Chapter XXXIII: Part IX: , p. 475, 1890), Dr. Johnstone Stoney, F. R. S., published an (23)

Dr. Gutberlet is the editor of the _Philosophisches Jahrbuch_, a Roman Catholic periodical. He belongs to that class of men who by partisans of free thought are regarded as especially dangerous. He is not as narrow as the common type of _defensores fidei_. He studies the works of modern savants “whose intellectual superiority,” as he confesses, he “admires in many respects.” He is broader than most of his _confreres_, and thus he makes the creed of his church appear broader than it practically is. We can see no danger in the appearance of such men. It is true, he will make converts among the educated, or at least, he will keep some wavering elements within the pale of the church; for the Roman church is, upon the whole, still very hostile to progress. But, on the other hand, such a man is in his circles a missionary of science; he will help to broaden the views of his brethren. He is learning, and they will learn from him.

P. C.

GRUNDZÜGE DER PHYSIOLOGISCHEN PSYCHOLOGIE. By _Wilhelm Wundt_. Leipsic: Wilhelm Engelmann. 1893.

Wundt’s “Physiological Psychology” is perhaps justly regarded as his best and most valuable work. We have just received the first part of the fourth edition and may expect that the second part will soon appear. We intend to review the whole work as soon as completed, and will state here only that this new edition contains, among many emendations and additions, an explicit account of the modern methods of psychological investigations, with descriptions and illustrations of the most important instruments invented for that purpose.

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VERGLEICHEND-ENTWICKELUNGSGESCHICHTLICHE UND ANATOMISCHE STUDIEN IM BEREICHE DER HIRNANATOMIE. 3. RIECHAPPARAT UND AMMONSHORN. Abdruck aus _Anatomischer Anzeiger_. By _Dr. L. Edinger_. (Jena: 1893. Gustav Fischer.)

Dr. Edinger proves in this essay that in the cerebral evolution of animals the cortex makes its first appearance in the formation of the cornu ammonis. This convolution being the centre of smell, it is more than merely probable that smell sensations, or something analogous to smell sensations, were phylogenetically the first psychical functions.

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ÉTAT MENTAL DES HYSTÉRIQUES LES STIGMATES MENTAUX. By _Pierre Janet_. Paris: Rueff & Co. 1892.

M. Pierre Janet, one of the most prominent disciples of Professor Charcot, presents in this little volume of two hundred and thirty-three pages a summary of the results of modern psychical research as it is understood at the Salpétrière. Charcot himself recommends the book to the medical profession. Janet investigates anæsthesia (Chap. I), amnesia, abulia, the diseases of motion, and the modifications of character. The author proposes to “describe the phenomena and endeavors to establish a rigorous determinism of their relations. The moral view of a diseased person,” he says, “ought to constitute a part of the clinical diagnosis while the psychical state must be closely investigated in its connection with physiological facts. This is the only way in which the physician can gain a knowledge of the entire man and understand the diseases which affect his organism.”

Professor Charcot states that Professor Janet’s researches on the mental state of hysterical persons were begun long ago and completed under his supervision; that they were expounded by M. Janet in the Spring of 1892 in a few lectures at the Salpétrière; that they tend to confirm the idea, often expressed in his own teachings, that hysteria is upon the whole a mental disease.

Hypnotism has long enough been regarded not only as harmless but even as a panacea for almost all the ailments of mankind. It would be well to heed Charcot’s warning, as hysterical diseases may be treated with better success, if the mystery that still surrounds them disappears before calm and scientific investigation.

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L’ÉCOLE D’ANTHROPOLOGIE CRIMINELLE. By _l’Abbé Maurice de Baets_. Gand: P. van Fleteren. 1893.

Dr. de Baets, Professor of Philosophy of the Gregorian University of Rome, Italy, and Secretary to the Bishop of Ghent, criticises in this elegantly printed little volume the modern school of criminal anthropology. He believes with Herbert Spencer that, if a great number of people accept certain errors, these errors must contain a kernel of truth. Professor de Baets says that he does not deny crime to be an outgrowth of the organism, to be inherited, to be closely connected with insanity, etc., but he cannot approve of criminal unaccountableness. The denial of responsibility, he says, is the denial of the wrong, and the denial of the wrong is the denial of morality. He sums up his view in italics on page 48: “Man is responsible for his acts in the measure that his acts depend on a free will.”

