 Coker, cited, p. 551.

201 E. D. Harvey, _The Mind of China_, New Haven, 1933, deals
extensively with these supernatural elements. The reader who turns
to it should keep in mind the fact that the supernatural plays a
rôle in China distinctly less important than that which it did, say,
in medieval Europe, and that a strong agnostic, rather than a
skeptical, spirit among the Chinese has preserved them from the
grossest errors of superstition.

202 Latourette, cited, p. 129. Dr. Latourette’s sketch of Chinese
religious thought is especially good, as indeed it might be, since
he is one of the most celebrated American scholars in the field of
Western religion in China.

203 H. G. Creel, work cited, p. 127.

204 The author cannot give a documentary citation for this observation.
It was communicated to him many times by his father, Judge Paul
Linebarger, who stated that Sun Yat-sen was most apt to talk in
terms of morality and morale by preference. The fact that Sun
Yat-sen came from a Chinese Confucian background into a Western
Christian one cannot be ignored. He did not permit his Christianity
to sway him from what he considered his necessary lines of behavior
in politics; it did not, for example, prevent him from being
extremely cordial to the Soviet Union at the time that that state
was still more or less outcaste. And yet, speaking of the Christian
God, he is reputably reported to have said: “God sent me to China to
free her from bondage and oppression, and I have not been
disobedient to the Heavenly mission”; and, again, to have said on
the day before his death: “I am a Christian; God sent me to fight
evil for my people. Jesus was a revolutionist; so am I.” (Both
quotations from appendix to the d’Elia translation, p. 718.)

205 Sun Yat-sen authorized the biography, cited, which Judge Linebarger
wrote of him. It was a propaganda work, and neither he nor the
author had any particular expectation that it would ever be regarded
as a source, or as an academically prepared document. The last
chapter of this authorized biography bears the title, “Conclusion:
Sun the Moral Force.” This, perhaps, is significant as to Sun’s own
attitude.

206 Note the contrast between the thought of Sun in this respect and
that of Tagore or Gandhi. This has been pointed out by many Western
writers on China.

207 Linebarger, _Conversations_, cited, Book III, p. 20.

208 Sharman, cited, p. 282.

209 The reader must bear in mind the fact that what is presented here is
Sun Yat-sen’s political program for China. In many instances the
course of affairs has deviated quite definitely from that program,
and it can be only a matter of conjecture as to what Sun Yat-sen
would do were he to return and observe the Nationalist movement as
it now is. It is manifestly impossible to trace all the changes in
this program. The actual developments have conformed only in part
with Sun Yat-sen’s plans, although the leaders seek to have it
appear as though they are following as close to Sun Yat-sen’s
democratic politics as they can. Many persons who were close to Sun
Yat-sen, such as Mme. Sun Yat-sen, believe that the National
Government has betrayed the theory of Sun Yat-sen, and that
Generalissimo Chiang Chieh-shih has made himself the autocrat of the
National Government. It is, of course, impossible within the scope
of this thesis to enter into this dispute. Who rules the
Soviet—Stalin, or the Communist Party? Who rules China—Chiang
Chieh-shih, or the Kuomintang? In each case there is the question of
whether the leader could get along without the party, and whether
the party could get along without the leader, as well as the
question of the leader’s sincerity. These issues, however burning
they might be in real life, could not be adequately treated in a
work such as this. The author has sought to present Sun Yat-sen’s
theory of applied politics. Where events which Sun Yat-sen foresaw
have come to pass, the author has referred to them. He does not wish
to be understood as presenting a description of the whole course of
events in China.

210 Here, again, one must remember that Mme. Sun Yat-sen, Eugene Chen,
and others charge that the Party no longer rules, that it has been
prostituted by Chiang Chieh-shih, and now serves only to cloak a
military despotism. It may be noted, so far as the other side of the
question is concerned, that a greater number of the persons who were
eminent in the Party before Sun Yat-sen died have remained in it
than have left it.

