Chapter V: Part 5

Occupied by the Battalion in support.
]

On November 3 Lieut.-Col. J. C. Parker proceeded to England for a six months’ tour of duty, and, as events turned out, this concluded his appointment, held for over two years, as our Battalion Commander. Col. Parker joined us from the 6th Battalion at the time of chaos just after Loos. His work in the muddy trenches at The Bluff, Canal Bank, and St. Eloi in October and November 1915 will never be forgotten. During the months at Ypres in 1916 the Colonel was really very ill, but he stuck it out then and right through the summer, until he was carried away at Fricourt with a very severe attack of malaria and trench fever. During the Ypres fighting of 1917 he was again very ill and very weak, but he refused to admit that anything was wrong. In the autumn of 1917 he had to go down for an operation, and when he returned in November he still looked so ill that the Brigade Commander insisted on his having a rest. And so in a quiet manner he left the Battalion which he had worked for with infinite bravery, and which he had loved so well for two long and arduous years. Col. Parker had led the Battalion successfully through very many of its most difficult experiences. All those who were intimately associated with him in his work knew and will always remember the great things he did for the 8th Battalion Royal West Kent Regiment.

“LEICESTER LOUNGE.”

Front line Battalion Headquarters, showing the “Leave Train.”
]

In the absence of Maj. Whitty, Maj. Wenyon took over command temporarily, when Col. Parker left us.

During the winter we concentrated on work on and in front of the front line. Organised wiring on an extensive scale was taken up, and we started digging a new trench in front of Pond Trench in order to cut off the awkward and water-logged Fish Lane positions recently taken over. On November 20 the 9th East Surreys did a raid in the early morning. Demonstrations and raids were taking place all along the front that morning in conjunction with the great surprise attack on Cambrai. In the afternoon we relieved the East Surreys in the front line, and every night we kept the closest possible touch with the enemy by continuous patrolling on a large scale, in order to find out if he was showing any signs of retiring opposite us as a result of Cambrai.

In the early hours of November 26, Lieut. H. J. Dunn, the Battalion Intelligence Officer, was shot dead when he was out with a party digging our new advanced trench. It was really too bright a moonlight night to go out in such an exposed position, but, knowing how urgent the work was, Dunn went out with two men to see if he could possibly get the party out to their work in safety. He was shot through the head almost immediately. Dunn was a splendid fellow. He took the most devoted interest in his work, first as Platoon Commander at Hulluch, and later until his death as Battalion Intelligence Officer. In this capacity he was to be seen at all hours of the day and night wandering round in the front line with compasses, field glasses, map cases, sniping rifles, and every modern device for accurately surveying and killing unwary Huns. He was a very talented musician, and withal he was such a cheery, lovable man. When he went, everyone in the Battalion felt he had lost a great personal friend. He was buried at Hargicourt cemetery in the afternoon. Major Whitty rejoined the Battalion, and took over command that day, and his first duty was to attend Dunn’s funeral.

The position of Battalion Intelligence Officer was taken over by Lieut. G. S. Bowen, of A Company. To take over and carry on Dunn’s work was no easy job, but Bowen tackled the job well, and he was still I.O. when the Armistice was signed.

The Division was to have been relieved at the end of November, but on the 30th the counter-attack at Cambrai took place, the relief was cancelled, and it looked as though we might be in action with the Hun at any minute. One battalion of our Brigade was hurriedly sent out to Ronssoy to protect our flank in the direction of Epèhy, and for a few hours the situation was decidedly obscure. Things blew over later, and on December 1 we relieved the East Surreys again in the front line, resuming normal trench life. Things were beginning to wake up a bit, however, and the discussion of detailed defence schemes—which was later in other sectors to become the mania of the higher command—started to take prominence.

During December the newly dug support line was strongly wired. Gas projector attacks by the Special Company R.E. took place on a biggish scale. On December 8 2nd Lieut. Carville and 2nd Lieut. Holliday made a great effort to get through the enemy wire with a small party. They blew up the wire to a depth of fifteen feet with a Bangalore torpedo, but there was another fifteen feet to blow. Holliday was nearly blown up himself in setting off the torpedo. They struggled hard to get through, but the Hun had been very good with his wiring here, and after getting their clothes very badly torn, the party had to come back. After a spell at Vendelles again, when most of the Battalion were out daily on road making at Jeancourt, we were back in the line again on the 14th. 2nd Lieut. Holliday was wounded on the 16th when out with a wiring party.

A spell of very cold weather set in, thick snow alternated with hard frost for nearly a month. About this time the Division held the line with two brigades, and one brigade was out.

On December 21 we were relieved by the 8th Buffs, 17th Brigade, and moved out to Hancourt. Here Christmas Day was spent. The accommodation at Hancourt was not the best in the world, but each company had its Christmas dinner, and the whole Battalion had a happy but quiet Christmas. On the 26th Lieut.-Col. N. I. Whitty, D.S.O., was suddenly ordered to proceed to England to take over command of one of the newly formed Divisional Machine-gun Battalions. When he returned to France a few weeks later he was posted to our Division, and we often saw him, and frequently did stunts together in which he assisted us with his guns.

