Chapter XIX: Front Matter (19)

General Howard, who, upon the 27th of July, according to the President’s appointment, assumed command of the Army of the Tennessee, vacant by General McPherson’s death, had put his army in motion while the events above detailed were taking place. The Army of the Tennessee was placed on the extreme right of General Sherman’s army, its right flank being held by General Logan. By this movement the whole lino was drawn out directly south, with its face to the eastward, and gradually winding around to the Macon road. The enemy perceiving this, massed his troops in the same direction. On the 28th, General Stewart’s corps advanced from Atlanta upon the Union right flank, and for several hours kept up a succession of fierce assaults upon General Logan’s troops. The assaults were as fiercely repelled, causing the rebels to retire again and again, with constantly lessening ranks, till compelled to retire entirely at four P. M., leaving their dead and wounded on the ground, after sustaining a loss of five thousand men. In this conflict the Union loss did not exceed six hundred.

About this time General Hooker resigned command of his corps, and was succeeded by General Slocum—whose place in turn, was temporarily filled by General H. S. Williams—General Slocum being absent in Vicksburg General Palmer also resigned command of his corps, and was succeeded by General Jeff. C. Davis; and General D. S. Stanley was placed in command of the Fourth corps, left vacant by the promotion of General Howard.

With his customary promptitude, General Sherman soon perceived that his last movement would not effect the dislodgment of Hood from Atlanta, and he accordingly changed his tactics. He still further extended the right wing of his army, with the view of outflanking Hood in that manner. The Twenty-third and Fourteenth were, therefore, during the 5th and 6th of August, transferred from their position on the left to the extreme right, where they joined the Fifteenth corps, and formed the army’s right flank.

While this movement was in progress, occasional demonstrations were made against the enemy, which only served to show that he was protected by defences of the strongest description, and was in a condition to maintain his position for a long period, unless dislodged by some master-piece of generalship on the part of the Union commander.

The Union army was now very much changed from its first position for the siege of Atlanta. Instead of threatening the city north and east, General Sherman’s left now covered the northern approaches to it, while his extreme right lay southwest and ran parallel to the railroad. The lines of his army were drawn about two and a half miles from the city, and between them and the enemy’s works lay a narrow strip of wooded country, which had been the scene of almost perpetual skirmishing between the opposing forces.

A movement against the enemy had now become of the first importance, as nothing could be gained to the National troops by delay, while Hood was every day strengthening the city’s defences, and adding to his army by organizing all the laborers, teamsters, and quartermasters’ men within Atlanta, and filling their places by negroes. Without haste, and after mature consideration as to the safest course to pursue, General Sherman, having satisfied himself that the rebel lines could not be taken except by a fearful sacrifice of life, determined upon the capture of Atlanta by a bold strategic movement. A new movement by the right flank was ordered, which would require the participation of nearly the whole army. One corps was withdrawn and sent to the intrenched position across the Chattahoochie, in order to preserve, in any event, communication with the base. The whole of the remaining army was ordered to move upon the south and southwest sides of the city, destroy the railroad communications, and thus place Atlanta beyond the possibility of obtaining supplies. Preparations for these operations were entered upon at once, and by the 16th General Sherman’s plans were virtually completed. On the 18th, General Kilpatrick, with five thousand men, made a raid, and struck the Macon railroad at Jonesboro’ and Lovejoy’s, and the Atlanta and West Point road at Fairburn. But the enemy resisted him at all points and he failed to inflict permanent injury upon the roads. Retreating, therefore, on the 22d instant, by way of Decatur, he brought in one hundred prisoners, and a piece of artillery. General Sherman now made no further delay in executing his plan to force Hood to abandon Atlanta. That plan, as already noted, consisted in changing the position of his lines, getting in between Atlanta and Macon, and thus cutting off Hood’s supplies. The scheme was brilliant, and was cleverly executed. A brisk engagement took place near Jonesboro’, on the 31st of August, in which the rebels under Hardee were severely defeated, which was accomplished with little loss to the Union arms. Finding himself thus dangerously situated, General Hood, on the 1st of September, ordered the evacuation of Atlanta—first taking care to burn the railroad rolling stock and all other material that would have been useful to the National army. On leaving the city he retreated to McDonough, whence, moving westward, he was able to join his forces to those of Hardee and S. D. Lee. Meanwhile, at daybreak on the 2d of September, the Union troops marched into Atlanta. “We have,” says General Sherman, announcing the capture of the city, “as the result of this quick, and, as I think, well-executed movement, twenty-seven guns, over three thousand prisoners, and have buried over four hundred rebel dead, and left as many wounded that could not be removed. The rebels have lost, besides the important city of Atlanta and their stores, about five hundred killed, twenty-five hundred wounded, and three thousand prisoners; whereas our aggregate loss will not foot up fifteen hundred. If that is not success I don’t know what is.”

To lose no time in the improvement of his victory, General Sherman, on the 4th of September, issued an order to the effect that the city of Atlanta being exclusively required for warlike purposes, all citizens must remove from it; and to expedite such removal, he entered into a truce with General Hood, and made arrangements with him for forwarding the citizens and their effects beyond the Federal lines. In connection with this event the following correspondence took place between the authorities of Atlanta and General Sherman.

“ATLANTA, GA., Sept. 11, 1864.

