Chapter XXXIV: THE REIGN OF VICTORIA (continued) (1)

France in 1870--The Ollivier Ministry--Diminution of Imperial
Prestige--Constitutional Reforms submitted to the Popular
Vote--Resignation of Daru and Buffet--The _Plébiscite_--The Military
Vote--Lull in European Affairs-The Hohenzollern Incident--The
Duc de Gramont's Speech--Excitement in France--The Candidature
withdrawn--Benedetti at Ems--His Second Interview with King
William--The Alarmist Telegram--War declared at Paris--Efforts of
the British Government--Bismarck divulges a supposed Franco-German
Treaty--Benedetti's Explanation--Earl Russell's Speech--Belgian
Neutrality guaranteed--Unpreparedness of the French Army--Hopes
of Alliances--The Emperor's Plans--Saarbrück--Weissenburg--The
Emperor partially resigns Command--Wörth--MacMahon
at Châlons--Spicheren--The Palikao Ministry--Bazaine
Generalissimo--Battle of Borny--Mars-la-Tour--Gravelotte--English
Associations for the Sick and Wounded--Palikao's Plan--MacMahon's
Hesitation--De Failly's Defeat--MacMahon resolves to
Fight--Sedan--The Surrender--Napoleon and his Captors--Receipt
of the News in Paris--Impetuosity of Jules Favre--A Midnight
Sitting--Jules Favre's Plan--Palikao's Alternative--Fall of the
Empire--The Government of National Defence--Suppression of the Corps
Législatif--The Neutral Powers: Great Britain, Austria, and Italy.

At his usual New Year's Day reception (the 1st of January, 1870) the Emperor Napoleon expressed himself to the diplomatic body as highly satisfied with the relations existing between his Government and all Foreign Powers. He added, "The year 1870, I am sure, cannot but consolidate this general agreement, and tend to the increase of concord and civilisation." So it might easily have done, had not the rise or fall of his own prestige, and that of his family, been matters of much greater importance in the Emperor's mind--notwithstanding these fine words--than the peace of Europe and the happiness of France.

M. Ollivier, having succeeded in inducing several public men of a higher stamp than had ever before served the Emperor--notably Count Daru and M. Buffet--to join him in the effort that he declared himself resolved to make to give real political liberty to France, appeared before the Chamber with his Ministry fully constituted on the 3rd of January. But these honest politicians of the Left Centre--these men of honour, and character and known antecedents--must have felt considerable surprise, not to say mistrust, when they found what sort of persons they were associated with in the Government and in what hand the executive force of the Empire really lay. Marshal Lebœuf was continued in the post of Minister of War; and courtiers like Marshal Vaillant, the Duc de Gramont, and General Fleury knew the Emperor's secrets and influenced his determinations much more than his responsible Ministers. M. Ollivier himself was a vain, impetuous man, abounding in self-confidence, but lacking in self-respect,--who was dazzled by the attentions shown him by the Emperor, and believed that he had converted his master to Liberal principles; whereas his master did but make a tool of him all along, and in the end caused him to lose the respect of everyone.

Although the country was materially prosperous, the popularity, and therefore the stability, of the Empire had greatly diminished in the last five years. With the temper that ruled in the breasts of French politicians, the aggrandisement of a neighbouring State was necessarily regarded as a check to the policy and a kind of outrage to the feelings of France. Even so moderate a writer as Jules Favre seemed to think that if the candidature of Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern had not been withdrawn when it was, the elevation of a Prussian prince to the throne of Spain would have constituted a real _casus belli_ for France. The line of French thought would appear to be this: "Prussia, by annexing a number of provinces without our consent, and not offering us a share, has brought herself relatively nearer to us in power than she was before, and has thereby done us a grievous wrong; if now the ambitious House of Brandenburg, not content with this provoking increase of power, should try to seat one of its princes on the throne--even though it be but a revolutionary throne--of Spain, we Frenchmen will not submit to it; our feelings will boil over; and we must go to war rather than allow it." It is true these things were little felt by the working and trading millions, to whom "peace was their dear delight;" yet even to them a little "glory" now and then was necessary in order to embellish their existence; and, moreover, the Emperor was a man of ideas, knew the French people, and could calculate the force of epigrams and the undermining power of a hostile sentiment. Certainly he could not afford, nor could the Empire afford, to lose any more _prestige_. Yet at this very moment an incident of the most damaging and discreditable character covered the name of the Bonapartes with infamy, namely, the death of the journalist Victor Noir at the hands of the Emperor's ruffianly cousin Pierre, and the latter's acquittal before the High Court of Justice at Tours.

