Chapter XIII: Book III: The Conflict Between the Right and the Expedient (4)

Nay; I think that tranquillity at such a price is to be despised and rejected; for if it is not morally right, neither is it expedient. *98* For what do you think would have been said of Ulysses, if he had persisted in that pretended madness, seeing that, notwithstanding his deeds of heroism in the war, he was nevertheless upbraided by Ajax thus:

"'Twas he himself who first proposed the oath; ye all
Do know; yet he alone of all his vow did break;
He feigned persistently that he was mad, that thus
He might not have to join the host. And had not then
Palamedes, shrewd and wise, his tricky impudence
Unmasked, he had evaded e'en for aye his vow."

*99* Nay, for him it had been better to battle not only with the enemy but also with the waves, as he did, than to desert Greece when she was united for waging the war against the barbarians.

But let us leave illustrations both from story and from foreign lands and turn to real events in our own history. #(2) the example of Regulus.# Marcus Atilius Regulus in his second consulship was taken prisoner in Africa by the stratagem of Xanthippus, a Spartan general serving under the command of Hannibal's father Hamilcar.[BX] He was sent to the senate on parole, sworn to return to Carthage himself, if certain noble prisoners of war[BY] were not restored to the Carthaginians. When he came to Rome, he could not fail to see the specious appearance of expediency, but he decided that it was unreal, as the outcome proves. His apparent interest was to remain in his own country, to stay at home with his wife and children, and to retain his rank and dignity as an ex-consul, regarding the defeat which he had suffered as a misfortune that might come to anyone in the game of war. Who says that this was not expedient? Who, think you? Greatness of soul and courage say that it was not. *100* #The violation of his oath could not have been expedient for him.# XXVII. Can you ask for more competent authorities? The denial comes from those virtues, for it is characteristic of them to await nothing with fear, to rise superior to all the vicissitudes of earthly life, and to count nothing intolerable that can befall a human being. What, then, did he do? He came into the senate and stated his mission; but he refused to give his own vote on the question; for, he held, he was not a member of the senate so long as he was bound by the oath sworn to his enemies. And more than that, he said--"What a foolish fellow," some one will say, "to oppose his own best interests"--he said that it was not expedient that the prisoners should be returned; for they were young men and gallant officers, while he was already bowed with age. And when his counsel prevailed, the prisoners were retained and he himself returned to Carthage; affection for his country and his family failed to hold him back. And even then he was not ignorant of the fact that he was going to a most cruel enemy and to exquisite torture; still, he thought his oath must be sacredly kept. And so even then, when he was being slowly put to death by enforced wakefulness, he enjoyed a happier lot than if he had remained at home an aged prisoner of war, a man of consular rank forsworn.

*101* "But," you will say, "it was foolish of him not only not to advocate the exchange of prisoners but even to plead against such action."

How was it foolish? Was it so, even if his policy was for the good of the state? Nay; can what is inexpedient for the state be expedient for any individual citizen?

[BX] Cicero is careless in his dates. Regulus was consul in
267 and 256. He was defeated and taken prisoner in his second
proconsulship at the battle of Tunes in 255. And the Hamilcar
of 255 was not Hannibal's father, for his career does not
begin until 247, when he was a mere youth, and he was still
in his prime when he fell in battle in Spain, in 229.

[BY] At the battle of Panormus in 250 Lucius Caecilius
Metellus took among the prisoners no less than thirteen
Carthaginian generals--all men of noble birth.

XXVIII. Pervertunt homines ea, quae sunt fundamenta naturae, cum utilitatem ab honestate seiungunt. Omnes enim expetimus utilitatem ad eamque rapimur nec facere aliter ullo modo possumus. Nam quis est, qui utilia fugiat? aut quis potius, qui ea non studiosissime persequatur? Sed quia nusquam possumus nisi in laude, decore, honestate utilia reperire, propterea illa prima et summa habemus, utilitatis nomen non tam splendidum quam necessarium ducimus.

*102* Quid est igitur, dixerit quis, in iure iurando? num iratum timemus Iovem? At hoc quidem commune est omnium philosophorum, non eorum modo, qui deum nihil habere ipsum negotii dicunt, nihil exhibere alteri, sed eorum etiam, qui deum semper agere aliquid et moliri volunt, numquam nec irasci deum nec nocere. Quid autem iratus Iuppiter plus nocere potuisset, quam nocuit sibi ipse Regulus? Nulla igitur vis fuit religionis, quae tantam utilitatem perverteret.

An ne turpiter faceret? Primum minima de malis. Num[357] igitur tantum mali turpitudo ista habebat,[358] quantum ille cruciatus? Deinde illud etiam apud Accium:

#Atreus; Ribbeck^2, 227-228#

Fregistín[359] fidem?
Néque dedi neque do ínfideli cuíquam

quamquam ab impio rege dicitur, luculente tamen dicitur.

*103* Addunt etiam, quem ad modum nos dicamus videri quaedam utilia, quae non sint, sic se dicere videri quaedam honesta, quae non sint, "ut hoc ipsum videtur honestum, conservandi iuris iurandi causa ad cruciatum revertisse; sed fit non honestum, quia, quod per vim hostium esset actum, ratum esse non debuit."

Addunt etiam, quicquid valde utile sit, id fieri honestum, etiamsi antea non videretur.

Haec fere contra Regulum. Sed prima _quaeque_[360] videamus.

[357] _Num_ Edd.; _non_ MSS.

[358] _habebat_ L c, Edd.; _habebit_ A B H a b.

[359] _fregistin_ Edd.; _fregistine_ A B H a b; _fregisti_ L
c.

[360] _quaeque_ Forchhammer, Müller, Heine; not in MSS., Bt.,
Ed.

#Expediency inseparable from moral rectitude.#

XXVIII. People overturn the fundamental principles established by nature, when they divorce expediency from moral rectitude. For we all seek to obtain what is to us expedient; we are irresistibly drawn toward it, and we cannot possibly be otherwise. For who is there that would turn his back upon what is to him expedient? Or rather, who is there that does not exert himself to the utmost to secure it? But because we cannot discover it anywhere except in good report, propriety, and moral rectitude, we look upon these three for that reason as the first and the highest objects of endeavour, while what we term expediency we account not so much an ornament to our dignity as a necessary incident to living.

#Arguments against Regulus's fidelity to his oath:#

#(1) he had no need to fear God's wrath,#

*102* "What significance, then," some one will say, "do we attach to an oath? It is not that we fear the wrath of Jove, is it? Not at all; it is the universally accepted view of all philosophers that God is never angry, never hurtful. This is the doctrine not only of those[BZ] who teach that God is Himself free from troubling cares and that He imposes no trouble upon others, but also of those[CA] who believe that God is ever working and ever directing His world. Furthermore, suppose Jupiter had been wroth, what greater injury could He have inflicted upon Regulus than Regulus brought upon himself? Religious scruple, therefore, had no such preponderance as to outweigh so great expediency."