He had been with us for two years. He was 2nd-in-Command under Col. Parker, and he commanded the Battalion for about seven months when Col. Parker was away. His energy while he was in command of the Battalion was tremendous. At all times of the day and night he was up inspecting the work in the trenches, planning and building dug-outs, organising artillery shoots and raids, salving material, opening canteens in the trenches, and a hundred-and-one other things. He was a great worker for the 8th Battalion. His direct forceful way of speaking and acting appealed very strongly to everyone. The Battalion owes a very great deal to the work of Col. Whitty.

He was awarded the D.S.O. in 1917, in recognition of his splendid work on the Somme, and in the command of the Battalion at Hulluch during the winter of 1916–17.

About this time our medical officer, Captain G. A. McLarty, left us. He is one who will always be remembered in the life of our Battalion. Joining us at Wulverghem in March 1916, almost his first experience was the bombardment of Tea Farm. On this occasion he worked magnificently amongst the shells until the last wounded man was got away. Under fire he was always splendid. His great work on the Somme in 1916 and in the Ypres fighting of 1917 has been described elsewhere. Long afterwards he was awarded the D.S.O. for his consistently gallant and thorough work, but particularly for his superhuman efforts at Guillemont and Delville Wood. There was no more popular visitor at any of the company messes. He knew every officer, N.C.O., and man in the Battalion individually, and he was the friend of them all.

Major H. J. Wenyon took over command of the Battalion on the departure of Col. Whitty, and Capt. R. P. Baker, the adjutant, acted as 2nd-in-Command temporarily, 2nd Lieut. J. B. Cryer taking over the duties of adjutant.

In December, Brig.-Gen. W. F. Sweny, D.S.O., the popular commander of the 72nd Brigade, left for six months’ duty in England, much to the regret of everyone in the Brigade. Brig.-Gen. R. W. Morgan, D.S.O., South Staffordshire Regiment, took over command, and remained with the Brigade until the end of the war. The early months of 1918 were marked by increased activity in the trenches, hard training, and digging of trenches in reserve battle zones, and a largely increased leave allotment. The last of these was popular, but there is some doubt about the others.

On January 1 the Battalion was inspected by Gen. Morgan at Hancourt, and on the 2nd we moved to Vendelles. The system of holding the forward positions in depth was beginning to be adopted, and when we took over the line on January 5 from the 2nd Leinsters, we had one company only (B) in the front line, two in support, and one in reserve at “L.10 A.” This was the map reference of the ration dump where the forward light railway started. Our transport used to come up to this spot each day.

The frost held until the 10th, and was so hard that no digging was possible, so instead we concentrated on carrying up enormous quantities of R.E. material to cope with the inevitable collapse of the trenches when the thaw should come.

In the war-diary for January 11 there appears a note: “Our trench mortars conducted a shoot on Ruby Wood.” A word might be said about this wonderful wood. It was in the enemy front line a little on our left, and consisted of a number of straggling tall trees. Some said there were six—some seven. Some ingenious people used to report that the number changed from day to day. The Divisional Pioneer Battalion sent us up a serious message one day that they had distinctly seen one tree added to the number. Knowing the habits of the pioneer mess, we could only conclude they were gifted once more with second or double sight. Every tree in the wood was at one time or another accused of being artificial, made of tempered steel, and containing a battalion of Boche snipers and observers. The universal opinion of those in front was that it was just an ordinary battered old copse, and the Hun hated it as much as we were supposed to do. It was visited in 1919 with a view of photographing it and finally settling how many trees there were, but the wood had completely disappeared.

_Photo by_] [_Thomas Fall, London._

LIEUT.-COL. H. J. WENYON, D.S.O.

Commanding the Battalion December 1917–June 1919.
]

The thaw set in on the 11th, and the trenches began to tumble in a bit. Till the 13th we worked in every way with pumps and mud scoops to get things better, and certainly improved the trenches a lot. They were at least passable, and you could not get drowned in them when we handed over again to the Buffs on the 13th. We moved to camp at Montigny Farm.

Just before we came out it was decided that we would try a raid on a section of the Hun trench known by us as “Herbert’s Post” next time up. Herbert was our name for the sentry they used to post there, or rather for the successive sentries, because we shot several of him. They never found out that we could see him from the chest upwards from a forward post of ours a little to the right, and with a telescopic rifle at 300 you could not miss.

D Company were to carry out the raid, and 2nd Lieuts. Carville, Crighton, and Janaway were to take part. While we were out of the line until the end of the month every man in the Battalion was out on working parties day or night. D Company were digging practice trenches for their raid, and later practising it. Other work was concentrated on the forward area, digging and wiring the intermediate (or Brown) line, various switch lines and defensive works and digging in the Bolsover Tunnel, a recent discovery of old underground works near Templeux. There were very few men available for work round the camp, but the few there were tarred and reroofed the huts, put in some stoves, and carried out many minor improvements.

On the 20th we had a practice stand-to in Hargicourt Trench. We were, of course, in the 5th Army at this time, and the activity on all sides was part of the strenuous efforts to form some sort of defensive positions in the enormous and threatened front held by Gen. Gough.

About this time the reorganisation of infantry brigades took place, and the 8th Battalion, The Queen’s Regiment, left the 72nd Infantry Brigade and joined the 17th.

