Chapter III: Part 3

After speaking of the Gods and our country, what person deserves to be mentioned more than, or prior to our parents? Hence it is requisite that we should discourse about them. He, therefore, will not err who says, that they are certain secondary and terrestrial Gods; since on account of their proximity to us, they are, if it be lawful so to speak, more to be honoured by us than the Gods themselves[45]. But it is necessary, previously, to assume, that the only measure of gratitude towards them is a perpetual and unremitting promptitude to repay the benefits we have received from them; since, though we should perform many things for their sake, yet they will be far less than what they deserve. At the same time, also, it may be said, that these our deeds are nearly theirs, because they produced us by whom they are performed. As therefore, if the works of Phidias and of other artists should themselves produce certain other things, we should not hesitate to say that these latter, also, were the works of the artists; thus, likewise, it may be justly said, that our performances are the deeds of our parents; through whom we likewise derived our existence. Hence, in order that we may easily apprehend the duties which we owe them, it will be requisite to have this sentence perpetually at hand, that our parents should be considered by us as the images of the Gods; and by Jupiter, as domestic Gods, our benefactors, kindred, creditors, lords, and most stable friends. For they are most stable images of the Gods, possessing a similitude to them beyond the power of art to effect. For they are the guardian Gods of the house, and live with us; and besides this, they are our greatest benefactors, imparting to us things of the greatest consequence; and, by Jupiter, bestowing on us not only what we possess, but also such things as they wish to give us, and for which they themselves pray. Farther still, they are likewise our nearest kindred, and the causes of our alliance with others. They are, also, creditors of things of the most honourable nature, and only repay themselves by taking what we shall be benefited by returning. For what gain can be so great to a child as piety and gratitude to his parents? They are most justly, too, our lords: for of what can we be in a greater degree the possession, than of those through whom we exist? Moreover, they are perpetual and spontaneous friends and auxiliaries; at all times, and in every circumstance, affording us assistance. Since, however, the name of parent is the most excellent of all the before-mentioned appellations, according to which we also denominate the Gods themselves; something else must also be added to this conception; viz. that children should be persuaded that they dwell in their father’s house, as if they were certain ministers and priests in a temple, appointed and consecrated for this purpose by nature herself; who entrusted a reverential attention to their parents to their care. Since of attentive regard, therefore, one kind pertains to the body, but another to the soul, we shall readily perform what each of these requires, if we are willing to do that which reason persuades us to do. But reason persuades us to pay less attention to the body than to the soul; though attention to the former is necessary. We should, therefore, procure for our parents liberal food, and such as is adapted to the imbecility of old age; and besides this, a bed, sleep, unction, a bath, garments; and in short, all the necessaries which the body requires, that they may never at any time experience the want of any of these; in thus acting, imitating their care about our nurture, when we were infants. Hence, we should compel ourselves to employ a certain prophetic attention to them, in order to discover what they particularly desire of things pertaining to the body, though they should not indicate the object of their wish[46]. For they divined many things respecting us, when we frequently signified by inarticulate and mournful sounds, that we were in want of certain things, but were unable to indicate clearly the subjects of our wants. So that our parents, by the benefits which they formerly conferred upon us, become the preceptors to us of what we ought to bestow on them.

With respect to the souls of our parents, we should, in the first place, procure for them hilarity; which will be especially obtained, if we are conversant with them by night and by day, unless something prevents us, walking, being anointed, and living together with them. For as to those who are undertaking a long journey, the converse of their families and friends is most delightful, after the manner of those that accompany a solemn procession; thus, also, to parents who are now verging to the grave, the sedulous and unremitting attention of their children is most acceptable, and most dear. Moreover, if at any time they should act wrong, which frequently happens to be the case with many, and especially with those who have been educated in a more vulgar manner; they should be corrected indeed, yet not by Jupiter with reprehension, as we are accustomed to do to our inferiors or equals, but as it were, with exhortation; and not as if they had erred through ignorance, but as if they had committed an oversight, through inattention; and that if they had attended, they would by no means have erred. For admonitions, and especially if they are vehement, are grievous to those that are old. Hence, it is necessary, that the remedy of their oversight should be accompanied by mild exhortation, and a certain elegant artifice. Children, likewise, increase the joy of their parents, by performing for them servile offices, such as washing their feet, making their bed, and waiting on them after the manner of servants. For they are not a little delighted, when they receive necessary servile attentions from the most dear hands of their children, and make use of their ministrant works. But parents will be especially gratified when their children are seen to honour those whom they love and very much esteem. On which account, it is fit that children should affectionately love the kindred of their parents, and pay a proper attention to them, and in a similar manner should love the friends of, and all those that are dear to their parents. And this being admitted, we shall be enabled to collect many other duties of children to their parents, which are neither small nor casual. For since our parents are gratified by the attention which we pay to those whom they love, but we are in a most eminent degree beloved by our parents, it is evident that we shall very much please them, by paying a proper attention to ourselves.

ON FRATERNAL LOVE.