#(2) "Of two evils choose the less,"#

"Or was he afraid that his act would be morally wrong? As to that, first of all, the proverb says 'Of evils choose the least.' Did that moral wrong, then, really involve as great an evil as did that awful torture? And secondly, there are the lines of Accius:

_Thyestes._ 'Hast thou broke thy faith?'
_Atreus._ 'None have I giv'n; none give I ever to the faithless.'

Although this sentiment is put into the mouth of a wicked king, still it is illuminating in its correctness."

#(3) oaths extorted by constraint not binding,#

*103* Their third argument is this: just as we maintain that some things seem expedient but are not, so they maintain, some things seem morally right but are not. "For example," they contend, "in this very case it seems morally right for Regulus to have returned to torture for the sake of being true to his oath. But it proves not to be morally right, because what an enemy extorted by force ought not to have been binding."

#(4) exceptional expediency makes right.#

As their concluding argument, they add: whatever is highly expedient may prove to be morally right, even if it did not seem so in advance.

These are in substance the arguments raised against the conduct of Regulus. Let us consider them each in turn.

[BZ] The Epicureans.

[CA] The Stoics.

*104* XXIX. "Non fuit Iuppiter metuendus ne iratus noceret, qui neque irasci solet nec nocere."

Haec quidem ratio non magis contra Reguli quam contra omne ius iurandum valet. Sed in iure iurando non qui metus, sed quae vis sit, debet intellegi; est enim ius iurandum affirmatio religiosa; quod autem affirmate quasi deo teste promiseris, id tenendum est. Iam enim non ad iram deorum, quae nulla est, sed ad iustitiam et ad fidem pertinet. Nam praeclare Ennius:

#(Thyestes?) _Fab. inc._, Vahlen^2, 403#

Ó Fides alma ápta pinnis ét ius iurandúm Iovis!

Qui ius igitur iurandum violat, is Fidem violat, quam in Capitolio "vicinam Iovis optimi maximi," #Unknown# ut in Catonis oratione est, maiores nostri esse voluerunt.

*105* At enim ne iratus quidem Iuppiter plus Regulo nocuisset, quam sibi nocuit ipse Regulus.

Certe, si nihil malum esset nisi dolere. Id autem non modo [non][361] summum malum, sed ne malum quidem esse maxima auctoritate philosophi affirmant. Quorum quidem testem non mediocrem, sed haud scio an gravissimum Regulum nolite, quaeso, vituperare. Quem enim locupletiorem quaerimus quam principem populi Romani, qui retinendi officii causa cruciatum subierit voluntarium?

Nam quod aiunt: "minima de malis," id est ut turpiter potius quam calamitose, an est ullum maius malum turpitudine? quae si in deformitate corporis habet[362] aliquid offensionis, quanta illa depravatio et foeditas turpificati animi debet videri! *106* Itaque nervosius qui ista disserunt, solum audent malum dicere id, quod turpe sit, qui autem remissius, ii tamen non dubitant summum malum dicere.

Nam illud quidem:

#Accius, Atreus; Ribbeck^2, 228#

Néque dedi neque do ínfideli cuíquam

idcirco recte a poëta, quia, cum tractaretur Atreus, personae serviendum fuit. Sed si hoc sibi sument, nullam esse fidem, quae infideli data sit, videant, ne quaeratur latebra periurio.

*107* Est autem ius etiam bellicum fidesque iuris iurandi saepe cum hoste servanda.[363] Quod enim ita iuratum est, ut mens conciperet fieri oportere, id servandum est; quod aliter, id si non fecerit, nullum est periurium. Ut, si praedonibus pactum pro capite pretium non attuleris, nulla fraus sit,[364] ne si iuratus quidem id non feceris; nam pirata non est ex perduellium numero definitus, sed communis hostis omnium; cum hoc nec fides debet nec ius iurandum esse commune. *108* Non enim falsum iurare periurare est, sed, quod EX ANIMI TUI SENTENTIA iuraris, sicut verbis concipitur more nostro, id non facere periurium est. Scite enim[365] Euripides:

#Hippolytus 612#

Iurávi lingua, méntem iniuratám gero.

Regulus vero non debuit condiciones pactionesque bellicas et hostiles perturbare periurio. Cum iusto enim et legitimo hoste res gerebatur, adversus quem et totum ius fetiale et multa sunt iura communia. Quod ni ita esset, numquam claros viros senatus vinctos[366] hostibus dedidisset.

[361] _non modo non_ B H a; _non modo nos_ c; _non modo_ L c
p, Edd.

[362] _habet_ L c, Edd.; _habeat_ A B H a b.

[363] _Est ... servanda_ bracketed by Unger, Bt.^2, Ed.

[364] _sit_ Edd. plerique; _est_ MSS., Bt.^1

[365] _Scite enim_ A L c, Edd.; _scit enim_ B H a b.

[366] _vinctos_ A L c, Edd.; _victos_ B H a b.

#Rebuttal.#

*104* XXIX. "He need not have been afraid that Jupiter in anger would inflict injury upon him; he is not wont to be angry or hurtful."

#(1) An oath is a covenant with Justice and Good Faith;#

This argument, at all events, has no more weight against Regulus's conduct than it has against the keeping of any other oath. But in taking an oath it is our duty to consider not what one may have to fear in case of violation but wherein its obligation lies: an oath is an assurance backed by religious sanctity; and a solemn promise given, as before God as one's witness, is to be sacredly kept. For the question no longer concerns the wrath of the gods (for there is no such thing) but the obligations of justice and good faith. For, as Ennius says so admirably:

"Gracious Good Faith, on wings upborne; thou oath in Jupiter's
great name!"

Whoever, therefore, violates his oath violates Good Faith; and, as we find it stated in Cato's speech, our forefathers chose that she should dwell upon the Capitol "neighbour to Jupiter Supreme and Best."

*105* "But," objection was further made, "even if Jupiter had been angry, he could not have inflicted greater injury upon Regulus than Regulus brought upon himself."

#What is evil?#

Quite true, if there is no evil except pain. But philosophers[CB] of the highest authority assure us that pain is not only not the supreme evil but no evil at all. And pray do not disparage Regulus, as no unimportant witness--nay, I am rather inclined to think he was the very best witness--to the truth of their doctrine. For what more competent witness do we ask for than one of the foremost citizens of Rome, who voluntarily faced torture for the sake of being true to his moral duty?

