Chapter I: Part 1

TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE

Italic text is denoted by _underscores_.

Footnote anchors are denoted by [number], and the footnotes have
been placed at the end of the book.

The Table of Contents was created by the Transcriber and has been
placed in front of the Introduction.

Some minor changes to the text are noted at the end of the book.

Political and Ethical Fragments.

POLITICAL FRAGMENTS

OF

ARCHYTAS, CHARONDAS, ZALEUCUS,

AND OTHER

ANCIENT PYTHAGOREANS,

PRESERVED BY STOBÆUS;

AND ALSO,

ETHICAL FRAGMENTS

OF

Hierocles,

THE CELEBRATED COMMENTATOR ON THE GOLDEN PYTHAGORIC
VERSES,

PRESERVED BY THE SAME AUTHOR.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK

BY THOMAS TAYLOR.

Αβαπτιστος ειμι φελλος ως
υπερ ερκος αλμας.
PIND. PYTH. OD. 2.
Just like a cork unmerged I keep
On the broad barrier of the deep.

Chiswick:

PRINTED BY C. WHITTINGHAM,
COLLEGE HOUSE;

FOR THE TRANSLATOR, MANOR PLACE, WALWORTH.

1822.

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION.
POLITICAL FRAGMENTS OF THE PYTHAGOREANS.
FROM THE TREATISE OF HIPPODAMUS THE THURIAN ON A REPUBLIC.
FROM THE TREATISE OF DIOTOGENES ON SANCTITY.
FROM THE TREATISE OF ARCHYTAS ON LAW AND JUSTICE.
AND IN ANOTHER PART OF THE SAME WORK.
IN ANOTHER PART ALSO OF THE SAME WORK.
ON THE MUTATIONS OF POLITIES, FROM THE TREATISE OF HIPPODAMUS ON
A POLITY.
FROM DIOTOGENES IN HIS TREATISE CONCERNING A KINGDOM.
AND IN ANOTHER PART OF THE SAME TREATISE.
FROM THE TREATISE OF STHENIDAS THE LOCRIAN, ON A KINGDOM.
FROM THE TREATISE OF ECPHANTUS, THE CROTONIAN, ON A KINGDOM.
AND IN ANOTHER PART OF THE SAME WORK.
FROM ARCHYTAS.
FROM THE TREATISE OF DIOTOGENES ON SANCTITY.
THE PREFACE OF CHARONDAS, THE CATANEAN, TO HIS TREATISE OF LAWS.
THE PREFACE OF ZALEUCUS, THE LOCRIAN, TO HIS LAWS.
FROM THE TREATISE OF CALLICRATIDAS ON THE FELICITY OF FAMILIES.
AND IN ANOTHER PART OF THE SAME WORK.
AND AGAIN, IN ANOTHER PART OF THE SAME WORK.
FROM THE TREATISE OF PERICTYONE ON THE DUTIES OF A WOMAN.
FROM THE TREATISE OF PERICTYONE ON THE HARMONY OF A WOMAN.
ON THE REVERENCE DUE TO PARENTS. FROM THE APOPHTHEGMS OF
ARISTOXENUS, THE TARENTINE.
AND IN THE FOURTH BOOK OF THE SAME WORK.
FROM THE TREATISE OF PEMPELUS ON PARENTS.
FROM THE TREATISE OF PHINTYS, THE DAUGHTER OF CALLICRATES, ON THE
TEMPERANCE OF A WOMAN.
ETHICAL FRAGMENTS OF HIEROCLES,
HOW WE OUGHT TO CONDUCT OURSELVES TOWARDS THE GODS.
HOW WE OUGHT TO CONDUCT OURSELVES TOWARDS OUR COUNTRY.
AFTER WHAT MANNER WE OUGHT TO CONDUCT OURSELVES TOWARDS OUR
PARENTS.
ON FRATERNAL LOVE.
ON WEDLOCK.
HOW WE OUGHT TO CONDUCT OURSELVES TOWARDS OUR [OTHER] KINDRED.
ON ECONOMICS.

INTRODUCTION.

The collection of PYTHAGORIC FRAGMENTS contained in this volume must be considered by every one as highly valuable if their antiquity only is regarded; but by the lover of genuine wisdom they will be deemed inestimable, as proceeding from the school of the father of philosophy.

Of the greater part of the authors of these fragments little more than the country in which they lived is known. But of Charondas, and Zaleucus, those celebrated legislators, Seneca in his 90th Epistle informs us that they learnt their laws in the silent and sacred recess of Pythagoras. Though Seneca, however, Diodorus Siculus, Diogenes Laertius, Porphyry, and Iamblichus make both Charondas and Zaleucus to be the disciples of Pythagoras; yet Dr. Bentley, in his Dissertation on Phalaris, seems more disposed to think that they were not Pythagoreans than that they were. At the conclusion, however, of his discussion of this subject he says, “I do not assert any thing positively on either side of this whole debate about the two lawgivers [Charondas and Zaleucus]. I rather desire to stand a neuter, till the matter shall be decided by some abler hand[1].” But the man of intellect who reads this concession of the doctor, will doubtless laugh when he finds him also asserting, “Thus much I am sure may be safely concluded, that if Zaleucus was really Pythagoras’ disciple, the learned Mr. Dodwell’s calculation must be wrong [respecting the age of Pythagoras]. For which is more probable, that a Mr. Dodwell was mistaken in this particular, or that Diodorus Siculus, Laertius, Porphyry, and Iamblichus were wrong, who lived so many centuries prior to him, and who were able to derive information so much more decisive respecting Zaleucus, through books which were then extant, but which have long since utterly perished? By Vossius[2], however, who, though he was not perhaps so great a verbal critic as Bentley, was certainly a man of more intellect[3], the whole of these fragments were considered as precious monuments; and he wonders, and is at the same time indignant, at their not being more frequently perused.