The first admonition, therefore, is very clear, easily obtained, and is common to all men. For it is a sane assertion, which every man will consider as evident. And it is this: Act by every one, in the same manner as if you supposed yourself to be him, and him to be you[47]. For he will use a servant well who considers with himself, how he would think it proper to be used by him, if he indeed was the master, and himself the servant. The same thing also must be said of parents with respect to children, and of children with respect to parents; and, in short, of all men with respect to all. This admonition, however, is transcendently adapted to the alliance of brothers to each other; since nothing else is necessary for him to admit previously, who considers how he ought to conduct himself towards his brother, than promptly to assume the natural sameness of the person of each of them. This, therefore, is the first admonition, that a man should act towards his brother in the same way in which he would think it proper that his brother should act towards him. But, by Jupiter, some one may say, I do not exceed propriety in my manners and am equitable, but my brother’s manners are rough and without affability. Such a one, however, does not speak rightly. For, in the first place, perhaps he does not speak the truth; since an excessive love of self is sufficient [to induce a man] to magnify and extol what pertains to himself, but to diminish and vilify what pertains to others. Frequently, therefore, men of inferior worth, prefer themselves to others who are far more excellent characters. And, in the next place, though the brother should be in reality such a person [as above described], I should say, prove yourself to be a better man than he is, and you will vanquish his rusticity by your beneficence. For no great thanks are due to those who conduct themselves moderately towards worthy and benignant men; but to render him more mild who is stupid, and whose manners are rough, is the work of a man [properly so called], and deserves great applause. Nor is it at all impossible for the exhortation to take effect. For in men of the most absurd manners, there are the seeds of a mutation to a better condition, and of honour and love for their benefactors. For are not even savage animals, and such as are naturally most hostile to our race, and who are taken away by violence, and at first are detained by chains, and confined in iron cages,—are not these afterwards rendered mild by a certain mode of treatment, and by daily supplying them with food? And will not the man who is a brother, or even any casual person, who deserves attention in a much greater degree than a brute, be changed to milder manners by proper treatment, though he should not entirely forsake his rusticity? In our behaviour, therefore, towards every man, and in a much greater degree towards a brother, we should imitate the reply of Socrates to one who said to him, “May I die unless I am revenged on you.” For his answer was, “May I die, if I do not make you my friend.” And thus much concerning these particulars.

In the next place, a man should consider that after a manner his brothers are parts of him, just as my eyes are parts of me; and likewise my legs, my hands, and the remaining members of my body. For brothers have the same relation to a family considered as one thing [as the parts to the whole of the body]. As, therefore, the eyes and the hands, if each of them should receive a peculiar soul and intellect, would, by every possible contrivance, pay a guardian attention to the remaining parts of the body, on account of the before-mentioned communion, because they could not perform their proper office well without the presence of the other members; thus also it is requisite that we who are men, and who acknowledge that we have a soul, should omit no offices which it becomes us to perform to our brothers. For again, brothers are more naturally adapted to assist each other, than are the parts of the body. For the eyes, indeed, being present with each other, see what is before them, and one hand cooperates with the other which is present; but the mutual works of brothers are, in a certain respect, much more multifarious. For they perform things which are profitable in common, though they should be at the greatest distance from each other; and they greatly benefit each other, though the interval which separates them should be immeasurable. In short, it must be considered, that our life appears to be a certain long war continued to the extent of many years; and this partly through the nature of the things themselves which possess a certain opposition; and partly through the sudden and unexpected occurrences of fortune; but most of all through vice itself, which neither abstains from any violence, nor from any fraud and evil stratagems. Hence nature, as not being ignorant of the purpose for which she generated us, produced each of us accompanied, after a certain manner, by an auxiliary. No one, therefore, is alone, nor does he derive his origin _from an oak or a rock_, but from parents, and in conjunction with brothers, and kindred, and other familiars. But reason affords us great assistance, conciliating to us strangers, and those who have no connection with us by blood, and procuring for us an abundance of auxiliars. On this account we naturally endeavour to allure and make every one our friend. Hence it is a thing perfectly insane to wish to be united to those who have not any thing from nature which is capable of procuring our love, and voluntarily to become familiar with them in the most extended degree; and yet neglect those prompt auxiliars and associates which are supplied by nature herself, such as brothers happen to be.

ON WEDLOCK.

The discussion of wedlock is a thing most necessary. For the whole of our race is naturally adapted to society. But the first and most elementary of all associations is that which is effected by marriage. For cities could not exist without a household; but the household of an unmarried man is truly imperfect; while, on the contrary, of him who is married, it is perfect and full. Hence we have shown in our treatise On Families, that a life accompanied by wedlock is to be precedaneously chosen by the wise man; but a single life is not to be chosen, except particular circumstances[48] require it. So that as it is requisite we should imitate the man of intellect where we can, but marriage is with him an object of precedaneous choice; it is evident that it will also be proper for us, unless some circumstance occurs to prevent it from taking place. And this is the first reason why wedlock is most necessary.

