Chapter V: Front Matter (5)

The army advanced in pursuit of the enemy, and it was thought that the rebels would concentrate at Danville—but instead of doing so, finding themselves hard pressed, they made a stand at Perryville; where on the evening of the 7th they stubbornly resisted General Buell’s advance. This point became the field of a bloody battle, which took its name from the spot on which it was fought. General McCook did not receive orders to march to Perryville, till three hours after midnight; and though his troops began to advance before dawn they did not reach the battle-field till ten o’clock on the 8th. General McCook formed a junction with General Gilbert’s corps; and in person reported to General Buell for orders. General Buell, appearing to anticipate no serious fighting, gave no orders for immediate attack; and the rebels, taking instant advantage of his indisposition for opening the engagement, resolved to take the initiative before the remaining corps under General Crittenden could arrive. General Bragg drew together his entire force and impetuously hurled them on General McCook’s corps, who met the unexpected assault with the greatest bravery, and stood like adamant before the furious enemy. From two o’clock till nightfall the battle continued to rage with unexampled violence; and both generals—Union and rebel—have recorded it as one of the bloodiest of the war. At General Buell’s headquarters the cannonading was distinctly heard; and he proved himself a most inefficient officer, in not sending the other two divisions to the immediate assistance of General McCook; whose solitary corps of fifteen thousand men was withstanding a force of at least three times their own number. There can be no doubt that the cooperation of the three corps would have insured certain victory; instead of which the brave division, fearfully cut up, after a superhuman contest of many hours was compelled to retire before the superior numbers of the enemy. Having completely overcome the troops under General McCook the rebels followed up their advantage by falling with all their strength on the corps of General Gilbert, which was still waiting orders from the commander-in-chief to hasten to the assistance of General McCook. The battle was instantly renewed with trebly increased fury; the large numbers of the enemy, like a great ocean sweeping on to what they considered an easy victory. But the flood was met and momentarily checked by a brigade under Colonel Gooding; and the Union forces rallying, the rebels retreated across the valley, never pausing till they had reached the protection of their batteries. Then began the carnage to the patriot band, who charged bravely upon the rebel batteries: but being unsupported, and flanked on either side, they were obliged to fall back and take up a position near the town—when night ended the conflict. On both sides the loss of officers was heavy; the loss of men on the Union side far outnumbered that of the rebels.

In the morning it was found that the rebel force, with their leader, fearing a renewal of the battle, had taken flight during the night; and pursuit was ordered; but was abandoned after a chase of about ten miles. And thus the invasion of Kentucky by General Bragg was ended, with results by no means wholly satisfactory to the rebels.

General Buell’s extraordinary tactics during the battles of Munfordsville and Perryville had entirely lost him the confidence of his army; and as the murmurs against his generalship grew louder, and deeper, he was on the 30th October again relieved of command; and Major-General V. S. Rosecrans was appointed to the position of commander-in-chief of the Army of the Ohio, subsequently known as the Army of the Cumberland.

BATTLE OF IUKA, MISS.
SEPTEMBER 19, 1862.

A brief backward glance is here necessary at the operations of the Army of the Mississippi, immediately preceding the transfer of General Rosecrans from that army to the command of the Army of the Ohio. Corinth, as we have seen, had been captured by the national forces on the 30th of May, 1862. Its importance as a military position, (early recognized by the rebel General Beauregard) continually tempted the rebels to undertake its recapture. Many endeavors to effect this had been made, during the summer of 1862. One of these occasioned severe engagements at Bolivar Station, on the 30th and 31st of August, and at Britton’s Lane, on the 1st of September. The rebels lost heavily in these fights.

The rebel strategy at this time contemplated severing the railroad communication between Memphis and Corinth. To prevent that disaster, and effectually to check the advance of the insurgents, General Rosecrans, on the 19th of September, gave battle to the rebels under General Price, attacking them near the village of Iuka. The battle commenced toward evening, the attack being made by two brigades of Missouri cavalry, commanded by General Stanley and General Hamilton, supported by the Fifth Ohio, Colonel Matthias—an excellent officer and a brave man—and the Eleventh Ohio battery. The latter, placed in position on the brow of a hill, commanded the road in front, and did great service. The Fifth Ohio and the Twenty-sixth Missouri occupied a position on the right under cover of woods. On the left of the road and slightly in advance of the battery, was stationed the Forty-eighth Indiana. The rebel forces, comprising eighteen regiments, were commanded by General Price, in person.

The rebels, largely outnumbering the Unionists, hurled themselves, at the outset, in a dense mass upon the front of the National line, and strove to break it. To bring up new troops to its support was impossible. At first, it appeared that the Federals would give way; great confusion prevailed; but just at the critical moment General Stanley pushed to the front, to aid General Hamilton in reforming the disordered troops. His presence had a magical effect; and when at length the Eleventh Missouri, a part of his division, was pushed to the right, where it united with the Twenty-sixth Missouri and the Fifth Iowa, a gallant and successful stand was made against the enemy, who was finally driven back with great loss. From this time, until darkness put an end to the battle, the rebels, confident in their great numerical strength, made repeated and desperate attacks upon the National forces—attacks which, in every instance, were bravely met, and successfully repulsed.

The brunt of the battle was borne by General Hamilton’s regiments, who well deserve the honor due to dauntless bravery. General Stanley’s division, being in the rear, was, with the exception of the Eleventh Missouri, before named—which rendered signal service—prevented from taking an active part in the conflict.

