Chapter XIX

SUMMARY.—THE FUNCTION OF SEA POWER AND THE POLICY OF GREAT
BRITAIN IN THE REVOLUTIONARY AND NAPOLEONIC WARS.

Great Britain's unpreparedness for war in 1792 358

Spirit and aims of the French leaders 359

Decree of the National Convention, November 19, 1792 361

Significance of this step 362

Annexation of Belgium, and opening of the Scheldt 362

Interest of Great Britain in the Netherlands 363

British preparations for war 363

Consistency of Pitt's course 364

Convention's decree of December 15, 1792 367

Aggressive spirit of the French Revolution 368

Misconception of its strength by European statesmen 370

Conservative temper of the British nation 371

Irrepressible conflict between the two forces 372

Twofold aspect of Sea Power 372

Origin and character of the British Sea Power 373

Annihilation of French, Dutch, and Spanish navigation 375

Consequent opportunities for neutral carriers 376

Restrictions imposed upon these by Great Britain 377

Rise of prices on the continent of Europe 377

Great Britain becomes the depot for supplying the Continent 378

Direct and indirect effects upon British prosperity 380

Strength of Great Britain dependent upon Sea Power 381

Use of Sea Power made by the ministry 382

"Security" the avowed object of the war 383

The war, therefore, avowedly defensive 384

British treaty obligations to Holland 384

Relation of Great Britain to the general struggle 385

Two resources arising from Sea Power 386

Great land operations inexpedient for Great Britain 386

Characteristics of the Seven Years' War 387

Contrasts between the elder and the younger Pitt 387

Pitt's war policy not simply a military question 391

General direction given by him to the national effort 392

Justification of his colonial enterprises 393

Unprecedented naval development and commercial prosperity
secured by him 394

Importance of these results 394

Exhaustion of France caused by Pitt's measures 395

Bonaparte's opinion as to the influence of Sea Power 396

Ruinous results to France of the measures to destroy British
commerce 396

Napoleon forced to these steps by Pitt's policy 397

Identity of spirit in the Republic and in Napoleon 398

France forced into the battle-field of Great Britain's choosing 400

Strain of the Continental System upon Europe 401

Revolt from it of Spain and Russia 401

Effect of these movements 402

Napoleon submits to divide his forces 402

General correctness of Pitt's war policy 402

The criticisms on the campaign of 1793 considered 403

Peculiar character of the Revolutionary War 403

Dependence of statesmen upon military advice 404

Peculiar merit of Pitt 404

His death 405

His policy pursued by his successors 405

Exhaustion the only check upon a great national movement 406

France revived by Bonaparte in 1796 and 1799 407

He unites the nation in a renewed forward movement 407

Bonaparte the incarnation of the Revolution 408

Combination of powers in Napoleon's hands 408

His career dependent upon the staying power of France 408

Effect of Great Britain upon French endurance 409

Function of Great Britain in the Napoleonic wars 411

Accuracy of Pitt's forecast 411

Result postponed only by Bonaparte's genius 411

INDEX 413

NOTE.—The references to the "Correspondance de Napoléon" are to the quarto edition, in thirty-two volumes, published in Paris between 1858 and 1869.

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.

VOLUME II.

MAP AND BATTLE PLANS.

PAGE

I. Battle of Copenhagen 44

II. Map of North Atlantic 117

III. The Attack at Trafalgar 190

THE

INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER

UPON THE

FRENCH REVOLUTION AND EMPIRE.