The position of the Government was strange and precarious; no one seemed exactly to understand it: with the exception of the extreme parties--the courtiers on one side, and the "Irreconcilables" on the other--all the actors on the political stage were moving they knew not precisely whither. M. Ollivier on one occasion (February 23rd) announced that the Government disapproved of the system of official candidatures, and would no more use pressure at the elections. No intelligence could be more unwelcome to a large proportion of the members on the Right, who had owed their seats to Government pressure, and knew that without it they had no chance of being re-elected. A split therefore began to develop itself in the ranks of the majority. But the Emperor still continued to support Ollivier and to play his Liberal game. His instincts and opinions were without doubt genuinely Liberal; and his life was consumed in the attempt to reconcile the gratification of these instincts with the conservation of his dynasty. And yet there must have been something in the apologetic tone that Ollivier often assumed in the Chamber, which must have been a little galling to Napoleon's pride. The Emperor resolved to teach his Liberal supporters a lesson and at the same time to reimpress a large and awkward fact on the minds of his enemies--namely, that he and his system were the choice of France. He instructed M. Ollivier (March 21st) to prepare a _Senatus Consultum_ for the redistribution of powers between the two branches of the Legislature, so that the Senate--the less popular body--should be curtailed of many privileges which it had before enjoyed; while the Corps Législatif--the more popular body--would have its powers extended, especially by giving it the right of originating all money Bills. M. Ollivier introduced the measure into the Senate on the 26th of March. But a few days later he was startled on being informed by the Emperor, that since, in his opinion, the new constitutional changes involved a departure from the basis that the popular vote had ratified in 1852, he was resolved to submit them also to the ordeal of universal suffrage. Ollivier remonstrated vainly against this decision: the Emperor stood firm; and the Minister, either not seeing or not wishing to see the vast difference that his consent made in his position, agreed to continue at the head of affairs and arrange the machinery of the _plébiscite_.

But Count Daru and M. Buffet, more clear-sighted and self-respecting than their flighty colleague, refused to have anything to do with a _plébiscite_. For the meaning of it was simply this--that the popular vote covered everything, and was itself the source of right and legality; that France had no right to liberty and just government unless the masses voted to that effect; and that similarly the _plébiscite_ of 1852, having sanctioned a system that arose out of perjury and violence, had made that system immaculate and unquestionable. In taking office, Count Daru and M. Buffet had never intended so to commit themselves; and they now accordingly resigned their _bureaux_. The Duc de Gramont, a courtier, received the charge of the Foreign Office in succession to Count Daru.

In resorting again to the device of a _plébiscite_, we cannot doubt that the Emperor had one main object in view--increased stability. The tide of Liberalism, he felt, was continually pushing him onward; piece by piece, the system of administration on which he had ruled France for eighteen years was giving way to its assault; and then, as he had once before said to M. Ollivier, "one always falls on the side on which one leans." Feeling the advances of age--conscious that his powers both of body and mind were being undermined by a harassing and incurable malady--he became more than ever desirous to secure the peaceable transmission of power to his son. If all France could be got to ratify the changes that were now being made in the system of government as decisively as it ratified his assumption of power after the _coup d'état_ of 1851, surely the dynasty might then breathe freely. One would have thought that the friendship and the pledged word of two or three leading generals would have offered a more substantial security for the succession of his son than the illusory test of a _plébiscite_. Perhaps, however, the Emperor had by this time half convinced himself that a popular vote, taken on a matter which the masses cannot properly judge of, was an honest and lawful mode of devolving power, and also a mode that imparted a peculiar strength and durability to the decision arrived at. The vote was taken in all the departments of France, and separately in the army and navy, with the following result: _Oui_, seven millions of civilian votes, and three hundred and nine thousand in the army and navy; _Non_, one million and a half (within five thousand) of civilian votes, and fifty-two thousand in the army and navy.

When, in the autumn of 1852, the Emperor demanded from the popular voice a condonation of the past and a sanction for the future, the Ayes numbered nearly 8,000,000, the Noes only 253,000. The returns of the voting in 1870 marked a notable progress of dissatisfaction since the commencement of the Empire. But it is known that the nature of the military vote was that which chiefly disquieted the Emperor. These fifty thousand soldiers who, in spite of the restraints of discipline and the ties of self-interest, had, by their "Noes," expressed their disapproval of the Imperial system, could not but be regarded as the more active and intelligent spirits in the army, who were more likely, unless their aims were attained, to estrange from the Empire the still loyal majority, than to be absorbed in that majority themselves. What, then, were their aims? In a warlike nation, where the humblest day-labourer is possessed by the sentiment of military glory, the more stirring and ambitious characters in the army are prone to become impatient in a long-continued peace; and this feeling is likely to be enhanced when a neighbouring people, the rival and antagonist of the soldier's country in many an historic campaign, has been winning _spolia opima_, and gaining victories of extraordinary brilliancy. Such reflections must have agitated the mind of Napoleon as he thought of those fifty thousand "Noes;" and the conviction must have come upon him with a lurid clearness, that the only way to regain the loyalty of the army and to secure the succession of his son lay through war. When the ruler of a great nation, having the absolute control of its military resources, arrives at such a conclusion as this, an occasion is not likely to be long wanting.

But for a time everything wore a peaceful aspect, and the results of the _plébiscite_ were even considered on the whole to have strengthened the Emperor's position. It was a matter of course that, on receiving from M. Schneider (May 21st) the official report of the results of the voting, the Emperor should use the language of serenity and cheerful hope. "We must," he said, "more than ever look fearlessly forward to the future." In a debate on the Bill for fixing the army contingent for 1870, M. Ollivier, to whom the Emperor's mind was a sealed book, declared that the Government had no uneasiness whatever; that in no epoch was the peace of Europe more assured; and that no irritating question anywhere existed. When, after the death of Lord Clarendon, Earl Granville repaired to the Foreign Office to take up the portfolio of the deceased statesman, he was informed by Mr. Hammond, the Under-Secretary, that in all his experience he had never known so great a lull in foreign affairs. Two hours later, a telegram from Mr. Layard, the British Minister at Madrid, communicated the decision of the Spanish Council of State to offer the crown of Spain to Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern. On the same afternoon, the Duc de Gramont informed Lord Lyons, the British ambassador at Paris, that France would use her whole strength to prevent the election of a Prussian Prince, and he requested the co-operation of Britain in warding off this danger to the peace of Europe. On the following day (July 6th) the Duc de Gramont read in the Chamber a memorandum of the views of the Government, the unusual and menacing language of which spread alarm through all the capitals of Europe. "We do not believe," he said, "that respect for the rights of a neighbouring people obliges us to suffer a Foreign Power, by placing a prince upon the throne of Charles V., to disturb the European equilibrium to our disadvantage, and thus to imperil the interests and honour of France. We entertain a firm hope that this will not happen. To prevent it, we count upon the wisdom of the German nation and the friendship of the people of Spain; but in the contrary event, with your support and the support of the nation, we shall know how to do our duty without hesitation or weakness." These words were received with wild and enthusiastic cheering.

