Chapter XII: The Twenty-Sixth of January (2)

He wishes the Queen’s Speech of 1833 to be imitated, when, after
the agitation of O’Connell, the Government declared in the Speech
their intention of maintaining the Union. I send you the paragraph
and also the paragraphs from the Speech of 1834, which seem still
more to the purpose. Mr. Buckle very forcibly argues that some
declaration of such a kind will force on the question at once, and
prevent Gladstonian shuffling being resorted to successfully. The
Irish would be obliged to meet such a challenge, and all parties
would have to declare themselves....

The paragraph which was finally adopted was modelled on the lines of the Speech of 1834:--

_The King’s Speech, Feb. 4, 1834._

But I have seen, with feelings of deep regret and just indignation,
the continuance of attempts to excite the people of that country to
demand a repeal of the Legislative Union.

This bond of our national strength and safety I have already
declared my fixed and unalterable resolution, under the blessing of
Divine Providence, to maintain inviolate by all the means in my
power.

In support of this determination I cannot doubt the zealous and
effectual co-operation of my Parliament and my people.

_The Queen’s Speech, Jan. 21, 1886._

I have seen with deep sorrow the renewal, since I last addressed
you, of the attempt to excite the people of Ireland to hostility
against the Legislative Union between that country and Great
Britain. I am absolutely opposed to any disturbance of that
fundamental law, and in resisting it I am convinced that I shall be
heartily supported by my Parliament and my people.

But the Tory leader was meditating a more decided challenge. He proposed to meet Parliament with a declaration of a Coercion policy which should disperse all doubts as to the relations of his Government with the Parnellites and should throw upon the Opposition the odium of defeating a Government upon a measure affecting law and order. He may have been led to this decision partly by a desire that the armies should face each other squarely in the coming battle. Partly, no doubt, he was persuaded thereto by the growing clamour and pressure of those sections of his own party who are always powerful to urge repressive measures. Sulky murmurs at the Carlton; loud complainings in the _Times_; trumpeted advent of Loyalist and Orange deputations claiming the protection of the Crown--all the storm-signals were flying. But there was a considerable case upon the merits. When Lord Randolph Churchill had visited Ireland in October he found the Viceroy anxious and alarmed by the growing power of the National League, and that organisation was now greatly extended. Throughout those parts of Ireland where the National League was supreme, liberty and law were gravely endangered. There was not, indeed, that kind of treasonable organisation which had existed in 1865 and 1867; nor was there such an amount of capital crime as culminated in the Phœnix Park murders; but a sullen, widespread, and well-organised spirit of resistance to the laws of property had taken possession of the Irish people and grew worse week by week. ‘There were in Ireland, and there are in Ireland now,’ said Lord Randolph at Paddington (February 13, 1886), ‘two governments--there is the Government of the Queen and the government of the National League--and the Government of the Queen is not the stronger government of the two in many parts of Ireland.’

Lord Salisbury first mentions the subject on January 13. ‘I am very perturbed,’ he writes, ‘about the state of Ireland.’ Three days later he met the Cabinet with definite proposals. Lord Ashbourne had prepared a Coercion Bill, and the Prime Minister had drafted a paragraph for the Queen’s Speech announcing its immediate introduction. The Cabinet was startled. Lord Randolph Churchill and Sir Michael Hicks-Beach had not prepared themselves for such a departure, grave as they knew the situation in Ireland to be. They were not satisfied that a case for special legislation was disclosed, still less that it could be sustained in the House of Commons. Both remembered their speeches of the previous summer. Neither responded sympathetically to the militant and autocratic temper of the mass of the party. The council was long and stormy and Ministers separated without having come to any decision. Meanwhile the resignation of Lord Carnarvon was publicly announced.

The decision of Lord Salisbury’s Administration to introduce a Coercion Bill in January 1886 has been the subject of much hostile criticism. It has been censured as a resort to extra-constitutional measures, not for the sake of public safety, but as a party manœuvre. It has been denounced as the callous and unscrupulous reversal of a policy of conciliation so soon as the Irish vote had been cast at the election. There is a degree of justice and truth in these harsh accusations, but it is only a degree; and if the Ministers concerned require a defence, that defence is best supplied by their own secret letters during these days of perplexity and stress.

_Lord Randolph Churchill to Lord Salisbury._

Carlton Club: January 16, 1886.