On the morning of the 20th, it was found that the rebels had fled—in a southerly direction. General Hamilton and General Stanley immediately started in pursuit with cavalry, following the foe for fifteen miles. Then, worn out with labor and fighting, and famished for want of food, they discontinued the pursuit and returned to camp.

BATTLE OF CORINTH, MISS.
OCTOBER 3 AND 4, 1862.

Immediately after the battle of Iuka, the rebel forces of Price and Van Dorn formed a junction, for the purpose of making another attempt upon Corinth. General Rosecrans, meanwhile, always watchful and energetic, speedily divined their plans, and at once made the requisite preparations to check their advance. Nor was the collision long deferred. On the morning of the 3rd of October, the Union forces were attacked by a body of insurgents, largely superior in numbers, (officially stated at thirty-eight thousand,) and on that day and the next was fought one of the bloodiest battles of the war, which is known as the battle of Corinth. The rebel force was commanded by Generals Price, Van Dorn, Lovell, Villipigue and Rusk.

The following was the disposition of the Union troops, on the 3rd of October: General McKean with his division occupied Chewalla; General Davis with his division, occupied the line between the Memphis and Columbus road: General Hamilton, with his division, had taken position between the rebel works, on the Purdy and Hamburgh roads; and General Stanley held his division in reserve, near the old headquarters of General Grant. This disposition of the troops placed General Hamilton on the right, General McKean on the left, and General Davis in the centre. McKean had an advance of three regiments of infantry, and a section of artillery under Colonel Oliver, on the Chewalla road, beyond the enemy’s breastworks.

On the morning of the 3rd, the advance under Colonel Oliver, took a strong position on a hill, near an angle in these breastworks: and at about nine o’clock they were strongly pressed by the enemy, who manœuvred to outflank them. At ten o’clock General Rosecrans was informed that Colonel Oliver was imperatively in need of reinforcements, and must yield his position unless they were furnished. The hill would be of great value to the enemy; and it was therefore necessary that the Union forces should hold possession of it; and two regiments of Colonel Davies’ brigade were sent to Colonel Oliver’s assistance. It was presently demonstrated that Brigadier-General Arthur had taken up four more regiments from McKean’s division; and Colonel Oliver’s position upon the hill was being strongly contested. An advance, leaving an interval between McArthur’s and Davies’ left, was now made upon the enemy’s breastworks; but the rebels cleverly pushed on behind Davies’ left, and, after a fierce and determined resistance, forced the brigade to a rapid retreat of nearly a thousand yards, in which movement it lost two heavy guns. Of the fighting, in this engagement, on the 3rd of October, General Rosecrans speaks thus:

“Our troops fought with the most determined courage, firing very low. At one P. M. Davies having resumed the same position he had occupied in the morning, and McArthur’s brigade having fought a heavy force, it became evident that the enemy were in full strength, and meant mischief. McKean with Crocker’s brigade had seen only skirmishers; there were no signs of any movement on our left, and only a few cavalry skirmishers on our right. It was pretty clear that we were to expect the weight of the attack to fall on our centre, where hopes had been given of our falling back.

“Orders were accordingly given to McKean to fall back to the next ridge beyond our intrenchments, to touch his right on Davies’ left, for Stanley to move northward and eastward, to stand in close echelon, but nearer town. General Hamilton was ordered to face toward Chewalla and move down until his left reached Davies’ right. Davies was informed of these dispositions, told to hold his ground obstinately, and then, when he had drawn them in strongly, Hamilton would swing in on their front and rear and close the day. Hamilton was carefully instructed on this point, and entered into the spirit of it.”

The result of this day’s battle was not favorable to the National troops; the fighting of each and every division engaged was superb, but the number of the enemy so far exceeded that of the Union army that when the engagement for the day was closed by the approach of night, the whole National force was driven back, and had lost a great many men. General Oglesby was wounded, and General Hackleman was killed.

Very early on the following morning the opening of fire from the enemy’s artillery gave indications of a very hard fight to come.

