Chapter I: THE REIGN OF VICTORIA (continued) (2)

The Turks, having no interest in the religious question, proposed various arrangements, which proved agreeable to neither party. When something like the basis of an agreement had been arranged, a strong letter from the Emperor Nicholas to the Sultan forced the Porte to retract it. Learning this, M. de Lavalette said that his Government, having embarked in the question, could not stop short under the dictation of Russia. The Russian Emperor would not desist from opposition at the dictation of France. Each presented himself to the Sultan, one with the treaty of 1740, the Charter of the Latins; the other with documents, antecedent and subsequent to that date, embodying concessions made to the Greeks. The Porte, desirous of satisfying both the powerful complainants, exhausted its ingenuity in devices, yielding now to Russian, now to French menaces, and looking keenly for assurances of support in the event of danger. The Turks consulted Lord Stratford de Redcliffe; but he was powerless to aid them, for his Government had determined to take no part. Nevertheless, he did his utmost to prevent precipitate action on all sides, on a question "involving little more than a religious sentiment, and the application of a treaty permitted to be more or less in abeyance for a century." He was only partially successful, for M. de Lavalette continued to talk of breaking off negotiations unless his demands were complied with, and M. de Titoff stood out against any alteration of the _status quo_. At length, at the beginning of 1852, by the exertions of M. de Lavalette, the questions at issue seemed to be settled, and the Porte embodied the whole of the arrangements respecting the Holy Places in an "imperial firman invested with a hatti-scherif." The Turkish Ministers hoped that both parties would be satisfied by concessions. This was a delusion, for the Porte in its trepidation gave conflicting pledges to the fighting embassies. In giving the assurance by letter which calmed for a time the abounding zeal of M. de Lavalette, the Porte promised that the firman should not be publicly read, but simply registered. The Russian _chargé d'affaires_ got wind of this, and insisted, with effect, that the firman should be read. M. de Lavalette, hearing probably that the Porte had promised M. de Titoff, months before, that the key of the "great door" of the church at Bethlehem should not be given to the Latins, grew very keen in his instructions to the French Consul to see that it was given up. M. de Lavalette became extremely violent. "He more than once," wrote Colonel Rose, the _chargé d'affaires_, in November, "talked of the appearance of a French fleet off Jaffa (in case the stipulations were not fulfilled), and once he alluded to a French occupation of Jerusalem, 'when,' he said, 'we shall have all the sanctuaries.'"

Nevertheless, the Turkish Government tried to appease France without offending Russia. In the autumn of 1852 there was a striking spectacle at Jerusalem. Afif Bey had been sent on a special mission to inform the contending Churches of the decisions arrived at in Constantinople. But Afif Bey did nothing except declare how desirous the Sultan was to gratify all classes of his subjects. The Russian Consul-General demanded the public reading of the firman, which was understood to declare the Latin claims to the shrines null and void. Afif Bey pretended not to know what firman was meant, then said he had no copy of it, then no directions to read it. Thus both parties were angered: the Latins because the key was withheld, and they were only allowed to celebrate mass once a year before "a schismatic altar"; the Greeks because the firman was not read. It was these proceedings, arising out of the irreconcilable hostility of Russia and France, which led to fresh threats from their respective envoys at the Porte. The Grand Vizier, driven hither and thither by the violence of the disputants, resolved, come what might, to make an end of the business. He gave up the keys to the Latins, and caused the firman to be read. Had there been sincerity on the part of the French or Russian Governments, here the matter should have ended; but neither had triumphed sufficiently over the other, and the quarrel did not come to a close.

FROM THE PAINTING BY THOMAS M. HEMY.

BY PERMISSION OF MESSRS. HENRY GRAVES & CO. LTD., PALL MALL, S.W.]

