Chapter XVIII: Part IX: , p. 475, 1890), Dr. Johnstone Stoney, F. R. S., published an (8)

Ingenious as this theory is, and notwithstanding the elements of truth it possesses, we cannot accept it as conclusive. Its weakness is revealed in the last line of the paragraph just quoted. If only the world of appreciation embodies the thought of the Logos, what becomes of the world of fact? The latter is said to be the outer aspect of the former, a notion which is apparently derived from the association with man of body and mind. But the existence of mind, which we must understand by the term Logos, in nature, although declared by Professor Royce to be the only thing certain, is a mere inference, and even if the analogy of the human organism justifies such an inference; it would require that if priority has to be given to mind or matter in the universe it must be allowed to the latter. At birth a human being has no mind, properly so-called, since it is the result of the activity after birth of the organism, through the agency of the brain. It is true that the human body possesses from the first the elements of the mind, or rather of the feeling which thus exhibits itself; or, better still, the organic structure of which feeling is the general function. The utmost that can be properly asserted of the universe, therefore, is that it possesses a certain organic arrangement of its parts, and therewith such a condition of feeling, or, what in this relation would be a better term, sensitiveness, as is required by its organic character. In relation to such a state of things the terms thought, consciousness, reflection, have no meaning so far as we can judge. That organic aspect of the universe, moreover, leaves no room for duality. Just as the human organism constitutes a perfect unity, although it is made up of various organs and exhibits the properties attributed to both mind and matter, so must the universe be such a perfect unity whatever its nature and attributes. The human organism may, however, be strictly described as matter under organic conditions, a description which is equally applicable to the universe, without determining what those conditions are. Professor Royce objects to the Unknowable of Herbert Spencer, but there is very little practical difference between it and his own true Self, which, as the Absolute, is unknowable, although he is known in the inner self of man, as Spencer’s Unknowable is known in the human consciousness. Both Absolute and Unknowable are, however, merely names for Organic Nature, which is seen in all things visible and is known by all her operations. These are governed by the laws of her very existence, and it is the uniformity of which those laws are the expression which constitutes the moral law of the universe, the breach of whose eternal order, whether this is established in the world of matter or in the human mind, must be attended with consequences that are designated by man as evil. We find only a world of description, which is nevertheless one of moral order.

Widely as we disagree on the grounds stated with the conclusions of Professor Royce’s work, it is undoubtedly a valuable contribution to the discussion of the world-problem. Its description of the characteristics of the philosophy of Kant and of the German idealists is clear, though not intended to do more than exhibit the spirit of their teaching, and it is written in a style which renders it easy reading. It is a pity, therefore, that it is disfigured with such colloquialisms as _you’ll_, _isn’t_, _can’t_, _don’t_, words which neither sound well, nor look well in print.

Ω.

DIE ARISTOTELISCHE AUFFASSUNG VOM VERHÄLTNISSE GOTTES ZUR WELT UND ZUM MENSCHEN. By _Dr. Eugen Rolfes_. Berlin: Mayer & Müller. 1892.

This book is a scholastic “survival.” The author believes that Zeller’s interpretation of Aristotle is wrong, and in five formal theses he endeavors to prove _secundum artem_ that the philosopher was a theist who taught the creation of the world from nothing, and the immortality of the soul. In the defence of his theses he manifests some ingenuity and industry, but no criticism. The work has no scientific significance.

P. S.

MAX STIRNER UND FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE. Erscheinungen des modernen Geistes und das Wesen des Menschen. By _Robert Schellwien_. Leipsic: C. E. M. Pfeffer, 1892. Price 2 m 60 pf.

Individualism is the spirit of the age, and among all the champions of individualism the most original, the most consistent, the boldest, are perhaps Max Stirner and Friedrich Nietzsche. Robert Schellwien, in sketching their views in great outlines, partly admires these courageous thinkers who dare to draw the consequences of their principles to the very last even though they will appear absurd to the world, partly censures the rashness with which they arrive at, and the superciliousness with which they sometimes state, their opinions. Upon the whole the author succeeds in impressing the reader that there is in these two peculiar geniuses a gigantic strength, and that their views of truth, morality, and justice deserve a greater attention than they have received. The reviewer is no admirer of either Stirner or Nietzsche; he believes nevertheless that a careful analysis of their erratic minds and lives will be very instructive. It will be first of pathological and then even of more than pathological interest. The actual objective value of the ideals truth, morality, and justice, will be best illustrated by showing all the consequences of a consistent individualism. We hope that this pamphlet will grow into a more comprehensive work; and in that case we should advise the author to add short biographies of his heroes.

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THE SOURCES AND DEVELOPMENT OF KANT’S TELEOLOGY. By _James Hayden Tufts_. Chicago: University Press. 1892.

This little tract is an inaugural dissertation presented by Mr. Tufts to the University of Freiburg for the attainment of the doctorate of philosophy. It is written in English. Mr. Tuft’s dissertation is wholly historical. He simply seeks to expound Kant’s true views. In this respect the work bears the marks of much research and of a thorough exploitation of Kant’s works. Mr. Tuft’s concluding words are that “with every new discovery of science, every advance in the ideals of art and of the conduct of life, every development in religious faiths, comes anew the task for philosophy to criticise, and through criticism to make a fresh attempt to interpret from the unity of reason the manifold of life.”

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DISTINCTION AND THE CRITICISM OF BELIEFS. By _Alfred Sidgwick_. London: Longmans, Green, & Co. 1892.

This work might be described as an inquiry into the conflict between philosophy and common sense, and its central idea as the continuity of nature. What bearing this idea has on the inquiry is shown by the statement, that the distinction between philosophy and common sense is only one of degree. And yet, regarded as methods, or attempts to follow ideals, they may be sharply contrasted. This implies the existence of distinctions, and hence arises the question how far distinction is consistent with continuity in nature. The recognition of such a continuity requires the admission of the unreality of distinctness, but this fact is not inconsistent with the use of rough distinctions, which give rise to what the author terms effective ambiguity. Here we have the field of the operation of common sense, which exhibits itself as tact in the use of rough distinctions, while, on the other hand, philosophy may be said to be concerned with the continuity which, from a superficial glance, might be supposed to stand in opposition to distinction.