But it seems that Nature herself, prior to the wise man, incites us to this, who also exhorts the wise man to marry. For she not only made us gregarious, but likewise adapted to copulation, and proposed the procreation of children and stability of life, as the one and common work of wedlock. But Nature justly teaches us, that a choice of such things as are fit should be made so as to accord with what she has procured for us. Every animal, therefore, lives conformably to its natural constitution, and, by Jupiter, in a similar manner every plant lives agreeably to the life which is imparted to it. Only there is this difference between the two, that the latter do not employ any reasoning, or a certain enumeration, in the selection of things which they explore; as they make use of nature alone, because they do not participate of soul; but animals are led to investigate what is proper for them by imaginations and exciting desires. To us, however, Nature gave reason, in order that it might survey every thing else, and, together with all things, or rather prior to all things, might direct its attention to Nature herself, so as in an orderly manner to tend to her as to a very splendid and stable mark, and choosing every thing which is consonant to her, might cause us to live in a becoming manner. Hence he will not err, who says that a family is imperfect without wedlock. For it is not possible to conceive of a governor without the governed, nor of the governed without a governor. And this reason appears to me to be very well calculated to make those ashamed who are adverse to marriage.

I say, therefore, that marriage is likewise advantageous. In the first place, indeed, because it produces a truly divine fruit, the procreation of children, since they will be assistants to us in all our actions (as partaking of our nature), while our strength is yet entire; and they will be good auxiliars, when we are worn out, and oppressed with old age. They will also be the familiar associates of our joy in prosperity, and sympathizing participants of our sorrows in adversity. Farther still, besides the procreation of children, the association with a wife is advantageous. For, in the first place, when we are wearied with labours out of the house, she receives us with officious kindness, and recreates us by every possible attention. In the next place, she produces in us an oblivion of our molestations. For those sorrowful circumstances of life which take place in the forum, or the gymnasium, or the country, and, in short, all the cares and solicitudes occasioned by converse with our friends and familiars, do not so obviously molest us, being obscured by our necessary occupations; but when we are liberated from these, return home, and our mind becomes, as it were, at leisure, then these cares and solicitudes approach, availing themselves of this occasion, in order to torment us, at the time when life is destitute of benevolence, and is solitary. Then, however, the wife being present becomes a great solace on this occasion, by making some inquiries about external affairs, or by referring to, and considering, together with her husband, something about domestic concerns, and thus, by her unfeigned alacrity, affords him a certain exuberance of pleasure and delight. But it would be too prolix to enumerate particularly the benefit of a wife in festivals, for the purpose of procuring sacrifices and victims; in the journeys of her husband, by preserving the family in a stable condition, and not suffering it to be entirely without a ruler; in paying proper attention to the domestics; and in the aid which she affords her husband when he is afflicted with disease. For it is sufficient summarily to say, that _two things are necessary to all men, in order to pass through life in a becoming manner, viz. the aid of kindred and sympathetic benevolence. But we cannot find any thing more sympathetic than a wife, nor any thing more kindred than children. Both these, however, marriage affords._ How is it possible, therefore, that it should not be most advantageous to us?

I also think that a married life is beautiful. For what other thing can be such an ornament to a family, as is the association of husband and wife? For it must not be said that sumptuous edifices, walls covered with marble plaster, and piazzas adorned with stones, which are admired by those who are ignorant of true good, nor yet paintings and arched myrtle walks, nor any thing else which is the subject of astonishment to the stupid[49], is the ornament of a family. But the beauty of a household consists in the conjunction of man and wife, who are united to each other by destiny, and are consecrated to the Gods who preside over nuptials, births, and houses, and who accord, indeed, with each other, and have all things in common, as far as to their bodies, or rather their souls themselves; who likewise exercise a becoming authority over their house and servants; are properly solicitous about the education of their children; and pay an attention to the necessaries of life, which is neither excessive nor negligent, but moderate and appropriate. For what can be better and more excellent, as the most admirable Homer says,

Than when at home the husband and the wife
Unanimously live[50].

On which account I have frequently wondered at those who conceive that the life with a woman is burdensome and grievous. For a wife is not by Jupiter either a burden or a molestation, as to them she appears to be; but, on the contrary, she is something light and easy to be borne, or rather, she possesses the power of exonerating her husband from things truly troublesome and weighty. For there is not any thing so troublesome which will not be easily borne by a husband and wife when they are concordant, and are willing to endure it in common. But imprudence is truly burdensome, and difficult to be borne by its possessors: for through it things naturally light, and among others a wife, become heavy. In reality, indeed, marriage to many is intolerable, not from itself, or because such an association as this with a woman is naturally insufferable; but when we marry those whom we ought not, and, together with this, are ourselves entirely ignorant of life, and unprepared to take a wife in such a way as a free and ingenuous woman ought to be taken, then it happens that this association with her becomes difficult and intolerable. It is certain, indeed, that marriage is effected by the vulgar after this manner. For they do not take a wife for the sake of the procreation of children, and the association of life; but some are induced to marry through the magnitude of the portion, others through transcendency of form, and others through other such like causes; and by employing these bad counsellors, they pay no attention to the disposition and manners of the bride, but celebrate nuptials to their own destruction, and with their doors crowned introduce to themselves a tyrant instead of a wife, whom they cannot resist, and with whom they are unable to contend for the chief authority. It is evident, therefore, that marriage through these causes, and not through itself, becomes burdensome and intolerable to many. It is proper, however, as it is said, neither to blame things which are innoxious, nor to make our imbecility in the use of things the cause of complaint against them. Besides, it is also in other respects most absurd, to investigate on all sides the auxiliaries of friendship, and procure certain friends and associates, as those who will aid and defend us in the difficulties of life, and yet not explore and endeavour to obtain that relief, defence, and assistance which are afforded us by nature, by the laws, and by the Gods, through a wife and children.