At seven o’clock the heads of the rebel column were seen, emerging from the woods in front of the Union forces, and slowly bearing down upon their centre—first on Davis, next on Stanley, and last on Hamilton. The rebel force was so overpowering that the jaded and worn troops of the Union fell back before it. A contemporary correspondent describing this portion of the battle on the 4th, writes as follows: “It was perhaps half-past nine o’clock when the bitter tragedy began to develop in earnest. A prodigious mass, with gleaming bayonets, suddenly loomed out, dark and threatening on the east of the railroad, moving sternly up the Bolivar road in column by divisions. Directly it opened out in the shape of a monstrous wedge, and drove forward impetuously toward the heart of Corinth. It was a splendid target for our batteries, and it was soon perforated. Hideous gaps were rent in it, but those massive lines were closed almost as soon as they were torn open. At this period the skilful management of General Rosecrans began to develop. It was discovered that the enemy had been enticed to attack precisely at the point where the artillery could sweep them with direct, cross and enfilading fire. He had prepared for such an occasion. Our shell swept through the mass with awful effect, but the brave rebels pressed onward inflexibly. Directly the wedge opened and spread out magnificently, right and left, like great wings, seeming to swoop over the whole field before them. But there was a fearful march in front. A broad turfy glacis, sloping upward at an angle of thirty degrees to a crest fringed with determined, disciplined soldiers, and clad with terrible batteries, frowned upon them. There were a few obstructions—fallen timber—which disordered their lines a little. But every break was instantly welded. Our whole line opened fire, but the enemy, seemingly insensible to fear, or infuriated by passion, bent their necks downward and marched steadily to death, _with their faces averted like men striving to protect themselves against a driving storm of hail_. The Yates and Burgess sharpshooters, lying snugly behind their rude breastworks, poured in a destructive fire, but it seemed no more effectual than if they had been firing potato-balls, excepting that somebody was killed. The enemy still pressed onward undismayed. At last they reached the crest of the hill in front and to the right of Fort Richardson, and General Davies’s division gave way. It began to fall back in disorder. General Rosecrans, who had been watching the conflict with eagle eye, and who is described as having expressed his delight at the trap into which General Price was blindly plunging, discovered the break and dashed to the front, inflamed with indignation. He rallied the men by his splendid example in the thickest of the fight. Before the line was demoralized he succeeded in restoring it, and the men, brave when bravely led, fought again. But they had yielded much space, and the loss of Fort Richardson was certain. Price’s right moved swiftly to the headquarters of General Rosecrans, took possession of it, and posted themselves under cover of the portico of the house, and behind its corners, whence they opened fire upon our troops on the opposite side of the public square. Seven rebels were killed within the little inclosure in front of the General’s cottage. The structure is a sort of sieve now—bullets have punctured it so numerously. But the desperate men got no further into town.

“Battle was raging about Fort Richardson. Gallant Richardson, for whom it was named, fought his battery well. Had his supports fought, as his artillerymen did, the record would have been different. The rebels gained the crest of the hill, swarmed around the little redoubt, and were swept away from it as a breath will dissipate smoke. Again they swarmed like infuriated tigers. At last a desperate dash with a yell. Richardson goes down to rise no more. His supports are not at hand. The foe shouts triumphantly and seizes the guns. The horses are fifty yards down the hill toward Corinth. A score of rebels seize them. The Fifty-sixth Illinois suddenly rises from cover in the ravine. One terrible volley, and there are sixteen dead artillery horses, a dozen dead rebels. Illinois shouts, and charges up the hill, across the plateau into the battery. The rebels fly out through embrasures and around the wings. The Fifty-sixth yells again and pursues.

“The rebels do not stop. Hamilton’s veterans, meantime, have been working quietly—no lung-work, but gun-work enough. A steady stream of fire tore the rebel ranks to pieces. When Davies broke it was necessary for all to fall back. General Rosecrans thought it well enough to get Price in deeply. A rebel soldier says Van Dorn sat on his horse grimly and saw it all. ‘That’s Rosecrans’s trick,’ said he; ‘he’s got Price where he must suffer.’ Maybe this is one of the apocrypha of battle. A rebel soldier says it’s true. But Hamilton’s division receded under orders—at backward step, slowly, grimly, face to the foe, and firing. But when the Fifty-sixth Illinois charged, this was changed. Davies’ misfortune had been remedied. The whole line advanced. The rebel host was broken. A destroying Nemesis pursued them. Arms were flung away wildly. They ran to the woods. They fled into the forests. Oh! what a shout of triumph and what a gleaming line of steel followed them. It is strange, but true. Our men do not often shout before battle. Heavens! what thunder there is in their throats after victory. ‘They’’ report that such a shout was never before heard in Corinth. Price’s _once_ ‘invincible’’ now invisible legions were broken, demoralized, fugitive, and remorselessly pursued down the hill, into the swamps, through the thickets, into the forests. Newly disturbed earth shows where they fell and how very thickly.”

During this hot fighting on the right, General Van Dorn, with his corps arranged in four dense columns, made an attack on the Union left, advancing on Battery Robinette. As the rebels came on they were received with a volley of grape and canister; and as they drew nearer, a murderous fire of musketry, from the Ohio brigade, met them directly in the front, and caused them to reel back in confusion to the woods in their rear. But the enemy were not yet defeated; they reformed immediately, and boldly advanced to the charge again, led on by Colonel Rogers, of the Second Texas; but a second time the dread musketry of the Ohio brigade broke over them in a perfect shower of death. The rebels held their ground with a front of desperate bravery, but when the Twenty-seventh Ohio and the Eleventh Missouri, at the order to charge, rushed forward upon them, their thinned ranks broke into fragments, and they fled wildly back to the shelter of the woods pursued by the Union soldiers, and the battle of Corinth was over—an entire and triumphant victory to the National arms.

The enemy’s loss in killed was one thousand four hundred and twenty-three officers and men; their loss in wounded amounted to five thousand six hundred and ninety-two. The Unionists took two thousand two hundred and forty-eight prisoners, among whom were one hundred and thirty-seven field-officers, captains, and subalterns, representing fifty-three regiments of infantry, sixteen regiments of cavalry, thirteen batteries of artillery, and seven battalions, making sixty-nine regiments, six battalions, and thirteen batteries, beside separate companies.

The National troops took also fourteen stands of colors, two pieces of artillery, three thousand three hundred stand of arms, four thousand five hundred rounds of ammunition, and a large lot of accoutrements. The enemy blew up several wagons between Corinth and Chewalla, and beyond Chewalla many ammunition wagons and carriages were destroyed, and the ground was strewn with tents, officers’ mess-chests, and small arms.