“Major-General WILLIAM T. SHERMAN:

“SIR: The undersigned, Mayor and two members of Council for the city
of Atlanta, for the time being the only legal organ of the people of
the said city to express their wants and wishes, ask leave most
earnestly but respectfully to petition you to reconsider the order
requiring them to leave Atlanta. At first view it struck us that the
measure would involve extraordinary hardship and loss, but since we
have seen the practical execution of it, so far as it has progressed,
and the individual condition of many of the people, and heard the
statements as to the inconvenience, loss and suffering attending it,
we are satisfied that the amount of it will involve in the aggregate
consequences appalling and heart-rending.

“Many poor women are in an advanced state of pregnancy; others have
young children, whose husbands, for the greater part, are either in
the army, prisoners, or dead. Some say: ‘I have such a one sick at my
house; who will wait on them when I am gone?’ Others say: ‘What are we
to do? we have no houses to go to, and no means to buy, build, or rent
any; no parents, relatives, or friends to go to.’ Another says: ‘I
will try and take this or that article of property; but such and such
things I must leave behind, though I need them much.’ We reply to
them: ‘General Sherman will carry your property to Rough and Ready,
and then General Hood will take it thence on:’ and they will reply to
that: ‘But I want to leave the railroad at such a place, and cannot
get conveyance from thence on.’

“We only refer to a few facts to illustrate, in part, how this measure
will operate in practice. As you advanced, the people north of us fell
back, and before your arrival here a large portion of the people here
had retired south; so that the country south of this is already
crowded, and without sufficient houses to accommodate the people, and
we are informed that many are now staying in churches and other
outbuildings. This being so, how is it possible for the people still
here (mostly women and children) to find shelter, and how can they
live through the winter in the woods? no shelter or subsistence; in
the midst of strangers who know them not, and without the power to
assist them much if they were willing to do so.

“This is but a feeble picture of the consequences of this measure. You
know the woe, the horror, and the suffering cannot be described by
words. Imagination can only conceive of it, and we ask you to take
these things into consideration. We know your mind and time are
continually occupied with the duties of your command, which almost
deters us from asking your attention to the matter, but we thought it
might be that you had not considered the subject in all of its awful
consequences, and that, on reflection, you, we hope, would not make
this people an exception to mankind, for we know of no such instance
ever having occurred—surely not in the United States. And what has
this helpless people done, that they should be driven from their
homes, to wander as strangers, outcasts, and exiles, and to subsist on
charity?

“We do not know as yet the number of people still here. Of those who
are here, a respectable number, if allowed to remain at home, could
subsist for several months without assistance; and a respectable
number for a much longer time, and who might not need assistance at
any time.

“In conclusion, we most earnestly and solemnly petition you to
reconsider this order, or modify it, and suffer this unfortunate
people to remain at home and enjoy what little means they have.

“Respectfully submitted, JAMES M. CALHOUN, Mayor.

“E. E. RAWSON, }
S. C. WELLS, } Councilmen.”

GENERAL SHERMAN’S REPLY.

“HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD, }
ATLANTA, GA., September 12, 1864. }

“JAMES M. CALHOUN, Mayor, E. E. RAWSON, and S. C. WELLS, representing
City Council of Atlanta:

“GENTLEMEN: I have your letter of the 11th, in the nature of a
petition, to revoke my orders removing all the inhabitants from
Atlanta. I have read it carefully, and give full credit to your
statements of the distress that will be occasioned by it, and yet
shall not revoke my order, simply because my orders are not designed
to meet the humanities of the case, but to prepare for the future
struggles in which millions, yea, hundreds of millions of good people
outside of Atlanta have a deep interest. We must have Peace, not only
at Atlanta, but in all America. To secure this we must stop the war
that now desolates our once happy and favored country. To stop war we
must defeat the rebel armies that are arrayed against the laws and
Constitution, which all must respect and obey. To defeat these armies
we must prepare the way to reach them in their recesses provided with
the arms and instruments which enable us to accomplish our purpose.

“Now, I know the vindictive nature of our enemy, and that we may have
many years of military operations from this quarter, and therefore
deem it wise and prudent to prepare in time. The use of Atlanta for
warlike purposes is inconsistent with its character as a home for
families. There will be no manufactures, commerce, or agriculture here
for the maintenance of families, and sooner or later want will compel
the inhabitants to go. Why not go now, when all the arrangements are
completed for the transfer, instead of waiting till the plunging shot
of contending armies will renew the scene of the past month? Of
course, I do not apprehend any such thing at this moment, but you do
not suppose that this army will be here till the war is over. I cannot
discuss this subject with you fairly, because I cannot impart to you
what I propose to do, but I assert that my military plans make it
necessary for the inhabitants to go away, and I can only renew my
offer of services to make their exodus in any direction as easy and
comfortable as possible. You cannot qualify war in harsher terms than
I will.

“War is cruelty, and you cannot refine it; and those who brought war
on our country deserve all the curses and maledictions a people can
pour out. I know I had no hand in making this war, and I know I will
make more sacrifices to-day than any of you to secure peace. But you
cannot have peace and a division of our country. If the United States
submits to a division now, it will not stop, but go on till we reap
the fate of Mexico, which is eternal war. The United States does and
must assert its authority wherever it has the power; if it relaxes one
bit to pressure it is gone, and I know that such is not the national
feeling. This feeling assumes various shapes, but always comes back to
that of Union. Once admit the Union, once more acknowledge the
authority of the National Government, and instead of devoting your
houses, and streets, and roads, to the dread uses of war, I, and this
army become at once your protectors and supporters, shielding you from
danger, let it come from what quarter it may. I know that a few
individuals cannot resist a torrent of error and passion such as has
swept the South into rebellion; but you can point out, so that we may
know those who desire a Government and those who insist on war and its
desolation.