211 See T’ang, work cited for an excellent description of the mutations
of the revolutionary party. T’ang criticizes the present personnel
of the Kuomintang severely, but the reader must keep in mind the
fact that he has since become reconciled with the present
leadership, and make allowances for the somewhat emphatic
indignation voiced at the time of writing the book. The brilliance
of the author guarantees that the story is well told, but it is not
told for the last time. See also, Min-ch’ien T. Z. Tyau, _Two Years
of Nationalist China_, Shanghai, 1930, for a summary that is as
excellent as it is short. Various changes have occurred in party
function, organization, and personnel since that time, but they have
not—to the knowledge of the author—been completely and adequately
covered by any one work.

212 For a history of this period, see T’ang, Sharman, or Tsui Shu-chin,
all cited above. The Communist side of the story is told by Harold
Isaacs (editor), _Five Years of Kuomintang Reaction_, Shanghai,
1932, and in the various works of the Stalinist and Trotskyist
groups concerning the intervention of the Third Internationale in
China. Two graphic personal accounts cast in semi-fictional form,
are Oscar Erdberg, _Tales of Modern China_, Moscow, 1932, and
Vincent Sheean, _Personal History_, New York, 1935; these present
the Communist and the left-liberal viewpoints, respectively. The
dramatic story of the Entente, the separation, and the ensuing
conflict are not yet remote enough to have cooled into material
ready for the historian.

213 The Kuomintang, in accepting the Communist administrative structure,
was not violating traditional Chinese patterns altogether. It has
been pointed out that the revised structure of the Kuomintang
resembled older Chinese guild patterns as well as the new Russian
style (Sharman, work cited, p. 262).

214 Here, again, one might refer to the disputes as to the orthodoxy and
integrity of the present leadership. The preëminence of
Generalissimo Chiang Chieh-shih, which cannot be doubted, is seen by
persons friendly to him as a strong and beneficent influence upon
the C. E. C. Persons hostile to him charge that he has packed the C.
E. C. with his adherents, and controls it as he chooses.

215 An interesting piece of research could deal with the method of
recruitment and registration in the Kuomintang before the coming of
the Communist advisers. There was rarely any doubt as to who was, or
was not, a member, but there was constant trouble as to the good
standing of members. Recruitment seems to have been on a basis of
oath-taking, initiation, etc.; what Party discipline there was seems
to have been applied only in the most extreme cases, and then
crudely.

216 It is interesting to note that the Kuomintang is to a certain degree
democratic in representing the various occupational groups in China.
Tyau, cited above, p. 25 and following, lists the percentages in the
membership in the Kuomintang according to occupation, as they stood
in 1930: Party work, 5.84%; government service, 6.61%; army and
navy, 3.26%; police, 4.09%; labor (in general), 7.32%; agriculture,
10.43%; navigation, 1.20%; railway, 1.14%; commerce, 10.47%;
students, 10.47%; teaching, 21.31%; independent professions, 1.66%;
social work, 1.68%; unemployed, O.54%; unclassified, 3.13%;
incomplete returns, 15.09%.

217 See above, pp. 59 and following.

218 Sun Yat-sen, _Kidnapped in London_, cited, _passim_.

219 d’Elia translation, cited, pp. 122-123.

220 The present instances are all taken from the third lecture on
nationalism, d’Elia translation, cited pp. 127-128. The Hsü
translation, in spite of its many merits, is not strong on
geography. Thus, in the translation referring to Poland which has
just been cited, the Hsü reading runs: “Although Persia was
partitioned by foreigners over a century ago, Persian nationalism
was not lost; consequently the Persians have been able to restore
their country to independence; and now Persia has the status of a
second or third class power in Europe” (p. 208), this in spite of
the fact that Persia is translated correctly further on (p. 327).
Another misreading is: “After the war, two new Slavic states were
born, namely Czechoslovakia and Jugoslovakia” (p. 217). These minor
errors are, however, among the very few which can be discovered in
the whole book, and do not mar the text to any appreciable extent.

221 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 132.

222 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 63.