The candidature of Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern had been first broached so far back as March, 1869, but at that time it met with no encouragement at Berlin; while M. Benedetti, under instructions from the French Government, represented that such an election could only be viewed by France with serious dissatisfaction. Now, after an interval of more than a year, the project was resumed, and that in circumstances of apparent trickery and intrigue that called forth disapprobation, not in Paris only, but also in London. At a later date the Duc de Gramont suggested, though he had no means of proving, that the idea of reviving the candidature of Prince Leopold came to General Prim from a Prussian source; and he pledged his veracity for the existence of a letter written to Prim by Count Bismarck some time in June, 1870, in which the Prussian Chancellor said that the candidature of the Prince of Hohenzollern was in itself an excellent thing, that it must not be abandoned, and that at a given moment it might be serviceable. The duke declared that though he had never seen this letter himself, it had been read by well-known eminent men. These and other details were related by the Duc de Gramont in order to bear out his theory that Prussia, and in particular Count Bismarck, was the real originator of the war, by means of a series of studied provocations and affronts, designedly framed so as to awaken the warlike passions of the French people, and hurry them into a strife for which he knew that Prussia was far better prepared than France. Whatever may be thought of this theory, it is certain that the suddenness of the whole thing (for the Council of Ministers at Madrid decided on the 5th of July to propose the Prince of Hohenzollern to the Cortes, and to convoke that body for the purpose on the 20th of July) was viewed with suspicion and disfavour in Britain, where no prejudice existed either against Prussia or France. The excitable imagination of Frenchmen immediately developed the incident into a hundred painful and humiliating consequences. "Prussia," they thought, "desires first to isolate us in Europe, and then to crush us. Just as she ruined Austria in 1866 by placing her between two fires--herself on the north, and Italy on the south--so it is her present aim to place France also between two fires--North Germany on the one side, and Spain, with a Prussian prince on its throne and its army reorganised on the Prussian system, on the other."

But the candidature was not adhered to; and this fact, in the absence of more weighty evidence on the other side than has yet been adduced, suffices in the judgment of most men to saddle France with the chief responsibility of the rupture. Lord Granville exerted all his influence at Berlin to procure the withdrawal of the dangerous candidature; and M. Olozaga, the Spanish Minister at Paris (a statesman of great experience, and sincerely friendly to France), alarmed at the terrible excitement around him, took measures with the Prince Anthony of Hohenzollern, the father of Prince Leopold, to induce him to exercise his parental authority and bring about the renunciation by his son of the honour proposed for him. Could this be accomplished, it seemed certain that the storm would blow over, for the Duc de Gramont himself said to Lord Lyons, on the 8th of July, that the voluntary renunciation of his candidature by Prince Leopold would be "a most fortunate solution" of the difficulty. Prince Anthony accordingly wrote to General Prim renouncing all pretensions to the crown of Spain on the part of his son; Prim communicated the renunciation to Olozaga, and by him it was conveyed to the French Government. M. Ollivier was greatly elated, and went about in the lobbies of the French Chambers, telling his friends that all difficulty was at an end, "_l'incident est vidé_." But, in fact, he was not behind the scenes: to the secret councils of the Emperor, in which the issues of peace or war were discussed, he was not summoned.