“You might as well appeal against the thunderstorm as against these
terrible hardships of war. They are inevitable, and the only way the
people of Atlanta can hope once more to live in peace and quiet at
home is to stop this war, which can alone be done by admitting that it
began in error, and is perpetuated in pride. We don’t want your
negroes, or your horses, or your land, or anything you have, but we do
want and will have a just obedience to the laws of the United States.
That we will have, and if it involves the destruction of your
improvements, we cannot help it. You have heretofore read public
sentiment in your newspapers, that live by falsehood and excitement,
and the quicker you seek for truth in other quarters, the better for
you.

“I repeat, then, that, by the original compact of government, the
United States had certain rights in Georgia which have never been
relinquished and never will be; that the South began war by seizing
forts, arsenals, mints, custom-houses, &c., &c., long before Mr.
Lincoln was installed, and before the South had one jot or tittle of
provocation. I myself have seen in Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee, and
Mississippi hundreds and thousands of women and children fleeing from
your armies and desperadoes, hungry and with bleeding feet. In
Memphis, Vicksburg, and Mississippi, we fed thousands upon thousands
of the families of rebel soldiers left on our hands, and whom we could
not see starve. Now that war comes home to you, you feel very
different; you deprecate its horrors, but did not feel them when you
sent car-loads of soldiers and ammunition, and molded shell and shot,
to carry war into Kentucky and Tennessee, and desolate the homes of
hundreds and thousands of good people, who only asked to live in peace
at their old homes, and under the Government of their inheritance.

“But these comparisons are idle. I want peace, and believe it can only
be reached through Union and war; and I will ever conduct war purely
with a view to perfect and early success.

“But, my dear sirs, when that peace does come, you may call on me for
anything. Then I will share with you the last cracker, and watch with
you to shield your homes and families against danger from every
quarter. Now you must go, and take with you the old and feeble, feed
and nurse them, and build for them in more quiet places proper
habitations to shield them against the weather until the mad passions
of men cool down, and allow the Union and peace once more to settle on
your old homes at Atlanta.

Yours in haste,
“W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.”

HOOD’S CAMPAIGN IN ALABAMA AND TENNESSEE.

The capture of Atlanta occasioned, as well it might, a panic among the rebel chieftains at Richmond. They saw, and saw clearly, that unless Sherman could be defeated, their confederacy would be shorn of half its territory and more than half its strength. In this emergency, Mr. Jefferson Davis left the rebel capital, on a tour of inspection in Georgia. In the course of this tour Mr. Davis exerted his well-known talents as an orator, to fire once more the Southern heart and to strengthen the Southern cause. His most important speech was delivered at Macon, on the twenty-third of September. But the only effect of his eloquence was to disclose the increasing weakness of the Confederacy. Yet it must be admitted that the expedient, undoubtedly suggested by Mr. Davis’s military experience and ability, which the rebels now adopted to recover their lost ground, was extremely ingenious. They determined that Hood’s army should move rapidly to the rear of Atlanta, cut off all communications between that city and Chattanooga, subsequently isolate the latter city from Nashville, and thus leave Sherman’s army, destitute of supplies, in an enemy’s country, from which it would, necessarily, be compelled to retire with all expedient haste.

The prosecution of this scheme was not long delayed. On the second of October General Hood was across the Chattahoochee, leading his forces toward Dallas. This was to be the point of rebel concentration. On the fourth the rebels captured Ackworth and Big Shanty, and destroyed the railroad between the two places. Then they advanced on Allatoona Pass, which is five miles north of Big Shanty, and about thirty miles from Atlanta. That position was one of great strength, and its possession was most important to Sherman. Moreover, it was a storehouse of Federal supplies. The rebels were aware of its value, and confident of its capture. But in this instance they were not dealing with a blind foe. General Sherman had already divined the entire plan of the rebel campaign, and had taken measures, not only to frustrate the designs of the foe, but to turn their temerity to his own advantage. The work of interrupting National communication between Chattanooga and Nashville had been committed to the rebel General Forrest. It was arranged that General Thomas, operating before Nashville, should oppose this movement. General Corse, who was at Rome, was directed to reinforce the garrison of Allatoona Pass, and to hold it until the arrival of the main body of the Union army. In obedience to this command General Corse immediately threw in a force of nine hundred men, increasing the garrison to seventeen hundred.

BATTLE OF ALLATOONA, GA.

On the morning of October 5th, the rebels, seven thousand strong, and led by General French, attacked Allatoona. A stubborn fight ensued, lasting about six hours. General Sherman, pushing on from Atlanta, reached Kenesaw Mountain while the battle was in progress. The National troops holding Allatoona, though largely outnumbered, fought with the greatest desperation, and successfully maintained their position, until, on the approach of reinforcements, the rebels fell back, entirely discomfited. Their loss in this spirited engagement was upwards of one thousand men, killed, wounded and prisoners. The Union loss was about five hundred.

THE GREAT REBEL BLUNDER.

General Sherman occupied the Pass, after the battle, and from that point kept watch upon Hood, secretly hoping—while pretending anxious pursuit—that the rebel general would be lured away into Northern Alabama and Tennessee. The sequel satisfied the hopes of the Union commander. Passing by Rome and Kingston, the rebels moved north, and next threatened Resaca, which was held by Colonel Weaver, with a garrison of six hundred men. Colonel Weaver’s reply, on being summoned to surrender, is memorable: “In my opinion,” he said, “I can hold the fort. If you want it, come and take it.” But Hood was burning with bolder designs, and the determined little garrison of Resaca was passed by unmolested.