On the 28th there was a bombing raid on Montigny Camp. One bomb hit the new Theatre, “Daly’s Theatre,” where the Divisional Party had been giving a highly successful pantomime, “Aladdin,” for some weeks. Several of the performers were hit, and three of our men were wounded.

On the 30th we moved up to the line again in relief of the 2nd Leinsters. The enemy was getting more alert in the front, and was beginning to snipe and to use his light trench mortars quite a lot. On the night of February 3rd/4th, D Company raided the enemy trenches. It was a silent raid, and gaps in the enemy wire had been cut previously by the 6-inch Newtons. The following is the official account of the raid, sent in at the time by Lieut.-Col. Wenyon:

“The raid on the enemy position at Herbert’s Post was carried out last night.

“The assembling of the parties in No Man’s Land was carried out in good order as arranged, and the circumstances seeming to be favourable, the Commander of each party took all his men to forward assembly positions on the enemy wire within a few yards of the Gaps. This was completed by the Right Party at 9.55 p.m., and by the Left Party at about 10.5 p.m.

“The Control Post had proceeded to its position, and Advanced Battalion Headquarters was in touch with 2nd Lieut. Janaway by telephone from 9 p.m. until about 11.10 p.m.

“At 9.55 p.m. 2nd Lieut. Carville led his party into the enemy trench. The wire had been perfectly cut, and the entry was made without difficulty. The party then proceeded along the trench northwards and reached a point where an enemy post is normally held. This was found to be unoccupied, and the party proceeded again towards a suspected dug-out. At this moment loud shouting was heard, and a large party of the enemy appeared on the high bank which forms the parados of the trench at this point. Our men were very heavily bombed from this bank, and further reinforcements in large numbers came up. One of the enemy, either officer or warrant officer, dropped into the front line and made off north. 2nd Lieut. Carville at once pursued him and fired four revolver shots into him at close range. 2nd Lieut. Carville did not consider it possible to search this man, as by this time the enemy party had been considerably reinforced, his party was hopelessly outnumbered and in great danger of being cut off.

“It was impossible to scale the parados, and the order was given for our party to throw all remaining bombs and return to their assembly positions in No Man’s Land. One of the enemy stood up to throw a bomb, and was shot by 2nd Lieut. Carville.

“By this time 2nd Lieut. Carville had been twice wounded, but he succeeded in getting his party back to shell-holes outside the enemy wire. From here he ordered the party to return to our trenches in small parties, and finally returned himself at 10.45 p.m. The casualties in this party were several, but not serious. Unfortunately a trench mortar fell among a party of six entering our trenches in Curtain Lane and killed or wounded them all.

“The Left Party entered the enemy trenches at about 10.10 p.m., and the two blocking parties proceeded to their posts. Two of the enemy retreated down the communication trench, and were fired at by the blocking party.

“2nd Lieut. Crighton led his party to the ‘T’ head. This was found to be unoccupied, but very fully stocked with bombs. The alarm was given by two men running northwards behind the trench shouting ‘English.’ From the ‘T’ head our party made for the enemy trench, and just as they were entering it, 2nd Lieut. Crighton was shot. Men appeared to come out of about four dug-out entrances behind the trench, as four patches of light could be seen, and there was a good deal of shouting. A word like ‘Mull’ was passed down from mouth to mouth, and our party was heavily bombed from the parados.

“Sergt. Vanner had taken command of the party, and all available bombs were thrown. The blocking parties co-operated. Sergt. Vanner then went to the blocking parties and gave the order to return through the enemy wire. He and Sergt. Allen stayed behind and attempted to get 2nd Lieut Crighton’s body away. They succeeded in dragging him some fifteen yards towards the ‘T’ head, but they were seen and fired at by several rifles from about fifteen yards away. Another effort was made to move the body, but Sergt. Vanner was then heavily bombed as well as fired at. They could not get the body any further. Sergt. Allen was hit slightly.

“Outside the enemy wire two of our party were wounded. Sergt. Vanner and Sergt. Allen succeeded in getting them back to Bait Trench. They were all reported in at 11 p.m.

“2nd Lieut. Janaway was still at the Control Post. He succeeded in gaining touch with the Left Party, and kept me fully informed by telephone of their movements. He made four attempts to gain touch with the Right Party, but was prevented by heavy volleys of bombs and darts which were put down by the enemy in front of his own wire. The enemy was continually bombing his wire just in front of the Control Post, but 2nd Lieut. Janaway and the sapper detailed for the work succeeded in exploding one Bangalore Torpedo in the wire.

“After this the enemy trench mortared the Control Post, very severely wounded one of the stretcher-bearers in 2nd Lieut. Janaway’s party, and buried 2nd Lieut. Janaway. I then ordered 2nd Lieut. Janaway to return. With the help of Cpl. Andrews the wounded man got in with very great difficulty. 2nd Lieut. Janaway finally returned to our line at 12 midnight, having been at his post in very difficult circumstances, constantly being bombed and later trench mortared for three hours. His work in keeping touch with the Left Party and keeping me informed of what was happening was of the greatest value.

“It was quite impossible for either attacking party to get in touch with the enemy, and in both cases our party was considerably outnumbered. As far as possible, in the case of each of these parties, as well as at the Control Post, the plans made were carried out.

“The return to our trenches was carried out in orderly fashion. The total casualties in the raiding party and the trench garrison were:

“One officer and five other ranks killed.

