Chapter LIV: The British Army

[Footnote: This and the two following chapters are by Mr. Spenser Wilkinson.]

In October, 1885, in the course of a speech delivered to his constituents, Dilke expressed his opinion on the subject of the reform of the army, then generally regarded as desirable, but also as so extremely difficult that the old Parliamentary hands shrank from grappling with it. "Everybody was agreed," he said, "upon this point, that we ought to have a strong navy, but there was more difference of opinion as to the army." Speaking personally, and without any authority from others, he felt desirous of throwing out a suggestion whether it would not be possible to have a separate army for India and the colonies, the army being treated as any other trade, and the men being permitted to withdraw when they pleased, with safeguards against the country being involved in loss when men came home prematurely. It would be necessary, of course, to have special training for cavalry, engineers, and artillery, as well as officers and non-commissioned officers; but he believed that for the great mass of the infantry, apart from the Indian and colonial army, we might safely rely upon the volunteers, and encourage volunteering by special advantages.

The suggestion thus modestly thrown out in 1885 proved to be the prelude of the effort of Dilke's later life--to prepare the country and the Empire for the times of storm and stress that were to come. His travels as a young man had given him an unrivalled acquaintance with the chief countries of the world, and especially with those which constitute the British Empire. In the spring of 1887, in his articles on "The Present Position of European Politics," as already seen, he passed in review the aims of the several Powers of Europe, and the military means which were available for their furtherance. His conclusion, expressed in the first sentence of the first article, was that "the present position of the European world is one in which sheer force holds a larger place than it has held in modern times since the fall of Napoleon." In this condition of Europe, the phenomenon that most impressed him was that "England is of all Powers the most unprepared for war." That being the case, it seemed to him to be the first duty of a British Government to set in order the nation's defences. The next five years he devoted chiefly to an effort to master the subject, to which he gave the name of Imperial Defence.

The spirit and method of Dilke's work on the subject of preparation for war mark him off from all his Parliamentary contemporaries into a class by himself. He took the subject of war seriously. He would not speak of it without knowledge, and, as he had not had the professional education of a naval or military officer, he associated himself as closely as possible in this part of his work with those who appeared to him the most completely to command the subject. His own words were: "Writing on the British Army as a civilian, I am only accepting an invitation which soldiers have often given to their fellow-countrymen. At the same time I have not the presumption to write without military help." [Footnote: _The British Army_, p. 1.]

He diligently studied the military literature of the day, English and foreign, treating of the questions he was considering, and collected a great number of official reports and other documents which he digested. At the same time he entered into correspondence with the best soldiers, in order to learn and appreciate their views. Prominent among these was Sir Frederick Roberts, then Commander-in-Chief in India, with whom during the whole period he was in constant communication. He also sought the collaboration of some congenial student of the problems of war, organization, and national defence, in order to insure the thorough discussion of all points, and to guard himself against the temptation to attach too much importance to his own impressions. He wished to acquaint himself with, and to reproduce in his writings, the best that was known and thought in the military world. In 1887, while writing his articles on European Politics, he frequently consulted in this way Colonel Charles Brackenbury, R.A., one of the most accomplished officers of the progressive school, a master of his profession and a clear exponent of its principles.

In this spirit and in these conditions was written the sixth article of the series on European Politics, published in June, 1887, and entitled "The United Kingdom." It was an account of the country's military weakness and a plea for a much-needed improvement of the army. "We spend more upon war services than does any other empire in the world.... It is believed abroad, and I fear with reason, that even within the last two years our stock of rifles was so small that there were only enough guns in store to arm the first-class army reserve, so that, in fact, there was from the military point of view no reserve of rifles, and that our ammunition stood at about a similar point of exhaustion.... The most capable men of the army tell us very frankly that they are almost in despair at its condition."

Assuming for the moment that all idea were given up of fulfilling the nation's treaty obligations for the defence of Turkey and of Belgium, and that no more were aimed at than the defence of India, of England, and of the colonies, "even upon this reduced estimate of our responsibilities, in the opinion of all competent men, we fall short of power to accomplish our task." In view of this state of things Dilke suggested methods of increasing the strength of the nation, and of obtaining value for the money spent. In the first place, "it is necessary for the statesmen, or if the statesmen will not, then for the public, to lay down for the soldiers a basis of military policy."

