Chapter VII: The Programs of Min Shêng (1)

The Three Programs of _Min Shêng_.

The new ideology of Sun Yat-sen, as has been shown, demanded three fulfilments of the doctrine of _min shêng_: a nationalistic economic revolution, a deliberate industrial revolution, and a social revolution. The last was to be accomplished negatively rather than positively. It was to aim at the reconstruction of the Chinese economy in such a manner as to avoid the necessity of class war. Since Chinese society was to be revolutionized by the development of a nation and a state, with all that that implied, and was to be changed by a transition from a handicraft economy to an industrial one, Sun Yat-sen hoped that these changes would permit the social revolution to develop at the same time as the others, and did not plan for it separately and distinctly. The three revolutions, all of them economic, were to develop simultaneously, and all together were to form a third of the process of readjustment.

In considering the actual plans for carrying out the _min shêng_ principle, the student encounters difficulties. The general philosophical position of the _min shêng_ ideology in relation to the ideologies of nationalism and democracy, and in connection with such foreign philosophies as capitalism and Marxism, has already been set forth. The direct plans that Sun Yat-sen had for the industrial revolution in China are also clear, since he outlined them, laboriously although tentatively, in _The International Development of China_;(295) but whereas the ideology and the actual physical blueprints can be understood clearly enough, the general lines of practical governmental policy with regard to economic matters have not been formulated in such a way as to make them indisputable.

Sun Yat-sen was averse to tying the hands of his followers and successors with respect to economic policy. He said: “While there are many undertakings which can be conducted by the State with advantage, others cannot be conducted effectively except under competition. I have no hard-and-fast dogma. Much must be left to the lessons of experience.”(296)

It would be inexpedient to go into details about railway lines and other modern industrial enterprises by means of which Sun sought to modernize China. On the other hand, it would be a waste of time merely to repeat the main economic theses of the new ideology. Accordingly, the examination of the program of _min shêng_ will be restricted to the consideration of those features that affected the state, either directly or indirectly, or which had an important bearing upon the proposed future social organization of the Chinese. Among the topics to be discussed are the political nature of the national economic revolution, the political effect of the industrial revolution upon the Chinese, and the expediency of Sun’s plans for that revolution; the nature of the social revolution which was to accompany these two first, especially with reference to the problem of land, the problem of capital, and the problem of the class struggle; the sphere of state action in the new economy; and the nature of that ideal economy which would be realized when the Chinese should have carried to completion the programs of _min shêng_. Railway maps and other designs of Sun, which have proved such an inspiration in the modernization of China and which represent a pioneer attempt in state planning, will have to be left to the consideration of the economists and the geographers.(297)

The program of _min shêng_ was vitally important to the realization of the Nationalist revolution as a whole, so important, indeed, that Sun Yat-sen put it first in one of his plans:

The first step in reconstruction is to promote the economic
well-being of the people by providing for their four necessities
of life, namely, food, clothing, shelter, and transportation. For
this purpose, the Government will, with the people’s co-operation,
develop agriculture to give the people an adequate food supply,
promote textile industries to solve their clothing problem,
institute gigantic housing schemes to provide for them decent
living quarters, and build roads and canals so that they may have
convenient means of travel.

Next is the promotion of democracy....

The third step is the development of nationalism....(298)

The plans for realizing _min shêng_ were to be the most necessary and the most difficult. In the change from a world-society to a race-nation, the Chinese had their own social solidarity and the experience of the Western nations to guide them. There was little in the development of a nation that had not already been tried elsewhere. The only real obstacles were the ignorance of the people, in relation to the new social environment in which their whole society was involved, and the possibility of opposition from the politically oppressing powers.

In the development of democracy the Chinese could rely in part upon the experience of the West. The Kuomintang could observe the machinery of democratic states in regular operation abroad. Although the new democracy of the five powers and the four rights was differed from the democratic methods of the West, still, as in mechanics, certain fundamental rules of political organization in its technical details could be relied upon. The Chinese people had a democratic background in the autonomy of the various extra-political units.

In _min shêng_ neither the experience of the West nor the old Chinese background would be of much value. More than the other two principles and programs, _min shêng_ sought to alter the constitution and nature of Chinese society. Yet in _min shêng_ the Chinese were to be guided only negatively by Western experience. Into their society, passing through a great economic upheaval, they must introduce, by a trial-and-error method, the requirements for economic unity, efficiency, and justice.

The National Economic Revolution.

After the pitiable failure of the 1912 Republic, Sun Yat-sen began to place an especially heavy emphasis on the necessity of a national economic revolution which would carry on the achievements of the national political revolution. He placed an even greater stress upon the necessity of _min shêng_ in the revolutionary ideology, and became more and more clearly conscious of the danger imperialism constituted to the Chinese race-nation. He believed that, as the 1912 revolution had been created by the sword, the new economic revolution might be furthered by the pen, and with this in mind he wrote _The International Development of China_. At the time that he wrote this work, he seems to have been convinced of the fruitlessness of purely military effort, and the superior value of pacific economic organization.(299)

This organization was to be effected through capital brought in from the outside. As it developed that capital would not come in, that instead of continuing the terrific pace of production which the World War had demanded, the nations returned to comparative laissez faire, and let their economies slump, Sun was persuaded that the whole revolution would have to be carried on by the Chinese themselves, with the possible help of the Communist Russians, and of Japan. He found the reorganized Kuomintang to be the instrument of this last revolution, both politically and democratically, and began to emphasize Chinese resistance to the outside, rather than appeal for help from the barbarian nations.