223 T’ang, cited, pp. 168 and following, gives the various documents of
the First National Congress of the Kuomintang, which place the
application of nationalism first in their programs. “The Manifesto
On Going to Peking,” issued by Sun November 10, 1924, refers to
various points to be achieved; the first is, “National freedom from
external restriction will enable China to develop her national
economy and to increase her productivity.” (Hsü translation, p.
148.) This might imply that the execution of _min shêng_ was to be
coincidental with or anterior to the fulfillment of nationalism; it
probably does not.

224 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 187.

225 Discussions of this are to be found in Sir Reginald Johnston’s
_Twilight in the Forbidden City_, cited.

226 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 244.

227 d’Elia translation, cited, pp. 245-247.

228 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 187. Numerals have been written out by
the present author.

229 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 365. Italics are omitted.

230 This is not due to any mystical veneration of numbers, or religious
influence. In spreading doctrines which would have to be followed by
the unlettered as well as by the scholars, Sun Yat-sen found it
necessary to develop the general outline of his principles in such a
way as to give them a considerable mnemonic appeal. Thus, the three
principles—and the three French (liberty, equality, fraternity) and
American (of, by, for the people) principles—and the triple foreign
aggression, the four popular powers, the five governmental rights.
The use of the number three permitted Sun Yat-sen to weave together
the various strands of his teaching, and to attain a considerable
degree of cross-reference. It cannot be shown to have induced any
actual distortion of his theories.

231 Hsü translation, cited, p. 213. See also d’Elia translation, p. 134.

232 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 114.

233 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 101.

234 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 113. The whole present discussion of
economic oppression is drawn from the latter part of the second
lecture. Except in the case of direct quotation, no further
reference will be given to this section, which occurs at pp. 97-115
of the d’Elia translation.

235 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 106.

236 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 113.

237 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 113.

238 In referring to a sub-principle, the author is following Sun
Yat-sen’s arrangement of his ideas, even though the exact term,
“sub-principle,” is not to be found in Sun’s works. Each of the
three principles can be considered with respect to national unity,
national autonomy, and national survival. The correlation of the
three principles, each with itself and then the two others,
logically leads to the appearance of nine sub-principles. The writer
has not followed any artificial compulsion of numbers, merely for
the sake of producing a pretty outline, but has followed Sun Yat-sen
in seeking to make clear the specific relations of each of the three
principles to the three cardinal points which they embody.

239 d’Elia translation, cited, pp. 179-180.

240 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 180.

241 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 180.

242 Tsui, cited, pp. 113-114.

243 Linebarger, _Conversations_, cited, pp. 21 and following, Book I.

244 Among the persons whom he entrusted with the task of seeking foreign
capital for the just and honorable national development of China
through international means were George Bronson Rea and Paul
Linebarger. Mr. Rea was given a power of attorney by Sun to secure
loans for railway purposes to an unlimited amount. Mr. Rea never
used the document, but kept it among his papers. (Statement of Mr.
Rea to the author in Washington, spring of 1934, at the time that
the former was “Special Counsellor to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Manchoukuo,” despite his former Chinese connections.)
Judge Linebarger was also unsuccessful. Sun Yat-sen was more
interested in having Judge Linebarger stop any assistance offered by
the Consortium to the Northern “Republic of China” than in having
him procure any actual funds.

245 It is obvious that a strong China would be a horrid nightmare to
Japan. Not only would the Chinese thwart the use of their man-power
and natural resources, as stepping stones to Asiatic or world
hegemony; they might even equal the Japanese in audacity, and think
of restoring the Japanese to the position of Chinese vassals which
they had enjoyed in the time of Yoshemitsu, the third Ashikaga
Shogun.

246 Tsui, cited, pp. 115-116.

247 Hu Han-min, cited in Tsui, work cited, p. 118, n. 63.

248 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 152. For a full discussion of this
curious relationship between China and her vassal states, see Djang
Chu (Chang Tso), _The Chinese Suzerainty_, Johns Hopkins University
doctoral dissertation, 1935. The submission to China was, among
other things, a means by which the rulers of the peripheral states
could get themselves recognized by an authority higher than
themselves, thus legitimizing their position.