“One officer and twelve other ranks wounded.

“Also two of the sappers attached were wounded. A large proportion of these casualties were caused through enemy trench mortars falling in one of the posts in our trenches and among the party of six men previously mentioned.

“Communication back and forward worked most excellently throughout. The wire out to 2nd Lieut. Janaway fortunately held until after the return of the Left Party.”

It turned out that 2nd Lieut. Crighton was not killed, as he was subsequently reported wounded and prisoner of war.

The following decorations were awarded for this raid: 2nd Lieut. Carville and 2nd Lieut. Janaway, the M.C.; Cpl. Andrews, Bar to the D.C.M.; Sergt. Vanner, D.C.M.; and Sergt. Allen, M.M.

On the 5th we extended our Battalion front southwards. After a tour out at Hancourt, where the whole Battalion was working all the time on digging the Green Line (some five miles behind the front positions), and a tour up at Cote Wood, where we relieved Indian troops (the Sialkot Dismounted Cavalry Brigade), who had recently come up into the sector, we took over the Right Subsector from the 1st North Staffordshire Regiment. This was new ground.

Most of the front—which was a wide one—was held by isolated posts; there were no continuous trenches. We had an uneventful tour here. Battalion Headquarters were back again at our old friend The Egg—still very comfortable.

On the 22nd we were relieved and moved to Vendelles. A battalion mess had been built on quite luxurious lines there. Mess room, anteroom, officers’ cubicles and bathroom were all complete. The whole place was made in a large Adrian hut, and had been very generously furnished out of the Divisional funds. News reached us here that we had finished our long spell in the Hargicourt Trenches, and we were going out for a rest. A draft of sixty-seven joined us at Vendelles during this tour there.

On the 27th we were relieved at Vendelles by the 2nd/7th Manchester Regiment (66th Division), and we had a most cordial handing and taking over. We marched away at 10 a.m., with the drums at our head blazing away at the tune of “Good-bye-ee, Good-bye-ee.” We little knew how soon we were to be back in the district. The Battalion entrained at Roisel at noon, detrained at Villers Bretonneux, and marched to La Neuville near Corbie, where we were greeted by a deluge of rain. A large draft of 108 joined us on Roisel Station that morning.

We all had very pleasant memories of the Hargicourt Sector. Five months in the same district was a long time, and there was probably no place among our travels up and down the line which we had taken possession of and made our home quite so much as this one.

When we had settled down, we had some good times behind the line. Trips to Amiens were arranged fairly frequently, and the Division really assisted greatly in organising concerts and shows. The inauguration of the 72nd Brigade Concert Party, “The P.B.I.,” came about at Vendelles in November, and started most successfully. Among the enormous working parties when we were out of the line there was little time for organised sport, but we had a few good football matches.

Even as we marched away from Vendelles that morning there was a feeling in the air that something was going to happen. We were indeed on the eve of tremendous events.

PHASE VII
WITH THE FIFTH ARMY AGAINST THE GREAT GERMAN OFFENSIVE
_March-April, 1918_

We detrained at Villers Brettoneux at about 6 o’clock in the evening of February 27, and marched through the rain to Corbie. There was some difficulty in getting into billets, and the position was not eased by the rain, which had now become a positive deluge. However, we were back in civilisation, and we were looking forward to a few weeks of it.

So much for our vain hopes. Soon after midday on the first day of our rest, rumour—which ever travelled faster than orders—indicated that everything was not right on the 5th Army front. During the afternoon we received orders that our long-expected rest was cancelled, and we were to entrain in the early hours of the next morning to take up a position in reserve behind Vermand. The disappointment of this turn of events may be imagined, and the situation is put before the reader here because it is one of those cruel turns of fortune which, apart from fighting and the trials of the trenches, made the lot of the infantry soldier a very hard one. The next morning back we all went into camp near Devise, a little village near Péronne.

We trained strenuously at Devise for a few days. We were now in the 19th Corps, commanded by Lieut.-Gen. Sir Herbert Watts, and were in reserve to the Dismounted Cavalry Division, who held the line in front of Vermand.

On Sunday, March 10, the 72nd Infantry Brigade were inspected by our new Corps Commander. Afterwards the whole Brigade marched past the General by platoons. One of our platoons (No. 4 of A Company) was placed as the smartest platoon on parade.

From time to time during our stay at Devise we reconnoitred the line we were shortly to take over. Finally, on March 11, we moved up to relieve troops of the 2nd Dismounted Cavalry Division at Vadencourt, and took the position of left forward battalion of the 72nd Brigade. Vadencourt was a beautiful place—once it must have been a superb château. All buildings were of course demolished, but the grounds remained practically untouched.

In view of the importance which later attached to the position at Vadencourt, it is necessary to give a brief description of the lie of the land and the method of holding the line.