The ultimate result which Mr. Sidgwick has in view is the reconciliation of philosophy and common sense, although it is incidental to his main purpose, which is the discussion of the best way of dealing with ambiguity, that is, of using rough distinctions. The improvement suggested is the substitution of “reasoned discrimination” for “haphazard tact,” and it is based on the doctrine that “the validity of all distinctions is relative to the purpose for which they are used at the time.” This cannot mean that distinction is merely relative, as it is said that there is no distinction which is quite safe against being broken down. The implication is that a safe distinction is possible, although difficult to find, and consistently with that view, the doctrine has the double aim of repressing excessive belief in distinctions which are, at least for the moment, invalid, and, on the other hand, of “enabling us to justify for a passing purpose, distinctions which are faulty on the whole.” The justification here arises from the use, and not from the distinctions themselves, although it is evident there must be some basis for them, or they would be invalid. The element of truth is derived from the continuity of nature, with which philosophy is concerned, and hence the improvement in the method of common sense is to be effected through its regulation by the method of philosophy.

The justice of this view may be tested by its consequences, which are stated by the author in reviewing the chief incidental aims of his book, as being those which have to do with controversy, the faults of language, and the conflict between the rival ideals, faith and doubt. “Philosophy,” we are told, “is doubt, just as science is knowledge,” (a description which like many other things in this book we cannot endorse,) and the true centre of philosophical interest in regard to rival ideals is “to harmonise the dispute by seeking how to limit each ideal by its opposite.” This is the aim of all real philosophy, which recognises that every ideal has an element of truth. Philosophy is thus explanation, and Mr. Sidgwick avers one of the great dividing forces in philosophy has always been “the rivalry between two opposite methods of general explanation—that which explains small things by great ones, the part by the whole, the many by the one (e. g. all earthly facts as related to their one cause and substance); and that which explains great things by small ones, the whole by its parts, the one by the many (e. g. the system of nature as a ‘concourse of atoms’).” Thus regarded, the distinction between philosophy and common sense is simply one of method; and it may be said to consist in the use by the former of rational doubt based on scientific knowledge, as distinguished from the belief founded on popular wisdom which distinguishes the latter. Both alike, however, are the fruit of observation, pushed further, nevertheless, in the one case than in the other, which is practically the view expressed by the author.

In considering the nature of philosophy, we have given the gist of Mr. Sidgwick’s reflections on controversy, which is treated as the opposition of ideals. This conflict is kept alive chiefly by doubt as to how abstract notions should be applied in concrete cases, and largely owing to “the absence of that kind of sharp distinction which is applicable, not only to the notions themselves, but to the actual facts to which they pretend to refer.” This view is ably enforced, as well as the necessity of applying to the conflict between ideals the rule laid down as to the purposive validity of distinctions. The operation of this rule would be attended with concession instead of assumption, there being, however, the admission, which is equivalent to an assumption, that neither side of any ideal dispute is devoid of some truth as well as some error. This is really required, if not by the continuity of nature, yet by continuity in our interpretation of nature. This is continuity in thought, and hence arises the difficulties connected with language which it is one of the author’s incidental aims to point out. He supposes that language acts as a drag on the progress of knowledge, owing to the _clumsiness_ of words arising from the fact that “things spoken of are always more full of change and movement than the words we can use in speaking of them.”

Mr. Sidgwick insists upon continuity, yet change itself may be evidence of at least partial discontinuity. Our author remarks, in an appendix note on the continuity of nature, that every change, as such, is a _saltus_, however small it may be, and that the same is true of any gap between the two extremes of nature and the intermediate region. That such an intermediate region exists, is required by the continuity of nature, which again is evidence of change, on the principle that every chain is made up of a series of links. But as in the chain there is no real gap between the links, so there is no actual discontinuity consequent on change in nature. The two extremes may be regarded as prolongations of the intermediate region, and the changes to which such prolongation is due may so occur that there may be discontinuity between certain parts, as between the fibres of which a hempen rope is made, and yet there be a perfectly continuous whole. We have an example of such a discontinuous _continuum_ in a beam of ordinary light, which presents not the slightest gap, and which yet is made up of numberless undulations in different ratios representing the six spectrum colors, each of which is, moreover, spread throughout the whole of the beam. Here we see that continuity is quite consistent with distinction. The latter may be regarded as discrimination of the various phases of the former, and the distinction remains valid or otherwise according to the accuracy of the discrimination or not. But constant change of distinction is required by progress in knowledge which may be regarded as a thought representation, by discontinuous steps, of the continuity of nature.

As to the conflict between faith and doubt, the author considers the function of scepticism as the search for grounds of belief, and thus doubt is said to be “rather a friend than an enemy to those who remember that there is still some truth, on any subject, for fallible men to learn,” as well as to those who are more interested in the discovery of truth than in supporting their own beliefs.

Ω.

VORLESUNGEN ÜBER GEOMETRIE, unter besonderer Benutzung der Vorträge von Alfred Clebsch. By _Dr. Ferdinand Lindemann_. Leipsic: B. G. Teubner. 1891.

This first part of the second volume of Alfred Clebsch’s Lectures has been arranged and treated by Professor Lindemann in the same way as the first, except perhaps that the editor has extended his independent investigations rather further than before, owing mainly to the fact that he had in addition to his own notes when attending Professor Clebsch’s lectures in 1871-1872, only five folio pages of the late master’s manuscript at his disposal. The present volume is divided into three parts. I. The Point, Plane, and Straight Line. II. Surfaces of the Second Order and of the Second Class. III. Fundamental Conceptions of Projective and Metrical Geometry. Historical notices and references are added in foot-notes. Considering the prominence of the editor as a mathematician, it would be a presumption on our part to praise his work.

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AN INTRODUCTION TO GENERAL LOGIC. By _E. E. Constance Jones_. London: Longmans, Green, & Co. 1892.

This work is another witness of the great interest now being taken in all that pertains to the methods of knowledge.

Miss Jones, the author, is lecturer on logic at Girton College, Cambridge. During an experience of several years in teaching, certain difficulties have very forcibly pressed themselves upon her attention. She hopes by her book to aid in removing these difficulties.