"It certainly seems clear, even to those who are not great
scientific soldiers, that there is sufficient risk of invasion to
make it essential to our position that we should have plenty of
cavalry and artillery, plenty of officers, plenty of guns,
ammunition, and other stores, always in readiness to supplement the
large force of infantry which is provided for us by the militia and
volunteers.... The things we need to keep in hand are the things
which cannot be suddenly improvised--cavalry, artillery, transport,
officers, and stores. We can, whatever some soldiers may say, make
effective infantry of our volunteers in a short space of time."

"What we have to look to are, mainly, the defence of India, the
defence of England, and the supply of a possible expeditionary
force. For the defence of India we need, according to an opinion
which I expressed at the date of the first introduction of short
service, a long-service army." Dilke quoted Major Buxton's words:
"For home service and European warfare we need a reserve, and
therefore a short-service army. What difficulties do not hamper us
in striving to reconcile short service with foreign service! Divide
the two services and all becomes simple. The foreign service army
... requires yearly fewer recruits, becomes acclimatized, and has
fewer green young men in its ranks; it is never relieved home,
though it moves about abroad. The question of home and foreign
reliefs is closed for ever. Recruits go out, and time-expired men
come home; that is all." "On the other hand, for the home army,"
Dilke wrote, "I would rely very largely upon the militia or
volunteers, and for the infantry privates of the expeditionary army,
upon special volunteers from the militia or volunteers.... I am
convinced that the time required, provided that your officers and
non-commissioned officers are well trained, to make an infantry
private is not very great."

"Instead of trying to imitate at one time the Prussians, and at
another the French, we ought, in my belief, to strike out a
thoroughly national system for ourselves"--the direction to be taken
being that of "giving high efficiency to the elements which cannot
be rapidly created in the home army, and the loyal adoption for the
infantry of the principle of localization and of union with the
militia and volunteers."

In the autumn and winter, with Brackenbury's collaboration, which was not disclosed, as Brackenbury was an officer on the active list, Dilke wrote for the _Fortnightly Review_ a second series of articles, entitled, like the volume in which they were afterwards collected, _The British Army_. The first article appeared in November. After its publication, Lord Wolseley wrote: "I have at this moment finished what I may be allowed to call your very interesting military article in the _Fortnightly Review_. I trust it may be read by every voter, and may turn public opinion to the shortcomings of our army and of our military establishments." Dilke thereupon wrote to ask Wolseley for some account, of which public use might be made, of his views upon the condition of the army and of the necessary reforms. Wolseley replied at some length, and said: "I should not like any quotation made from this very hurriedly written letter, but if you care to do so you may say in any of your articles that I entertain these views and opinions." Wolseley's views were given, accordingly, in the third article, in a paraphrase of his letter.

A more complete exposition of England's unreadiness for war has never been written than was contained in _The British Army_. It revealed the neglect of successive Governments to ascertain and determine the purposes for which in war the army would be employed, and the standards, quantitative and qualitative, of the military forces which ought to be kept ready. It showed the evils of excessive centralization. For an expenditure as great as that of a Continental military Power the War Office maintained a regular army, as to which it was doubtful whether it could mobilize, in a condition to take the field, a single army corps. The militia was imperfectly officered. The volunteer force was of unequal quality, and the mass of its officers inadequately trained for war. It was without field artillery, and the guns with which in case of war it ought to be accompanied did not exist. The regular army at home was sacrificed to the necessity of furnishing reliefs to the army in India, which, however, was not in a condition to defend that country against serious attack.

The system on which Continental armies were raised, organized, and trained, was explained, and proposals were made for reform of the British system. The suggestion was repeated that the British army in India should be rendered independent of the military administration at home, and the home army be relieved of the burden of supplying reliefs to India. This would render possible the introduction of true short service at home, and the enlistment for the Indian army of men willing to serve for comparatively long periods as professional soldiers. It was maintained that for national defence it would be found necessary to rely mainly upon the volunteers, and that therefore they should be given a place in the system corresponding to the call which would have to be made upon them in case of war. In the regular army those elements should be specially maintained which least admit of rapid training--cavalry, field and horse artillery--and a General Staff of an English type ought to be developed.

