Chapter XIX: Expressions of Public Opinion

This case and all the attendant circumstances--the attempted assassination of Justice Field by his former associate, Terry; the defeat of this murderous attempt by Deputy Marshal Neagle; the arrest of Justice Field and the deputy marshal upon the charge of murder, and their discharge--created very great interest throughout the United States. They were the subject of articles in all the leading journals of the country; and numerous telegrams and letters of congratulation were sent to the Justice on his escape from the murderous attempt. Satisfaction was very generally expressed at the fate which Terry met, and much praise was given to the courageous conduct of Neagle and at the bearing of Justice Field under the trying circumstances.

A few of the letters received by him are here given, and citations are made from some of the periodicals, which indicated the general sentiment of the country.

Letter from Hon. T.F. Bayard, ex-Secretary of State:

WILMINGTON, DELAWARE, _August 18, 1889_.

MY DEAR BROTHER FIELD:

I was absent from home when I first saw in the newspapers an
account of the infamous assault of the Terrys--husband and
wife--upon you, and the prompt and courageous action of Deputy
Marshal Neagle that happily frustrated the iniquitous plot
against your life.

Accept, my dear friend, my fervent congratulations on your
escape from the designs of this madman and of the shameless
creature who was his wife and accomplice.

For the sake of our country and its reputation in the eyes of
Christendom, I am indeed grateful that this vile stab at its
judicial power, as vested in your personality, miscarried, and
that by good fortune the insane malice of a disappointed
suitor should have been thwarted.

Your dignified courage in this tragical episode is most
impressive, and, while it endears you the more to those who
love you, will wring even from your foes a tribute of respect
and admiration.

Passing over the arguments that may be wrought out of the
verbiage of our dual constitution of government, the robust
and essential principle _must_ be recognized and
proclaimed--that the _inherent powers_ of every government
which are sufficient to authorize and enforce the judgments of
its courts are equally and at all times and in all places
sufficient to protect the individual judge who fearlessly and
conscientiously, in the discharge of his duty, pronounces
those judgments.

The case, my dear friend, is not yours alone; it is equally
mine and that of every other American. A principle so vital to
society, to the body politic, was never more dangerously and
wickedly assailed than by the assault of Terry and his wife
upon you for your just and honorable performance of your duty
as a magistrate.

I can well comprehend the shock to which this occurrence has
subjected you, and I wish I could be by your side to give you
assurance orally (if any were needed) of that absolute
sympathy and support to which you are so fully entitled. But
these lines will perhaps suffice to make you feel the
affectionate and steadfast regard I entertain for you, and
which this terrible event has but increased.

I cannot forbear an expression of the hope that the arguments
of jurisdictional and other points which must attend the
litigation and settlement of this tragedy may not be abated or
warped to meet any temporary local or partisan demand.

The voice of Justice can never speak in clearer or more divine
accents than when heard in vindication and honor of her own
faithful ministers.

Ever, my dear Judge Field,
Sincerely yours,
T.F. BAYARD.

The Hon. STEPHEN J. FIELD,
_San Francisco, Cal_.

Letter from Hon. E.J. Phelps, former Minister to England:

BURLINGTON, VERMONT, _August 17, 1889_.

MY DEAR JUDGE FIELD:

Pray let me congratulate you most heartily on the Terry
transaction. Nothing that has ever occurred in the
administration of justice has given me more satisfaction than
this prompt, righteous, and effectual vindication through an
officer of the court of the sanctity of the judiciary when in
the discharge of its duty. What your marshal did was exactly
the right thing, at the right time, and in the right way. I
shall be most happy to join in a suitable testimonial to him,
if our profession will, as they ought, concur in presenting
it. * * *

Your own coolness and carriage in confronting this danger in
the discharge of your duty must be universally admired, and
will shed an additional lustre on a judicial career which was
distinguished enough without it.

You have escaped a great peril--acquired a fresh
distinction--and vindicated most properly the dignity of your
high station.

I am glad to perceive that this is the general opinion.
Anticipating the pleasure of seeing you in Washington next
term,

I am always, dear sir,
Most sincerely yours,
E.J. PHELPS.

Letter from Hon. George F. Hoar, Senator from Massachusetts:

WORCESTER, _August 16, 1889_.

MY DEAR JUDGE FIELD:

I think I ought to tell you, at this time, how high you stand
in the confidence and reverence of all good men here, how
deeply they were shocked by this outrage attempted not so much
on you as on the judicial office itself, and how entirely the
prompt action of the officer is approved. I hope you may long
be spared to the public service.

I am faithfully yours,
GEO. F. HOAR.

Letter from Hon. J. Proctor Knott, for many years a Member of Congress from Kentucky and Chairman of the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives, and afterwards Governor of Kentucky:

LEBANON, KENTUCKY, _September 5, 1889_.

MY DEAR JUDGE: * * *

I have had it in mind to write you from the moment I first
heard of your fortunate escape from the fiendish assassination
with which you were so imminently threatened, but I have,
since the latter part of May, been suffering from a most
distressing affection of the eyes which has rendered it
extremely difficult, and frequently, for days together, quite
impossible to do so. Even now, though much improved, I write
in great pain, but I cannot get my consent to delay it longer
on any account. You are to be congratulated, my dear friend,
and you know that no one could possibly do so with more
genuine, heartfelt sincerity than I do myself. * * *

