Chapter I: My Boyhood, and Entrance Into the Navy (12)

That is to say, each wing of the boom was more than half a mile long, and the distance between the extremities of the base was nearly a mile. This formidable obstacle was composed of large spars, bound by chains, and moored along its whole double line with heavy anchors at appropriate intervals, forming the most stupendous structure of the kind on record.

The statement of Captain Wooldridge to Lord Gambier, therefore, amounts to this,—that his ship, the _Mediator_, an Indiaman of 800 tons, broke up a double boom, each side of which was upwards of half a mile in length; tore up, by pressure on one point only, a double line of heavy anchors more than a mile in extent; and snapped many miles of iron chains and lashings connecting the spars together!!!—though her contact could not have been more than a few feet, the collision necessarily taking place on one wing of the boom only. This was Captain Wooldridge’s own version to Lord Gambier. To the nautical reader it is unnecessary to write one word of comment; so much so, indeed, that I will not insult the common sense even of the unprofessional reader by any attempt at further explanation.

Yet this statement was made by Captain Wooldridge, not only to Lord Gambier but to the officers composing the subsequent court-martial; more strangely still, it was _accepted by those officers_, though every one present must have known that the _Mediator_ would either have been brought up on her first contact with the boom, or, if she were weighty enough to overcome the obstacle, must have passed over it, by pressing it beneath her bow into the water.

It was not even pretended by those on board the _Mediator_ that any shock was felt! a pretty clear proof that, when she passed over the place where the boom _had been_, no such obstacle existed. That a vessel could have broken up a boom of such magnitude is too absurd for reflection. Nor, had not this version of the matter appeared in every naval history since 1809, should I have deemed a statement so truly incredible worthy of notice.[53]

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Footnote 53:

The _Mediator’_s log, now amongst the Admiralty records, is conclusive
on the point. It is carried up to midnight on the 11th, two hours and
a half after notifying that the ship was set on fire at 9.30 P.M., but
_does not say a word about breaking or even feeling a shock from any
boom_.

-----

Even the explosion-vessel did not break the boom by actual contact. It was the combined effect of the explosion upon the boom and upon the surface of the sea that shook it to pieces. The huge waves caused by the explosion lifted the boom along its entire length, and the strain so loosened the chains which bound the spars together, that the latter floated out of the fastenings, and were carried away with the tide, the chains sinking as a matter of course. It is certain that at daylight the next morning not a vestige of this formidable boom was to be seen; no one pretended to have seen so much as a single spar of it; though, had the _Mediator_ broken through it, as falsely alleged, the whole length of the boom, except the part ruptured, must necessarily have remained at anchor!!

CHAP. XXII.

ARRIVAL IN ENGLAND.

INTENDED VOTE OF THANKS TO LORD GAMBIER.—RESOLVE TO OPPOSE IT.—INTERVIEW
WITH LORD MULGRAVE.—LORD GAMBIER DEMANDS A COURT-MARTIAL.—HE IS
DIRECTED TO MAKE A FRESH REPORT OF THE ACTION IN BASQUE
ROADS.—INJUSTICE OF THIS SECOND DESPATCH.—ATTEMPT TO ENTRAP ME INTO
THE POSITION OF PROSECUTOR.—COMPOSITION AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE
COURT-MARTIAL.—THE ADMIRAL’S POINTS OF JUSTIFICATION.—DISPOSED OF BY
CAPTAIN BROUGHTON’S EVIDENCE, AND BY THAT OF CAPTAINS MALCOLM,
NEWCOMBE, AND SEYMOUR.—SIR HARRY NEALE’S EVIDENCE STOPPED BY ADMIRAL
YOUNG.

On the 26th of April, His Majesty was pleased to confer on me the Knighthood of the Order of the Bath.

Soon after Lord Gambier’s arrival in England, Lord Mulgrave informed me that a vote of thanks to the commander-in-chief would be proposed in the House of Commons. Whereupon I told Lord Mulgrave that it was my duty to apprise him that in my capacity as one of the members for Westminster, I would oppose the motion, on the ground that the commander-in-chief had not only done nothing to merit a vote of thanks, but had neglected to destroy the French fleet in Aix Roads, when it was clearly in his power to do so.

Lord Mulgrave entreated me not to persist in this determination, as such a course would not only prove injurious to the Government, but highly detrimental to myself, by raising up against me a host of enemies. The public, said his lordship, was satisfied with what had been done, and gave me full credit for my share therein, so that as I should be included in the vote of thanks, the recognition of Lord Gambier’s services could do me no harm.

I told his lordship that, speaking as a member of the House of Commons, I did not recognise Lord Gambier’s services at all, for that none had been rendered; and as for any thanks to myself, I would rather be without them, feeling conscious that I had not been enabled satisfactorily to carry out the earnest wishes of the Admiralty by the destruction of the enemy’s fleet, as impressed on me by his lordship before accepting the command with which I had been entrusted. I nevertheless begged his lordship to consider that in my professional capacity as a naval officer, I neither did offer nor had offered, any opinion whatever on Lord Gambier’s conduct, but that my position as member of Parliament for Westminster forbade my acquiescence in a public misrepresentation.