With respect to a numerous offspring, it is after a certain manner, according to nature and consentaneous to marriage, that all, or the greatest part of those that are born, should be nurtured. Many, however, appear to be unpersuaded by this admonition, through a cause not very decorous: for they are thus affected through a love of riches, and because they think poverty to be a transcendently great evil. In the first place, therefore, it must be considered, that in procreating children, we not only beget assistants for ourselves, nourishers of our old age, and participants with us of every fortune and every circumstance that may occur in life;—I say, we do not beget them for ourselves alone, but in many things also for our parents. For the procreation of children is gratifying to them; because, if we should suffer any thing of a calamitous nature prior to their decease, we shall leave our children instead of ourselves, as the support of their old age. But it is a beautiful thing for a grandfather to be conducted by the hands of his grandchildren, and to be considered by them as deserving of every other attention. Hence, in the first place, we shall gratify our own parents, by paying attention to the procreation of children. And, in the next place, we shall cooperate with the prayers and ardent wishes of those that begot us. For they from the first were solicitous about our birth, conceiving that through it there would be a very extended succession of themselves, and that they shall leave behind them children of children, and have to pay attention to our marriage, our procreation, and nurture. Hence, by marrying and begetting children, we shall accomplish, as it were, a part of their prayers; but, by being of a contrary opinion, we shall cut off the object of their deliberate choice. _Moreover, it appears that every one who voluntarily, and without some prohibiting circumstance, avoids marriage, and the procreation of children, accuses his parents of madness, as not having engaged in wedlock with right conceptions of things._ It is easy also to see, that such a one forms an incongruous opinion. For how is it possible that he should not be full of dissension, who finds a pleasure in living, and willingly continues in life as one who was produced into existence in a becoming manner by his parents, and yet conceives that for him to procreate others is one among the number of things which are to be rejected? In the first place, however, as we have before observed, it is requisite to consider, that we do not beget children for our own sakes alone, but for those also through whom we ourselves were begotten; and, in the next place, for the sake of our friends and kindred. For it is gratifying to these to see children which are our offspring, both on account of benevolence and propinquity, and on account of security. For the life of those to whom these pertain, is established as in a port by a thing of this kind, analogously to ships, which, though greatly agitated by the waves of the sea, are firmly secured by many anchors. On this account, the man who is a lover of his kindred, and a lover of his associates, will earnestly desire to marry and procreate children. We are likewise loudly called upon by our country to do so. For we do not beget children so much for ourselves as for our country, procuring a race that may follow us, and supplying the community with our successors. Hence the priest should know that he owes priests to his city; the ruler that he owes rulers; the public orator public orators; and, in short, the citizen that he owes citizens to it. As, therefore, to a choir the perennial continuance of those that compose it is gratifying, and to an army the duration of the soldiers, so to a city is the lastingness of the citizens. If, indeed, a city was a certain system of a short duration, and the life of it was commensurate with the life of man, it would not be in want of succession. But since it is extended to many generations, and if it employs a more fortunate dæmon endures for many ages, it is evident that it is not only necessary to direct our attention to the present, but also to the future time, and not despise our natal soil, and leave it desolate, but establish it in good hopes from our posterity.

HOW WE OUGHT TO CONDUCT OURSELVES TOWARDS OUR [OTHER] KINDRED.

The consideration of the duties pertaining to [our other] kindred is consequent to the discussion of those that pertain to parents, brothers, wives, and children; for the same things may, in a certain respect, be said of the former as of the latter; and on this account may be concisely explained. For, in short, each of us is, as it were, circumscribed by many circles; some of which are less, but others larger, and some comprehend, but others are comprehended, according to the different and unequal habitudes with respect to each other. For the first, indeed, and most proximate circle is that which every one describes about his own mind as a centre, in which circle the body, and whatever is assumed for the sake of the body, are comprehended. For this is nearly the smallest circle, and almost touches the centre itself. The second from this, and which is at a greater distance from the centre, but comprehends the first circle, is that in which parents, brothers, wife, and children are arranged. The third circle from the centre is that which contains uncles and aunts, grandfathers and grandmothers, and the children of brothers and sisters. After this is the circle which comprehends the remaining relatives. Next to this is that which contains the common people, then that which comprehends those of the same tribe, afterwards that which contains the citizens; and then two other circles follow, one being the circle of those that dwell in the vicinity of the city, and the other, of those of the same province. But the outermost and greatest circle, and which comprehends all the other circles, is that of the whole human race[51].