I had been troubled, ever since I saw you had gone to your
circuit, with apprehensions that you would be assassinated, or
at least subjected to some gross outrage, and cannot express
my admiration of the serene heroism with which you went to
your post of duty, determined not to debase the dignity of
your exalted position by wearing arms for your defense,
notwithstanding you were fully conscious of the danger which
menaced you. It didn't surprise me, however; for I knew the
stuff you were made of had been tested before. But I _was_
surprised and disgusted, too, that _you_ should have been
charged or even suspected of anything wrong in the matter. The
magistrate who issued the warrant for your arrest may possibly
have thought it his duty to do so, without looking beyond the
"railing accusation" of a baffled and infuriated murderess,
which all the world instinctively knew to be false, yet I
suppose there is not an intelligent man, woman, or child on
the continent who does not consider it an infamous and
unmitigated outrage, or who is not thoroughly satisfied that
the brave fellow who defended you so opportunely was legally
and morally justifiable in what he did. I have not been in a
condition to _think_ very coherently, much less to read
anything in relation to the question of jurisdiction raised by
the State authorities in the _habeas corpus_ issued in your
behalf by the U.S. Circuit Court, and it may be that, from
the mere newspaper's reports that have reached me, I have been
unable to fully apprehend the objections which are made to the
courts hearing all the facts on the trial of the writ; but it
occurs to me as a plain principle of common sense that the
federal government should not only have the power, but that it
is necessary to its own preservation, to protect its officers
from being wantonly or maliciously interfered with, hindered
or obstructed in the lawful exercises of their official
duties, not arbitrarily of course, but through its regularly
constituted agencies, and according to the established
principles of law; and where such obstruction consists in the
forcible restraint of the officer's liberty, I see no reason
why the federal judiciary should not inquire into it on
_habeas corpus_, when it is alleged to be not only illegal but
contrived for the very purpose of hindering the officer in the
discharge of his official duties, and impairing the efficiency
of the public service. It is true that in such an
investigation a real or apparent conflict between State and
federal authority may be presented, which a due regard to the
respective rights of the two governments would require to be
considered with the utmost caution, such caution, at least, as
it is fair to presume an intelligent court would always be
careful to exercise, in view of the absolute importance of
maintaining as far as possible the strictest harmony between
the two jurisdictions. Yet those rights are determined and by
fixed legal principles, which it would be impossible for a
court to apply in any case without a competent knowledge of
the _facts_ upon which their application in the particular
case might depend. For instance, if your court should issue a
writ of _habeas corpus_ for the relief of a federal officer
upon the averments in his petition that he was forcibly and
illegally restrained of his liberty for the purpose of
preventing him from performing his official duties, and it
should appear in the return to the writ that the person
detaining the prisoner was a ministerial officer of the State
government authorized by its laws to execute its process, and
that he held the petitioner in custody by virtue of a warrant
of arrest in due form, issued by a competent magistrate, to
answer for an offense against the State laws, I presume the
court, in the absence of any further showing, would instantly
remand the petitioner to the custody of the State authorities
without regard to his official position or the nature of his
public duties. But, on the other hand, suppose there should be
a traverse of the return, averring that the warrant of the
arrest, though apparently regular in all respects, was in
truth but a fraudulent contrivance designed and employed for
the sole purpose of hindering and obstructing the petitioner
in the performance of his duties as an officer of the
government of the United States; that the magistrate who
issued it, knowingly and maliciously abused his authority for
that purpose in pursuance of a conspiracy between himself and
others, and not in good faith, and upon probable cause to
bring the prisoner to justice for a crime against the State.
How then? Here is an apparent conflict--not a _real_
one--between the rights of the government of the United States
and the government of the State. The one has a right to the
service of its officer, and the right to prevent his being
unlawfully interfered with or obstructed in the performance of
his official duties; the other has the right to administer its
laws for the punishment of crime through its own tribunals;
but it must be observed that the former has no right to shield
one of its officers from a valid prosecution for a violation
of the laws of the latter not in conflict with the
Constitution and laws of the United States, nor can it be
claimed that the latter has any right to suffer its laws to be
prostituted, and its authority fraudulently abused, in aid of
a conspiracy to defeat or obstruct the functions of the
former. Such an abuse of authority is not, and cannot be in
any sense, a _bona fide_ administration of State laws, but is
itself a crime against them. What, then, would your court do?
You would probably say: If it is true that this man is held
without probable cause under a fraudulent warrant, issued in
pursuance of a conspiracy to which the magistrate who issued
it was a party, to give legal color to a malicious
interference with his functions as a federal official, he is
the victim of a double crime--a crime against the United
States and a crime against the State--and it is not only our
duty to vindicate his right to the free exercise of his
official duties, but the right of the federal government to
his services, and its right to protect him in the legal
performance of the same. But if, on the other hand, he has
raised a mere "false clamor"--if he is held in good faith upon
a valid warrant to answer for a crime committed against the
State, it is equally as obligatory upon us to uphold its
authority, and maintain its right to vindicate its own laws
through its own machinery. To determine between these two
hypotheses we must know the _facts_. * * * The same simple
reasoning, it occurs to me, applies to Mr. Neagle's case.
Whether he acted in the line of his duty under the laws of the
United States, as an officer of that government, is clearly a
question within the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary. If
he _did_, he cannot be held responsible to the State
authority; if he did _not_, he should answer, if required,
before its tribunals of justice. I presume no court of
ordinary intelligence, State or federal, would question these
obvious principles; but how _any_ court could determine
whether he did or did not act in the line of his official duty
under the laws of his government without a judicial inquiry
into the _facts_ connected with the transaction I am unable to
imagine. * * *

I am, as always,
Your faithful friend,
J. PROCTOR KNOTT.

Hon. S.J. FIELD,
_Associate Justice Supreme Court U.S._

Letter from Hon. William D. Shipman, formerly U.S. District Judge for the district of Connecticut:

NEW YORK, _October 20, 1889_.

DEAR JUDGE:

* * * * *

I have attentively read Judge Sawyer's opinion in the Neagle
_habeas corpus_ case, and I agree with his main conclusions.
It seems to me that the whole question of jurisdiction turns
on the fact whether you were, at the time the assault was made
on you, engaged in the performance of your official duty.