The 72nd Brigade were on the right of the 24th Divisional front, and held a front of about 3,000 yards, with two battalions forward and one in reserve. The country was “rolling” from east to west. Vadencourt Château was in a commanding position on a ridge which practically formed our main line of resistance. A road ran due south from our Headquarters to Maissemy, about a mile and a half from us, where was the headquarters of the Right Battalion. About 600 yards east of us was another ridge, on which and in the plain in front was the outpost zone to a depth of about 800 yards, and on a front of 1,500 yards. The Omignon River formed the right flank of our Battalion front, and ran at right angles to our position from Vermand, some 2,000 yards behind Vadencourt, into the enemy territory in front of us. The forward positions were held by isolated posts. There were no continuous trenches. There was a double line of trenches in the ridge in front of Battalion Headquarters already referred to, and Vadencourt itself was a large organised and well-sited redoubt, with trenches with good field of fire and machine-gun positions. The main road, known as Watling Street, from Vermand to Estrees, was our left flank. Almost in the centre of our outpost zone was a huge mound known as The Tumulus, standing some fifty feet high. Such registration as the German gunners did was usually carried out on this mound.

THE TUMULUS.
]

Most of our positions were moderately well wired, and had a good field of fire. There was a very wide No Man’s Land—about 1,000 yards. At Vadencourt itself, in addition to the flank defence formed by the Omignon, there was strong and well-sited wire, and on our right front an arm of the river formed a swamp at the bottom of the valley about 300 yards from our fire positions. From the point of view of stationary warfare, this seemed to be an ideal sector of the line. There was little shelling, and it was a case of lying dogo simply during daylight, and thoroughly beating up No Man’s Land during the night. Large patrols were out each night from dusk till dawn, about eighty men and four officers being employed.

VADENCOURT CHÂTEAU.

Battalion Headquarters was near the two trees on the right.
]

On the whole all the positions except one or two of the foremost were comfortable, the weather was fine; and when we first had a good look at the delightful countryside, it was almost impossible to think of anything but a peaceful life there. Very soon, however, it was to become an inferno of every kind of beastliness in the way of shot and shell. We knew we were brought back into the line for a reason, and work on the improvement of defences at all possible times, the constant instructions of all ranks as to the exact importance of the various positions, and constant intelligence reports of activity extraordinary behind the enemy lines made us feel in our bones that the charm of our present outlook might not last for ever. We started then on this evening of March 11 for a long tour in this position. Two companies were in the outpost zone in front; two companies and Battalion Headquarters in the Vadencourt defences. Inter-company reliefs were carried out every four days, and we began to settle down to routine work.

In spite of the seeming uncertainty of things, leave was never better in the whole war. When the great enemy offensive commenced on March 21, about 200 officers and other ranks of the Battalion were on leave to England. On March 19 B Company were holding the outpost zone on the right, D Company on the left. A and C Companies were at Vadencourt Château with Battalion Headquarters. On our right the 1st North Staffordshire Regiment were in the front line with Headquarters at Maissemy.

On our left were the 3rd Rifle Brigade (17th Brigade).

On March 20, which was very quiet, the adjutant, Capt. Baker, went on leave. In the evening report was received at Battalion Headquarters that according to information given by a German prisoner, an enemy attack might take place on March 20 or 21. The usual patrolling was carried out on the night of the 20th/21st, and no abnormal enemy activity was reported. The night was clear and fine, but just before dawn a thick mist began to develop which shortly became so dense that it was impossible to see more than fifteen yards. It was in this famous mist that the Germans commenced their grand offensive against the British 3rd and 5th Armies, which was designed to cut between the British and French Forces and win the war in a few weeks.

At 4.30 a.m. on March 21 a general bombardment by the enemy commenced, and we were in the thick of it.

Vadencourt Château was very heavily shelled for six hours, largely with gas shells. The outpost zone and trenches on the ridge were being knocked to pieces.

A very gallant young officer of C Company, 2nd Lieut. C. C. Baring, unfortunately got badly gassed by almost the first gas shell thrown over, and later died of the effects. Apart from this there was no known case of a gas casualty in the Battalion. About 7 o’clock Lieut. G. S. Bowen, the Intelligence Officer, set out to visit the forward companies. He got safely through a perilous journey, and returned to Battalion Headquarters about 9 o’clock. The trenches in which were the Company Headquarters on the ridge in front had been badly knocked in in parts, but no attack had developed in this area.

The enemy gunnery had certainly been marvellous. In the previous weeks there had been practically no registration by their artillery, and almost all shooting on March 21 must have been by map or by sound ranging. Yet there was scarcely a battery behind our front which did not lose half its guns, and trenches and redoubts were shot up with wonderful precision. Just behind Vadencourt were two 4·5-inch howitzers, which had been in position two days, and fired a few rounds only.

Both these guns were knocked out by direct hits very early.

About 10.30 a.m. the order was given for gas masks to be removed, and a few minutes later the first report of the enemy advance came in. It was still too misty to see more than a few yards, and scouts had therefore been sent out on the flanks. One of these from the road to Maissemy reported that the enemy had attacked the North Staffordshire Regiment from the right flank and rear, and had overwhelmed them and was now advancing on us straight up the Maissemy road. How much of this was true it was impossible to say, but it was soon obvious that something serious was wrong, for machine-gun and rifle bullets began to whistle among us from the direction of Maissemy on our right, and slightly from the rear. The bridge over the Omignon was demolished at once, and just in time, by Lieut. Christison, R.E., of the 103rd Field Company, in the face of the enemy. This bridge was the only crossing of the river anywhere near our position, and we now had a fair protection on our right flank against direct assault, but not against enfilade fire, which was very troublesome all day long.

About 11.30 a.m. the fog began to clear and the sun came out.

