Chapter XXII: Part 2: , contains three important articles by Csoma Körösi,

including Analyses of the Books of the Kandshur.--19. Sangermano,
"The Burmese Empire," Rome, 1833.--20. Turnour, "The Mahawanzo,"
Ceylon, 1836.--21. Upham, "The Mahavansi, Raja Ratnacari et
Rajavali," 3 vols. 1833.--22. _ejusd._ "Doctrine of Buddhism,"
1839, fol.--23. Spence Hardy, "Eastern Monachism," 1850.--24.
_ejusd._ "Manual of Buddhism," 1853. The two last books, written
after a twenty years' stay in Ceylon and from oral information
supplied by the priests there, have given me a deeper insight
into the essence of the Buddhist dogma than any other work. They
deserve to be translated into German, but without abridgement, for
otherwise the best part might be left out.--[25. C. F. Köppen, "Die
Religion des Buddha," 1857, a complete compendium of Buddhism,
compiled not only with great erudition and serious industry but
also with intelligence and insight from all the other works I have
mentioned above and from many more besides, which contains all that
is essential on the subject.--26. "The Life of Buddha," from the
Chinese of Palladji, in the "Archiv für wissenschaftliche Kunde von
Russland," edited by Erman, vol. xv. Heft 1, 1856.--Add. to 3rd ed.]