Of Hierocles, the author of the ETHICAL FRAGMENTS, something more is known than of the authors of the POLITICAL FRAGMENTS, through what is said of him by Suidas, Damascius[4], and Æneas Gazæus. For from the last of these we learn that he flourished about the end of the fifth century of the Christian era; and from the other two, that he was a Platonic philosopher of Alexandria: that his conceptions were magnificent, and his genius sublime; that he was very eloquent, astonished his auditors by the beauty and copiousness of his language, and contended with Plato himself in elegance of diction, and fertility of intellect. One of his auditors was Theosebius, a man of great penetration, who at different times twice heard Hierocles orally explaining the Gorgias of Plato; and though on comparing the latter with the former explanation, he found nothing in the one which might be said to be the same with what was in the other, yet each of them unfolded as much as possible the intention of Plato in that dialogue—which, as Damascius well observes, was a thing of a most singular nature, and clearly demonstrates the amplitude of his conceptions. We are informed, also, by the same Theosebius, that Hierocles once said, when expounding Plato, that the discourses of Socrates[5] resembled cubes, because they remained firm wherever they might fall.

The following circumstance, says Suidas, evinces the fortitude and magnanimity of Hierocles. On coming to Byzantium, he offended the _prevailers_ (προσεκρουσε τοις Κρατουσι) i.e. _the Christians_[6]; and being brought into a court of justice by them was whipped. But while the blood was flowing, he took some of it in the hollow of his hand, and besprinkled with it the judge, at the same time exclaiming:

Cyclops, since human flesh is thy delight,
Now drink this wine[7].

Being banished, most probably in consequence of this magnanimous behaviour; and returning some time after to Alexandria, he gave philosophical lectures to his auditors in his usual manner. Suidas adds, that the grandeur of the conceptions of Hierocles may be learnt from the perusal of his Commentaries On the Golden Verses of the Pythagoreans, and from his treatise On Providence[8]; in which works it appears that he was sublimely wise in his life, but not accurate in his knowledge. Damascius also says, that Hierocles was not at all deficient in any thing pertaining to merely human science, but that he was by no means replete with _blessed conceptions_, i.e. with conceptions which are the offspring of an _entheastic_, or divinely inspired energy; and which are to be found in abundance in the writings of Plato, Plotinus, Iamblichus, Proclus, and Damascius himself. This, indeed, will be immediately evident[9] to the man who has penetrated the depth of these writings, but to the merely verbal critic is a circumstance involved in Cimmerian darkness.

POLITICAL FRAGMENTS

OF THE

PYTHAGOREANS.

FROM THE TREATISE OF HIPPODAMUS THE THURIAN ON A REPUBLIC.

I say that the whole of a polity is divided into three parts. And one part, indeed, consists of good men, who manage the public affairs. But the second part consists of those who are powerful. And the third part is composed of those who are employed in supplying and procuring the necessaries of life. I denominate, however, the first multitude [in a polity] that which consults [for the good of the whole]; the second, that which is auxiliary; and the third, that which pertains to mechanical and sordid occupations. Of these also, I say that the two first belong to those whose condition in life is liberal; but the third, to those who labour to procure subsistence. And of these indeed, that which consults is the best; but that which is employed in sordid occupations is the worst; and that which is auxiliary, is a medium between the two. That which consults likewise [for the general good] ought to govern; but that which is engaged in sordid occupations ought to be governed: and that which is auxiliary ought both to govern and be governed. For that which consults for the general good previously deliberates what ought to be done; but that which is of an auxiliary nature, so far as it is belligerent, rules over the whole of the mechanical tribe; but so far as it antecedently receives counsel from others, is itself governed.

Of these parts, however, each again receives a triple division. For of that which consults, one part presides, another governs, and another counsels for the general good. And with respect to the part which presides, it is that which plans, contrives, and deliberates about what pertains to the community, prior to the other parts, and afterwards refers its counsels to the senate. But the governing part is either that which now rules [for the first time], or which has before performed that office. And with respect to the third part, which consults for the general good, this receives the advice of the parts prior to itself, and confirms by its suffrages and authority whatever is referred to its decision. And, in short, it is requisite that those who preside should refer the affairs of the community to that part which consults for the general good; but that this latter part should refer these affairs through the Prætors to the Convention.