#(2) no evil can be greater than moral wrong;#

Again, they say "Of evils choose the least"--that is, shall one "choose moral wrong rather than misfortune," or is there any evil greater than moral wrong? For if physical deformity excites a certain amount of aversion, how offensive ought the deformity and hideousness of a demoralized soul to seem! *106* Therefore, those[CC] who discuss these problems with more rigour make bold to say that moral wrong is the only evil, while those[CD] who treat them with more laxity do not hesitate to call it the supreme evil.

Once more, they quote the sentiment:

"None have I given, none give I ever to the faithless."

It was proper for the poet to say that, because, when he was working out his Atreus, he had to make the words fit the character. But if they mean to adopt it as a principle, that a pledge given to the faithless is no pledge, let them look to it that it be not a mere loophole for perjury that they seek.

#What is perjury?#

*107* Furthermore, we have laws regulating warfare, and fidelity to an oath must often be observed in dealings with an enemy: for an oath sworn with the clear understanding in one's own mind that it should be performed must be kept; but if there is no such understanding, it does not count as perjury if one does not perform the vow. For example, suppose that one does not deliver the amount agreed upon with pirates as the price of one's life, that would be accounted no deception--not even if one should fail to deliver the ransom after having sworn to do so; for a pirate is not included in the number of lawful enemies, but is the common foe of all the world; and with him there ought not to be any pledged word nor any oath mutually binding. *108* For swearing to what is false is not necessarily perjury, but to take an oath "upon your conscience," as it is expressed in our legal formulas, and then fail to perform it, that is perjury. For Euripides aptly says:

"My tongue has sworn; the mind I have has sworn no oath."

#Oaths made to an enemy as binding as treaties.#

But Regulus had no right to confound by perjury the terms and covenants of war made with an enemy. For the war was being carried on with a legitimate, declared enemy; and to regulate our dealings with such an enemy, we have our whole fetial[CE] code as well as many other laws that are binding in common between nations. Were this not the case, the senate would never have delivered up illustrious men of ours in chains to the enemy.

[CB] The Stoics.

[CC] The Stoics.

[CD] The Peripatetics.

[CE] See Index, s.v.

*109* XXX. At vero T. Veturius et Sp. Postumius cum iterum consules essent, quia, cum male pugnatum apud Caudium esset, legionibus nostris sub iugum missis pacem cum Samnitibus fecerant, dediti sunt iis; iniussu enim populi senatusque fecerant. Eodemque tempore Ti. Numicius, Q. Maelius, qui tum tribuni pl. erant, quod eorum auctoritate pax erat facta, dediti sunt, ut pax Samnitium repudiaretur; atque huius deditionis ipse Postumius, qui dedebatur, suasor et auctor fuit.

Quod idem multis annis post C. Mancinus, qui, ut Numantinis, quibuscum sine senatus auctoritate foedus fecerat, dederetur, rogationem suasit eam, quam L. Furius, Sex. Atilius ex senatus consulto ferebant; qua accepta est hostibus deditus. Honestius his quam Q. Pompeius, quo, cum in eadem causa esset, deprecante accepta lex non est. Hic ea, quae videbatur utilitas, plus valuit quam honestas, apud superiores utilitatis species falsa ab honestatis auctoritate superata est.

#§ 103#

*110* At non debuit ratum esse, quod erat actum per vim.--Quasi vero forti viro vis possit adhiberi.

Cur igitur ad senatum proficiscebatur, cum praesertim de captivis dissuasurus esset?

Quod maximum in eo est, id reprehenditis. Non enim suo iudicio stetit, sed suscepit causam, ut esset iudicium senatus; cui nisi ipse auctor fuisset, captivi profecto Poenis redditi essent; ita incolumis in patria Regulus restitisset. Quod quia patriae non utile putavit, idcirco sibi honestum et sentire illa et pati credidit.

#§ 103#

Nam quod aiunt, quod valde utile sit, id fieri honestum, immo vero esse, non fieri. Est enim nihil utile, quod idem non honestum, nec, quia utile, honestum, sed, quia honestum, utile.

Quare ex multis mirabilibus exemplis haud facile quis dixerit hoc exemplo aut laudabilius aut praestantius.

#Roman strictness.#

*109* XXX. And yet that very thing happened. Titus Veturius and Spurius Postumius in their second consulship lost the battle at the Caudine Forks, and our legions were sent under the yoke. And because they made peace with the Samnites, those generals were delivered up to them, for they had made the peace without the approval of the people and senate. And Tiberius Numicius and Quintus Maelius, tribunes of the people, were delivered up at the same time, because it was with their sanction that the peace had been concluded. This was done in order that the peace with the Samnites might be annulled. And Postumius, the very man whose delivery was in question, was the proposer and advocate of the said delivery.

Many years later,[CF] Gaius Mancinus had a similar experience: he advocated the bill, introduced in accordance with a decree of the senate by Lucius Furius and Sextus Atilius, that he should be delivered up to the Numantines, with whom he had made a treaty without authorization from the senate; and when the bill was passed, he was delivered up to the enemy. His action was more honourable than Quintus Pompey's; Pompey's situation was identical with his, and yet at his own entreaty the bill was rejected. In this latter case, apparent expediency prevailed over moral rectitude; in the former cases, the false semblance of expediency was overbalanced by the weight of moral rectitude.

#(3) the interests of the state higher than personal advantage;#

*110* "But," they argued against Regulus, "an oath extorted by force ought not to have been binding." As if force could be brought to bear upon a brave man!

"Why, then, did he make the journey to the senate, especially when he intended to plead against the surrender of the prisoners of war?"

Therein you are criticizing what is the noblest feature of his conduct. For he was not content to stand upon his own judgment but took up the case, in order that the judgment might be that of the senate; and had it not been for the weight of his pleading, the prisoners would certainly have been restored to the Carthaginians; and in that case, Regulus would have remained safe at home in his country. But because he thought this not expedient for his country, he believed that it was therefore morally right for him to declare his conviction and to suffer for it.

#(4) nothing expedient unless morally right.#

When they argued also that what is highly expedient may prove to be morally right, they ought rather to say not that it "may prove to be" but that it actually is morally right. For nothing can be expedient which is not at the same time morally right; neither can a thing be morally right just because it is expedient, but it is expedient because it is morally right.

From the many splendid examples in history, therefore, we could not easily point to one either more praiseworthy or more heroic than the conduct of Regulus.

[CF] 184 years, i.e., in B.C. 137.