It is this last attitude which one finds expressed in the acts of the last years of his life. The national revolution was to be made a reality by being intimately associated with the economic life and development of the country. The plans made for economic development should be pushed as far as possible without waiting for foreign help. The Chinese should use the instrument of the boycott as a sanction with which to give weight to their national policy.(300) They had to practise economic nationalism in order to rid themselves of the incubus of imperialism which was sucking the life-blood of their country. In this connection between nationalism and _min shêng_, the economic aspect of the nationalist program was to be the means, and the national aspect of the _min shêng_ program the consequence. Unless Chinese, both as members of a state and as individuals stirred by national sentiment, were moved to action against Western economic aggression, they might consider themselves already doomed.

How did Sun propose to promote the national economic revolution,(301) as distinguished from the industrial revolution and the social revolution? He gave, in the first place, as earlier stated, the economic part of his theories a greater weight than they had hitherto enjoyed, and placed them first in his practical program. Secondly, he tended to associate the national political revolution more and more with the real seat of economic power: the working class. In this introduction of the working class into the labors for the fulfilment of _min shêng_ as a national economic revolution, he was doing two things. He was hoping to bring the standards of Chinese labor up to those of the West, and he was making use of the political power of labor in China as an added instrument of the national economic revolution.

The Chinese nation could and should not continue, as a nation, on a scale of living lower than that of the Western nations. He urged the Chinese workers, as the class most affected, to fight for the economic advancement of themselves and of their nation. “Comrades, the people meeting here are all workers and represent a part of the nation. A great responsibility rests on Chinese labor, and if you are equal to the task, China will become a great nation and you a mighty working class.”(302) The Chinese workers were performing not only a duty that they owed to themselves—they were also acting patriotically.

In advancing the national economic revolution by advancing themselves, they could not afford to lose sight of the political part of the revolution. “Beyond the economic struggle for the shortening of the working day and the increase of wages, there are before you other much more important questions of a political character. For our political objectives you must follow the three principles and support the revolution.”(303) The two parts of the revolution could not be separated from one another.

Besides the economic part of the national revolution, there was another readjustment of which Sun did not often speak, because it was not an open problem which could be served by immediate political action. This was the problem of the transition of China from an autarchic to a trading economy. The old Chinese world had been self-sustaining, so self-sustaining that the Emperor Tao Kuang wrote to George III of England that he did not desire anything that the barbarians might have, but, out of the mercy and the bounty of his heart, would permit them to come to China in order to purchase the excellent things that the Chinese possessed in such abundance.(304) The impact of the West had had serious economic consequences,(305) and the Chinese were in the unpleasant position of having their old economic system disrupted without gaining the advantages of a nationally organized economy in return. They had the actual privilege of consuming a greater variety of goods than before, but this was offset by the fact that the presence of these goods threw their domestic markets and old native commercial system out of balance, without offering a correspondingly large potentiality of foreign export. Furthermore, the political position of the Western powers in China was such, as Sun Yat-sen complained, that trade was conducted on a somewhat inequitable basis.

The consequences of a national economic revolution could not but be far-reaching. The political changes in the economic situation demanded by Sun Yat-sen in his program of economic nationalism—the return of tariff autonomy, the retrocession of the occupied concessions, etc.—would have a great positive and immediate effect; but there would be a long system of development, not to be so easily predicted or foreseen, which would inevitably appear as a result of Chinese nationhood. If China were to have a state strong enough to perform the economic functions which Sun wished to have imposed upon it, and were to take her place as one of the great importing and exporting nations of the world, it is obvious that a real economic revolution would have to be gone through.

Here again the liberal-national character of Sun’s ideology and programs with respect to relations with the West appears. The Fascist states of the present time exhibit a definite drift from free trade to autarchy. In China the change from an autarchic world-society to a trading nation constituted the reverse. Sun Yat-sen did not leave a large legacy of programs in this connection, but he foresaw the development and was much concerned about it.

The Industrial Revolution.

The program of industrial revolution was planned by Sun Yat-sen with great care. The same belief which led him to urge the social revolution also guided him in his plans for the industrial revolutionizing of the Chinese economy, namely, his belief that China could profit by the example of the West, that what the West had done wastefully and circuitously could be done by the Chinese deliberately and straightforwardly. He proposed that the change from the old economy to the new be according to a well thought out plan. “However, China must develop her industries by all means. Shall we follow the old path of western civilization? This old path resembles the sea route of Columbus’ first trip to America. He set out from Europe by a southwesterly direction through the Canary Islands to San Salvador, in the Bahama group. But nowadays navigators take a different direction to America and find that the destination can be reached by a distance many times shorter. The path of Western civilization was an unknown one and those who went before groped in the dark as Columbus did on his first voyage to America. As a late comer, China can greatly profit in covering the space by following the direction already charted by western pioneers.”(306) By calling in the help of friends who were familiar with engineering and by using his own very extensive knowledge of Chinese economic potentialities, Sun Yat-sen drafted a broad long-range plan by means of which China would be able to set forth on such a charted course in her industrial revolution. This plan, offered tentatively, was called _The International Development of China_ in the English and _The Outline of Material Reconstruction_ in the Chinese version, both of which Sun himself wrote.