When it was finally ascertained that the enemy, utterly routed, were in full retreat, General Rosecrans ordered preparations for an immediate pursuit. General Grant also sent a force under General Ord and General Hurlbut to intercept and cut off the enemy’s retreat; and thus, when the rebels reached Hatchie river, they found themselves completely hemmed in—caught between two rivers—the Hatchie in front of them, the Tuscumbia behind them. For a time the capture of the entire rebel army seemed inevitable, pursued as they were by General Rosecrans, and assailed in front by the reinforcements from General Grant. Unfortunately, the Union army was too much exhausted by its recent severe efforts, to follow up the advantage; and General Price, always accomplished in carrying out a retreat, made a successful attempt to cross the Hatchie a few miles above the point where his first effort had been disputed, and so escaped with his imperilled army.

GENERAL BURNSIDE TAKES COMMAND OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
NOVEMBER 10, 1862.

On the 12th of November General Burnside issued the following address to the army:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, _Nov. 10, 1862_.

In accordance with General Orders, No. 182, issued by the President of
the United States, I hereby assume command of the Army of the Potomac.
Patriotism, and the exercise of every energy in the direction of this
army, aided by the full and hearty cooperation of its officers and
men, will, I hope, under the blessing of God, insure its success.

Having been a sharer of the privations, and a witness of the bravery
of the old Army of the Potomac in the Maryland campaign, and fully
identified with them in their feelings of respect and esteem for
General McClellan, entertained through a long and most friendly
association with him, I feel that it is not as a stranger I assume
command.

To the Ninth army corps, so long and intimately associated with me, I
need say nothing. Our histories are identical. With diffidence for
myself, but with a proud confidence in the unswerving loyalty and
determination of the gallant army now intrusted to my care, I accept
its control, with the steadfast assurance that the just cause must
prevail.

[Signed] A. E. BURNSIDE,
Major-General Commanding.

This was a position that was by no means coveted by General Burnside. He well knew the difficulties and responsibilities of the office, and expressed his misgivings of his ability to perform its duties. But he was a brave and gallant soldier, and had already won the confidence of the Government, and the admiration of his companions in-arms. It was only after mature deliberation, and the consultation and advice of the principal corps commanders that he consented to take upon himself the chief command. In this determination he recognized the soldier’s duty of obedience as a paramount consideration.

On the 12th the general-in-chief, (Halleck) and General Meigs proceeded from Washington to the headquarters to confer with General Burnside. On the same day the advance of the army was across the Rappahannock and fifteen miles south of Warrenton. On the 14th General Burnside issued the following order reorganizing a portion of army:

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, }
WARRENTON, VA., _Nov. 14, 1862_. }

_General Order, No. 184._

First. The organization of a part of this array in three grand
divisions is hereby announced. These grand divisions will be formed
and commanded as follows:

The Second and Ninth Corps will form the right grand division, and
will be commanded by Major-General E. V. Sumner.

The First and Sixth Corps will form the left grand division, and will
be commanded by Major-General W. B. Franklin.

The Third and Fifth Corps will form the centre grand division, and
will be commanded by Major-General Joseph Hooker.

The Eleventh Corps, with such others as may hereby be assigned to it,
will constitute a reserve force, under the command of Major-General F.
Sigel.

Assignments of cavalry and further details will be announced in future
orders.

By command of Major-General BURNSIDE.
S. WILLIAMS, A. A.-G.

Meanwhile the mass of General Lee’s forces retired to Gordonsville. On the 16th the forces of General Burnside began to move for Fredericksburg, as had been previously determined in consultation on the 12th between Generals Halleck and Burnside. On the 15th the evacuation of Warrenton and the adjacent places was commenced, and by the morning of the 18th it was entirely completed. The advance was led by General Sumner. At the same time supplies were sent to Acquia Creek, and the repairs of the railroad track to Fredericksburg commenced, and the army concentrated at Falmouth, opposite Fredericksburg.

The march to Richmond was to be made by the route from Fredericksburg. This city is on the south bank of the Rappahannock, and sixty-five miles distant from Richmond. It is connected with the latter place by a railroad, of which there is a double line nearly to Hanover Junction, twenty-three miles from Richmond. The railroad crosses the Matapony river at Milford, thirty-seven miles from Fredericksburg, and the Pamunkey, twenty-five miles from Richmond, besides a number of smaller streams. Between Falmouth, where the Federal army concentrated, and Richmond, there are two main and two minor lines of defence. The first that of the Rappahannock river. Above Falmouth its abrupt banks, which are lined with high hills, difficult of access, and its narrow fords and rocky bottom render a rapid crossing for a large force almost impossible. Below, the valley of the river expands, spreading often into spacious plains, while the winding course of the stream forms numerous necks of land, easily commanded from the north side, and giving secure crossing places, and ample ground for the formation of troops. At Fredericksburg the north commands the south bank, and much of the distance, which is a mile and a half, to the frowning hills or table land beyond. But these heights equally command this intermediate plain, and are unassailable in front except by infantry. Next in the rear, and twelve miles distant, is the line of the Po river and Stannard’s Marsh, which is hardly available except to hold a pursuing foe in check. The North Anna is about forty miles from the Rappahannock, and affords another principal line of defence. It is a deep and rapid stream, with a narrow valley. The table-land on its north bank is about one hundred feet above the bed of the river, and about one hundred and fifty feet on the south bank. The extension of its line after it turns to join the South Anna, and becomes the Pamunkey, presents scarcely less obstacles than the river itself, so well is the ground guarded by swamps and flanked by streams. The last and a minor line of defence is the South Anna river, with the southern commanded by the northern bank, and too near the North Anna for a second formation by a force that has been badly defeated. Numerous small streams parallel to the line of advance present suitable points for resistance, and protect foes attacking the line communication, while the bridges over them are weak points necessary to be securely guarded.

