Chapter XXXII: Appendix: I

'"_December 21st_, 1893.

'"Dear Mr. Balfour,

'"I have been thinking over the matter which you mentioned in the
tea-room yesterday. I am absolutely convinced of your own detachment
from party in connection with it, and I write as one not likely at
any time to act generally in connection with your party, unless in
the (I hope most improbable) event of doubtful or unfortunate war.

'"The suggestion that I am inclined to make is that a letter should
be written, to be signed by Sir George Chesney as a Conservative, by
myself as a Gladstonian Liberal, by Arnold-Forster as a Liberal
Unionist, and Spenser Wilkinson as a civilian expert, to Mr.
Gladstone as Prime Minister, you and Chamberlain as leaders of your
parties in the House of Commons, and Lord Salisbury and the Duke of
Devonshire as leaders of the same parties in the House of Lords;
that a copy should be sent by me confidentially to the Prince of
Wales, it not being right, of course, that we should in any way
address the Queen; that this letter should not be made public either
at the time or later; that this letter should press for the joint
consideration of the naval and military problem, and should point to
the creation of a Defence Ministry, of which the War Office and the
Admiralty would be the branches, or to a more active control of the
Secretary of State for War and the First Lord of the Admiralty by
the Prime Minister personally. We should be put in our places by Mr.
Gladstone, but I fancy, probably, not by the other four.

'"I had sooner discuss this matter first with you, if you think
there is anything in it, than with Chamberlain, because he is, oddly
enough, a much stronger party man than you are, and would be less
inclined (on account of national objects which to him are
predominant) to keep party out of his mind in connection with it. I
have not, therefore, as yet mentioned the matter to him. If you
think ill of the whole suggestion, and are not even disposed to
suggest modification of it, it can be stopped at the present point.

'"The addition of Spenser Wilkinson to a member of each party is
because I owe to him the clearing of my own mind, and believe that
he is probably the best man on such questions who ever lived, except
Clausewitz. When I first wrote upon them in _The Present Position of
European Politics_ in 1886-87, and in _The British Army_ in 1887-88,
I was in a fog--seeing the existing evils, but not clearly seeing
the way out. In the Defence chapter of _Problems of Greater Britain_
I began to see my way. Admiral Colomb, and Thursfield of _The
Times_, who are really expositors of the application to our naval
position of the general principles of military strategy of
Clausewitz, helped me by their writings to find a road. I then set
to work with Spenser Wilkinson, whose leaders in the _Manchester
Guardian_ (which he has now quitted, except as an amateur) struck me
as being perfect, to think out the whole question; and we succeeded,
by means of a little book we wrote together--_Imperial Defence_,
published in February, 1892--in afterwards procuring the agreement
of Lord Roberts in views widely different in many points from those
which Lord Roberts had previously held. We are now in the position
of being able to declare that in naval particulars there is no
difference of opinion among the experts, and that in military there
is so little upon points of importance that the experts are
virtually agreed. This is a great point, never reached before last
year, and it is owing to Spenser Wilkinson, and in a less degree to
Arnold-Forster, that it has been reached.

'"The question of the length at which the proposed letter should
develop the existing dangers and the remedies is, of course,
secondary.

'"The dangers are much greater than even the alarmist section of the
public supposes. For example, the public have not in the least
grasped the fact that we were on the brink of war with France at the
moment of the Siam blockade, nor have they realized the great risk
of the fall of the monarchy in Italy and of a complete change in
Italian policy, leading more or less rapidly to an alliance with
France and Russia. The adoption of Lefevre's policy by the Liberal
party, which is possible at any time, and the announcement that we
do not hope to hold the Mediterranean, might attach to the Franco-
Russian combination even the present advisers of King Humbert.

'"With regard to Siam, neither the English nor the French Government
dare publish the despatches which passed about the blockade, and
they have not been able to come to an agreement as to what portion
of the papers should be published, although both Governments have
long since promised publication. The words used in the House of
Commons by Sir Edward Grey were altered by the French Government
into meaningless words, and the words actually used excluded by
Governmental action from every newspaper in France."'

[Footnote: On December 25th, 1913, M. d'Estournelles de Constant
wrote to the _Frankfurter Zeitung_ an article warning Europe against
the chance of war breaking out, not because it is desired, but "by
chance, by mistake, by stupidity," and he cited an instance from his
experiences in 1893:

"The stage was Siam, where British India and French Indo-China were
seeking to push, one against the other, their rival spheres of
influence. Lord Dufferin, British Ambassador in Paris and ex-Viceroy
of India, was upholding the British claim, but it was in London that
the negotiations were carried on. The irreparable conflict broke out
on the day when the French Admiral, the bearer of an ultimatum,
anchored his ships in the very river of Bangkok. I was negotiating,
but during this time the British Government telegraphed to the
Admiral commanding the Pacific station to proceed also to Bangkok
with his whole fleet, which was far superior in numbers to ours.