This outline was originally prepared as a vast plan which could be financed by the great powers, who would thereby find markets for their glut of goods left over by the war. The loan was to be made on terms not unprofitable to the financial powers, but nevertheless equitable to the Chinese. Sun Yat-sen hoped that with these funds the Chinese state could make a venture into state socialism. It was possible, in his opinion, to launch a coöperative modern economy in China with the assistance of international capitalism, if the capital employed were to be remunerated with attractive rates of interest, and if the plan were so designed as to allow for its being financially worthwhile. He stated:

Before entering into the details of this International development
scheme four principles have to be considered:

1. The most remunerative field must be selected in order to
attract foreign capital.
2. The most urgent needs of the nation must be met.
3. The lines of least resistance must be followed.
4. The most suitable positions must be chosen.(307)

He was not oblivious to the necessity of making each detail of his plan one which would not involve the tying-up of unproductive capital, and did not propose to use capital advanced for the purposes of the industrial revolution for the sake of military or political advantage.

This may be shown in a concrete instance. He spoke of his Great Northeastern railway system as a scheme which might not seem economically attractive, and then pointed out that, as between a railway system running between densely-populated areas, the latter would be infinitely the more preferable. But, said he, “... a railway between a densely populated country and a sparsely settled country will pay far better than one that runs end to end in a densely populated land.”(308)

Even though he came to despair of having this scheme for the development of China carried out by international financial action, the expediency of his plans remained. He sought the fulfillment of this outline throughout his life; it has remained as a part of his legacy, challenging the Chinese people by the grandeur of its conception and the precision of its details.

It is a work which cannot easily be summarized in a discussion of political doctrines. Fully comparable in grandeur to the Russian _Piatiletka_, it provides for a complete communication system including all types of transport, the development of great ports, colonization and reclamation projects, and the growth of vast industrial areas comparable to the Donbas or the Kuzbas. The plan, while sound as a whole and not inexpedient in detail, is not marked by that irregularity of proportion which marks planning under capitalism; although not as fully worked out as the later Russian projects, Sun’s plan, in 1922, was considerably more advanced than any Russian plan of that time. Sun shared with Lenin a passionate conviction of the inevitable necessity of industrialization; but while Lenin saw in industrialism the strengthening of that revolutionary bulwark, the proletariat, Sun believed in industrialism as a benefit to the whole nation.

This plan is the obvious fruit of Sun’s advocacy of the adoption of the Western physical sciences. Here there is little trace of his ideological consistency with the old premises of Chinese society. He does not challenge them, but he does present a concrete plan which refers only incidentally to the political or the ideological. It is heavy with the details of industrial revolution. Sun Yat-sen’s enthusiasm shows clearly through the pages of this work; he wrote it at a time when his health was still comparatively good, and when he was not harassed by the almost explosive dynamics of the situation such as that in which he delivered the sixteen lectures on the _San Min Chu I_. Here the practical aspects of his thinking show forth, his willingness to consider and debate, the profound and quiet enthusiasm for concrete projects which animated him and which was so infectious among his followers.

It were, of course, unfeasable to attempt any detailed description and assessment of the plan.(309) The great amount of point by point elaboration worked over by Sun Yat-sen in order to make his plan appealing precludes the consideration of any one project in detail as a sample. Failing this, the magnitude of the plan may be gauged by a recapitulation of the chief points in each of his programs. It must be remembered, however, that each one of these subheads might necessitate hundreds of millions of dollars for execution, involving the building of several industrial cities or the reconstruction of a whole industry throughout the country. The printing industry, for example, not even mentioned in the general outline given below, was discussed as follows:

This industry provides man with intellectual food. It is a
necessity of modern society, without which mankind cannot
progress. All human activities are recorded, and all human
knowledge is stored in printing. It is a great factor of
civilization. The progress and civilization of different nations
of the world are measured largely by the quantity of printed
matter they turned out annually. China, though the nation that
invented printing, is very backward in the development of its
printing industry. In our international Development Scheme, the
printing industry must also be given a place. If China is
developed industrially according to the lines which I suggested,
the demand for printed matter will be exceedingly great. In order
to meet this demand efficiently, a system of large printing houses
must be established in all large cities in the country, to
undertake printing of all kinds, from newspapers to encyclopedia
[sic!]. The best modern books on various subjects in different
countries should be translated into Chinese and published in cheap
edition form for the general public in China. All the publishing
houses should be organized under one common management, so as to
secure the best economic results.

In order to make printed matter cheap, other subsidiary industries
must be developed at the same time. The most important of these is
the paper industry. At present all the paper used by newspapers in
China is imported. And the demand for paper is increasing every
day. China has plenty of raw materials for making paper, such as
the vast virgin forests of the northwestern part of the country,
and the wild reeds of the Yangtze and its neighboring swamps which
would furnish the best pulps. So, large plants for manufacturing
paper should be put up in suitable locations. Besides the paper
factories, ink factories, type foundries, printing machine
factories, etc., should be established under a central management
to produce everything that is needed in the printing
industry.(310)

With this comment on printing as a small sample of the extent of each minor project in the plans, let us observe Sun’s own summary:

I.
The Development of a Communications System.

(a)
100,000 miles of Railways.
(b)
1,000,000 miles of Macadam Roads.
(c)
Improvement of Existing Canals.

(1)
Hangchow-Tientsin Canals.
(2)
Sikiang-Yangtze Canals.

(d)
Construction of New Canals.

(1)
Liaoho-Sunghwakiang Canal.
(2)
Others to be projected.

(e)
River Conservancy.

(1)
To regulate the Embankments and Channel of the Yangtze
River from Hankow to the Sea thus facilitating
Ocean-going ships to reach that Port at all seasons.
(2)
To regulate the Hoangho Embankments and Channel to
prevent floods.
(3)
To regulate the Sikiang.
(4)
To regulate the Hwaiho.
(5)
To regulate various other rivers.

(f)
The Construction of more Telegraph Lines and Telephones and
Wireless Systems all over the Country.