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AGAINST DOGMA AND FREE-WILL. By _H. Croft Hiller_. London: Williams and NORGATE. 1892.

The author has much to say against ecclesiasticism and sacerdotalism, and while he repudiates such men as Wundt and Ribot, he “begs to thank Drs. Weismann, Luys, and Ferrier from whose labors the views expressed in this treatise derive that scientific authentication without which they would be worthless.” The book is apparently a first venture into the stormy ocean of literary pursuits.

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF INDIVIDUALITY, OR THE ONE AND THE MANY. By _Antoinette Brown Blackwell_. New York and London: G. P. Putnam’s Sons. 1893.

The author trusts that she has “_demonstrated_ a conscious immortality.” In a former book of hers entitled “The Physical Basis of Immortality,” 1876, she propounded “the theory of persistent mind-matter individuals” which are to be conceived as ultimate atoms. The present volume of five hundred and nineteen pages is written to show that “this conception of the ultimate atoms could consistently explain and harmonise mental and material phenomena and by coördinated interpretations of the most diverse processes simplify and unify nature and her manifestations.” The theory of the correlation of matter and mind is accepted; “Nature,” the author says, “is nothing if not mathematical,” and there are many passages to which no monistic thinker would take exception. Along with them we find statements, e. g. on the rhythmic motion of atoms, etc., which it will be difficult to prove. Her peculiar view is characterised in the following sentence: “All ultimate individualities _may_ be identical in kind, but no obvious necessity decides that they _must_ be, and in an order of things where other varieties are prevalent, the weight of evidence for the present is on the side of varieties, even in the ultimate units.” The author’s theory (if we rightly understand her) has been tried before. Some suggestions of Goethe’s seem to indicate that he believed in soul-monads, and the German psychologist Herbart erected on the assumption of material soul-atoms his system of a mathematical psychology in which sound science was curiously mingled with improbable vagaries. The author of “The Philosophy of Individuality,” although apparently quite well informed otherwise, has, strange enough, not taken notice either of Goethe or of Herbart. Perhaps she would have abandoned her theory if she had been fully familiar with Herbartism and the critique which it has received; for Herbart’s soul-atoms are to-day regarded as a thing of the past.

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DIE GRUNDBEGRIFFE DER GEGENWART. By _Prof. Rudolf Eucken_. Leipsic: Veit & Co. 1893.

Prof. Rudolf Eucken discusses in this volume such topics as “Subjective—Objective”; “A priori—A posteriori”; “Monism—Dualism”; “Idealism, Realism, and Naturalism”; “Theoretical—Practical,” and so forth. It seems to us that Eucken has not yet fully succeeded in reconciling his philosophy with natural science. We are glad to notice that he has a critical eye for the shortcomings of naturalists under whose methods of classification and mechanical conceptions the properly spiritual of man would be eliminated. He is judicious in his exposition of the various problems, but we miss a final solution, such as would clearly state and recognise the truth in both. Nevertheless the book is sound, full of valuable information, and its perusal is to be recommended to every student of philosophy.

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THE ÆSTHETIC ELEMENT IN MORALITY. By _Frank Chapman Sharp, Ph.D._ New York: Macmillan & Co. 1893.

The book contains chapters on: (1) the theory of altruism; (2) the intrinsic worth of character; (3) an analysis of moral beauty; (4) an examination of the æsthetic method of ethics; and (5) the idea of obligation in æsthetics and ethics. The author’s knowledge of ethical theories appears to be limited. Duns Scotus, the Realist, is called a thoroughgoing Nominalist. In spite of such defects, we find much that is good in the book. In the end of his discussion the author says with truth: “When the element of the _good_, or that which is capable of clothing itself in the form of an ideal, is taken out of the conception of obligation, this latter degenerates into what is nothing more than mere submission to an arbitrary imperative....Prometheus, chained to the rocks for bringing the gift of fire to the wretched barbarous inhabitants of the earth, in defiance of the will of the ‘Father of gods and men,’ is one of the grandest productions of the human imagination, and were the Supreme Being such a one as Augustine and Calvin imagined him, we should despise the wretched slaves that licked the dust at his feet.”