Dear Lord Salisbury,--I cannot resist writing to you on Ireland
while the proceedings of to-day’s Cabinet are fresh in my mind. As
far as I could ascertain, the exact difference of opinion between
the view which you hold and the view which I ventured to express
amounts (in the measure of time) to a month at the outside. You
would announce and produce a Bill at once. It appears to me that at
present there is no sufficient Parliamentary case for a Bill,
estimated by the weight of facts adduced; and that the Bill which
you may decide upon now, upon your incomplete grounds, may and will
in all probability be utterly insufficient to meet the facts which
you will have to deal with in abundance in a period of time which
may be calculated by weeks and even days.

What I would like to know, if I am not asking too much, is
this--What influence or information not yet disclosed is compelling
you to lay such a heavy burden on your sadly inefficient colleagues
in the House of Commons? I assume as indubitable that you consider,
and almost entirely guide your action by, the state of parties in
the House of Commons--that is involved in the decision come to in
December to carry on the Government--yet I am certain that you know
that none of us could sustain a case for Coercion. Yet you press it
on us--for we could have come to an agreement to-day on Lord
Cranbrook’s suggestion, only that evidently it was not acceptable
or good in your eyes.

I wish I knew what you really wanted, and how you wished it to be
worked out. I have never thought of anything except the success, or
at least the credit, of _your_ Government; and, knowing how much
depends on the House of Commons, I am at the present moment only
occupied in imagining how the action which you seem to favour could
be effectively sustained from a House of Commons point of view. I
do not think you will accuse me of arrogance or conceit if I avow
my belief that, unless you show me the way very clearly, that
action must fail disastrously. I do not want it to fail so. I know
how very great and high your position is, what a really fine party
you have behind you, how great their confidence in you is (on these
points I do not believe I am capable of making an error), and I am
most anxious that that great instrument on which depends not merely
the item of Ireland, but also the interests of the entire Empire
and home community, should not be damaged or blunted by weak and
inefficient House of Commons action such as the immediate demand
for Coercion will in practice involve.

One word as regards the Government of Ireland. You think the
situation so serious that it demands a Coercion Bill. That
necessitates a strong Irish Government. That Government you have
not got. I think there are three men in the Government who would
answer to the requirements of the position--Lord Cranbrook, Mr.
Smith, and (please don’t be shocked) myself. Of the three I greatly
prefer Mr. Smith. But, assuming that you have decided it is your
duty to carry on the Government until you are turned out, I implore
you not to think of [the arrangement Lord Salisbury had suggested].
No extra laws could make that good or stable. I hope you won’t be
vexed with me for writing so freely. I am only anxious to find
myself on Monday loyally and strenuously supporting whatever you
may think best to be done; but I admit I have not been able
hitherto to refrain from shrinking to take part in an enterprise
desperate in its nature, involving certain and immediate
Parliamentary death, and which, if determined on, will only leave
you without one or two of your most faithful supporters in the
House of Commons. Not that they will refuse to obey what you order,
but that the order itself will be their ruin.

Yours most sincerely, RANDOLPH S. CHURCHILL.

_Lord Salisbury to Lord Randolph Churchill._

_Confidential._

Foreign Office: January 16, 1886.

My dear Randolph,--I cannot say how much touched I am by the great
kindness and loyalty of your letter. I cannot help feeling how
little I deserve it. I will tell you at once what my dominant
feeling is. It is that we should be a united Cabinet--if possible
with a united party. I have been throughout ready to postpone my
individual opinion to this primary consideration. We have no right
to the luxury of divided councils in a crisis such as this. It is
evident that the great majority of the Cabinet--and, I believe, the
great majority of the party--wish earnestly for a policy which will
show that we do not shrink from the duty of government, and that we
mean to stand by the Loyalists. The disaster I am afraid of is that
we should be driven from office on some motion insisting on the
necessity of a vigorous step, and our position in Opposition would
then be very feeble and we should be much discredited.

I really feel very strongly and deeply all the kindness you have
shown to me, and the great and most successful efforts you have
made to sustain the Government. I should differ from you and Beach
with the most extreme reluctance. But do not let us take any line
which will brand us in the eyes of our countrymen--or will enable
our opponents to do so--as the timid party, who let things float
because they dared not act. The time is coming on us when people
will long for government: do not let us get a character of
shrinking from responsibility.