II.
The Development of Commercial Harbors.

(a)
Three largest Ocean Ports with future capacity equalling New
York Harbor to be constructed in North, Central and South
China.
(b)
Various small Commercial and Fishing Harbors to be constructed
along the Coast.
(c)
Commercial Docks to be constructed along all navigable rivers.

III.
Modern Cities with public utilities to be constructed in all Railway
Centers, Termini, and alongside Harbors.
IV.
Water Power Development.
V.
Iron and Steel Works and Cement Works on the largest scale in order
to supply the above needs.
VI.
Mineral Development.
VII.
Agricultural Development.
VIII.
Irrigational Work on the largest scale in Mongolia and Sinkiang.
IX.
Reforestation in Central and North China.
X.
Colonization in Manchuria, Mongolia, Sinkiang, Kokonor, and
Thibet.(311)

The industrial revolution is to _min shêng_ what the present program of socialist construction is to the Marxians of the Soviet Union, what prosperity is to American democracy. Without industrialization _min shêng_ must remain an academic theory. Sun’s program gives a definite physical gauge by means of which the success of his followers can be told, and the extent of China’s progress estimated. It provides a material foundation to the social and political changes in China.

The theory of Sun Yat-sen in connection with the continuation of the old system is a significant one. His political doctrines, both ideological and programmatic, are original and not without great meaning in the development of an adequate and just state system in modern China. But this work might have been done, although perhaps not as well, by other leaders. The significance of Sun in his own lifetime lay in his deliberate championing of the cause of industrial revolution as the _sine qua non_ of development in China. In the epoch of the first Republic he relinquished the Presidency in favor of Yüan Shih-k’ai in order to be able to devote his whole time to the advancement of the railway program of the Republic. In the years that he had to spend in exile, he constantly studied and preached the necessity of modernizing China. Of his slogan, “Modernization without Westernization!” modernization is the industrial revolution, and non-Westernization the rest of his programs and ideology. The unity of Sun Yat-sen’s doctrines is apparent; they are inseparable; but if one part were to be plucked forth as his greatest contribution to the working politics of his own time, it might conceivably be his activities and plans for the industrial revolution.

He spoke feelingly and bitterly of the miserable lives which the vast majority of his countrymen had to lead, of the expensiveness and insecurity of their material existences, of the vast, tragic waste of human effort in the form of man-power in a world where machine-power had rendered muscular work unnecessary. “This miserable condition among the Chinese proletariat [he apparently means the whole working class] is due to the non-development of the country, the crude methods of production, and the wastefulness of labor. The radical cure for all this is industrial development by foreign capital and experts for the benefit of the whole nation.... If foreign capital cannot be gotten, we will have to get at least their experts and inventors to make for us our own machinery....”(312) Howsoever the work was to be done, it had to be done. In bringing China into the modern world, in modernizing her economy, in assuring the justice of the new economy which was to emerge, Sun found the key in the physical advancement of China, in the building of vast railway systems, in creating ports “with future capacity equalling New York harbor,” in re-making the whole face of Eastern Asia as a better home for his beloved race-nation.

The Social Revolution.

In considering the social revolution which was to form the third part of the program of _min shêng_, four questions appear, each requiring examination. It is in this field of Sun’s programs that the terms of the Western ideology are most relevant, since the ideological distinctions to be found in old China as contrasted with the West do not apply so positively in problems that are to appear in a society which is to be industrially modern. Even in this, however, some of the old Chinese ideas may continue in use and give relevance to the terms with which Sun discusses the social revolution. Private property, that mysterious relation between an individual and certain goods and services, has been almost a fetish in the West; the Chinese, already subject to the collectivisms of the family, the village and the _hui_, does not have the deep attachment to this notion that Westerners—especially those who do have property—are apt to develop. Consequently, even though the discussion of Sun’s programs with regard to distributive justice are remarkably like the discussions of the same problem to be found in the West, the possibility, at least, of certain minor though thoroughgoing differences must be allowed for, and not overlooked altogether. The four aspects to this problem which one may distinguish in Sun’s program for _min shêng_ are: what is to be the sphere of state action? what is to be the treatment accorded private ownership of land? what is to be the position of private capital? and, what of the class struggle?

Sun Yat-sen said: “In modern civilization, the material essentials of life are five, namely: food, clothing, shelter, means of locomotion, and the printed page.”(313) At other times he may have made slightly different arrangements of these fundamental necessities, but the essential content of the demands remained the same.

Behind his demand for a program to carry out _min shêng_ there was the fundamental belief that a government which does not assure and promote the material welfare of the masses of its citizens does not deserve to exist. To him the problem of livelihood, the concrete aspect of _min shêng_, was one which had to be faced by every government, and was a means of judging the righteousness of a government. He could not tolerate a state which did not assure the people a fair subsistence. There was no political or ethical value higher than life itself. A government which did not see that its subjects were fed, sheltered, clothed, transported, and lettered to the degree which the economic level of its time permitted, was a government deserving of destruction. Sun Yat-sen was not a doctrinaire on the subject of classes; he would tolerate inequality, so long as it could be shown not to militate against the welfare of the people. He was completely intolerant of any government, Eastern or Western, which permitted its subjects to starve or to be degraded into a nightmare existence of semi-starvation. Whatever the means, this end of popular livelihood, of a reasonable minimum on the scale of living for each and every citizen, had to prevail above all others.(314)