And here, at the beginning of December, 1852, we find the origin of that now famous demand for a protectorate over all the Greek Christians in Turkey, which, when advanced by Prince Menschikoff, led at once to war. The claim purported to be based on the Treaty of Kainardji, but that treaty expressly limited the Russian Protectorate to two chapels--one in the Russian Legation, the other a chapel to be built in Galata. This baseless demand irritated the French, frightened the Turks, and filled the English with apprehension. But it was not then pressed. Another incident occurred, showing the critical temper of the time. The Porte was at war with the tribes who inhabit Montenegro. Austria, affecting to see danger to herself in the continuance of a contest so near her frontier, sent Count Leiningen to Constantinople, with a peremptory demand for the cessation of the war. It is not improbable that this was a Russian project; for the Czar felt, or affected to feel, that Austria would do all he desired in the Eastern Question; and no sooner was the Austrian demand made, than he supported it. But the Porte, beset by enemies, determined wisely to satisfy Austria, and thus to deprive Russia of any pretext for hostilities on that score. Russia was baffled, but not diverted from her purpose; for the Emperor now began to be impassioned, to feel the sting of French rivalry, and to commit himself almost too deeply to recede. In vague, but menacing terms, he declared that the Porte should be required to fulfil its engagements with him, and to that end he set troops in motion. "It was necessary that the diplomacy of Russia should be supported by a demonstration of force," and he prepared for a violent struggle. Two _corps d'armée_, above 100,000 men, were ordered to march towards the frontier of the Turkish empire.

It was an anxious moment for statesmen; but the attention of the great European public was not turned towards the East. In England the strife of parties had led to the downfall of the Tories, and to the undisguised joy of the Czar Nicholas Lord Aberdeen became the head of a new Cabinet. The Emperor conceived vast hopes of support from the new British Government, with several members of whom, on his visit to England, he had discussed the Eastern Question; the British public looked for social reforms from a composite Cabinet which unquestionably included in itself the ablest servants of the State. If the people thought of danger, it was danger from France, for the Prince-President, to the intense indignation of the Czar, had made himself Emperor; and a desire to see a completion of economical reforms was mingled with a determination to look to the defences of the nation. Ministers were not, and could not be, blind to the perils which threatened peace; but, as will be seen, they placed an unfounded reliance on the personal honour of the Emperor Nicholas, and they did not appreciate the provocative policy of France. Yet whatever qualms of apprehension they may have felt, they carefully kept to themselves, and even so late as April, 1853, Lord Clarendon assured Parliament that as regarded Turkey there was no danger of the peace of Europe being disturbed.

Yet between the 1st of January and the 30th of April the British Government had become possessed of facts which should have clouded their sanguine anticipations. For the conflict, hitherto confined to Constantinople, was transferred for a time to Paris, London, and St. Petersburg, and did not improve by its extension. Lord Cowley suggested direct negotiations between France and Russia. The suggestion was adopted, but it only served to embitter the relations between the two Courts, and it was open to the objection that it took out of the hands of the Porte a question which nearly concerned its sovereignty. This was met by the device of requesting the Porte to sanction such an arrangement as the two Courts might recommend in common. It had no other result than the exchange of sharp observations between Count Nesselrode and General de Castelbajac. For Russia had determined on a totally different course. The Emperor resolved to treat directly with Turkey, and obtain from the Porte his demands.

The real policy of the Czar was steadily developing itself. It was on the 4th of February, 1853, that Count Nesselrode informed Sir Hamilton Seymour of the intention of the Czar to send Prince Menschikoff to Constantinople, and at the same time gave assurances that the Prince would be provided with instructions of a conciliatory nature; and that "although bred to arms," the negotiator was "animated by intentions the most pacific." A few days later Count Nesselrode again declared that the Prince's instructions, though "necessarily vague," were moderate; and he volunteered the further information that there would be no question of attempting to regain from the Latins any privileges which they might have acquired since the year before. Subsequent events showed what this studied moderation and vagueness were intended to cover, and how the Czar was aiming at larger game than the privileges conferred by the acquisition of keys and the affixing of stars at the Holy Places. At the same time, the Russian Government, preparing for a grand _coup_, resolved not to prosecute further the direct negotiation with France opened at St. Petersburg, but to transact the business in hand at Constantinople. For the great conflict, the scope of which none but the Russians foresaw, all the Governments prepared.