It is certainly a good augury for women when their intellectual representatives begin to show the disposition to turn towards the “dry light.” Logic and mathematics are “dry” to be sure; that is, they are very apt to be _found_ dry, very dry, by beginners, and always by those who lack that real intellectual robustness which is alone fit to meddle with fundamental problems. Hence these sober and severe disciplines find little favor among those who seek merely for “showy” attainments, those to whom whatever is “uninteresting” is intolerable, and those who regard obscurity as inseparable from profundity. When then we find scholarly women manifesting a real relish for this “dry light,” it gives promise of a coming day when the intellectual appetite will rise above the level of mere entertainment, the level of the playhouse and the circus, and take kindly, and perhaps zealously, to real edification.

Miss Jones makes but very modest claims on behalf of her treatise. She has not undertaken to innovate to any great extent upon the regular scheme. If in her changes there is that which might especially provoke criticism, it is perhaps in the nomenclature which she adopts. The traditional logic forms a system which has its own proper merits and defects. It is of great historical interest, and its regular terminology is almost indispensable for the proper illustration of its doctrines.

We think also that the author fails to state the case in all its amplitude, when, she lays it down as one of the most absolute and ultimate of all logical principles that the self-evident ought to be believed. The truth is, as we conceive it, that the self-evident is sure to be believed, and that in the face of any proposition that truly bears its own justification along with it, any doctrine of logic is either useless or impertinent.

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HYPNOTISMUS UND SUGGESTION. By _W. Wundt_. Leipsic: Wilhelm Engelmann. 1892.

A Greek student translates κλεινός ‘small’; “You are thinking of the German _klein_,” says the teacher quickly. Another renders ἡμείς γὰρ ἁγνοί, ‘we are lambs,’ misled by a chance cross association with the Latin _agni_. Every careful self-observer knows that there is no combination of memories, images, and resultant incipient acts too absurd for some moments of confusion and mental fatigue. We account for such confusions of thought by citing parallel cases and adding generally that normal associations are liable to disintegration and abnormal recombination in fatigued or excited conditions of the brain. If we seek a causal scientific explanation, two methods are open to us: (1) we may attempt to map out in detail and describe for all similar cases the pathways of association, or (2) we may endeavor to define their physiological conditions and accompaniments in the nervous system. The first leads us at once into the metaphysics of the unconscious. The second method, when we attempt to pass from a general to a specific correspondence, leads to a hypothetical restatement of the observed psychological facts in terms of the latest cerebral anatomy and physiology Now all serious scientific thinkers are fast coming to the conclusion (on which Wundt’s book is based) that the phenomena of dreams and of hypnotism are to be explained by the general laws of association as revealed especially in the confused and obstructed associations of the normal state. The critical and destructive part of Wundt’s sensible and timely work has two aims: (1) to discriminate the attested phenomena of hypnotism from the alleged phenomena of thought-transference, telepathy, and “possession” on which no serious student will waste his words; and (2) to point out the confusions of thought in current explanations of hypnotic phenomena, which either confine themselves to restatements of the observed facts in terms of a hypothetical anatomy, or at any rate in Wundt’s opinion base their physiological hypotheses on an inadequate psychological analysis. His own constructive work is an attempt to supply the missing analysis and accompany it with the most plausible physiological theory that our imperfect science allows. Dreams and the illusions of the hypnotic subject are doubtless explicable generally as derangements of the associative machinery. But they are specific forms of abnormal association, the special characteristics of which we wish to define. Suggestion, Wundt says (with James), is association accompanied by a “limitation of consciousness to the images aroused by the association.” The scientific problem is: _Wie entsteht die Einengung des Bewusstseins?_ This narrowing of consciousness manifests itself in a diminished sensibility to all impressions outside of the suggestions. Dreams show the same features, accidental impressions of sense or changes in the nutritive processes here taking the place of direct suggestions from without. But in sleep and dreams the limitation of consciousness is conditioned by general fatigue of the nervous system. In the hypnotic state it results not from fatigue, but from neuro-dynamic and vaso-motor changes in the distribution of tensions in the brain. Hence the superior intensity and vividness of the presentations that are allowed to develop themselves. This altered equilibrium of the forces of the brain is brought about by the suggestions of the operator, which are generally guided by him to a more or less definite end. The resulting derangements of normal associations are consequently less lawless than is the case in dreams. On these principles Wundt explains the chief facts of hypnotism as follows: Automatic obedience to the commands of the operator results simply from the fact that every idea tends to realise itself in action, is an incipient act; and in the narrowed consciousness of the hypnotic subject the idea suggested by the operator finds no competitors in the struggle for existence as a reality. This explanation (which is really as old as Spinoza) accounts also for positive hallucinations—there are no reductors, as Taine would say. Negative hallucinations (the non-existence of an existing door) may be explained sometimes by a contradictory positive hallucination (as of a curtain covering the door) more often in the same way as hypnotic analgesia by the familiar analogy of our insensibility to the toothache when the attention is elsewhere strongly engaged. This is favored by the generally diminished sensibility of the hypnotic subject. Post-hypnotic suggestions are associations depending on partial memories, such as we have in the normal state when we merely recall an image or an object without time-and-circumstance localisation. The subject who is to execute a post-hypnotic suggestion at 7 o’clock is reminded by the striking of the clock of an image of a thing to be done which the original command of the operator associated with the stroke of seven. All else is forgotten. When the time limit is not thus definitely marked, the process must be analogous to that whereby some persons are able to waken at a predetermined hour in the morning. A latent association is aroused into full activity by naturally recurring conditions of internal physiological processes or external surroundings. Courtesy or prudence are perhaps all that prevent the best explanation of certain extreme cases being the old one: “the boy lied.” Wundt rejects the claim that suggestion is the experimental method in psychology _par excellence_, for the very sufficient reason that the phenomena experimented with are only very partially in the control of the operator and are furthermore mainly pathological. He is far from disputing the practical efficacy of hypnotic therapeutics in functional disorders, but he regards the hypnotic sleep as a dangerous remedy, the employment of which should be limited to trained practitioners. The subjection of the hypnotic subject to the will of the hypnotiser is _a priori_ an immoral relation to obtain between man and man unless justified by superior medical necessities, but, quite apart from _a priori_ ethics, indiscriminate hypnotisation is to be discouraged as a direct cause of nervous degeneration. The book closes as it began With a dignified but severe reprobation of those thinkers who in the interests of occultism magnify the psychological significance of hypnotism and disseminate superstition in the name of science.