Within the limits of this supreme criterion, Sun Yat-sen left the government to its own choice in the matter of the sphere of state action. If the system of private initiative could develop more efficiently than could the government in certain fields, then leave those fields to private effort. If and when private initiative failed to meet rigid requirements to be established by the government it was not merely the privilege, it was the obligation of the government to intervene. Sun Yat-sen seems to have believed that government action would in the long run be desirable anyhow, but to have been enough of a political realist at the same time to be willing to allow the government a considerable length of time in expanding its activities. In a developing country like China it seemed to him probable that the ends of _ming shêng_ could best be served in many fields by private enterprise. “All matters that can be and are better carried out by private enterprise should be left to private hands which should be encouraged and fully protected by liberal laws....”(315)

From the outset, Sun Yat-sen’s plan of empirical collectivism demanded a fairly broad range of state action. “All matters that cannot be taken up by private concerns and those that possess monopolistic character should be taken up as national undertakings.”(316) This view of his may be traced, among others, to three suppositions he entertained concerning Bismarck, concerning "war socialism," and concerning the industrial revolution in China. Sun shows a certain grudging admiration for Bismarck, whom he believed to have offset the rising tide of democratic socialism in Germany by introducing state socialism, in government control of railroads, etc. “By this preventive method he imperceptibly did away with the controversial issues, and since the people had no reason to fight, a social revolution was naturally averted. This was the very great anti-democratic move of Bismarck.”(317) Secondly, he believed that the “... unification and nationalization of all the industries, which I might call the Second Industrial Revolution ...” on account of the world war would be even more significant than the first.(318) It intensified the four elements of recent economic progress, which tended to prove the falsity of the Marxian predictions of the future of capitalism, namely: “a. Social and industrial improvements (i. e. labor and welfare legislation); b. State ownership of the means of transportation and of communication; c. Direct taxes; d. Socialized distribution (the coöperative movement).”(319) Finally, Sun believed that the magnitude of the Chinese industrial revolution was such that no private capital could establish its foundations, and that the state had perforce to initiate the great undertakings of industrialism.

Concerning Sun’s beliefs regarding the sphere of state action in economic matters, one may say that his ideology of empirical collectivism required a program calling for: 1) the protection of private enterprise and the simultaneous launching of great state enterprises at the beginning; 2) the intermediate pursuance of a policy by means of which the state would be the guarantor of the livelihood of the people, and establish the sphere of its own action according to whether or not private enterprise was sufficient to meet the needs of the people; and 3) a long range trend toward complete collectivism.

With respect to the question of land, Sun Yat-sen believed in his own version of the “single tax,” which was not, in his programs, the single tax, since he foresaw other sources of revenue for the state (tariffs, revenue from state enterprises, etc.). According to the land-control system of Sun Yat-sen the land-owner would himself assess the value of his land. He would be prevented from over-assessing it by his own desire to avoid paying too high a tax; and under-assessment would be avoided by a provision that the state could at any time purchase the land at the price set by the owner. If the land were to go up in value the owner would have to pay the difference between the amount which he formerly assessed and the amount which he believed it to be worth at the later time. The money so paid would become “... a public fund as a reward, to all those who had improved the community and who had advanced industry and commerce around the land. The proposal that all future increment shall be given to the community is the ‘equalization of land ownership’ advocated by the Kuomintang; it is the _Min-sheng_ Principle. This form of the _Min-sheng_ Principle is communism, and since the members of the Kuomintang support the _San Min_ Principles they should not oppose communism.” Continuing directly, Sun makes clear the nature of the empirical collectivism of his _min shêng_ program, which he calls communism. “The great aim of the Principle of Livelihood in our Three Principles is communism—a share in property by all. But the communism which we propose is a communism of the future, not of the present. This communism of the future is a very just proposal, and those who have had property in the past will not suffer at all by it. It is a very different thing from what is called in the West ‘nationalization of property,’ confiscation for the government’s use of private property which the people already possess.”(320) Sun Yat-sen declared that the solution to the land problem would be half of the solution of the problem of _min shêng_.(321)

Sun Yat-sen believed in the restriction of private capital in such a way as to assure its not becoming a socially disruptive force. That is a part of his ideology which we have already examined. In the matter of an actual program, he believed in the use of “harnessed capital.”(322) He had no real fear of capital; imperialist foreign capital was one thing—the small native capital another. The former was a political enemy. The latter was not formidable. In a speech on Red Labor Day, 1924, when his sympathies were about as far Left as they ever were, in consideration for the kindliness of the Communist assistance to Canton, he said: “Chinese capitalists are not so strong that they could oppress the Chinese workers,”(323) and added that, the struggle being one with imperialism, the destruction of the Chinese capitalists would not solve the question.

The restriction of private capital to the point of keeping it harmless, and thus avoiding the evils which would lead to the class war and a violent social revolution, was only half the story of capitalism in China which Sun Yat-sen wanted told in history. The other half was the advancement of the industrial revolution by the state, which was the only instrumentality capable of doing this great work. “China cannot be compared to foreign countries. It is not sufficient (for her) to impose restrictions upon capital. Foreign countries are rich, while China is poor.... For that reason China must not only restrict private capital, but she must also develop the capital of the State.”(324) The restrictions to be placed upon private capital and upon private land speculation were negative; the development of state-owned capital and of capital which the state could trust politically were positive, as was the revenue which should be gained from the governmental seizure of unearned increment. In some cases the state would not even have to trouble itself to confiscate the unearned increment; it could itself develop the land and profit by its rise in value, applying the funds thus derived to the paying-off of foreign loans or some socially constructive enterprise.(325)

Ideologically, Sun Yat-sen was opposed to the intra-national class war. Class war could, nevertheless, be justified in the programs of Sun in two ways: 1) if it were international class war, of the oppressed against the oppressing nations; and 2) if it were the class war of the nationalist Chinese workers against foreign imperialism. In these two cases Sun Yat-sen thought class-war a good idea. He did not think class war necessary in contemporary China, and hoped, by means of _min shêng_, to develop an economy so healthy that the pathological phenomena of the class struggle would never appear. On the other hand, in justice to Sun, and to those Marxians who would apologize for him to their fellow-Marxians, there can be little doubt that Sun Yat-sen would have approved of the class war, even in China, if he had thought that Chinese capitalism had risen to such power that it obstructed the way of the Chinese nation to freedom and economic health. Even in this he might not have set any particular virtue upon the proletariat as such; the capitalists would be the enemies of the nation, and it would be the whole nation which would have to dispose of them.