In their endeavours to acquire knowledge of the state of Religion in China, Europeans began as usual, and as the Greeks and Romans under similar circumstances had done, by first searching for points of contact with their own belief. Now as, in their own way of thinking, the conceptions of Religion and of Theism were almost identified, or at any rate had grown together so closely, that they could only be separated with great difficulty; as moreover, till a more accurate knowledge of Asia had reached Europe, the very erroneous opinion had been disseminated--for the purpose of argument _e consensu gentium_--that all nations on earth worship a single, or at any rate a highest, God, Creator of the Universe:[328] when they found themselves in a country where temples, priests and monasteries abounded, they started from the firm assumption that Theism would also be found there, though in some very unusual form. On seeing these expectations disappointed however, and on finding that the very conceptions of such things, let alone the words to express them, were unknown, it was but natural, considering the spirit in which their inquiries were made, that their first reports of these religions should refer rather to what they did not, than to what they did, contain. Besides, for many reasons, it can be no easy task for European heads to enter fully into the sense of these faiths. In the first place, they are brought up in Optimism, whereas in Asia, existence itself is looked upon as an evil and the world as a scene of misery, where it were better not to find oneself. Another reason is to be found in the decided Idealism which is essential to Buddhism and to Hindooism: a view only known in Europe as a paradox hardly worth a serious thought, advanced by certain eccentric philosophers; whereas in Asia it is even embodied in popular belief. For in Hindoostan it prevails universally as the doctrine of _Maja_, and in Thibet, the chief seat of the Buddhist Church, it is taught in an extremely popular way, a religious comedy being performed on occasions of special solemnity, in which the Dalaï-Lama is represented arguing with the Arch-fiend. The former defends Idealism, the latter Realism, and among other things the Devil says: "What is perceived through the five sources of all knowledge (the senses), is no deception, and what you teach is not true." After a long argumentation the matter is decided by a throw of the dice: the Realist (the Devil) loses, and is dismissed amid general jeering.[329] Keeping this fundamental difference in the whole way of thinking steadily in view, we shall find it not only excusable, but even natural, that in their investigation of the Asiatic religions Europeans should at first have stopped short at the negative stand-point; though, properly speaking, it has nothing to do with the matter. We therefore find a great deal referring to this negative stand-point which in no way advances our positive knowledge; it all however amounts to this: that Monotheism--an exclusively Jewish doctrine, to be sure--is alien to Buddhists and in general to the Chinese. For instance, in the "Lettres Édifiantes"[330] we find: "The Buddhists, whose views on the migration of souls are universally adopted, are accused of Atheism." In the "Asiatic Researches" (vol. vi. p. 255) we find: "The religion of the Birmans (Buddhism) shows them to be a nation far advanced beyond the barbarism of a wild state and greatly influenced by religious opinions, but which nevertheless has no knowledge of a Supreme Being, Creator and Preserver of the world. Yet the system of morality recommended in their fables is perhaps as good as any other taught by the religious doctrines which prevail among mankind."--And again, p. 258: "The followers of Gótama (_i.e._ of Buddha) are strictly speaking Atheists."--_Ibid._, p. 258: "Gótama's sect consider the belief in a divine Being, Creator of the world, to be highly impious."--_Ibid._, p. 268, Buchanan relates, that Atuli, the Zarado or High-Priest of the Buddhists at Ava, in an article upon his religion which he presented to a Catholic bishop, "counted the doctrine, that there is a Being who has created the world and all things in it and is alone worthy of adoration, among the six damnable heresies." Sangermano relates precisely the same thing,[331] and closes the list of the six grave heresies with the words: "The last of these impostors taught, that there is a Supreme Being, the Creator of the world and of all things in it, and that he alone is worthy of adoration." Colebrooke too says:[332] "The sects of Jaina, and Buddha are really atheistic, for they acknowledge no Creator of the world, nor any Supreme ruling Providence."--I. J. Schmidt[333] likewise says: "The system of Buddhism knows no eternal, uncreated, single, divine Being, having existed before all Time, who has created all that is visible and invisible. This idea is quite foreign to Buddhism and there is not the slightest trace of it anywhere in Buddhistic books."--We find the learned sinologist Morrison too[334] not less desirous to discover traces of a God in the Chinese dogmas and ready to put the most favourable construction upon everything which seems to point in that direction; yet he is finally obliged to own that nothing of the kind can be clearly discovered. Where he explains the words _Thung_ and _Tsing_, _i.e._ repose and movement, as that on which Chinese cosmogony is based, he renews this inquiry and concludes it with the words: "It is perhaps impossible to acquit this system of the accusation of Atheism."--And even recently Upham[335] says: "Buddhism presents to us a world without a moral ruler, guide or creator." The German sinologist Neumann too, says in his treatise[336] mentioned further on: "In China, where neither Mahometans nor Christians found a Chinese word to express the theological conception of the Deity.... The words God, soul, spirit, as independent of Matter and ruling it arbitrarily, are utterly unknown in the Chinese language.... This range of ideas has become so completely one with the language itself, that the first verse of the book of Genesis cannot without considerable circumlocution be translated into genuine Chinese."--It was this very thing that led Sir George Staunton to publish a book in 1848 entitled: "An Inquiry into the proper mode of rendering the word God in translating the Sacred Scriptures into the Chinese language."[337]

[328] This is equivalent to imputing to the Chinese the thought,
that all princes on earth are tributary to their Emperor. [Add. to
3rd ed.]

[329] "Description du Tubet," traduite du Chinois en Russe par
Bitchourin, et du Russe en Français par Klaproth, Paris, 1831,
p. 65. Also in the "Asiatic Journal" new series, vol. i. p. 15.
[Köppen, "Die Lamaische Hierarchie," p. 315.--Add. to 3rd ed.]

[330] "Lettres édifiantes," édit. de 1819, vol. viii. p. 46.

[331] "Description of the Burman Empire," Rome. 1833. p. 81.

[332] Colebrooke, "Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society," vol.
i.; "Essay on the Philosophy of the Hindoos," published also among
his "Miscellaneous Essays," p. 236.

[333] "Investigations concerning the Tibetans and Mongols," p. 180.

[334] Morrison, "Chinese Dictionary," Macao, 1815, and following
years, vol. i. p. 217.

[335] Upham, "History and Doctrine of Buddhism," London, 1829, p.
102.

[336] Neumann, "Die Natur-und Religions-Philosophie der Chinesen,
nach den Werken des Tehu-hi," pp. 10, 11.