PAUL SHOREY.

DER HYPNOTISMUS IN GEMEINFASSLICHER DARSTELLUNG. By _Dr. Hans Schmidkunz_. Stuttgart: A. Zimmer (E. Mohrmann). 1892.

This book (266 pp.) is a popular compendium of hypnotism. The author, beginning (I) with the hypnosis of common life, goes over the whole field as follows: (II) the phenomena of hypnosis, (III) its application, (IV) the “beyond” of hypnotism, (V) the conceptions of hypnotism, and (VI) its dangers. The seventh and last chapter is a short history of the subject.

Dr. Schmidkunz, Docent of philosophy at the University of Munich, is one of the few who believe that there is a “beyond” in hypnotism. He says on p. 65: “A hypnotised person was led through a room while sleeping. The experimenter made a few passes over his head and then violently whirled his arm around in a vertical direction before his subject. When the subject approached the marked place, he recoiled from it crying with pain.” Our author asks, “what is this magnetic wall to be regarded as? As a charm, as an obstacle of occult power, from which the body recoils as from a wall of stone? If not, was it the subject’s soul that recoiled? Was it the hypnotised person’s belief which created the wall?” etc. The two interpretations, the one attributing the effect to a magnetic power, the other to suggestion are typical. The former is bolder: he goes “beyond” hypnotism.

Our author is one of those who go beyond hypnotism, and is not satisfied with the theory that suggestion explains all. We may add that he regards telepathy as a sufficiently established fact. Telepathy finds little support among scientists in Germany, and Dr. Schmidkunz complains, in a circular letter to “Professor Wundt’s and other Savants’ Critical Saltomortales” of the cool and depreciative treatment which his book _Psychologie der Suggestion_ received at the hands of men of science.

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L’HYPNOTISME DEVANT LES CHAMBRES LEGISLATIVES BELGES. Par _J. Delbœuf_. Paris: Félix Alcan. Pp. 80.

In a recent number of _The Monist_ Prof. J. Delbœuf gave the reasons which have induced him to come to the conclusion that “persons in an hypnotic condition preserve at least a sufficient portion of their intelligence, their reason, together with freedom of action, to prevent them from committing deeds that neither their conscience nor their habits approve of.” This opinion is entertained by many other hypnotists, but the more general opinion is that “suggestion” may be made use of for criminal purposes: Such is the case especially in France and in Belgium; and acting on that supposition the medical faculty of the latter country promoted in the legislative Chamber a law interdicting public hypnotic séances, and reserving the practice of hypnotism as a therapeutic measure exclusively to medical men, as well as the treatment of insane persons and those under twenty-one years of age. Professor Delbœuf, who is not a medical man, naturally objects when those who but a few years ago would have classed him and his fellow hypnotists as charlatans, seek without reason to reserve for themselves the promising field of labor opened up by the researches of others. He maintains that men are born hypnotisers as they are born artists, and therefore to exclude all but medical men from the application of the hypnotic power will often prevent its use for curative purposes. Moreover it is a serious question for those who possess this natural gift. They might perform the most praiseworthy actions and yet be subjected to a legal penalty. Professor Delbœuf states that by hypnotism he cured a youth eighteen years of age of a mania for stealing (_la manie du vol_), and thus saved him from unmerited dishonor. On another occasion he had charge of a young wife who was possessed with the idea of murdering her children, and after all other means had failed he was able to remove the idea by suggestion extending over a period of eight days. He properly asks whether the performance of such actions ought to be treated as criminal.

The real question to be considered, however, is whether the practice of hypnotism is likely to be made use of for criminal purposes if it is permitted to every one. We much doubt whether any actual case of such an abuse has been legally established, or whether suggestion could lead to the perpetration of a criminal act unless there was a predisposition in that direction. Professor Delbœuf makes use, however, of an apparent paradox which would seem to render abortive any such law of prevention as that above referred to. It is that there is in reality no such thing as hypnotism. M. Bernheim writes in a letter given in the present work, “for my part, in the thousands of hypnotisations I have practised, I have never seen the least inconvenience result. Undoubtedly very impressionable subjects can, under the emotional influence of auto-suggestion, present certain nervous troubles; but these a prudent operator can always calm by suggestion.” Professor Delbœuf relates several cases of this kind within his own experience, which shows that severe nervous pain can be removed by simple assertion that it does not exist. He affirms that “the so-called hypnotic sleep is only a sign of suggestibility, and that it is not at all necessary to suggestive therapeutics.”

We may conclude this notice of a very interesting contribution to the discussion as to the true nature and operation of hypnotism, by quoting the conclusions arrived at by the author as to the proper mode of regulating its practice. He suggests that representations of hypnotism should be permitted subject to the measures which regulate public spectacles; that any one should be allowed to become a hypnotiser, as he can become a shampooer or a truss-maker; that the hypnotist who gives remedies should be punishable, since he exercises the art of curing without a diploma; that he should not be allowed to hypnotise minors without the consent of the family; and that he should be forbidden to treat a sick person without the written authorisation of a medical man and under his direction. This rule Professor Delbœuf, although he disapproves of the law which forbids the practice of medicine to those who have not a diploma, has always acted on. He thinks that if medical men then studied hypnotism and practised it themselves, hypnotisers who had no diplomas would soon have nothing to do. This spirited defence by Professor Delbœuf of his views will be widely read. Not the least interesting portion of it is the criticism, with which it ends, of “the affair of the brothers Vandevoir,” where we read that he is designated by his opponent M. Masoin “_doux et bon vieillard_” and “_l’homme cheveu_”!

Ω.

UEBER DEN HAUTSINN. By _Dr. phil. et med. Max Dessoir_, Privatdocenten an der Universität zu Berlin. Separat-Abzug aus Archiv für Anatomie und Physiologie. Physiologische Abtheilung. 1892.