A finically Scrupulous and detailed examination of Sun Yat-sen’s programs for _min shêng_ is intellectually unremunerative, since it has been established that _min shêng_ may be called empirical collectivism; collectivism which is empirical cannot be rigidly programmatic, or it loses its empirical character. Sun, not accepting the dialectics of historical materialism, and following the traditionally Chinese pragmatic way of thinking, could not orient his revolution in a world of economic predestinations. With the characteristic Chinese emphasis on men rather than on rules and principles, Sun Yat-sen knew that if China were ruled by the right sort of men, his programs would be carried through in accordance with the expediency of the moment. He does not appear to have considered, as do some of the left wing, that it was possible for the revolutionary movement to be diverted to the control of unworthy persons. Even had he foreseen such a possible state of affairs, he would not, in all probability, have settled his programs any more rigidly; he knew, from the most intimate and heart-breaking experience, how easy it is in China to pay lip-service to principles which are rejected. The first Republic had taught him that.

One must consequently regard the programs of national economic revolution, of industrial revolution, and of social revolution as tentative and general outlines of the course which Sun wished the Nationalist Kuomintang and state to follow in carrying out _min shêng_. Of these programs, the one least likely to be affected by political or personal changes was that of the industrial revolution, and it is this which is most detailed.(326) His great desire was that the Chinese race-nation continue, not merely to subsist, but to thrive and multiply and become great, so that it could restore the ancient morality and wisdom of China, as well as become proficient in the Western sciences.

A last suggestion may be made concerning the programs of Sun Yat-sen, before consideration of the Utopia which lay at the end of the road of _min shêng_. His plans may continue to go on in _min shêng_ because they are so empirical. His nationalism may be deflected or altered by the new situation in world politics. His optimism concerning the rapidity of democratic developments may not be justified by actual developments. The programs of _min shêng_ are so general that they can be followed to some degree by governments of almost any orientation along the Right-Left scale. The really important criterion in the programs of _min shêng_ is this: the people must live. It is a simple one to understand, and may be a great force in the continued development of his programs, to the last stage of _min shêng_.

The Utopia of _Min Shêng_.

Sun Yat-sen differs from the empirical collectivists of the West in that he has an end to his program, which is to be achieved over a considerable period of time. The means are such that he can be classified with those Western thinkers; his goal is one which he took from the ideals in the old ideology and which he identified with those of the communists, although not necessarily with the Marxists. He said, at the end of his second lecture on _min shêng_:

Our way is community of industrial and social profits. We cannot
say, then, that the doctrine of _min shêng_ is different from
communism. The _San Min Chu I_ means a government “of the people,
by the people, and for the people”—that is, the state is the
common property of all the people, its politics are participated
in by all, and its profits are shared by all. Then there will be
not only communism in property, but communism in everything else.
Such will be the ultimate end of _min shêng_, a state which
Confucius calls _ta t’ung_ or the age of “great similarity.”(327)

Perhaps no other passage from the works of Sun Yat-sen in relation to _min shêng_ could illustrate his position so aptly. He describes his doctrine. He labels it “communism,” although, as we have seen, it is quite another thing than Marxism. He cites Lincoln. In the end he calls upon the authority of Confucius.

To a Westerner, the ideal commonwealth of Sun Yat-sen bears a remarkable resemblance to the world projected in the ideals of the ancient Chinese. Here again there is “great similarity,” complete ideological harmony, and the presumable disappearance of state and law. Property, the fount of war, has been set aside, and men—animated by a profound and sincere appreciation of _jên_—work together, all for the common good. The Chinese will, in this Utopia, have struck down _might_ from the high places of the world, and inaugurated an era of _the kingly way_ throughout the earth. Their ancient doctrines of benevolence and peace shall have succeeded in bringing about cosmospolitanism.

There are, however, differences from the old order of ideals. According to the Marxists, nationality, after it has served its purpose as an instrument in the long class struggle, may be set aside. Speculation of this sort is rare among them, however, and it is difficult to envision their final system. To Sun Yat-sen, however, there was the definite ideal that the Chinese live on forever. This was an obligation imposed upon him and his ideology by the teleological element in the old ideology which required that humanity be immortal in the flesh and that it be immortal through clearly traceable lines of descent. The individual was settled in a genealogical web, reaching through time and space, which gave him a sense of certainty that otherwise he might lack. This is inconsistent with the Marxian ideal, where the family system, a relic of brutal days, shall have vanished.