On the fourteenth of October, General Sherman’s forces arrived there, slowly pursuing Hood. On the same day Hood captured Dalton, continuing there the work of destruction which had marked his entire advance. Thence, closely pushed by Sherman, he passed, by way of Lafayette, into Alabama, halting at last at Gadsdens, on the Coosa river, seventy-five miles from the latter city. But the halt lasted only for a few days.

Early in November, having received reinforcements from Beauregard—then at Charleston—Hood resumed his march, and entered Tennessee. The pursuing army of Sherman was now at Gaylesville; and here the pursuit ceased. The enemy had fallen into the snare, and it only now remained for the invincible General Thomas to deal him his deathblow. That blow was struck, within a very brief period of time, at Nashville. It will be proper, however, before describing those memorable battles, to recount the more immediate movements of General Sherman, and the destruction of Atlanta.

PREPARATIONS FOR SHERMAN’S GRAND MARCH.

General Thomas, at the head of a considerable body of Union troops, was at this time in readiness to confront the advancing rebels south of Nashville. On hearing that Hood had started to invade Tennessee, General Sherman immediately withdrew his army to Rome, and sent forward two corps, the Fourth and the Twenty-third, one commanded by General Stanley, the other by General Schofield, to reinforce Thomas. These troops went by way of Chattanooga, and safely reached their destination. General Sherman’s remaining force consisted of five corps—the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Sixteenth, Seventeenth and Twentieth—the latter constituting the garrison of Atlanta. With this force, subsequently condensed into four corps, and amply sufficient for the purpose, he was prepared for his great march across the rebel territory, from Atlanta to the sea. Full details of the plan had been given to General Thomas, who, on his part, felt confident of being able to dispose of Hood.

To cut off all communication between Atlanta and Chattanooga, to destroy every possible facility of transportation in that vicinity, which an enemy might chance to find serviceable, and lastly, to render Atlanta itself entirely useless, were now imperative incidents of Sherman’s campaign. This work was accomplished within the first twelve days of the month of November. In the course of that time, all the wounded and the sick, together with all prisoners, stores and machinery, and surplus artillery that had accumulated at Rome, Atlanta, and other neighboring places were conveyed by railroad to Chattanooga. The road was then destroyed. The hand of destruction was also laid, though lightly, upon Rome, everything being demolished in that city which might chance to become useful to the rebels in future. A contemporary correspondent gives the following account of

THE BURNING OF ROME, GA.
NOVEMBER 11, 1864.

“Rome was evacuated at ten o’clock this forenoon by our (U. S.) forces; but not until the Etowah House, a respectable three-story brick hotel was consumed by fire. Stragglers managed to ignite a lot of straw in the building, and, there being no engines in the town, it was impossible to subdue the flames. A block of fine brick stores was also wantonly destroyed by skulking stragglers. All the barracks were laid in ashes, and a black veil of dark smoke hung over the war-desolated city all day, arising from the smouldering ruins. Owing to the great lack of railroad transportation, General Corse was obliged to destroy nearly a million of dollars’ worth of property, among which was a few thousand dollars’ worth of condemned and unserviceable government stores. Nine rebel guns, captured at Rome by our troops, were burst, it being deemed unsafe to use them. One thousand bales of fine cotton, two flour mills, two rolling mills, two tanneries, one salt mill, an extensive foundry, several machine shops, together with the railroad depots and storehouses, four pontoon bridges, built by General Corse’s pioneer corps, for use on the Coosa and Etowah rivers, and a substantial trestle bridge nearly completed for use, were completely destroyed. This trestle, constructed by the engineer corps, I am told, would have cost fifty thousand dollars north. Recollecting the outrages perpetrated upon Colonel Streight by the ‘Romans,’ our troops, as soon as they learned that the town was to be abandoned, and a portion of it burned, resolved to lay Rome in ashes in revenge. The roaring of the flames, as they leaped from window to window, their savage tongues of fire darting high up into the heavens, and then licking the sides of the buildings, presented an awful but grand spectacle, while then mounted patrol and the infantry men glided along through the brilliant light, like the ghostly spectres of horrid war.”

THE DESTRUCTION OF ATLANTA.
NOVEMBER, 1864.

Atlanta, popularly called the Gate City, is situated seven miles southeast of the Chattahoochie river, and on the line of railroads leading from Savannah to Chattanooga and Nashville, and to Macon, Augusta, Milledgeville, Savannah, and Charleston, in the southeast direction. It is one hundred and one miles from Macon, one hundred and seventy-one miles from Augusta, three hundred and seven miles from Charleston, and two hundred and ninety-two miles from Savannah. Four of the principal railroads of the State terminate at this point. The Georgia railroad extends from Atlanta to Augusta; the Western railroad to Macon; the Atlantic and Western railroad to Chattanooga; and the Lagrange railroad to West Point, seventy-two miles distant. Atlanta was laid out in 1845, and has grown with great rapidity, its population being, in 1850, two thousand five hundred and seventy; in 1853, four thousand two hundred and eighty; and in 1860, nine thousand eight hundred and seventy.

Its destruction by General Sherman has sometimes been condemned as an act of vandalism, whereas it was—as subsequent events sufficiently demonstrated—a timely and unavoidable military act, dictated by the most imperative prudential reasons.