249 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 153. Sun Yat-sen seems to have had a
high opinion of the American administration of the Philippines,
saying: The United States “... even allows the Filipinos to send
delegations to Congress in Washington. Not only does the United
States require no annual tribute in money from them, but, on the
contrary, she gives the Filipinos considerable subsidies to build
and maintain their roads and to promote education. It seems as
though so humanitarian a treatment would be regarded as the utmost
benevolence. Still, until the present day, the Filipinos do not
boast of being ‘Americanized’; they are daily clamoring for
independence” (d’Elia translation, p. 153). This statement is
interesting in two connections. In the first place, although Sun
Yat-sen had once thought of sending men, money, or munitions to help
the Filipino nationalists in their struggles against the Americans,
he seems to have conceived a warm admiration for the American
administration in those islands. Secondly, the reader may consider
that Sun Yat-sen, at the time that he made this comment, was in the
course of attacking imperialism. If Sun Yat-sen could offer so
enthusiastic an apology for the Americans in the Philippines, it
shows that he must have let the abstract principle ride, and judged
only on the basis of his own observation. To the orthodox Communist
the American rule of the Philippines is peculiarly wicked because of
the American denial of imperialist practises.

250 Some of the older books on China give interesting maps of that
country divided up into spheres of influence between the various
powers. It was quite fashionable among journalists to sketch the
various Chinese possessions of the great powers; the powers never
got around to the partition. The American declaration of the “Open
Door” may have had something to do with this, and the British
enunciation of the same doctrine probably carried weight. For a
time, however, the Europeans seemed quite convinced of the almost
immediate break-up of China into three or four big colonies. Lord
Charles Beresford, a prominent English peer, wrote a work which was
extremely popular; its title was _The Break-Up of China_ (London,
1899).

251 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 93.

252 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 165.

253 d’Elia translation, cited, pp. 165-170.

254 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 170.

255 The Communists envision three types of conflict to be produced by
the contradictions of imperialism: intra-national class war,
international class war, and inter-imperialist war. The first is the
struggle of the proletariat of the whole world against the various
national bourgeois governments; the second, the struggle of the
oppressed peoples, under revolutionary bourgeois or proletarian
leadership, against the oppressions of Western imperialism; and the
last, the conflict of the various imperialist powers with one
another. Sun Yat-sen’s theory agreed definitely with the second
point, the international class war; he seems to have admitted the
probability of class war within the nations of the West, and of
inter-imperialist war, but he did not draw the three types of
conflict together and because of them predicate an Armageddon and a
millenium. His flexible, pragmatic thought never ran to extremes;
although he agreed, more or less distinctly, with the Bolshevik
premises of the three conflicts of the imperialist epoch, he did not
follow them to their conclusion.

256 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 75.

257 d’Elia translation, cited, pp. 148-149.

258 Such works as Lea’s _The Valor of Ignorance_, New York, 1909, and
Stoddard’s _The Rising Tide of Color Against White World Supremacy_,
New York, 1920, make precisely the same sort of statements,
although, of course, they regard the “Saxon” or “Teutonic” race as
the logical master-race of the world. Since Lea was associated for
some time with Sun Yat-sen, accompanying him from Europe to Nanking
in 1911, and undoubtedly had plenty of time to talk with him, it may
be that some of the particular terms used by Sun in this discussion
are those which he may have developed in his probable conversations
with Lea. Nothing more definite than this can be stated.

259 Quoted by Sun in d’Elia translation, cited, p. 138. The remark does
not sound like Lenin. A Communist would not invoke nature, nor would
he count the whole membership of an imperialist nation as
imperialist. The world, to him, is misguided by a tiny handful of
capitalists and traditional ideologues and their hangers-on, not by
the masses of any nation.

260 Note, however, the reference in d’Elia translation, cited, p. 76, or
the Price translation, p. 18. Sun Yat-sen speaks of _international
wars, within_ races, on the lines of social _classes_. He may have
meant international wars within the races and across race lines on
the basis of the oppressed nations of the world fighting the
oppressing nations. He may, however, have meant intra-national class
wars. Since he recognized the presence of the class conflict in the
developed capitalistic states of the West, this would not
necessarily imply his expectation of an intra-national class war in
China.