You had been to Los Angeles to hold court there and had
finished that business. In going there you were performing
an official duty as much as you were when you had held court
there. It was then your official duty to go from Los Angeles
to San Francisco and hold court there. You could not hold
court at the latter place without going, and you were engaged
in the line of your official duty in performing that journey
for that purpose, as you were in holding the court after you
got there. The idea that a judge is not performing official
duty when he goes from court-house to court-house or from
court-room to court-room in his own circuit seems to me to
be absurd. The distance from one court-house or court-room to
another is not material, and does not change or modify the act
or duty of the judge.

Now, Neagle was an officer of your court, charged with the
duty of protecting your person while you were engaged in the
performance of your official duty. _His_ duty was to see
to it that you were not unlawfully prevented from performing
_your_ official duty--not hindered or obstructed therein. For
the State authorities to indict him for repelling the assault
on you in the only way which he could do so effectually seems
to me to be as unwarranted by law as it would be for them
to indict him for an assault on Terry when he assisted in
disarming the latter in the court-room last year.

When, therefore, it was conceded on the argument that if the
affair at Lathrop had taken place in the court-room during the
sitting of the court, the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court
would be unquestionable, it is difficult for me to see why
the whole question of federal jurisdiction was not embraced in
that concession. Assassinating a judge _on_ the bench would no
more obstruct and defeat public justice than assassinating him
on his way to the bench. In each case he is _proceeding in the
line of official duty imposed on him by law and_ his official
oath. The law requires him to go to court wherever the latter
is held, and he is as much engaged in performing the duty
thus imposed on him while he is proceeding to the place of
his judicial labors as he is in performing the latter after he
gets there.

It would, therefore, seem to go without saying that any acts
done in defense and protection of the judge in the performance
of the duties of his office must pertain to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the court of which he forms a part.

The fact that the assault on you was avowedly made in revenge
for your judicial action in a case heard by you gives a darker
tinge to the deed, but, perhaps, does not change the legal
character of the assault itself.

That Neagle did his whole duty, and in no way exceeded it, is
too plain for argument.

Yours faithfully,
W.D. SHIPMAN

Mr. Justice FIELD.

Letter from James C. Welling, president of Columbian University, Washington:

HARTFORD, _August 15, 1889._

MY DEAR JUDGE:

It is a relief to know that Justice, as well as the honored
justice of our Supreme Judiciary, has been avenged by the
pistol-shot of Neagle. The life of Terry has long since been
forfeited to law, to decency, and to morals. He has already
exceeded the limit assigned by holy scripture to men of his
ilk. "The bloody-minded man shall not live out half his days."
The mode of his death was in keeping with his life. Men who
break all the laws of nature should not expect to die by the
laws of nature.

In all this episode you have simply worn the judicial ermine
without spot or stain. You defeated a bold, bad man in his
machinations, and the enmity you thereby incurred was a crown
of honor. I am glad that you are to be no longer harassed
by the menace of this man's violence, for such a menace is
specially trying to a minister of the law. We all know that
Judge Field the _man_ would not flinch from a thousand Terrys,
but Judge Field the _Justice_ could hardly take in his own
hands the protection of his person, where the threatened
outrage sprang _entirely_ from his official acts.

I wish, therefore, to congratulate you on your escape alike
from the violence of Terry and from the necessity of killing
him with your own hands. It was meet that you should have been
defended by an executive officer of the court assailed in your
person. For doubtless Terry, and the hag who was on the hunt
with him, were minded to murder you.

Convey my cordial felicitations to Mrs. Field, and believe me
ever, my dear Mr. Justice,

Your faithful friend,
JAMES C. WELLING.

Mr. Justice FIELD.

Letter from Right Rev. B. Wistar Morris, Episcopal Bishop of Oregon:

BISHOPCROFT, PORTLAND, OREGON,
_August 22, 1889_.

MY DEAR JUDGE FIELD:

I hope a word of congratulation from your Oregon friends for
your escape in the recent tragedy will not be considered an
intrusion. Of course we have all been deeply interested in its
history, and proud that you were found as you were, without
the defenses of a bully.

I will not trespass further on your time than to subscribe
myself,

Very truly your friend,
B. WISTAR MORRIS.

Mr. Justice FIELD.

A copy of the following card was enclosed in this letter:

AN UNARMED JUSTICE.
PORTLAND OREGON, _August 19_.

_To the Editor of the Oregonian_:

There is one circumstance in the history of the Field and
Terry tragedy that seems to me is worthy of more emphatic
comment than it has yet received. I mean the fact that Judge
Field had about his person no weapon of defense whatever,
though he knew that this miserable villain was dogging his
steps for the purpose of assaulting him, perhaps of taking his
life. His brother, Mr. Cyrus W. Field, says:

"It was common talk in the East here, among my brother's
friends, that Terry's threats to do him bodily harm were
made with the full intent to follow them up. Terry threatened
openly to shoot the Justice, and we, who knew him, were
convinced he would certainly do it if he ever got a chance.

"I endeavored to dissuade my brother from making the trip West
this year, but to no purpose, and he said, 'I have a duty to
perform there, and this sort of thing can't frighten me away.
I know Terry will do me harm if he gets a chance, and as I
shall be in California some time, he will have chances enough.
Let him take them.'

"When urged to arm himself he made the same reply. He said
that when it came to such a pass in this country that judges
find it necessary to go armed, it will be time to close the
courts themselves."

This was a manly and noble reply and must recall to many
minds that familiar sentiment: "He is thrice armed who has his
quarrel just." With the daily and hourly knowledge that this
assassin was ever upon his track, this brave judge goes about
his duty and scorns to take to himself the defenses of a bully
or a brigand; and in doing so, how immeasurably has he placed
himself above the vile creature that sought his life, and all
others who resort to deeds of violence. "They that take
the sword shall perish with the sword," is a saying of wide
application, and had it been so in this case; had this brave
and self-possessed man been moved from his high purpose by the
importunity of friends, and when slain by his enemy, had been
found armed in like manner with the murderer himself, what
a stain would it have been upon his name and honor? And how
would our whole country have been disgraced in the eyes of the
civilized world, that her highest ministers of justice must be
armed as highwaymen as they go about their daily duties!