The question of the _personnel_ of the [Irish] Government must be
considered, but the Speech presses for settlement in the first
instance. I should have thought that the notorious growth of this
‘second government’ throughout Ireland, overshadowing the law and
the Queen’s authority and securing its power by organised terror,
would have sustained a case for such a Bill as Gibson produced. If
you remain of the opposite opinion, let us consider whether some
such phrase as the enclosed could unite us.[50] It is merely a
suggestion. I confess I have a heavy heart in the whole matter. I
have serious doubts whether I am doing my duty. But my train is
going. Perhaps I may write again from Hatfield.

Ever yours very truly, SALISBURY.

Lord Randolph now surrendered his view altogether. Never before or afterwards did the two men stand in such cordial relationship. A comradeship in anxiety had drawn these contrasted natures, each so vehement and earnest after its own fashion, very close together:--

_Lord Randolph Churchill to Lord Salisbury._

India Office: January 16, 1886.

Dear Lord Salisbury,--I am very grateful for your letter, which
enables me to enter more fully into the position from which you
view things than I have been able hitherto to do. I greatly like
the paragraph suggested, and believe firmly that it meets with
wisdom, tact, and courage the necessities and the possibilities of
the situation. But, _after all_, you are the head of the
Government, and have had a very long experience of public affairs;
and if you think it absolutely incumbent to go further--well,
then, further we must go. A collapse of the Government at the
present moment would be a catastrophe too hideous to contemplate.

I have said all that occurs to me at much too great length and with
far too much reiteration. _Kismet._

Yours most sincerely, RANDOLPH S. CHURCHILL.

There is a passage in the speech of Sir R. Peel on the Address in ‘33, where the constitutional position required before a Coercion demand is very clearly and weightily laid down.

He wrote to Beach accordingly. The Chancellor of the Exchequer was more unyielding and his letter shows the variety of strong characters arrayed against Mr. Gladstone:--

_Sir Michael Hicks-Beach to Lord Randolph Churchill._

January 17, 1886.

My dear Churchill,--Of course I should readily accept the sentence
Salisbury suggests. But though his letter touches and influences
me, it does not persuade me to anything more; and I am sorry your
reply goes so far. I do not in the least believe that, with such
Irish paragraphs as we are all ready to accept, any motion
insisting on the necessity of a vigorous step would be ever
proposed, much less carried, against us. I do not think in such a
matter we ought to be governed by the ignorant wish of ‘the great
majority of the party’ or be forced to action we do not approve for
fear of being branded as the ‘timid party.’ If these are
Salisbury’s reasons for Coercion, my opinion remains the same.

But his last sentences require explanation. If by ‘serious doubts
whether I am doing my duty’ he means that he is himself persuaded
that the moment has come when the government of Ireland cannot be
carried on without it, and that he ought not therefore to agree to
delay, that is another matter. I would yield my opinion, strong as
it is, to his convictions, but _only to his convictions_. And in
that case he _must_ have a man to govern Ireland.

Yours sincerely, M. E. HICKS-BEACH.

Monday’s Cabinet was united upon the Queen’s Speech. Lord Salisbury decided to entrust the Irish Office to Mr. Smith. Lord Randolph Churchill, who had acquired much influence with him, was chosen to press it upon him. The task was thankless and unpromising; the occasion momentous; but the post of difficulty and peril was also the post of honour. Gravely and reluctantly Smith accepted, and Lord Cranbrook became Minister of War in his stead. ‘I saw Mr. Smith this morning,’ wrote Lord Randolph to the Prime Minister (January 20), ‘and used every argument to persuade him to take in hand the government of Ireland. The appointment should be settled to-day and announced to-morrow morning without fail. If there is any weakness in our attitude on Coercion (which I do not at all admit) it will be more than contradicted by the appointment of Mr. Smith. This of itself will do much to restore confidence. Please do not, if possible, allow any delay. On second thoughts,’ added Lord Randolph mischievously, ‘would Lord Iddesleigh like to go as Lord-Lieutenant?’

The appointment of the new Irish Secretary was announced on the morning of the 21st, and that same day formal business, including election of Speaker, having been previously completed, Parliament was opened in state and the Session began.