Lord Mulgrave replied, that I was even now accusing Lord Gambier in my professional capacity; the public would not draw the distinction between my professional and parliamentary conduct. I expressed my regret for the public want of discrimination, but told his lordship that this would not alter my determination.

Soon after this conversation Lord Mulgrave sent for me, and again entreated me, for my own sake, to reconsider my resolution, saying that he had reported our former conversation to the Government, which was highly dissatisfied therewith. His lordship further assured me that he was anxious about the matter on my account, as the course intimated would certainly bring me under high displeasure. To this I replied, that the displeasure of the Government would not for a moment influence my Parliamentary conduct, for which I held myself answerable to my constituents.

His lordship then said, “If you are on service, you cannot be in your place in Parliament. Now, my lord, I will make you a proposal. I will put under your orders three frigates, with _carte blanche_ to do whatever you please on the enemy’s coasts in the Mediterranean. I will further get you permission to go to Sicily, and embark on board your squadron my own regiment, which is stationed there. You know how to make use of such advantages.”

I thanked Lord Mulgrave for the offer, at the same time expressing my gratitude for his anxiety to preserve me from the evils of acting contrary to the wishes of the Government; but told his lordship that, were I to accept this offer, the country would regard my acquiescence as a bribe to hold my peace, whilst I could not regard it in any other light. Self-respect must, therefore, be my excuse for declining the proposal.

The anxiety of the then Government was, no doubt, to convert what had been effected in Aix Roads into political capital, as a victory which merited the thanks of parliament. My tacit aquiescence in the object of Government would have subjected me, and rightly, to a total loss of political confidence in the estimation of those with whom I acted. No man with the slightest pretensions to personal honesty or political consistency could, therefore, have decided otherwise than I did, even with the kind warning of Lord Mulgrave, that evil consequences to myself would follow—a prediction subsequently verified to the letter.

The upshot of the matter was, that on Lord Mulgrave communicating my determination to Lord Gambier, the latter demanded a court-martial.

As soon as my fixed resolution of opposing the vote of thanks became known to the Government, the Board of Admiralty directed Lord Gambier to make a _fresh report_ of the action in Basque Roads! requiring his lordship to call upon various officers for further reports as to the part they took therein!

Accordingly, on the 10th of May, Lord Gambier forwarded _a new despatch_ to the Admiralty, _in which my services were altogether passed over!!!_ notwithstanding that, in Lord Gambier’s previous report, he had written as follows:—“I cannot speak in sufficient terms of admiration and applause of the vigorous and gallant attack made by Lord Cochrane upon the French line-of-battle ships which were on shore; as well as of his judicious manner of approaching them, and placing his ship in a position most advantageous to annoy the enemy and preserve his own ship, which could not be exceeded by any feat of valour hitherto achieved by the British navy.”

Still more singularly, in the second despatch, which is too long for insertion[54], Lord Gambier inadvertently confirms the fact that _no attack on the French fleet would have been made at all_, had it not been for my having commenced an attack with the _Impérieuse_ alone, which movement, as has been said, was executed literally _by stealth_, under the fear that the signal of recall would be hoisted by the commander-in-chief!

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Footnote 54:

The letter in question will be found at p. 7 of “Minutes of a
Court-Martial on Lord Gambier, taken in short-hand by W. B. Gurney,”
and, as therein stated, revised by his lordship.

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It having, for reasons described in a former chapter, become imperative on Lord Gambier to send us assistance, he, nevertheless, construed this into an _intention_ on his part to attack the enemy. “_Observing the Impérieuse to advance, and the time of flood nearly done running, the Indefatigable_, &c. &c. were ordered to the attack!” It is not very probable that, had Lord Gambier intended an attack, he would have let the flood-tide go by, without taking advantage of it in a channel which was afterwards declared unsafe from want of water!

This passage alone of Lord Gambier’s second despatch ought to have decided the result of any court-martial. The Board of Admiralty would not, however, see anything inculpatory of their former colleague; but, on the 29th of May, ordered me, through their secretary, to become the accuser of the commander-in-chief; “I am commanded by their Lordships to signify their directions that you state fully to me, for their information, the grounds on which your lordship objects to the vote of thanks being moved to Lord Gambier, to the end that them Lordships’ objections may be of a nature to justify the suspension of the intended motion in Parliament, or to call for any further information.”—(Signed) “W. W. POLE.”

This command was manifestly intended to entrap me into the position of Lord Gambier’s prosecutor, and was, moreover, an improper interference with my Parliamentary capacity, in which alone I had declared my intention to oppose an uncalled-for vote of thanks to the commander-in-chief. I therefore wrote to the Secretary of the Admiralty the subjoined reply.

“Portman Square, 30th May, 1809.