Finding, as the result of its pressing representations since the first announcement of the candidature, that the Prussian Government declined all responsibility in regard to it, and professed to consider it as a matter that only concerned the King of Prussia in his capacity of head of the Hohenzollern family, the French Government instructed M. Benedetti to seek an interview with the King, who was then at Ems, and obtain from him an explicit disavowal of all share in the project. "We are in great haste," wrote Gramont, "for we must gain the start in case of an unsatisfactory reply, and commence the movements of the troops on Saturday in order to enter upon the campaign in a fortnight." M. Benedetti accordingly went to Ems, where he obtained an interview with the King on the 10th of July. At first, the King of Prussia said that he had certainly consented to the Prince of Hohenzollern's accepting the crown of Spain; and that having given his consent, it would be difficult for him to withdraw it. Two days later, the Prince's renunciation was known at Paris, and it became then a serious question with the French Government what course it should take. By the peremptory and unusual language that they had employed in the tribune, they had excited the passions and raised the expectations of the people to an extraordinary height, so that merely to accept the renunciation of the candidature appeared too lame and poor a conclusion to the tumult they had raised. The Duc de Gramont accordingly explained to Lord Lyons, on the 13th of July, that while the withdrawal of the candidature put an end to all question with Spain, from Prussia France had obtained literally nothing. M. Benedetti was ordered again to wait on the King and procure from him a guarantee that the project of raising his kinsman to the Spanish throne should not be renewed. The exact terms of the French demand, according to a memorandum placed by the Duc de Gramont in the hands of Lord Lyons, were these: "We ask of the King of Prussia to forbid the Prince of Hohenzollern to alter his present resolution. If he does so, the whole matter is at an end." M. Benedetti saw the King again at Ems, on the 13th, and endeavoured to obtain from him the assurance for the future required by the French Government. But to this the King, although M. Benedetti insisted warmly, and hinted at the serious consequences that might follow upon a refusal, declined to consent. Later in the day Benedetti sent to request another interview; but the King sent word that, as his mind was made up, and he had no other answer to give than that which he had given in the morning, it would be useless to re-open the question. This message--which seems to have been sent naturally and with perfect sincerity and in which M. Benedetti himself, as his despatches prove, saw no discourtesy--was so magnified and distorted as to create, on the minds of all who received the intelligence, the impression of an already consummated rupture. From Berlin the incident was officially telegraphed to most of the European Courts to the following effect--that M. Benedetti had accosted the King in the Kurgarten at Ems, and preferred his last extravagant demand; and that the King had thereupon turned round and ordered an aide-de-camp to tell M. Benedetti that there was no reply and that he would not receive him again.

In France the rumour flew that the King had affronted the French Ambassador and the ardour for war rose to fever heat. Immense crowds of Parisians gathered on the Boulevards (July 14th), singing the "Marseillaise" and eagerly discussing the chances of war. Three meetings of the Council of Ministers were held that day. At the first the peace party had the upper hand, but the voice of the Empress prevailed and at the third meeting, held shortly after midnight, the vote was given for war. At Berlin, on the same day, the King was received, on his return from Ems, by the acclamations of an immense multitude of persons, all animated by stern and enthusiastic resolution. On the next day occurred the memorable scene in the French Chambers which left no doubt remaining that the die was cast, and that the terrible eventuality of a war between France and Prussia was close at hand. The Duc de Gramont in the Senate, and M. Ollivier in the Corps Législatif, communicated a Ministerial message, in which it was stated that the King had refused to give the engagement required by France; that, notwithstanding this, in consequence of their desire for peace, they did not break off the negotiations; but that they had learned, to their surprise, that the King had refused to receive M. Benedetti and had communicated the fact officially to his Cabinet. "In these circumstances, we should have forgotten our dignity and also our prudence, had we not made preparations. We have prepared to maintain the war which is offered to us, leaving to each that portion of the responsibility that devolves upon him."

The Ministerial announcement produced an indescribable ferment in the Legislative Body. The majority applauded vehemently every expression that had a warlike sound; but there were a few sober-minded and independent men on the Opposition benches who endeavoured to gain a hearing,--who demanded that the despatches on which the action of the Government was founded should be laid before the Chamber,--who declared that since the withdrawal of the Hohenzollern candidature they could see no sufficient cause for war. Among these objectors the most prominent was M. Thiers. His remonstrances were met by passionate cries and invectives. "Offend me, insult me," he cried; "I am ready to endure anything to spare the blood of my countrymen, which you are ready to shed so imprudently. You will not reflect for a moment; you will not demand the contents of the despatches, upon which your judgment ought to be founded." "Keep your advice, we do not require it," exclaimed the violent Imperialist, M. Jérôme David. The sitting concluded with the vote of a credit of fifty millions of francs for extraordinary military expenses, as demanded by the Government, by a majority of 245 to 10 voices. On the next day, the Senate, with its President, M. Rouher, at their head, waited upon the Emperor with an address, conceived in the worst French taste, and marked by that appalling disregard of moral considerations which led a noble country into such terrible misfortunes. "Your Majesty," he said, "draws the sword, and the country is with you, trembling with indignation at the excesses that an ambition over-excited by one day's good fortune was sure, sooner or later, to produce." As a matter of fact the war was popular in some sixteen only of the eighty-seven Departments of France.

All through the period of nine days that intervened between the announcement of the French Government on the 15th of July and the speech made by the Duc de Gramont on the 6th, the British Government had laboured heartily and indefatigably for the preservation of peace. All was, however, in vain. The French Ministry had, by the needless publicity and _empressement_ which they had imported into the affair, raised such a tempest of passion and excitement, that soon neither they nor the Parisian public were in a condition to listen to reason. On the other hand, Count Bismarck, while remaining perfectly cool, was not disposed to take extraordinary pains to avert a struggle which he believed to be sooner or later inevitable, and which he was too well informed as to the comparative armaments of the two countries to view with apprehension.