At this point it may be well to mention the officers and warrant officers who held the commands within the Battalion:

Commanding Officer, Lieut.-Col. H. J. Wenyon.
Adjutant, 2nd Lieut. J. B. Cryer.
Intelligence Officer, Lieut. G. S. Bowen.
Medical Officer, Capt. W. A. Kellogg (U.S. Army).
Company Officers:
B Company (Right Forward Company), Capt. C. R. H. Allworth.
D Company (Left Forward Company), Capt. F. C. Needham.
A Company (at Vadencourt), Capt. W. J. Ewen.
C Company (at Vadencourt), Capt. S. G. Thompson.
Regimental-Sergeant-Major, Regt.-Sergt.-Maj. R. Rankin.
Transport Officer, Capt. J. N. Arnaud. A/Quartermaster, Lieut. H. E.
Outram. Regimental-Quartermaster Sergeant,
Regt.-Quartermaster-Sergt. R. Ifould.

WATLING STREET, COOKER QUARRY, THE SUPPORT POSITIONS, AND IN THE
DISTANCE THE TUMULUS.
]

THE BRIDGE OVER THE OMIGNON RIVER.
]

A number of officers, including the Adjutant, Capt. Baker, the Quartermaster, Capt. J. R. Wood, and the Officer Commanding D Company, Capt. F. Proctor, were on leave.

As visibility became better at 11.30 a.m., it was possible to discover at last something of what had happened.

The enemy were seen to be occupying Mareval and Pontru Trenches on the ridge in front of Vadencourt. Capt. Needham, Officer Commanding D Company, got back wounded to Battalion Headquarters. He reported that after very heavy shelling, his company had been attacked from the right flank and from the rear, and very few could have escaped. Shortly after this two prisoners were brought back by one of B Company’s runners, and a few men of B Company (mostly wounded) came to the dressing station. The following account of the fate of B Company is given by Capt. C. R. H. Allworth:

“At 4.30 a.m. on March 21 the enemy opened a very heavy bombardment on our positions, chiefly on the village of Pontru and on the forward outpost positions; a great number of gas shells were used, together with the high explosive. By 5 o’clock the telephone wires between Company Headquarters and the forward platoons and Battalion Headquarters had been cut by shell-fire. During the bombardment the Battalion Intelligence Officer and a runner visited me; they stayed for about ten minutes, and then returned. I then decided to go up to visit the forward platoons; my runner accompanied me. We had left the trench, and had proceeded about 200 yards, when two Germans appeared out of the mist, one was a wounded man and the other a medical orderly or a stretcher-bearer; the latter escaped in the mist, but we captured the man and brought him back to Company Headquarters. He could speak neither French nor English, and since I could not speak German, he was not of much use to us. This was our first indication that the enemy had attacked.

“The enemy had occupied Pontru village and all the foremost positions. About 8.30 a.m. they attacked our line (Pontru Trench and Mareval Trench). The wire in front of the trench had been untouched by the bombardment, and owing to our Lewis-gun and rifle fire they failed to get through it. The enemy then brought up a machine gun on the flank bridge across the Omignon River on the right of our sector; this was put out of action at once by our right Lewis gun. They then brought up another gun, and, owing to a jam in our Lewis gun, put our team out of action. A number of the enemy came down the banks of the stream and rushed the post and occupied the right of Pontru Trench. We attempted to bomb them out, but they got round in the rear of the trench, and we had a rather exciting retreat down the trench to Company Headquarters, where we established a block.

“By this time the enemy had broken through on the left, and were coming down the Bellenglise-Vermand road. I ordered a few men to hold the “block,” and the remainder I sent up the trench to convenient positions to fire at the enemy on the road. The Germans suffered very heavy casualties on the road; a machine gun from Cooker Quarry did some splendid shooting. After about three-quarters of an hour of this, which under different conditions would have been very good sport, we ran out of ammunition. The enemy had been rifle grenading us and sniping us very heavily, and only very few men remained. We could see the Germans digging our support line, and there were great numbers attacking our rear positions. We then, with fixed bayonet, got out of the trench and attempted to get back to the Battalion’s main positions, but we ran into large numbers of Germans and were overpowered.

“The men of my company behaved splendidly. Though several of them were wounded, they carried on firing, and the enemy suffered very heavily.”

Had we not known it from the weight and length of the bombardment, it was obvious, as soon as we could see, that this was no ordinary attack. The effrontery of the enemy was astounding. He was marking out the line of his advance with white flags, and far in the rear the forward movement of battalions with full transport could be seen in all directions. Message after message was sent down asking for artillery fire to be brought to bear on these wonderful targets, but our guns were practically all silenced, and not till late in the day did any begin to speak at all, and these were shooting very short into our own positions. The general advance of the enemy in large numbers towards Vadencourt and Cooker Quarry (held by the Rifle Brigade on our left) began about 12 noon. Vadencourt was subjected to very heavy machine-gun fire from three directions. Finding the obstacle of the river and swamp on our right front too difficult, the enemy attempted to advance across our front towards Cooker Quarry. He was in close formation about a battalion strong. Our Vickers guns, Lewis guns, and rifles did tremendous execution, and very few of the enemy got back. This success braced us up considerably, and we felt there was yet a chance of holding on to our position if only our flanks could hold. No information came through to us as to the general position, even on our own divisional front.