These things being thus considered, it is the province of him who strives to conduct himself properly in each of these connections to collect, in a certain respect, the circles, as it were, to one centre, and always to endeavour earnestly to transfer himself from the comprehending circles to the several particulars which they comprehend. It pertains, therefore, to the man who is a lover of kindred [to conduct himself in a becoming manner[52]] towards his parents and brothers; also, according to the same analogy, towards the more elderly of his relatives of both sexes, such as grandfathers, uncles and aunts; towards those of the same age with himself, as his cousins; and towards his juniors, as the children of his cousins. Hence we have summarily shown how we ought to conduct ourselves towards our kindred, having before taught how we should act towards ourselves, our parents, and brothers; and besides these, towards our wife and children. To which it must be added, that those who belong to the third circle must be honoured similarly to these; and again, kindred similarly to those that belong to the third circle. For something of benevolence must be taken away from those who are more distant from us by blood; though at the same time we should endeavour that an assimilation may take place between us and them. For this distance will become moderate, if, through the diligent attention[53] which we pay to them, we cut off the length of the habitude towards each individual of these. We have unfolded, therefore, that which is most comprehensive and important in the duties pertaining to kindred.

It is requisite, likewise, to add a proper measure conformably to the general use of appellations, calling indeed cousins, uncles and aunts, by the name of brothers, fathers and mothers; but of other kindred, to denominate some uncles, others the children of brothers or sisters, and others cousins, according to the difference of age, for the sake of the abundant extension which there is in names. For this mode of appellation will be no obscure indication of our sedulous attention to each of these relatives; and at the same time will incite, and extend us in a greater degree, to the contraction as it were of the above mentioned circles. But as we have proceeded thus far in our discussion, it will not be unseasonable to recall to our memory the distinction with respect to parents, which we before made. For in that place in which we compared mother with father, we said that it was requisite to attribute more of love to a mother, and more of honour to a father; and conformably to this, we shall here add, that it is fit to have more love for those who are connected with us by a maternal alliance, but to pay more honour to those who are related to us by a paternal affinity.

ON ECONOMICS.

Prior to all things, it is requisite to speak of the works through which the union of a family is preserved. These, therefore, are to be divided after the accustomed manner; viz. rural, forensic, and political works are to be attributed to the husband; but to the wife, such works as pertain to spinning wool, making of bread, cooking, and, in short, every thing of a domestic nature. Nevertheless, it is not fit that the one should be entirely exempt from the works of the other. For sometimes it will be proper when the wife is in the country that she should superintend the labourers, and perform the office of the master of the house; and that the husband should sometimes convert his attention to domestic affairs; and partly inquire about, and partly inspect what is doing in the house. For thus, what pertains to the mutual association of both will be more firmly connected by their joint participation of necessary cares. Since, however, our discussion has extended thus far, it appears to me that I ought not to omit to mention manual operations; for it will not be incongruous to add this also to what has been said about works.

What occasion, therefore, is there to say, that it is fit the man should meddle with agricultural labours? For there are not many by whom this will not be admitted. But though so much luxury and idleness occupies the life of men of the present day, yet it is rare to find one who is not willing to engage in the labour of sowing and planting; and to be employed in other works which pertain to agriculture. Perhaps, however, the arguments will be much less persuasive, which call on the man to engage in those other works which belong to the woman. For such men as pay great attention to neatness and cleanliness will not conceive the spinning of wool to be their business: since, for the most part, vile diminutive men, and the tribe of such as are delicate and effeminate apply themselves to the elaboration of wool, through an emulation of feminine softness. But it does not become a man, who is truly so called, to apply himself to things of this kind; so that neither shall I, perhaps, advise those to engage in such employments, who have not given perfectly credible indications of their virility and modesty. What, therefore, should hinder the man from partaking of the works which pertain to a woman, whose past life has been such as to free him from all suspicion of absurd and effeminate conduct? For in other domestic works, is it not thought that more of them pertain to men than to women? For they are more laborious, and require corporeal strength, such as to grind, to knead meal, to cut wood, to draw water from a well, to transfer large vessels from one place to another; to shake coverlets and carpets, and every other work similar to these. And it will be sufficient, indeed, for these things to be performed by men. But it is also fit that some addition should be made to the legitimate work of a woman, so that she may not only engage with her maid servants in the spinning of wool, but may also apply herself to other more virile works. For it appears to me that the making of bread, the drawing of water [from a well], the lighting of fires, the making of beds, and every other work similar to these are the proper employments of a freeborn woman. But a wife will seem much more beautiful to her husband, and especially if she is young, and not yet worn out by the bearing of children, if she becomes his associate in gathering grapes, and collecting olives; and if he is verging to old age, she will render herself more pleasing to him, by partaking with him of the labour of sowing and ploughing, and extending to him, while he is digging or planting, the instruments proper for such works. For when a family is governed after this manner by the husband and wife, so far as pertains to necessary works, it appears to me that it will be conducted in this respect in the best manner.

THE END.

C. Whittingham, College House, Chiswick.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Dissertation on Phalaris, p. 273.

[2] In Lib. de Philosophorum Sectis.

