Chapter II: Part 2

D Company was thus left to take over its portion of the Sanctuary Wood Trenches, B1 and B2, with only Capt. Penton of commissioned rank. Lieut. S. B. Smith was therefore ordered to report to D Company for this tour in the trenches. About 5.30 p.m. the Battalion moved up and relieved the 8th Queens in the right of the Right Sector of the Sanctuary Wood Trenches.

During this tour, February 19–23, considerable apprehension of attack would appear to have existed in high quarters. On the 21st the following messages were received in the front line in the space of three hours:

(1) “Gas reported by troops in Boesinghe Area, coming from the
north-east.”

(2) “Aeroplane reports enemy massing behind Sanctuary Wood.”

(3) “Prisoner taken at St. Eloi this morning states that an attack on
Sanctuary Wood is imminent.”

About two hours later another message came through:

“Cancel statement of prisoner taken this morning at St. Eloi; prisoner
misunderstood.”

Nothing, however, came of all the reported Boche preparations, and the Battalion moved back to Belgian Château Dug-outs on the 23rd after a quiet tour, during which a considerable amount of good wire had been put up to cover the front-line system.

SANCTUARY WOOD.
]

About this date the Boche was becoming rather troublesome in and about the Salient, exploding a mine at Hooge and attempting to take the crater. Though causing a number of casualties in the 9th Sussex, he was completely stopped, and vented his anger in considerable shelling, destroying a number of the communication trenches behind the front-line system. He also persistently shelled the Belgian Château Dug-outs, though whether this was directed at the large number of batteries stationed about that spot or at the dug-outs is open to doubt. During the period February 24–27 spent in these Dug-outs he caused a number of casualties in the Battalion by shelling, D Company being particularly unlucky, as he managed one night to drop a shell into the dug-out occupied by No. 13 Platoon, which killed four and wounded fourteen.

CAFÉ BELGE.

On the Ypres-Dickebusch Road.
]

About this date also the Germans attacked and captured The Bluff from the division which occupied the trenches on the right of the 24th Division.

This success of the Germans caused considerable uneasiness at 2nd Army Headquarters, and it was thought probable that the 24th Division would be ordered to retake the Bluff; this operation was, however, carried out by the 3rd Division, who had just moved into rest as Corps Reserve. The taking of the Bluff by the Germans caused “a certain liveliness,” however, in the 24th Division, and the system of reliefs had to be altered, owing to a whole brigade being kept in Divisional Reserve complete, instead of one battalion of each brigade.

On the night of February 27 the Battalion moved up again, and took over the Sanctuary Wood Trenches from the 8th Queens, the sector taken over being the right of the Right Sector and Maple Copse.

On February 29 orders were received to move back to Belgian Château, and the 8th Queens took over the Sanctuary Wood Trenches.

It was thought at first that the Battalion was going to take part in retaking the Bluff, but nothing transpired, and the Battalion remained at Belgian Château Dug-outs till March 3, when they moved up and took over the sector occupied by the 8th Queens. Coy.-Sergt.-Maj. Acland was wounded during the stay at Belgian Château.

This proved a quiet tour from March 3–7, though a considerable amount of work was put in building up the trenches, orders having been received that everything possible was to be done to strengthen the system, as it was believed that the Germans meditated an attack in the spring.

During this period the Battalion lost a valued officer in 2nd Lieut. Hamilton of C Company, an original officer of the Battalion from its inception. He was sniped while going down a communication trench to Company Headquarters.

A few casualties occurred during this tour, chiefly from rifle grenades, which the Boche had now begun to use extensively.

On March 8 the Battalion moved back into rest and took over A Camp at Ouderdon from the 13th Battalion Middlesex Regiment.

Here the Battalion was strengthened by the arrival of a fresh batch of officers, among whom was Sir Henry Hawley, an original member of the Battalion and afterwards Officer Commanding C Company.

During the period spent at A Camp, March 9–15, the Battalion had to find working parties, two companies strong, every night for work in the Salient, building machine-gun emplacements, and wiring and repairing trenches. These parties proceeded by train to Ypres, and then marched to their rendezvous. A number of casualties by shell-fire were caused on these working parties, the Germans showing the most uncanny knowledge of the whereabouts of the sites of proposed machine-gun emplacements.

On the night of March 15 the Battalion moved forward and took over the dug-outs at Belgian Château. Rumours of relief by the 3rd Canadian Division were now rife.

Working parties on the support defences south of the Lille Gate continued unceasingly; much of this work was observed by the Germans daily, by the aid of their Fokker aeroplane, which at this time was superior to any British machine in use, and it was no rare sight to see two or more of our machines crashed daily by Fokkers.

The night March 20/21 saw the relief of the Battalion by the 4th Canadian Mounted Rifles, and the Battalion moved back to Camp F. It may safely be said that all ranks were glad to leave the Ypres Salient after nearly three months of monotonous trench warfare. Moreover, the Boche was undoubtedly meditating mischief, which culminated in his lightning attack on the Canadian Corps, an attack which the Canadians heroically withstood, though it cost them enormous casualties.

On March 22 the Battalion moved to Berthen, near Bailleul. Excellent billets were found for all, and the contrast of unshelled fields, spring weather, and peaceful nights soon put all ranks on good terms with themselves.