The following narrative of the burning of Atlanta is furnished by an eye-witness:

“Atlanta was of strategic value only so long as it remained a great railroad centre; it had now no longer any value to our troops, as every railroad leading to it was destroyed—the railways gutted, torn up, and the very iron of which they were composed, put beyond use. For miles the country round about it had been made a complete waste, so that there was no possibility of the rebels again occupying it. But had we remained there all winter, Hood and the rebel cavalry would also have remained hanging about the place, and whenever opportunity offered, harassing our men, though they would have, at any time, fled before our army. The ever-active mind of General Sherman scorned such petty warfare; he therefore determined to render the city itself as unfit for rebel habitation as he had already rendered the country around it unfit for the movements of an army.

“In the month of November, the once proud Atlanta—the beautiful Gate City, was laid in ashes. A harrowing scene of confusion and fright was presented when the city was first set in flames. Those of the citizens who had not left with the first exodus, were now afraid of being abandoned to the tender mercy of the rebels. The depot presented a scene of confusion and suffering impossible to describe. Women and children were huddled together, with the sole remaining wealth they possessed in the world clutched closely to their bosoms. The cry of young infants rose upon the air, and mingled dismally with the roar and crackle of the flames not a hundred yards distant—flames which licked up it their devouring fury the last remaining property of hundreds, and gave in return only a thick, but sickening smoke, and a blood-red glare streaming up against the clear sky. From house to house the destroying element sped, thrusting out forked tongues of fire in a thousand different directions—from street to street the dread demon of flame trailed his hideous and scorching length along, leaving in his wake desolate, grimy, smoking ruin. Men who were millionaires but a few months before, fled from their homes and the scene of their wealth, roofless in the wide world, and without a dollar in their pockets. On, on, on, always onward, till nothing more remained, spread the fire-fiend, with still increasing appetite for plunder, till every factory, railroad depot, hotel, mill, government buildings of all descriptions—everything, in short, save a few churches and some private dwellings, were reduced to blackened, ghastly, horrible ruin.

“The Tyre of southern trade was laid level with the dust; her grace, splendor, wealth and beauty, were things of the past, and the mere charred skeleton of Atlanta alone remained, to prove that ever she had been—to prove, also, one more dreadful monument of the waste and desolation that must ever follow in the footsteps of rebellion.”

THE BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, TENN.
NOVEMBER 30, 1864.

Our narrative left the rebel army under General Hood—whose movements were now superintended by the redoubtable Beauregard—advancing into the State of Tennessee, in the early part of the month of November. His design was to defeat the Union forces under General Thomas, and capture the city of Nashville. On the twenty-third of November his army took Pulaski, and on the twentieth, after a little skirmishing, entered Columbia. All this while, as the rebels advanced, the National troops retired; but, on the thirtieth, when the forces of Hood appeared before the town of Franklin, where the Federal troops were fortified, General Schofield felt it to be necessary to make a stand. The original plan had been, to lure the rebels nearer to Nashville, and fight the final battle there, with the aid of heavy reinforcements that were expected to arrive at that point. But the foe pressed on somewhat too precipitately, and it became necessary to check his advance. The National force here, under General Schofield’s command, numbered fifteen thousand men. The right wing was commanded by General Stanley, the left by General Cox.

At about half-past three, in the afternoon of the twentieth, the assault was commenced by the rebels. Cheatham’s corps was on the right, Stewart’s on the left, and S. D. Lee’s in reserve, on the centre.

Cheatham threw his whole corps on Wagner’s division with great impetuosity, and after an hour’s desperate fighting pushed Wagner back on the second Union line, where Wagner’s men became mingled with those of Cox and Huger, on the left and centre.

The rebels, encouraged by their success in driving back Wagner, with loud cheers advanced on the second line. Their order of advance was very peculiar—a semicircle of two regiments deep, extending all around the lines, and behind each alternate regiment was placed four others, so that the assaulting columns were six regiments deep.

General Hood appeared about four o’clock P. M. at the head of his command, and, pointing towards the Federal lines, said:—“Break those lines, boys, and you have finished the war in Tennessee. Break them, and there is nothing to oppose your march from Nashville to the Ohio river.”

Loud and ringing cheers answered the words of the rebel leader, and the whole space in front of the National troops was crowded with the advancing enemy.

Captain Lyman, commanding an artillery brigade in the Fourth corps, had placed his batteries in most favorable positions, and from these storms of shot and shell were hurled into the charging rebel ranks.

With the most reckless bravery the rebels rushed on. When within a few hundred yards of the National works, the Unionists opened upon them a terrible fire of musketry. It seemed impossible for anything to live before it. But no wavering was perceived in the advancing rebel lines. On they came, to the very parapets of the Unionists’ works, and stuck their bayonets under the logs on the opposing battlements.

On the Columbus pike the pressure was so great that some of Cox’s and Wagner’s men temporarily gave way.

Up to this time the brigade commanded by Colonel Opdyke, of the One Hundred and Twenty-fifth Ohio, had been held in reserve; and now Colonel Opdyke, by orders of General Stanley, came forward, with his brigade, to restore the broken line.

The rebels, who had crawled over the works, had not time to retire, and Cox’s and Wagner’s men, who had broken away but a moment before, rallied and attacked the enemy on the flank, while Opdyke charged on the front. A desperate hand to hand fight ensued with bayonets and the butt ends of muskets. A hundred rebels were captured here, and the line was restored. For two hours and a half the battle now raged all along the lines. The men of the Fourth and Twenty-third corps vied with each other in bravery. Riley’s brigade, of the Twenty-third corps, fairly covered the ground in front of it with rebel dead. The rebel General Adams was killed. He and his horse fell into the ditch in front of the One Hundred and Fourth Ohio. Seventeen distinct attacks of the enemy were repelled.