By the 20th a considerable force had reached Falmouth. General Sumner on the next day sent a summons to surrender, which elicited a correspondence from Mayor Slaughter, showing that the town was at the mercy of the combatants, and beyond the control of the city authorities.

As General Burnside’s army concentrated on the north bank, General Lee’s forces concentrated on the heights in the rear of Fredericksburg. Had the pontoon bridges been at hand when the advance reached Falmouth, the line of the Rappahannock would have been taken without opposition. Then, with proper supplies and bridges, thirty of the sixty miles to Richmond would have been placed within the reach of General Burnside, and perhaps a lodgment have been effected on the banks of the North Anna. Nearly thirty days elapsed before the pontoons arrived and the bridges were completed.

It was the design of General Burnside that the pontoons should leave Alexandria on November 11, and arrive at Falmouth at the same time with the advance of his army. The right grand division reached Falmouth on November 17. The pontoons left Alexandria on November 19, and arrived at Fredericksburgh after the movements of General Burnside had not only become known, but after General Lee had advanced his forces from Gordonsville to the heights in the rear of Fredericksburg, and had fortified them. They were not used until the night of December 10, owing to material changes in the plan of the commander-in-chief, necessitated by new movements of the enemy.

During the night of the 10th of December, therefore, the pontoons were conveyed to the river, and the artillery to the number of one hundred and forty-three pieces was placed in position opposite the city. Between four and five o’clock on the morning of the 11th, the work of building four bridges was commenced. One was to be made at the point where the railroad bridge formerly crossed, and two others opposite the city but nearer Falmouth, and the fourth nearly two miles below for the crossing of the left wing under General Franklin. A dull haze so obscured the movement, that it was not discovered for some time by the Confederate pickets. The bridges were thus partly constructed, when a brisk and deadly fire of musketry from along the banks of the river and windows of the houses was opened, which compelled the workmen to stop. They fled to the cover of the surrounding hills where they formed again, and about six o’clock the work was recommenced. The Confederates had now become aroused to a sense of what was going forward, and with reinforcements of sharpshooters swarmed the opposite bank and houses. The pontonniers, nothing daunted by the hot fire poured upon them, went bravely to work. A storm of bullets covered them. The planks and boats were riddled by every volley. Once more they were compelled to withdraw, and again fell back to the cover of the ridge of hills running parallel with the river. Orders were now given to the artillery to open fire on the city. The Federal batteries commenced an almost simultaneous bombardment, directing their fire chiefly at the houses in which the sharpshooters had concealed themselves. At the first fire they became untenable, and the riflemen retreated to the rear of the town, and took shelter behind the buildings unharmed. The fire of the artillery, which commenced at seven o’clock, was continued incessantly until one o’clock. The fog somewhat obscured its results, but bodies of the Confederates with great stubbornness still kept within the city. The Confederate batteries on the heights in the rear continued silent. Not a gun was fired. About ten o’clock, the workmen were again formed for a third attempt to build the bridges. Volunteers joined them from the Eighth Connecticut. Some planks were seized and carried out to the end of a string of boats and placed in position, when a galling fire from sharpshooters in rifle pits near the edge of the water again interrupted them, and they were recalled. Meantime the bombardment was continued, and several houses in the city had taken fire. In the afternoon, several pontoon boats, loaded with volunteers from the Seventh Michigan and Nineteenth Massachusetts, were sent over. They chased the Confederate sharpshooters from their hiding places, and the bridges were finished without further interruption. On the other side a scene of destruction presented itself. The walls of houses were breached, roofs had fallen in, and the interiors were destroyed.

No sooner were the bridges completed than the troops began to cross, and before dusk General Sumner’s grand division had gone over, and a section of General Hooker’s. All had rations for three days, and blankets for a bivouac. The grand division of General Franklin, consisting of the corps of General Reynolds and Smith, crossed over at the lower bridge, which was built earlier in the day, without interruption, as there was a plain before it which the artillery could have easily swept. The troops commenced crossing again early on the morning of the 12th without molestation. Some sharp resistance had been made by the Confederate soldiers to those who crossed on the previous day, but those were driven out of the city, or killed. During the afternoon fire was opened upon the city by the Confederate batteries on the nearest heights, which was replied to by the Federal batteries, and soon ceased. The occupation of Fredericksburg had now been successfully made. No greater opposition had been presented by the forces of General Lee than was sufficient to tempt the Federal troops to press forward with greater ardor.

The next movement was to drive the Confederate forces from their positions on the heights. These positions consisted of two lines of batteries, one a mile in rear of the other, and both overlooking the city. They extended, in the form of a semicircle, from Port Royal to a point about six miles above Fredericksburg. Their right wing, under General Jackson, extended from Port Royal to Guinney’s Station on the Richmond and Fredericksburg railroad; the centre, under General Longstreet, extended to the telegraph road; the left, under General Stuart, was west of Massaponax creek. A reserve corps was commanded by General A. P. Hill. This was the force which had fought at Richmond and in Maryland.