Training was carried out for three days, the usual reconnoitring party proceeding to the Wulverghem Sector on the 24th to reconnoitre the new area to be taken over from the Canadians.

The new sector was found to be extraordinarily quiet, and the lack of shelling amazing, whole houses and farms being untouched by shell-fire within 1,400 yards of the front line.

On the 26th the Battalion moved to Dranoutre and took over the rest area for the night, the men being well pleased with the hutments and the look of Dranoutre, which at this time was absolutely untouched and full of its original inhabitants, plying a thriving trade with “Tommy.”

On the 27th the Battalion moved up to Wulverghem and took over trenches C3 and C4, B1 and B2, facing Messines, from the 1st Canadians, moving in by sections in daylight about 4 p.m., the relief being accomplished without loss.

Headquarters took over St. Quentin Cabaret, a small inn within 1,000 yards of the front line, absolutely intact and undoubtedly the best headquarters in the whole of the British front at that time. The support company lived even nearer to the line in Souvenir Farm, also intact.

During the months previous to our taking over there had been something like an understanding between our artillery and the enemy’s: “If you don’t shell, we won’t.” So estaminets and small shops were open in and around Wulverghem, less than three-quarters of a mile from the front line, and farmers were working in the fields just as close.

There was only one line of trenches on our front, and, as was the custom in those days, every firebay had a section of men in it. About 400 yards behind the line were absurd Strong Points built overground of sandbags. Each was held by a platoon. The two on our front were known as S.P.4 and S.P.5. The chief incident during our first five-day tour in the front line was the destruction of S.P.5 by enemy artillery fire. He shelled it very accurately for over an hour with 5·9s. The garrison stuck it out under Sergt. “Miffy” Mills, who, though badly shaken, was merry and bright when it was over. Cpl. Hogg was wounded.

After five days we moved into support, not very far back, all living in farm buildings. Battalion Headquarters and A Company went to Tea Farm, B and C Companies to Aircraft Farm, and D Company to Kandahar Farm.

Trouble began during this tour in support. Our artillery had given up the policy of peace, and had been steadily strafing the Hun during the previous days. So _he_ started. First of all on Tea Farm. At 5.30 a.m., on April 6, he put a 5·9 shell into the loft of one of the barns where the Battalion bombers were sleeping. It was real bad luck that he hit the place first shot, because we had trenches a short way off to go to; and before the next shell came over a few minutes after, everyone not actually employed on attending to casualties was safely away. That first shell accounted for thirteen casualties, eight killed and five wounded. He shelled the farm then for two hours, and off and on all day for three days, until it was a wreck. Cpl. Bates greatly distinguished himself evacuating the wounded under heavy fire. Battalion Headquarters moved up to Kandahar Farm with D Company, and we had peace for the rest of the five days out.

Our next tour in the trenches was uneventful. We had a few casualties, including 2nd Lieut. Eldridge, who was wounded in the knee. On April 10 we were relieved by the 8th Queens, and moved back into reserve at Dranoutre, where everyone was fairly comfortable.

So things went on for a time—five days in the line, five days in support; five days in the line, five days in reserve.

At the end of April the enemy released gas against us. The 8th Queens and 1st North Staffordshire Regiment were in the line. We were in support and the 9th East Surreys were in reserve. We had to take up our battle positions, and assist in the work of getting up new gas-masks and rations after the attack was over. We escaped lightly, but the battalions in the line had fairly heavy casualties. Shortly after this it was decided to organise a big raid in retaliation for the gas attack, and our Battalion was ordered to carry it out. Maj. N. I. Whitty organised the raid, Capt. W. Wood was in command, and other officers were Lieut. N. B. Green, 2nd Lieuts. S. E. Dove, S. B. Smith, and T. Bowling. During the greater part of May the party were out of the line, training at Dranoutre. The sector had become decidedly “lively” by this time, and the Boche had “set about” most of the open farms in the district. The civilians had given it best and left.

On May 6, Capt. W. K. Tillie left to command the 72nd M.G.C., and Lieut. S. J. F. Mills became adjutant.

On May 31 occurred one of the tragedies in the history of the Battalion. Capt. W. Wood was killed by a German sniper when out in No Man’s Land patrolling with some of his raiding party.

It is impossible to exaggerate the worth of Capt. Wood’s work while he was with the Battalion, or the sense of personal loss felt by all ranks when the news of his death reached us. Brave as a lion himself, he was a strict disciplinarian. His work and influence as Officer Commanding A Company had been marvellous, and the effect of his example upon the whole Battalion was seen at every turn. Perhaps one can sum up his record with the Battalion by saying that at first most of us were afraid of him, then we came to respect him, and last we came to love him. He was buried at Dranoutre on June 1. Gen. Mitford and his staff were present, and practically all the Battalion. Gen. Capper, the Divisional Commander, in a letter to Col. Parker, spoke of the personal loss he had sustained by Wood’s death, and alluded to him as the finest company commander in the Division. “Quo fas et gloria ducunt.”

On the night of June 4/5 the raid was attempted. 2nd Lieut. S. B. Smith behaved with great gallantry in trying to cut the enemy’s wire, but it was found impossible to get through. We had a number of casualties, and 2nd Lieut. Bowling was killed. 2nd Lieut. Smith, although he had been working hard nearly all night and was dead beat, went out just after dawn and got in Bowling’s body.