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PERIODICALS.

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PSYCHOLOGIE UND PHYSIOLOGIE DER SINNESORGANE.

CONTENTS: Vol. V. Nos. 1 and 2.

DIE STABILITÄT DER RAUMWERTE AUF DER NETZHAUT. By _Franz
Hillebrand_.

UEBER EIN OPTISCHES PARADOXON. (Second Article.) By _Franz
Brentano_.

LITTERATURBERICHT. (Hamburg and Leipsic: Leopold Voss.)

This second article, “On an Optical Paradox,” is a rejoinder of Franz Brentano of Vienna to Th. Lipps. We gave an account of this interesting discussion in _The Monist_, Vol. III, No. 1, p. 153 et seqq. Professor Brentano insists on explaining the optical illusion concerning distances between two points, as seen in Fig. 1-3, by an overestimation of small and an underestimation of large angles. He complains of being misunderstood by Professor Lipps who substitutes “acute” for “small” and “obtuse” for “large”; for, says he, in comparisons both angles may be obtuse or both may be acute. Professor Brentano adds some more puzzling figures to prove his case; and, as in his first article, his propositions are ingenious and thought-stimulating; but his arguments do not suffice to convince us of the validity of his theory. We do not exactly intend to deny the general rule as to the overestimation of large and underestimation of small angles, but are inclined to believe that it will not serve as a sufficient explanation. We reproduce the most important figures devised by Brentano, and take the liberty of adding a few remarks and additional figures of our own.

Fig. 4 represents two right angles, one of which is divided into nine angles of 10° each. Brentano claims that we so overestimate the nine small angles as to take the undivided right angle as an acute one. I can only say that however much I have tried, I am not subject to the illusion.

In Fig. 5 we have on the straight line _AB_ a series of stations which are connected with a common centre. The line _AB_ is not a curve, but this figure reminds us of a perspective view of the sector of a circle. The drawing appears as the diagrammatic picture of a shield, the buckle of which is in _C_. Thus _AB_ is conceived as representing a curve. It does not seem that a comparison of the angles has anything to do with the illusion.

How much perspective interferes with the optical illusions under discussion, impresses itself upon my mind, when I think of figure 5 as the diagram of a mountain, rising above the plane _AB_. If I imagine I stand below the plane, which may be a high table-land, the line _AB_ appears to my eye straight. But when I imagine I am looking down upon the plane, the curvature of _AB_ becomes very strongly marked.

In Fig. 6 we can detect no optical illusion. The line _AB_ appears straight to us. The drawing reminds us of a sunrise on the ocean.

The same must be said about Figure 7. Brentano, in agreement with Lipps, claims that we are inclined to regard the distance between the ends of the two lines as larger than between the points. If there is any illusion at all, it seems to me, that on the contrary, the distance between the ends of the lines appears shorter. And why? We measure the distance by allowing our eyes to run from one point to the other and then comparing the measurements. This comparison is geometrically effected by combining the respective starting points, and thus judging as to the parallelism of these two lines mentally constructed. Whether or not the dots appear equidistant, depends upon the execution of all these operations. While directly measuring the distances between the points, we have an easier measurement where the lines are attached. The lines give to the points a certain vim; they almost appear to move with a velocity indicated by the length of the little lines, while the isolated dots present a very phlegmatic appearance.

In order to see what effects other positions of the lines produce, let us compare in Fig. 9 the several relations by covering the rest. If there is any illusion as to _a_ and _b_, we should say that the points of _a_ appear at a greater distance; as to _b_ and _c_, we see the greater distance in _c_, as to _c_ and _d_, we feel doubtful, while any comparison with _e_, tends strongly to convince us of their equal distance. The reason is obvious. The lines in _e_ assist us in drawing the parallels, which we consciously or unconsciously construct in order to compare the distances.