Friday night and Saturday morning, the 13th, were spent by General Burnside in making a proper disposition of his forces. The left was occupied by General Franklin with his grand division, the centre by General Hooker, and the right by General Sumner.

The right of General Franklin rested on the outskirts of the city, his centre was advanced about a mile from the river, and his left was on the Rappahannock, about three miles below. The action commenced on the extreme left by an annoying fire from a rebel battery, which the Ninth New York was ordered to charge and capture. In this attempt they were repulsed. A brigade was brought to their aid by General Tyler, and another attempt made, but the fire was so deadly that it failed of success. The battle now became more general, and another attempt was made to capture the battery. No advantage was gained at this time, but a severe loss was suffered. The conflict now extended along the whole line of the left, and a desperate effort was made to drive the Confederates across the Massaponax creek by turning their position. The ground was contested most obstinately, but the Confederates gradually fell back, occasionally making a most desperate stand, until night, when General Franklin had succeeded in gaining nearly a mile, and his troops occupied the field. The right of General Franklin’s division, under General Reynolds, encountered the fire of the Confederate artillery on the heights, and although the conflict was most deadly, no advantage was gained.

On the right, under command of General Sumner, the action commenced about ten o’clock and was furious during the rest of the day. The Confederate forces occupied the woods and hills in the rear of the city, from which it soon became evident they could not be driven except at the point of the bayonet. The charge was ordered to be made by the division of General French supported by that of General Howard. Steadily the troops moved across the plain, until they were within a dozen yards of the ridge, when they were suddenly met by a galling fire from the Confederate infantry posted behind a stone wall. For a few minutes the head of the column exhibited some confusion; but quickly forming into line it retired back to a ravine within musket shot of the rebels. Here they were reinforced by fresh troops who fearlessly advanced to their aid under a most destructive fire of artillery. The line of assault was now formed again, and with bayonets fixed and a double quick step, they rushed forward to seize the Confederate artillery. From the first step they encountered a terrific fire of infantry and artillery. No veterans could face that shock. They were thrown into confusion and brought to a sudden halt. At this juncture the centre quivered, faltered, and fled in disorder, but was afterwards rallied and brought back. Three times was the attack thus made to dislodge those batteries. But each time it was in vain. The ranks of the storming party, shrunk to small limits, retired. The entire force of his artillery was now brought by General Sumner to bear upon the enemy, and thus the contest was kept up until dark. At night the Confederate force occupied their original position, and the wounded and the dead remained where they had fallen. Every attempt to remove them by the Federal troops was defeated by the rebel infantry.

In the centre under the command of General Hooker, skirmishing commenced early in the morning; and during the forenoon, while the fog prevailed, a terrific contest, chiefly with artillery, was kept up on both sides. The Confederate position appeared to be invulnerable to artillery, and about noon preparations were made for storming it. The troops marched steadily up within musket shot of the batteries, and were there met by such a destructive fire of artillery and rifles as drove them back with a heavy loss. Reinforcements were obtained, and the attempt to take the batteries was repeated in the afternoon, but without success. The contest continued with great fierceness until night. About half past five the firing of the musketry ceased, but that of the artillery continued until long after dark.

On the next day, Sunday the 14th, both armies remained comparatively quiet. Some skirmishing and artillery fire took place for a short time.

On Monday, both armies continued in the same position. The Confederates had strengthened some of their works. During the ensuing night, the army evacuated Fredericksburg and retired across the river to its former position. The artillery crossed first, followed by the infantry, the last of whom left about daylight. The pontoon bridges were then removed and all communication cut off. The movement was not perceived by the Confederates until it was too late to do any injury to the retreating force. The following is the despatch of General Burnside announcing this movement:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY POTOMAC, }
SIX O’CLOCK, P. M., _December 16, 1862_. }

Major-General HALLECK: The army was withdrawn to this side of the
river because I felt the position in front could not be carried, and
it was a military necessity either to attack or retire. A repulse
would have been disastrous to us. The army was withdrawn at night,
without the knowledge of the enemy, and without loss either of
property or men.

A. E. BURNSIDE,
Major-General Commanding.

The Federal loss was as follows: General Sumner’s division on the right, killed, four hundred and seventy-three; wounded, four thousand and ninety; missing, seven hundred and forty-eight. Total, five thousand three hundred and eleven.

General Hooker’s division on the centre, killed, three hundred and twenty-six; wounded, two thousand four hundred and sixty-eight; missing, seven hundred and fifty-four. Total, three thousand five hundred and forty-eight.

General Franklin’s division on the left, killed, three hundred and thirty-nine; wounded, two thousand five hundred and forty-seven; missing, five hundred and seventy-six. Total, three thousand four hundred and sixty-two. Grand total, killed, one thousand one hundred and thirty-eight; wounded, nine thousand one hundred and five; missing, two thousand and seventy-eight. Total, twelve thousand three hundred and twenty-one.

The Confederate loss was comparatively small, having been sheltered by their works.

General Burnside in his report to the general-in-chief, thus explains his defeat:

“How near we came to the accomplishment of our object future reports will show. But for the fog, and the unexpected and unavoidable delay in building the bridges, which gave the enemy twenty-four hours to concentrate his forces in his strong position, we would almost certainly have succeeded, in which case the battle would have been, in my opinion, far more decisive than if we had crossed at the places first selected. As it was, we came very near success. Failing in the accomplishment of the main object, we remained in order of battle two days, long enough to decide that the enemy would not come out of his strongholds to fight me with his infantry, after which we recrossed to this side of the river unmolested, without the loss of men or property.