June 1916 will be remembered long by all who were with the Battalion. We were out of the line, in support again, for the enemy’s second gas attack on June 17. The Queens and the North Staffords had the misfortune to be again in the line. This time the enemy used phosgene for the first time, and the Brigade suffered severely. Most of our Battalion were in the front line or in the communication trenches as working parties, and they behaved magnificently. All night and long into the next day they helped with casualties. Gas discipline among our men was then, as it always has been, very good, and we had comparatively few casualties. Apart from these few days in support, which were far from a rest, we were in the front line the whole month, and after the enemy gas attack it was no picnic.

It was arranged that we should release gas in retaliation, and all labour was devoted to installing the cylinders in our trenches. Work was carried on at feverish speed, and at the same time the enemy had brought up his well-known “travelling circus” of trench mortars opposite us, and he made a practice of blowing us up every evening. The trenches came to be known humorously as the “Wulverghem Empire”—Two Houses Nightly.

On the 28th we released our gas, and the Queens followed it up and raided the enemy’s trenches. The wire had been previously cut by artillery, the raiding party got in successfully and captured about six prisoners. In this raid one of our officers, 2nd Lieut. Reynolds, who had been transferred to the Queens, did splendidly. This night’s work annoyed the Hun no end, and he made our positions a positive inferno. The next evening he set about us with trench mortars of the heaviest type, and fairly wrecked the trenches. All ranks behaved with the greatest gallantry, and were ready to repel an enemy attack at any moment. We had forty casualties, and 2nd Lieut. E. F. Vinicombe, of D Company, was killed.

On the next day, June 30, we were relieved by the 7th Australian Battalion, and moved out to Kortipyp Huts, very tired but greatly exhilarated by the experiences of the past weeks. We knew very little about the coming Somme offensive, but we had rumours, and we assumed, correctly, that we were “for it” there sooner or later. It was with surprise, therefore, that we received orders after a few days out at Meteren to go into the line again at Ploegsteert. Here some of us were served out with Australian hats, which we were to wear, and show ourselves in order to give the enemy the idea that the Australians were still in the line. Our stay in these trenches only lasted two days, when we were relieved by a battalion of the 20th Division, and moved out to Berthen. Here we remained for a few days until orders were received to move by train to Amiens, behind the Somme Battle. Then we knew.

The end of June 1916 saw the Battalion in good spirits, united and keen. We had had real hard trench experience, and the Battalion had proved itself worthy of the trusts which had been put upon it. All ranks looked forward with confidence, even with eagerness, to the Somme, and all the possibilities of getting at the Hun in the open and really finishing the war which it promised. How things actually turned out on the Somme are well known, and the next phase of the Battalion’s history will give details of our part in that great struggle.

PHASE III
THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME
_August–September 1916_

After a few days at Berthen the Battalion entrained at Bailleul and detrained at Longeau, near Amiens.

By this time we had all formed a pretty clear idea of what was happening in the Somme Battle. News of the terrific fighting had been digested. We had read with pride of the work of our 7th Battalion in Trones Wood, where we were ourselves very soon destined to be, and we knew we were in for serious business.

During July 25 we marched seventeen miles to the village of Saisseval. It was intensely hot and very dusty, but we arrived at Saisseval about noon. This village was without exception the dirtiest and nastiest the Battalion had ever been quartered in. However, there was some excellent country round the village, and for a week we trained strenuously in the new methods of following a barrage and attacking in waves.

On July 31 and August 1 we moved to the Sandpits, near Meaulte, just outside Albert. We were here for ten days continuing the training. On August 8 A and B Companies were suddenly ordered up into Montauban. An enemy counter-attack was expected at Delville Wood, and it was apparently not certain whether the troops detailed for the Montauban defences would be able to get there. The two companies got into position in the afternoon, took over the dispositions, and arranged to continue work on the trenches at dawn the next day. However, during the evening the troops for Montauban arrived, and our companies marched back again to the Sandpits.

On August 9 orders were received to take over the front-line positions between Trones Wood and Guillemont the next day.

Early in the morning of August 10 our advance parties went up and thoroughly reconnoitred the positions. The rest of the Battalion followed in the afternoon. We were treated to quite a healthy bombardment on the way in, but the Battalion was finally settled in position before dusk. In front D Company were on the right, A Company on the left, in Edward Trench, B Company were in support just outside Trones Wood, and C Company and Battalion Headquarters in positions round the Sunken Road at the south-east corner of Trones Wood.

Such trenches as there were had only just been scratched out, and were mostly not more than a foot deep. From dusk till dawn work by the front companies was continuous. It was a case of digging for our lives, and at stand to in the morning every man had trench room nearly six feet deep. The positions were heavily shelled by the enemy in the morning, and our casualties would have been very heavy had it not been for the strenuous digging of the night before. As it was, very few were hit, and the experience was a very healthy object-lesson to all of us.

The unfortunate village of Guillemont in front of us was practically gone. Our shelling was continuous. During the day the place was usually obscured from view by clouds of red brick-dust from bursting shells, and at night the crashing of shells was continuous. The Hun did no persistent shelling, but he gave us hurricane bombardments at intervals, which were most unpleasant.