This pamphlet, a reprint from the _Archiv für Anatomie und Physiologie_ of 1892, is an elaborate and careful investigation into the _modus operandi_ of skin sensations. The first part is a discussion of the theory of sensation in general containing (1) an analysis of the ideas _Gefühl_, _Empfindung_, and _Wahrnehmung_, (2) a critique of Johannes Müller’s doctrine of specific energies, (3) an exposition of the objectification of sensations. Feeling (_Empfindung_), according to the author, is, no magnitude, its main feature is intensity, quality becomes important only in sensation (_Wahrnehmung_). For the psychology of skin-sensations, we have to note the great influence of accompanying feelings (_Mitempfindungen_). The second part is devoted to the author’s investigations of the sense of temperature. Dr. Dessoir rejects Blix’s point theory; he regards the idea of two different end-apparatuses for warm and cold sensations as an unfounded assumption, and claims that the temperature sense is one mode of sensation possessing two qualities. The intensity of temperature sensations depends not only upon the _vis viva_ of the heat in the stimulus; but also upon five other factors (1) the size of the surface affected, (2) the duration of the affect, (3) the thickness of the epidermis, (4) its conductibility, and (5), last not least, its temperature.

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RECHERCHES D’OPTIQUE PHYSIOLOGIQUE ET PHYSIQUE. By _Clémence Royer_. Brussels Imprimerie Veuve Monnom. 1892.

The first part of this brochure consists chiefly of an examination of the theories of M. M. Hirth and Chauveau on chromatic sensation. The talented authoress disagrees with the view entertained by M. Chauveau, that the sensations of contrast which are fused cerebrally, so as to give, when viewed with both eyes, a white image, are subjective in an intellectual sense. The result is purely physico-physiological, as it is even assuming the intervention of M. Hirth’s _interior eye_. Mad. Royer regards the eyes organised so as to effect a fusion of the colors and forms depicted on the two retinas, and she accepts the conclusion of M. Hirth, that they lessen the real polychromism of objects, the inability to perceive the infra-red and the ultra-violet rays concealing from us a considerable part “of the palette of nature and of its chromatic scale.” The authoress refers with approval to the theory of M. Charpentier that the complementary colors correspond to inverse undulatory phases, which are destroyed by interference in the field of vision.

The second part of Mad. Royer’s pamphlet is devoted to a consideration of the photography of colors, and the theory of light. It points out that the photography of colors, which has been effected to some extent by M. Lippmann, must be a physical and not a chemical process. It is the result of the periodic compressions of the sensitised silver-surface, due to the shocks it receives from the light undulations of the ether, which so modify the surfaces of the silver atoms that they reflect colored rays identical with those received from the object photographed. With reference to the propagation of light, the authoress affirms that the atoms of matter, as well as those of the ether, which differs from matter only in being imponderable and without inertia, are centres of emanation of a continuous and impenetrable fluid, which is however indefinitely expansible or compressible. The size and form of atoms will thus depend on the compressions they receive, and they will be able to accommodate themselves to the spaces to which they are confined by the resistance of the atomic groups by which they are surrounded. But the world may be regarded as consisting of three sorts of atoms: (1) those of the ether which possess their primordial unity of expansive force and are endowed with perfect elasticity; (2) those of ponderable matter, which have lost a portion of their expansive force and elasticity; (3) those which are called vitaliferous, because they have regained their expansive force, and are thus capable of autonomous movements necessary to resist the compressions of the ether and to oppose the inertia of matter. They thus answer to the cell-souls of Haeckel.

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DIE BEWEGUNG DER LEBENDIGEN SUBSTANZ. Eine vergleichend-physiologische Untersuchung der Contractionserscheinungen. By _Max Verworn_, Dr. med., Privatdocent der Physiologie an der Universität Jena. Mit 19 Abbildungen. Jena: Gustav Fischer, 1892.

The mechanism of muscle contraction and expansion and the motions of amœboid substance have been recognised as one and the same problem; and several naturalists, foremost among them Hofmeister, Engelmann, and Edmund Montgomery have investigated it, fully aware of the enormous importance of the subject. The present pamphlet is small, it contains only 103 pages, but it contains the statement of the problem, a description of the author’s experiments, and his solution so lucidly that one cannot read it without great satisfaction. Both processes, expansion as well as contraction, are, according to Verworn, spontaneous motions, and both are to be explained by chemotropy. Expansion, i. e., in amœba the protrusion of pseudopodia, is due to the plasma’s hunger for the oxygen, which is contained in the surrounding medium. Every irritation (electric shocks, concussions, injuries etc.) causes a chemical decomposition of the oxygenised plasma; it loses carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen, (as we know from the waste products, carbonic acid, creatine, lactic acid,) and these substances are exactly those which are most prominent in building up living substance. Irritations without exception cause the plasma to return to the nucleus. The chemical change in the plasma makes it hungry for the nuclear substances. The vital process, accordingly, is an interaction between the nucleus, the plasma, and the medium, so that in the constant exchange of materials the old structure is preserved; and the fundamental features of the vital process are first the plasma’s chemotropy for oxygen, causing centrifugal motions, and then its chemotropy for nuclear substance, causing centripetal motions. The plasma saturated with nuclear substances, shows a chemotropy for the oxygen of the medium; it moves in a centrifugal direction, and the oxygenised plasma has become so unstable that it breaks down on the slightest provocation. The decomposed plasma exhibits a chemotropy for nuclear substance and thus returns in contripetal motions to the centre. Without entering into details we may mention that this accounts also for the fact that dying protoplasm always assumes a globular shape, until it crumbles to pieces. The _rigor mortis_ is the last vital action of living substance. The plasma seeks once more the nuclear substance, but not finding sufficient material for being built up again into a substance endowed with a chemotropy for oxygen remains rigid until it decays.

The author finds his theory to hold good for the actions of the striated and nonstriated muscles, and also of ciliated tissues. Having shown that the vital functions are due to the same forces that are observable in the retort of the chemist, he adds: “The savage accordingly was not quite wrong when he drew no distinct line, considering everything moving as alive. Life is motion. That old poetical view of all nature being animated with life throughout was in possession of a germ of truth, and our proud civilisation has actually made a retrogressive step in abandoning this view.”