The physical immortality of the Chinese race was not the only sort of immortality Sun Yat-sen wished China to have. His stress on the peculiar virtues of the Chinese intellectual culture has been noted. The Chinese literati had sought an immortality of integrity and intellect, a continuity of civilization without which mere physical survival might seem brutish. In the teleology of Sun’s ideal society, there would no doubt be these two factors: filial piety, emphasizing the survival of the flesh; and _jên_, emphasizing the continuity of wisdom and honor. Neither could aptly continue unless China remained Chinese, unless the particular virtues of the Chinese were brought once again to their full potency.(328)

The family system was to continue to the _min shêng_ Utopia. So too were the three natural orders of men. Sun Yat-sen never advocated that the false inequality of the present world be thrown down for the purpose of putting in its place a false equality which made no distinction between the geniuses, the apostles, and the unthinking. The Chinese world was to be Chinese to the end of time. In this the narrowness of Sun Yat-sen’s ideals is apparent; it is, perhaps, a narrowness which limits his aspirations and gives them strength.

The Chinese Utopia which was to be at the end of _min shêng_ was to be established in a world, moreover, which might not have made a complete return to ideological control, in which the state might still survive. The requirements of an industrial economy certainly presupposes an enormous length of time before the ideology and the society shall have been completely adjusted to the peculiarities of life in a world not only of working men but of working machines. The state must continue until all men are disciplined to labor: "When all these vagrants will be done away with and when all will contribute to production, then clothing will be abundant and food sufficient; families will enjoy prosperity, and individuals will be satisfied.

“Then the question of the ‘people’s life’ will be solved.”(329)

Thus Sun Yat-sen concluded his last lecture on _min shêng_.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

The bibliography of works in Western languages dealing with Sun Yat-sen is short. The author has made no attempt to gather various fugitive pieces, such as newspaper clippings. He believes, however, that the following bibliography of Western works on Sun is the most nearly complete which has yet appeared, and has listed, for the sake of completeness, two Russian items as yet unavailable in the United States.

The first half of the bibliography presents these Western materials, arranged according to their subject. Within each category, the individual items are presented in chronological order; this has been done in order to make clear the position of the works in point of time of publication—a factor occasionally of some importance in the study of these materials.

The second half of the bibliography lists further works which have been referred to or cited. The first group of these consists of a small collection of some of the more important Chinese editions of, and Chinese and Japanese treatises upon, Sun Yat-sen’s writings. The second group represents various Western works on China or on political science which have been of assistance to the author in this study.

Chinese names have been left in their natural order, with the patronymic first. Where Chinese names have been Westernized and inverted, they have been returned to their original Chinese order, but with a comma inserted to indicate the change.

A. Major Sources on Sun Yat-sen Which are Available in Western Languages.

I. Biographies of Sun Yat-sen.

Ponce, Mariano, _Sun Yat-sen, El fundador de la Republica de
China_, Manila, 1912.

A popular biography. Valuable for the period just before 1912.

Cantlie, James and Sheridan-Jones, C., _Sun Yat-sen and the
Awakening of China_, New York, 1912.

Also a popular work. Valuable for the description of Sun Yat-sen’s education.

Linebarger, Paul (and Sun Yat-sen), _Sun Yat-sen and The Chinese
Republic_, New York, 1925.

The only biography authorized by Sun Yat-sen, who wrote parts of it himself. A propaganda work, it presents the most complete record of Sun’s early life. Does not go beyond 1922.

Vilenskii (Sibiriakov), V., _Sun’ Iat-Sen—otets kitaiskoe
revoliutsii_, Moscow, 1925. The same, Moscow, 1926.

Not available.

Lee, Edward Bing-shuey, _Dr. Sun Yat-sen, His Life and
Achievements_ (English and French), Nanking, n. d.

A synopsis, by a spokesman for the Nationalist Party.

Wou, Saofong, _Sun Yat-sen, Sa Vie et Sa Doctrine_, Paris, 1929.

An excellent outline, largely from Chinese sources.

Restarick, Henry Bond, _Sun Yat-sen, Liberator of China_, New
Haven, 1931.

Useful for a description of Sun Yat-sen’s life in Honolulu, and of some of his overseas connections.

—— (R.-Ch. Duval, translator), _Sun Yat-sen, Liberator de la
Chine_, Paris, 1932.

de Morant, George Soulie, _Soun Iat-sènn_, Paris, 1932.

A romantic work based upon Chinese sources, and the Chinese translation of Linebarger’s work.

Linebarger, Paul; Linebarger, Paul M. A. (editor), _The Gospel of
Sun Chung-shan_, Paris, 1932.

Sharman, (Mrs.) Lyon, _Sun Yat-sen, His Life and Its Meaning, A
Criticall Biography_, New York, 1934.

The most complete biography of Sun Yat-sen. Well documented and prepared. Mrs. Sharman’s work will remain authoritative for many years to come. Its main fault is its somewhat hyper-sensitive criticism of Sun Yat-sen’s personality, with which the author never comes in contact.

Linebarger, Paul, _The Life of Sun Chung-san_, Shanghai, 1932.
Fragmentary proofsheets. See note in Preface.

Reissig, Paul, _Sun Yat Sen und die Kuomintang_, Berlin, n. d. A
Lutheran missionary tract.

II. Translations of the Sixteen Lectures on the _San Min Chu I_.

Anonymous, _The Three Principles_, Shanghai 1927.

Of no value.

Tsan Wan, _Die Drei Nationalen Grundlehren, Die Grundlehren von
dem Volkstum_, Berlin, 1927.

A translation of the lectures on Nationalism; excellent as far as it goes.

d’Elia, Paschal M., S. J. (translator and editor); _Le Triple
Demisme de Suen Wen_, Shanghai, 1929.

The only annotated translation. The style is simple and direct, and the notes accurate, for the most part, and informative. The uninitiated reader must make allowances for Father d’Elia’s religious viewpoints. This is probably the most useful translation.

Price, Frank W. (translator), Chen, L. T. (editor); _San Min Chu
I, The Three Principles of the People_, Shanghai, 1930.