During the afternoon of August 12 a partial attack by the French on our right took place. We had a good view of the creeping barrage, and a very considerable amount of retaliation by the enemy on our trenches. Capt. Penton, Officer Commanding D Company, was wounded during the afternoon. In the evening things quietened somewhat, and we were relieved by the 1st North Staffordshire Regiment. We were out for forty-eight hours, just in front of the Briqueterie, during which time the whole Battalion was up at night digging a new trench, Nott Trench, some 400 yards in advance of our front line. On the 15th we went up again, D Company into Nott Trench, C Company into Edward Trench, B Company into the Trones Wood position, and A Company to Carnoy Craters. The enemy set about our new trench that night, and we had a bad time. 2nd Lieut. S. E. Dove, who was commanding D Company, was killed. There was no enemy attack, however. After two days we were relieved again, and the Battalion concentrated at Carnoy Craters.

It had been a stiff week. We had casualties to six officers and 146 other ranks. While in the line the Reserve Company had been working continuously in salving. As a consequence, huge dumps were made at Battalion Headquarters, which were used as forward dumps in future for all troops coming into the area.

An outstanding feature of this week’s fighting was the magnificent work of Capt. McLarty, the Medical Officer. He was working almost continuously in the open in the Sunken Road by Battalion Headquarters, and he must have dressed hundreds of cases during the week. An abortive attack on Guillemont had taken place just before we took over, and wounded were coming down and being brought in by our stretcher-bearers continuously. Practically every shell-hole in front of us had a corpse or a wounded man in it. All night cries for “water” were heard. We had large parties out every night, and every soldier in front of us who was not past human assistance was got back.

On August 18 the 24th Division attacked Guillemont.

The 72nd Brigade was in support, concentrated at Carnoy Craters. The whole attack was on a frontage of fourteen miles. On our Division’s front Guillemont Station and a post in the village near the famous Quarries were captured. In the evening we moved up, and as a first step we occupied our old positions in Nott and Edward Trenches. Battalion Headquarters were now in a dug-out in Edward Trench. A Company held Nott Trench, C and D Company Edward Trench, and B Company the Trones Wood positions.

On August 19 A Company was ordered up into the village to take over the post captured there and held by elements of the 73rd Brigade. From Nott Trench the Company marched in three sections into the village on a compass bearing after dark. The relief was completed before midnight, B Company having taken over Nott Trench. The Company in Guillemont was in a peculiar position. Our new line ran from the post in the village northwards to the Station. There were trenches of sorts here, and touch was established with the 3rd Rifle Brigade, who were holding the Station. But southwards and eastwards our post in the village was in touch with the enemy only, and that at very close quarters. The post itself consisted of shell-holes in a very early stage of consolidation. The quarries which faced our positions from the south at about 40 yards’ distance were strongly held by the enemy, and he made the work of consolidation exceedingly difficult for our men by constantly harassing them with machine-gun and rifle-grenade fire.

By daylight on the 20th we had succeeded in getting a continuous trench facing south to the quarry, and two enormous shell-holes were consolidated as a defensive position facing east. The enemy seemed to have no settled position in the village, and he was evidently occupying shell-holes in a very irregular fashion. During the day he showed himself a great deal, and we did a lot of very successful shooting. In view of the enemy’s unsettled position in the village, it was decided to make an attempt to continue our trench which faced south in an easterly direction, to form a jumping-off position for another attack on the village.

A large party of the 12th Sherwood Foresters (Pioneers) was to come up at night to do the digging, and the area where they were to work was to be previously cleared of and held from the enemy. At dusk, therefore, 2nd Lieut. A. Roscoe took out a big fighting patrol of a platoon in strength. He first worked eastwards from our shell-hole position to the eastern extremities of the village, then southwards towards the low ground in the centre of the village. It was a very difficult operation indeed, but his work was splendidly successful. The patrol had several encounters with isolated posts in shell-holes. One of these fights developed into a wrestling match in which one Hun was killed and one wounded. We had a few casualties, but succeeded in establishing two positions south of the site of the new trench. The garrisons of these posts remained out all night, frustrated all attempts by the Boche to filter northwards again, and covered the party digging the new trench. In the small hours of the morning of August 21 A Company was relieved by two companies of the 8th Queens, and moved back to Dublin Trench, near the Briqueterie. It had been a highly exciting thirty hours up in the village, and the memory of it will live long in the minds of all who were there. The relieving feature had been the absence of shelling; our positions in the village were too near the enemy’s, and the Boche positions east of ours were too indefinite for the enemy to shell us with safety to his own men. The other companies had been holding the old trenches, and had been subjected to the same old hurricane bombardments several times a day. We moved back to Citadel Camp, near Fricourt, on August 22, and on the 25th to camps near Ville-sur-Ancre.