At dusk the rebels were repulsed at all points, but the firing did not cease until nine o’clock at night.

At least five thousand rebels were killed, wounded and captured. The National loss was about fifteen hundred.

General Schofield directed the battle from the fort on the north bank of the stream, where some heavy guns and the batteries of the Twenty-third corps were placed, which did great service in damaging the enemy’s right wing.

The following dispatch from General Schofield apprised General Thomas of the leading facts of this battle:

“FRANKLIN, TENN., NOV. 30, 1864.

“Major-General THOMAS:—

“The enemy made a heavy and persistent attack with two corps,
commencing at four P. M. and lasting till after dark. He was
repulsed at all points with heavy loss—probably five or six thousand
men. Our loss is probably not more than one-fourth of that number.
We have captured about one thousand prisoners, including one
brigadier-general.

“JOHN M. SCHOFIELD, Major-General.”

General Stanley greatly distinguished himself by his personal intrepidity in this battle. When a part of his command had retired before the charge of the rebels, he rushed to the front, had a horse shot under him, and was himself wounded; yet he led on the charge, waving his hat in the air and calling on his men to follow. By this means he succeeded in rallying his faltering troops, and repelling seven successive charges made by the rebels. Colonel Schofield, a brother of General Schofield, and his chief of artillery, won great credit for his admirable management of the guns.

The result of the battle of Franklin was to stay the advance of Hood, and enable General Thomas to complete his preparations for the last and decisive struggle. During the night of the thirtieth, General Schofield’s forces fell back on Nashville. The rebels followed, next day, and cautiously reconnoitered the Union lines; but, deeming it unsafe to assault, they determined to beleaguer the city. Thus began the siege of Nashville. It lasted two weeks. At the end of that time General Thomas, having received his reinforcements and completed his preparations, sallied out and fought the decisive battle of Nashville.

THE BATTLE OF NASHVILLE, TENN.
DECEMBER 15–17, 1864.

On the evening of the 14th of December, a council of war was held at the St. Cloud Hotel, in Nashville, at which the plan of the battle was thus arranged:

The artillery from the forts and advanced batteries to open all along the line. Major-General Steadman, who commanded on the extreme left, was to make a heavy demonstration, so as to attract the enemy’s attention to that point. Schofield, who connected with Steadman’s right, was to hold himself in readiness to move if necessary. Wood’s corps, the Fourth, was to move on the Hillsboro’ pike, keeping up a connection with A. J. Smith’s, and pierce the centre, while A. J. Smith was to attack the extreme left. Hatch’s division of cavalry connected with Smith’s right. Some of Major-General Wilson’s cavalry had wheeled on the enemy’s rear, towards Brentwood, so as to cut off the rebel retreat.

FIRST DAY’S BATTLE.

The booming of guns from Forts Negley and Cassino and several batteries awakened the inhabitants of Nashville, on the morning of November 15th, to the terrible reality that a battle was raging outside their city. There was great anxiety and hurrying to and fro, for the fate of thousands hung upon the issue. Defeat would be ruin, for it meant the fall of Nashville. Thomas knew this, and therefore decided on attacking Hood before he had time to fortify his new position. At early dawn Steadman’s troops were in motion. The First and Second brigades—colored troops, commanded by Colonels Thompson and Morgan—took up position to the right and left of the Chattanooga line. These were supported by an Indiana battery. Colonel Grosvenor, commanding a brigade formed of detachments of the Fourteenth corps, took up a position on their left. The colored troops drove back the enemy’s skirmishers to their main lines, but wavered under the assault. Grosvenor’s brigade charged, taking the advance line of works; but, as it was not Thomas’s intention to bring on a general engagement at this point, General Steadman ordered them to fall back to their original position, still keeping up a brisk skirmish fire.

About six o’clock in the morning the Fourth corps broke camp, moving on the Hillsboro’ pike in the following order, _en echelon_ on the left; the Second division in front, the First division next, and the Third division in the rear. The corps moved forward, regulating its movements by those of General Smith, who was to attack the rebel left flank, it being intended to make the main assault on this part of the rebel line. The Fourth corps took up the following position. General Samuel Beatty, commanding the Third division, on the left, held the front line, the division of General Nathan Kimball in the centre, came second, and the division of General Elliot, in the rear, connecting with Garrard’s division, of Smith’s corps; then came McArthur’s division.

There was heavy cannonading all the morning. About noon Smith’s and Wood’s skirmishers became engaged. General Wood ordered General Beatty to charge a hill in his front, held by a strong force of the enemy, heavily intrenched. The Second brigade of Beatty’s division, commanded by Colonel Post, was ordered to make the charge. The First brigade, Colonel Straight, moved _en echelon_ on the left, and in support, while the Third brigade of Colonel Kneppler (Seventy-ninth Ohio) was held in reserve. The order was no sooner given for the charge than the Second brigade rushed forward with a yell. The First brigade supported it by a spirited fire, and on the order to charge being given, sprang forward in a spirit of emulation. The rebels occupied a strong position around Montgomery’s house, near the Granny White pike, which now became the central point of the battle. The defence of the rebels at this point was of the most stubborn character. The Unionists fired volley upon volley, charged them repeatedly, and at last drove them in great confusion through the grounds of the mansion. Though ordered to halt on dislodging the rebels from this position, the National troops charged on them as they fled, capturing over two hundred, and securing their entire line of works in front of Wood. In the mean time the First and Second divisions were sharply engaged, pressing back the rebels, and advancing slowly. The batteries were moved forward to the hills abandoned by the rebels, and the fight was carried on heavily all the while by Smith’s corps. About two o’clock General Schofield, who had been in the rear of the Fourth corps, took up a position on the right of Smith, thus extending the Union line without weakening it, and soon became engaged. The roar of artillery and musketry continued fierce along the whole line.