A comparison like that of α and β in Fig. 8, where the equal length of the combining lines is very apparent, induced Brentano to regard the illusion which is observed in Figures 1-3 as due to the angles. In our opinion he is mistaken. For the illusion actually takes place in α and β; only it is quickly corrected with the help of the parallels, which, as in ε, assist the imagination in making an exact comparison. When we place α and β either at a sufficient distance, or are somehow prevented from making use of the parallel lines, we shall have the same illusion as appears in Figures 1, 2, 3. To prove this, we have but to bring the figure α in a slanting position, as is shown in λ, and the illusion is so strong that many will find it difficult to believe that λ is an electrotyped duplicate of α.

The mooted illusions are not sense-illusions, but illusions of judgment; and we believe that the explanation of these curious phenomena must be sought in the elements which unconsciously enter into the make-up of our judgments.

Lipps says that lines are felt to be movements. If a line is continued, albeit with a slight declination, the motion appears “free and victorious,” aspiring beyond itself; while, if confined in the corner of an acute angle, it seems cut off and impeded. The victoriously progressive motion is overestimated; the checked motion is underestimated.

Brentano, in order to meet Lipps’s objections, proposes a few additional figures, of which we reproduce the most important ones in Fig. 10-14.

It seems to us that the main part which the angles play in these or any other similar figures, consists in leading our imagination astray. The parallel lines which we attempt to construct for our comparison, switch slightly off with an inclination toward the angles.

But that is not all; there are other elements that affect our judgment at the very outset. In measuring a distance we do something, and in looking at a diagram we think something. The diagram is suggestive of some reality to which we compare it. All these ideas, be they conscious, subconscious, or even unconscious, affect our judgment and are sometimes apt to lead it astray.

In addition we have to mention two things, the influence of which upon our verdict cannot be doubted; the one is the size of the entire figure, the other the vacuity of the distance to be measured: both tend to make the distance appear longer than it really is. To illustrate this, we add the three Figures 15, 16, 17 which contain no angles and yet show the same illusions.

The distance between the points in Figure 17 appears longer than in Figure 16, and in Figure 16 again longer than in Figure 15. The fact is, that before starting on our measurement-journey, we have in Figure 17 already traversed a good distance after having noted the extraordinarily lengthened boundary marks. The town _A_ may be exactly as far as the town _B_, yet the journey to _A_ will appear longer, if I have to ride an hour before I reach the station, while I may live opposite the terminus of the railroad to _B_.

When our eyes glide down from one point to the other, we pass in one case through an empty desert the dreariness of which is not interrupted. We almost lose our way and become lonesome in its monotony. If our way, however, is full of variations, we are pleasantly entertained and regard our journey as so much shorter. The contrast is most obvious in figure 10. The time-illusions as to the swiftness of hours of work or amusement and the slowness of moments of _ennui_ have become proverbial among all nations. The more dreariness, the more marked is the lengthening of the distance, while even a partial accompaniment shortens the traversed road.

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CONTENTS: Vol. V. Nos. 3 and 4.

THEORIE DES FARBENSEHENS. By _H. Ebbinghaus_.

UEBER DEN MUSKELSINN BEI BLINDEN. By _Paul Hocheisen_.

LITTERATURBERICHT. (Hamburg and Leipsic: Leopold Voss.)

VIERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT FÜR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE.

CONTENTS: Vol. XVII. No. 2.

EINIGES ZUR GRUNDLEGUNG DER SITTENLEHRE. (First Article.) By
_J. Petzoldt_.

KRITIK DER GRUNDANSCHAUUNGEN DER SOCIOLOGIE H. SPENCER’S. By
_P. Barth_.

WERTHTHEORIE UND ETHIK. (Second Article.) By _Chr. Ehrenfels_.
(Leipsic: O. R. Reisland.)

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY.

CONTENTS: Vol. V. No. 3.

ON ERRORS OF OBSERVATION. By _Prof. James McKeen Cattell_.

MINOR STUDIES FROM THE PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY OF CLARK
UNIVERSITY.

ON THE DISCRIMINATION OF GROUPS OF RAPID CLICKS. By _Thaddeus
L. Bolton_.

STATISTICS OF DREAMS. By _Mary Whiton Calkins_.

ON THE PRESSURE SENSE OF THE DRUM OF THE EAR AND “FACIAL
VISION.” By _F. B. Dresslar_.