“SIR,—I have to request that you will submit to their Lordships that I
shall, at all times, entertain a due sense of the honour they will
confer by any directions they may be pleased to give me; that in
pursuing the object of these directions, my exertions will invariably
go hand in hand with my duty; and that, to satisfy their Lordships’
minds in the present instance, I beg leave to state that the log and
signal log-books of the fleet in Basque Roads contain all particulars,
and furnish premises whence accurate conclusions may be drawn; that,
as these books are authentic public documents, and as I cannot myself
refer to them, anything I could offer to their Lordships on the
subject would be altogether superfluous, and would appear presumptuous
interruptions to their Lordships’ judgment, which will, doubtless,
always found itself upon those grounds only that cannot be disputed.

“I have, &c. &c.
“COCHRANE.

“The Hon. W. W. Pole,
Secretary to the Admiralty.”

This reply, though plain, was respectful; but, as I had afterwards good reason to know, was deemed very offensive; the result being that, _after two months’ delay_ to enable Lord Gambier to get up his defence, a court-martial was assembled on the 26th of July, on board the _Gladiator_, at Portsmouth, the court being composed of the following members:—

PRESIDENT—Sir Roger Curtis, Port-Admiral.

ADMIRALS—Young, Stanhope, Campbell, Douglas, Duckworth, and Sutton.

CAPTAINS—Irwin, Dickson, Hall, and Dunn.

It may perhaps be asked in what way a court-martial on Lord Gambier can so far concern me as to occupy a prominent place in this autobiography? The reply is, that, notwithstanding my repudiation, I was regarded at the court-martial as his accuser, though not permitted to be present so as to cross-examine witnesses; the whole proceeding being conducted in my absence, rather as a prosecution against me than Lord Gambier; and that the result was injurious to myself, as Lord Mulgrave had predicted, involving the punishment of not being employed with my frigate at Flushing, there to put in execution plans for the certain destruction of the French fleet in the Scheldt; so that, in order to punish me, the enemy’s fleet was suffered to remain in security, when it might easily have been destroyed.

The reader must not imagine that I am about to inflict on him the evidence of a nine days’ trial; but without some extracts therefrom, it is impossible to comprehend the matter. Let him bear in mind that Lord Gambier relied for justification on three points:—1st, That, had he sent in the fleet, its safety would have been endangered by the fortifications of Aix (which he had previously spoken of as being dismantled); 2nd, Want of water to navigate the fleet in safety; and 3rdly, From the fire of the enemy’s vessels driven ashore (though lightened of their guns and stores).

CAPTAIN BROUGHTON (of the _Illustrious_).—“I was in Basque Roads, in
the _Amelia_, on the 17th of March, and when within gunshot of the
Isle of Aix observed the fortifications as being under repair, from
the quantity of rubbish thrown up. I thought the fortifications on the
island were not so strong as we supposed, and so reported to Lord
Gambier. This was on the 1st of April. I did not notice any furnaces
for heating red-hot shot. We were just out of gunshot,—_they fired at
us from both sides, but none reached us_.”

In reply to the question, “whether everything was done that could be done to effect the destruction of the enemy’s ships?” Captain Broughton said:—

“It would have been more advantageous if the line-of-battle ships,
frigates, and small vessels had _gone in at half-flood_, about 11
o’clock. There were _nine sail ashore_, and if the British ships had
been ordered in, it would have been more advantageous. There were only
_two_ of the enemy’s ships at anchor, and the _fleet_, had it gone in,
would have been exposed to _their_ fire; but I conceived they were
panic-struck, and on the appearance of a force might have been induced
to cut their cables, and escape up the river. A ship or two might have
been placed, in my opinion, against the batteries on the southern part
of Isle d’Aix so as to take off their fire, and _silence them_. I told
Sir Henry Neale, on board the _Caledonia_, when the signal was made
for all captains in the mooring, that ‘_they were attackable from the
confused way in which the French ships were at the time_;’ viz. from
having run ashore in the night, in order to escape from the
fire-ships, which they imagined would explode.

“As the wind was north-westerly and northerly, ships might have found
safe anchorage in what is called, in my French chart, le Grand
Trousse, where there is thirty or forty feet of water _out of range of
shot or shells in any direction_. When we first came into Basque
Roads, if the charts were to be believed, _there appeared to be water
enough in that position. I do not know anything of any shoal water. I
sounded from the wreck of the Varsovie to that anchorage, and found no
shoal there_. Two ships of the line would have been sufficient to have
silenced the batteries on Aix, and five or six of the least draught of
water to attack the enemy’s ships. The discomfited French squadron
would have made very little resistance. The loss would have been very
little, as few of their ships were in a situation to fight their
guns.”

Here a distinguished officer shows that two ships could have silenced the batteries; that, in case of damage, there was plenty of water for them to retire to out of reach; and that the French ships, being ashore, could not use their guns.