The same spirit of rivalry and combativeness that impelled Count Bismarck in 1866, against the traditions of his country and the declarations of his whole life, to employ revolutionary agencies against Austria because they furnished him with a convenient weapon, now induced him, in contempt of the usages of men of honour and the _bienséances_ of diplomacy, to bring forth from some secret drawer in the Prussian Foreign Office a document that he rightly thought was calculated seriously to damage France and the Emperor in the judgment of the neutral States. On the 25th of July there appeared in the _Times_ what purported to be a textual copy of a project for a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, between France and Prussia. The paper containing it was communicated to the _Times_ from the Prussian Foreign Office and was stated to be in the handwriting of M. Benedetti. The Emperor and the King agreed to the following bases: That France should recognise all the Prussian acquisitions of 1866, and should engage not to oppose the incorporation of the South German States, with the exception of Austria, in the North German Confederation; and that the King, on his part, would facilitate for France the acquisition of Luxemburg by means of an indemnity to be paid to the King of Holland, and would also "lend, if need were, the support of his arms for the conquest of Belgium." At the reading of this audacious proposal, a sentiment of stupefaction came upon the English mind, succeeded by a feeling of lively indignation. But as further correspondence developed accurately what had occurred, the case against France assumed a less unfavourable aspect. On the 29th of July the Duc de Gramont transmitted to London a letter from Benedetti, containing the following explanation of the circumstances. In the first place, he pointed out, that, if the project was a villainy, there were evidently two parties to it; on the very face of the document it was manifest that Prussia was not more averse from entertaining the question of the absorption of Belgium than was France. Secondly, whereas Count Bismarck had stated that this was but one of many such schemes with which he was continually being pestered by the French Ambassador, Benedetti asserted that since 1866 he had had no communications with the Prussian Chancellor upon any matter of the kind; but that in that year, and particularly while the negotiations for the Treaty of Prague were going on, Bismarck, fearful lest France should be provoked by the annexation of Hanover, Frankfort, etc., to Prussia, laid several proposals of this nature before him and discussed them with apparent seriousness. On one such occasion, wishing to put the substance of the conversation in a tangible shape, Benedetti wrote, almost under the direction of Count Bismarck, the rough draft now made public by the Prussian Government; Bismarck took it from him, saying he would show it to the King; after that Benedetti saw and thought no more of it. But when the project was submitted to the Emperor, Benedetti added, he at once rejected it; and he believed that it was also rejected by the King of Prussia.

Whatever might be the exact balance of truth between the conflicting statements, the painful impression was left on the minds of English statesmen, that neither France nor Prussia would have much scruple about destroying the independence of Belgium; and that, if that independence were worth preserving, from the point of view both of the honour and of the interests of Great Britain, new guarantees for its maintenance had become necessary. It is a pleasure to record the manly stand taken on this question by Lord Russell (which was in marked contrast with his abandonment of Denmark, in 1864), when (August 2nd) the subject came up in the House of Lords. Britain's duty, he said, was clear. "It is not a question of three courses. There is but one course and one path--namely, the course of honour and the path of honour--that we ought to pursue. We are bound to defend Belgium. I am told that that may lead us into danger. Now, in the first place, I deny that any great danger would exist if this country manfully declared her intention to perform all her engagements and not to shrink from their performance." After saying that all these intrigues arose from the doubt that prevailed on the Continent whether Britain would adhere to her treaty engagements, he proceeded: "I am persuaded that if it is once manfully declared that England means to stand by her treaties, to perform her engagements--that her honour and her interests would allow nothing else--such a declaration would check the greater part of these intrigues, and that neither France nor Prussia would wish to add a second enemy to the formidable foe which each has to meet."

Being strongly urged forward by the expressions of opinion delivered both in and out of Parliament, Mr. Gladstone's Government acted on this critical occasion both promptly and skilfully. Earl Granville prepared the text of a treaty guaranteeing the independence of Belgium during the continuance of the war and twelve months afterwards, and proposed its acceptance, simultaneously, but separately, to the two belligerent Powers. The substantial proviso of the treaty was to this effect: "His Majesty [Emperor of the French, or King of Prussia] having declared that, in spite of the state of war existing between [France and North Germany], he is determined to respect the neutrality of Belgium as long as it shall be respected by [North Germany, or France], her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland declares, on her part, that if, during the continuance of hostilities, the [North German, or French] armies should violate that neutrality, she will be prepared to co-operate with [his Imperial Majesty, or his Prussian Majesty] with the view of defending, in such manner as shall be mutually agreed upon, by employing to that end her naval and military forces, and of maintaining, in conjunction with [his Imperial Majesty, or his Prussian Majesty], then and afterwards, the independence and neutrality of Belgium." The other contracting Power agreed to co-operate with Great Britain for the accomplishment of the same end. The treaty was to be in force during the continuance of the war between France and Germany, and for a term of twelve months after the ratification of any treaty of peace concluded between those Powers; after which time, the independence and neutrality of Belgium would continue, so far as the high contracting parties were respectively concerned, to be maintained, as heretofore, in accordance with the first article of the Quintuple Treaty of the 19th of April, 1839. This treaty was accepted and signed by Prussia immediately, and by France also, after a little hesitation. Its provisions slumbered indeed, but there is no reason to suppose that they were without effect. Had there been no such treaty, it is possible that, during the operations near the Belgian frontier which terminated in the capitulation of Sedan, the neutrality of the Belgian territory would have been forcibly violated by one or the other belligerent; the area over which the devastating effects of war were experienced would have been extended; and serious political complications, from which it would have been difficult for any one of the great Powers to hold aloof, must infallibly have supervened.