On the 27th the Battalion was inspected by Maj.-Gen. J. E. Capper, C.B., the Divisional Commander, who in a short speech thanked us for what had been done, and gave us his well-known doctrine of hatred of the Hun, as displayed by blood on the bayonet. He also spoke of our forthcoming work in Delville Wood. On this day company commanders had paid their first visit to Delville Wood, and Inner Trench, which had just been taken from the enemy in his final ejection from the wood, was reconnoitred. As a result of the reconnaissance it was clear to all of us that the enemy would never allow us to hold the trench without desperate efforts to retake it. The Battalion went into billets at Ribemont on the evening of the 27th, and stayed there till the morning of the 30th, when we marched to Fricourt. In the evening we went up to Delville Wood. Will anyone who was with the Battalion ever forget that night? At Bernafay Wood we were to be met by guides, and from there to Inner Trench the distance was about a mile “as the crow flies.” The men were excessively heavily laden. Each company carried three days’ rations, 25 petrol tins of water, 25 boxes of bombs, 12 boxes of flares, 12 boxes of Very lights, and some boxes of S.A.A. It had rained hard all day, and showed no signs of abating at night. The guides were picked up successfully at 9.30 p.m., and the crawl across Caterpillar Valley and through the wood began. Nominally there was a communication trench leading all the way, but there was little or nothing of it left, and the guides could scarcely be expected to keep direction. Delville Wood was notorious for changing its shape and appearance every hour. Details of that terrible night’s march are innumerable, and cannot be dwelt on here. Most of them can be recalled by those who were there, and they can be imagined when it is stated that the rain was continuous, the shelling of the wood heavy and incessant, and the mud knee-deep at least. Added to this it should be remembered that the Battalion had already marched ten miles during the day, and the men were loaded up like desert camels. The leading company began to get into its position at 5 a.m. on August 31, but it was nearly 8 o’clock before the trenches were really taken over—eleven hours after we had picked up our guides a mile away!

DELVILLE WOOD.
]

THE MEMORIAL BOARD TO THOSE WHO FELL ON THE SOMME, 1916, PLACED IN
GUILLEMONT CEMETERY.
]

A Company occupied Inner Trench and a new trench forward of the wood facing north-east. B Company occupied Edge Trench in touch with the left flank of A Company. C Company were in support in the wood, and D Company in reserve behind the wood. Battalion Headquarters were in a dug-out at Longueval Church. Col. Parker had gone down sick with malaria and trench fever, and Maj. N. I. Whitty took over command of the Battalion. The Company Commanders were: A Company, Capt. H. J. Wenyon; B Company, 2nd Lieut. H. Flowers; C Company, Capt. Sir Henry Hawley, Bt.; D Company, 2nd Lieut. W. G. Lock.

We were allowed very little respite after the position had been taken over. If the night’s march had been deadly, the day which followed was far worse. It was the day of the enemy’s last and biggest attempt to retake the high ground from High Wood to Guillemont. We just had time to have our breakfast of sodden biscuits and cold bacon, when the shelling began, shortly after 8 a.m. It is not intended to paint lurid details of this shelling. Suffice it to say that Delville Wood went up in fire and smoke for five and a half hours. In Inner Trench was one deep dug-out. In this we kept five machine guns and crews of the 72nd M.G.C., also some of our Lewis guns and teams. The shelling round the dug-out was particularly heavy, but by the grace of God the enemy failed to demolish it. In Edge Trench cover was scanty and the shelling terrific. Most of the forward platoons of A Company were casualties before 10 a.m., and B Company on the left suffered very severely too. The garrison of the two front companies became very thin, and two platoons of D Company from reserve were sent up to hold the centre.

At 1.30 p.m. the shelling suddenly and very obviously lifted on to the south edge of the wood. Shelters and dug-outs were immediately cleared, machine guns and Lewis guns were got into position, and our depleted garrison disposed to meet an attack.

Scouts crawled out in front to beyond the edge of the wood to watch a piece of dead ground there. On the right we were in fair order for meeting an attack. We had our machine guns and most of our Lewis guns intact, and quite a fair supply of ammunition. The enemy was some 600 yards away, and was bound to show himself clearly at 500 yards’ range. On the left our position was more difficult, the enemy was much closer, and there was a covered way of approach opposite the front of the Battalion on our left. The men were tremendously eager. After terrific shelling which numbs the senses while it lasts, the reaction often took this form. As the first of the attacking troops began to trickle into view it was difficult to hold our rifle fire down. We kept perfectly silent, however, and, encouraged by this, the enemy came forward in considerable numbers till he arrived at an intermediate jumping-off trench some 500 yards away. Here he collected for half an hour, and word was passed down our line that as soon as he debouched from these positions in force, every rifle, machine gun, and Lewis gun was to open fire. At about 2.30 p.m. the enemy came forward all along the front, at a slow trot. Immediately all along our line machine guns, Lewis guns, and rifles let fly at him. He was stopped dead within 50 yards of his trenches, while his men fell right and left. For a moment his line wavered, and the next his troops were running back in a mad rush to their original positions, followed all the way by our fire.

Baulked of his desire, the enemy shelled us again for an hour and an half, and then in the early evening he repeated his attempt. This time we knew exactly what to do, and we carried out the same programme as before with the same result. Inner Trench and Edge Trench were still entirely held by us at the end of the day. On the left of Edge Trench, however, the enemy had gained a footing in Orchard Trench, held by the battalion on our left, and B Company had a very nasty time in the evening. The Company Commander, 2nd Lieut. Flowers, was killed, and 2nd Lieut. E. G. Brown took over command. He and his Sergeant-Major, Coy.-Sergt.-Maj. R. Rankin, did splendid work, and organised their exposed flank for defence. Away on our right, too, the enemy gained a footing in the trenches of a battalion of the 7th Division, but he was ejected. A counter-attack the next day expelled the enemy from Orchard Trench and re-established the position all along the front. The enemy’s great bid for the high ground had failed, and the night of August 31/September 1 was comparatively quiet.