"I knew nothing about it; no one knew anything about it. I was
negotiating, and it was war almost to a certainty without anybody
suspecting it. I only knew this later. Happily, wireless telegraphy
did not then exist, and the orders of the Admiralty did not reach in
time the British squadron, which was then sailing somewhere in the
Pacific. Thanks to this chance delay, the negotiations had time to
come to a successful conclusion, and the agreement was concluded."]

On the same day Dilke received the following reply:

"I shall be most pleased to have a further conversation with you on
the all-important subject on which we had a brief talk yesterday,
and which is dealt with in your letter of to-day.

"I should like, however, to discuss the matter first with Lord
Salisbury (whom I shall see to-morrow), and, if you will allow me,
to show him your letter.

"I may, however, say at once that I have _always_ been in favour of
a Defence Committee of Cabinet, with expert advisers and permanent
records carrying on the work from Government to Government; and
that, oddly enough, I pressed the idea on Asquith last week. I think
he and Rosebery would be in favour of the plan; not so the older
members of the Cabinet."

'On Friday, January 5th, 1894, I had a long interview with Balfour
upon my letter, and wrote on it to Wilkinson as follows:

'"_Confidential_.

'"76, Sloane Street, S.W.,
'"_January_ 5_th_, 1894.

'"Dear Wilkinson,

'"I saw Balfour (in a full discussion) this afternoon. We
provisionally agreed, with Lord Salisbury's consent, that Sir George
Chesney, Arnold-Forster (if he agrees), you, and I, should sign a
letter which we should address (with the view to publishing it with
the replies) to Mr. Gladstone as Prime Minister and leader of my
party, to Lord Salisbury and to Balfour as leaders of Sir George
Chesney's party, and to the Duke of Devonshire and Chamberlain as
leaders of Arnold-Forster's party, and of which I should privately
send a copy to the Prince of Wales in the hope of its reaching the
Queen. In this letter we should press for the joint consideration of
the naval and military problem, and point either to the creation of
a Defence Ministry, of which the War Office and Admiralty would be
the branches--to which the objection is that Parliamentary consent
would be necessary--or to a more active control over the Secretary
of State for War and the First Lord of the Admiralty, and their
Estimates, by the Prime Minister personally, or to that which is
Balfour's own scheme and which has the support, among our people, of
Rosebery and Asquith: the creation of a Defence Committee of the
Cabinet, ordinarily to consist of the Prime Minister, of the leader
of the other House, of the Secretary of State for War, the First
Lord, and (doubtless) the Chancellor of the Exchequer (?), with
expert advisers and permanent records which would carry on their
work from Government to Government. Mr. Gladstone would snub us. The
other four would not, and our proposal (that is, our third proposal,
which is Balfour's) would probably be adopted when the Conservatives
came in, and continued by the Liberals.

'"Balfour would be very willing to express his favourable opinion of
our view in debate in the House of Commons, should we raise one next
Session, and Lord Salisbury is less inclined to make a strong and
distinctly favourable reply to our letter than is Balfour.

'"Balfour would go more willingly, if possible, than he does into
the schemes if he could see his way beforehand to the saving of
money on the army for the purpose of devoting it to the navy. He
says that he himself cannot put his finger on the waste which he
knows must exist, that Buller has to some extent his confidence and
tells him that there is none, although Balfour is not convinced by
this. We discussed our Indian army scheme, to which he sees no
objection, and (very fully) the Duke of Cambridge and the extent to
which he will be supported by the Queen.

'"Balfour sees immense difficulty in the absence of a sufficiently
commanding expert, and in the consequent jealousy between the
Admiralty and War Office officials.

'"Will the letter which Sir George Chesney has do as a base, or
would it be better to write a shorter and a fresh letter? If the
latter, will you try your hand at it, if you approve? And after
noting this will you return it to me, that I may send it to Sir
George Chesney and then to Arnold-Forster?

'"Balfour had in reading _us_ [Footnote: "Us" refers to the joint
work on Imperial Defence. One of the recommendations was to
substitute marines for soldiers in the small garrisons, such as
Bermuda.] asked questions through George Hamilton, who agrees with
us, on the point of further employment of marines, and has been told
that they would be sadly costly.

'"Yours very truly,
'"Charles W. Dilke."'