England, at the end of February, directed Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to proceed to Constantinople by way of Paris and Vienna. The Earl of Clarendon had succeeded Lord John Russell at the Foreign Office, although the latter still remained in the Ministry. It was Lord Clarendon's duty to draw up the instructions to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe; they were broad and wise; they left the diplomatist a large discretion; they entrusted to him the power of ordering Admiral Dundas to hold his fleet in readiness; but at this stage of the dispute, the Ambassador was not to direct the admiral to approach the Dardanelles without positive instructions from her Majesty's Government. Although Austria had interfered between the Porte and Montenegro, she had told the British Government that she would not depart from her conservative policy in the East; and although France had thrust the Porte into so deep a peril, she had in the opening of 1853 officially stated that she regarded her interests in the East as identical with those of England, and it was everywhere given out that the two Western Powers were acting in concert. To carry out her objects in the East, France sent, as successor to M. de Lavalette, M. de la Cour, a mild diplomatist, who had none of the fiery qualities of his predecessor, and who was not likely to quarrel with Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. The British Government believed it could neutralise, by moral influence, the evils springing from the action of France and Russia, and thus, by imposing moderation on both, stave off a catastrophe involving all. But at this juncture, as Russia grew more menacing, France grew more moderate: indeed, for some time to come she hardly appears in the quarrel at all: the original question of the Holy Places fades rapidly out of sight, and a new one arises, in which the opponents are Russia and Turkey, with Lord Stratford de Redcliffe as the supporter of the Sultan. In fact, France, supposing her ruler desired war, had no need to stir a finger, for the rage of the Czar had got the better of his judgment, and he was bent on working out his will.

The Emperor Nicholas, knowing that he was about to enter upon a very hazardous policy in the East, sought, on the 9th of January, 1853, an apparently accidental meeting with Sir Hamilton Seymour, at the palace of the Grand-Duchess Helen. His object was to convey to Sir Hamilton his opinion how very essential it was, especially at that moment, that Russia and England should be on the best terms. "When we are agreed," he said, "I am quite without anxiety as to the West of Europe; it is immaterial what others may think or do. As to Turkey, that is another question: that country is in a critical state, and may give us all a great deal of trouble." Five days later the Czar told Sir Hamilton that, in the event of a dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, he thought it might be less difficult to arrive at a satisfactory territorial arrangement than was commonly believed. "The Principalities are," he said, "in fact, an independent State under my protection: this might continue. Servia might receive the same form of government. So again with Bulgaria: there seems to be no reason why this province should not form an independent State. As to Egypt, I quite understand the importance to England of that territory. I can, then, only say, that if, in the event of the distribution of the Ottoman succession upon the fall of the empire, you should take possession of Egypt, I shall have no objection to offer. I would say the same thing of Candia: that island might suit you, and I do not know why it should not become an English possession." Here, then, was a disclosure implying the kind of understanding which the Czar desired to arrive at; and it need not be said that the British Government adhered to its old views, and declined to be a party to any such understanding. But these conversations had one effect--they created in the minds of the British Ministers a baseless confidence in the honour of the Czar.

It was just as the Porte, yielding to the advice of England, had satisfied the Austrian demands touching Montenegro, and just as the question of the Holy Places seemed to be dying away, that Prince Menschikoff, at the end of February, landed at Constantinople. Attended by his showy suite, but himself plainly attired, the Prince went to the Porte and presented himself to the Grand Vizier. One of the Sultan's household then invited him to visit Fuad Effendi, the Foreign Minister, whose offices were next to those of the Turkish Premier. But the Prince said he should not, as Fuad Effendi had broken faith with the Emperor; and, having put this slight on Fuad, he passed by the line of troops and the very door of the Minister, which had been opened to receive him.

For a moment there was a panic in high places at Constantinople. The Grand Vizier was indignant and terrified, and, fearing the worst, trembling lest a mortal blow should be struck before help could arrive, if help were deferred, he asked Colonel Rose to request Admiral Dundas to bring up the British squadron to Vourla Bay. Colonel Rose did not hesitate. He knew how forward were the warlike preparations of the Czar, and he immediately complied with the wish of the Grand Vizier. But this bold step was premature. The Czar had not made up his mind to strike a sudden blow, and Count Nesselrode told Sir Hamilton Seymour that the tendency was rather to slacken than to push on military preparations--a statement destitute of truth. Fuad Effendi, of course, refused to hold office any longer, and the Sultan, for the first time, accepted the resignation of a public servant, replacing him by Rifaat Pasha. When Admiral Dundas received the request of Colonel Rose, he declined to act upon it, and his Government approved of the conduct of the admiral, and disapproved of the bold haste of Rose. But the French Government, hearing of what had occurred, without consulting the British Ministers, ordered their fleet at once to set out on a "cruise in Greek waters." The fleet sailed, and Lord Clarendon instantly expressed the regret of his Government that France had taken so strong a measure. Her Majesty's Government, he said, had received from the Czar his most solemn assurance that he would uphold the Turkish Empire, and not change his policy without notice of his intention; and, as no such notice had been received, the British Government were "bound to believe, until they had proofs to the contrary, that the mission of Prince Menschikoff was not of a character menacing to the independence and integrity of Turkey."