The Government prolonged a precarious existence for five days. Both parties were in a turmoil. On the one side Whigs and Moderate Liberals endeavoured, without success, to extract from Mr. Gladstone definite declarations upon Ireland. In the Tory camp the demand for a Coercion Bill was loud and insistent. Although the party as a whole had been beaten in the elections, the bulk of its members came fresh from remarkable victories in the big towns. Their temper was aggressive. They welcomed the declaration of the Chancellor of the Exchequer that Mr. Smith would go to Ireland at once to consider what special measures were necessary.

We are told that Mr. Gladstone did not resolve to overturn the Ministry until they definitely declared for Coercion on January 26. That act, he considered, imposed the responsibility of government upon him. But Lord Randolph Churchill’s correspondence shows that he had information as early as January 13 that some independent member would move an amendment to the Address regretting that no announcement was made of provision for the wants of the agricultural population. Whether this would fail, or would gain the support of a united Opposition, could not be ascertained till the House met. A few hours of Westminster were, however, sufficient to convince the Tory leaders that the temper of the majority was adverse to them, that virtual and effective agreement existed between Mr. Gladstone and Parnell, and that Whig and Moderate Liberal support would almost certainly be insufficient to sustain them. They had decided on Coercion; they resolved, if possible, to place the details of their policy and the case in support of it before the country. The adroit and experienced Parliamentarians on the Treasury Bench used all their wits to obtain the necessary delay. The Chancellor of the Exchequer had given notice on the 21st that immediately on the conclusion of the debate on the Address he would move resolutions for the Reform of Procedure and that these would be pressed to the exclusion of other matters, ‘subject to the intervention of any specially important or urgent business.’ On the following day Lord Randolph Churchill suggested that the general debate on the Address should be brought to a conclusion and that the reforms in Parliamentary Procedure, the consideration of which Mr. Gladstone had declared in his election address ought to take precedence of legislation, might be decided before the amendments to the Address were considered. The changes which Ministers proposed were in themselves sufficiently startling to have absorbed the House in calmer times; and Lord Randolph no doubt calculated upon this. But Mr. Gladstone found no difficulty in persuading his party that Procedure reform might safely be a little delayed. Lord Randolph’s proposal was ignored and the debate continued.

On the 23rd Mr. Smith started for Dublin, which he reached on the morning of the 24th. The imminent defeat of the Ministry had now become certain. An amendment relating to Burma was moved on the 25th. Mr. Gladstone, though recommending that no decision should be taken upon it, as other more convenient opportunities of discussing Indian matters would occur, indulged in acid criticism of the Burmese policy. ‘Shall I answer him now?’ asked Lord Randolph, taking up the red box in which the India Office papers reposed, ‘or shall I wait for the Indian Budget?’ ‘Now or never,’ answered the Leader of the House; and Lord Randolph thereupon, using the precise information of a great department with the skill of a practised debater, made a vigorous rejoinder. Upon the spur of the moment he managed to cite a number of instances from the record of the late Government where they had themselves been drawn into warlike operations, with, as Lord Randolph contended, far less justification than was presented in Burma. Mr. Gladstone was much provoked by such comparisons. He could not speak again himself, and as the Secretary for India proceeded he was observed repeatedly turning to those about him and behind him, explaining how this did not apply; how that was wholly unfounded: how this, again, was a travesty; and so forth. The Conservatives were delighted at Lord Randolph’s prowess. The attack was repelled. On the next amendment the Liberal Front Bench abstained, and the Government survived by twenty-eight. But this was the end.

Faced by approaching destruction, the Government cared only to rally their friends, to make one last bid for Whig support, and to declare plainly the issue on which they were to be dismissed. The Cabinet which met on the morning of the 26th desired the immediate introduction of a Coercion Bill. But Mr. Smith was not inclined to be hustled. He could not realise the rapid developments which had taken place in his absence. Harassed by telegrams, he appealed to Lord Randolph. The friendship between them was steadily ripening. Of all the characters with which this story deals, scarcely one improves so much upon acquaintance as this valiant and honest man. He was the true type of what Disraeli calls ‘an English worthy.’ Here is his letter:--

_Mr. Smith to Lord Randolph Churchill._

_Private._

Chief Secretary’s Office, Dublin Castle: January 25, 1886, 6 P.M.