*111* XXXI. Sed ex tota hac laude Reguli unum illud est admiratione dignum, quod captivos retinendos censuit. Nam quod rediit, nobis nunc mirabile videtur, illis quidem temporibus aliter facere non potuit; itaque ista laus non est hominis, sed temporum. Nullum enim vinculum ad astringendam fidem iure iurando maiores artius esse voluerunt. Id indicant leges in duodecim tabulis, indicant sacratae, indicant foedera, quibus etiam cum hoste devincitur fides, indicant notiones animadversionesque censorum, qui nulla de re diligentius quam de iure iurando iudicabant.

*112* L. Manlio A. f., cum dictator fuisset, M. Pomponius tr. pl. diem dixit, quod is paucos sibi dies ad dictaturam gerendam addidisset; criminabatur etiam, quod Titum filium, qui postea est Torquatus appellatus, ab hominibus relegasset et ruri habitare iussisset. Quod cum audivisset adulescens filius, negotium exhiberi patri, accurrisse Romam et cum primo luci[367] Pomponi domum venisse dicitur. Cui cum esset nuntiatum, qui illum iratum allaturum ad se aliquid contra patrem arbitraretur, surrexit e lectulo remotisque arbitris ad se adulescentem iussit venire. At ille, ut ingressus est, confestim gladium destrinxit iuravitque se illum statim interfecturum, nisi ius iurandum sibi dedisset se patrem missum esse facturum. Iuravit hoc terrore coactus Pomponius; rem ad populum detulit, docuit, cur sibi causa desistere necesse esset, Manlium missum fecit. Tantum temporibus illis ius iurandum valebat.

Atque hic T. Manlius is est, qui ad Anienem Galli, quem ab eo provocatus occiderat, torque detracto cognomen invenit, cuius tertio consulatu Latini ad Veserim fusi et fugati, magnus vir in primis et, qui perindulgens in patrem, idem acerbe severus in filium.

[367] _primo luci_ Beier, Heine, Ed.; _primo lucis_ c; _prima
luce_ A B H a b.

#The most striking lesson in the story of Regulus.#

*111* XXXI. But of all that is thus praiseworthy in the conduct of Regulus, this one feature above all others calls for our admiration: it was he who offered the motion that the prisoners of war be retained. For the fact of his returning may seem admirable to us nowadays, but in those times he could not have done otherwise. That merit, therefore, belongs to the age, not to the man. For our ancestors were of the opinion that no bond was more effective in guaranteeing good faith than an oath. That is clearly proved by the laws of the Twelve Tables, by the "sacred" laws,[CG] by the treaties in which good faith is pledged even to the enemy, by the investigations made by the censors and the penalties imposed by them; for there were no cases in which they used to render more rigorous decisions than in cases of violation of an oath.

#The sanctity of an oath in the old days.#

*112* Marcus Pomponius, a tribune of the people, brought an indictment against Lucius Manlius, Aulus's son, for having extended the term of his dictatorship a few days beyond its expiration. He further charged him with having banished his own son Titus (afterward surnamed Torquatus) from all companionship with his fellow-men, and with requiring him to live in the country. When the son, who was then a young man, heard that his father was in trouble on his account, he hastened to Rome--so the story goes--and at daybreak presented himself at the house of Pomponius. The visitor was announced to Pomponius. Inasmuch as he thought that the son in his anger meant to bring him some new evidence to use against the father, he arose from his bed, asked all who were present to leave the room, and sent word to the young man to come in. Upon entering, he at once drew a sword and swore that he would kill the tribune on the spot, if he did not swear an oath to withdraw the suit against his father. Constrained by the terror of the situation, Pomponius gave his oath. He reported the matter to the people, explaining why he was obliged to drop the prosecution, and withdrew his suit against Manlius. Such was the regard for the sanctity of an oath in those days.

And that lad was the Titus Manlius who in the battle on the Anio killed the Gaul by whom he had been challenged to single combat, pulled off his torque and thus won his surname. And in his third consulship he routed the Latins and put them to flight in the battle on the Veseris. He was one of the greatest of the great, and one who, while more than generous toward his father, could yet be bitterly severe toward his son.

[CG] "Sacred" laws, according to Festus (p. 318), were laws
that placed their transgressor, together with his household
and his property, under the ban of some divinity; other
authorities limit the term to the laws enacted upon the
Sacred Mount (B.C. 394).

*113* XXXII. Sed, ut laudandus Regulus in conservando iure iurando, sic decem illi, quos post Cannensem pugnam iuratos ad senatum misit Hannibal se in castra redituros ea, quorum erant potiti Poeni, nisi de redimendis captivis impetravissent, si non redierunt, vituperandi. De quibus non omnes uno modo; nam Polybius, bonus auctor in primis, ex decem nobilissimis, qui tum erant missi, novem revertisse dicit re a senatu non impetrata; unum ex decem, qui paulo post, quam erat[368] egressus e castris, redisset, quasi aliquid esset oblitus, Romae remansisse; reditu enim in castra liberatum se esse iure iurando interpretabatur, non recte; fraus enim astringit,[369] non dissolvit periurium. Fuit igitur stulta calliditas perverse imitata prudentiam. Itaque decrevit senatus, ut ille veterator et callidus vinctus ad Hannibalem duceretur.

*114*[370] Sed illud maximum: octo hominum milia tenebat Hannibal, non quos in acie cepisset, aut qui periculo mortis diffugissent, sed qui relicti in castris fuissent a Paulo et a Varrone consulibus. Eos senatus non censuit redimendos, cum id parva pecunia fieri posset, ut esset insitum militibus nostris aut vincere aut emori. Qua quidem re audita fractum animum Hannibalis scribit idem, quod senatus populusque Romanus rebus afflictis tam excelso animo fuisset. Sic honestatis comparatione ea, quae videntur utilia, vincuntur.

*115* _C._[371] Acilius autem, qui Graece scripsit historiam, plures ait fuisse, qui in castra revertissent eadem fraude, ut iure iurando liberarentur, eosque a censoribus omnibus ignominiis notatos.

Sit iam huius loci finis. Perspicuum est enim ea, quae timido animo, humili, demisso fractoque fiant, quale fuisset Reguli factum, si aut de captivis, quod ipsi opus esse videretur, non quod rei publicae, censuisset aut domi remanere voluisset, non esse utilia, quia sint flagitiosa, foeda, turpia.

[368] _Novem ... quam erat_ c, Bt.^1, Ed.; om. A B H a b;
_unum qui_ Unger, Bt.^2

[369] _astringit_ c p, Ed., Heine; _distringit_ A B H a b,
Unger, Bt.

[370] § 114 bracketed by Heus., Bt., as un-Ciceronian.

[371] _C._ Heine, Ed.; not in MSS.