The translation most widely known and quoted.

d’Elia, Paschal M., S. J., _The Triple Demism of Sun Yat-sen_,
Wuchang, 1931.

A translation of the French version.

Hsü, Leonard Shihlien; _Sun Yat-sen, His Political and Social
Ideals_, Los Angeles, 1933.

The most complete selection of the documents of Sun Yat-senism available in English. Dr. Hsü has assembled his materials remarkably well. His chapter “The Basic Literature of Sunyatsenism” is the best of its kind in English.

III. Other Translations of the Chinese Works of Sun Yat-sen.

Anonymous; _Zapiski kitaiskogo revoliutsionera_, Moscow, 1926.

Not available.

—— _Memoirs of a Chinese Revolutionary_, Philadelphia, n. d.

Not documented and apparently unreliable. English version of the above.

Wittfogel, Karl; _Sun Yat Sen, Aufzeichnungen eines chinesischen
Revolutionärs_, Vienna and Berlin, n. d. (ca. 1927).

The most complete Marxist critique, containing also an excellent short biography.

Tsan Wan; _30 Jahre Chinesische Revolution_, Berlin, 1927.

An excellent translation of one of the short autobiographies of Sun Yat-sen.

Wei Yung (translator); _The Cult of Dr. Sun, Sun Wên Hsüeh Shê_,
Shanghai, 1931.

Also referred to as _The Outline of Psychological Reconstruction_. It comprises a series of popular essays discussing the problems involved in modernization of the Chinese outlook, and presenting Sun Yat-sen’s theory of knowledge versus action.

IV. Works in English by Sun Yat-sen.

Sun Yat-sen; _Kidnapped in London_, Bristol, 1897.

Sun Yat-sen’s first book in English. Expresses his Christian, modernist, anti-Manchu attitude of the time.

—— _How China was Made a Republic_, Shanghai, 1919.

A short autobiography of Sun Yat-sen; see note in Preface.

—— _The International Development of China_, New York and London,
1929.

Sun Yat-sen’s bold project for the industrialization of China. First proposed in 1919, the work calls for a coördinated effort of world capitalism and Chinese nationalism for the modernization of China. Also called the _Outline of Material Reconstruction_.

V. Commentaries on the Principles of Sun Yat-sen.

Li Ti tsun; _The Politico-Economic Theories of Sun Yat-sen_.

This work has not been published, but portions of it appeared in the _Chinese Students’ Monthly_, XXIV, New York, 1928-1929, as follows: “The Life of Sun Yat-sen,” no. 1, p. 14, November, 1928; “The Theoretical System of Dr. Sun Yat-sen,” no. 2, p. 92, December 1928, and no. 3, p. 130, January 1929; and “The Sunyatsenian Principle of Livelihood,” no. 5, p. 219, March 1929. It is most regrettable that the whole work could not be published as a unit, for Li’s work is extensive in scope and uses the major Chinese and foreign sources quite skilfully.

Tai Chi-tao (Richard Wilhelm, translator); _Die Geistigen
Grundlagen des Sunyatsenismus_, Berlin, 1931.

An informative commentary on the ethical system of Sun Yat-sen. Tai Chi-tao is an eminent Party leader.

Antonov, K.: _Sun’iatsenizm i kitaiskaia revoliutsiia_, Moscow,
1931.

Not available to the author.

William, Maurice; _Sun Yat-sen Vs. Communism_, Baltimore, 1932.

A presentation, by the author of _The Social Interpretation of History_, of the influence which that work had on Sun; useful only in this connection.

Linebarger, Paul; Linebarger, Paul M. A. (editor); _Conversations
With Sun Yat-sen_, 1919-1922.

For comment on this and the following manuscript, see Preface.

Linebarger, Paul; _A Commentary on the San Min Chu I_. Four
volumes, unpublished, 1933.

Tsui, Shu-Chin, _The Influence of the Canton-Moscow Entente upon
Sun Yat-sen’s political Philosophy_, in _The Chinese Social and
Political Science Review_, XVIII, 1, 2, 3, Peiping, 1934.

A dissertation presented to Harvard University. Dr. Tsui covers the ground very thoroughly; his conclusions challenge the general belief that the Communists influenced Sun Yat-sen’s philosophy. Ranks with the works of Tai Chi-tao, Hsü Shih-lien, and Father d’Elia as an aid to the understanding of the Three Principles.

Jair Hung: _Les Idées Économiques de Sun Yat Sen_, Toulouse, 1934.

A doctoral thesis presented to the University of Toulouse, treating, chiefly, the programmatic parts of the principle of _min shêng_.

Tsiang Kuen; _Les origines économiques et politiques du socialisme
de Sun Yat Sen_, Paris, 1933.

A doctoral thesis presented to the University of Paris, which deals with the institutional and historical background of min sheng.

Li Chao-wei; _La souveraineté nationale d’après la doctrine
politique de Sun-Yet-Sin_, Dijon, 1934.

A doctoral thesis presented to the University of Dijon, concerning the four popular powers of election, recall, initiative, and referendum.

B. Chinese Sources and Further Western Works Used as Auxiliary Sources.

I. Chinese and Japanese Works by or Concerning Sun Yat-sen.

Anonymous; _Tsung-li Fêng An Shih Lu (A True Record of the
Obsequies of the Leader)_, Nanking, n. d.

Bai-ko-nan (Mei Sung-nan); _San-min-shu-gi To Kai-kyu To-so (The
San Min Chu I and the Struggle between Capitalism and Labor)_,
Tokyo, 1929.