In the afternoon the Rifle Brigade were still holding a line level with ours, but on the right the enemy was established in Maissemy and had advanced about a mile beyond it, and was trying to get machine-gun posts on the river bank.

The scene on our front during the afternoon was most exasperating. Several frontal attacks by the enemy were frustrated by our rifle fire, but the steady movement of enemy forces from the rear could not be checked. All we could do was to engage them with Vickers guns at 2,000 yards’ range. Enemy aeroplanes swarmed overhead and bombed us at intervals. An observation post had been established on The Tumulus, and a group of mounted men remained there all the afternoon.

In the early evening the enemy commenced to shell Vadencourt and its surroundings heavily again; trench mortars had been brought up, and things began to get very unpleasant. In spite of the precarious nature of our line, it appeared that we could hold on if the troops on our left in Cooker Quarry held. We had plenty of ammunition, and although we were reduced in numbers and several machine guns had been knocked out, we could still bring a very withering fire to bear on anything like a frontal attack.

At 7.15 p.m. the enemy commenced to advance towards Cooker Quarry, and unfortunately both quarry and trench were captured, the garrison, some 200 strong, retiring in the direction of Vermand. The enemy immediately commenced to advance in large numbers up Watling Street, and towards the high ground on our left flank. This left us with both flanks hopelessly in the air. We engaged the enemy with every available rifle, Lewis gun, and machine gun, and considerably delayed his advance. About this time we received the only written message of the day from Brigade Headquarters, sent off about five hours before. This informed us that a counter-attack to retake Maissemy under an artillery barrage would take place at 7.30. In view of this we decided to hold on. This message, as we learned afterwards, was cancelled by another one which we never received, and the counter-attack did not take place. We were now truly in “Queer Street.” Every minute we were expecting the bombardment and attack on Maissemy to commence, every minute also we were expecting an overwhelming attack from our left flank. The outposts of A Company on this flank did splendidly during these tense minutes. They harassed the enemy furiously, and undoubtedly deceived him as to our actual strength at this particular spot. It was barely a platoon, but it might well have been half a battalion. However, it was obvious this could not go on for long. We were badly placed to meet an attack from this flank, and as soon as the enemy discovered the real position he could overwhelm us by probably twenty to one. Still there was the hope of the Maissemy attack, and we held on.

The next move by the enemy was a bombardment by howitzers and trench mortars, added to a rattling and continuous machine-gun fire on this unfortunate left flank of ours. Tyler and Malby, two young officers of A Company, were in charge up there, and they and their men stuck it splendidly. But they were losing men steadily, and something had to be done at once.

At 8.30 p.m. it was decided that we would make an attempt to withdraw under cover of darkness to the Brown Line at Bihecourt some 600 yards behind. This was no easy matter, and it was essential that we got away unknown to the enemy. A strong rearguard was organised, and took up positions on the threatened flank.

Lieut. Goulden, 2nd Lieut. Pfeuffar, and 2nd Lieut. Tiley, with a number of men with four Lewis guns formed the guard, and they set up a powerful demonstration of fire for nearly an hour. There was no panic in the Battalion whatever. A definite order of march was laid down, and a section at a time the whole garrison withdrew to Bihecourt.

The rearguard got back about 10 p.m., and, thanks to their work, we had achieved almost a miracle in getting back without a single casualty. Two companies of the 13th Middlesex reinforced us in this line, and the whole force was properly organised from the river northwards, and into touch with the 17th Brigade by 12 midnight.

So ended March 21, 1918, one of the most memorable days in the whole history of the Battalion. The brief sketch of the main events of the day gives a very feeble picture of the actual fight. Countless acts of heroism could be recorded if space allowed. The whole Battalion fought splendidly. Vadencourt could well have been described as hell during almost the whole of that day, yet no one ever thought of wavering, and again and again the enemy was thrown back with heavy losses. It was not till afterwards that we learnt with pride that the holding of the ridge north of the Omignon River had such an important tactical bearing on the general situation, and that the 24th Division was the first division in the British Army to be mentioned by the Commander-in-Chief in his first dispatch on the great fight against the German offensive.

Congratulations were showered on the Commanding Officer for the work of the Battalion. A message had been sent to us ordering us to withdraw to Bihecourt in the early afternoon. The message had never arrived, but the Brigade Staff, seeing that we did not come back, had given us all up for lost. A council of war took place in an old cellar in Vermand at midnight. Everything was fairly quiet now, but it was obvious that by the morning the enemy would be ready for another great smash. So far he had achieved very little success on our front, but our numbers were sadly depleted, and we had seen almost countless numbers of men, horses, guns, and trench mortars being hurried into the forward positions obviously for the next day’s work. It was decided that a stand should be made on the Brown Line, and the 72nd Brigade was hastily reorganised.

Col. Le Fleming of the 9th East Surreys had been killed in the afternoon; Col. Pope of the 1st North Staffordshire Regiment severely wounded in the morning.

Col. Anderson, who came up to reinforce with dismounted cavalry, joined the East Surreys, and took command of the force south of the Omignon. Col. Wenyon was given command north of the river.