So much heat and haste had been apparent in the proceedings of the French Government since the first rise of the Hohenzollern incident that it was generally expected that very few days would pass after the formal declaration of war (July 19th) before the French Army of the North would be arrayed along the frontier of Rhenish Prussia, ready to take the field in overwhelming force. But day followed day and nothing decisive was done. It appears that the arrangements for mobilisation--especially in what relates to transport--were found to be extremely defective. In truth, the military system of France was rotten and honeycombed with abuses; wherever unexpected pressure was applied, it gave way. In the subordinate posts there were many excellent and honourable men--it needs but to mention such names as MacMahon, Trochu, and Vinoy to establish the fact--but the real power lay with the Emperor and his personal friends or favourites. He is said, after the first great disaster had occurred, to have had continually on his lips the words, "I have been deceived." Doubtless he had been deceived; "cooked" reports had been submitted to him; money received for substitutes, instead of being so applied, had gone no one knew where, and the regiments were disgracefully attenuated in consequence; jobbery and corruption, extending into every department, made every service on which the usefulness of soldiers depends less efficient by many degrees than it ought to have been. Thus it happened that it was not till quite the end of the month that a respectable French force was collected at the frontier, and it was in sore stress for provisions. Meanwhile, the Prussians silently mustered three powerful armies behind the Rhine, intending to fall with an irresistible onset, when the fitting moment should arrive, on the heedless and vainglorious foe. The Emperor left Paris on the 28th of July, accompanied by his son Louis, and assumed the chief command of the army at Metz on the following day.

Napoleon appears to have reckoned even to the last moment that dislike and jealousy of Prussia would move the South German Governments to separate their interests from hers in the great struggle that was impending, or at least to wait and see how events fell out before finally committing themselves. How--knowing as he did the existence of the secret treaties of 1866, by which Bavaria, Würtemberg, and Baden bound themselves to assist Prussia, if attacked--he could seriously entertain such a hope, it is not easy to understand. The Governments of those States, on this occasion in full sympathy with their subjects, were animated by a hearty indignation at the unwarrantable attack made on Germany and they speedily sent in their adhesions to Prussia. Their military contingents were assigned, under the supreme command of the King of Prussia, to the third of the great armies that were being formed for the protection of German interests. These armies furnished a grand total of 338,000 men, to which enormous force France could for the moment only oppose 200,000. Marshal Lebœuf unfortunately imagined that the Foreign Office had concluded alliances with Austria and Italy, and that a great part of the Prussian army would in consequence be detained on the southern frontier. He was justified to this extent that Austria was willing enough to wound Germany, but yet afraid to strike. Count Beust saw that an immediate participation of Austria in the war would involve the appearance of Russia in the field on the side of King William. He determined therefore to restrict himself for the present to armed mediation in concert with Italy and to that end advised Napoleon III. to place the Italians in possession of Rome. Here were obviously the materials for a triple alliance and affairs were further advanced on the 2nd of August when the Papal States were evacuated by the French Government. Austria and Italy, however, stipulated for the preliminary success of the French troops as a condition of their armed support, in which case they promised to assume a position of armed neutrality, then to demand the exact performance of the treaty of Prague, i.e. the independence of the South German States, and to take the field in the event of refusal by the 15th of September. According to the Duc de Gramont a draft treaty had actually been drawn up, but before it could be signed the French armies had been dispersed.

The Emperor's plan of campaign, as explained in a pamphlet which he drew up while at Wilhelmshöhe, was to draw together 150,000 men from Metz and 100,000 from Strasburg, and with a force of 250,000 men cross the Rhine at Maxan, between Rastadt and Spires, while his rear was covered by the advance of a reserve force of 50,000, under Marshal Canrobert, from Châlons to Metz. Marching towards Dresden, the Emperor hoped to meet and defeat the North German forces, and, being thus interposed between North and South Germany, to intimidate the South German Powers into an attitude of acquiescence while he followed up his advantage against Prussia, and endeavoured to break up the newly cemented and, as he fain would believe, fragile ties that united Prussia to the countries annexed in the last war. If Germany had been unready; if Bismarck had been no more far-seeing than Persigny, and Moltke no more vigilant than Lebœuf; lastly, if the Emperor could have disposed of a hundred thousand more men, the plan might have been promising, perhaps even feasible. But when the Emperor remembered the enormous strength of the Prussian armies in 1866, and reflected that the populations then annexed were instantly brought within the cords of the Prussian military system, it is wonderful (even supposing him to have been under a complete delusion as to the probable conduct of Bavaria and Würtemberg) that he did not see that 250,000 men--on paper--was an utterly inadequate force wherewith to attempt so vast an enterprise as that he meditated.

The 2nd Corps, under General Frossard, was at Forbach, close to the Prussian frontier, just within which, on the river Saar, was the flourishing little town of Saarbrück, held by a battalion of infantry and three squadrons of cavalry belonging to the 8th North German Corps (First Army). General Steinmetz had assumed the command of that army at Coblenz on the 28th of July, and at the beginning of August had concentrated it in a position where it covered Trèves, and guarded against any sudden inroad into the Rhine province on the side of Thionville. On the 2nd of August Frossard received orders to drive the Prussians out of Saarbrück. The action began at 10.30 A.M., and soon afterwards the Emperor, with the Prince Imperial, arrived on the ground from Metz. The Prussians, though greatly outnumbered, held their ground tenaciously, but were gradually pushed out of the villages to the south of Saarbrück, and finally compelled to evacuate the town and retreat to the wooded heights that look down upon it from the north. The French did not attempt to occupy the town, nor to dislodge the enemy from the heights beyond.