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GRABER’S LEITFADEN DER ZOOLOGIE FÜR DIE OBEREN CLASSEN DER MITTELSCHULEN. Vienna and Prague: F. Tempsky. 1892. Price 1 fl. 60 kr.

We had occasion in a recent number of _The Monist_ to review an excellent text-book of physics published by this same house. The present work on zoology is in its second edition, and is intended, like the above-mentioned work of Professor Mach’s, for high-school instruction. Professor Graber, its author, died before the completion of the second edition, and the work was finished by J. Mik.

Graber’s Zoology is unique in its class; it covers, within the restricted limits of two hundred and sixty-one pages, the whole field of elementary biology, human physiology, and zoology, as it is usually exploited in such books, and thus combines in a single volume what is usually contained in two or three. The human organism (Part 1) is made the starting-point of study in the work, and the explication of the physiological and mechanical functions of animals are thus all grouped about this central figure. In a concise form (55 pages) this book contains about all of human anatomy and physiology that is usually learned in high-schools. Part 1 also contains, at the end of the discussions, brief dietetic suggestions. “Systematic Zoology” is taken up in the Second Part. This part is well analysed and arranged. The cuts are also excellent. Attached to the book is a “Picture-Atlas.” This atlas contains a number of colored plates, which depict various physiological and anatomical organs, and also four beautiful representations of scenes from the Naples Aquarium. Although this book will not be used by English school-students, it may be recommended to students of scientific German who wish a good introduction into the technical vocabulary of German biology and zoology, which to the foreigner is very difficult.

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L’ANTHROPOLOGIE DU BENGALE. By _Paul Topinard_. Extracted from _L’Anthropologie_ for May-June, 1892. Paris: G. Masson.

The present contribution to the science of Anthropology by the Editor of _L’Anthropologie_, is based on the anthropometric inquiries of Mr. H. H. Risley made under instructions from the government of Bengal. The conclusions deduced by Dr. Topinard from the large mass of material brought together by Mr. Risley, and which relates to members of all the castes to be met with in Bengal, are of great interest. He finds that the populations are much mixed, but that they may be divided into three types, one tall and dolichocephalic, that of the Aryans; another short and brachycephalic, derived from northern Asiatics; and the third short and dolichocephalic, or that of the native blacks. India is a world by itself, and most of its inhabitants belong to races of which there is no specimen in Europe. Dr. Topinard naturally attaches more importance to physical than to ethnographical characters as evidence of anthropological descent, and he is justified by Mr. Risley’s researches, of which he speaks very highly; although he thinks they would have been more fruitful if the anthropometrical instructions prepared by the French Anthropologist had been more strictly adhered to. That they were not so is the more surprising as Mr. Risley’s work is dedicated to Dr. Topinard himself.

Ω.

UEBER SITTLICHE DISPOSITIONEN. By _Dr. Anton Oelzelt-Newin_, Privatdocent an der Universität in Bern. Graz: Leuschner & Lubensky. 1892. Price Mk. 2 70 Pf.

The main idea of this book is to prove that there are certain innate dispositions forming the elements of morality. The elements of morality are according to Dr. Oelzelt-Newin the attitudes of fear, anger, love, sympathy, shame, and pride. Conscience is a complex which has developed from these six dispositions. Having stated sufficient evidences for the heredity of moral dispositions and illustrated the parallel phenomena of bodily states in their reference to moral alienation, the author treats the six elements of morality in single chapters, explaining their causes and the influence of conditions under which they develop either into virtues or crimes. The essay (92 pp.) is a contribution to that ethical determinism which regards evil as the necessary result of given factors. “Religious people should say: Not Only the stone which falls from the roof and kills a just man, but also the will of a criminal and the punishment of the judge are inscrutable ordinances of God. That alone is a true theodicy.” As an optimist the author trusts that the evil of the world will be conquered with legal means and enjoins priests to revise in this sense their creed, jurists their law, and all men their love of mankind.

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THE BEAUTIES OF NATURE. And the Wonders of the World We live in. By Sir _John Lubbock_. New York: Macmillan & Co. 1892. 429 pages. Price $1.50.

NATUR UND KUNST. Studien zur Entwicklungsgeschichte der Kunst. By _Carus Sterne_. Berlin: Verein für deutsche Literatur. 1892.

The first of these two books is a delightful compilation by Sir John Lubbock. It is another addition to that series of popular works which this well-known naturalist is now giving to English-speaking peoples. It makes no pretension of being scientific: it simply takes the world which science has revealed and shows us its wonders and its beauties. Yet it insinuates many a scientific fact and inculcates many a moral lesson. No one will regret the few hours that can be spent in its perusal, and the stimulus derived from it will heighten the pleasure which every religiously-minded heart takes in the contemplation of natural grandeur and truth. In the main, it is intended for unscientific readers. It requires hardly any preparatory knowledge to be understood; yet it sometimes touches on a truth that even great thinkers overlook. Thus, _à propos_ of the capacity for intact divisibility which some life-forms possess, Sir John remarks that these considerations introduce “much difficulty into our conception of the idea of an Individual.” “In fact,” he says, “the realisation of the idea of an individual gradually becomes more and more difficult, and the continuity of existence, even among the highest animals, gradually forces itself upon us. I believe that as we become more rational, as we realise more fully the conditions of existence, this consideration is likely to have important moral results.” The work is divided into the following chapters: “Animal Life,” “Plant Life;” “Woods and Fields,” “Mountains,” “Water,” “Rivers and Lakes,” “The Sea,” “The Starry Heavens.”

The second of the two books that head this review is by Carus Sterne. Few men possess the wide technical knowledge and the same command of the historical literature of his subject, that this investigator and writer possesses. Carus Sterne unites with a rigorous scientific training the rare qualities of philosophical insight and sound erudition. He possesses the scientific facts on which to base valid judgments, and he deduces from these facts the inferences that affect the most important problems of life—its culture and morality. We have had occasion before, to refer to these phases of Carus Sterne’s activity as an author.