[337] The following account given by an American sea-captain, who
had come to Japan, is very amusing from the _naïveté_ with which
he assumes that mankind consists exclusively of Jews. For the
"Times" of the 18th October, 1854, relates that an American ship,
under command of Captain Burr, had arrived in Jeddo Bay, and gives
his account of the favourable reception he met with there, at the
end of which we find: "He likewise asserts the Japanese to be a
nation of Atheists, denying the existence of a God and selecting
as an object of worship either the spiritual Emperor at Meaco, or
any other Japanese. He was told by the interpreters that formerly
their religion was similar to that of China, but that the belief
in a supreme Being has latterly been entirely discarded--(this is
a mistake)--and he professed to be much shocked at Deejunoskee (a
slightly Americanised Japanese), declaring his belief in the Deity."
[Add. to 3rd ed.]

My intention in giving the above quotations and explanations, is merely to prepare the way for the extremely remarkable passage, which it is the object of the present chapter to communicate, and to render that passage more intelligible to the reader by first making him realize the standpoint from which these investigations were made, and thus throwing light upon the relation between them and their subject. For Europeans, when investigating this matter in China in the way and in the spirit described, always inquiring for the supreme principle of all things, the power that rules the world, &c. &c., had often been referred to that which is designated by the word Tien (Engl. T'hëen). Now, the more usual meaning of this word is "Heaven," as Morrison also says in his dictionary; still it is a well-known thing that Tien is used in a figurative sense also, and then has a metaphysical signification. In the "Lettres Édifiantes"[338] we find the following explanation: "_Hing-tien_ is the material, visible heaven; _Chin-tien_ the spiritual and invisible heaven." Sonnerat too,[339] in his travels in East-India and China, says: "When the Jesuits disputed with the rest of the missionaries as to the meaning of the word Tien, whether it was Heaven or God, the Chinese looked upon these foreigners as restless folk and drove them away to Macao." It was at any rate through this word that Europeans could first hope to find the track of that Analogy of Chinese Metaphysic with their own faith, which had been so persistently sought for; and it was doubtless owing to investigations of this kind that the results we find communicated in an Essay entitled "Chinese Theory of the Creation" were attained.[340] As to _Choo-foo-tze_, called also _Choo-hi_, who is mentioned in it, I observe that he lived in the twelfth century according to our chronology, and that he is the most celebrated of all the Chinese men of learning; because he has collected together all the wisdom of his predecessors and reduced it to a system. His work is in our days the basis of all Chinese instruction, and his authority of the greatest weight. In the passage I allude to, we find: "The word _Teen_, would seem to denote 'the highest among the great' or 'above all what is great on earth:' but in practice its vagueness of signification is beyond all comparison greater, than that of the term _Heaven_ in European languages.... Choo-foo-tze tells us that 'to affirm, that heaven has a _man_ (_i.e._ a sapient being) there to judge and determine crimes, should not by any means be said; nor, on the other hand, must it be affirmed, that there is nothing at all to exercise a supreme control over these things.'

[338] Édition de, 1819, vol. xi. p. 461.

[339] Book iv. ch. i.

[340] To be found in the "Asiatic Journal," vol. xxii. anno 1826,
pp. 41 and 42.

"The same author being asked about the _heart of heaven_, whether it was intelligent or not, answered: it must not be said that the mind of nature is unintelligent, but it does not resemble the cogitations of man....

"According to one of their authorities, _Teen_ is call'd ruler or sovereign (Choo), from the idea of the supreme control, and another expresses himself thus: Had heaven (Teen) no designing mind, then it must happen, that the cow might bring forth a horse, and on the peach-tree be produced the blossom of the pear.' On the other hand it is said, that _the mind of Heaven is deducible from what is the Will of mankind_!"