#Contrast between Regulus and the ten envoys from Hannibal.#

*113* XXXII. Now, as Regulus deserves praise for being true to his oath, so those ten whom Hannibal sent to the senate on parole after the battle of Cannae deserve censure, if it is true that they did not return; for they were sworn to return to the camp which had fallen into the hands of the Carthaginians, if they did not succeed in negotiating an exchange of prisoners. Historians are not in agreement in regard to the facts. Polybius, one of the very best authorities, states that of the ten eminent nobles who were sent at that time, nine returned when their mission failed at the hands of the senate. But one of the ten, who, a little while after leaving the camp, had gone back on the pretext that he had forgotten something or other, remained behind at Rome; he explained that by his return to the camp he was released from the obligation of his oath. He was wrong; for deceit does not remove the guilt of perjury--it merely aggravates it. #The ancient Roman discipline.# His cunning that impudently tried to masquerade as prudence was, therefore, only folly. And so the senate ordered that the cunning scoundrel should be taken back to Hannibal in chains.

*114* But the most significant part of the story is this: the eight thousand prisoners in Hannibal's hands were not men that he had taken in the battle or that had escaped in the peril of their lives, but men that the consuls Paulus and Varro had left behind in camp. Though these might have been ransomed by a small sum of money, the senate voted not to redeem them, in order that our soldiers might have the lesson planted in their hearts that they must either conquer or die. When Hannibal heard this news, according to that same writer, he lost heart completely, because the senate and the people of Rome displayed courage so lofty in a time of disaster. Thus apparent expediency is outweighed when placed in the balance against moral rectitude.

*115* Gaius Acilius, on the other hand, the author of a history of Rome in Greek, says that there were several who played the same trick of returning to the camp to release themselves thus from the obligation of their oath, and that they were branded by the censors with every mark of disgrace.

#Expediency and Courage identical.#

Let this be the conclusion of this topic. For it must be perfectly apparent that acts that are done with a cowardly, craven, abject, broken spirit, as the act of Regulus would have been if he had supported in regard to the prisoners a measure that seemed to be advantageous for him personally, but disadvantageous for the state, or if he had consented to remain at home--that such acts are not expedient because they are shameful, dishonourable, and immoral.

*116* XXXIII. Restat quarta pars, quae decore, moderatione, modestia, continentia, temperantia continetur.

Potest igitur quicquam utile esse, quod sit huic talium virtutum choro contrarium? Atqui ab Aristippo Cyrenaici atque Annicerii philosophi nominati omne bonum in voluptate posuerunt virtutemque censuerunt ob eam rem esse laudandam, quod efficiens esset voluptatis. Quibus obsoletis floret Epicurus, eiusdem fere adiutor auctorque sententiae. Cum his "viris[372] equisque," ut dicitur, si honestatem tueri ac retinere sententia est, decertandum est.

*117* Nam si non modo utilitas, sed vita omnis beata corporis firma constitutione eiusque constitutionis spe explorata, ut a Metrodoro scriptum est, continetur, certe haec utilitas, et quidem summa (sic enim censent), cum honestate pugnabit. Nam ubi primum prudentiae locus dabitur? an ut conquirat undique suavitates? Quam miser virtutis famulatus servientis voluptati! Quod autem munus prudentiae? an legere intellegenter voluptates? Fac nihil isto esse iucundius, quid cogitari potest turpius?

Iam, qui dolorem summum malum dicat, apud eum quem habet locum fortitudo, quae est dolorum laborumque contemptio? Quamvis enim multis locis dicat Epicurus, sicuti[373] dicit, satis fortiter de dolore, tamen non id spectandum est, quid dicat, sed quid consentaneum sit ei dicere, qui bona voluptate terminaverit, mala dolore.

Et,[374] si illum audiam, de continentia et temperantia dicit ille quidem multa multis locis, sed aqua haeret, ut aiunt; nam qui potest temperantiam laudare is, qui ponat summum bonum in voluptate? est enim temperantia libidinum inimica, libidines autem consectatrices voluptatis.

*118* Atque in his tamen tribus generibus, quoquo modo possunt, non incallide tergiversantur; prudentiam introducunt scientiam suppeditantem voluptates, depellentem dolores; fortitudinem quoque aliquo modo expediunt, cum tradunt rationem neglegendae mortis, perpetiendi doloris; etiam temperantiam inducunt non facillime illi quidem, sed tamen quoquo modo possunt; dicunt enim voluptatis magnitudinem doloris detractione finiri. Iustitia vacillat vel iacet potius omnesque eae virtutes, quae in communitate cernuntur et in societate generis humani. Neque enim bonitas nec liberalitas nec comitas esse potest, non plus quam amicitia, si haec non per se expetantur,[375] sed ad voluptatem utilitatemve referantur.

Conferamus igitur in pauca.

*119* Nam ut utilitatem nullam esse docuimus, quae honestati esset contraria, sic omnem voluptatem dicimus honestati esse contrariam. Quo magis reprehendendos Calliphontem et Dinomachum iudico, qui se dirempturos controversiam putaverunt, si cum honestate voluptatem tamquam cum homine pecudem copulavissent. Non recipit istam coniunctionem honestas, aspernatur, repellit. Nec vero finis bonorum [et malorum],[376] qui simplex esse debet, ex dissimillimis rebus misceri et temperari potest. #De Finibus, II# Sed de hoc (magna enim res est) alio loco pluribus; nunc ad propositum.

*120* Quem ad modum igitur, si quando ea, quae videtur[377] utilitas, honestati repugnat, diiudicanda res sit, satis est supra disputatum. Sin autem speciem utilitatis etiam voluptas habere dicetur, nulla potest esse ei cum honestate coniunctio. Nam, ut tribuamus aliquid voluptati, condimenti fortasse non nihil, utilitatis certe nihil habebit.

*121* Habes a patre munus, Marce fili, mea quidem sententia magnum, sed perinde erit, ut acceperis. Quamquam hi tibi tres libri inter Cratippi commentarios tamquam hospites erunt recipiendi; sed, ut, si ipse venissem Athenas (quod quidem esset factum, nisi me e medio cursu clara voce patria revocasset), aliquando me quoque audires, sic, quoniam his voluminibus ad te profecta vox est mea, tribues iis[378] temporis quantum poteris, poteris autem, quantum voles. Cum vero intellexero te hoc scientiae genere gaudere, tum et praesens tecum propediem, ut spero, et, dum aberis, absens loquar.

Vale igitur, mi Cicero, tibique persuade esse te quidem mihi carissimum, sed multo fore cariorem, si talibus monitis[379] praeceptisque laetabere.

[372] _viris_ c p, Edd.; _veris_ A B H b.

[373] _sicuti_ L c, Edd.; _sicut id_ A B H a b.