261 Wittfogel, _Sun Yat-sen_, pp. 331-337, gives the whole text of the
speech. Sharman, _Sun Yat-sen_, p. 304, refers to it.

262 Wittfogel, _Sun Yat-sen_, p. 335. “Es ist gegen Gerechtigkeit und
Menschlichkeit, dass eine Minderheit von vierhundert Millionen eine
Mehrheit von neunhundert Millionen unterdrückt....”

263 Wittfogel, _Sun Yat-sen_, p. 333. “Die Europäer halten uns Asiaten
durch die Macht ihrer materiellen Errungenschaften zu Boden.”

264 Wittfogel, _Sun Yat-sen_, cited, p. 333. “Wenn wir
zweitausendfünf-hundert Jahre zurückdenken, so war China damals das
mächtigste Volk der Welt. Es nahm damals eine Stellung ein wie heute
Grossbritannien und Amerika. Doch während Grossbritannien und die
Vereinigten Staaten heute zur zwei unter einer Reihe von Weltmächten
sind, war China damals die einzige grosse Macht.”

265 Ponce, work cited, p. xiv: “_Conozcámonos y nos amaremos más_—decía
el gran Sun Yat-sen á sus amigos orientales.” This work is, by the
way, the most extensive for its account of Sun’s associations with
Koreans, Filipinos, and Japanese. It has been completely overlooked
by the various biographers of and commentators on Sun, with the
exception of Judge Linebarger, to whom Sun Yat-sen presented a copy
of the work.

266 Wittfogel, _Sun Yat-sen_, p. 337: “In England und Amerika gibt es
immerhin eine kleine Zahl von Menschen, die diese unsere Ideale im
Einklang mit einer allgemeinen Weltbewegung verteidigen. Was die
anderen Barbarennationen anbelangt, so dürfte es auch in ihren
Reihen Menschen geben, die von der gleichen Überzeugung beseelt
sind.”

267 Wittfogel, _Sun Yat-sen_, p. 335: “Wenn wir Asiaten nach der
Herstellung einer panasiatischen Einheitsfront streben, müssen wir
selbst in unserer Zeit daran denken, auf welcher grundlegenden
Auffassung wir diese Einheitsfront errichten wollen. Wir sollen
dasjenige zugrunde legen, was die besondere Eigentümlichkeit unserer
östlichen Kultur gewesen ist, wir sollten unseren Nachdruck legen
auf die moralischen Werte, auf Güte und Gerechtigkeit. Sie sollen
das Fundament der Einheit ganz Asiens werden.”

268 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 207. Italics omitted.

269 The article by Tsui, cited, p. 177 and following, goes into a quite
detailed comparison of the Chinese Nationalist and the Marxian
Communist theories of the three stages of revolution. He draws
attention to the fact that, while the Communists do not speak of
"three stages" and prefer to emphasize the transitional stage of the
dictatorship of the proletariat, the two theories are similar almost
to the point of being identical.

270 Tsui, cited, p. 181.

271 Tyau, cited, p. 439 and following. It is also available in Hsü, _Sun
Yat-sen_, cited above, p. 85 and following. The Tyau translation was
preferred since it was written by an official of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, and may be regarded as the work of a Government
spokesman. It is interesting, by way of contrast, to quote a passage
from the Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic, so-called:
“The Chinese Soviet Government is building up a state of the
democratic dictatorship [sic!] of the workers and peasants. All
power shall be vested in the Soviets of Workers, Peasants, and Red
Army men.” _Fundamental Laws of the Chinese Soviet Republic_, New
York, 1934, p. 18. The absence of an acknowledged period of
tutelage, in view of the unfamiliarity of the Chinese people with
democratic forms, is significant. The constitutional jurisprudence
of the Chinese Communists is, however, primarily a matter of
academic interest, since the Soviets, where they have existed, have
existed in a state of perpetual emergency, shielded by the Red
Terror and other devices of revolutionary control. The contrast
between a pronouncement of Sun Yat-sen and a constitution is a fair
one, since the writings of Sun Yat-sen form the final authority in
the Nationalist movement and government; in a dispute as to the
higher validity of a governmental provision or a flat contrary
statement of Sun Yat-sen, there can be little question as to which
would—or, in the eyes of the Nationalists, should—prevail.