“As the day broke our long lines of troops were seen marching to their different positions as if going on parade—not the least demoralization or disorganization existed.

“To the brave officers and soldiers who accomplished the feat of thus recrossing in the face of the enemy, I owe everything. For the failure in the attack, I am responsible, as the extreme gallantry, courage, and endurance shown by them were never exceeded, and would have carried the points had it been possible.

“To the families and friends of the dead I can only offer my heartfelt sympathies, but for the wounded I can offer my earnest prayer for their comfort and final recovery.

“The fact that I decided to move from Warrenton on this line rather against the opinion of the President, Secretary of War, and yourself, and that you have left the whole movement in my hands, without giving me orders, makes me the more responsible.”

Thus closed the third campaign against Richmond. No further hostile demonstrations were made by either army during the year.

OPERATIONS IN TENNESSEE. BATTLE OF MURFREESBORO’.
DECEMBER 31, 1862.

On the 25th of October General Rosecrans was ordered to Cincinnati to take command of the Army of the Ohio, which consisted of what remained of the splendid army formerly commanded by General Buell. The Army of the Ohio was at this time—October 30, 1862—concentrated at Bowling Green, Kentucky; and there General Rosecrans took up his headquarters. This General’s first step was to organize and discipline the army, which had been, in a measure, demoralized by its reverses, under the command of General Buell. This was a task of magnitude, requiring both time and energy. It was accomplished, however, and on the 10th of November, General Rosecrans transferred his headquarters from Bowling Green to Nashville, Tennessee.

Six weeks of unavoidable delay occurred, during which time the Army of the Ohio did nothing to retrieve its past disasters. General Rosecrans was one hundred and eighty-three miles from Louisville, his base of supplies; and the only communication between his present headquarters and the capital of Kentucky was a single line of railroad, not yet completed from Mitchellsville to Nashville, a distance of fifty miles. The completion of this piece of railroad occupied three weeks; and after it was in perfect running order, it required still another three weeks to collect supplies, sufficient to make it safe for the army to attempt any movement in advance. Much skirmishing between the patriot troops and the rebels meanwhile occurred; in most of which the former were victorious. The only disaster of any moment, that occurred to the Union army, at this period, was the capture of Colonel Moore’s brigade, at Hartsville, by the rebel guerrilla, General John A. Morgan, with a cavalry force, and mounted infantry, numbering about five thousand men.

General Rosecrans proceeded with indefatigable energy in his preparations to meet the enemy; but, with the utmost dispatch and patience combined, it was almost the end of December before he was in condition to offer battle to the rebel Bragg, who was stationed at Murfreesboro’, having made his headquarters there, after his escape from Kentucky. The army under General Rosecrans bore no comparison in numbers with that of Bragg; but its organization was perfect. Being compelled to leave a large force at Nashville, for the protection of that city, General Rosecrans’ force, when he advanced, was less than forty-seven thousand men; while that of General Bragg numbered sixty-five thousand.

General Rosecrans divided his army into three corps; one under command of General McD. McCook; another under command of General George H. Thomas; and a third under command of General Thomas L. Crittenden. The corps of General McCook consisted of three divisions under Generals Johnson, Davis and Sheridan; General Thomas’ corps consisted of two divisions, under Generals Rousseau and Negley. The corps of General Crittenden was composed of three divisions, under Generals Van Cleve, Wood and Palmer. General D. S. Stanley was chief of cavalry.

The rebel forces under Bragg were also divided into three corps, commanded respectively by Generals Hardee, Polk and E. Kirby Smith. In addition General Bragg had two cavalry brigades, under command of General Forrest and General Morgan; each of these brigades contained five thousand men.

The moment for attack had come, in the judgment of General Rosecrans. The rebel cavalry force had been sent north, on a raid, in consequence of incorrect information received by Bragg, concerning the movements of Rosecrans.

General McCook received orders to advance upon General Hardee, who occupied a position on the Nolensville road. General Thomas was ordered to the Franklin road, so as to threaten Hardee’s flank; and, by a crossroad, to form a junction with McCook. And General Crittenden was ordered to advance on the Murfreesboro’ road, as far as Lavergne. These movements being carried out caused the retreat of Hardee toward Murfreesboro’. Encountering considerable opposition from the rebels, and being compelled to feel their way over a totally unknown and wooded country, the National force had all crossed over to the Murfreesboro’ road.

On the night of Tuesday, the 30th of December, General Rosecrans had his line formed. The relative positions of the armies were then as follows:

The rebels were intrenched in a thick wood about two miles in front of Murfreesboro’; their lines extending along both sides of a stream, the right under command of General Polk, the left commanded by General Hardee, and the centre by General Smith.

The line of battle of the National troops was drawn up directly opposite that of the rebels, with General Crittenden holding the left, which rested on Stone River; General McCook the right, and General Thomas the centre.

While General Rosecrans was deciding the method of attack, and explaining it to his corps commanders, the rebel General had decided to take the aggressive.