A certain amount of fitful sleep came to most of us during the night, and food was taken very early in the morning. There was another very dense fog at dawn, and the enemy did not begin his advance so early. About 9 o’clock he commenced a hurricane bombardment of Vermand and the Brown Line area, and immediately launched his attack on Bihecourt. Possibly the cases of excellent port wine which we had been compelled to leave behind at Vadencourt had made him reckless, and in spite of casualties the enemy advanced almost right up to our trenches. Fortunately there was some wire in front of this line, and most of the attacking force that had got so far died a few yards only in front of the muzzles of our rifles. Here and there over the 300 yards of open country in front of us small pockets of the enemy established themselves in shell-holes and old trenches. A supply of rifle grenades which were found in the Brown Line were used with great effect by C Company in driving away these enemy posts. The enemy’s trench mortaring was again very unpleasant. The manner in which he had moved up these great engines was almost uncanny.

Constantly during the morning the attacks were renewed, but he met the same steady front he had tasted the day before. The two companies of the 13th Middlesex took up the fight splendidly, and we can really be said to have taken tea with the Hun on this morning. Several times he reached our wire in small numbers, but he never got into our trenches. From the noise on our left we were under the strong impression, however, that all was not well there. It was pretty clear that the enemy had fairly penetrated, but it was not until much later in the day that we knew that during the morning he was fighting through Bernes, some five miles behind us.

About 1 p.m. the enemy succeeded in driving in our troops at Villecholles, south of the river, and reached the outskirts of Vermand. So suddenly did this happen, that it seemed that the only way back for our men was going to be closed before we could move. An immediate order to withdraw was given, but it was not until 2 p.m. that we actually left the Brown Line. By all the rules of warfare, none of us should have got back alive. Our only way back was along a dead straight road (our own wire made it impossible to go across country). This road was being shot along and across by a murderous fire from well-placed machine guns. We certainly had many casualties on the Vermand road, but the miracle was that so many did get safely back.

We got on to the road from Vermand to Monchy Lagache, and it was a case of a straight march in small parties. The enemy was through a long way on our left, and too close to our flank to be pleasant. He was through even further on our right, but beyond the river, and not so close. We were peppered with machine guns along the road, but we got through, and we were ready for a rest and some food when the Brigade concentrated in some old trenches at Monchy at 8 o’clock in the evening. After these two days of battle we realised the tactics, now so well known, which the enemy was using for his great offensive. The battling all along the line was calculated by him to discover some weak spots in our resistance. Immediately he had penetrated anywhere, he sent reserve mobile troops with motor machine-gun sections if possible through the gap, and very often succeeded in cutting off troops which had resisted. This is what happened to part of our front companies on the first day. The enemy had penetrated right through on their right, and, crossing the river between Vadencourt and their trenches under cover of fog, he had attacked them simultaneously from the flank and the rear. So it was all the way back on this sustained rearguard fight. Every day we were fighting the Hun very hard, and at close quarters; at the end of the day we found our positions intact, and were ready to take up the fight with him again at dawn. Then, just as we were hoping to snatch an hour’s rest, we were ordered back to conform with a new line for the next day’s battle, the enemy having succeeded in getting through some miles on one of our flanks.

We passed through the Green Line, held on this front by the 50th Division, who had been hurried up from rest in motor-buses. The position did not inspire us with much confidence as we passed through it. On most of the front the trenches were only a few inches deep, and the front held by the 50th Division must have been a wide one, for the troops were very scattered. However, the trenches were well sited and the wire was quite good. One party of our men, under the Regimental-Sergeant-Major, stayed and held a post in the Green Line until nightfall, when they joined us at Monchy Lagache.

We found the transport under Capt. Arnaud at Monchy, and heard the first news of their experiences. The transport lines had been fairly blown up at Vermand on the 21st. Cpl. Verrall and one or two men, directly the bombardment started, got the animals out and stampeded them on the road behind Vermand. Here they were all collected, and it was a miracle that we did not lose a single horse. Had they remained in their lines for half an hour, most of them must have been killed. The Brigade Transport Officer had taken the transport right back to Monchy straight away, and in consequence there were no vehicles available forward to remove our Quartermasters’ stores from Vermand, most of which had to be abandoned. The cookers were going strong at Monchy, and we had a very welcome hot meal before getting our first rest for forty-eight hours.

All night the hangars at the great aerodrome at Monchy were burning, and lit up the country for miles. The enemy shelled the village in a random way, and the night was bitterly cold.

At dawn breakfast and as fine a tot of rum as was ever drunk was issued. The Commanding Officer was called to a council of war at Brigade Headquarters in the village.

Col. Wyatt, who was commanding the Brigade in the absence of Gen. Morgan, set out the plan for the day. The Green Line had apparently been fairly easily forced by the enemy, and our Division was ordered to withdraw across the Somme at Falvy. The 24th Divisional Reinforcement Camp had been formed into a battalion, and were attached to the 72nd Brigade for the day. Our brigade was detailed to form the rearguard on the eastern bank of the Somme for the rest of the Division to pass through. The other brigades were in the trenches on our right, and we were to stop at Monchy till they had all moved off. It was the third foggy morning, and this seemed all to the good for our particular job. However, it seemed the orders had not reached the other brigades so soon, and we had to wait for them to move. All orders were issued and the order and manner of march laid down, but it was after 10 o’clock before we started.