272 It is interesting to note that the institution which most Western
writers would incline to regard as the very key-stone of democracy,
parliament, has a quite inferior place in the Sun Yat-sen system. In
the National Government of China, the Legislative Yuan is more like
a department than like a chamber. This question, however, will be
discussed under the heading of the Five Rights.

273 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 341.

274 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 342.

275 A discussion of the four powers and the five rights is to be found
in Li Chao-wei, _La Souveraineté Nationale d’après la Doctrine
Politique de Sun-Yet-Sin_, Dijon, 1934. This work, a doctoral thesis
submitted to the University of Dijon, treats the Western theory of
democracy and Sun’s theory comparatively. It is excellent in
portraying the legal outline of the Chinese governmental structure,
and points out many significant analogies between the two theories.

276 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 391.

277 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 395.

278 The unfavorable view of the Five Powers is taken by Dr. Jermyn
Chi-hung Lynn in his excellent little book, _Political Parties in
China_, Peiping, 1930. Since Dr. Lynn speaks kindly and hopefully of
the plans of Wu Pei-fu, one of the war-lords hostile to Sun Yat-sen
and the whole Nationalist movement, his criticism of Sun Yat-sen
need not be taken as completely impartial. It represents a point
that has been made time and time again by persons antagonistic to
the _San Min Chu I_.

“The Wu Chuan Hsien Fa is also no discovery of Dr. Sun’s. As is
known, the three power constitution, consisting of the legislative,
judiciary [sic!] and executive functions, was originally developed,
more or less unconsciously, by the English, whose constitution was
critically examined by Montesquieu, and its working elaborately
described by him for the benefit of his fellow-countrymen. And the
unwritten constitution of Old China contained the civil service
examination and an independent Board of Censors. Now the
much-advertised Wu Chuan Hsien Fa or Five-Power constitution only
added the systems of state examination and public censure to the
traditional form of constitution first advocated by the French
jurist.” P. 66, work cited.

279 Hsü translation, cited, p. 104.

280 For an intensively vivid description of this government, which Sun
Yat-sen’s planned democracy was to relegate to limbo, see B. L.
Putnam Weale, _The Vanished Empire_, London, 1926. Putnam Weale was
the pseudonym of Bertram Lennox Simpson, an Englishman born and
reared in China, who understood and participated in Chinese life and
policies as have few since the days of Marco Polo; he was an advisor
to the insurrectionary Peking “Nationalist” Government of 1931 when
he was shot to death in his home at Tientsin. Few other Westerners
have left such a wealth of accurate and sympathetic material about
modern China.

281 d’Elia translation, cited, p. 399.

282 Harold Monk Vinacke, _Modern Constitutional Development in China_,
Princeton, 1920, p. 100.

283 Vinacke, cited, p. 141 and following. While Dr. Vinacke’s book is
now out of date, it contains excellent material for the period
covered, roughly 1898 to 1919. He quotes Morse’s comment on the
provinces with approval: “The Provinces are satrapies to the extent
that so long as the tribute and matriculations are duly paid, and
the general policy of the central administration followed, they are
free to administer their own affairs in detail as may seem best to
their own provincial authorities.” (Hosea Ballou Morse, _The Trade
and Administration of China_, London, 1913, p. 46, quoted in
Vinacke, work cited, p. 5.)

284 Paul M. W. Linebarger, _Conversations with Sun Yat-sen_, mss., 1934;
Book two, Chapter Five, “Democratic Provincial Home Rule.”

285 Hsü, cited, p. 124.

286 Tyau, cited, p. 441. From “The Outline of National Reconstruction.”

287 Tyau, cited, p. 450.

288 V. I. Lenin, _State and Revolution_, New York, 1932. Lenin’s
discussion of Marx’s point, p. 39 and following, is stimulating
although inclining to the ingenious.

289 The number of the villages is taken from Tawney, Richard Henry,
_Land and Labor in China_, London, 1932; and the number of _hsien_
from Tyau, cited, p. 85.