The cogency of Sir Charles Dilke's appeal to his countrymen to attend to the subject of defence, the weight of authority behind his exposition of the failure of the military administration, and the appropriateness of the reforms which he suggested, will be better conveyed by the quotation of a few passages than by a summary:

"The reign of force of which I have often spoken is so marked at present that no Power can consider itself safe unless it is ready at any time to defend its interests." "Humanly speaking, we can trust for our protection in the last resort only to our strong right arm." "Time is slipping by, and the unreadiness of England is a danger to the peace of the world." "It is time that party politics should be put aside on questions relating to the national defence." He pointed out how dangerous was the influence of those "who may almost be said to oppose all military expenditure, and yet whose ability and honesty gave them a deserved influence with the electors." "It was impossible to adopt a policy of disarmament without grave danger for the future;" but if it was to be prevented, "the people have to be shown that large expenditure, not only upon naval but also upon military purposes, is a necessity of the time." He deprecated "the unwisdom of those who, thinking our present position unsatisfactory, and more or less agreeing about the main lines of the remedies to be applied, fight among themselves.... The points which have a real importance are not those on which we differ, but those upon which we are agreed."

The first question that he wished to have cleared up was what the country would fight for. He pointed out that England was bound by treaty to support the defence of Turkey against Russia, though he doubted whether English opinion would support that policy, and to defend the neutrality of Belgium, as to which he thought the attitude of Governments had been ambiguous. He would himself approve of fulfilling our treaty obligations as regards that country, but he said: "If indeed we are to defend the neutrality of Belgium, we may at any time find ourselves involved in a Continental war against Germany, with France and Belgium for our Allies." He was prepared to accept as a minimum basis for preparation the assumption "that we ought to defend the coaling-stations, to be in a position to defend ourselves in India and at home, and to send, if need were, two army corps abroad as an expeditionary force."

One great difficulty of proving a case against the sufficiency and efficiency of the army lay in the fact "that, while soldiers are very willing to communicate information in their possession as to our present weakness, to those who, they think may help in any degree to set things straight, they not unnaturally shrink from the publication of their names." Yet Dilke was able to express the views of Sir Frederick Roberts, communicated to him very fully, and more briefly those of Lord Wolseley. He was also able to quote Wolseley's statement to a Royal Commission, that "if a hostile force of, say, 100,000 men were to land upon our shores, there is no reason whatever, if that 100,000 were properly led, why they should not take possession of London.... We are not in the position we ought to be in, nor do I believe we are in the position we should be in if the English people were told the whole truth."

"The inefficiency of our present organization, and its wastefulness,
are admitted by persons who differ as greatly the one from the other
as, on the one hand, the chief of the 'Economists,' Lord Randolph
Churchill, and, on the other, the soldiers who are the object of his
scorn--Lord Wolseley, Sir Frederick Roberts, and General
Brackenbury. [Footnote: General Sir Henry Brackenbury, brother of
Colonel Charles Brackenbury.] Our present position is, therefore,
condemned all round, and the day has come when it behoves every
Englishman to have an opinion as to the direction in which the
remedy is to be sought."

"To form armies which will be of any value against the power of
'armed nations,' it is necessary to provide modern weapons, and here
again we are weak just where we should be strong.... It is one of
the most astonishing features of our 'system' that, with all our
enormous expenditure, we manage to drop behind other nations both in
the quality of our weapons and the proportional number of them to
the hands that would have to use them. The reason probably is that
the country has gradually arrived at the absurd belief that Great
Britain alone of all nations in the world can by prudence escape the
common lot, and never have war again except with savages. From this
unfounded and unwise opinion springs grave carelessness as to the
condition of the military forces, and Governments desirous of
presenting a comparatively small Budget fail to keep up the
necessary quantity of arms and stores, because deficiency in these
is a weakness easy to conceal.... Thus we, who should always be in a
state of readiness to supply arms to improvised forces, and to
colonial levies, have never enough for the purposes of the home
army. We are always compromising between the popularity of a
Government and the safety of the Empire."

It will be shown later on how Dilke, when the time came, upheld this opinion by his vote in Parliament, even against his own party and to the sacrifice of his own political interests.