[3] The following extract from Bentley’s Eighth Sermon at Boyle’s Lectures, sufficiently shows the doctor’s deficiency in intellect. “Nor do we count it any absurdity, that such a vast and immense universe should be made for the sole use of such mean and unworthy creatures as the children of men. For if we consider the dignity of an intelligent being, and put that in the scales against brute inanimate matter, we may affirm, without overvaluing human nature, that the soul of one virtuous and religious man is of greater worth and excellency than the sun and his planets, and all the stars in the world.” For this opinion is not only stupid and arrogant in the extreme, but is also contrary to the doctrine of the Scriptures, of which the doctor was a teacher. For as I have observed in p. 13 of the Introduction to my translation of Proclus On the Theology of Plato, “the stars are not called Gods by the Jewish legislator, as things inanimate like statues fashioned of wood or stone.” This is evident from what is said in the book of Job, and the Psalms. “Behold even the moon and it shineth not, yea the stars are not pure in his sight. How much less man that is a worm, and the son of man which is a worm?” (Job, xxv. v. 5 and 6). And, “When I consider thy heavens, the work of thy fingers, the moon and the stars which thou hast ordained; what is man that thou art mindful of him, and the son of man that thou visitest him.” (Psalm viii. v. 3 and 4.) It is evident, therefore, from these passages, that the heavens and the stars are more excellent than man; but nothing inanimate can be more excellent than that which is animated. To which may be added, that in the following verse David says, that God has made man a little lower than the angels. But the stars, as I have demonstrated in the above mentioned Introduction, were considered by Moses as angels and Gods; and consequently they are animated beings, and superior to man.

Farther still, it is said in Psalm xi. v. 4, that “the Lord’s throne is in heaven.” And again, in Isaiah, chap. lxvi. v. 1. “Thus saith the Lord, the heaven is my throne, and the earth is my footstool.” If, therefore, the heavens are the throne of Deity, they must evidently be deified. For nothing can come into immediate contact with divinity, without being divine. Hence, says Simplicius, (in Comment in Lib. ii. de Cælo.) “That it is connascent with the human soul to think the celestial bodies are divine, is especially evident from those (the Jews), who look to these bodies through preconceptions about divine natures. For they also say that the heavens are the habitation of God, and the throne of God, and are alone sufficient to reveal the glory and excellence of God to those who are worthy; than which assertions what can be more venerable?”

Indeed, that the heavens are not the inanimate throne and residence of Deity, is also evident from the assertion in the nineteenth Psalm, that “the heavens declare the glory of God.” For R. Moses, a very learned Jew, (See Gaffarel’s Unheard-of Curiosities, p. 391.) says, “that the word _saphar_ to _declare_, or _set forth_, is never attributed to things inanimate.” Hence he concludes, “that the heavens are not without some soul; which, says he, is no other than that of those blessed intelligences who govern the stars, and dispose them into such letters as God has ordained; _declaring_ unto us men, by means of this writing, what events we are to expect. And hence this same writing is called by all the ancients, _chetab hamelachim_; that is to say, _the writing of the angels_.”

[4] In the Fragments of his Life of Isidorus the Platonist, preserved by Photius. The greater part of what Suidas has said about Hierocles is taken from these memoirs of Isidorus.

[5] The discourses of Socrates in Plato.

[6] For so the Christians were called by the heathens, when the religion of the latter was rapidly declining, and that of the former had gained the ascendency. Thus Porphyry, in a passage preserved by Theodoret, (in lib. i. De Curat. Græc. Superst.) Χαλκοδετος γαρ η προς θεους οδος, αιπεινη τε και τραχεια, ης πολλας ατραπους Βαρβαροι μεν εξευρον, Ελληνες δε επλανηθησαν, οι δε κρατουντες ηδη και διεφθειραν. i.e. “For the way which leads to the Gods is bound with chains of brass, and is arduous and rough, many paths of which were indeed discovered by the Barbarians; but the Greeks have wandered from them, and they are entirely corrupted by _those who now prevail_.”

This passage of Porphyry, derived its origin from the following oracle of Apollo, preserved by Eusebius:

Αιπεινη γαρ οδος μακαρων τρηχεια τε πολλον,
Χαλκοδετοις τα πρωτα διοιγομενη πυλεωσιν.
Ατραπετοι δε εασσιν αθεσφατοι εγγεγαυιαι,
Ας πρωτοι μεροπων επ’ απειρονα πρηξιν εφηναν
Οι το καλον πινοντες υδωρ Νειλωτιδος αιης·
Πολλας και Φοινικες οδους μακαρων εδαησαν,
Ασσυριοι Λυδοι τε, και Εβραιων γενος ανδρων.

But for Εβραιων, in the last line, I read Χαλδαιων, it not being at all reasonable to suppose that an oracle of Apollo would say that the Hebrews knew many paths which led to the knowledge of the Gods. It is probable, therefore, that either Aristobulus the Jew, well known for interpolating the writings of the heathens, or the wicked Eusebius, as he is called by the Emperor Julian, has fraudulently substituted the former word for the latter. The Oracle, with this emendation, will be in English as follows:

The path by which to deity we climb
Is arduous, rough, ineffable, sublime;
And the strong massy gates, through which we pass
In our first course, are bound with chains of brass.
Those men the first who of Egyptian birth
Drank the fair water of Nilotic earth,
Disclosed by actions infinite this road,
And many paths to God Phœnicians show’d.
This road the Assyrians pointed out to view,
And this the Lydians and Chaldeans knew.