In the present work the author of _Werden und Vergehen_ discusses the relations which obtain between nature and art. Here is not the place to give even a synopsis of the great wealth of material which this book of 395 pages contains; we are allowed simply to hint at its purport and methods. Carus Sterne defines the artistic impulse in man to be a longing of the mind to rise above the ordinary routine of physical existence. It is a lifting ourselves out of our every-day life. This cannot be accomplished by the simple reproduction of the things of nature; such reproductions have not in themselves an elevating effect. Art is not imitative, art is creative. It uses color, form, space, merely as a means to give “local habitation” to an idea. The imitation of actually existing things is the beginning of art; but it is its lowest stage. Nature must be our guide, our norm, not our model. Here the middle road is taken between the old and the new idea of art. That was ultra-idealistic, this is ultra-realistic. The author then proceeds to discuss the notion of beauty in art and nature (Part I) and finally takes up generally (Part II) the subject of the artistic contemplation and reproduction of the world. All these topics, with their many subdivisions, are treated in Carus Sterne’s best and most fascinating style. The work is well illustrated, and all interested in the natural history of art will find in it a storehouse of valuable material.

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FOOTNOTES:

[58] Cf. Ward, _Encyclopædia Britannica_, Vol. XX, p. 44.

PERIODICALS.

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PSYCHOLOGIE UND PHYSIOLOGIE DER SINNESORGANE.

CONTENTS: Vol. IV. No. 3.

UEBER DIE SOGENANNTE CONSCIENCE MUSCULAIRE (DUCHENNE). By _A.
Pick_.

EINE NEUE THEORIE DER LICHTEMPFINDUNGEN. By _Christine
Ladd-Franklin_.

LITTERATURBERICHT. (Hamburg and Leipsic: Leopold Voss.)

Mrs. Christine Ladd Franklin (a contributor to this number of _The Monist_) is one of those few women who have actually won a well deserved reputation as a thinker and scientific worker. She is an American by birth and the wife of an American savant. It is pleasant to find her name in a German periodical among whose editorial writers are men so prominent as Ebbinghaus, König, Exner, Helmholtz, Hering, Kries, Lipps, G. E. Müller, Pelman, Preyer, and Stumpf. Mrs. Ladd criticises Helmholtz and Hering, and thinks that the theories of Donders (in Gräfe’s “Archiv,” 1884) and Göller (in Du Bois-Reymond’s “Archiv,” 1888) have not received sufficient attention. In accord with their propositions, she sets forth an exceedingly simple hypothesis which attempts an explanation of the three main colors by atomic motions in the three different dimensions of space.

PHILOSOPHISCHE MONATSHEFTE.

CONTENTS: Vol. XXVIII. Nos. 9 and 10.

UEBER DIE GRUNDFORMEN DER VORSTELLUNGSVERBINDUNG.
Psychologische Studie. (Concluded.) By _M. Offner_.

DER BEGRIFF DER VERSCHMELZUNG UND DAMIT ZUSAMMENHÄNGENDES IN
STUMPF’S “TONPSYCHOLOGIE,” BAND II. By _Th. Lipps_.

WERKE ZUR PHILOSOPHIE DER GESCHICHTE UND DES SOCIALEN LEBENS
(Third Article: _J. S. Mackenzie_, An Introduction to Social
Philosophy; _J. H. Ferguson_, The Philosophy of Civilisation;
_W. A. Macdonald_, Humanitism). By _F. Tönnies_.

CONTENTS: Vol. XXIX. No. 1 and 2.

DIE MODERNE ENERGETIK IN IHRER BEDEUTUNG FÜR DIE
ERKENNTNISSKRITIK. By _K. Lasswitz_.

DIE SITTLICHE FRAGE EINE SOCIALE FRAGE (I). By _F. Staudinger_.

RELIGIONSPHILOSOPHISCHE THESEN. By _E. von Hartmann_.

LITTERATURBERICHT. (Berlin: Dr. R. Salinger.)

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PHILOSOPHIE UND PHILOSOPHISCHE KRITIK. Vol. 101. No. 1.

CONTENTS:

PSYCHOLOGISCHE APHORISMEN. By _Otto Liebmann_.

UNTERHALB UND OBERHALB VON GUT UND BÖSE. By _Eduard von
Hartmann_.

JAHRESBERICHT ÜBER ERSCHEINUNGEN DER ANGLO-AMERIKANISCHEN
LITTERATUR AUS DER ZEIT VON 1890-1891. By _Friedrich Jodl_.

ZUR BEGRÜSSUNG DES ZWEITEN HUNDERTS DER BÄNDE DIESER
ZEITSCHRIFT. By _Prof. Dr. Rud. Seydel_.

RECENSIONEN. (Leipsic: C. E. M. Pfeffer.)

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY. October, 1892. Vol. V. No. 1.

CONTENTS:

DISTURBANCE OF THE ATTENTION DURING SIMPLE MENTAL PROCESSES. By
_Edgar James Swift_.

PSEUDO-CHROMESTHESIA, OR THE ASSOCIATION OF COLORS WITH WORDS,
LETTERS, AND SOUNDS. By _William O. Krohn_, Ph. D.

REPORT ON AN EXPERIMENTAL TEST OF MUSICAL EXPRESSIVENESS. (Part
II.) By _Benjamin Ives Gilman_.

The present investigation made by Mr. Edgar James Swift shows that a disturbance of the attention through sight is more effective in lengthening the reaction time than when the disturbance comes through the sense of hearing; but whenever the reaction follows a slight sensation, the time of choice is less affected by disturbances of the attention than if the excitation is a sound. Dr. William O. Krohn concludes, after carefully studying several hundred cases of pseudo-chromesthesia, that a greater per cent. of them arise from some sort of cerebral work due to the close relation of the cortical centres. Mr. Gilman concludes from experiments made with various persons, that musical expressiveness has been overestimated, and that on the emotional theory of its nature the importance of the art has also been overestimated. (Worcester: J. H. Orpha.)

MIND. New Series. No. 4. October, 1892.

CONTENTS:

THE FIELD OF ÆSTHETICS PSYCHOLOGICALLY CONSIDERED, II. By
_Henry Rutgers Marshall_.

LOTZE’S ANTITHESIS BETWEEN THOUGHT AND THINGS, II. By _A.
Eastwood_.