In a similar manner also of that part which is auxiliary, powerful, and efficacious, one part is of a governing nature; another part is defensive; and the remaining, which is the greater part, is gregal and military. It is the governing part, therefore, from which the leaders of armies, the præfects of cohorts, the bands of soldiers, and the vanguards are derived, and universally all those who rank as leaders. But the whole genus of the vanguards consists of those that are most brave, most impetuous, and most daring. And the remaining multitude is gregarious and military. Of the third part, however, which is engaged in sordid occupations, and in labouring to procure the necessaries of life, one part consists of husbandmen, and those who are employed in the elaboration of the land; but another part consists of artificers, who procure such instruments and machines as the occasions of life require; and another part is engaged in peregrinations and merchandise, and in exporting to foreign regions such things as are superabundant in the city, and importing into it other things from foreign countries. The systems of political society, therefore, are coarranged through so many and such like parts.

In the next place, it is requisite to speak of their adaptation and union. Since, however, the whole of political society may be perfectly assimilated to a lyre, in consequence of requiring apparatus and coaptation, and also because it is necessary that it should be touched and used musically;—this being the case, I have sufficiently spoken above about the apparatus of a polity, and shown from what and from how many particulars it is constituted. I shall now, therefore, endeavour to speak of the coaptation and union of these. I say then, that political society is coadapted from the following three particulars, from disciplines, the study of manners [or customs], and from the laws; and that through these three, man is instructed, and becomes more worthy. For disciplines are the sources of erudition, and cause the desires to be impelled to virtue. But the laws, partly detaining by fear, repell men [from the commission of crimes,] and partly alluring by honours and gifts, excite them [to virtue]. And manners and studies fashion the soul like wax, and through their continued energy impress in it propensities that become, as it were, natural. It is necessary, however, that these three should have an arrangement in conjunction with the beautiful, the useful, and the just; and that each of these three should, if possible, have all these for its final intention; but if not all of them, it should at least have two or one of them as the mark at which it aims, in order that disciplines, manners, and laws may be beautiful, just, and advantageous. In the first place, however, the beautiful in conduct should be preferred; in the second place the just; and in the third place, the useful. And universally the endeavour should be, that through these the city may become, in the most eminent degree, consentaneous and concordant with its parts, and may be free from sedition and hostile contention. But this will be effected, if the passions in the souls of youth are disciplined, and in things pleasing and painful are led to mediocrity, and if the possessions of men are moderate, and they derive their subsistence from the cultivation of the earth. And this will also be accomplished, if good men rule over those that are in want of virtue; skilful men over those that are deficient in skill; and rich men over those things that require a certain largess and expenditure; and if also appropriate honours are distributed to those who govern in all these in a becoming manner. But there are three causes which are incitements to virtue, viz. fear, desire, and shame. The law, however, is able to produce fear, but custom shame: for those that have been accustomed to act well, will be ashamed to do any thing that is base. And disciplines are capable of producing desire. For they at one and the same time assign the causes of things, and attract the soul, and they especially effect this when they are accompanied with exhortation. Hence it is necessary that the souls of young men should be sufficiently instructed in what pertains to senates, fellowship, and associations, both military and political, but that the tribe of elderly men should be coadapted to things of this kind; since young men, indeed, require correction and instruction, but elderly men are in want of benevolent associations, and a mode of living unattended with pain.

Since, therefore, we have said, that the worthy man is perfected through three things, viz. through customs, laws, and disciplines, it is requisite to consider how customs or manners are usually corrupted, and how they become permanent. We shall find, then, that customs are corrupted in two ways: for they are either corrupted through ourselves or through foreigners. And through ourselves, indeed, either through our flying from pain, or through our pursuit of pleasure. For in consequence of flying from pain, we do not endure labour; and through our pursuit of pleasure, we reject what is good. Labours, however, procure good for mankind; but pleasures evil. Hence men through pleasures, becoming incontinent and remiss, are rendered effeminate in their souls, and more profuse in their expenses. But customs and manners are corrupted through foreigners, when a multitude of these dwelling with us, rejoice in the success of their emporetic employment; or when those who dwell in the suburbs, being lovers of pleasure and luxury, impart their manners to the neighbouring inhabitants. On this account it is necessary that the legislators, and prefects of the mass of the people, should diligently observe whether the customs of the city are carefully preserved, and proceed equally through all the citizens. And farther still, they should observe whether the genuine and indigenous multitude, of which the polity consists, remains pure and unmingled with any other nation; and whether the magnitude of possessions remains in the same state, and does not become excessive. For the possession of superfluities is accompanied by the desire of still more of the superfluous. After this manner, therefore, customs ought to be rendered secure.

With respect to disciplines, however, the same legislators and præfects should diligently inspect and examine the tribe of sophists, whether they teach what is useful to the laws, to political dogmas, and to the peculiar economy of life. For the doctrines of the sophists ingenerate in the souls of men, no casual but the greatest infelicity; when they dare to make innovation in any thing pertaining either to human or divine concerns, contrary to common conceptions; than which nothing can be more pernicious either with respect to truth, or security, or renown. And in addition to this, also, they introduce darkness and confusion into the minds of the vulgar. But of this kind are all such doctrines as either teach that there is no God, or if there is, that he is not so affected towards the human race, as to look to it with providential attention, but deserts and despises it. For doctrines of this kind produce in men folly and injustice, to an extent which it is not easy to narrate. For every man who is full of anarchy, and who has shaken off the fear of disobedience [to rulers and the laws], wantonly exults, and violates the laws. Hence it is necessary to employ political and venerable assertions, which are adapted to the disposition of the speaker, and which are void of dissimulation. For thus what is said will exhibit the manners of the speaker. From the laws, however, security will thus be necessarily introduced, if the polity is composed and coarranged from every thing which is according to nature, and not from such things as are preternatural. For cities derive no advantage from a tyranny, and very little from an oligarchy. It is necessary, therefore, that a kingdom should be established in the first place; and in the second place, an aristocracy. For a kingdom, indeed, is a thing imitative of God, and which is with difficulty preserved and defended by the human soul. For it is rapidly changed through luxury and insolence. Hence it is not proper to employ it universally, but only so far as it may be useful to the polity; but an aristocracy should be more abundantly interwoven in it, because it consists of many rulers, who emulate each other, and who often alternately govern. It is also entirely necessary that a democracy should be introduced. For as a citizen is a part of the whole polity, it is requisite that he should receive a certain reward from it[10]. But it is necessary that he should be sufficiently restrained. For the vulgar are audacious and precipitate.