About three o’clock Post’s and Straight’s brigades, abandoning their _echelon_ formation, formed in line with the First brigade of Beatty’s division and the Second division of Wood’s corps, and the whole line again advanced, protected by a fierce artillery fire from Battery H, Fifth regular, the Second Pennsylvania, the First Illinois, the Fourth regular, First and Sixth Ohio batteries. The advance of this line was magnificent, the columns extending in one long line of battle, marching steadily and strongly forward over a clear plateau and driving the enemy before it, Post and Straight moving in simple line of battle, with Kimball’s and Ellicott’s divisions, in column of brigade front. Smith and Schofield continued to press back the rebel left flank to the hills in rear of their first position. Garrard’s and McArthur’s divisions captured the rebel works, and succeeded in turning their left flank and driving them from hill to hill. The line of the Fourth corps for a moment halted and laid down to allow batteries to rake the rebel line. The fire grew nearer and nearer on the right. Soon the rebel lines and columns were seen to be breaking up in mad panic and confusion. A wild cheer ran along the lines. The Fourth corps rose and again advanced at a double quick. The batteries poured shot and shell on the panic-stricken fugitives. So wild was the enthusiasm that civilians rushed to the batteries to help the gunners. Union columns now appeared on the right and connected with the centre, thus forming a V out of their lines.

A deafening cheer went up when Smith’s and Schofield’s columns emerged with flaunting flags, the rebels flying in confusion before them. A gallant charge followed the wild cheering, and accompanied by the roar of artillery, the enemy was pressed back on the centre in confusion, and only night ended the pursuit.

SECOND DAY’S BATTLE.

During the night of the 15th, Hood withdrew both his wings from the river, contracted his lines everywhere, and, on the morning of the 16th, was holding a strong position along Granny White Hills, with his centre protected by two lines of intrenchments.

The Union troops were disposed in the following order:—Wilson’s cavalry was on the extreme right. Schofield’s Twenty-third corps, consisting of Couch’s and Cox’s divisions, was at first held in reserve, but before the main battle opened it had to take a position on the left of the cavalry, thus forming the right of the infantry line. A. J. Smith’s Sixteenth corps, consisting of the divisions of McArthur, Garrard and Moore, came next on the left of Schofield. On the left of Smith, the magnificent Fourth corps, General T. J. Wood commanding, comprising the divisions of Kimball, Elliott, and Beatty, was formed in close order of battle; and, partially massed, Steadman, with Croft’s division and two brigades of colored troops, held the left. The Union plan of battle was to press the advantage gained on the enemy’s left. At about half-past eight o’clock a hundred pieces opened fire simultaneously along the Union line. The rebel artillery replied feebly. Schofield, marching down Granny White pike, carefully concealing his strength, placed his corps directly upon the enemy’s left flank. Steadman at the same time worked his force forward. The enemy in the mean time strengthened his advance line. It was determined to carry this line without delay. Kimball’s First division moved forward to the charge, firing volley after volley, but still steadily pressing on until within half a pistol shot, when the enemy’s fire became so deadly that the patriots, in order to return it more effectually, came to the “halt.” They remained here, perhaps, longer than any troops ever remained in such a position. They stood and fired fast and furious at the enemy, but they could not remain and live. A few gave way and fled in disorder, and the whole line staggered. Had the rebels done nothing more than keep up their deadly fire, the Federals would have been driven back; but the enemy shifted their artillery, which was received as an indication that they were about to abandon their lines and retire. Raising a loud shout, the division, with fixed bayonets, rushed impetuously forward, and swarming over the works captured such rebels as had not fled, and all the guns except two.

As soon as this preliminary success was achieved, General Thomas, who was seen during the day in the very front of the line of battle, ordered a charge along the entire line.

Schofield moved upon the left flank of the enemy, and before his veterans the rebel lines gave way like frostwork.

The assailed flank crumbled to pieces as Schofield advanced, and rolled back upon that portion of the line which was just then attacked by A. J. Smith’s troops with a weight and energy nothing could withstand. McMillan’s brigade, foremost in the battle, as on the previous day, rushed right up in the face of three powerful rebel batteries, and carried at the point of the bayonet the salient point of the enemy’s works. In a few moments their works were everywhere overwhelmed, their forces utterly routed, their soldiers captured by thousands, and every piece of their artillery taken.

Such as escaped death or capture fled towards Franklin pike, to a refuge behind A. D. Lee’s corps, which held the gap in the hills.

Wood and Steadman had now united on the left, and prepared to assault the rebel right, which was still unbroken. Under cover of a tremendous fire from the national guns, Colonel Post’s brigade moved forward. Straight’s brigade, of Beatty’s division, formed on his right. In support, immediately on Post’s left, Thomas’ colored brigade was drawn up, and Morgan’s colored brigade was next on the left.

The enemy reserved his fire until Post’s brigade commenced climbing the hill, when a perfect hurricane of shot, shell and canister tore through his ranks. In the face of this fire the men steadily advanced.