But when Porphyry says that the Greeks have wandered from the path which leads to divinity, he alludes to their worshipping men as Gods; which, as I have shown in the Introduction to my translation of Proclus On the Theology of Plato, is contrary to the genuine doctrine of the heathen religion; and was the cause of its corruption, and final extinction, among the Greeks and Romans.

[7] Odyss. lib. ix. v. 347.

[8] Fragments of this work are to be found in Photius. But they are fragments of a treatise or treatises, On _Providence, Fate, and Free Will_.

[9] An adept in the philosophy of Plato will at once be convinced of the truth of this assertion, by comparing what Hierocles has said about prayer in his Commentary On the Golden Verses of the Pythagoreans, with what is said respecting it by Iamblichus, in his Treatise on the Mysteries; and by Proclus, at the beginning of the second book of his Commentary On the Timæus of Plato. See the Introduction to the second Alcibiades, in Vol. 4. of my translation of Plato, and the Notes to my translation of Maximus Tyrius; in which the reader will find what Iamblichus, Proclus, and Hierocles have said on this subject. And that he was not consummately accurate in his knowledge, will be evident by comparing what he says in his above mentioned Commentary, about that middle order of beings denominated _the illustrious heroes_, with what Iamblichus and Proclus have most admirably unfolded concerning them. And this will still more plainly appear from what he says about the celebrated _tetrad_, or _tetractys_ of the Pythagoreans, in p. 166, and 170, of the same Commentary. For in both these places, he clearly asserts, that this tetrad is the same with the _Demiurgus_, or _maker_ of _the universe_. Thus, in the former of these places και την τετραδα πηγην της αιδιου διακοσμησεως, αποφαινεται την αυτην ουσαν τῳ δημιουργῳ θεῳ. i.e. “And the author of these verses shows that the tetrad, which is the fountain of the perpetual orderly distribution of things, is the same with the God who is the Demiurgus.” And in the latter passage, εστι γαρ ως εφαμεν, δημιουργος των ολων και αιτια η τετρας, θεος νοητος, αιτιος του ουρανιου και αισθητου θεου. i.e. “For as we have said, the tetrad is the Demiurgus and cause of the wholes of the universe, being an intelligible God, the source of the celestial and sensible God.” The tetrad, however, or the _animal itself_, (το αυτωζωον) of Plato; who, as Syrianus justly observes, was the best of the Pythagoreans; subsists at the extremity of the _intelligible_ triad, as is most satisfactorily shown by Proclus in the third book of his Treatise On the Theology, and in the fourth book of his Commentary On the Timæus of Plato. But the Demiurgus, as it is demonstrated by the same incomparable man, in the fifth book of the former of these works, subsists at the extremity of the _intellectual_ triad. And between these two triads another order of Gods exists, which is denominated _intelligible, and at the same time intellectual_, as partaking of both the extremes. The English reader who has a genius for such speculations, will be convinced of this by diligently perusing my translations of the above mentioned works. Notwithstanding, however, the knowledge of Hierocles was not so consummately accurate on certain most abstruse theological dogmas as that of Iamblichus, Proclus, and Damascius, yet where ethics are concerned, his notions are most correct, most admirable, and sublime.

[10] Thus, too, Plato in his Laws mingles his polity from a democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy. He was, however, decidedly of opinion, as is evident from his Politicus, that the best form of government is that in which either one man, who is a most excellent character, is the supreme ruler, or a few excellent men rule conjointly.

[11] In the original there is only πρωτος ὦν ο νομος, which is evidently defective; but by adding εμψυχος the sense will be complete. And in what immediately follows τουτω γαρ ο μεν βασιλευς νομιμος which also is defective, Gesner adds τηρησει after τουτω γαρ, but he should doubtless have added ει τηρησει.

[12] _i.e._ To a perfect subjugation of the passions to reason, and not to a perfect insensibility, as is stupidly supposed by many who do not understand the proper meaning of the word _apathy_, as used by the Pythagoreans, Platonists, and Stoics.

[13] The original is, I conceive, evidently defective in this place; for it is, ουτε γαρ γα τως αυτως καρπως, ουτε ψυχα ανθρωπων ταν αυταν αρεταν παραδεξασθαι δυναται. It appears, therefore, to me, that πανταχου should be added after καρπως, and that for ουτε ψυχα we should read ουτε πασα ψυχα.

[14] Among the Lacedæmonians the three men were thus denominated, who were chosen by the Ephori to preside over the equestrian order. But the ephori were magistrates corresponding to the _tribunes_ of the people among the Romans.

[15] In the original, α μεν γαρ πλεονεκτια γινεται περι το αγουμενον μερος τας ψυχας· λογικα γαρ α επιθυμια. But for αγουμενον, I read αλογον; and for λογικα, it is necessary to read ου λογικα. For the vices, according to the Pythagoreans, subsist about the irrational part of the soul, which consists, according to them, as well as according to Plato, of _anger_ and _desire_. Hence Metopus, the Pythagorean, says: “Since there are two parts of the soul, the rational and the irrational, the latter is divided into the irascible and the appetitive. And the rational part, indeed, is that by which we judge and contemplate; but the irrational part is that by which we are impelled and desire.” See my translation of Pythagoric Ethical Fragments, at the end of my translation of Iamblichus’ Life of Pythagoras.