The agreement between this last sentence and my doctrine is so striking and so astonishing, that if this passage had not been printed full eight years after my own work had appeared, I should no doubt have been accused of having taken my fundamental thought from it. For there are three well-known modes of repelling the attack of new thoughts: firstly, by ignoring them, secondly by denying them, and lastly by asserting that they are not new, but were known long before. But the fact that my fundamental thought was formed quite independently of this Chinese authority, is firmly established by the reasons I have given; for I may hope to be believed when I affirm, that I am unacquainted with the Chinese language and consequently unable to derive thoughts for my own use from original Chinese sources unknown to others. On further investigation I have elicited the fact, that the passage I have quoted, was most probably, nay almost certainly, taken from Morrison's "Chinese Dictionary," where it may be found under the sign _Tëen:_ only I have no opportunity of verifying it.[341]--In an article by Neumann[342] there are some passages which have evidently a common source with those here quoted from the "Asiatic Journal." But they are written with the vagueness of expression which is so frequent in Germany, and excludes clear comprehension. Besides, this translator of Choo-hi evidently did not himself quite understand the original; though by this no blame need be implied, when we consider the enormous difficulty of the Chinese language for Europeans, and the insufficiency of the means for studying it. Meanwhile it does not give us the enlightenment desired. We must therefore console ourselves with the hope, that as a freer intercourse with China has now been established, some Englishman may one day give us more minute and thorough information concerning the above-mentioned dogma, of which we have hitherto received such deplorably imperfect accounts.

[341] A note of Schopenhauer's referring to this says:--"According
to letters from Doss" (a friend of S.'s), "dated 26th February and
8th June, 1857, the passages I have here quoted are to be found
in Morrison's Chinese Dictionary, Macao, 1815, vol. i. p. 576,
under 天 Tëen, although in a slightly different order, in nearly
the same words. The important passage at the end alone differs
and is as follows: 'Heaven makes the mind of mankind its mind: in
most ancient discussions respecting Heaven, its mind, or will,
was _divined_ (it stands thus, and not _derived_) from what was
the will of mankind.'--Neumann translated this passage for Doss,
independently of Morrison's rendering, and the end was: 'Through
the heart of the people Heaven is usually revealed.'" [_Editor's
Note._]

[342] Neumann, "Die Natur-und Religions-Philosophie der Chinesen,
nach dem Werke des Tschu-hi," an article in Illgen's "Periodical
for Historical Theology," vol. vii. 1837, from pp. 60 to 63.

REFERENCE TO ETHICS.

For reasons I have stated in the beginning, confirmations of the rest of my doctrine are excluded from my present task. Still, in concluding, I may perhaps be allowed to make a general reference to Ethics.

From time immemorial, all nations have acknowledged that the world has a moral, as well as a physical, import. Everywhere nevertheless the matter was only brought to an indistinct consciousness, which, in seeking for its adequate expression, has clothed itself in various images and myths. These are the different Religions. Philosophers, on their side, have at all times endeavoured to attain clear comprehension of the thing and, notwithstanding their differences in other respects, all, excepting the strictly materialistic, philosophical systems, agree in this one point: that what is most important, nay, alone essential, in our whole existence, that on which everything depends, the real meaning, pivot or point (_sit venia verbo_) of it, lies in the morality of human actions. But as to the sense of this, as to the ways and means, as to the possibility of the thing, they all again quite disagree, and find themselves before an abyss of obscurity. Thus it follows, that it is easy to preach, but difficult to found, morality. It is just because that point is determined by our conscience, that it becomes the touchstone of all systems; since we demand, and rightly demand, that Metaphysic should give support to Ethics: and now arises the difficult problem to show that, contrary to all experience, the physical order of things depends upon a moral one, and to find out a connection between the force which, by acting according to eternal laws of Nature, gives the world stability, and the morality which has its seat in the human breast. This is therefore the rock on which the best thinkers have foundered. Spinoza occasionally tacks a moral theory on to his Pantheistic Fatalism by means of sophisms, but more often leaves morality terribly in the lurch. Kant, when theoretical Reason is exhausted, sends his Categorical Imperative, laboriously worked out of mere conceptions,[343] on the stage, as _deus ex machina_, with an absolute _ought_. But the mistake he made by it only became quite clear when Fichte, who always took outbidding for outdoing, had spun it out with Christian Wolfian prolixity and wearisomeness to a complete system of _moral fatalism_ in his "System of Moral Doctrine," and subsequently presented it more briefly in his last pamphlet.[344]

[343] See my prize-essay "On the Fundament of Morality," § 6.