FROM THE TREATISE OF DIOTOGENES ON SANCTITY.

It is necessary that the laws should not be enclosed in houses, and by gates, but in the manners of the citizens. What, therefore, is the principle of every polity? The education of youth. For vines will never bear useful fruit, unless they are well cultivated; nor will horses ever become excellent, if colts are not properly trained. For recently produced fruit receives a figure especially similar to that which touches and is near to it. And men prudently attend to the manner in which vines ought to be cut and taken care of; but in things pertaining to the education of their own species, they conduct themselves negligently and rashly; though neither vines nor wine govern men, but man and the soul of man. And we commit the nurture of a plant, indeed, to a man of some worth, and think that he who takes care of it, deserves no less than two mina; but we commit the education of youth to some Illyrian or Thracian, who are men of no worth. The first legislators, however, as they could not render the middle class of mankind stable, adjoined [in their education] dancing and rhythm, which participate of motion alone and order; and besides these they added sports, some of which exhorted them to fellowship, but others to truth and mental acuteness. In a similar manner also they instituted for those who through intoxication or repletion had committed any crime, the pipe and harmony, by which they gave an arrangement to the mind, so that the manners being matured and rendered mild, they might be capable of being adorned.

FROM THE TREATISE OF ARCHYTAS ON LAW AND JUSTICE.

I say that every [political] association consists of a governor and the governed; and of a third thing, viz. the laws. Of laws, however, one is animated, viz. a king; but another inanimate, viz. written law. The first law, therefore, is animated[11]; and if it is observed, the king will be legitimate; the magistrate will be consentaneous; the subject will be free; and the whole community will be happy. But if both the animated and written laws are transgressed, the king will be a tyrant; the magistrate unfit for his office; the subject a slave; and the whole community unhappy. For actions form a continued series from governing, the being governed, and, in the third place, from subjugation. To govern, therefore, is the province of that which is more, but to be governed, of that which is less excellent, and to be subjugated, pertains to both these. For that part of the soul which is rational governs, the part which is irrational is governed, and both are vanquished by the passions. For virtue is produced from the apt conjunction of both these parts; and she leads the soul from pleasures and pains to tranquillity and apathy[12].

AND IN ANOTHER PART OF THE SAME WORK.

It will be beneficial to the community, if law is not monarchical, and advantageous [only] to a private individual, but if it is generally useful, and extends to every one. But it is also necessary that the law should look to the whole region, and to the different places in it. For neither is the earth able to receive the same fruits [every where] nor the soul of every man the same virtue[13].

IN ANOTHER PART ALSO OF THE SAME WORK.

But it is necessary that the more excellent law and the city should be composed of every other polity, and should have something of a democracy, of an oligarchy, of a kingdom, and of an aristocracy; as is the case in Lacedæmon. For the kings there are monarchs; the elders form an aristocracy; the ephori an oligarchy; and the ippagretæ[14] and the young men a democracy. It is necessary, however, that law should not only be good and beautiful, but that it should also reciprocate in its parts: for thus it will be strong and stable. But when I say it should reciprocate, I mean that the same magistrate should alternately govern and be governed, as in Lacedæmon, in which there are the most equitable laws. For there the ephori are opposed to the kings, the elders to the ephori, and the media between these are the young men, and the ippagretæ; for these last both incline to those rulers that excel in power, and are in subjection to others.