Forty-eight hours after the French made this unmeaning demonstration at Saarbrück, the concentration of the German armies was completed, and their heavy masses were ready to be moved down to and across the French frontier. To the Third Army was given the honour of striking the first blow--doubtless because in it were arrayed the contingents from the South German States, and Prussia desired that France and the world should be convinced without delay of the futility of all calculations that took German dissension for their basis. On the 3rd of August the Crown Prince sent orders from Spires to his corps commanders to advance upon Weissenburg, just across the Alsatian frontier. At this point MacMahon had stationed his second division, commanded by General Abel Douay, in order to cover his communications with the 5th Corps, under De Failly, which was stationed round Bitche. Douay's force, which did not exceed 12,000 men, was left absolutely without reinforcements. The French were outnumbered, probably two to one, but they had a very strong position, and their field guns and chassepôts scattered destruction through the German lines as they slowly forced their way up the height. At one o'clock the assailants were in possession of the castle of Geissberg, near the top of the hill. The leading brigade attacked from the eastward; the other, edging round to the left, and scaling the southern face of the hill, threatened to cut off the French from their line of retreat. Douay had been killed early in the action, and the officer who succeeded to the command, judging that further resistance was unadvisable, ordered a retirement.

On the day after the affair at Saarbrück the Emperor was exceedingly unwell, and the physicians would not allow him to quit his room. It was probably from a sense of great weakness that he came to the resolution of divesting himself of a portion of the responsibility of command, by appointing Marshal Bazaine to the command of the three corps (2nd, 3rd, and 4th) that formed the left wing of the Army of the Rhine, and Marshal MacMahon to that of the 1st; 5th, and 7th Corps, forming its right wing. This was carried out on the 5th, till which day Bazaine remained in ignorance of the Emperor's plan of campaign. The three corps that this order placed at the disposal of MacMahon--namely, his own at Strasburg and Hagenau, De Failly's at Bitche, and Félix Douay's at Belfort--would, if united, have formed an army of about 80,000 men. He wished to effect a concentration, but was overruled by the Emperor, who feared the political consequences of a retreat. Accordingly, in the course of the 5th, MacMahon drew up his army along the high ground to the west of the Sauer. In the first line were the three divisions of his own corps that had not yet been engaged; in the second line he placed the troops who had been beaten at Weissenburg, a division of the 7th Corps that had come up from Belfort and two brigades of cavalry, one of which consisted of two fine regiments of cuirassiers. De Failly was expected with his corps in the course of the day. On the 5th of August, the Crown Prince, still holding the 1st Bavarian Corps in reserve, moved the main body of his army, marching in four columns as before, from the Lauter towards the Sauer. At the headquarters of the Crown Prince no thought was entertained of fighting a battle on the next day, during which the Prince intended to have remained quietly at Sulz. But early on the morning of the 6th of August the impetuosity of the divisional commanders brought on a general battle, after the Germans had suffered severely for their rashness. Soon after twelve, the Crown Prince, finding that the troops already on the field were hotly engaged, and that the French showed no signs of an intention to retreat, determined to bring his whole force into action, in order to deal a crushing blow to an enemy whose greatly inferior numbers could not expect from any quarter to be adequately reinforced. A long cannonade ensued, to which the French, who were deficient in artillery, could not make an effective reply. Then Kirchbach ordered the advanced guard to storm Wörth, which was done about 12.30, and the victorious troops advanced up the hills on the left bank of the Sauer. Soon, however, they were brought to a stand by a biting fire from the French position and made no progress for a long time. A great artillery duel went on for hours on the centre and right of the line. About 11 A.M. the French right had made a forward movement across the Sauer, and drove the Germans out of Gunstett, but were unable to hold it long. Fresh troops continually coming up, General Bose moved his corps across the Sauer in support of Kirchbach; the Würtembergers also joined in this advance, and turning towards the north, after crossing the river, Prussians and Würtembergers steadily pressed forward, and took from the French the village of Elsasshausen about two o'clock; but the resistance was stubborn and the loss proportionately heavy. It was while the Germans were advancing by Elsasshausen that Michel's brigade, composed of two regiments of cuirassiers, made its celebrated but useless charge. With wild fury these devoted horsemen charged into the advancing masses, but the rapid discharges of the needle-gun smote and crushed their ranks, and not more than 150 unwounded men remained after the battle in the whole brigade. Froschweiler, the village to the north of Elsasshausen, attacked both from the south and from the east, was taken at 3.30. MacMahon, outnumbered and beaten, was now compelled to retreat. Keeping his centre and left pretty well together, he fell back on Niederbronn, where he found a division of De Failly's corps, which, through some telegraphic mistake, had not arrived in time to take part in the battle. These fresh troops checked the German pursuit. The French right, demoralised by defeat, and losing almost all its organisation, fled in headlong flight towards Hagenau and Strasburg.

On the day following the battle, MacMahon reached Saverne, on the Strasburg-Paris railway, and proceeded to despatch his troops to Nancy and Châlons. His only course now was to reorganise his army at the camp of Châlons, while Bazaine, with his portion of the Army of the Rhine, detained the enemy round Metz. De Failly, prevented from marching towards Metz by the rapid advance of the First and Second German Armies into French territory, in consequence of the success we are about to describe, fell back from Bitche in a southerly direction, struck the Strasburg-Paris railway, and brought his corps to join MacMahon. The remainder of the 7th Corps was brought up to Châlons soon afterwards from Belfort. The Crown Prince, before crossing the Vosges in pursuit of MacMahon, detached General Werder with the Baden division to invest and besiege Strasburg. General Beyer, the divisional commander, summoned General Uhrich, the governor of the fortress, to surrender, but of course with no result. The town was then invested (August 10th) and several regiments of Prussian Landwehr were presently added to the besieging force.