Everyone was absolutely dead beat. In turns most of us managed to snatch some sleep that night, and the next morning we heard we were to be relieved during the day. The Queens relieved us in the afternoon, and we moved back into Check Trench in Caterpillar Valley, between Bernafay Wood and Delville Wood. The valley was stiff with our guns, and Check Trench was about thirty yards in front of their muzzles. At about 9 p.m., just when we were all hoping to get a bit of sleep, the enemy commenced a concentrated counter-battery bombardment with gas shell of the guns in Caterpillar Valley. We got the full benefit of this. Everyone was ordered to put on gas helmets (the old P.H.) at once. We spent a most uncomfortable night: the bombardment was kept up for five hours, and many of us had our first experience of sleeping in a gas helmet—quite possible, but most unpleasant. We had practically no casualties from that night’s gas shelling.

We remained in Caterpillar Valley till September 5. The batteries were constantly shelled, and we usually got the benefit of it. On the first afternoon we had ten signallers buried in one firebay by an 8-inch shell. 2nd Lieut. Roscoe organised a digging party at once, and after two hours he succeeded in clearing the whole firebay; only one man was killed. A similar fate overtook another bay shortly after, and again all except one man were dug out alive. On the next day 2nd Lieut. Roscoe took up a party at daybreak to get rations up to the Queens, who were now in a new trench in front of Inner Trench. The party ran into very heavy shelling in Inner Trench, and had several casualties, including 2nd Lieut. Roscoe, who was severely wounded in the leg. He died of wounds at Corbie the next day. Throughout the fortnight at Guillemont and Delville Wood he had done magnificently. His cheerfulness was wonderful, and he was ready at all times for any job there was going. After 2nd Lieut. Roscoe was hit in Inner Trench, Sergt. Greenaway took the remains of the party on, though it was now broad daylight. They crawled across the open to the new trench, and delivered the rations and water successfully to the officers in command there.

On September 3 a big attack on Ginchy and Guillemont on our right took place, and on the evening of the 5th the 24th Division was relieved, and moved back to a camp near Fricourt. On September 7 the Battalion arrived at Vauchelles-les-Quesnoy, a delightful little village close to Abbeville, where we were very comfortable. A large draft of new officers joined us on our way, and the Battalion settled down to refit and train for what was to follow. As things turned out, we had finished with the Somme, and we were soon hurried off north to the 1st Army.

Our sojourn in the historic battlefields of the Somme had been crammed with incident. It coincided with the period in which the enemy was making his most strenuous efforts to drive us from the high ground, which gave the British their first sight of Bapaume. We had learnt what shelling meant at Ypres and Messines, and during the terrific bombardments at Guillemont and Delville Wood the Battalion was always steady. Apart from the holding and exploiting of the forward positions, the Battalion did a tremendous amount of work in their brief spells out of the front posts. As examples, one may mention Nott Trench, 800 yards long, dug in two nights right in front of our front line and under constant fire from the enemy, and the work of salvage done by the Reserve Companies in the Trones Wood area.

Of fighting the enemy we had had it at close quarters in Guillemont Village, and we had had it after a shattering bombardment in Delville Wood, where the enemy was not allowed to get within 400 yards of us. In both cases he had been beaten.

It is difficult to pick out any isolated cases of brave deeds among the countless acts of heroism of those weeks. 2nd Lieut. Roscoe’s work has already been mentioned. 2nd Lieut. E. G. Brown and Coy.-Sergt.-Maj. R. Rankin in Edge Trench did wonderful work in an awful position in keeping the enemy at bay. The Battalion stretcher-bearers one and all did magnificently all through. They worked seemingly without sleep or food, and without ceasing, as also did Capt. McLarty, the Medical Officer. An act of two private soldiers may be mentioned as indicating very truly the spirit of the Battalion during the day of the enemy’s counter-attack at Delville Wood. Towards the end of the bombardment, when one front company had lost over a third of its men, the Company Commander considered it imperative to send back a report to Battalion Headquarters. He hesitated to do so for a time, because it seemed certain death to the men taking the message. Finally volunteers were called for, and two wounded men, Pte. Skerry and Pte. Tyrrell, came forward. The message was given to them, and they were told to deliver it at Battalion Headquarters, and then to go down to the field ambulance. The wood was a perfect inferno at the time, but they started off with the greatest bravery, although one of them could scarcely walk. Something more than an hour later the Company Commander was astounded to see them back in Inner Trench, and assumed they had not been able to get through the barrage. The fact was, however, that they had not only got back to Battalion Headquarters with the message, but they had insisted on bringing an answer back to their Company Commander rather than go straight back to the safety of the field ambulance. As the result of this message the reinforcements from D Company already mentioned came up to fill the gaps in the two front companies.

One other case may be mentioned. At the end of a long night’s work in front of Guillemont, dawn broke with a slight mist. Cries for “water” could still be heard in front, so under cover of the mist a large party went out and brought back many wounded men. While they were out, a cry was heard from a long way in front. An officer who was with the party went forward as far as possible and discovered that the wounded man was in the enemy wire. The stretcher-bearer party was following up, but the officer ordered them not to go forward, as it seemed obviously hopeless to get the man back. The whole party therefore returned to Edward Trench. It was then discovered that one man, Pte. Allchin, was missing. A few men went out again to find him, and after about an hour he was seen coming back from the enemy wire carrying the wounded man on his back. That he had got there and back was nothing short of a miracle, because the enemy was exceedingly vigilant at this time, and he was sniping incessantly.