[374] _dolore. Et_ Müller, Heine; _dolore: ut_ MSS., Bt.;
_dolore. Ut_ Ed.

[375] _expetantur_ A, Edd.; _expectantur_ B a; _exspectantur_
c.

[376] Omitted by Muretus; bracketed by Heine, Ed., et al.

[377] _videtur_ c, Edd.; _videretur_ B H a b; _viderentur_ A.

[378] _iis_ Edd.; _his_ A B H a b; _hijs_ c.

[379] _monitis_ Lambinus, Edd.; _monumentis_ A B H a b;
_monimentis_ c.

#Apparent Expediency _vs._ Temperance.#

*116* XXXIII. We have still left our fourth division, comprising propriety, moderation, temperance, self-restraint, self-control.

Can anything be expedient, then, which is contrary to such a chorus of virtues? And yet the Cyrenaics, adherents of the school of Aristippus, and the philosophers who bear the name of Anniceris find all good to consist in pleasure and consider virtue praiseworthy only because it is productive of pleasure. Now that these schools are out of date, Epicurus has come into vogue--an advocate and supporter of practically the same doctrine. Against such a philosophy we must fight it out "with horse and foot," as the saying is, if our purpose is to defend and maintain our standard of moral rectitude.

#The fallacy of Epicureanism.#

*117* For if, as we find it in the writings of Metrodorus, not only expediency but happiness in life depends wholly upon a sound physical constitution and the reasonable expectation that it will always remain sound, then that expediency--and what is more, the highest expediency, as they estimate it--will assuredly clash with moral rectitude. For, first of all, what position will wisdom occupy in that system? The position of collector of pleasures from every possible source? What a sorry state of servitude for a virtue--to be pandering to sensual pleasure! And what will be the function of wisdom? To make skilful choice between sensual pleasures? Granted that there may be nothing more pleasant, what can be conceived more degrading for wisdom than such a rôle?

Then again, if anyone hold that pain is the supreme evil, what place in his philosophy has fortitude, which is but indifference to toil and pain? For however many passages there are in which Epicurus speaks right manfully of pain, we must nevertheless consider not what he says, but what it is consistent for a man to say who has defined the good in terms of pleasure and evil in terms of pain.

And further, if I should listen to him, I should find that in many passages he has a great deal to say about temperance and self-control; but "the water will not run," as they say. For how can he commend self-control and yet posit pleasure as the supreme good? For self-control is the foe of the passions, and the passions are the handmaids of pleasure.

#Epicureanism and the Cardinal Virtues.#

*118* And yet when it comes to these three cardinal virtues, those philosophers shift and turn as best they can, and not without cleverness. They admit wisdom into their system as the knowledge that provides pleasures and banishes pain; they clear the way for fortitude also in some way to fit in with their doctrines, when they teach that it is a rational means for looking with indifference upon death and for enduring pain. They bring even temperance in--not very easily, to be sure, but still as best they can; for they hold that the height of pleasure is found in the absence of pain. Justice totters or rather, I should say, lies already prostrate; so also with all those virtues which are discernible in social life and the fellowship of human society. For neither goodness nor generosity nor courtesy can exist, any more than friendship can, if they are not sought of and for themselves, but are cultivated only for the sake of sensual pleasure or personal advantage.

Let us now recapitulate briefly.

#Sensual pleasure and moral rectitude incompatible.#

*119* As I have shown that such expediency as is opposed to moral rectitude is no expediency, so I maintain that any and all sensual pleasure is opposed to moral rectitude. And therefore Calliphon and Dinomachus, in my judgment, deserve the greater condemnation; they imagined that they should settle the controversy by coupling pleasure with moral rectitude; as well yoke a man with a beast! But moral rectitude does not accept such a union; she abhors it, spurns it. Why, the supreme good, which ought to be simple, cannot be a compound and mixture of absolutely contradictory qualities. But this theory I have discussed more fully in another connection; for the subject is a large one. Now for the matter before us.

*120* We have, then, fully discussed the problem how a question is to be decided, if ever that which seems to be expediency clashes with moral rectitude. But if, on the other hand, the assertion is made that pleasure admits of a show of expediency also, there can still be no possible union between it and moral rectitude. For, to make the most generous admission we can in favour of pleasure, we will grant that it may contribute something that possibly gives some spice to life, but certainly nothing that is really expedient.

#Conclusion.#

*121* Herewith, my son Marcus, you have a present from your father--a generous one, in my humble opinion; but its value will depend upon the spirit in which you receive it. And yet you must welcome these three books as fellow-guests, so to speak, along with your notes on Cratippus's lectures. But as you would sometimes give ear to me also, if I had come to Athens (and I should be there now, if my country had not called me back with accents unmistakable, when I was half-way there), so you will please devote as much time as you can to these volumes, for in them my voice will travel to you; and you can devote to them as much time as you will. And when I see that you take delight in this branch of philosophy, I shall then talk further with you--at an early date,[CH] I hope, face to face--but as long as you are abroad, I shall converse with you thus at a distance.

Farewell, my dear Cicero, and be assured that, while you are the object of my deepest affection, you will be dearer to me still, if you find pleasure in such counsel and instruction.

[CH] But Cicero never saw his son Marcus again.

INDEX

References are to Book and Section; all dates, given in parentheses (...), are B.C.

Academicians.
1. adherents of the New Academy (_q.v._);
their right to teach ethics, I, 6;
attitude toward knowledge, II, 7;
Cicero's philosophy, II, 1-8.
2. adherents of the Old Academy, III, 20.

Academy,
1. the Older, a school of philosophy founded by Plato and so called
from its home;
their doctrine of ideas, III, 76, 81;
the pre-existence and immortality of the soul;
monotheism;
the goodness of God;
striving after His perfection.
2. the New, a modification of the Old, sceptical, anti-dogmatic,
eclectic, III, 20.

Accius, Lucius, a tragic poet (born 170). His tragedies were mostly
imitations from the Greek. Cicero knew him personally;
quotes from him, III, 84, 102, 106.

Acilius;
Gaius Acilius Glabrio (tribune, 197);
interpreter, when Carneades, Diogenes, and Critolaus came to Rome;
author of History of Rome, III, 115.

Admiration, how won with dignity, II, 31 fg.

Aeacidae, descendants of Aeacus (_q.v._), the father of Peleus and
Telamon and grandfather of Achilles and Ajax, I, 38.

Aeacus, son of Zeus (Jupiter) and king of Aegina (_q.v._);
renowned for his justice and piety, I, 97;
after his death he became with Minos and Rhadamanthus judge in Hades.

Aedileship, cost of, II, 57-60.