[344] "Die Wissenschaftslehre in allgemeinen Umrisse" (The Doctrine
of Science in a general outline), 18, 10.

Now, from this point of view, a system which places the reality of all existence and the root of the whole of Nature in _the Will_, and in this will places the root of the world, must undeniably carry with it, to say the least, a strong prejudice in its favour. For, by a direct and simple way, it reaches, nay, already holds in its hand before coming to Ethics, what other systems try to reach by roundabout, ever dubious by-paths. Nor indeed can any other road ever lead to this but the insight, that the active and impulsive force in Nature which presents this perceptible world to our intellect, is identical with the will within us. The only Metaphysic which really and immediately supports Ethics, is that one which is itself primarily ethical and constituted out of the material of Ethics. Therefore I had a far greater right to call my Metaphysic "Ethics," than Spinoza, with whom the word sounds almost like irony, and whose "Ethics" might be said to bear the name like _lucus a non lucendo_; since it is only by means of sophistry that he has been able to tack his morality on to a system, from which it would never logically proceed. In general, moreover, he disavows it downright with revolting assurance.[345] On the whole, I can confidently assert, that there has never yet been a philosophical system so entirely cut out of one piece, so completely without any joins or patches, as mine. As I have said in my preface, it is the unfolding of a single thought, by which the ancient ἁπλοῦς ὁ μῦθος τῆς ἀληθείας ἔφυ[346] is again confirmed. Then we must still take into consideration here, that freedom and responsibility--those pillars on which all morality rests--can certainly be asserted in words without the assumption of the aseity[347] of the will; but that it is absolutely impossible to think them without it. Whoever wishes to dispute this, must first invalidate the axiom, stated long ago by the Schoolmen: _operari sequitur esse_ (_i.e._ the acts of each being follow from the nature of that being), or we must demonstrate the fallacy of the inference to be drawn from it: _unde esse, inde operari_. Responsibility has for its condition freedom; but freedom has for its condition primariness. For I _will_ according to what I _am_; therefore I must _be_ according to what I _will_. Aseity of the will is therefore the first condition of any Ethics based on serious thought, and Spinoza is right when he says: _Ea res libera dicetur, quæ ex sola suæ naturæ necessitate_ existit, _et a se sola ad agendum determinatur_.[348] Dependence, as to existence and nature, united with freedom as to action, is a contradiction. Were Prometheus to call the creatures of his making to account for their actions, they would be quite justified in answering: "We could only act according to our being: for actions arise from nature. If our actions were bad, the fault lay in our nature: this is thine own work; punish thyself."[349] And it is just the same with the imperishableness of our true being in death; for this cannot be seriously thought without the aseity of that being, and can even hardly be conceived without a fundamental separation of the will from the intellect. This last point is peculiar to my philosophy; but Aristotle had already proved the first thoroughly, by showing at length how that alone can be imperishable which has not arisen, and that the two conceptions condition each other:[350] Ταῦτα ἀλλήλοις ἀκολουθεῖ, καὶ τό τε ἀγένητον ἄφθαρτον, καὶ τὸ ἄφθαρτον ἀγένητον.... τὸ γὰρ γενητὸν καὶ τὸ φθαρτὸν ἀκολουθοῦσιν ἀλλήλοις.--εἰ γενητόν τι, φθαρτὸν ἀνάγκη[351] (_hæc mutuo se sequuntur, atque ingenerabile est incorruptibile, et incorruptibile ingenerabile.... generabile enim et corruptibile mutuo se sequuntur.--si generabile est, et corruptibile esse necesse est_). All those among the ancient philosophers who taught an immortality of the soul, understood it in this way; nor did it enter into the head of any of them to assign infinite permanence to a being _having arisen_ in any way. We have evidence of the embarrassment to which the contrary assumption leads, in the ecclesiastical controversy between the advocates of Pre-existence, Creation and Traduction.