Thompson’s men, in endeavoring to pass around to the left, met a terrible flank fire, which confused their ranks. The troops on the right, torn in pieces by the fire, paused an instant, and at this juncture the brave Colonel Post was mortally wounded. In a moment all order was lost, and the men, whose conduct had ennobled them, rushed back, confused and scattering, to the line from which they started. Wood soon reformed his broken battalions and issued orders for the renewal of the assault, while Post’s veterans again assailed the hill directly, and Thompson’s Africans moved on the rebel right. Elliott’s and Kimball’s divisions were hurled like a thunderbolt against the rebel left. Wood himself, accompanied by all his staff, followed and directed the charge. The rebel force blazed forth anew, and the patriots, without hesitation or panic, carried the entire works with all their guns, and drove the rebels in dismay from the hill. This was the last stand that the rebels made, and their whole army was now fleeing in rout and panic. The results of the battle were five thousand prisoners, thirty guns, and seven thousand small arms.

THIRD DAY.—PURSUIT.

During the night of the 16th, Hood’s army duly improved the opportunity of retreat, falling back in the direction whence they had advanced. At eight o’clock, on the morning of the 17th, the pursuit was commenced, the fighting, of course, being chiefly done by the cavalry, and was continued beyond Franklin. Many prisoners were captured. The pursuit thus commenced went on from day to day, till before the close of the year, the rebels had been fairly chased out of Tennessee. The loss of the enemy, in prisoners, at the battle of Nashville, was thirteen thousand one hundred and eighty-nine, including numerous officers of various grades, and seventy-two pieces of artillery. The National loss was about ten thousand. Hood retreated into Alabama.

CONTINUATION OF THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON IN 1864.

The siege of Charleston was prosecuted with intermittent activity, during many months of this year. On the third of January, the besiegers threw a large number of shells into the city, loaded with Greek fire. This is one of the most dangerous and deadly agencies of war, and its use, on this occasion, has been condemned, as barbarous. But, as said by General Sherman, “war is cruelty, and you cannot refine it.” A conflagration of considerable violence and extent, was the result of this bombardment. Its scene was the southern part of the city. The shelling was continued at intervals, for several weeks. On the sixteenth of January the Union headquarters were removed from Folly Island to Hilton Head, General A. H. Terry being left in command at the former place. Port Royal was all along held as the basis of military operations on the coast of the State. From this time forward no event of magnitude occurred in the vicinity of Charleston. The guns and mortars of the Union rained on it, now and then, from Morris Island, and from the blockading gunboats, and the rebels responded with occasional shells. The harbor had been filled with insurmountable obstacles, and the city was well fortified and bravely defended. Looked at in the light of succeeding events, it would almost seem as if the capture of Charleston, at this time, were not especially desired by the United States Government. But, however that might have been, the city held out against such assaults as were made, and was only abandoned at last, on the approach of General Sherman from Savannah, after his great march from Atlanta, which will be presently described. The Secession State Government of South Carolina held control of the greater part of the State throughout the year.

OPERATIONS IN MIDDLE AND WESTERN VIRGINIA IN 1864.

At the opening of the campaign for this year, a force of thirty-one thousand men, under command of Major-General Sigel, was held for the protection of West Virginia, and the frontiers of Maryland and Pennsylvania. While these troops could not be withdrawn to distant fields without exposing the North to invasion by comparatively small bodies of the enemy, they could act directly to their front and thus give better protection than if lying idle in garrison. By such movements they could compel the enemy to detach largely for the protection of his supplies and lines of communication.

General Sigel was directed by General Grant to organize all his available force into two expeditions, to move from Beverly and Charleston, under command of Generals Ord and Crook, against the East Tennessee and Virginia railroad. Subsequently, General Ord having been relieved at his own request, General Sigel was instructed to give up the expedition by Beverly and to form two columns, one under General Crook, on the Kanawha, numbering about ten thousand men, and one on the Shenandoah, numbering about seven thousand men. The one on the Shenandoah to assemble between Cumberland and the Shenandoah, and the infantry and artillery to advance to Cedar creek with such cavalry as could be made available at that moment, to threaten the enemy in the Shenandoah valley, and advance as far as possible; while General Crook would take possession of Lewisburg with part of his force and move down the Tennessee railroad, doing as much damage as he could, destroying the New river bridge and the salt-works at Saltville, Va.

These movements of the Kanawha and Shenandoah valleys, under General Sigel, commenced on the 1st of May. General Crook, who had the immediate command of the Kanawha expedition, divided his forces into two columns, giving one, composed of cavalry, to General Averill. They crossed the mountains by separate routes. General Averill’s force comprised two thousand cavalry. He started on the 1st of May, with three days’ rations and two days’ forage, and moved day and night over mountain paths until the evening of the 8th, when a cavalry force of the enemy was encountered near Jeffersonville, Va. After a slight engagement with the enemy, General Averill made a detour by way of Princeton. On the 9th he left Tazewell Court House for Wytheville, in order to cut the railroad thirty miles lower down than the point where General Crook’s command was to strike. Averill reached Cove Mountain Gap, near Wytheville, on the 10th, where he learned that the enemy were then in possession of the latter place. A conflict ensued, in which General Averill sustained a heavy loss and was prevented from forming a junction with General Crook at Dublin Station, as first proposed. He however accomplished the main object of his expedition, and proceeding to New river and Christiansburg, he destroyed the railroad, several important bridges and depots, including New river bridge, and formed a junction with Crook at Union on the 15th.

The rebel General Morgan commanded the troops encountered by General Averill. General Morgan had made a forced march from Saltville, on learning of Averill’s expedition, and arrived at Wytheville in advance of the latter commander, and thus saved that town and its valuable lead mines from destruction.