Well said this undaunted servant of the state: "Then will it
be time to close the courts themselves." May we not hope, Mr.
Editor, that this example of one occupying this high place in
our country may have some influence in staying the spirit and
deeds of violence now so rife, and that they who are so ready
to resort to the rifle and revolver may learn to regard them
only as the instruments of the coward or the scoundrel?

B. WISTAK MORRIS.

The citations given below from different journals, published at the time, indicated the general opinion of the country. With rare exceptions it approved of the action of the Government, the conduct of Neagle, and the bearing of Justice Field.

The _Alta California_, a leading paper in California, had, on August 15, 1889, the day following the tragedy, the following article:

THE TERRY TRAGEDY.

The killing of David S. Terry by the United States Marshal
David Neagle yesterday was an unfortunate affair, regretted,
we believe, by no one more than by Justice Field, in whose
defense the fatal shot was fired. There seems, however, to
be an almost undivided sentiment that the killing was
justifiable. Every circumstance attending the tragedy points
to the irresistible conclusion that there was a premeditated
determination on the part of Terry and his wife to provoke
Justice Field to an encounter, in which Terry might either
find an excuse for killing the man against whom he had
threatened vengeance, or in which his wife might use the
pistol which she always carries, in the pretended defense
of her husband. For some time past it has been feared that
a meeting between Terry and Justice Field would result in
bloodshed. There is now indisputable proof that Terry had made
repeated threats that he would assault Justice Field the first
time he met him off the bench, and that if the Judge resisted
he would kill him. Viewed in the light of these threats,
Terry's presence on the same train with Justice Field will
hardly be regarded as accidental, and his actions in the
breakfast-room at Lathrop were directly in line with the
intentions he had previously expressed. Neagle's prompt and
deadly use of his revolver is to be judged with due reference
to the character and known disposition of the man with whom
he had to deal and to his previous actions and threats. He was
attending Justice Field, against the will of the latter and
in spite of his protest, in obedience to an order from the
Attorney-General of the United States to Marshal Franks to
detail a deputy to protect the person of Justice Field from
Terry's threatened violence. A slap in the face may not, under
ordinary circumstances, be sufficient provocation to justify
the taking of human life; but it must be remembered that there
were no ordinary circumstances and that Terry was no ordinary
man. Terry was a noted pistol-shot; it was known that he
invariably carried arms and that he boasted of his ability to
use them. If on this occasion he was unarmed, as Mrs. Terry
asserts,[1] Neagle had no means of knowing that fact; on the
contrary, to his mind every presumption was in favor of the
belief that he carried both pistol and knife, in accordance
with his usual habit. As a peace officer, even apart from the
special duty which had been assigned to him, he was justified
in taking the means necessary to prevent Terry from continuing
his assault; but the means necessary in the case of one man
may be wholly inadequate with a man bearing the reputation
of David S. Terry, a man who only a few months previously had
drawn a knife while resisting the lawful authority of another
United States officer. It is true that if Terry was unarmed,
the deputy marshal might have arrested him without taking his
life or seriously endangering his own; but Terry was a man of
gigantic stature, and though aged, in possession of a giant's
strength; and there is no one who was acquainted with him, or
has had opportunity to learn his past history, who does not
know that he was a desperate man, willing to take desperate
chances and to resort to desperate means when giving way to
his impulses of passion, and that any person who should at
such a moment attempt to stay his hand would do so at the risk
of his life. Whether he had a pistol with him at that moment
or not, there was every reason to believe that he was armed,
and that the blow with his hand was intended only as the
precursor to a more deadly blow with a weapon. At such moments
little time is allowed for reflection. The officer of the law
was called upon to act and to act promptly. He did so, and the
life of David S. Terry was the forfeit. He fell, a victim to
his own ungovernable passions, urged on to his fate by the
woman who was at once his wife and his client, and perhaps
further incited by sensational newspaper articles which
stirred up the memory of his resentment for fancied wrongs,
and taunted him with the humiliation of threats unfulfilled.

The close of Judge Terry's life ends a career and an era. He
had the misfortune to carry into a ripened state of society
the conditions which are tolerable only where social order is
not fully established. Restless under authority, and putting
violence above law, he lived by the sword and has perished by
it.

That example which refused submission to judicial finalities
was becoming offensive to California, but the incubus of
physical fear was upon many who realized that the survival
of frontier ways into non-frontier period was a damage to the
State. But, be this as it may, the stubborn spirit that defied
the law has fallen by the law.

When Justice Field showed the highest judicial courage in
the opening incidents of the tragedy that has now closed, the
manhood of California received a distinct impetus. When the
Justice, with threats made against his life, returned to the
State unarmed, and resentful of protection against assault,
declaring that when judges must arm to defend themselves from
assault offered in reprisal of their judicial actions
society must be considered dissolved, he was rendering to our
institutions the final and highest possible service. The event
that followed, the killing of Terry in the act of striking
him the second time from behind, while he sat at table in
a crowded public dining-room, was the act of the law.
The Federal Department of Justice, by its chief, the
Attorney-General of the United States, had ordered its
officer, the United States marshal for the northern district
of California, to take such means and such measures as might
be necessary to protect the persons of the judges against
assault by Judge Terry, in carrying out the threats that
he had made. This order was from the executive arm of the
Government, and it was carried out to the letter. Judge Terry
took the law into his own hands and fell. Nothing can add to
the lesson his fate teaches. It is established now that in
California no man is above the law; that no man can affect the
even poise of justice by fear. Confiding in his own strength
as superior to the law, David S. Terry fell wretchedly.

No more need be said. New California inscribes upon her
shield, "Obedience to the law the first condition of good
citizenship," and the past is closed.