CAPTAIN PULTENEY MALCOLM (of the _Donegal_).—“I saw the enemy’s
three-decker on shore. Till about noon she was heeling over
considerably, and appeared to me to be _heaving her guns overboard_.
She got off about two o’clock; _all the ships got off, except those
that were destroyed_. Had it appeared to me that there was no other
chance of destroying those ships but by such an attack, I CERTAINLY
THINK IT OUGHT TO HAVE BEEN MADE. _Had they been attacked by the
British ships, in my opinion they could not have been warped off from
the shore, as it was necessary so to do, to lay out anchors to heave
them off._”

_Question._—“Would you, had you commanded the British fleet, have sent
in ships to attack the enemy’s ships on shore?”

_Answer._—“The moment the two ships quitted their defensive position,
the risk was then small, and OF COURSE I WOULD HAVE SENT THEM IN
INSTANTLY.”

This evidence is pretty decisive, but its plain tendency was attempted to be neutralised by the question whether there would have been _risk of damage_, had the British fleet been sent in to attack the enemy’s ships when ashore! The great point of defence throughout was risk to the ships, as though the chief use of ships of war was to save them from injury.

CAPTAIN F. NEWCOMBE (of the _Beagle_).—“Can you state any instance of
neglect, misconduct, or inattention in the proceedings of the
Commander-in-chief, between the 11th and the 18th?”

_Answer._—“None; save and except, had the Commander-in-chief thought
proper, from his situation, TO HAVE SENT IN VESSELS EARLIER THAN THEY
WERE SENT, though there might be a great risk in so doing, there was a
possibility of annoying the enemy more than they were annoyed.”

CAPTAIN GEORGE FRANCIS SEYMOUR (of the _Pallas_.)—“I saw the
_Impérieuse_ inform the Commander-in-chief, by signal, that if allowed
to remain he could destroy the enemy: there was every prospect of
preventing them from getting off, as it would prevent their carrying
out hawsers to heave off by. From what I afterwards saw, I think the
ships might have floated in sooner—they might have come in with the
last half of the flood-tide.”

PRESIDENT.—“How much sooner would that have been than the time they
actually did join?”

_Answer._—“At _eleven o’clock_.”

_Question._—“What time did the line-of-battle ships join?”

_Answer._—“_Within a short time after two o’clock._”

_Question._—“Is your opinion formed from information obtained since
the 12th of April, or on that day?”

_Answer._—“It was formed from the depth of water _we found_ ON GOING
IN.”

This evidence, coming from an officer of Captain Seymour’s character and standing, was so decisive, that it was subjected to a severe cross-examination, of which the subjoined is the substance:—

“It is impossible for me to foretell the event of such an attack, it
so much depending on fortuitous circumstances. I cannot say that the
line-of-battle ships _should_ have gone in; I was not in possession of
the Commander-in-chief’s information. _I state the fact, and leave the
Court to judge._ I mean to say, _there would have been water enough
for the line-of-battle ships to have floated in_. As to the opposition
they would have met with, the Court has as much before them as I
have.”

If the reader will refer to Lord Gambier’s expression, in his second despatch of the 10th of May (see page 407), it will be evident that no attack whatever was intended; “but observing the _Impérieuse_ to advance,” it became imperative to support her, _i.e._ when the _flood-tide “had nearly done running.”_ This is the true explanation of the British ships having been sent in _at all_. I repeat, that the advance of the _Impérieuse_ thus forced on the little that was done. Had an attack been seriously intended, the time at which the British fleet should have gone in was that pointed out by the preceding officers, viz. when the French ships were aground, and the whole within reach of destruction; instead of when the few, which were unable to get off by any exertions, were assailed. To have rested a case upon the danger to the British fleet from the fire of the ships _ashore_, with their guns thrown overboard to lighten them, was a course of defence which, for the honour of the British navy, is elsewhere unparalleled.

There is no necessity to adduce further extracts on this head; and I have purposely refrained from introducing my own evidence; but the _animus_ by which the Court was actuated in the case must not be lightly passed over.

One of the principal witnesses was, as a matter of course, the Captain of the Fleet, Sir Harry Neale. This officer, though thoroughly conversant with both the acts and intentions of the commander-in-chief, was directed by the President openly, _not to state the opinions he had given to Lord Gambier on public services_! By Admiral Young Sir Harry Neale was told _to say nothing but what he was directed to detail_! This would be incredible were it not printed in “Minutes of the Court-Martial, revised by Lord Gambier!”

Sir H. NEALE (Captain of the Fleet).—“There were continued
conversations between the Commander-in-chief and me. I have given him
my opinion _on different services_; some of those he may have
approved, and _some he may not have approved_.”

PRESIDENT.—“I apprehend _these_ are _not_ to be stated!”

Yet Sir H. Neale carefully marked the distinction between private conversation and the _public service_, by using the term “different services;” he being evidently ready to tell all he knew as regarded the public service. He was, however, stopped by Admiral Young in one of the strangest injunctions which ever fell from the lips of a judge.

ADMIRAL YOUNG.—“If you are directed _to detail_ any circumstances, you
are _then_ to say all you know of the circumstances you _are directed
to detail_; but if you are asked a specific question, your oath, I
imagine, will _only_ oblige you to answer SPECIFICALLY and directly,
and as fully as you _can, the question which is proposed to you_!”