The fighting on the Somme had taken a heavy toll of the Battalion. The Battalion memorial erected in Guillemont Cemetery gives the names of 3 officers and 91 N.C.O.s and men who were killed or who died of wounds. Our total casualties were 13 officers and about 300 N.C.O.s and men.

The impression left in the minds of most people who fought on the Somme was that the enemy was being taught there once for all that the British Army was going to beat the Germans at all cost.

The 8th Battalion of the Royal West Kent Regiment can justly claim to have done much to drive home that lesson to the enemy at Guillemont and Delville Wood.

PHASE IV
TRENCH WARFARE AT VIMY RIDGE, HULLUCH, AND MAROC—THE ADVANCE ON LENS
_September 1916–April 1917_

Our stay at Vauchelles was pleasant, but short. The billets were all quite good, and Battalion Headquarters occupied sumptuous quarters at the château of the Baron de Rocquigny. Reorganisation was taken in hand.

The commands were as follows:

Commanding Officer, Maj. N. I. Whitty; A/Adjutant, Lieut. H. S. Brown, vice Lieut. and Adjutant S. J. F. Mills, who broke his ankle as the result of a fall from his horse.

Company Commanders: A Company, Capt. H. J. Wenyon; B Company, 2nd Lieut. E. G. Brown; C Company, Lieut. Sir H. C. W. Hawley; D Company, 2nd Lieut. W. G. Lock.

On September 19 we entrained at Abbeville under orders to move to the 1st Army Area. After a four days’ halt at Sains-les-Pernes, where training and reorganisation were continued strenuously, a further move was made to Haillicourt, near Bruay, for a couple of days before the Battalion arrived in the new area behind the Vimy Ridge and went into Divisional Reserve at Gouy-Servins on the 26th. The civilians were inclined to be hostile here, and we were not very comfortable. The Battalion was billeted in the château, which was in a very dilapidated condition. On October 2 we moved up to the front line in the right subsection (Berthonval Section), and spent an uneventful spell of eight days there. The Hun did a certain amount of trench mortaring, but after the Somme these trenches were really a peaceful home from home. The communication trenches were in very fair condition, but the front line was not so good. A, C, and D Companies were in the front line, with B in support.

On October 10 the Battalion went back into support in Zouave Valley, Coliseum, and Alhambra Trenches and Cabaret Rouge. Here the chief sports were working parties of all sorts, and rat-hunting. On the 18th we moved to Gouy-Servins again, and while there the officers gave the sergeants a good trouncing at football, and later played a very even game with the whole of the rest of the Battalion.

Orders were soon received for us to move up to the Hulluch Sector. On the 24th the Battalion marched to Mazingarbe, and on the 25th moved into the line opposite Hulluch, relieving the 14th Highland Light Infantry, a bantam battalion of the 40th Division.

Many tragic memories were here revived, for we were holding the very trenches over which the attack on Hulluch had been launched on September 26, 1915.

_Photo by_] [_Swaine, London._

LIEUT.-COL. N. I. WHITTY, D.S.O.

Commanding the Battalion August 1916–January 1917 and October—December
1917.
]

The 72nd Brigade was on a two-battalion front, holding the left sector of the 24th Divisional front. We shared the right subsector with the 1st North Staffordshire Regiment. The trench system consisted of a front line running along the Lens-La Bassee road, a close support 40 yards in rear, a support line “Reserve Trench” 600 yards behind, and a reserve line “Tenth Avenue” for the Battalion in support about 1,000 yards behind “Reserve Trench.” The Battalion in Divisional Reserve was in billets at Philosophe. The forward trenches were fairly good except on the left, but they had been recently knocked about considerably, and one portion of the front line on the centre company front, which jutted out rather prominently into No Man’s Land, was practically extinct. A trench called New Cut was dug across later on to replace this. There was another very bad place 200 or 300 yards in length between the centre and left companies which was unoccupied. The communication trenches on our front, Posen Alley, Broadway, and Vendin Alley, were very poor.

We found the Hun was very out of hand on this front. On our right company front No Man’s Land was about 100 yards wide, and it increased to about 300 yards on the left company front. The enemy had a different treatment for each company. On the right, where the enemy held Posen Crater, a big chalk mound where a mine had been blown some time before, he had developed his light trench mortars, “Grenatenwerfer,” or “Pineapples,” to an extraordinary extent. On the centre company, where our trenches were bad, he used medium trench mortars, “Rum Jars,” very extensively, particularly on the roof of Company Headquarters. The left company used to be shelled a good deal, and medium trench mortars dropped there quite frequently as well. We went into the line in the early morning of October 25, A Company on the right, B Company in the centre, D Company on the left, and C Company in support in Reserve Trench. Battalion Headquarters were in dug-outs in Curzon Street, 500 yards behind Reserve Trench. During the day all was quiet, but as soon as it got dusk in the evening the fun began. On the right the Hun fairly let fly with his “Pineapples,” in the centre he began to drop “Rum Jars” with startling accuracy on the roof of Company Headquarters, and on the left he served up all kinds of stuff. We had very little means of retaliation, and something had to be done. By the second night we had arranged one or two artillery concentrations, which could be switched on to various parts of his trenches, and on the right we had got one or two rifle-grenade batteries in position for retaliation for his “Pineapples.” On this night 2nd Lieut. F. G. Yeo, who had just joined A Company, was killed by a “Pineapple,” and his platoon sergeant, Sergt. Champion, was badly wounded and died a few days after. For a fortnight a desperate duel for supremacy in these trenches went on. At first we could only manage to give him about two rifle grenades for each “Pineapple” he sent over, with a mild artillery strafe if things got very bad. But by the end of the fortnight he must have been getting twelve rifle grenades for every “Pineapple.” Also, our artillery liaison had been greatly improved. Officers who were with the Battalion at that time will remember the code words, “Air,” “Love,” “Hate,” “Fortnum,” and “Mason,” among those used to bring down fire and brimstone on the head of the Hun. The Stokes mortars were really being used as a mobile weapon. We made temporary emplacements all along the trench during the daytime with a few sandbags, and during the night 2nd Lieut. H. J. Dunn, with a party of men, used to carry a mortar along from emplacement to emplacement, firing off a couple of rounds as required here or there. The rifle-grenade batteries were manned all the time, but no firing took place until the friendly Boche saw fit to commence.

