Chapter XXVIII: Section 787: of the Revised Statutes also declares that "It shall be

the duty of the marshal of each district to attend the District and Circuit Courts when sitting therein, and to execute throughout the district all lawful precepts directed to him and issued under the authority of the United States, and he shall have power to command all necessary assistance in the execution of his duty." There is no more authority specifically conferred upon the marshal by this section to protect the judge from assassination in open court, without a specific order or command, than there is to protect him out of court, when on the way from one court to another in the discharge of his official duties. The marshals are in daily attendance upon the judges, and performing official duties in their chambers. Yet no statute specifically points out those duties or requires their performance. Indeed, no such places as chambers for the circuit judges or circuit justices are mentioned at all in the statutes. Yet the marshal is as clearly authorized to protect the judges there as in the court-room. All business done out of court by the judge is called chamber business. But it is not necessary to be done in what is usually called chambers. Chamber business may be done, and often is done, on the street, in the judge's own house, at the hotel where he stops, when absent from home, or it may be done in transitu, on the cars in going from one place to another within the proper jurisdiction to hold court. Mr. Justice Field could, as well, and as authoritatively, issue a temporary injunction, grant a writ of _habeas corpus_, an order to show cause, or do any other chamber business for the district in the dining-room at Lathrop, as at his chambers in San Francisco, or in the court-room. The chambers of the judge, where chambers are provided, are not an element of jurisdiction, but are a convenience to the judge, and to suitors--places where the judge at proper times can be readily found, and the business conveniently transacted.

But inasmuch as the Revised Statutes of the United States (sec. 753) declare that the writ of _habeas corpus_ shall not extend to "a prisoner in jail unless where he is in custody--for an act done or omitted in pursuance of a _law_ of the United States, or of an order, process, or decree of a court or judge thereof, or in custody in violation of the Constitution or of a law or treaty of the United States," it was urged in the argument by counsel for the State that there is no statute which specifically makes it the duty of a marshal or deputy marshal to protect the judges of the United States whilst out of the court-room, travelling from one point to another in their circuits, on official business, from the violence of litigants who have become offended at the adverse decisions made by them in the performance of their judicial duties, and that such officers are not within the provisions of that section. To this the court replied that the language of the section is, "an act done in pursuance of a _law_ of the United States"--not in pursuance of a statute of the United States; and that the statutes do not present in express terms all the law of the United States; that their incidents and implications are as much a part of the law as their express provisions; and that when they prescribe duties providing for the accomplishment of certain designated objects, or confer authority in general terms, they carry with them all the powers essential to effect the ends designed. As said by Chief Justice Marshall in Osborn v. Bank of the United States (9 Wheaton, 865-866), "It is not unusual for a legislative act to involve consequences which are not expressed. An officer, for example, is ordered to arrest an individual. It is not necessary, nor is it usual, to say that he shall not be punished for obeying this order. His security is implied in the order itself. It is no unusual thing for an act of Congress to imply, without expressing, this very exemption from State control, which is said to be so objectionable in this instance. The collectors of the revenue, the carriers of the mail, the mint establishment, and all those institutions which are public in their nature, are examples in point. It has never been doubted that all who are employed in them are protected while in the line of duty; and yet this protection is not expressed in any act of Congress. It is incidental to, and is implied in, the several acts by which these institutions are created; and is secured to the individuals employed in them by the judicial power alone--that is, the judicial power is the instrument employed by the Government in administering this security."

Upon this the Circuit Court observed:

"If the officers referred to in the preceding passage are to
be protected while in the line of their duty, without any
special law or statute requiring such protection, the judges
of the courts, the principal officers in a department of the
Government second to no other, are also to be protected, and
their executive subordinates--the marshals and their
deputies--shielded from harm by the national laws while
honestly engaged in protecting the heads of the courts from
assassination."[1]

To the position that the preservation of the peace of the State is devolved solely upon the officers of the State, and not in any respect upon the marshals of the United States, the court replied: This position is already answered by what has been said. But it is undoubtedly true that it was the imperative duty of the State to preserve the public peace and amply protect the life of Justice Field, _but it did not do it_, and had the United States relied upon the State to keep the peace as to him--one of the justices of the highest court--in relation to matters concerning the performance of his official duties, they would have leaned upon a broken reed. The result of the efforts to obtain an officer from the State to assist in preserving the peace and protecting him at Lathrop was anything but successful. The officer of the State at Lathrop, instead of arresting the conspirator of the contemplated murderer, the wife of the deceased, arrested the officer of the United States, assigned by the Government to the special duty of protecting the justice against the very parties, while in the actual prosecution of duties assigned to him, without warrant, thereby leaving his charge without the protection provided by the Government he was serving, at a time when such protection seemed most needed. And, besides, the use of the State police force beyond the limits of a county for the protection of Justice Field would have been impracticable, as the powers of the sheriff would have ended at its borders, and of other township and city peace officers at the boundaries of their respective townships and cities. Only a United States marshal or his deputy could have exercised these official functions throughout the judicial district, which embraces many counties. The only remedy suggested on the part of the State was to arrest the deceased and hold him to bail to keep the peace under section 706 of the Penal Code, the highest limit of the amount of bail being $5,000. But although the threats are conceded to have been publicly known in the State, no State officer took any means to provide this flimsy safeguard. And the execution of a bond in this amount to keep the peace would have had no effect in deterring the intended assailants from the, commission of the offense contemplated, when the penalties of the law would not deter them.