So that Sir Harry Neale was cautioned that, if he was _not_ directed to detail circumstances, he was not to relate them, however important they might be! And if asked only a specific question, he was merely to answer _specifically_; though the Court could know nothing of the facts, unless they permitted the witnesses to tell the truth, and the whole truth, in the very words of the oath.

But as Sir Harry Neale was known to be a man not likely to be thus peremptorily silenced, half a dozen insignificant questions were, therefore, only put to him by the Court, with the exception of one or two leading questions from Lord Gambier.

CHAP. XXIII.

LORD GAMBIER’S DESPATCH.

ITS OMISSIONS AND SUPPRESSIONS.—MOTIVE FOR LORD GAMBIER’s
MISSTATEMENTS.—MR. FAIRFAX REPORTS THAT THE MEDIATOR WENT IN FIFTH,
NOT FIRST.—REASON OF THE CONTRARY ASSERTION.—NAPOLEON ATTRIBUTES THE
ESCAPE OF HIS FLEET TO THE IMBECILITY OF LORD GAMBIER.—MISMANAGEMENT
OF THE FIRESHIPS.—LORD GAMBIER’s DELAY AND MISDIRECTION.—HIS
PERVERSION OF FACT.—HIS MISPLACED PRAISE.—THE DESPATCH FAILS TO
SATISFY THE PUBLIC.—CRITICISED BY THE PRESS.—ADMIRAL GRAVIÈRE’s
ACCOUNT OF THE TERMINATION OF THE ACTION.

The despatch brought to England by Sir Harry Neale set out with the perversion, that the fireships, “arranged according to my plan,” were “led on in the most undaunted and determined manner by Captain Wooldridge in the _Mediator, preceded by some vessels filled with powder and shells, as proposed by Lord Cochrane, with a view to explosion_!”

The omission of the fact that before Captain Wooldridge “led the fireships” I had myself preceded them in the explosion vessel, and that, even before the _Mediator_ proceeded on service in obedience to the signals made by my order from the _Impérieuse_, the explosion vessel under my personal command was half-way towards the French fleet; the suppression of my name as having anything at all to do with the attack by means of the explosion vessels, notwithstanding that by going first I ran all the risk of being boarded by the French guard-boats, and myself and crew murdered, as would have been the case had we been captured, showed that the object of the commander-in-chief was to suppress all mention of me, my plans, or their execution, as entitled to any credit for the mischief done to the enemy.

The despatch leads the reader to infer that the success subsequently obtained arose from the “undaunted and determined manner in which Captain Wooldridge led the fireships,” from “Admiral Stopford’s zealous co-operation with the boats,” though not one of these ever stirred from alongside the _Cæsar_, anchored full four miles from the scene of action, and from the plans of the commander-in-chief himself.

That this suppression of all mention of the success of my plans in driving the whole enemy’s fleet ashore with the exception of two ships of the line, was deliberately intended by the commander-in-chief, is placed beyond question by the contemptuous manner in which he speaks of the means which really effected the mischief,—“_some vessels filled with powder and shells, with a view to explosion_.” That these means, conducted by myself, not Captain Wooldridge, _did_ drive the French ships ashore, has been admitted by every French and English historian since that period; and that this was done by my personal presence and instrumentality is a historical fact which nothing can shake or pervert. The only person ignoring the fact was the commander-in-chief of the British force, who not only gives me no credit for what had been done, but does not even mention my name, as having, by the above means, contributed to the result!

The sole conceivable motive for such a suppression of the success of my plans must have been that, having neglected to take advantage of the helpless condition of the French ships driven ashore, it was desirable to conceal the whole of the facts from the British public, by ascribing the success gained to other, and totally different causes, and thus to convert a deep discredit into a great victory!

The despatch goes on to state that, “the _Mediator, by breaking the boom!_” opened the way for the fireships, “but, owing to the darkness of the night, several mistook their course and failed.”

At the conclusion of the last chapter, such reasons have, I think, been given why the _Mediator_ could not have broken a double boom nearly a mile in extent as ought to have set the question for ever at rest. But as that statement, notwithstanding its impossibility, is endorsed by the commander-in-chief as the groundwork of his despatch, it will be necessary to refute his lordship’s statement also, and that from the evidence of an officer upon whose testimony he must necessarily rely, viz. Mr. Fairfax, the master of the fleet, who was deputed in the _Lyra_ to observe the effect produced by the fireships, and, as a matter of course, reported to the commander-in-chief the result of his observations, which were as follows:—

“When the explosion-vessel blew up, she was about two cables’ length
from the _Lyra_. The _Lyra_, as well as the other explosion-vessel, is
marked in the chart produced by me. When she blew up, the fire vessels
_all_ seemed to steer for that point. _I hailed four of them, and the
Mediator_, and desired the _Mediator_ to steer south-east, or else she
would miss the _French fleet_.”—_Minutes_, p. 177.