_The Record-Union_ of Sacramento, one of the leading papers of California, on August 15, 1889, the day following the tragedy, had the following article under the head--

KILLING OF JUDGE TERRY.

In the news columns of the _Record-Union_ will be found all
the essential details of the circumstances of the killing
of D.S. Terry. It will be evident to the reader that they
readily sap the whole case, and that there is no substantial
dispute possible concerning the facts. These truths we assert,
without fear of successful contradiction, establish the
justifiableness of the act of the United States marshal who
fired upon and killed Terry. We think there will be no dispute
among sensible men that a federal circuit judge or a justice
of the supreme bench, passing from one portion of the circuit
to another in which either is required to open a court and
hear causes, and for the purpose of fully discharging his
official duties, is while en route in the discharge of an
official function, and constructively his court is open to the
extent that an assault upon him, because of matters pending
in his court, or because of judgments he has rendered or is
to render, is an assault upon the court, and his bailiff or
marshal detailed to attend the court or to aid in preserving
the order and dignity of the court has the same right to
protect him from assault then that he would have, had the
judge actually reached his court-room.

But further than this, we hold that in view of the undeniable
fact that the Justice had knowledge of the fact that the
Terrys, man and wife, had sworn to punish him; that they
had indulged in threats against him of the most pronounced
character; that they had boarded a train on which it is
probable they knew he had taken passage from one part of his
circuit to another in his capacity as a magistrate; in view of
the fact that Terry sought the first opportunity to approach
and strike him, and that, too, when seated; and in view of the
notorious fact that Terry always went armed--the man who shot
Terry would have been justified in doing so had he not even
been commissioned as an officer of the court. He warned the
assailant to desist, and knowing his custom to go armed, and
that he had threatened the Justice, and Terry refusing to
restrain his blows, it was Neagle's duty to save life, to
strike down the assailant in the most effectual manner. Men
who, having the ability to prevent murder, stand by and see
it committed, may well be held to accountability for criminal
negligence.

But in this case it is clear that murder was intended on the
part of the Terrys. One of them ran for her pistol and brought
it, and would have reached the other's side with it in time,
had she not been detained by strong men at the door. Neagle
saw this woman depart, and coupling it with the advance of
Terry, knew, as a matter of course, what it meant. He had been
deputed by the chief law officer of the Government--in view of
previous assaults by the Terrys and their threats and display
of weapons in court--to stand guard over the judges and
protect them. He acted, therefore, precisely as it was proper
he should do. Had he been less prompt and vigorous, all the
world knows that not he but Terry would to-day be in custody,
and not Terry but the venerable justice of the Supreme Court
of the United States would to-day be in the coffin.

These remarks have grown too extended for any elaboration of
the moral of the tragedy that culminated in the killing of
David S. Terry yesterday. But we cannot allow the subject to
be even temporarily dismissed without calling the thought
of the reader to contemplation of the essential truth that
society is bound to protect the judges of the courts of the
land from violence and the threats of violence; otherwise
the decisions of our courts must conform to the violence
threatened, and there will be an end of our judicial
system, the third and most valuable factor in the scheme of
representative government. Society cannot, therefore, punish,
but must applaud the man who defends the courts of the people
and the judges of those courts from such violence and threats
of violence. For it must be apparent to even the dullest
intellect that all such violence is an outrage upon the
judicial conscience, and therefore involves and puts in peril
the liberties of the people.

The New Orleans _Times-Democrat,_ in one of its issues at this period, used the following language:

The judge in America who keeps his official ermine spotless,
who faithfully attends to the heavy and responsible duties
of his station, deserves that the people should guard the
sanctity of his person with a strength stronger than armor of
steel and readier than the stroke of lance or sword. Though
the judges be called to pass on tens of thousands of cases, to
sentence to imprisonment or to death thousands of criminals,
they should be held by the people safe from the hate and
vengeance of those criminals as if they were guarded by an
invulnerable shield.

If Judge Field, of the Supreme Court, one of the nine highest
judges under our republican government, in travelling recently
over his circuit in California, had been left to the mercy of
the violent man who had repeatedly threatened his life, who
had proved himself ready with the deadly knife or revolver, it
would have been a disgrace to American civilization; it would
have been a stigma and stain upon American manhood; it would
have shown that the spirit of American liberty, which exalts
and pays reverence to our judiciary, had been replaced by
a public apathy that marked the beginning of the decline of
patriotism.

Judge Field recognized this when, in being advised to arm
himself in case his life was endangered, he uttered the noble
words: "No, sir; I do not and will not carry arms, for when
it is known that the judges of the court are compelled to arm
themselves against assaults offered in consequence of their
judicial action it will be time to dissolve the courts,
consider the government a failure, and let society lapse into
barbarism." That ringing sentence has gone to the remotest
corner of the land, and everywhere it has gone it should fire
the American heart with a proud resolve to protect forever the
sanctity of our judiciary.

Had not Neagle protected the person of Judge Field from the
assault of a dangerous and violent ruffian, apparently intent
on murder, by his prompt and decisive action, shooting the
assailant down to his death, it is certain that other brave
men would have rushed quickly to his rescue; but Neagle's
marvelous quickness forestalled the need of any other's
action. The person of one of the very highest American judges
was preserved unharmed, while death palsied the murderous hand
that had sworn to take his life.

That act of Neagle's was no crime. It was a deed that any and
every American should feel proud of having done. It was an act
that should be applauded over the length and breadth of this
great land. It should not have consigned him for one minute to
prison walls. It should have lifted him high in the esteem of
all the American people. When criminals turn executioners, and
judges are the victims, we might as well close our courts
and hoist the red flag of anarchy over their silent halls and
darkened chambers.

The New York _Herald_, in its issue of August 19, 1889, said:

The sensation of the past week is a lesson in republicanism
and a eulogium on the majesty of the law.