THE STUDY OF CRIME. By _Rev. W. D. Morrison_.

ON THE PROPERTIES OF A ONE-DIMENSIONAL MANIFOLD. By _Benj. Ives
Gilman_.

In his present article Mr. H. R. Marshall finds a basis for the differentiation of Æsthetics from Hedonics, in “pleasure permanency in revival” as belonging particularly to the former. Mr. Eastwood criticises Lotze’s antithesis between thoughts and things which is closely connected with his erroneous opinion that time is a property of things in themselves. The study of crime by Mr. W. D. Morrison discusses crime under the three heads of the movement of crime, its causes, and its repression, of which the last deals with the theory, the methods, and the efficacy of punishment. In his discussion of the properties of a one-dimensional manifold, examples of which are time, the straight line, quantity, intensity, number, and pitch, Mr. B. I. Gilman, who was a pupil of Mr. C. S. Peirce, seeks to give a formulation of one-dimensionality in which the general notion of relation and converse relation is substituted for that of greater and less difference. This number of _Mind_ contains a voluminous note on the blind deaf-mute child, Helen Keller, by Prof G. C. Robertson, the late editor, whose death is announced in the same number. (London: Williams & Norgate.)

Ω.

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS. October, 1892. Vol. III. No. 1.

CONTENTS:

THE NATIONAL TRAITS OF THE GERMANS AS SEEN IN THEIR RELIGION.
By _Prof. Otto Pfleiderer_, D. D., University of Berlin.

PHILANTHROPY AND MORALITY. By _Father Huntington_.

INTERNATIONAL QUARRELS AND THEIR SETTLEMENT. By _Leonard H.
West_, LL. D., London University.

1792.—YEAR 1. By _David G. Ritchie_, Jesus College. Oxford.

UTILITARIANISM. By _A. L. Hodder_.

BOOK REVIEWS.

(Philadelphia: _International Journal of Ethics_, 118 S.
Twelfth Street.)

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

CONTENTS: Vol. I. No. 5.

PSYCHOGENESIS. By _President David J. Hill_.

THE PROBLEM OF EPISTEMOLOGY. By _Professor Andrew Seth_.

THE ORIGIN OF PLEASURE AND PAIN, (II.) By _Dr. Herbert Nichols_.

DISCUSSIONS: REALITY AND “IDEALISM.” By _F. C. S. Schiller_.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS.

SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

CONTENTS: Vol. I. No. 6.

GREEN’S THEORY OF THE MORAL MOTIVE. By _Prof. John Dewey_.

THOUGHT BEFORE LANGUAGE. By _Prof. William James_.

PLEASURE-PAIN, AND SENSATION. By _Henry Rutgers Marshall_.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS.

SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

(Boston. New York, Chicago: Ginn & Company.)

THE NEW WORLD. December, 1892. Vol. I. No. 4.

CONTENTS:

THE BRAHMO SOMAJ. By _Protap Chunder Mozoomdar_.

THE FUTURE OF CHRISTIANITY. By _William M. Salter_.

PROGRESSIVE ORTHODOXY. By _Egbert C. Smyth_.

MICHAEL SERVETUS. By _Joseph Henry Allen_.

THE PRESENT POSITION OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH. By _G.
Santayana_.

THE CHURCH IN GERMANY AND THE SOCIAL QUESTION. By _John Graham
Brooks_.

A WORLD OUTSIDE OF SCIENCE. By _Thomas Wentworth Higginson_.

THE BIRTH AND INFANCY OF JESUS. By _Albert Réville_.

THE MONISTIC THEORY OF THE SOUL. By _James T. Bixby_.

The last article is a criticism to the point, discriminating and fair. The author takes special notice of Dr. Carus’s position, whose views are recapitulated with accuracy, but not accepted as convincing. (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, & Co.)

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE.

CONTENTS: September, 1892. No. 201.

LA PERSONNALITÉ DANS LES RÊVES. By _J.-.M. Guardia_.

HISTOIRE ET PHILOSOPHIE RELIGIEUSES. By _M. Vernes_.

SUR LA TERMINOLOGIE PHILOSOPHIQUE. By _Durand (de Gros)_.

COMPTES RENDUS ET NOTICES BIBLIOGRAPHIQUES.

CONTENTS: October, 1892. No. 202.

DU TROUBLE DES FACULTÉS MUSICALES DANS L’APHASIE. By _Dr.
Brazier_.

LE DÉVELOPPEMENT DE LA VOLONTÉ. (Concluded.) By _A. Fouillée_.

LE MOUVEMENT PÉDAGOGIQUE. By _E. Blum_.

ANALYSES ET COMPTES RENDUS.

REVUES DES PÉRIODIQUES ÉTRANGERS.

CONTENTS: November, 1892. No. 203.

LA PSYCHOLOGIE DE W. JAMES. By _L. Marillier_.

DE L’UNITÉ DE LA SCIENCE: LES GRANDES SYNTHÈSES DU SAVOIR. By
_E. de Roberty_.

SUR LES DIVERSES FORMES DU CARACTÈRE. By _Th. Ribot_.

VARIÉTÉS.

ANALYSES ET COMPTES RENDUS.

REVUE DES PÉRIODIQUES ÉTRANGERS. (Paris: Félix Alcan.)

PHILOSOPHISCHES JAHRBUCH. Vol. V. No. 4.

CONTENTS:

DIE NEUESTE PHASE DES SCHOPENHAUERIANISMUS. (Concluded.)
_Bäumker._

DIE SPECULATIVEN GRUNDLAGEN DER OPTISCHEN WELLENTHEORIE.
(Concluded.) _S. J. Linsmeier._

RELIGION UND ENTWICKELUNGSTHEORIE. (Concluded.) _Schanz._

DER SUBSTANZBEGRIFF BEI CARTESIUS IM ZUSAMMENHANG MIT DER
SCHOLASTISCHEN UND NEUEREN PHILOSOPHIE. (Continued.) _S. J.
(C.) Ludewig._

RECENSIONEN UND REFERATE. (Fulda: Fuldaer Actien-Druckerei.)

VOL. III. APRIL, 1893. NO. 3.

THE MONIST.

RELIGION AND MODERN SCIENCE.

I.