[345] For instance, "Eth." iv. prop. 37, Schol. 2.

[346] The language of truth is simple. [Tr.'s add.]

[347] Self-existence; self-dependence.

[348] "Eth." i. def. 7. [Tr.]

[349] Compare "Parerga," i. p. 115, _et seqq._ (p. 133 of 2nd ed.).

[350] Aristot. "De Cœlo," i. 12.

[351] "These two go together, the uncreated is imperishable,
and the imperishable is uncreated.... For the created and the
perishable go together.... If a thing is created it is necessarily
perishable." [Tr.]

The Optimism moreover of all philosophical systems is a point closely allied to Ethics which must never fail in any of them, as in duty bound: for the world likes to hear that it is commendable and excellent, and philosophers like to please the world. With me it is different: I have seen what pleases the world, and therefore shall not swerve a step from the path of truth in order to please it. Thus in this point also my system varies from all the others and stands by itself. But when all the others have completed their demonstrations to the song of the best of worlds, quite at the last, at the background of the system, like a tardy avenger of the monster, like a spirit from the tomb, like the statue in Don Juan, there comes the question as to the origin of evil, of the monstrous, nameless evil, of the awful, heartrending misery in the world:--and here they are speechless, or can only find words, empty, sonorous words, with which to settle this heavy reckoning. On the other hand, a system, in whose basis already the existence of evil is interwoven with the existence of the world, need not fear that apparition any more than a vaccinated child need fear the smallpox. Now this is the case when freedom is placed in the _esse_ instead of in the _operari_ and sin, evil and the world then proceed from that _esse_.--Moreover it is fair to let me, as a serious man, only speak of things which I really know and only make use of words to which I attach a quite definite meaning; since this alone can be communicated with security to others, and Vauvenargues is quite right in saying: "_la clarté est la bonne foi des philosophes_." Therefore if I use the words 'Will, Will to live,' this is no mere _ens rationis_, no hypostasis set up by me, nor is it a term of vague, uncertain meaning; on the contrary, I refer him, who asks what it is, to his own inner self, where he will find it entire, nay, in colossal dimensions, as a true _ens realissimum_. I have accordingly not explained the world out of the unknown, but rather out of that which is better known than anything, and known to us moreover in quite a different way from all the rest. As to the paradoxical character finally, with which the ascetic results of my Ethics have been reproached, these results had given umbrage even to Jean Paul, otherwise so favourably disposed towards me, and had induced Herr Rätze also (not knowing that the only course to be adopted against me was silence) to write a book against me in 1820, with the best intentions. They have since become the standing rock of offence in my philosophy; but I beg my readers to take into consideration, that it is only in this north-western portion of the ancient continent, and even here only in Protestant countries, that the term paradoxical can be applied to such things; whereas throughout the whole of vast Asia--everywhere indeed, where the detestable doctrine of Islam has not prevailed over the ancient and profound Religions of mankind by dint of fire and sword--they would rather have to fear the reproach of being commonplace. I console myself therefore with the thought that, when referred to the Upanishads of the Sacred Vedas, my Ethics are quite orthodox,[352] and that even with primitive, genuine Christianity they stand in no contradiction. As to all other accusations of heresy, I am well armoured and my breast is fortified with triple steel.

[352] I refer those who may wish to be briefly, yet thoroughly,
informed on this point, to the late Pasteur Bochinger's work:
"La vie contemplative, ascétique et monastique chez les peuples
Bouddhistes," Strasbourg, 1831.