As to the deliberation and wisdom of Neagle's conduct under the circumstances, the court, after stating the established facts, concludes as follows:

"When the deceased left his seat, some thirty feet distant,
walked stealthily down the passage in the rear of Justice
Field and dealt the unsuspecting jurist two preliminary blows,
doubtless by way of reminding him that the time for vengeance
had at last come, Justice Field was already at the traditional
'wall' of the law. He was sitting quietly at a table, back to
the assailant, eating his breakfast, the side opposite being
occupied by other passengers, some of whom were women,
similarly engaged. When, in a dazed condition, he awoke to the
reality of the situation and saw the stalwart form of the
deceased with arm drawn back for a final mortal blow, there
was no time to get under or over the table, had the law, under
any circumstances, required such an act for his justification.
Neagle could not seek a 'wall' to justify his acts without
abandoning his charge to certain death. When, therefore, he
sprang to his feet and cried, 'Stop! I am an officer,' and saw
the powerful arm of the deceased drawn back for the final
deadly stroke instantly change its direction to his left
breast, apparently seeking his favorite weapon, the knife, and
at the same time heard the half-suppressed, disappointed growl
of recognition of the man who, with the aid of half a dozen
others, had finally succeeded in disarming him of his knife at
the court-room a year before, the supreme moment had come, or,
at least, with abundant reason he thought so, and fired the
fatal shot. The testimony all concurs in showing this to be
the state of facts, and the almost universal consensus of
public opinion of the United States seems to justify the act.
On that occasion a second, or two seconds, signified, at
least, two valuable lives, and a reasonable degree of prudence
would justify a shot one or two seconds too soon rather than a
fraction of a second too late. Upon our minds the evidence
leaves no doubt whatever that the homicide was fully justified
by the circumstances. Neagle on the scene of action, facing
the party making a murderous assault, knowing by personal
experience his physical powers and his desperate character,
and by general reputation his life-long habit of carrying
arms, his readiness to use them, and his angry, murderous
threats, and seeing his demoniac looks, his stealthy assault
upon Justice Field from behind, and, remembering the sacred
trust committed to his charge--Neagle, in these trying
circumstances, was the party to determine when the supreme
moment for action had come, and if he, honestly, acted with
reasonable judgment and discretion, the law justifies him,
even if he erred. But who will have the courage to stand up in
the presence of the facts developed by the testimony in this
case, and say that he fired the smallest fraction of a second
too soon?

"In our judgment he acted, under the trying circumstances
surrounding him, in good faith and with consummate courage,
judgment, and discretion. The homicide was, in our opinion,
clearly justifiable in law, and in the forum of sound,
practical common sense commendable. This being so, and the act
having been 'done * * * in pursuance of a law of the United
States,' as we have already seen, it cannot be an offense
against, and he is not amenable to, the laws of the State."

The petitioner was accordingly discharged from arrest.

[1] NOTE.--I find the following apt illustrations of this doctrine
in a journal of the day:

If a military or naval officer of the United States, in the
necessary suppression of a mutiny or enforcement of obedience,
should wound or take the life of a subordinate, would it
be contended that, if arrested for that act by the State
authority, he could not be released on _habeas corpus_,
because no statute expressly authorized the performance of the
act? If the commander of a revenue cutter should be directed
to pursue and retake a vessel which, after seizure, had
escaped from the custody of the law, and the officer in the
performance of that duty, and when necessary to overcome
resistance, should injure or kill a member of the crew of the
vessel he was ordered to recapture, and if for that act
he should be arrested and accused of crime under the State
authority, will any sensible person maintain that the
provisions of the _habeas corpus_ act could not be invoked for
his release, notwithstanding that no statute could be shown
which directly authorized the act for which he was arrested?
If by command of the President a company of troops were
marched into this city to protect the subtreasury from
threatened pillage, and in so doing life were taken, would not
the act of the officer who commanded the troops be an act
done in pursuance of the laws of the United States, and in the
lawful exercise of its authority? Could he be imprisoned and
tried before a State jury on the charge of murder, and the
courts of the United States be powerless to inquire into the
facts on _habeas corpus_, and to discharge him if found to
have acted in the performance of his duty? Can the authority
of the United States for the protection of their officers be
less than their authority to protect their property?

There appears to be but one rational answer to these
questions.

In all these cases the authority vested in the officer to
suppress a mutiny, or to overtake and capture an escaped
vessel, or to protect the subtreasury from threatened pillage,
carries with it power to do all things necessary to accomplish
the object desired, even the killing of the offending party.
The law conferring the authority thus extended to the officer
in these cases, is in the sense of the _habeas corpus_ act,
a law of the United States to do all things necessary for the
execution of that authority.