A second disaster happened on the same day as the battle of Wörth. On the previous day, General Frossard, commanding the 2nd Corps, withdrew his troops from the valley of the Saar to the heights of Spicheren, where his right rested on a difficult wooded country; on his left was the little town of Forbach and the railway to Metz. General Kameke, commanding a division of the 7th Corps (First Army), pushed troops over the Saar at Saarbrück on the morning of the 6th, who came into action with the French batteries on the Rothe Berg (a hill jutting out from the Spicheren plateau) about 11.30 A.M. From that time the battle raged with varying success all through the day till nightfall. Von Göben came up and took the command about three o'clock; about five the Prussians carried the greater part of the heights of Spicheren, though at a terrible cost of life. On the other hand, the French left, between six and seven, advanced along the railway from Stiring and drove back the Germans nearly to the Saar. The bravery of the French in this battle was conspicuous; the losses they inflicted on the Germans were far heavier than those they themselves suffered; and there seems little reason to doubt that with more clear-sightedness and determination on the part of Frossard, and more energetic co-operation on the part of Bazaine (who was at St. Avold with the 3rd Corps, about fifteen miles from Spicheren), or, perhaps, on the part of Bazaine's lieutenants, the Germans would have been repulsed with heavy loss. Frossard does not appear to have held the plateau with a sufficient force; and in a critical period of the action, when German reinforcements were coming up from all sides, he telegraphed to Bazaine, asking him to send him a regiment! It was not till towards six o'clock that he telegraphed to Bazaine to assist him with all the forces at his disposal; but it was then too late. The French were sadly demoralised by their defeat. Frossard retired upon Saargemund, and thence, with what was left of his corps, joined the army that Bazaine was collecting near Metz.

On that fatal Sunday (August 7th) the full truth concerning Wörth and Forbach was known at Paris. A telegram from the Emperor was published, admitting that the army had suffered reverses, but feebly adding, "_Tout peut se rétablir_" ("All may yet be regained"). An indescribable ferment agitated all minds and hearts. The cry in the streets was for a _levée en masse_, and the word "_déchéance_" ("deposition") was often heard. The Corps Législatif met on the 9th of August. Jules Favre and the party of the Left urged the Emperor's recall from the army, and the appointment of a committee with full power for the conduct of war. Ollivier, who showed little sense of the terrible gravity of the situation, spoke in defence of the Ministry, but his speech was received with vehement interruptions and loud denials, and the majority cared not now to screen him from the attacks of the Left. A middle course was taken. The Empress sent for the Count de Palikao (August 10th), and requested him to form a Ministry. He was in command of the military centre of Lyons when summoned to Paris by the Empress. He succeeded in forming a Ministry, in which Magne took charge of the Department of Finance; the Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne, of Foreign Affairs; and Palikao himself became the Minister of War. Vigorous measures were instantly taken to make timely preparation for the worst, in case the armies still in the field should not be able to prevent the Germans from marching upon Paris. General Trochu, a brave and honest soldier, but a little too rigid and positive in his opinions, was appointed to the command of the forces of Paris; a new war loan of one thousand millions of francs was set on foot; the ranks of the National Guard and Mobiles were filled; and great efforts were made to bring into Paris as large a supply of provisions as possible from the surrounding country.

After Forbach there was nothing to hinder the Germans from pushing forward their armies into France. The First and Second Armies, facing to the westward, marched in the direction of Metz--Steinmetz keeping to the north, and Prince Frederick Charles to the south, of the railway connecting Metz with Saarbrück. Bazaine on his part was doing his utmost to re-form and augment the French army round Metz. He was now possessed of uncontrolled authority; for Count Palikao, though he would not consent to Jules Favre's motion for the recall of the Emperor to Paris, lest the excited populace should rise and put a sudden end to the dynasty, wisely yielded on the main point, and prevailed upon the Emperor to resign the chief command.

Accordingly by an Imperial order of the 12th of August Bazaine was appointed generalissimo of the Army of the Rhine, with Colonel Jarras as his chief of the staff. Nevertheless, Napoleon, afraid to return to Paris, unwilling even to trust himself at the camp of Châlons, remained with the army and was the cause of much embarrassment and delay. Bazaine had now under his command the Imperial Guard, the 4th, 3rd, 2nd, and part of the 6th Corps, making a total of about 140,000 men. Finding that with his utmost efforts he could not bring together a force capable of coping with the First and Second German Armies in the field, Bazaine resolved to leave Metz for a time to the protection of its encircling forts and powerful garrison, and fall back towards Verdun and Châlons. The movements within the French lines, caused by the preparations for complying with this order, attracted the attention of General Steinmetz and brought on the battle of Borny. Prince Frederic Charles had moved with the Second Army to the southward, intending to cross the Moselle at Pont-à-Mousson and other places above Metz, and then seize the roads leading to Verdun and Paris. Steinmetz seems to have intended only a reconnaissance in force, but the eagerness of the German troops brought on an engagement along the whole line, some miles to the east of Metz, in which (August 14th) neither side gained a decided advantage, but a part of the French army was detained at Metz on the following day; which was the very thing that Steinmetz had desired. The German armies had but to cross the Moselle and Bazaine was caught in a trap.