My dear Churchill,--I have had a telegram from Salisbury which
affords evidence of pressure for what is termed ‘prompt action,’
and I have replied by letter. Another telegram has just come in
from Beach, which cannot be deciphered before post leaves.

There is only one opinion here--that the League must be suppressed
and large powers obtained to protect life, property and public
order, unless the Government is prepared to treat for terms of
capitulation with the Parnellites. But the Land Question is at the
bottom of the trouble, and gives all the force to the agitation. As
at present advised, I should be unwilling to ask for large
repressive powers unless I had authority to promise a large land
scheme.

But these telegrams indicate restlessness in my colleagues. So big
a question cannot be decided offhand. It is more than peace or war
with a foreign Power. We are at a crisis in the relations of the
Imperial Government with Ireland. I may very possibly fail to do
any good, but I will not be hurried into a positive decision on
such momentous issues by the party or the papers; and if my
colleagues think the three or four days I propose to take too long,
I will return to London with pleasure. Let me hear from you either
by telegraph or post.

Yours sincerely, W. H. SMITH.

The correspondence was continued by cypher telegrams:--

_Lord R. Churchill to Mr. Smith._

January 26.

Greatly obliged by your letter.

Absolutely necessary for Government to state to-night their
intentions with regard to Ireland--viz. suppression of National
League followed by Land Bill. This is the only method of averting
defeat on Jesse Collings. Notice should be given to-day of
introduction of repressive Bill on Thursday, coupled with revival
of rules of urgency. Telegraph to me your views. I would earnestly
press your return to London.

_Mr. Smith to Lord R. Churchill._

I think proposed action looks precipitate. There is no excessive
urgency here, and great care is required in framing and describing
measure. I should prefer, if possible, to provide against the
intimidation of League than denounce it by name. I cross to-night.

Lord Randolph replied from the House of Commons at six o’clock the same day:--

Your telegram received half-hour after Cabinet separated. Beach has
just announced introduction of Bill by you on Thursday for
suppression of National League and other dangerous associations,
for the prevention of intimidation and for the protection of life,
property and order in Ireland.[51] Of course, great sensation.

It is not improbable, however, that we shall be defeated to-night,
in which case we shall resign. I showed your wire to Lord
Salisbury. We both agreed you would not wish unanimous decision of
Cabinet modified.

Mr. Smith arrived in London with the daylight, to read upon the early placards that the Government was out.

The famous Jesse Collings Amendment produced an interesting debate; but as the members listened to the opposing views of Mr. Chaplin and Mr. Joseph Arch, of Mr. Goschen and Mr. Bradlaugh, of Mr. Gladstone and Lord Hartington, they knew that behind the relevant arguments of the speakers, behind all the talk of peasant-proprietors, allotments, vegetables, and cows, stood a far greater issue. ‘If the result of this division,’ said the Chancellor of the Exchequer, ‘should be unfavourable to Her Majesty’s Government we shall accept that decision without regret. We assumed office reluctantly, and we shall leave it willingly as soon as we are assured that we do not possess the support of the House. But the success of this motion will have another and graver effect.... It will not only be a defeat of Her Majesty’s Government, but it will be a defeat of the policy ... which they believe it to be their duty to pursue with respect to Ireland.’

The Government were beaten on the division by seventy-nine votes, notwithstanding that sixteen Liberals, including Lord Hartington, Mr. Goschen and Sir Henry James, voted with them and fifty-six others stayed away. The next day Lord Salisbury’s Cabinet resigned.

Thus, after a brief but exciting reign, fell the ‘Ministry of Caretakers.’ They had confronted enormous difficulties with small resources. They existed at the caprice of their enemies. They had office, but not power. Yet they faced their task and their opponents with courage and skill. Their Administration was defended by powerful oratory; it was sustained--except in its dying moments--by sedate and efficient Executive action. In a few short months the Conservative party were freed from the reproach of irresponsibility and their capacity for government was recognised by the country. The peace of Europe was preserved amid grave embarrassments and under their guidance the nation emerged safely and honourably from the Russian crisis. They legislated with unexpected good fortune. They inaugurated a new policy, never since abandoned, of Land Purchase in Ireland. They restored and greatly strengthened the defences of India. They laid the foundations of Australian Federation, and by a successful, inexpensive and almost bloodless military expedition added a vast and fertile province to the dominions of the Crown.