It is necessary that the law should, in the first place, establish what pertains to the gods, to dæmons and parents, and, in short, to what is beautiful and honourable. But in the second place, it should establish what pertains to things that are useful. For it is fit that minor concerns should be subsequent to such as are greater. Nor should the laws be contained in houses and gates, but in the manners of the citizens. For neither in Lacedæmon, which possesses the most excellent laws, is the city governed by a multitude of writings, but rather by the manners of the subjects. But it will be beneficial to the community, if law is not monarchical, and advantageous [only] to a private individual, but if it is generally useful, and extends to every one; and if it refers punishment to disgrace and ignominy, and not to the loss of property. For by punishing with disgrace, the citizens will endeavour in the most decorous and useful manner, to avoid the punishment ordained by the laws. But if the punishment is pecuniary, the citizens will value money immoderately, and will conceive it to be the greatest remedy of crimes. It will be best, therefore, for the whole city to be so arranged that it may not be in want of any thing external, either with respect to virtue or power, or any other cause. For thus the body, a family, and an army will be beautifully constituted, when each of these has the cause of safety in itself, and does not derive it externally. And this, indeed, will be the case with the body when it is strong, with a family when it is well composed, and with an army which neither consists of mercenaries, nor is unexercised. For these, when thus constituted, will be far more excellent than others, and will be free indeed, and foreign from every thing of a servile nature; and will not, for the purpose of endurance, be in want of many things, but of a few, and those easily procured. For thus he who is strong will not sink under burdens, and he who is thinly clothed will vanquish cold; since men are exercised by casualties and calamities. Indeed, to the man who is temperate, and who has laboured much both in body and soul, all meat and drink will appear to be agreeable; and a bed composed of leaves will be pleasant; but to him who has deliberately chosen a luxurious and Sybaritic life, even the apparatus of the great [or Persian] king would not be sufficiently pleasing. Hence it is necessary that the manners and pursuits of the citizens should be deeply tinctured with law: for this will cause them to be sufficient to themselves, and will be the means of distributing to each of them that which is due to him according to his desert. For thus, also, the sun, moving in a circle through the zodiac, distributes to every thing on the earth generation, nutriment, and an appropriate portion of life; administering, as if it were equitable legislation, the excellent temperature of the seasons. Hence, too, Jupiter is called _Nomios_, or _legal_; and _Nemeios_, or the _distributor_. He, likewise, who distributes nutriment to sheep, is called _Nomeus_, or a _shepherd_; and the songs of harpers are denominated _Nomai_. For these properly dispose the parts of the soul by harmony, rhythms, and measures.

ON THE MUTATIONS OF POLITIES, FROM THE TREATISE OF HIPPODAMUS ON A POLITY.

Every thing mortal, by a necessity of nature, is conversant with mutations; some things, indeed, receiving a revolution from a worse to a better condition, but others from a better to a worse. For things that are generated, are increased; when increased, arrive at their acme: after this become old, and at length finally perish. And things, indeed, which are generated by nature, through the same nature terminate in the immanifest; and again from the immanifest accede to mortality, through a permutation of generation; and, by a reciprocation of corruption, form a circular retrogression. And some things, through human folly, from an ebullition of insolence and satiety, when both houses and cities have been exalted to the summit of human felicity, and been exuberantly rich, have perished, together with their much applauded possessions. Thus, also, it happens that every empire is bounded by three times: by one, indeed, and that the first, which comprehends in itself acquisition; by the second, which comprehends fruition; and by the last, which brings with it destruction. For empires at their commencement being destitute of the goods of fortune, are busied in acquisition; but afterwards becoming prosperous, they perish. Such things, therefore, as are under the dominion of the gods, being incorruptible, are preserved through the whole of time by incorruptible natures; but such things as are under the government of men, being mortal, receive from mortals a perpetually various mutation. For the end, indeed, of satiety and lascivious insolence is destruction; but a strenuous and worthy life is the end of poverty and narrow circumstances. Not only poverty, however, but many other things bring human life to an end.

FROM DIOTOGENES IN HIS TREATISE CONCERNING A KINGDOM.

A king should be one who is most just; and he will be most just who pays the greatest attention to the laws. For without justice no one will be a king; and without law there can be no justice. For that which is just is just through law, which is the effective cause of justice. But a king is either animated law, or a legal ruler. And hence it follows that he will be most just and most observant of the laws. There are, however, three peculiar employments of a king; viz. to lead an army, to administer justice, and to worship the gods. He will, therefore, be able to lead an army properly, if he knows how to carry on war in a becoming manner. But he will be skilled in administering justice, and in governing all his subjects, if he has well learned the nature of justice and law. And he will worship the gods in a pious and holy manner, if he has diligently considered the nature and virtue of God; so that a good king must necessarily be a good general, judge, and priest. For these are things consequent and suitable to the transcendency and virtue of a king. For it is the province of the pilot to preserve the ship, of the charioteer to preserve the chariot, and of the physician to save the sick; but it belongs to a king and to a general to save those who are in danger in battle. For of that of which any one is the leader, he is also the provident inspector and artificer. But to be conversant with judicial affairs is, indeed, a universal thing; but is particularly the proper work of a king; who, like a god, is a leader and protector in the world. And universally, indeed, it is fit that the whole polity should be coadapted to one ruler and empire; but, especially, that things which have the relation of parts should accord with the same harmony and supreme domination. Farther still, it is the province of a king to oblige and benefit his subjects, but this not without, justice and law. And the third thing which is adapted to the dignity of a king is the worship of the gods. For it is necessary that what is most excellent should be honoured by the most excellent; and that which is the leader and ruler, by that which leads and rules. Of things, therefore, which are by nature most honourable, God is the best; but of things on the earth, and pertaining to men, a king is the most excellent. As God also is to the world, so is a king to the city [which he governs]; and as a city is to the world, so is a king to God. For a city, indeed, being coadapted from things which are many and different, imitates the coarrangement and harmony of the world; but a king who possesses an innoxious dominion, and who is himself animated law, exhibits the form of God among men.

AND IN ANOTHER PART OF THE SAME TREATISE.

Hence it is necessary that a king should not be vanquished by pleasure, but that he should vanquish it; that he should not be similar to, but far excel the multitude; and that he should not conceive his proper employment to consist in the pursuit of pleasure, but rather in the acquisition of probity. At the same time also it is fit that he who has occasion to rule over others should first be able to govern his own passions.