Aegina, an island in the Saronic Gulf, a dangerous rival to Athens,
directly in front of Piraeus and only twelve miles away, III, 46;
unjustly appropriated by Athens (429), III, 46.

Aeginetans, the people of Aegina (_q.v._).

Aelius;
_see_ Tubero.

Aemilius;
_see_ Paulus and Scaurus.

Aequians, a warlike mountain tribe on the upper Anio, warring against
Rome (till 304), I, 35.

Aesopus, Claudius, an intimate friend of Cicero, Rome's greatest tragic
actor, I, 114.

Africa, the province in which Carthage was, I, 112 (Thapsus);
III, 99 (Carthage).

Africanus;
_see_ Scipio.

Agamemnon, leader of the war against Troy;
when detained at Aulis he sacrificed his daughter Iphigenia to save
the expedition, III, 95. For this he was slain on his return from
Troy by his wife Clytaemnestra.

Agesilaus, king of Sparta (398-360);
waged war in Asia (396-394), victor at Coronea, saviour of Sparta
after Mantinea (362); II, 16.

Agis IV, king of Sparta (244-240);
attempted to re-establish the institutions of Lycurgus and reform
property abuses;
put to death through organized wealth, II, 80.

Agrarian Laws, a menace to the stability of the government, II, 78-83.

Agriculture, impossible without man, II, 12;
man's noblest calling, I, 151.

Agrigentum, a city on the south coast of Sicily, once "the most
beautiful city of mortals," ruled by Phalaris (560), II, 26.

Ajax, son of Telamon; could brook no wrong, went mad, and committed
suicide when the arms of Achilles were awarded to Odysseus,
I, 113;
rebuked Odysseus, III, 98.
Subject of a tragedy by Ennius, I, 114.

Albucius, Titus, an Epicurean;
praetor in Sardinia (105);
prosecuted for extortion, II, 50.

Alexander, the Great (356-323), son of Philip of Macedon, II, 16, 48;
greater than his father in achievement, inferior in courtliness,
I, 90;
governor of Macedonia (340), II, 53;
conquered Greece (338-335), subdued Asia (334-331), Egypt (331),
invaded India (329-327), founded Alexandria and other cities, and
died of a drunken debauch (I, 90).

Alexander, tyrant of Pherae (369);
brother, son-in-law, and successor of Jason (_q.v._), defeated and
slew Pelopidas of Thebes at Cynocephalae (364);
murdered by his wife and her three brothers, II, 25, 26.

Alexandria, the metropolis of Egypt at the mouth of the Nile;
founded by Alexander (332);
centre of wealth (II, 82);
grain market, III, 50.

Alps, the mountains between Italy and further Gaul, II, 28.

Ambition, a cause of injustice, I, 25-26, 46, 65;
of moral wrong, III, 82;
of treason, III, 82-83;
the foe of freedom, I, 68; II, 28.

Amusements, wholesome, I, 103-104.

Anger, never excusable, I, 89.

Anio, the Sabine river, tributary to the Tiber;
the battle on (340), which gave Rome supremacy over all Latium,
III, 112.

Anniceris, of Cyrene (4th century), a successor of Aristippus;
his school a cross between the Epicurean and the Cyrenaic: he denied
that pleasure was merely absence of pain;
he held that every act had its own distinct purpose and that the
virtues are good in themselves;
his teachings were not permanent, III, 116.

Antigonus, one of Alexander's generals, governor of Asia (323-301),
king of Asia (306-301);
father of Demetrius Poliorcetes and Philip, II, 48.

Antiope, mother of Amphion and Zethus, by whom she was saved from the
persecutions of her former husband Lycus and his wife Dirce;
her vengeance on Dirce drove her mad;
subject of a tragedy of Pacuvius, I, 114.

Antipater, vice-regent of Macedon (334);
father of Cassander, II, 48.

Antipater, of Tarsus (2nd century), pupil and successor of Diogenes of
Babylonia;
teacher of Panaetius;
his ethical teachings, III, 51-55, 91.

Antipater, of Tyre (1st century), friend of Cato the younger;
a Stoic, II, 86.

Antonius, Marcus, the famous orator (143-87), II, 49;
advocate, III, 67;
father of Cicero's colleague and grandfather of the triumvir.

Apelles, of Cos (4th century), the greatest painter of his age;
court painter to Alexander the Great;
his masterpiece was a Venus rising from the sea;
another Venus left unfinished, III, 10.

Apollo, god of the light of day;
giver of oracles at Pytho, II, 77.

Appetite, subject to Reason, I, 101-103, 132, 141.

Appius Claudius Pulcher, father of Gaius, II, 57.

Aquilius;
Gaius Aquilius Gallus, famous jurist;
Cicero's colleague in the praetorship;
author of formulae on criminal fraud, III, 60-61.

Aquilius, Manius, consul (101) with Marius;
victorious in the Servile War in Sicily;
prosecuted (98) but acquitted, II, 50.

Aratus, of Sicyon, soldier and statesman (271-213), removed the tyrant
Nicocles (251) and averted financial ruin, II, 81, 82;
leader of the Achaean League;
poisoned by order of Philip of Macedon.

Areopagites, members of the Council of Areopagus.

Areopagus, "Mars Hill," a spur of the Acropolis, seat of the highest
court of Athens;
the court itself, with powers of senate and supreme court, reorganized
and enlarged in function by Solon, I, 75.

Arginusae, a group of islands off the coast of Asia Minor, near Lesbos,
scene of the victory of the Athenian fleet (406), I, 84.

Argos, the chief city of Argolis, II, 81.

Aristides, "the Just," III, [16], 49, 87;
fought at Marathon (490), Salamis (480), and commanded the Athenians
at Plataea (479);
exiled (483) because his policies clashed with those of Themistocles.

Aristippus, of Cyrene (flourished 370), founder of the Cyrenaic school,
III, 116;
disciple of Socrates, but taught that the chief end of man was to get
enjoyment from everything (hedonism), to subject all things and
circumstances to himself for pleasure;
but pleasure must be the slave not the master;
good and bad identical with pleasure and pain; I, 148.

Aristo, of Chios (3rd century), a Stoic philosopher, pupil of Zeno;
he taught indifference to externals, nothing good but virtue, nothing
evil but vice;
his theories rejected, I, 6.

Aristotle (385-322), disciple of Plato and teacher of Alexander the
Great;
founder of the Peripatetic school;
greatest of philosophers, master of all knowledge--physics,
metaphysics, natural philosophy, ethics, politics, poetics,
sociology, logic, rhetoric, etc.; II, 56; III, 35;
might have been a great orator, I, 4.

Arpinates, the people of Arpinum, owners of public lands, I, 21.

Arpinum, a town in Latium, birthplace of Cicero and Gaius Marius, I, 21.