In the meantime, Prince Menschikoff conducted himself so mysteriously and so quietly at Constantinople, and Sir Hamilton Seymour received such positive assurances at St. Petersburg, that no one except the French _chargé d'affaires_, and perhaps the French Government, suspected the bad faith of Russia. It seems to have been the common talk in Pera and Galata that the Russian Minister was intent on obtaining from the Turks a secret treaty. But Prince Menschikoff went about the business in so strange a manner, that Rifaat Pasha, with whom he talked, did not appear to comprehend at what the Prince was driving. It was at this juncture that Lord Stratford de Redcliffe arrived.

The first step of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe was to discover the actual position of affairs and to learn how far the demands of Prince Menschikoff were moderate or threatening. On the day after he landed, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe saw the Grand Vizier and Rifaat Effendi; but while he learnt that there was some prospect of settling the tiresome question of the Holy Places, he could gain no distinct statement respecting the ulterior views of the Czar. Nevertheless they admitted the existence of ulterior demands, and they were pressing in their requests for advice. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe gave it willingly. He recommended them to keep the question of the Holy Places separate from the ulterior proposals, and he set before them a variety of considerations carrying comfort with them in case the ulterior demands took an inadmissible form. Next he saw the Sultan and offered his good offices, and, alluding to the secret Russian demands, said he was convinced the Sultan, in making reasonable concessions, "would be careful to admit no innovation dangerous to his independence." This from Lord Stratford de Redcliffe's lips meant more than the mere words convey. As a last resource he brought the Russian and Turkish Ministers face to face, and in a short time sent them away, and with them the settlement of the dispute, so that nothing remained but to embody the compromise in a firman. In little more than a fortnight after his arrival the points raised by Aupick in 1850 were put to rest, but out of them had grown a huger quarrel, which could only be appeased by an appeal to arms.

It was during the closing days of the combat about the Holy Places that Lord Stratford de Redcliffe became aware of the arrival of despatches expressing the dissatisfaction of the Czar at the slow progress made by his envoy. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, on the 22nd of April, learnt that, four or five days before, "fresh and pressing instructions" had reached Menschikoff from St. Petersburg. In fact, Rifaat Pasha placed in the hands of the English Minister a document called a _note verbale_, which Prince Menschikoff had put in. In this note the Prince demanded a categorical answer on certain points, some of which were settled by the agreement come to in regard to the Holy Places, together with an entirely fresh demand, that the Porte should accept a treaty from Russia guaranteeing the Greco-Russian religion from all molestation. The British Government, it should be remarked, persisted in believing that Prince Menschikoff had no authority to make these ulterior demands which so disturbed Europe. The French Government were not deceived. But they affected to regard the demand of Russia for a protectorate as one concerning all the other Powers, and they declared themselves ready to consult and act with them, but not to act alone. The conduct of the British Government is the more remarkable, for Lord Stratford de Redcliffe pointed out, in a despatch which reached Lord Clarendon on the 6th of May, that the omission of Count Nesselrode, in his remarks to Sir Hamilton Seymour, to make any mention of the ulterior demands corresponded with the endeavours of Prince Menschikoff to isolate the Porte. The Austrian Minister at the Porte had no doubts respecting the intentions of Russia, and told the British Minister that he could only advise the Porte to give its unqualified assent to the Czar's demands. This drew from Lord Stratford de Redcliffe the severe remark that he was "not prepared to take part in placing the last remains of Turkish independence at the feet of any Foreign Power."

In the meantime events had been marching rapidly at Constantinople. Urged on by the impatient orders of his master, Prince Menschikoff, on the 5th of May, sent by a common messenger a note to the Porte, having all the character, though it did not bear the name, of an ultimatum. It embodied the obnoxious demand for a protectorate in a most offensive form, and it gave the Porte only five days of grace. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe advised the Porte to reject the ultimatum, and his advice was obeyed. On the 22nd of May the Prince and his whole suite embarked on board a man-of-war and steered for Odessa.