But with respect to the desire of obtaining great property, it must be observed, that a king ought to be wealthy in order that he may benefit his friends, relieve those that are in want, and justly punish his enemies. For the enjoyment of prosperity in conjunction with virtue is most delightful. The same thing must be said concerning the transcendency of a king. For since he always surpasses others in virtue, it is fit to form a judgment of his empire with reference to virtue, and not with reference to riches, or power, or his military strength. For he possesses one of these [viz. riches] in common with any casual persons; another [viz. power] in common with irrational animals; and the last in common with tyrants. But virtue is alone the peculiarity of good men. Hence, whatever king is temperate with respect to pleasures, liberal with respect to money, and prudent and most skilful in governing, he will be in reality a king. The people, however, have the same analogy with respect to the virtues and the vices, as the parts of the human soul. For the desire of accumulating more than is fit subsists about the irrational part of the soul: for desire is not rational[15]. But ambition and ferocity subsist about the irascible part: for this is the fervid and strenuous part of the soul. And the love of pleasure subsists about the epithymetic part: for this is the effeminate and yielding part of the soul. But injustice, which is the most perfect vice, and is of a composite nature, subsists about the whole soul. Hence it is necessary that the king should coharmonize like a lyre the city that is furnished with good laws, first establishing in himself the most just boundary and order of law, as knowing that the proper arrangement of the people, over whom divinity has given him dominion, ought to be coadapted to this boundary. It is also necessary that a good king should establish becoming positions and habits in the delivery of public orations, conducting himself politically, seriously, and earnestly, in order that he may neither appear to be rough to the multitude; nor may be contemptible; but may be agreeable and easy in his manners. He will however obtain these things, if in the first place he is venerable in his aspect and his discourse, and appears to deserve the sovereign authority which he possesses. But, in the second place, if he proves himself to be benign from his behaviour to those whom he may happen to meet, from his countenance and his beneficence. And in the third place, if he is formidable from his hatred of depravity, from the punishment which he inflicts on it, from his celerity in inflicting it, and, in short, from his skill and exercise in the art of government. For venerable gravity, being a thing which imitates divinity, is capable of causing him to be admired and honoured by the multitude. Benignity will render him pleasing and beloved. And his being formidable will cause him to be terrible to and unconquered by his enemies, and magnanimous and confident to his friends.

It is necessary, however, that his gravity should have nothing in it of an abject or vulgar nature, but that it should be admirable, and such as becomes the dignity of empire and a sceptre. Nor should he ever contend with his inferiors, or his equals, but with those that are greater than himself; and he should conceive, conformably to the magnitude of his empire, that those pleasures are the greatest which are derived from beautiful and great deeds, and not those which arise from sensual gratifications; separating himself indeed from human passions, and approximating to the Gods, not through arrogance, but through magnanimity and an invincible transcendency of virtue. Hence he should invest himself with such a gracefulness and majesty in his aspect and his reasonings, in the conceptions of his mind, in the manners of his soul, and in his actions and the motions and gesture of his body, that those who survey him may perceive that he is adorned and fashioned with modesty and temperance, and a decorous disposition. For a good king should convert to himself the souls of those that behold him, no less than the sound of a flute and harmony attract the attention of those that hear them. And thus much concerning the venerable gravity of a king.

But I shall now endeavour to speak of his benignity. Universally, therefore, every king will be benign, if he is just, equitable, and beneficent. For justice is a connective and collective communion, and is alone that disposition of the soul which adapts itself to those that are near to us. For as rhythm is to motion, and harmony to the voice, so is justice to communion; since it is the common good of those that govern, and those that are governed, because it coharmonizes political society. But equity and benignity are certain assessors of justice; the former indeed softening the severity of punishment; but the latter extending pardon to less guilty offenders. It is necessary, however, that a good king should give assistance to those that are in want of it, and be beneficent. But his assistance should be given not in one way only, but in every possible way. And it is requisite to be beneficent, not looking to the magnitude of honour, but to the manner and deliberate choice of him by whom honour is conferred. It is likewise necessary that a worthy king should so conduct himself towards all men as to avoid being troublesome to them, but especially towards men of an inferior rank and of a slender fortune: for these, like diseased bodies, can endure nothing of a troublesome nature. Good kings, indeed, have dispositions similar to those of the Gods, and which especially resemble those of Jupiter, the ruler of all things. For he is venerable and honourable, through transcendency and magnitude of virtue. He is benign, because he is beneficent, and the giver of good; and hence he is said by the Ionic poet [Homer] to be the father of men and Gods. He is also terrible and transcendent, because he punishes the unjust, and reigns and rules over all things. But he carries thunder in his hand, as a symbol of his formidable excellence. From all these particulars, therefore, it is requisite to remember that a kingdom is a God-resembling thing.

FROM THE TREATISE OF STHENIDAS THE LOCRIAN, ON A KINGDOM.