Athenians, the people of Athens, I, 75, 84;
their cruel subjugation of Aegina, III, 46;
left their homes to fight at Salamis, III, 48;
political strife, I, 86;
high moral principles of, III, 49, 55.

Athens, II, 64, 86; III, 55, 87;
the intellectual and artistic centre of the world;
led Greece in the Persian wars (490-479);
humbled by Sparta (404);
the university city of the Roman world, I, 1; III, 6, 121.

Atilius;
_see_ Regulus.

Atilius;
Sextus Atilius Serranus, consul (136), III, 109.

Atreus, son of Pelops and father of Agamemnon and Menelaus, murderer of
his half-brother Chrysippus and of his brother Thyestes's
children;
murdered by his nephew Aegisthus;
a fruitful theme for tragedy, I, 97; III, 106.

Attic, belonging to Attica, the province in which Athens is situated;
Attic comedy, the comedy of Aristophanes, Eupolis, Menander, etc.,
I, 104.

Avarice, the great temptation, II, 38, 77;
the root of evil, III, 73-75;
due to delusion as to expediency, III, 36;
avoided by the statesman, II, 76-77;
contrary to all law, III, 21-23;
_see also_ Covetousness.

Babylonia, the district around Babylon at the head of the Persian Gulf,
III, 51.

Bardulis, king of Illyria, conquered a large part of Macedonia from
Perdiccas, the brother and predecessor of Philip;
defeated and slain by Philip (358);
called a "brigand," because his career did not tend to promote
civilization, II, 40.

Basilus, Lucius Minucius, otherwise unknown;
perhaps Sulla's lieutenant, III, 73-74.

Beauty, physical, I, 98, 126;
types of, I, 130.

Beneficence;
_see_ Generosity.

Bribery, in Rome, II, 21-22, 75.

Brutus, Lucius Junius, led the Romans to expel the Tarquins;
helped by Collatinus, who shared with him the first consulship (509),
III, 40.

Brutus, Marcus Junius, an eminent jurist, one of the three founders of
the civil law;
father of "the Accuser," II, 50.

Brutus; Marcus Junius Brutus Accusator, orator and vigorous prosecutor,
son of the preceding, II, 50.

Caelian Hill, the south-east hill of Rome, III, 66.

Caesar, Gaius Julius, son of Lucius Caesar Strabo Vopiscus, candidate
for the consulship (88), slain by Marius (87);
poet and orator, I, 108, 133.

Caesar, Gaius Julius (100-44), consul (59), in Gaul (58-50), conquered
Pompey at Pharsalus (48), dictator (48-44), assassinated (44);
orator, statesman, scholar, soldier;
despot, II, 2;
tyrant, I, 112; II, 23-28, 83;
confiscator, I, 43; II, 84;
enslaver of Rome, III, 85;
treatment of Marseilles, II, 28;
a victim of depraved ambition, I, 26; III, 83;
a conspirator with Catiline, his love of wrong, II, 84;
deserved his death, III, 19, 32, 82.

Caesar, Lucius Julius, father of the Dictator, I, 108.

Callicratidas, succeeded Lysander as admiral of the Spartan fleet,
I, 109;
defeated Conon, took Lesbos, lost the battle and his life at Arginusae
(406), I, 84.

Calliphon, a Greek philosopher, probably a disciple of Epicurus, taught
that the supreme good was a union between moral rectitude and
pleasure, III, 119.

Calpurnius;
Lucius Calpurnius Piso Frugi;
_see_ Piso.

Calpurnius;
Publius Calpurnius Lanarius;
_see_ Lanarius.

Calypso, the nymph of Ogygia, who kept Odysseus (Ulysses) with her seven
years, I, 113.

Campus (Martius), the open plain next to the Tiber outside the north
wall of Rome;
playground and drillground, I, 104.

Canius, Gaius, a Roman knight, III, 58-60.

Cannae, a town on the Aufidus in Apulia, scene of Hannibal's
overwhelming defeat of the Romans (216), I, 40; III, 47, 113.

Capitolium, the Capitoline Hill, between the forum and the Tiber, the
citadel of Rome, with the temple of Jupiter and Good Faith,
III, 104;
place of augury, III, 66.

Carthage, once a mighty city, on the north central coast of Africa,
III, 99, 100;
the most formidable commercial and military rival of Rome;
conquered by Rome in the First Punic War (264-241), I, 39;
Second Punic War (219-202), I, 40; III, 47;
destroyed in the Third (149-146), I, 35; II, 76.

Carthaginians, the people of Carthage, I, 39, 108; III, 99, 110, 113;
treacherous, III, 102;
cruel, III, 100, 102;
treaty-breaking, I, 38.

Cassander, son of Antipater, disinherited by his father, gained the
throne of Macedonia (306) by wars and murders (319-301), II, 48.

Cato, Marcus Porcius, the Censor (or Major, the Elder, I, 37) (234-149),
author, I, 104; III, 1;
orator, III, 104;
soldier, served in Second Punic War (217-202);
statesman, responsible for the destruction of Carthage (146), I, 79;
"the Wise," III, 16;
consul (195);
censor (184);
stalwart champion of the simple life and stern morals, II, 89;
bitterly opposed luxury and Greek culture; yielded in old age.

Cato, Marcus Porcius, son of the preceding;
jurist;
served under Paulus in Macedon (168), I, 37;
[under Marcus Popilius Laenas in Liguria (172), I, 36].

Cato, Marcus Porcius, grandson of the Censor and father of Cato
Uticensis, III, 66.

Cato;
Marcus Porcius Cato Uticensis (95-46), son of the preceding and
great-grandson of the Censor;
a Stoic philosopher;
orator;
soldier, I, 112;
defeated at Thapsus (46);
judge, III, 66;
stern and unyielding as his great-grandfather, I, 112; III, 88;
his suicide, I, 112;
close friend of Cicero (II, 2); III, 88.

Catulus, Quintus Lutatius, half-brother of Julius Caesar Strabo, I, 133;
orator;
scholar, I, 133;
author;
soldier;
consul with Marius (102) in the war against the Cimbri (101);
gentleman, I, 109;
committed suicide to escape the proscriptions of Marius (87).

Catulus, Quintus Lutatius, son of the preceding, defeated Lepidus at the
Milvian bridge;
statesman, I, 76;
scholar, I, 133.

Caudium, a little town in the mountains of Samnium;
near it are the Caudine Forks, the scene of the disastrous battle
(321); III, 109; (II, 79).

Celtiberians, a powerful people of central Spain, opposed Rome in Second
Punic War, were reduced in the Numantian War (134), submitted on
the death of Sertorius (72), I, 38.