[16] I here read, with Victorius, κατ’ οικειοτατα εγγενη, for και οικειοτατον εν γενοιν.

[17] This sentence within the brackets is not to be found in Stobæus.

[18] i.e. God is not in want of ministers or servants to assist him in the government of the universe: for he produces and provides for all things at once by his own immediate energy. But the cooperation of subordinate divine powers with him is necessary to the proper participation of him by the different beings which the universe contains.

[19] For οι μιμευμενοι των αυτων in this place, I read οι μιμευμενοι τον αυτον.

[20] Instead of ενιοτε here, I read παντοτε.

[21] Conformably to this, Plato also in the Politicus says: “It is requisite to call him royal who possesses the royal science, whether he governs or not.”

[22] Plato says somewhere (I think in his Laws), that a greater evil than impudence cannot befall either cities or individuals.

[23] _i.e._ The seed which pertains to the propagation of his children.

[24] _i.e._ To his children while they live in his house under his protection and are unmarried; and who are in danger through having a stepmother of losing that property which ought to be theirs on the death of their father.

[25] Pæan is a song of rejoicing, which was sung at festivals and on other occasions, in honour of Apollo, for having slain the serpent Python.

[26] A kind of harp beaten with sticks.

[27] In the original ουρανιον ζωον a _celestial_ animal; but as Callicratidas is here speaking of the Demiurgus, or artificer of the universe, who is an _intellectual_ god, for ουρανιον I read νοερον. For the Demiurgus is the maker, and not one of the celestial gods. But he is called an _animal_, as being the cause of _life_ to all things. Thus, too, Aristotle, in the 12th book of his Metaphysics, says, “that God is an animal eternal and most excellent.”

[28] This Perictyone is different from her who was the mother of Plato.

[29] In this extract no mention whatever is made of the harmony of a woman; for it wholly consists of the duty of children to their parents.

[30] και νοσῳ is omitted in the original, but ought, as it appears to me, to be inserted.

[31] It is well observed by Olympiodorus, on the Phædo of Plato, “that the soul is not punished by divinity through anger but medicinally; and that by eternity of punishment we must understand punishment commensurate with the soul’s partial period; because souls that have committed the greatest offences cannot be sufficiently purified in one period.”

[32] For φρονεειν in this place, which is evidently erroneous, I read φθονεειν.

[33] The whole of this extract is to be found in the fourth book of Plato’s Laws. (See tom. viii. p. 187, and 188, of the Bipont edition.) But there is occasionally some little difference between the text of Plato and that of Aristoxenus, as the critical reader will easily discover. Neither Fabricius nor the editors of Stobæus have noticed the source of this extract.

[34] The whole of this extract is taken from the eleventh book of Plato’s Laws, but what is there said is here somewhat amplified.

[35] See p. 137, and 138, of my Translation of Iamblichus on the Mysteries.

[36] Iliad IX. v. 495. 6. 7.

[37] Iliad IX. v. 493. Hierocles is mistaken in saying that poetry _rashly asserts that the Gods are flexible_. For as I have observed in my Notes to Iamblichus on the Mysteries, divine flexibility indicates in Homer, and other theological poets of antiquity, that those who through depravity become unadapted to receive the illuminations of the Gods, when they afterwards obtain pardon of their guilt through prayers and sacrifices, again become partakers of the goodness of the Gods. So that divine flexibility is a resumption of the participation of divine light and goodness, by those who through inaptitude were before deprived of it.

[38] See on this most interesting subject, that divinity is not the cause of evil, my translation of the Fragments of Proclus on the Subsistence of Evil, at the end of my translation of his six books On the Theology of Plato.

[39] See Odyss. I. v. 32, 33, 34.

[40] See the first book of his Republic.

[41] i.e. Such things as are neither really good, nor really evil, but media between these.

[42] After this last sentence, the words ταυτα χρη, follow in the original; which evidently show that something is wanting: as they are only the beginning of another sentence. This defect, however, is supplied in my copy of Stobæus, (Eclog. Ethic. lib. II. p. 207), by some one in manuscript, as follows: ταυτα χρη προνοειν, μη δια νου τυφλοτητα και αγνωμοσυνην, τα (lege ταυτα) ημιν απαντασωσι; and he has also added the following Latin translation of these words: “Hæc oportet prospicere ne per mentis cæcitatem et ignorantiam hæc nobis occurrant.” But the addition, from whatever source it was obtained, does not appear to me to be at all apposite; and therefore I conceive it to be spurious.

[43] This is true of the whole which consists of parts, so as not to be able to subsist without them. For whole has a triple substance; viz. it is either prior to parts, or in other words, is a whole containing parts causally; or it consists of parts; or is in a part, so that a part, also, becomes a whole according to participation. A city, therefore, is a whole consisting of parts, any part of which being absent, diminishes the whole. See Prop. 67 of my translation of Proclus’ Elements of Theology; and the second book of my translation of Proclus on the Timæus.

[44] When the intelligent reader considers that Hierocles flourished about the middle of the fifth century after Christ, he will immediately understand what the _recent customs_ are to which Hierocles, in the above passage, alludes. Needham, in his translation of this passage, either did not understand the meaning of it, or wilfully omitted to translate it.