It was not a personal controversy between Stephen J. Field
and David S. Terry. It was a conflict between law and
lawlessness--between a judicial officer who represented the
law and a man who sought to take it into his own hands. One
embodied the peaceful power of the nation, the will of the
people; the other defied that power and appealed to the
dagger.

Justice Field's whole course shows a conception of judicial
duty that lends grandeur to a republican judiciary. It is an
inspiring example to the citizens and especially to the judges
of the country. He was reminded of the danger of returning to
California while Judge Terry and his wife were at large. His
firm answer was that it was his duty to go and his would go.
He was then advised to arm himself for self-defense. His reply
embodies a nobility that should make it historic: "When it
comes to such a pass in this country that judges of the courts
find it necessary to go armed it will be time to close the
courts themselves."

This sentiment was not born of any insensibility to danger;
Justice Field fully realized the peril himself. But above all
feeling of personal concern arose a lofty sense of the duty
imposed upon a justice of the nation's highest court. The
officer is a representative of the law--a minister of peace.
He should show by his example that the law is supreme; that
all must bow to its authority; that all lawlessness must yield
to it. When judges who represent the law resort to violence
even in self-defense, the pistol instead of the court becomes
the arbiter of controversies, and the authority of the
government gives way to the power of the mob.

Rather than set a precedent that might tend to such a result,
that would shake popular confidence in the judiciary, that
would lend any encouragement to violence, a judge, as Justice
Field evidently felt, may well risk his own life for the
welfare of the commonwealth. He did not even favor the
proposition that a marshal be detailed to guard him.

The course of the venerable Justice is an example to all who
would have the law respected. It is also a lesson to all who
would take the law into their own hands.

Not less exemplary was his recognition of the supremacy of the
law when the sheriff of San Joaquin appeared before him with
a warrant of arrest on the grave charge of murder. The warrant
was an outrage, but it was the duty of the officer to serve
it, even on a justice of the United States Supreme Court.
When the sheriff hesitated and began to apologize before
discharging his painful duty, Justice Field promptly spoke
out: "Officer, proceed with your duty. I am ready, and an
officer should always do his duty." These are traits of
judicial heroism worthy the admiration of the world.

The _Albany Evening Union_, in one of its issues at this time, has the following:

JUSTICE FIELD RELIES UPON THE LAW FOR HIS DEFENSE.

The courage of Justice Stephen J. Field in declining to carry
weapons and declaring that it is time to close the courts when
judges have to arm themselves, and at the same time proceeding
to do his duty on the bench when his life was threatened by
a desperate man, is without parallel in the history of our
judiciary. We do not mean by this that he is the only judge
on the bench that would be as brave as he was under the
circumstances, but every phase of the affair points to the
heroism of the man. He upheld the majesty of the law in a
fearless manner and at the peril of his life. He would not
permit the judiciary to be lowered by any fear of the personal
harm that might follow a straightforward performance of his
duty. His arrest for complicity in a murder was borne by the
same tranquil bravery--a supreme reliance upon a due process
of law. He did not want the officer to apologize to him for
doing his duty. He had imprisoned Judge Terry and his wife
Sarah Althea for contempt of court. * * * The threats by
Judge Terry did not even frighten him to carry weapons of
self-defense. This illustration of upholding the majesty of
the law is without precedent, and is worth more to the cause
of justice than the entire United States army could be if
called out to suppress a riotous band of law-breakers. Justice
Field did what any justice should do under the circumstances,
but how many judges would have displayed a like courage had
they been in his place?

The _New York World_, in its issue of Monday evening, August 26th, has the following article:

A NEW LEAF TURNED.

When Judge Field, knowing that his life was threatened,
went back unarmed into the State of California and about his
business there, he gave wholesome rebuke to the cowardice that
prompts men to carry a pistol--a cowardice that has been too
long popular on the coast. He did a priceless service to the
cause of progress in his State, and added grace to his ermine
when he disdained to take arms in answer to the threats of
assassins.

The men who have conspired to take Judge Field's life ought to
need only one warning that a new day has dawned in California,
and to find that warning in the doom of the bully Terry. The
law will protect the ermine of its judges.

The New York _World_ of August 18th treats of the arrest of Justice Field as an outrage, and speaks of it as follows:

THE ARREST OF FIELD AN OUTRAGE AND AN ABSURDITY.

The California magistrate who issued a warrant for Justice
Field's arrest is obviously a donkey of the most precious
quality. The Justice had been brutally assailed by a notorious
ruffian who had publicly declared his intention to kill his
enemy. Before Justice Field could even rise from his chair
a neat-handed deputy United States marshal shot the ruffian.
Justice Field had no more to do with the shooting than any
other bystander, and even if there had been doubt on that
point it was certain that a justice of the United States
Supreme Court was not going to run away beyond the
jurisdiction. His arrest was, therefore, as absurd as it was
outrageous. It was asked for by the demented widow of the dead
desperado simply as a means of subjecting the Justice to an
indignity, and no magistrate possessed of even a protoplasmic
possibility of common sense and character would have lent
himself in that way to such a service.

The Kansas City _Times_, in its issue at this period, uses the following language:

NO ONE WILL CENSURE.

_Gratitude for Judge field's Escape the Chief Sentiment._

Deputy Marshal Neagle acted with terrible promptitude in
protecting the venerable member of the Supreme Court with
whose safety he was specially charged, but few will be
inclined to censure him. He had to deal with a man of fierce
temper, whose readiness to use firearms was part of the best
known history of California.

It is a subject for general congratulation that Justice Field
escaped the violence of his assailant. The American nation
would be shocked to learn that a judge of its highest tribunal
could not travel without danger of assault from those whom
he had been compelled to offend by administering the laws.
Justice Field has the respect due his office and that deeper
and more significant reverence produced by his character
and abilities. Since most of the present generation were
old enough to observe public affairs he has been a jurist of
national reputation and a sitting member of the Supreme Court.
In that capacity he has earned the gratitude of his countrymen
by bold and unanswerable defense of sound constitutional
interpretation on more than one occasion. In all the sad
affair the most prominent feeling will be that of gratitude at
his escape.