In another place Mr. Fairfax states that the night was so dark that it was difficult to make out exact positions; but the testimony of Captain Proteau, of the _Indienne_, that the explosion took place _at the boom_, “_à l’estacade_,” is indisputable, as the _Indienne_, by Captain Proteau’s testimony, was lying so close to the boom and the explosion-vessel also, as only to escape the effect of the latter by her shells going over. The spot, therefore, where the explosion took place is historically beyond doubt.

The testimony of Mr. Fairfax, then—and it must be borne in mind that I had no worse enemy in the fleet than that person—is this:—1st, The explosion took place; 2ndly, _all_ the fireships steered for the point where it had taken place; 3rdly, Mr. Fairfax hailed _four_ of them; 4thly, the _Mediator_ then came up, _steering in a wrong direction_, so that in place of “leading the fireships in the most undaunted and determined manner,” as vouched for by the commander-in-chief, the master of the fleet, who was on the spot, vouches that she was the _fifth fireship which came up_, and that had he not set her right in her course she would have “missed the French fleet;” _i.e._ she was behind the other fireships, and _steering outside the boom, which lay in front of the French fleet!_

It would, I think, be superfluous to say another word about this extraordinary story of the boom, nor should I have condescended to notice it at all in connection with the despatch, but that the commander-in-chief makes it the groundwork of his report to the Government, for the unworthy purpose of altogether omitting my name as connected with the explosion-vessels, and for leading the public to infer that these produced _no effect whatever, either on the boom or the French fleet!_ which is indeed the main object of the despatch.

It was, however, necessary to give some reason why the French fleet ran ashore; and as it was not considered expedient to give me the credit of causing it to do so by the terror created from the explosion, the commander-in-chief, despite his own judgment as a seaman, appears to have caught at Captain Wooldridge’s story of breaking the boom, and other subsequent exploits just as unfounded; though the master of the fleet must have reported that some time after the explosion-vessel had done its work _he fell in with the Mediator, steering in a wrong direction, and set her right in her course!!!_

I forbear to speak of having myself encountered the _Mediator_ after passing several other fireships, as that would be assertion only. Of the effect produced, and by what means it was produced, the subjoined extract from the _Times_ newspaper of May 4th, 1809, will furnish some idea, as coming from French sources:—

“Some letters have been received from the French coast, which bear
testimony to the destructive result of the late attack an the enemy’s
fleet in Basque Roads. ‘Your _infernal machines_,’ says one of the
letters, ‘have not only destroyed several of our ships, but they have
rendered almost all the remainder unfit to put to sea again. They have
proved the destruction of more than 2000 of our people, (?) and
_petrified the rest with fear_. The mouth of the Charente river is
completely blocked up with wreck.’”[55]

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Footnote 55:

That is, of the boom, for no ship had been wrecked at the mouth of the
Charente.

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Yet two days after the departure of the _Impérieuse_, the commander-in-chief addressed another despatch to the Admiralty, from which the subjoined is an extract:—

“_Caledonia_, April 16, 1809.

“It has blown violently from the southward and westward ever since the
departure of the _Impérieuse_, which has rendered it _impracticable to
act in any way with the small vessels or boats of the fleet_ against
the enemy. I have the satisfaction to observe this morning, that the
enemy have set fire to their frigate _L’Indienne_, and that the ship
of the line which is aground at the entrance of the river—supposed to
be the _Regulus_—there is every reason to believe will be wrecked.”

The Emperor Napoleon himself is, moreover, an authority on the subject, not to be passed over.

“Some conversation now took place about Lord Cochrane, and the attempt
which his lordship had made to capture or destroy the ships in the
Charente.

“I said it was the opinion of a very distinguished officer, whom I
named, and who was well known to him (Napoleon), that if Cochrane had
been properly supported, he would have destroyed the whole of the
French ships.

“‘He would not only have destroyed them,’ replied Napoleon, ‘but _he
might and would have taken them out_, had your admiral supported him
as he ought to have done. For, in consequence of the signal made by
L’Allemand’ (I think he said) ‘to the ships to do the best in their
power to save themselves—_sauve qui peut_, in fact—they became
panic-struck, and cut their cables. The terror of the _brûlots_[56]
was so great, that they _actually threw their powder overboard, so
that they could have offered very little resistance_.’

-----

Footnote 56:

Napoleon, like other French writers, includes the explosion vessels
under the general term _brûlot_.

-----

“‘The French admiral,’ continued Napoleon, ‘was an _imbecile_, but
yours was just as bad. I assure you, that if Cochrane had been
supported, he would have taken every one of the ships. They ought not
to have been alarmed by your _brûlots_, but fear deprived them of
their senses, and they no longer knew how to act in their own
defence.’”—_O’Meara’s Napoleon_, vol. ii. p. 291.

Were it worth while, numerous testimonies of the like character could be gathered from French official sources, but it is necessary to mention some other points of the despatch.