It is requisite that a king should be a wise man: for thus he will be honoured analogously to the first God, of whom also he will be an imitator. For this god is by nature the first king and potentate; but a king is so by birth and imitation. And the former rules in the universe, and in the whole of things; but the latter in the earth. The former also governs all things eternally, and has a never-failing life, possessing wisdom in himself; but the latter acquires science through time. But a king will imitate the first God in the most excellent manner, if he acquires magnanimity, gravity, and the want of but few things; exhibiting to his subjects a paternal disposition. For on this account especially, the first God is conceived to be the father both of Gods and men, because he is mild to every thing which is in subjection to him, and never ceases to govern with providential regard. Nor is he alone satisfied with being the maker of all things, but he is the nourisher, the preceptor of every thing beautiful, and the legislator to all things equally. Such also ought the king to be who rules over men on the earth. Nothing however is beautiful which is deprived of a king and a ruler. But it is not possible for a king or a ruler [properly so called] to exist without wisdom and science. He, therefore, who is a wise man and a king, will be an imitator, and a legitimate minister of God.

FROM THE TREATISE OF ECPHANTUS, THE CROTONIAN, ON A KINGDOM.

That the nature of every animal is adapted to the world, and to the things contained in the world, appears to me to be evident from many arguments. For every animal thus conspiring [into union and consent], and having such a colligation of its parts, it follows a series which is most excellent, and at the same time necessary, through the attractive flux of the universe about it, which is effective of the general ornament of the world, and the peculiar permanency of every thing which it contains. Hence it is called κοσμος _kosmos_, and is the most perfect of all animals. But in its parts, which are many, and naturally different, a certain animal excels; both from its native alliance to the world[16], and from participating of divinity in a greater degree. [And in the nature, indeed, of the God who is eternal, the stars called planets are comprehended, forming the first and the greatest series[17]]. But in the sublunary region, where bodies move in a right line, the nature of demons has its subsistence. And in the earth, and with us, the most excellent nature is man; but the most divine is a king, who surpasses other men in the common nature: in his tabernacle, indeed, [i.e. in his body], resembling other men, as being generated from the same matter, but fashioned from the best of artificers, who fabricated him, by using himself as the archetype. Hence, in a certain respect, a king is one and alone; being the production of the supernal king, with whom he is always familiar: but being beheld by his subjects in his kingdom as in a splendid light. For a kingdom is judged and proved to resemble the eagle, the most excellent of winged animals, which looks undazzled at the sun. And a kingdom is, indeed, analogous to the sun, because it is divine; and through excess of splendour cannot be seen without difficulty, except by genuine eyes. For the numerous splendours which surround it, and the dark vertigos which it produces in those who survey it, as if they had ascended into a foreign altitude, evinces that their eyes are spurious. But those who can fitly arrive thither, on account of their familiarity with, and alliance to it, are able to use it properly. A kingdom, therefore, is a thing pure, genuine, uncorrupted, and through transcendency, most divine; and difficult to be acceded to by man. Hence it is necessary that he who is established in it should be naturally most pure and pellucid [in his soul], in order that he may not obscure by his stains that which is most splendid; as some persons defile the most sacred places, and the impure pollute those they may happen to meet. But it is requisite that a king, who associates with men, should participate of an undefiled nature, and should know how much more divine both himself and his qualifications are than other things; and from the exemplars to which he assimilates himself, he should use both himself and his subjects in the best manner. And to other men, indeed, if they are delinquents, the most holy purification is for them to be assimilated to their rulers, whether law or a king administers their affairs. But kings who cannot find any thing on the earth to imitate more excellent than their own nature, ought not to wander any farther in search of a paradigm, but should immediately become benefited by imitating God. For neither should any one search for the world, since he exists in, and is a part of it; nor should he who governs others be ignorant of him by whom he is governed. This, however, is a most abundant ornament, that nothing [in the universe] can be found without a ruler.

The manners of a king also ought to be the preceptors of his government. For thus the beauty of it will immediately shine forth, since he who imitates God through virtue will be dear to him whom he imitates; and much more will he be dear to his subjects. For no one who is beloved by divinity will be hated by men; since neither do the stars, nor the whole world hate God. For if they hated their ruler and leader, they would never be obedient to him. But because he governs properly, mundane affairs are well governed. I therefore, indeed, apprehend that the terrene king ought not to be deficient in any one of the virtues which pertain to the celestial king. But as the former is a certain foreign and external thing, in consequence of proceeding to men from the heavens; so, likewise, his virtues may be conceived to be the works of God, and to accede to him through divinity. And if you consider the thing from the beginning, you will find what I say to be true. For the terrestrial king obtains possession of the race of men by a communion, which is the first and the most necessary of all things. And this race is also the possession of him who governs every thing in the universe. For it is impossible that any thing can subsist without friendship and communion; the truth of which may be easily seen, if the accustomed communion which exists among citizens is supposed to be destroyed; since this is much inferior to a divine and royal nature. For natures of this kind are not oppressed by any such indigence; but, conformably to intellect, they supply the wants of others, and afford them assistance in common. For they are perfect in virtue. But the friendship which is in a city, and which possesses a certain common end, imitates the concord of the universe. But without the arrangement of magistrates no city can be inhabited. In order, however, to effect this arrangement, and to preserve the city, laws are necessary, and a certain political domination, and also a governor and the governed. But, the consequence of these things is, the general good, a certain concinnity, and the consent of the multitude in conjunction with concordant persuasion. He, likewise, who governs according to virtue, is called a king, and is so [in reality]; since he possesses the same friendship and communion with his subjects as divinity possesses with the world, and the natures which it contains. All benevolence, however, ought to be exerted; in the first place, indeed, by the king towards his subjects; but in the second place, by the subjects towards the king: and this benevolence should be such as that of a parent towards his child, of a shepherd towards his flock, and of law towards him who uses it.