The rebel attack was cleverly managed. Without any demonstration, the enemy suddenly emerged from the woods in which they had been concealed, at about seven o’clock on the morning of the 31st of December, and steadily and noiselessly advanced toward the National line. The troops had fallen in line on the first news of the enemy’s approach, and quietly awaited their coming; but notwithstanding this, however, the unexpected nature of the attack threw the Union troops into confusion, in a very short time the infantry breaking and retreating without a single shot. There was much brave but fruitless fighting. The dense masses of the enemy bore down upon the enfeebled National line, and were bravely met; but continued resistance was impossible. A large part of McCook’s ammunition and subsistence trains were captured by the enemy. The day was plainly against the Federals; and, for the time, it might have been said that General Rosecrans was defeated even before his attack had begun. Unless the battle-field was at once given up to the rebels, it became evident that a complete and immediate change of plan was essential to the maintenance of even a show of resistance to the enemy. General McCook’s army was almost broken up; and upon the centre the firing only increased in fury.

General Rosecrans, with the energy, bravery, and promptness that ever characterized him, saw the danger of defeat, and instantly determined on a means of retrieving his fortunes. Having sent his staff along the lines, he dashed right into the furious fire upon the centre, and sent forward Beatty’s brigade. Immediately a scorching fire was opened from six batteries at once; and as a loud, prolonged cheer burst from the Union troops, it was plain that the rebels were falling back before them. This so encouraged the patriots that every man bent with renewed vigor and enthusiasm to the work before him. A large force of cavalry, which had been sent down the Murfreesboro’ road, had arrested the flying men of McCook’s division, and sent them back to their regiments. General Rosecrans continued to urge his encouraged troops forward, and the rebels fled before them for nearly a mile. The foe now prepared to fall upon the left of the Union line; and although that portion of the army had already received orders to charge upon the enemy, before the advance could be made, the rebels had meanwhile again burst upon the centre, which had begun to break. The breech was instantly filled by the gallant General Rousseau, at the head of his division, and the enemy was beaten back into the cedar thicket in their rear.

Once more the rebels fell upon the Union right, driving it back; and, as the men, fled in disorder before the attack, the sight was very discouraging: but happily no panic ensued. General Rosecrans now massed his divisions against the rebel left, crossed the river, and gave them desperate battle for the space of two hours, during which time the rebels had all the advantage of position and attack till they were at last checked by a terribly destructive fire of musketry and artillery. “The scene at this point,” says a correspondent of the day, “was magnificently terrible.” The whole battle was in full view, the enemy deploying right and left, bringing up their batteries in fine style—our own vomiting smoke and iron missiles upon them with awful fury, and our gallant fellows moving to the front with unflinching courage, and lying flat upon their faces to escape the rebel fire until the moment for action. Shell and shot fell around like rain. General Rosecrans was himself incessantly exposed. It is wonderful that he escaped. His chief-of-staff, the noble Lieutenant-Colonel Garesché, had his head taken off by a round shot, and the blood bespattered the General and some of the staff. Lieutenant Lylam Kirk, just behind him, was thrown out of his saddle by a bullet which shattered his left arm. The enemy at about six o’clock took up a position not assailable except by artillery; and being evidently exhausted by the repeated and rapid assaults, the firing on both sides gradually slackened, and ceased entirely as the darkness deepened,—the battle having continued almost without intermission for eleven hours. The losses on both sides were heavy. Major Rosengarten and Major Ward were both killed, during a cavalry charge: General Rousseau at the head of his splendid division, was wounded, after having made two bayonet charges, and fought during five hours. General Stanley and General Palmer were also wounded.

At dawn of the following morning, General Rosecrans opened fire furiously upon the enemy, with his left endeavoring to beat him back from the right. The enemy met the attack bravely, holding their ground; and the battle continued in that direction for several hours. Matters did not look favorable for the National army; but at twelve o’clock new supplies of ammunition were received, the batteries were replenished and massed, and a murderous fire was opened upon the rebel line. It began to give way: and, with General Thomas pressing on its centre, and General Crittenden on its left, was handsomely repulsed.

For the remainder of the day, the battle changing from one point to another, continued to rage with varied success—now the Unionists were victors, and now the rebels; till night again closed the conflict, and no decisive victory had been gained on either side.

The next day, Friday, began quiet along both lines: the dead lay unburied on the field, already become objects of loathing and horror, nor could their comrades of yesterday spare the time to lay them beneath the moist, and blood-stained earth. The day wore slowly away, both Unionists and Confederates making preparations for more fighting but up to three o’clock in the afternoon there seemed no prospect of the battle being resumed during that day. At half past three the rebels made a furious and sudden attack upon the left wing of the National army, Colonel Beatty’s division, (in command since General Van Clere had been wounded) with the evident intention of cutting it off from the rest of the line. But Beatty was not wholly unprepared, and met the overwhelming force hurled against him, with skill and gallantry. The rebels were three columns deep, and consisted of the divisions of Breckinridge, Claiborne, and Anderson. Beatty’s three brigades defended themselves with desperate bravery; and in return for the flood of shot, shell, and Minnie sent into their ranks, they sent back a perfect storm of lead that caused the first rebel column Breckinridge’s division, to fall back instantly, mowed down by the fierce fire of the Union brigades. The place of the retreating column was instantly filled by another formed of Claiborne’s division; which met with better success than its predecessor; as Beatty’s division, after the severe treatment it had just received could not hope to stand before an entirely fresh column of the enemy.

The Union brigades fell slowly back, and recrossed the river, pursued to the very banks by the rebels, pouring in upon them a steady fire, and then immediately forming their line in the deserted position. The rebel artillery was moved, and from both sides of the stream a heavy fire was poured into each force by its opponents.