_The Army and Navy Journal_, in its issue of August 24, 1889, had the following article under the head of--

MARSHAL NEAGLE'S CRIME.

The public mind appears to be somewhat unsettled upon the
question of the right of Neagle to kill Terry while assaulting
Judge Field. His justification is as clear as is the benefit
of his act to a long-suffering community. Judge Field
was assaulted unexpectedly from behind, while seated at a
dining-table, by a notorious assassin and ruffian, who had
sworn to kill him, and who, according to the testimony of at
least one witness, was armed with a long knife, had sent his
wife for a pistol, and was intending to use it as soon as
obtained. * * *

The rule is that the danger which justifies homicide in
self-defense must be actual and urgent. And was it not so
in this case? No one who reflects upon the features of the
case--an old man without means of defense, fastened in a
sitting posture by the table at which he sat and the chair he
occupied, already smitten with one severe blow and about to
receive another more severe from a notorious ruffian who had
publicly avowed his intention to slay him--no one surely can
deny that the peril threatening Judge Field was both actual
and urgent in the very highest degree.

"A man may repel force by force in the defense of his person,
habitation, or property, against one or many who manifestly
intend and endeavor by violence or surprise to commit a
known felony on either." "In such a case he is not obliged to
retreat, but may pursue his adversary till he find himself
out of danger; and if in a conflict between them he happens to
kill, such killing is justifiable. The right of self-defense
in case of this kind is founded on the law of nature, and is
not, nor can be, superseded by any law of society. Where a
known felony is attempted upon the person, be it to rob or
murder, the party assaulted may repel force by force; and
even his servant attendant on him, or any person present, may
interpose for preventing mischief, and, if death ensue, the
party interposing will be justified." (Wharton Amer. Crim.
Law, Vol. 2, Sec. 1019.)

This is the law, as recognized at the present day and
established by centuries of precedent, and it completely
exonerates Neagle--of course Judge Field needs no
exoneration--from any, the least, criminality in what he did.
He is acquitted of wrong-doing, not only in his character of
attendant servant, but in that of bystander simply. He was
as much bound to kill Terry under the circumstances as every
bystander in the room was bound to kill him; and in his
capacity of guard, especially appointed to defend an
invaluable life against a known and imminent felony, he was so
bound in a much greater degree.

"A sincere and apparently well-grounded belief that a felony
is about to be perpetrated will extenuate a homicide committed
in prevention of it, though the defendant be but a private
citizen" (25 Ala., 15.) See Wharton, above quoted, who
embodies the doctrine in his text (Vol. 2, Sec. 1039).

* * * * *

Let us be grateful from our hearts that the old Mosaic law,
"Whoso sheddeth man's blood by man shall his blood be shed,"
is shown by this memorable event to have not yet fallen
altogether into innocuous desuetude; and let us give thanks
to God that he has seen fit on this occasion to preserve from
death at the hands of an intolerable ruffian the life of that
high-minded, pure-handed, and excellent jurist and magistrate,
Stephen J. Field.

The Philadelphia _Times_ of August 15th has the following:

ONLY ONE OPINION.

_Marshal Neagle Could Not Stand Idly By._

The killing of Judge Terry of California is a homicide that
will occasion no regret wherever the story of his stormy and
wicked life is known. At the same time, the circumstances that
surrounded it will be deeply lamented. This violent man,
more than once a murderer, met his death while in the act of
assaulting Justice Field of the Supreme Court of the United
States. Had he not been killed when he was, Judge Field would
probably have been another of his victims. Terry had declared
his purpose of killing the Justice, and this was their first
meeting since his release from deserved imprisonment.

In regard to the act of United States Marshal Neagle, there
can be only one opinion. He could not stand idly by and see
a judge of the Suprene Court murdered before his eyes. The
contumely that Terry sought to put upon the Judge was only the
insult that was to go before premeditated murder. The case has
no moral except the certainty that a violent life will end in
a violent death.

The _Philadelphia Inquirer_ of the same date says as follows:

A PREMEDITATED INSULT.

_Followed Quickly by a Deserved Retribution._

Ex-Judge Terry's violent death was a fitting termination to
a stormy life, and the incidents of his last encounter were
characteristic of the man and his methods. He was one of the
few lingering representatives of the old-time population of
California. He was prominent there when society was organizing
itself, and succeeded in holding on to life and position when
many a better man succumbed to the rude justice of the period.
Most of his early associates died with their boots on, a
generation ago. Terry lived, assailed on all sides, despised
by the better element and opposed by the law, in trouble
often, but never punished as he deserved. His last act was to
offer a gross, premeditated insult to the venerable Justice
Field, and the retribution he had long defied followed it
quickly. California will have little reason to mourn his loss.

The _Cleveland Leader_, in its issue of August 18th, speaks of the conduct of Neagle as follows:

THE KILLING OF TERRY.

We have already expressed the opinion in these columns that
the killing of David S. Terry by Deputy Marshal Neagle at
Lathrop, California, Wednesday, was entirely justifiable. In
that opinion it is a pleasure to note that the press of the
country concur almost unanimously. The judgment of eminent
members of the legal profession, as published in our telegraph
columns and elsewhere, support and bear out that view of the
case. The full account of the trouble makes the necessity of
some such action on the part of the deputy marshal clear. The
judgment of the country is that Neagle only did his duty in
defending the person of Justice Field, and in that judgment
the California jury will doubtless concur when the case is
brought before it.