For there is one virtue pertaining to the government, and to the life of men. But no one should through indigence solicit the assistance of others, when he is able to supply himself with what nature requires. For though there is a general communion [in the city], yet every one should so live as to be sufficient to himself; since he who is sufficient to himself does not appear to require the aid of any other person in his passage through life. If, therefore, it is necessary to lead an active life, it is evident that a king, though he should also assume other things, will, nevertheless, be sufficient to himself. For he will have friends through his own virtue; and in using these, he will not use them by any other virtue than that by which he regulates his own life. For it is necessary that he should follow a virtue of this kind, since he cannot procure any thing which is more excellent. And God, indeed, not having either ministers or servants[18], nor employing any mandate, and neither crowning nor proclaiming those that are obedient to him, or disgracing those that are disobedient, thus administers so great an empire. But as it appears to me exhibiting himself to be most worthy of imitation, he inserts in all things a vehement desire of participating his nature. He is, however, good; and the communication of goodness, and this, with the greatest facility, is his only work. But those who imitate him[19], accomplish every thing in a better manner through this imitation. And the imitation of him is to every thing the source of sufficiency. For there is not one virtue which makes things to be acceptable to God, and another which imitates him; [but both these are effected by one and the same virtue]. And is not our terrestrial king in a similar manner sufficient to himself? For assimilating himself to one, and that the most excellent nature, he will beneficently endeavour to render all whom he governs similar to himself. But such as offer violence to, and compel their subjects, entirely[20] destroy in every individual of the community a promptitude to imitate [that which is most excellent]. For without benevolence, it is impossible there can be assimilation; since benevolence especially destroys every thing of a terrific nature. It is much to be wished, indeed, that human nature was not in want of persuasion: for persuasion is the relic of human depravity, of which this temporary animal [man] is not destitute. Persuasion, indeed, is a thing proximate to necessity; since this first of itself performs those things which fly from necessity. Such beings, however, as spontaneously use what is beautiful and good, are not influenced by the reverence of persuasion; for neither are they influenced by the fear of necessity.

Again, a king alone is capable of effecting this good in human nature, that through the imitation of what is more excellent, man may pursue what is fit and decorous; and that those who are corrupted as if by intoxication, and through a bad education have fallen into an oblivion of that which is more excellent, may through his eloquence be corroborated, may have their diseased minds healed, and the oblivion which dwells in them through depravity being expelled, may have memory for an intimate associate, from which persuasion is produced. For this, though it originates from depraved seeds, yet is the source of a certain good to the inhabitants of the terrestrial region, in which language supplies what is deficient (through the imbecility of our nature), in our converse with each other.

AND IN ANOTHER PART OF THE SAME WORK.

He who has a sacred and divine conception of things, will be in reality a king[21]. For being persuaded by this, he will be the cause of all good but of no evil. And, moreover, that he will be just, being fitted for society, is evident to every one. For communion or association consists in equality, and in the distribution of it. And justice indeed precedes, but communion participates. For it is impossible for a man to be unjust, and yet distribute equality; or that he should distribute equality, and yet not be adapted to association. But how is it possible that he who is sufficient to himself should not be continent? For sumptuousness is the mother of incontinence, and incontinence of wanton insolence, from which so many human evils are derived. But self-sufficiency is not vanquished by sumptuousness, nor by any thing which proceeds from it; but being itself a certain principle, it leads all things, but is not led by any thing. And to govern, indeed, is the province of God, and also of a king (on which account, likewise, he is denominated sufficient to himself); but it pertains to both, not to be governed by any one. It is, however, evident, that these things cannot be effected without prudence. And it is manifest that God is the intellectual prudence of the world. For the world is connectedly contained by gracefulness, and a fit order of things, which cannot take place without intellect. Nor is it possible for a king without prudence to possess these virtues; I mean justice, continence, communion, and such other virtues as are the sisters of these.

FROM ARCHYTAS.

The unwritten laws of the gods were promulgated against depraved manners, inflicting a severe destiny and penalty on the disobedient; and these unwritten laws are the fathers and leaders of those that are written, and of the dogmas established by men.

FROM THE TREATISE OF DIOTOGENES ON SANCTITY.

It is proper to invoke God in the beginning both of supper and dinner, not because he is in want of any thing of this kind, but in order that the soul may be adorned by the recollection of Divinity. For since we proceed from him, and participate of a divine nature, it is requisite that we should honour him. And since God also is just, it is fit that we should act justly in all things. In the next place, there are four causes which terminate all things, and bring them to an end, viz. nature, law, art, and fortune. And nature, indeed, is universally the principle of all things. But of those things which from manners lead to political concord, law is the inspective guardian and fabricator. Of things which obtain their consummation through human prudence, art is justly said to be the mother and leader. And of those things which, casually and accidentally, similarly befall the worthy and the depraved, we assert fortune to be the cause. For fortune does not produce any thing in measure and bound, in an orderly and prudent manner.

THE PREFACE OF CHARONDAS, THE CATANEAN, TO HIS TREATISE OF LAWS.