The commander-in-chief’s assertion, that, “_owing to the darkness of the night, several fireships mistook their course and failed_,” was true enough, but not the _whole truth_, which was, that, from their clumsy management—neither going in the right direction, nor being kindled at the right time or place—_not one out of the twenty-three fireships took effect_!

The despatch goes on to state, that at daylight Lord Cochrane signaling that seven of the enemy’s ships were on shore, and might be destroyed, the commander-in-chief “_immediately_”[57] ordered the fleet to unmoor and weigh, _intending_ to proceed with it to their destruction; but the wind blowing fresh _from the northward_[58], and _the flood-tide running_[59], rendered it too hazardous to enter Aix Roads, wherefore the fleet again anchored about three miles from the forts on Isle d’Aix.

-----

Footnote 57:

Four hours afterwards.

Footnote 58:

And therefore a fair wind.

Footnote 59:

Consequently favourable for the fleet to enter Aix Roads.

-----

This was, indeed, all that the fleet collectively did, or that the commander-in-chief intended it to do. Seeing, however, the “_enemy warping off their ships_” and that, whilst the fleet was unmooring and anchoring again, “_they had succeeded in getting off all but five of the line!_” the commander-in-chief “gave orders to Capt. Bligh of the _Valiant_, with the _Revenge_, frigates, bombs, &c.,”—to attack those that remained aground? Nothing of the kind, but—“_to anchor near the Boyart Shoal, in readiness for an attack_!!” An odd way truly of preventing the five remaining enemy’s ships, then throwing their guns overboard for the purpose of lightening themselves, from warping off!!

“At twenty minutes past two, P.M.,” continues the commander-in-chief, “Lord Cochrane advanced in the _Impérieuse_, with his accustomed gallantry and spirit, and opened a well-directed fire on the _Calcutta_, which _struck her colours to the Impérieuse_.” Lord Gambier afterwards _denied this_, though almost the only part of the action which he was near enough to see with his own eyes! Indeed, the terms of the despatch are decisive of having been detailed from his own personal observations!

But now comes the monstrous part of the assertion; viz. “The ships and vessels above-mentioned _soon after_ joined in the attack on the _Ville de Varsovie_ and _Aquilon_, and obliged them to strike their colours,” &c. Instead of “_soon after_,” the _Valiant_, _Revenge_, &c., remained at anchor near the Boyart, till my signal “In want of assistance,” had been wrongly interpreted as a signal of “distress.” But for this, it is clear that not an anchor would have been weighed. Yet the commander-in-chief made the act of sending in these ships, _when it could no longer be avoided_, appear part of a previous plan to attack the _Ville de Varsovie_ and _Aquilon_, and that they were sent for this purpose _soon after_ my attack on the _Calcutta_ and them simultaneously!

This is not only a perversion of fact, but a suppression of it; for the commander-in-chief must have seen that the _Impérieuse_ was engaged with the _Aquilon_ and _Ville de Varsovie_, as well as with the _Calcutta_, before the _Valiant_, _Revenge_, &c., were ordered in to our assistance, as requested by my signal. And here it must be distinctly understood, that _had not a portion of the fleet been compelled by this justifiable device of my signaling “In want of assistance,” to come to our supposed aid, no attack would have been made_. To avert this disgrace, I resolved, if necessary, to sacrifice my ship.

Throughout the whole despatch, there is not a word to indicate that the terror caused by the explosion-vessels had anything to do with the success gained. On the contrary, the success is attributed to causes purely imaginary. Great credit is given to me “for the vigorous and gallant attack on the French line-of-battle ships ashore,” and for “my judicious manner of approaching them, and placing my ship in a position most advantageous to annoy the enemy, and _preserve my own ship!_ which,” continued his Lordship, “could not be exceeded by any feat of valour hitherto achieved by the British navy!”

The plain fact is, and it will by this time be evident to others besides nautical men, that the just quoted piece of claptrap was considered in the light of a sop to my supposed vanity, sufficient to insure my holding my peace on the subject of the fleet not having even contemplated an attack till forced into it by my signal being mistaken for being “in distress.”

Instead of being praised for what my plans really effected, I was praised for what was neither done nor intended to be done. Instead of adopting “a judicious manner of approaching the enemy, so as _to preserve my ship_,” I drifted the _Impérieuse_ in like a log with the tide, and stern foremost, for fear of being recalled, and then went at the enemy with a determination, not to preserve, but _to lose_ my ship, if the commander-in-chief did not relieve her before she was riddled with shot; this being my only hope of forcing on an attack of any kind. My motive was, no doubt, fathomed from seeing me attack three line-of-battle ships simultaneously. Not a moment was to be lost, and for the first time, since the French ran their ships ashore in terror, two British line-of-battle ships, and some frigates, approached the spot where the enemy’s vessels had been lying aground _ever since the previous midnight_, helpless, and, as every French authority admits, hopeless of escape, had the slightest effort been made to prevent it.