"For an expenditure of nineteen millions the Germans can put into
the field nineteen army corps of 37,000 men each, besides an
enormous force of garrison troops and a territorial army, of which
they could rapidly make a field army of thirty-five army corps in
all. For an expenditure of twice nineteen millions we can put into
the field in India two army corps, of which one is composed of
native troops, but in the United Kingdom, in General Brackenbury's
words, owing to our defective organization, we should scarcely be
able to put one; but if the army were properly organized we should
be able to put two into the field."

Yet it could not be said that the British army fell short in numbers:

"The army proper, the militia, the army reserve and militia reserve,
the volunteers, the native troops in India, the 36,000 Canadian
militia of the first line, about 16,000 men in Australia and New
Zealand, the South African local forces of between six and seven
thousand well-trained men, the Irish constabulary, the armed and
drilled portion of the Indian constabulary, the Hyderabad
contingent, and the marines, easily make up a total of a million of
men fit for some kind of land service, of whom very nearly the whole
are supposed to serve even in time of peace."

"We are more saving of peace taxes than of war debt.... If the
arrangement for strict saving in time of peace and for wild waste in
time of war was ever a wise one, which in my opinion it was not,
even in the days of old-fashioned armies, it is certainly foolish in
these times of rapid mobilization.... We are in these times exposed
to war at a day's notice, and to invasion at very short notice, if
our fleet can be divided or drawn away and beaten in detail."

"We are not without men who could reduce our non-system to system.
Sir F. Roberts, who has partly done this in India so far as the
white army goes, and has attempted, in spite of resistance at home,
to reform the native force--Sir F. Roberts could do it. Lord
Wolseley, whose organization of each of his expeditions has been
careful, energetic, and in every way remarkable, and who in his
_Soldier's Pocket-Book_ has produced the best of all handbooks to
the elements of the art of war--Lord Wolseley could do it. But the
existing system does not do it."

In examining the Continental system, Dilke enumerated what he thought the principal points. They were, first of all, personal service by all men, which produced an enormous trained reserve; then complete localization both of troops and stores; fully worked out plans of mobilization and arrangements for obtaining horses instantly on the outbreak of war; and last, but not least, "the organization of a General Staff which shall act as the brain and nervous system of the army, and shall draw to it and pass through its training as large a number of officers as possible, so that experienced staff officers shall be numerous in the event of war."

In spite of his appreciation of the Continental system, Dilke did not advocate universal compulsory service:

"Many of my correspondents cannot understand why I do not advocate
for the British army that same general service which now prevails
almost universally on the Continent, and brings with it so many good
fruits both for the nation and the army. I have, as I have shown, no
personal objection to it, but I have pointed out the existence of a
fatal obstacle in certain forms of English and Scotch religious and
certain forms of English commercial thought. It would be unpractical
to consider at length a measure which stands no present chance of
adoption. The time may come when we shall be drawn into a struggle
for life or death, and it seems to me that it will very probably
come within the next ten years, and maybe bring with it the
necessity for that general service which would now be impossible of
attainment. For our present ideas of the imperial position general
service is not necessary, and, moreover, until some capacity is
shown for organizing the troops which we already possess, I do not
see the slightest use in obtaining a large number of fresh men. But,
in view of the reign of force which now exists in Europe, and of
slowly but surely advancing danger in the East, it is impossible to
contemplate an ideal defence of the Empire without supposing that
the inhabitants of Great Britain and all her colonies may arrive at
a condition in which every strong man shall recognize that he owes
to the State some kind of defensive military service. I have tried
to make it plain that such service need not be in the regular army;
still less need any man with us be taken against his will to fight
outside the limits of his own country. But there can be no ideal
defence in which the bulk of the population is not trained, however
slightly, in the handling of military weapons, and the individual
man trained in spirit to believe that the hearths and homes where
his sisters or his wife live free from danger owe their immunity
from attack, not merely to a half-despised 'mercenary army,' but to
the strength and the skill of his own right arm."

"My first condition for an ideal British organization would be
freedom of the fleet from the calls of local defence. The maritime
fortresses and coaling-stations should all be capable of defending
themselves." This meant, of course, guns and garrisons. "My second
ideal principle would be to look to local help for all garrisons
where that system is possible, we retaining always a large staff of
specially well-trained officers for the purpose of organizing and
commanding local levies in war."