The _Argonaut_, a leading paper of San Francisco, not a political, but a literary paper, and edited with great ability, in its issue of August 26, 1889, used the following language:

The course of Judge Field throughout this troublesome business
has been in the highest degree creditable to him. He has
acted with dignity and courage, and his conduct has been
characterized by most excellent taste. His answer, when
requested to go armed against the assault of Terry, is worthy
of preservation. And now that his assailant has been arrested
in his career by death, all honest men who respect the law
will breathe more freely. Judge Terry had gained a most
questionable reputation, not for courage in the right
direction; not for generosity which overlooked or forgave,
or forgot offenses against himself or his interests. He never
conceded the right to any man to hold an opinion in opposition
to his prejudices, or cross the path of his passion with
impunity. He could with vulgar whisper insult the judge who
rendered an opinion adverse to his client, and with profane
language insult the attorney who had the misfortune to be
retained by a man whose cause he did not champion. He had
become a terror to society and a walking menace to the
social circle in which he revolved. His death was a necessity,
and, except here and there a friend of blunted moral
instincts, there will be found but few to mourn his
death or criticise the manner of his taking off. To say
that Marshal Neagle should have acted in any other manner than
he did means that he was to have left Justice Field in the
claws of a tiger, and at the mercy of an infuriated, angry
monster, who had never shown mercy or generosity to an enemy
in his power. * * *

Judge Field has survived the unhappy conflict which carried
Judge Terry to his grave. He is more highly honored now than
when this quarrel was thrust upon him; he has lost no friends;
he has made thousands of new ones who honor him for protecting
with his life the honor of the American bench, the dignity of
the American law, and the credit of the American name. In
the home where Judge Terry lived he went to the grave almost
unattended by the friends of his social surroundings, no
clergyman consenting to read the service at his burial. The
Supreme Court over which he had presided as chief justice
refused to adjourn in honor of his death, the press and public
opinion, for a wonder, in accord over the manner of his taking
off.

Indeed, the public opinion of the country, as shown by the press and declarations of prominent individuals, was substantially one in its approval of the action of the Government, the conduct of Neagle, and the bearing of Justice Field.[2]

The _Daily Report_, a paper of influence in San Francisco at the time, published the following article on "The Lesson of the Hour," from the pen of an eminent lawyer of California, who was in no way connected with the controversy which resulted in Judge Terry's death:

The universal acquiescence of public opinion in the
justifiable character of the act which terminated the life of
the late David S. Terry is to be accounted for by the peculiar
nature of the offense which he had committed. It was not for a
mere assault, though perpetrated under circumstances which
rendered it peculiarly reprehensible, that he met his death
without eliciting from the community one word of condemnation
for the slayer or of sympathy with the slain.

Mr. Justice Field is an officer of high rank in the most
important department of the Government of the United States,
namely, that which is charged with the administration of
legal justice. When David S. Terry publicly and ostentatiously
slapped the face of this high official--this representative of
public justice--the blow being in all probability the intended
prelude to a still more atrocious offense, he committed a
gross violation of the peace and dignity of the United States.
The echo of the blow made the blood tingle in the veins of
every true American, and from every quarter, far and near,
thick and fast, came denunciations of the outrage. That any
man under a government created "by the people, for the people"
shall assume to be a law unto himself, the sole despot in a
community based on the idea of the equality of all before
the law, and the willing submission and obedience of all to
established rule, is simply intolerable.

In his audacious assault on "the powers that be" Terry took
his life in his hand, and no lover of peace and good order can
regret that, of the two lives in peril, his was extinguished.
He threw down the gage of battle to the whole community, and
it is well that he was vanquished in the strife.

In the early part of the war of the rebellion General Dix,
of New York, was placed in charge of one of the disaffected
districts. We had then hardly begun to see that war was a very
stern condition of things, and that it actually involved the
necessity of killing. Those familiar with the incidents of
that time will remember how the General's celebrated order,
"If any one attempts to haul down the American flag, shoot him
on the spot," thrilled the slow pulses of the Northern heart
like the blast of a bugle. Yet some adverse obstructionist
might object that the punishment pronounced far exceeded
the offense, which was merely the effort to detach from its
position a piece of colored bunting. But it is the _animus_
that characterizes the act. An insult offered to a mere
symbol of authority becomes, under critical circumstances,
an unpardonable crime. If the symbol, instead of being an
inanimate object, be a human being--a high officer of the
Government--does not such an outrage as that committed by
Terry exceed in enormity the offense denounced by General Dix?
And if so, why should the punishment be less?

In every civilized community, society, acting with a keen
instinct of self-preservation, has always punished with just
severity those capital offenders against peace and good order
who strike at the very foundation on which all government must
rest.

[1] It has been conclusively established since that he was armed
with his usual bowie-knife at the time.

[2] NOTE.--Whilst there was a general concurrence of opinion as to
the threats of Terry and of the fate he met at the hands of
Neagle and of the bearing of Justice Field through all the
proceedings, there were exceptions to this judgment. There
were persons who sympathized with Terry and his associates and
grieved at his fate, although he had openly avowed his
intention not merely to insult judicial officers for their
judicial conduct, but to kill them in case they resented the
insult offered. He married Sarah Althea Hill after the United
States Circuit Court had delivered its opinion, in open court,
announcing its decision that she had committed forgery,
perjury, and subornation of perjury, and was a woman of
abandoned character. And yet a writer in the _Overland
Monthly_ in October, 1889, attributes his assault upon the
marshal--striking him violently in the face for the execution
of the order of the court to remove her from the court-room
because of her gross imputation upon the judges--chiefly to
his chivalric spirit to protect his wife, and declares that
"the universal verdict" upon him "will be that he was
possessed of _sterling integrity of purpose_, and stood out
from the rest of his race as a strongly individualized
character, which has been well called an anachronism in our
civilization." And Governor Pennoyer, of Oregon, in his
message to the legislature of that State, pronounced the
officer appointed by the marshal under the direction of the
Attorney-General to protect Justices Field and Sawyer from
threatened violence and murder as a "_secret armed assassin_,"
who accompanied a Federal judge in California, and who shot
down in cold blood an unarmed citizen of that State.