It was a most amusing fortnight. It would be difficult to say how many hundreds of rifle grenades and Stokes shells fell into the Hun trenches. One morning, when all was quiet, a company commander was looking at some old boxes of Mills bombs in the front line. In order to test them, he threw one over the parapet. It exploded all right—but the parties with the rifle-grenade batteries in the support line thought it was a “Pineapple” going off, and before you could say “knife” a hail of rifle grenades dropped into the unfortunate Posen Crater. By the end of the first week in November the Hun had given it best, and he was kept well in his place during the rest of our stay in this sector. We got on steadily with improving the trenches, and a lot of new wire was put up, and constant patrolling gave us the complete mastery of No Man’s Land. Normal tours up here were six days in the line, six days in support in Tenth Avenue—with rat hunts and working parties galore to keep us busy; six days in the line again, and then six days in reserve at Philosophe. We remained in the sector for nearly four months, and it was on the whole a very happy winter.

PHILOSOPHE VILLAGE.

The billets of the Battalion in reserve.
]

During the greater part of this time A, B, and D Companies retained the right, centre, and left positions respectively, each one being relieved in turn by C Company when it was due for a tour in support. For the last two tours A and B Companies changed round in order to give B Company a rest from the centre sector, which had the reputation of being the most trench mortared. From the neighbourhood of Battalion Headquarters we had a very fine view of the whole of the enemy’s trench system and the country behind his line, and sniping with artillery became one of the principal amusements. It was great fun chasing groups or single Huns about behind their lines with whizz-bangs or sniping with a 60-pounder at the intrepid cyclist who rode into Hulluch regularly every afternoon, and the effort to knock down Wingles Tower was another constant sport for the heavier artillery. We got to know the gunners very well in these days. In addition to having the liaison officer actually with the Battalion, most of their observation posts were in the neighbourhood of our headquarters, and the F.O.O. usually dropped in to see us on his way up to ask if anyone wanted to do a shoot.

POSEN CRATER.

In the enemy front line near Hulluch.
]

We used to have good times at Philosophe for six days in twenty-four. It was just a one-street miners’ village, with the outer shells of most of the houses intact, but lacking such comforts as window-panes and furniture. Our first tour the billets were far from comfortable, but we and the other battalions in the Brigade made improvements every time we were there, and when we left the sector it was a very satisfactory rest area. There were still some very dirty civilians about, mostly those connected with the mines, and some of them did quite a good trade selling odds and ends to the troops at a very large profit. Bethune was only a few miles away, and was very popular. Shops and estaminets were open there almost as in normal times, and divisional cinemas or concert parties often gave their shows in the town. We sometimes got motor buses or lorries to take a proportion of the Battalion into Bethune or to an entertainment elsewhere, and several very successful Battalion concerts were held at Philosophe during the winter.

Just before Christmas a draft of 200 arrived to make up our losses on the Somme. Christmas Day was not very exciting. We moved into the line from Philosophe on the morning of December 24, but we had all the excitement we wanted that day, as the Boches elected to give us one of the worst strafes we ever had in this sector. Christmas was kept up during our next visit to Philosophe. Each company had one day set apart for it, on which the concert hall was at its disposal. The programme consisted of some form of sports or football in the morning, a colossal midday meal washed down with a plentiful supply of beer, and the afternoon divided up between the Divisional Band, a company concert, and a big tea. Everyone thoroughly enjoyed the Christmas of 1916, although it was celebrated in 1917.

From the beginning of January until a day or two before we left this sector, on February 12, the weather was very cold. There was some snow at the beginning of this long period, and the frost held so consistently that it was lying on the ground for over five weeks. All this time it was perfectly dry, and the trenches were in a far better state than at any other time during the winter. When we left the sector the thaw was just making itself felt, and we fear that our successors must have had a lot of trouble repairing the trenches, which were bound to collapse as the frost came out of them. During the latter days of January we were preparing a raid to be carried out by a party of C Company, under Lieut. H. L. Lewis and 2nd Lieut. K. Pfeuffar, but we were relieved before it could take place.

On January 20 Lieut.-Col. J. C. Parker returned after an absence of over four months, and resumed command of the Battalion.