Dilke thought it needful for England to train as many officers as possible, especially as she had an ample supply of men capable, if trained, of being good officers.

"Is it possible to conceive a more absurd situation than that of the
wealthiest country in the world, with a vast reserve of high-blooded
youth lying idle, and enormous masses of warlike people, Sikhs,
Goorkhas, Mahrattas, Zulus, Arabs, Malays, and what not, under our
hands 'spoiling for a fight,' while this nation is unprepared to
defend its own possessions and its very existence in circumstances
which all know to be more than likely to occur? This nation, our
nation, might absolutely keep the peace of the world, yet shivers at
every breeze of Continental politics."

Dilke's scheme was for a professional army for India and for a citizen army at home, in which the bulk of the infantry would be volunteers, while the special arms and the infantry of two army corps, destined to be an expeditionary force, would be short-service soldiers. It was in its broad outlines a forecast of the actual development that has taken place. In particular he proposed, what was carried out by Lord Haldane's Act, that "the militia should become liable to general service in war, and should be organized and equipped accordingly. The volunteers should be liable to be called out for home defence whenever the two army corps were sent out of the kingdom."

"My first object," he said in conclusion, "has been to point out how
seriously our national military strength falls behind our
requirements, and how unready we always are, in spite of our huge
expenditure. My second object was to show that what we want most is,
not a great and expensive increase of the regular army, but an
endeavour to make the best possible use of what we have already, by
proper organization and by utilizing to the utmost the voluntary
principle, which best suits our national temper and that of the
colonies.... We stand in presence of new forces the power of which
is almost incalculable, and, while I admit that there are in the
army a great number of able men, perhaps more than there ever were,
capable both of creating new systems and of leading us to victory, I
am inclined to think that their characters have been formed in spite
of an obsolete and decaying system, and that they are restrained by
the incapacity of others and the carelessness of the country from
exercising the influence which their talents and energy ought to
command. If the question were one of commerce, liberty, or progress
in civil affairs, the nation would be interested, and would bring
the resources of its accumulated knowledge to bear on the subject.
But being, as it is, a question without the right settlement of
which neither commerce nor liberty is safe, the public is so little
in earnest about it that politicians are allowed to play with it,
and the serious needs of self-defence are sacrificed to the poor aim
of keeping constituencies in good-humour. Nothing can or will be
done by Governments of any party till the nation can be roused to
some expression of public opinion; and that opinion has to be formed
before it can be expressed. In the reign of force which now prevails
throughout Europe, carelessness as to our power of defence is
culpable beyond possibility of exaggeration, for we may have to
defend not only our individual interests as a nation, but all that
enormous influence for the good of mankind which is at present
exercised in the remotest parts of the earth by an enormous Empire
bent on preventing war and on spreading the blessings of peace."

Coming when it did, _The British Army_ made an impression on the educated public. It followed soon after the report of Sir James Stephen's Commission, which had exposed the chaotic condition of the administration of the army. Dilke revealed a grasp of every branch of the subject. His criticisms reflected the judgment of officers familiar with the branch of service discussed. His proposals were modest and intelligible, and in every case represented some body of competent military opinion. He told the public much that none of his readers fully appreciated at the time. The German army had been largely increased in the spring of 1887, and in the beginning of 1888 a Bill passed the Reichstag which increased by a further 700,000 men the numbers available in case of war. Dilke explained in one of his chapters that, "according to the calculations of the French Staff, the total number of armed men upon which Germany would be able to draw for all purposes would exceed 7,000,000." [Footnote: The British Army, p. 161.] This and other forecasts may startle those readers whose curiosity tempts them to read the volume again in 1917. But the work produced no practical result except to put Dilke into the front rank of army reformers. The Government took no action to remedy the military weakness which everyone recognized. The report of the Stephen Commission remained a dead letter. In June, 1888, a new Royal Commission was issued, in which the Marquis of Hartington, associated with a number of colleagues of Cabinet rank and with a General and an Admiral, was instructed to inquire into the administration of the naval and military departments. The attempt at reform was postponed until these Commissioners should have made their report.