In place, then, of attacking these with a single frigate, in such a way as to “_preserve my ship_,” I here avow that I rushed at the enemy in the bitterness of despair, determined that if a portion of the fleet was not sent in, the _Impérieuse_ should never again float out; for rather than incur the stigma which would have awaited me in England, from no fault of mine, but because it was not expedient that plans which had been partially successful should be fully accomplished, she should have been destroyed.

This despatch, inexplicable as it was felt to be, naturally suggested to the public mind in England, that, despite its assumption of a great victory, the result of the victory was by no means commensurate with the tone of exultation assumed. The French fleet was _not_ destroyed; and it was equally manifest, that if but little had been effected, it was owing to the time which had been suffered to elapse between my first signals and the tardy aid reluctantly yielded in support of them. By that kind of intuitive perception characteristic of the British press, it was agreed that there had been mismanagement somewhere, but _where_ was not to be gathered from the commander-in-chief’s despatch, in which everything “by favour of the Almighty,”[60] as the despatch most reprehensibly set forth, had succeeded.

-----

Footnote 60:

There is something very revolting to a truly religious mind in these
derogatory phrases, which couple the beneficent Author of our being
with the butcheries of war. Under no circumstances are they
defensible. But when the name of the great and merciful Creator is
made subservient to an attempt to palm off as a great victory that
which, in reality, was a great disgrace even to the human means
available, there is something shocking in the perversion of language
which should only be uttered with the profoundest reverence, and on
occasions in strict coincidence with the attributes of the sacred name
invoked. In this case _fireships_ had been denounced as horrible and
antichristian, yet _explosion vessels_—engines of destruction tenfold
more diabolical—had, “by favour of the Almighty,” succeeded!

-----

It is not surprising, then, that the press began to criticise the despatch on its own merits. The following remarks are extracted from a _Times_ leading article in the paper of April 25th, 1809, by way of specimen:—

“None felt more joy than ourselves at the destruction of four French
vessels in Basque (Aix) Roads. We have, however, been given to
understand that there are some people conversant in these things,
whose satisfaction is not quite so complete as was our own on the
result of the action.

* * * * * * * *

“Lord Cochrane’s first signal, as we learn from the _Gazette_, to the
admiral of the fleet, was that ‘seven of the enemy’s ships were on
shore, and might be destroyed.’ The question which hereupon naturally
suggests itself to the mind is, ‘Why, then, if seven might be
destroyed, were there only four?’

“The despatch proceeds. ‘I _immediately_ made the signal for the fleet
to unmoor and weigh.’ Indeed! Had Admiral Lord Gambier to unmoor at
the time he received this intelligence? Did he not expect this might
be the case? Or with what view was Lord Cochrane sent up the Roads? We
are not much acquainted with naval matters, and therefore ask for
information. To reason by analogy, if a military commander, knowing
the enemy to be near, should send forward a detachment to reconnoitre
and to attack, if possible, he would at least keep the rest of his
troops under arms, that he might be ready to advance at a moment’s
warning, and to sustain his own party when necessary.”

* * * * * * * *

The most honest account I have ever seen of the termination of the action, is written by the venerable and gallant Admiral Gravière, who was present at the attack. It will be found in the _Revue des Deux Mondes_ for 1858. From this, though incorrect in stating that I commanded a division, I make the subjoined extract, which shall close the subject:—

“Un esprit de vertige semblait s’être emparé, dans cette affreuse
nuit, et dans les journées qui suivirent, des plus braves capitaines.
Des vaisseaux que l’ennemi n’avait pas même attaqués furent abandonnés
par leurs équipages, et des hommes héroïques partagèrent la faiblesse
commune.

“_La mollesse de Lord Gambier_, le courage et le sang froid de
quelques-uns de nos officiers, préservèrent seuls l’escadre française
d’une ruine totale.”

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

LONDON
PRINTED BY SPOTTISWOODE AND CO.
NEW-STREET SQUARE

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Transcriber’s Note

A simple diagram of a French defensive boom, on p. 400, seems geometrically suspect. A triangle with two ‘400 toise’ sides, cannot have an ‘800 toise’ opposing side. (A ‘toise’ is a French measure slightly less than two meters.) The French description the obstacle is on p. 381, beginning with ‘Elle étoit flanquée...’.

Footnote 41 (297.28 refers to _Michelot_ de Prato, which appears in the text as _Michelet_. These are references to Micheletto Corella, a Catalan soldier who served as Cesar Borgia’s executioner.

Errors deemed most likely to be the printer’s have been corrected, and are noted here. The references are to the page and line in the original.

ix.8 I must have p[er/re]maturely sunk. Transposed.
2.8 to the grant [w]hich Dungal Restored.
21.33 [“]Your lordship’s real friend Added.
60.8 that our national[,] safety depended on Removed.
98.11 sunk [her.] Restored.
292.1 to render it useless[,/.] Replaced.
340.1 He th[a/e]n ran for Madeira Replaced.
342.6 an immense amount of mischief[,/.] Replaced.
422.6 “‘The French admiral,[”/’] Replaced.