290 Linebarger, _Conversations_, cited above; throughout this volume,
Judge Linebarger recalls references made by Sun Yat-sen to him
concerning the _hsien_.

291 It is but fair to state, at the beginning, that this point of the
family system as one of the institutions of the democratic nation
has been very largely neglected by the Kuomintang and the National
Government. To the knowledge of the author, no plan has ever been
drafted either by Party or by Government which would erect the
system that Sun Yat-sen proposed. It is not beyond all conjecture
that Sun’s suggestion may at a later date seem more practicable to
the leaders than now appears, and be put into operation in some
manner.

292 Hsü, cited, p. 164.

293 Hsü, cited, p. 243.

294 The material concerning the clans has been taken from the fifth
lecture on Nationalism (Hsü, cited, p. 240 and following; d’Elia,
cited, p. 174 and following). Judge Linebarger recorded Sun
Yat-sen’s mention of a convention of the clans in _Conversations_,
cited above, Book One, Chapter Eight, “The Clans in the Nation.”

295 There are three excellent discussions of the _min shêng_ programs.
Wou, cited, gives a clear precis of the doctrine. Hung Jair, _Les
idées économiques de Sun Yat Sen_, Toulouse, 1934, and Tsiang Kuen,
_Les origines économiques et politiques du socialisme de Sun Yat
Sen_, Paris, 1933, cover essentially the same ground, although they
are both doctoral dissertations submitted to French universities.
The former deals primarily with the theory of Sun’s economic ideas,
contrasting them with the economic thought of Adam Smith and of the
Marxians. The latter gives a rather extensive historical and
statistical background to Sun’s _min shêng_, and traces the Chinese
economic system, whence _min shêng_ was derived in part, quite
fully. These authors have covered the field so widely that the
present work need not enter into the discussion of the precise
immediate policies to be advocated under _min shêng_. Enough will be
given to describe the relations of _min shêng_ with the more
formally political principles of nationalism and democracy, and to
afford the reader an opportunity to assess its scope and
significance for himself. The works of Hung Jair, Tsiang Kuen, Wou
Saofong, and Li Ti-tsun all measure _min shêng_ in terms of
classical Western _laissez-faire_ economics and then in terms of
Marxism; they all proceed in considerable detail to recapitulate the
various concrete plans that Sun projected. The present author will
not enter into the minutiae of the problems of clothing, of
transport, of communications, etc., inasmuch as they have already
been dealt with and because they are not directly relevant to the
political or ideological features of Sun’s thought.

296 Tsui, cited, p. 378, n. 125.

_ 297 The International Development of China_ was welcomed as an
interesting fantasy in a world which had not yet heard of the Five
Year Plans and the programs of the New Deal. The fact that Sun
Yat-sen was a few years ahead of his contemporaries gave him the air
of a dreamer, which was scarcely deserved.

298 Hsü translation, “The Outline of National Reconstruction,” p. 85.
Two points of detail may be noted here. In the first place, _min
shêng_ has been emphasized by being placed first, although Sun
Yat-sen generally arranged his principles in their logical order:
nationalism, democracy, _min shêng_. Secondly, _min shêng_, although
emphasized, is dealt with in one single paragraph in this vitally
important document. The question of the _hsien_ is given eight
paragraphs to the one on _min shêng_. This is indicative of the
point stressed above, namely, that Sun Yat-sen, while he was sure of
the importance of _min shêng_, did not believe in hard and fast
rules concerning its development.

299 Work cited, p. 232.

300 See above, p. 180 ff.

301 The author uses the term “national economic revolution” to
distinguish those parts of the _ming shêng chu i_ which treat the
transformation of the Chinese economy in relation to the development
of a nation-state. Obviously, there is a great difference between
the economy of a society regarding itself as ecumenical, and one
faced with the problem of dealing with other equal societies. The
presence of a state implies a certain minimum of state interference
with economic matters; the national economic revolution of Sun
Yat-sen was to give the Chinese economy a national character,
coordinating the economic with the other programs of nationalism.
Hence, the significant stress in the phrase “national economic
revolution” should rest upon the word “national.”