ON REACTION-TIMES WHEN THE STIMULUS IS APPLIED TO THE REACTING
HAND. By _J. F. Reigart and Edmund C. Sanford_.

EXPERIMENTS UPON PHYSIOLOGICAL MEMORY BY MEANS OF THE
INTERFERENCE OF ASSOCIATIONS. By _John A. Bergström_.

A NEW INSTRUMENT FOR WEBER’S LAW; WITH INDICATIONS OF A LAW OF
SENSE MEMORY. By _James H. Leuba_.

A NEW PENDULUM CHRONOGRAPH. By _Edmund C. Sanford, Ph. D._

LABORATORY COURSE IN PHYSIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY. (Fourth Paper.)
By _Edmund C. Sanford, Ph. D._ (Worcester, Mass.: J. H. Orpha.)

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

CONTENTS: Vol. II. No. 3.

GERMAN KANTIAN BIBLIOGRAPHY. By _Dr. Erich Adickes_.

THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF NEO-KANTISM. By _Prof. Andrew Seth_.

MENTAL MEASUREMENT. By _Prof. J. McK. Cattell_.

BOOK REVIEWS. (Boston, New York, Chicago: Ginn & CO.)

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE.

CONTENTS: Vol. XVIII. No. 5.

PSYCHOLOGIE DU MUSICIEN. 1. L’EVOLUTION DES APTITUDES
MUSICALES. By _L. Dauriac_.

LA SOCIABILITÉ ET LA MORALE CHEZ LES ANIMAUX. By _Houssay_.

SUR LES IDÉES GÉNÉRALES. By _Marchesini_.

QUESTIONNAIRE SUR L’AUDITION COLORÉE, FIGURÉE ET ILLUMINÉE. By
_Gruber_.

L’ATTENTION ET LES IMAGES. By _F. Paulhan_.

UNE ILLUSION D’OPTIQUE. By _B. Bourdon_.

SCIENCE ET SOCIALISME. _G. Sorel_.

ANALYSES ET COMPTES RENDUS. (Paris: Félix Alcan.)

CONTENTS: Vol. XVIII. No. 6.

LA NOUVELLE THÉORIE DE L’HÉRÉDITÉ DE WEISMANN. By _Y. Delage_.

UN CALCULATEUR DU TYPE VISUEL. By _J.-M. Charcot and A. Binet_.

PSYCHOLOGIE DU MUSICIEN.—II. L’OREILLE MUSICALE. By _L.
Dauriac_.

REVUE DE MÉTAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE.

CONTENTS: Vol. I. No. 2.

LE MOUVEMENT ET LES ARGUMENTS DE ZÉNON D’ÉLÉE. By _G. Noël_.

LE PROBLÈME MORAL DANS LA PHILOSOPHIE DE SPINOZA. By _V.
Delbos_.

LE CONCEPT DU NOMBRE CHEZ LES PYTHAGORICIENS. By _G. Milhaud_.

LE DIALOGUE DANS L’ENSEIGNEMENT DE LA PHILOSOPHIE. By _C.
Mélinand_. (Paris: Librairie Hachette et Cie.)

CONTENTS: Vol. I. No. 3.

LES PRÉTENDUS SOPHISMES DE ZÉNON D’ÉLÉE. By _V. Brochard_.

SPIR ET SA DOCTRINE. By _A. Penjon_.

ESSAI SUR LE CARACTÈRE GÉNÉRAL DE LA CONNAISSANCE. By _G.
Remacle_.

PHILOSOPHISCHES JAHRBUCH.

CONTENTS: Vol. VI. No. 2.

BEGRIFF DER PHILOSOPHIE. By _Uebinger_.

DIE OBJECTIVITÄT UND DIE SICHERHEIT DES ERKENNENS. By
_Isenkrahe_.

DER BEGRIFF DES “WARREN.” (Concluded.) By _Franz Schmid_.

DER GRUNDPLAN DER MENSCHLICHEN WISSENSCHAFT. By _Bahlmann, S.
J._

HANDSCHRIFTLICHES ZU DEN WERKEN DES ALANUS. By _Bäumker_.
(Fulda, 1893.)